Rev.Aplc(MD)No.21 of 2026

BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT

Reserved on : 22.04.2026

Pronounced on : 21.07.2026

CORAM:

THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P.VADAMALAI

Rev.Aplc(MD)No.21 of 2026

Selva Sivapackiyam,

S/o.Chettiappa Nadar,

Door No.5/18, High School Street,

T.Ramanathapuram Village,

Sivagiri Taluk,

Tirunelveli District. ...Petitioner/Petitioner/Appellant

Vs.

Chettiappa Nadar (Died)

1.Kanagaselvi,

W/o.Amirtharaj,

Sevalapatti Village,

Kariappatti Taluk,

Virudhunagar District.

2.Kunjaram,

W/o.Swaminathan,

Door No.5/5, North Car Street,

Chokkanathaputhur Village,

Rajapalayam Taluk,

Virudhunagar District.

3.Kalaiselvi,

W/o.Arunachalam,

Mandapam Street,

Rayagiri Village,

Sivagiri Taluk,

Tirunelveli District. ...Respondents 1 to 3/ Respondents 1 to 3/

Respondents 1 to 3

1/28 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

Rev.Aplc(MD)No.21 of 2026

4.Thangamariyammal,

W/o.Late.Chettiappa Nadar,

Door No.20A/16, High School Street,

T.Ramanathapuram Village,

Sivagiri Taluk,

Tirunelveli District. ...4

th

Respondent/4

th

Respondent/

Proposed 4

th

Respondent

PRAYER: Review Application filed under Order 47 Rule 1 and 2 of CPC

r/w Section 114 of the Civil Procedure Code, to review the order passed in

C.M.P(MD)No.16024 of 2023 in A.S(MD)No.75 of 2011, dated

04.06.2025.

For Petitioner : Mr.V.R.Shanmuganathan

For Respondents : Mr.C.M.Arumugam

for Mr.S.Lenin Prabu

ORDER

This Review Application is filed by the petitioner to review the order

passed in C.M.P(MD)No.16024 of 2023 in A.S(MD)No.75 of 2011, dated

04.06.2025.

2.The petitioner has stated reasons in the accompanying affidavit

filed along with the Civil Miscellaneous Petition are as follows:

The petitioner filed a suit for partition in O.S.No.59 of 2008 on

the file of the Additional District Court/Fast Track Court No.1, Tirunelveli

against the respondents 1 to 3 and their father Chettiappa Nadar. The trial

Court passed judgment dated 11.08.2010 partly decreeing the suit in respect

2/28 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

Rev.Aplc(MD)No.21 of 2026

of the 1st schedule property and dismissing the suit in respect of schedule

Nos.2 and 3, which were settled by Chettiappa Nadar in favour of the

respondents 1 and 3 under a settlement deed, dated 05.03.2008.

The petitioner filed an appeal in A.S(MD)No.75 of 2011. Pending appeal,

the said Chettiappa Nadar died on 18.11.2016 and after his death, a

compromise was reached between the parties as they are the legal heirs of

Chettiappa Nadar. The 2nd schedule rice mill was allotted to the petitioner

in that compromise. The appeal was ''dismissed for default'' on 07.12.2016.

There were renewed disputes with the respondents. The petitioner knew of

the dismissal of the appeal only on 22.08.2023. Due to illiteracy, the

petitioner filed petition C.M.P(MD)No.16024 of 2023 to condone the delay

of 2422 days in filing the restoration petition. There is a finding by the

Court of law regarding the settlement deed, dated 05.03.2008, executed by

father Chettiappa Nadar. This Court dismissed the delay condonation

petition in C.M.P(MD)No.16024 of 2023 on 04.06.2025, but failed to

consider the compromise reached after father’s demise. Hence, the order of

this Court dated 04.06.2025 passed in C.M.P(MD)No.16024 of 2023 has to

be reviewed.

3.The learned counsel for the respondents objected this petition.

3/28 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

Rev.Aplc(MD)No.21 of 2026

4.Heard both sides and perused the records in the Review

Application.

5.The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the suit

filed by the petitioner was partly decreed in respect of the 1st schedule of

suit property and, in respect of schedules 2 & 3, the suit was dismissed.

Hence, the petitioner has filed an appeal in A.S(MD)No.75 of 2011, and it

was dismissed for default on 07.12.2016. As there was a compromise

between the parties and in that compromise the 2nd schedule rice mill was

allotted to the petitioner, he remained in peaceful possession of the same.

But later renewed disputes arose. Later, the petitioner came to know about

the dismissal of the appeal for default. Hence, the petitioner filed a delay

condonation petition specifically stating sufficient reasons about the death

of his father Chettiappa Nadar and the compromise reached among them,

but the respondents acted with mala fide intention by revoking the

compromise. The respondents colluded and, contrary to the compromise

talks, encroached on the properties and lodged a police complaint

disturbing the petitioner’s possession. Hence, the petitioner filed a petition

to condone delay of 2422 days in restoring the appeal, which was

dismissed for default. After hearing both sides, this Court dismissed the

petition without considering the compromise and has not considered the

4/28 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

Rev.Aplc(MD)No.21 of 2026

reasons for delay. The respondents filed a counter against the delay

condonation petition, contending vague denial of compromise.

The 1st respondent has obtained an order of this Court in

W.P(MD)No.27720 of 2023 in the petitioner’s absence. The order can be

reviewed by the same Court on account of some mistake or error apparent

on the face of the records or for any other sufficient reason. In this case,

there is no reason for not considering the cause stated by the petitioner.

Hence, the order of this Court may be reviewed.

6.In support of his argument, the learned counsel for the petitioner

has relied on the following citations:

(1) (2014) 14 Supreme Court Cases 127 in the case of Dhiraj

Singh (Dead) Through LRs and Ors. /v/ State of Haryana and Ors.,

wherein it is held in paragraph Nos.15 and 16 as follows:

''15.Equities can be balanced by denying

the appellants’ interest for the period for which

they did not approach the Court. The substantive

rights of the appellants should not be allowed to

be defeated on technical grounds by taking hyper

technical view of self-imposed limitations. In the

matter of compensation for land acquisition, we

are of the view that approach of the Court has to

be pragmatic and not pedantic.

5/28 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

Rev.Aplc(MD)No.21 of 2026

16.The principles regarding condonation

of delay particularly in land acquisition matters,

have been enunciated in Collector (LA) Vs.

Katiji, where it is stated in para 3 as under:-

(SCC p. 108)

"3.The legislature has conferred the power

to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the

Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the

courts to do substantial justice to parties by

disposing of matters on "merits". The expression

"sufficient cause" employed by the legislature is

adquately elastic to enable the courts to apply

the law in a meaningful manner which subserves

the ends of justice - that being the life-purpose

for the existence of the institution of courts. It is

common knowledge that this Court has been

making a justifiably liberal approach in matters

instituted in this Court. But the message does not

appear to have percolated down to all the other

courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal

approach is adopted on principle as it is realized

that:

1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to

benefit by lodging an appeal late.

2. Refusing to condone delay can result in

a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very

threshold and cause of justice being defeated.

As against this when delay is condoned the

highest that can happen is that a cause would be

6/28 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

Rev.Aplc(MD)No.21 of 2026

decided on merits after hearing the parties.

3."Every day’s delay must be explained"

does not mean that a pedantic approach should

be made. Why not every hour’s delay, every

second’s delay? The doctrine must be applied in

a rational common sense pragmatic manner.

4.When substantial justice and technical

considerations are pitted against each other,

cause of substantial justice deserves to be

preferred for the other side cannot claim to have

vested right in injustice being done because of a

non-deliberate delay.

5.There is no presumption that delay is

occasioned deliberately, or on account of

culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides.

A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to

delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.

6.It must be grasped that judiciary is

respected not on account of its power to legalise

injustice on technical grounds but because it is

capable of removing injustice and is expected to

do so."

(2) (2012) 5 Supreme Court Cases 157 in the case of Maniben

Devraj Shah /v/ Municipal Corporation of Brihan, Mumbai, it is held in

paragraph Nos.14, 15 and 23 as follows:

''14.We have considered the respective

7/28 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

Rev.Aplc(MD)No.21 of 2026

arguments/submissions and carefully scrutinized

the record. The law of limitation is founded on

public policy. The Limitation Act, 1963 has not

been enacted with the object of destroying the

rights of the parties but to ensure that they

approach the Court for vindication of their rights

without unreasonable delay. The idea underlying

the concept of limitation is that every remedy

should remain alive only till the expiry of the

period fixed by the Legislature. At the same time,

the Courts are empowered to condone the delay

provided that sufficient cause is shown by the

applicant for not availing the remedy within the

prescribed period of limitation.

15.The expression ''sufficient cause'' used

in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and other

statutes is elastic enough to enable the Courts to

apply the law in a meaningful manner which serve

the ends of justice. No hard and fast rule has been or

can be laid down for deciding the applications for

condonation of delay but over the years this Court

has advocated that a liberal approach should be

adopted in such matters so that substantive rights of

the parties are not defeated merely because of delay.

23.What needs to be emphasised is that even

though a liberal and justice oriented approach is

required to be adopted in the exercise of power

under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and other

similar statutes, the Courts can neither become

8/28 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

Rev.Aplc(MD)No.21 of 2026

oblivious of the fact that the successful litigant has

acquired certain rights on the basis of the judgment

under challenge and a lot of time is consumed at

various stages of litigation apart from the cost.''

(3) (2014) 14 Supreme Court Cases 77 in the case of State of

Rajasthan and Anr. /v/ Surendra Mohnot and Ors., in which it is held in

paragraph Nos.25, 26 and 28 as follows:

''25.To appreciate what constitutes an

error apparent on the face of the record, the

observations of the Court in Satyanarayan

Laxminarayan Hegde v. Mallikarjun

Bhavanappa Tirumale are useful:- (AIR p. 137)

“An error which has to be established by a

long-drawn process of reasoning on points where

there may conceivably be two opinions can

hardly be said to be an error apparent on the

face of the record. Where an alleged error is far

from self-evident and if it can be established, it

has to be established, by lengthy and complicated

arguments, such an error cannot be cured by a

writ of certiorari according to the rule governing

the powers of the superior court to issue such a

writ.”

26. ......At a mere glance it would have

been clear to the writ court that the decision was

rendered on the basis of a wrong authority. The

9/28 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

Rev.Aplc(MD)No.21 of 2026

error was self-evident. When such self-evident

errors come to the notice of the court and they

are not rectified in exercise of review jurisdiction

or jurisdiction of recall which is a facet of

plenary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the

Constitution, a grave miscarriage of justice

occurs......

28.We have already stated the legal

position with regard to legal impact as regards

the concession pertaining to the position in law.

That apart, we think that an act of the Court

should not prejudice anyone and the maxim actus

curiae neminem gravabit gets squarely

applicable. It is the duty of the Court to see that

the process of the court is not abused and if the

court’s process has been abused by making a

statement and the same court is made aware of it,

especially the writ court, it can always recall its

own order, for the concession which forms the

base is erroneous.''

(4) (2006) 4 Supreme Court Cases 78 in the case of Haridas

Das /v/ Usha Rani Banik and Ors., wherein it is held in paragraph

Nos.12 and 13 as follows:

''12. Order XLVII Rule 1 reads as follows:

"REVIEW :

1.Application for review of judgment. -

10/28 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

Rev.Aplc(MD)No.21 of 2026

(1)Any person considering himself aggrieved -

(a) by a decree or order from which an

appeal is allowed, but from which, no appeal has

been preferred,

(b) by a decree or order from which no

appeal is allowed, or

(c) by a decision on a reference from a

Court of Small Causes and who, from the

discovery of new and important matter or

evidence which, after the exercise of due

diligence, was not within his knowledge or could

not be produced by him at the time when the

decree was passed or order made, or on account

of some mistake or error apparent on the face of

the record, or for any other sufficient reason,

desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or

order made against him may apply for a review

of judgment to the court which passed the decree

or made the order.

(2) A party who is not appealing from a

decree or order may apply for a review or

judgment notwithstanding the pendency of an

appeal by some other party except where the

ground of such appeal is common to the

applicant and the appellant, or when, being

respondent, he can present to the Appellate Court

the case on which he applies for the review.

11/28 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

Rev.Aplc(MD)No.21 of 2026

Explanation : The fact that the decision on

question of law on which the judgment of the

court is based has been reversed or modified by

the subsequent decision of a superior court in

any other case, shall not be a ground for the

review of such judgment.

2. [Repealed by Act 66 of 1956]."

13.In order to appreciate the scope of a

review, Section 114 of the CPC has to be read,

but this section does not even adumbrate the

ambit of interference expected of the Court since

it merely states that it "may make such order

thereon as it thinks fit." The parameters are

prescribed in Order XLVII of the CPC and for

the purposes of this lis, permit the defendant to

press for a rehearing "on account of some

mistake or error apparent on the face of the

records or for any other sufficient reason".

The former part of the rule deals with a situation

attributable to the applicant, and the latter to a

jural action which is manifestly incorrect or on

which two conclusions are not possible. Neither

of them postulate a rehearing of the dispute

because a party had not highlighted all the

aspects of the case or could perhaps have argued

them more forcefully and/or cited binding

precedents to the Court and thereby enjoyed a

favourable verdict. This is amply evident from the

explanation to Rule 1 of the Order XLVII which

12/28 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

Rev.Aplc(MD)No.21 of 2026

states that the fact that the decision on a question

of law on which the judgment of the Court is

based has been reversed or modified by the

subsequent decision of a superior Court in any

other case, shall not be a ground for the review

of such judgment. Where the order in question is

appealable the aggrieved party has adequate and

efficacious remedy and the Court should exercise

the power to review its order with the greatest

circumspection.''.

7.Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents has vehemently

contended that the petitioner filed this petition only to harass the

respondents. There is limited scope for review under Order 47 Rule 1 of

CPC. Since the petition in C.M.P(MD)No.16024 of 2023 in A.S(MD)No.75

of 2011 was filed U/s.5 of the Limitation Act, there is no appeal, only the

petitioner can file SLP before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Hence, the

petitioner has chosen an alternative remedy by way of review.

The petitioner has stated grounds for review in paragraph Nos.3 to 10,

simply blaming his counsel, which is impermissible in law. Though the

petitioner stated there was a compromise, when and where it occurred has

not been stated and there is no reason assigned for not writing it down.

The delay for restoration is 2422 days, nearly 7 years; the reason for delay

is only compromise and the same was revoked, but the petitioner has not

13/28 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

Rev.Aplc(MD)No.21 of 2026

stated sufficient circumstances for the same. The petitioner stated that the

suit properties are ancestral, but in fact the 1st Schedule is ancestral and

schedules 2 and 3 are self-acquired properties of father Chettiappa Nadar,

which were discussed by the trial Court. Chettiappa Nadar executed a

settlement deed in respect of his self acquired properties. So, the petitioner

has touched the merits of the case. The reasons stated in paragraph

Nos.7 and 8 that this Court has not considered the compromise post the

father’s demise and this Court did not render a finding on the validity or

effect of the settlement deed executed by Chettiappa Nadar, which are not

for adjudication in the petition filed U/s.5 of the Limitation Act. So, these

grounds are not sufficient for review. Though the petitioner as plaintiff has

averred about the settlement deed dated 05.03.2008 executed by his father

Chettiappa Nadar, he has not challenged it. Though the petitioner has stated

about compromise, he has not chosen to reduce it into writing, since there

is no such compromise at all. The father died on 08.11.2016 and the appeal

was dismissed for default on 07.12.2016. The petitioner has filed a delay

condonation petition for restoration after a lapse of 7 years without any

sufficient reason and the said petition was dismissed. The petitioner’s claim

is totally barred one, as the restoration petition was filed after several years.

So, the order of this Court cannot be reviewed, as there is no ground

contemplated under Order 47 Rule 1 of the CPC. Hence, the petition may

14/28 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

Rev.Aplc(MD)No.21 of 2026

be dismissed. The citations relied on by the petitioner are not applicable to

the facts of the case.

8.In support of his argument, the learned counsel for the respondents

has relied on the following citation:

(a) Order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in SLP (C) No.12787 of

2025 in the case of Malleeswari /v/ K.Suguna and Another, it is held in

paragraph Nos.15, 16 and 19 as follows:

''15.It is axiomatic that the right of appeal

cannot be assumed unless expressly conferred by

the statute or the rules having the force of a

statute. The review jurisdiction cannot be

assumed unless it is conferred by law on the

authority or the Court. Section 114 and Order

47, Rule 1 of CPC deal with the power of review

of the courts. The power of review is different

from appellate power and is subject to the

following limitations to maintain the finality of

judicial decisions:

15.1 The review proceedings are not by

way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined

to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 of

CPC.

15.2 Review is not to be confused with

appellate powers, which may enable an appellate

15/28 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

Rev.Aplc(MD)No.21 of 2026

court to correct all manner of errors committed

by the subordinate court.

15.3 In exercise of the jurisdiction under

Order 47 Rule 1 of CPC, it is not permissible for

an erroneous decision to be reheard and

corrected. A review petition, it must be

remembered, has a limited purpose and cannot

be allowed to be an appeal in disguise.

15.4 The power of review can be

exercised for the correction of a mistake, but not

to substitute a view. Such powers can be

exercised within the limits specified in the statute

governing the exercise of power.

15.5 The review court does not sit in

appeal over its own order. A rehearing of the

matter is impermissible. It constitutes an

exception to the general rule that once a

judgment is signed or pronounced, it should not

be altered. Hence, it is invoked only to prevent a

miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and

palpable errors.

16. To wit, through a review application,

an apparent error of fact or law is intimated to

the court, but no extra reasoning is undertaken to

explain the said error. The intimation of error at

the first blush enables the court to correct

apparent errors instead of the higher court

correcting such errors. At both the above stages,

16/28 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

Rev.Aplc(MD)No.21 of 2026

detailed reasoning is not warranted. .

17. Having noticed the distinction between

the power of review and appellate power, we

restate the power and scope of review

jurisdiction. Review grounds are summed up as

follows:

17.1 The ground of discovery of new and

important matter or evidence is a ground

available if it is demonstrated that, despite the

exercise of due diligence, this evidence was not

within their knowledge or could not be produced

by the party at the time, the original decree or

order was passed.

17.2 Mistake or error apparent on the face

of the record may be invoked if there is

something more than a mere error, and it must be

the one which is manifest on the face of the

record. Such an error is a patent error and not a

mere wrong decision. An error which has to be

established by a long-drawn process of

reasoning on points where there may conceivably

be two opinions can hardly be said to be an error

apparent on the face of the record.

17.3.Lastly, the phrase ‘for any other

sufficient reason’ means a reason that is

sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those

specified in the other two categories.

17/28 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

Rev.Aplc(MD)No.21 of 2026

19.The impugned order has not adverted

to an error apparent on the face of the record,

but has taken up an error on reappreciation of

the case and counter case of the parties.

The review order records a few findings

extending far beyond the actual working out of

prayers in a suit for partition. The order

impugned has exceeded the jurisdiction of review

by a court.

9.On hearing both sides, it is clear that both the petitioner and the

respondents are children of one Chettiappa Nadar. As there was a dispute

over the immovable properties, the petitioner filed a suit in O.S.No.59 of

2008 before the Additional District Court/Fast Track Court No.1,

Tirunelveli for partition in respect of suit properties in schedule 1 to 3

against the respondents. The respondents contended that their father

Chettiappa Nadar executed a settlement deed, dated 05.03.2008, in respect

of schedule 2 and 3. The trial Court partly decreed the suit in respect of the

1st schedule and dismissed in respect of schedules 2 and 3 by its judgment,

dated 11.08.2010. The petitioner preferred a first appeal before this Court

in A.S(MD)No.75 of 2011. During pendency of the appeal, their father

Chettiappa Nadar died on 18.11.2016. Later, the petitioner left the appeal in

A.S(MD)No.75 of 2011 for dismissal for default. Thereafter, the petitioner

18/28 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

Rev.Aplc(MD)No.21 of 2026

filed a Civil Miscellaneous Petition in C.M.P(MD)No.16024 of 2023 in

A.S(MD)No.75 of 2011 to condone the delay of 2422 days in filing a

restoration petition to restore the appeal, which was dismissed for default.

The reason stated for the delay by the petitioner is that after the demise of

his father, there was a compromise and the 2nd schedule rice mill was

allotted to him, but the respondent defeated the compromise and hence, he

came to know about the dismissal of the appeal for default.

10.This Court passed order after hearing both sides in

C.M.P(MD)No.16024 of 2023 on 04.06.2025, which is as follows:

''4.I have considered the rival submission

of both side and perused the case records. The

petitioner has filed the suit in O.S.No.59 of 2008

for the relief of partition in respect of three

schedule properties. The trial Court partly

decreed that the petitioner is entitled to only

½ share in the suit 1

st

schedule properties.

The trial Court has also held that the suit

2

nd

and 3

rd

schedule properties belonged to the

1

st

defendant, namely father of the parties,

Chettiappa Nadar.

5. The learned counsel for the petitioner

has submitted that after the death of their father,

both parties entered into compromise and as per

19/28 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

Rev.Aplc(MD)No.21 of 2026

compromise, the 2nd schedule rice mill was

allotted to the petitioner. The learned counsel for

the respondents contended that there is no such

compromise entered. Those allegations can not

be decided in this petition which is filed to

condone the delay of 2422 days in filing petition

to restore the main appeal, which was dismissed

for default on 07.12.2016. On considering the

contents of affidavit and submission of the

petitioner, it is seen that there is no valid ground

to condone the delay of 2422 days. However, it

is admitted by both sides that the petitioner is

entitled to ½ share in the 1

st

schedule properties

and the findings and the decree of the trial Court

were not questioned or disputed.

6.The trial court also held that the

2

nd

and 3

rd

schedule properties are belonged to

the father Chettiappa Nadar and there is no

finding given by the trial court with regard to

alleged settlement deed executed in favour of the

respondents 1 to 3. There is no cross appeal

filed by the respondents against the finding of

trial court in respect of suit 2

nd

and 3

rd

schedule

properties. Now, it is admitted fact that the

father of the parties namely Chettiappa Nadar

died on 18.11.2016 and the petitioner

respondents are the only legal heirs of their

father. Therefore, the petitioner and the

20/28 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

Rev.Aplc(MD)No.21 of 2026

respondents are entitled to equal share to the

properties of their father, subject to any

disposition made by their father and that cannot

be decided in this petition and there is no

necessity to reopen the appeal. Both parties

have also admitted the above fact during the

course of arguments. Therefore, this court is of

the view that the petition is liable to be

dismissed as the petitioner has not assigned any

valid reason to condone the delay.

7.In the result, this Civil Miscellaneous

Petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently,

connected Civil Miscellaneous Petition is

rejected at SR stage itself.”

11.Now, the petitioner has filed this petition to review the above

order dated 04.06.2025 passed by this Court. The reasons stated by the

petitioner is that his counsel has not intimated him about the dismissal of

appeal for default on 07.12.2016, further he states that after death of his

father on 18.11.2016 there was a compromise among the parties in which

the 2

nd

schedule property was allotted to him. However, when the

respondents renewed disputes he came to know about the dismissal of

appeal only on 22.08.2023. Additionally, there was a writ petition filed

against him in W.P(MD)No.27720 of 2023. As he is an illiterate, he did not

21/28 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

Rev.Aplc(MD)No.21 of 2026

know the restoration procedure and hence, there was a delay of 2422 days

in filing restoration petition. He contends that these facts are not considered

by this Court in the delay condonation petition.

12.The petitioner has filed this petition under Order 47 Rule 1 and 2

r/w Section 114 of CPC, to review the order passed by this Court. It is a

well-settled principle that the scope of review is for review of “an error

apparent” only and not to review the judgment/order, even if the parties are

in a position to satisfy the Court that the order under review is an erroneous

order. It is also a settled principle of law that the review petition has to be

entertained only on the ground of error apparent on the face of the record

and not on any other ground.

13.On perusal of the contents of the affidavit, the petitioner once

again seeks reconsideration of his averments made in the delay condonation

petition. As rightly argued by the respondents, the petitioner raised

grounds only to place the blame upon his counsel, which is impermissible;

Details regarding the assertion of a compromise, such as when it was

happened, on which date and in whose presence the compromise talks were

held and why it was not reduced into writing are missing; Further, the

petitioner claims that the suit properties are ancestral properties whereas

22/28 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

Rev.Aplc(MD)No.21 of 2026

the trial Court held that only the 1st schedule is ancestral and the schedules

2 and 3 are self acquired properties of their father Chettiappa Nadar, who

executed settlement deed, dated 05.03.2008. So, the petitioner has not made

out any ground to show that the order passed by this Court has an apparent

error.

14.As rightly submitted by the learned counsel for the respondents,

the impugned order was passed in a petition filed U/s.5 of the Limitation

Act, and thus the appropriate remedy is to file an SLP before the Hon’ble

Supreme Court. It is a settled position that the pleas urged in a review

petition are a reiteration of grounds urged during the hearing of appeals,

such review petitions may be held as not maintainable. The Division Bench

of this Court in Review Application No.137 of 2014 in Siril Bernad /v/

The Registrar of University of Madras held in paragraph Nos.18 and 23

as follows:

''18.It is to be relevantly pointed out that

the power of Review is not an inherent power

and must be conferred by law either expressly or

by necessary implication. Moreover, in the

decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sardar

Narender Singh V. IV Additional District Judge,

AIR 1994 Supreme Court 1245, it is held that

'review petition filed by tenant after a gap of

23/28 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

Rev.Aplc(MD)No.21 of 2026

more than four years is not maintainable'. Also

that, where all the pleas urged in review petition

were reiteration of grounds urged during

hearing of appeals, review petitions may held as

not maintainable, as per decision of the Hon'ble

Supreme Court in Rajinder Singh V. State of

Haryana and others, (2005) 12 Supreme Court

Cases 322. That apart, where the Petitioner had

not been acting bona fide, delay in filing review

would not be condoned, as opined by this Court.

23.Besides the above, this Court aptly

points out the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme

Court in Parsion Devi and others V. Sumitri

Devi and others, (1997) 8 Supreme Court Cases

715, at special page 716, whereby and

whereunder, it is observed and held as follows:

Under Order 47, Rule 1 CPC a judgment

may be open to review inter alia if there is a

mistake or an error apparent on the face of the

record. An error which is not self-evidence and

has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can

hardly be said to be an error apparent on the

face of the record justifying the court to exercise

its power of review under Order 47, Rule 1 CPC.

In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47,

Rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an

erroneous decision to be reheard and corrected.

There is a clear distinction between an

24/28 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

Rev.Aplc(MD)No.21 of 2026

erroneous decision and an error apparent on the

face of the record. While the first can be

corrected by the higher forum, the latter only

can be corrected by exercise of the review

jurisdiction. A review petition has a limited

purpose and cannot be allowed to be an appeal

in disguise.

24.On a careful consideration of the

Applicant/Appellant's contentions and also this

Court, taking note of the entire conspectus of the

attendant facts and circumstances of the present

case in an integral fashion, comes to an

irresistible conclusion that the Applicant/

Appellant has not made out a case for 'Review'

to the subjective satisfaction of this Court and

further, this Court is of the considered view that

there is no apparent error on the face of record

in the Judgment dated 28.06.2012 in

W.A.No.1796 of 2011. In reality, the Applicant/

Appellant has projected the present Review

Application in the guise of an Appeal. Moreover,

if the Applicant/Appellant is aggrieved by the

Judgment dated 28.06.2012 in W.A.No.1796 of

2011 passed by this Court, which in his

understanding has not been correctly decided as

per Law or on facts or erroneously decided, such

an argument/plea can be agitated/raised in an

25/28 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

Rev.Aplc(MD)No.21 of 2026

Appeal before the Superior Forum, but not in a

Review Application, in the considered opinion of

this Court. That apart, reappraisal of the entire

facts or materials on record for finding the error

would certainly, in the considered opinion of this

Court, amount to exercise of 'Appellate

Jurisdiction' which is certainly impermissible.

Viewing it from any angle, the Review

Application fails.”

15.In this case on hand, from careful consideration of the affidavit

filed by the petitioner, this Court comes to conclusion that the petitioner

has not made out a case for 'Review' to the subjective satisfaction of this

Court and the petitioner has merely repeated the very same averments made

in the affidavit filed in C.M.P(MD)No.16024 of 2023 which was filed to

condone the delay of 2422 days in filing restoration petition for restoration

of appeal in AS(MD)No.75 of 2011. This Court further holds that there is

no apparent error on the face of record in the impugned order, dated

04.06.2025. In fact, the petitioner has projected the present Review

Application in the guise of rehearing his earlier petition instead of moving

an SLP before the Hon’ble Supreme Court as rightly argued by the

respondents’ counsel. If the petitioner is aggrieved by the impugned order

of this Court, which, in his understanding, has not been correctly decided as

26/28 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

Rev.Aplc(MD)No.21 of 2026

per Law or on the facts or has been erroneously decided, such a plea can be

agitated or raised before the Superior Forum, but not in a Review

Application. The petitioner cannot seek a review of the order in the

absence of any apparent error. The citations relied on by the petitioner are

not applicable to the facts of this case, whereas the citation relied on by the

respondents is squarely applicable to this case. Therefore, this Court is of

the considered view that the present application for review is not

maintainable and the same is liable to be dismissed.

16. In the result, this Review Application is dismissed.

21.07.2026

NCC : Yes / No

Index : Yes / No

Internet : Yes / No

VSD

27/28 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

Rev.Aplc(MD)No.21 of 2026

P.VADAMALAI, J.

VSD

Pre - Delivery Order made in

Rev.Aplc(MD)No.21 of 2026

21.07.2026

28/28 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis