As per case facts, the petitioner, a Branch Manager, was dismissed from service due to allegations of fraudulent withdrawals and issuing bank guarantees without proper documentation, violating bank regulations. He ...
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GAHC030003052024
THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Case No. : WP(C)/41/2024
Sh. Chawngsangliana
S/o C. Hmingliana
R/o Venglai, Lunglei, Mizoram
VERSUS
The Chairman and Disciplinary Authority, Mizoram Rural Bank and Anr.
H.O. New Capital Complex (MINECO), Khatla, Aizawl, Mizoram
2:The Branch Manager
Mizoram Rural Bank
Serkawn Branc
Advocate for the petitioner : Mr. T. Lalzekima
(Legal Aid Counsel)
Advocates for the respondents : Mr. C. Zoramchhana
Sr. Counsel
Mr. Issac Lalremruata, Adv
BEFORE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NELSON SAILO
Date on which judgment is reserved : 01.09.2026
Date of pronouncement of Judgment : 10.09.2026
Whether the pronouncement is of the
Operative part of the judgment? : No
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Whether the full judgment has been
Pronounced? : Yes
JUDGMENT & ORDER (CAV)
Heard Mr. T. Lalzekima, learned Legal Aid Counsel, appearing for the
petitioner and Mr. C. Zoramchhana, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. Issac
Lalremruata, learned counsel for the respondents.
2. By filing this writ petition, the petitioner has challenged the order dated
07.06.2007 (Annexure-9), passed by the Chairman of the respondent Bank, by
which the petitioner has been dismissed from service with immediate effect and
also the communication dated 30.11.2007 (Annexure-11), by which the appeal
preferred by the petitioner upon being considered by the Board in its meeting
held on 21.08.2007 was rejected.
3. Brief facts of the case as projected by the petitioner is that he was
appointed as an Officer of the Mizoram Rural Bank (the Bank) vide order dated
26.07.1988 and he was posted at Thingfal Branch of the Bank. As per the said
order, the petitioner was to be on probation for a period of 02(two) years and
would be confirmed in service subject to satisfactory report with regard to his
character antecedent and his service in the Bank. The petitioner was thereafter
regularized vide order dated 30.01.1992 w.e.f. 26.07.1990.
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4. The petitioner while being posted as the Branch Manager, Serkawn Branch,
Lunglei, certain allegations were made against him and for which reason, he
was placed under suspension. Following his suspension, a Memorandum of
Charge was issued to him on 11.10.2006 (Annexure-4) along with statement of
Articles of Charge framed against him. As per the memorandum, he was
required to submit his written statement of defence within a period of
15(fifteen) days from the date of receipt of the memorandum. Article-I of the
Charge was that the petitioner while working in the Bank at Serkawn Branch for
the period w.e.f. 31.07.2003 to 14.05.2002, fraudulently withdrew Rs.4,19,000/-
(rupees four lacs nineteen thousand) on various occasions, violating the
Regulations 17 and 19 of the Mizoram Rural Bank (Officers and Employees)
Service Regulations, 2003 (Regulations of 2003). Article-II of the Charge was
that for the same period of time, the petitioner acted prejudicial to the interest
of the bank by availing rural housing loan in the name of one Mr. K.
Lalramthanga and thereby, violating Regulations 17 and 19 of the Regulations of
2003. Article-III of the Charge was that during the same period of time, the
petitioner allegedly issued bank guarantee amounting to Rs.6,30,764.10 (rupees
six lacs thirty thousand seven hundred sixty four and ten paisa) without proper
document and security and thereby, violating Regulations 17 and 19 of the
Regulations of 2003. Article-IV of the Charge was that the petitioner for the said
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period allegedly issued bank guarantee amounting to Rs.12,65,528.20/- (rupees
twelve lacs sixty five thousand five hundred twenty eight and twenty paisa)
without proper document and security and thereby, violating Regulations 17 and
19 of the Regulations of 2003.
5. In response, the petitioner submitted his written statement of defence
admitting to the Article of Charge Nos. I and II. However, in respect of Article
of Charge No.-I, the petitioner admitted misuse of a sum of Rs.2,59,000/-
(rupees two lacs fifty nine thousand) while stating that he had also paid back
the amount. The remaining amount according to him was perhaps the
correction made from the previous wrong transaction. In so far as Article of
Charges III and IV were concerned, the petitioner stated that he was not the
one who made the bank guarantees and that it was not issued by him. He also
denied knowing Mr. P.C. Zokaia or any of his family members. The petitioner
also pleaded his ignorance on the subject and he came to learn about the F.I.R
only after the police arrested him. That as he was ignorant on the subject, he
requested the Court of Additional District Magistrate (J) to investigate and to
make a decision and pending such decision, he requested the authorities to
keep the matter in abeyance. The respondent authorities concerned however,
did not accept the written statement of defence submitted by the petitioner and
upon examining the Memorandum of Charge, the written statement of defence
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submitted by the petitioner and the Enquiry Report dated 17.04.2007, submitted
by the Enquiry Officer, passed the impugned order dated 07.06.2007, dismissing
the petitioner from service with immediate effect.
6. The petitioner thereafter, filed an appeal before the Chairman, Board of
Directors, Mizoram Rural Bank on 17.07.2007 praying for reconsideration of the
penalty of dismissal from service inflicted upon him on the ground that the
misconduct was not intentional, such indulgence was not habitual and he has
the goodwill to repay the loan. The petitioner, therefore, sought for an
imposition of any other penalty other than dismissal from service such as
reduction to a lower grade or post or even compulsory retirement under the
Regulations of 2003. However, the appeal of the petitioner came to be rejected
by the Board in its meeting held on 21.08.2007 and the same was
communicated to the petitioner on 30.11.2007. Aggrieved, the petitioner is
before this Court.
7. Mr. T. Lalzekima, learned Legal Aid Counsel submits that the petitioner was
not given a copy of the Enquiry Report and he was not aware about the findings
recorded therein. It was only in the year 2021 when the petitioner submitted an
application through RTI, the Chief Information Commissioner directed the
respondent Bank to give him a copy of the Enquiry Report on 29.11.2021 and it
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was then only that the Enquiry Report was given to him. The learned Legal Aid
Counsel further submits that another reason for not approaching this Court
earlier is because the petitioner was not aware about that fact that he did not
cause any financial loss to the Bank. Sometime in the month of March, 2021,
the petitioner fortunately came to know that the Public Works Department
admitted that the demand notice served to the Bank was illegal and therefore,
they took no further action. Likewise, the Bank too did not meet the demand of
the Public Works Department. The petitioner otherwise was all along under the
impression that he had caused huge financial loss to the Bank and therefore, did
not find himself in a position to question the penalty awarded to him. The
learned Legal Aid Counsel submits that even in a case which are more severe
than the alleged charge drawn against the petitioner, this Court after finding
that due opportunity had not been given to the delinquent Officer had interfered
with the order of dismissal from service. Therefore, the petitioner in the instant
case also falling in the same category, the impugned order of dismissal and the
rejection of his appeal may be set aside by this Court. In this connection he
relies upon the Judgment and Order dated 01.04.2015, passed by a Co-ordinate
Bench of this Court in WP(C)/7/2014 (Shri R. Lalthanzama v. Mizoram
Rural Bank and 2 Ors). Referring to the said case, the learned Legal Aid
Counsel submits that the Court after coming to a finding that prejudice has
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been caused to the petitioner as a result of the respondent’s failure to hold an
enquiry against him in a fair manner, interfered with the decision of the
disciplinary authority and the consequential order that was passed by directing
initiation of fresh proceedings from the stage of holding the enquiry and
recording of the enquiry proceeding by the Enquiry Officer and the Presenting
Officer.
8. The learned Legal Aid Counsel also relies upon the decision of a Co-
ordinate Bench of this Court rendered in WP(C)/4398/2022, vide Judgment and
Order dated 14.09.2022 (Mukti Nath Rai v. the Executive Director FCI
and 8 Ors.) to contend that there is no limitation prescribed to file a writ
petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and taking the same into
account relief was granted to the petitioner in that case.
9. The learned Legal Aid Counsel also relies upon the case of State of Uttar
Pradesh through Principal Secretary Department of Panchayati Raj
Lucknow v. Ram Prakash Singh (2025) SCC OnLine SC 891 to contend
that in an appropriate case, the Court upon finding the enquiry proceedings to
be vitiated, may also direct the respondent authorities concerned to grant the
employee concerned full retirement benefits from the date of attaining their
superannuation age instead of remanding the matter back for reconsideration
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afresh.
10. The learned Legal Aid Counsel also submits that the Criminal Proceedings
drawn against the petitioner vide Criminal Trial No.141/2006 ended in his
acquittal vide Judgment and Order dated 29.03.2010, passed by the Court of
Magistrate 1
st
Class, Lunglei District as the prosecution failed to prove the guilt
of the accused/petitioner beyond reasonable doubt and he was given the
benefit of doubt. The learned Legal Aid Counsel submits that in the F.I.R that
was submitted by the Branch Manager of the Bank who had replaced the
petitioner, the complaint was for recovery of Rs.14,96,000/- (rupees fourteen
lacs ninety six thousand) towards guarantorship of contract works as per the
communication of the Chief Engineer, Public Works Department, Aizawl to the
Bank. However, in the Memorandum of Charge, the amount in Article-III of the
Charge is Rs.6,32,764.10/- (rupees six lacs thirty two thousand seven hundred
sixty four and ten paisa) and in Article-IV of the Charge Rs.12,65,528.20/-
(rupees twelve lacs sixty five thousand five hundred twenty eight and twenty
paisa), which adds up to more than Rs.18,00,000/- (rupees eighteen lacs). The
learned Legal Aid Counsel therefore, submits that in view of the discrepancies
and the manner in which the Enquiry was conducted, the impugned order of
dismissal from service cannot be sustained and should be set aside. Likewise,
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the rejection of the appeal filed by the petitioner also should be set aside.
11. On delay, the learned Legal Aid Counsel also relies upon the case of Smt.
Sudama Devi v. Commissioner and Others, reported in (1983) 2 SCC 1 to
contend that there is no period of limitation prescribed to file a writ petition and
that the maintainability of a writ petition is to be decided by applying the
general rule of laches by considering the facts and circumstances of the case.
Learned Legal Aid Counsel also relied the case of Damoh Panna Sagar Rural
Regional Bank and Another v. Munna Lal Jain, reported in (2005) 10
SCC 84. The petitioner also relies upon the case of The State of Punjab and
Others v. Bakhtawar Singh and Others, reported in (1972) 4 SCC 730.
12. Mr. C. Zoramchhana, learned senior counsel on the other hand submits that
there has been inordinate delay of about 17 (seventeen) years in filing the writ
petition and therefore, the writ petition should be dismissed on this ground
alone. He submits that the petitioner has not tendered any reasonable
explanation as to why he has approached this Court after such a long delay.
Learned senior counsel submits that the Apex Court in a given case had in fact
rejected a writ petition, which was filed after a delay of 06(six) years. Learned
senior counsel further submits that it is an established principle of law that delay
defeats equity and therefore, the petitioner having approached this Court after
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such a long delay of 17(seventeen) years, cannot seek equitable relief from this
Court on account of inordinate delay and laches on his part. In order to support
his submission, learned senior counsel has relied upon the case of Life
Insurance Corporation of India and Others v. Jyotish Chandra Biswas,
reported in (2000) 6 SCC 562 and Chairman/Managing Director, Uttar
Pradesh Power Corporation Limited and Others v. Ram Gopal, reported
in (2021) 13 SCC 225.
13. Learned senior counsel further submits that in view of the admissions on
the part of the petitioner specifically to Article-I and II of the Charges and also
to the Articles-III and IV of the Charges, no prejudice has been caused to him
for non-furnishing of the Enquiry Report. He submits that the reply submitted by
the petitioner to the Memorandum of Charge and also the appeal filed by the
petitioner would go to show that he had admitted the charges. In such a
situation, it cannot be said that the petitioner has been prejudiced in any
manner and moreover, such a claim made being belated and apparently as an
afterthought, the writ petition even on this ground would not be maintainable.
He also submits that some of the submissions advanced on behalf of the
petitioner are also submissions which are beyond pleadings. Learned senior
counsel in support of his submission, has relied upon the case of Managing
Director, ECIL, Hyderabad and Others v. B. Karunakar and Others,
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reported in (1993) 4 SCC 727.
14. Mr. C. Zoramchhana, learned senior counsel further submits that although
the petitioner has taken the stand that he has been acquitted by the Criminal
Court, but the same by itself does not give the petitioner any benefit in view of
the fact that the standard of test in a criminal trial and in a departmental
proceedings are different. He submits that the degree of proof in a criminal trial
is proof beyond reasonable doubt, whereas in a departmental proceeding, it is
only preponderance of probabilities, which is required to be established by the
prosecuting authorities. He submits that the petitioner being an employee of a
bank, has to maintain the highest standard of trust and therefore, a lenient view
cannot be taken in case of a bank employee. In support of his submission,
learned senior counsel has relied upon the case of Ajit Kumar Nag v.
General Manager (PJ), Indian Oil Corporation Limited, Haldia and
Others, reported in (2005) 7 SCC 764.
15. The learned senior counsel also submits that the disciplinary authority
upon making a proper assessment of the materials available on record, which
includes the reply submitted by the petitioner himself as well as the Enquiry
Report, had passed the impugned order of dismissal from service and therefore,
the same may not be interfered with by this Court. He submits that it is a
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settled position of law that disciplinary authority in a departmental proceeding is
the sole judge of facts and unless such decision arrived at by the disciplinary
authority is a decision, which no reasonable person properly instructed in law
would have passed, Courts normally would not interfere. He therefore, submits
that the decision of the disciplinary authority and which was later considered
and upheld by the appellate authority, may not be interfered with by this Court.
In support of his submission, the learned senior counsel relies upon the case of
Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra, reported in (1999) 1
SCC 759.
16. I have heard the submissions made by the learned counsel for the rival
parties and have perused the materials available on record.
17. The projection made by the petitioner is that there has been violation of
the principles of natural justice, equity and good conscience in view of the fact
that a copy of the Enquiry Report had not been supplied to the petitioner and
that the order dated 30.11.2007, rejecting the appeal of the petitioner is also a
non-speaking order.
18. As already stated, while the petitioner was working as Branch Manager,
Serkawn Branch, Lunglei, certain allegations had been made against him and for
which, he was placed under suspension and thereafter, disciplinary proceeding
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was drawn against him with the issuance of the Memorandum of Charge on
11.10.2006, which also contained the statement of Articles of Charges framed
against him. The petitioner was required to submit his written statement of
defence within a period of 15(fifteen) days. In response to the Memorandum of
Charge, the petitioner submitted his written statement of defence and against
Article No.I of the Charge Memo, the petitioner stated that due to his severe
financial problem, he had misused the bank funds. That although he has repaid
the amount, he was greatly embarrassed and regretted what he had done. He
therefore, asked for forgiveness from the authorities for what he did and that he
would not repeat such a conduct again.
19. In respect of the Article No.II of the Charge Memo, the petitioner’s
explanation was that his brother-in-law was working as a Junior Engineer in the
Public Works Department and his wife was a Teacher in a Middle school. As he
had frequent problems in making repayment of the Tipper loan taken by his
wife from Tata Company, he requested his brother-in-law to take a housing loan
and then to lend him the money as per his convenience. His brother-in-law
agreed to the request, but when the amount was sanctioned, his brother-in-law
had gone away for training and since he had urgent requirement for the money,
he disbursed the amount with an intention to rectify the voucher later on. On
return, his brother-in-law refused to take the loan and told him that he would be
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responsible for taking the loan as it was he who had used the money. He
therefore, kept a note on the non-judicial stamp paper that he will take all the
responsibility and not his brother-in-law and sent the same to the Head Office.
Further, as his wife has already paid of the entire loan taken from the Tata
Company, they have decided to sell the vehicle to repay all the loan that they
have taken. He accordingly, begged for forgiveness for the mistake he has
committed.
20. The petitioner in respect of the Article of Charge Nos. III and IV,
contended that he was not the one who made the bank guarantee and that it
was not issued by him. He did not know Mr. P.C. Zokaia nor any of his family
members. Since Mr. P.C. Zokaia had expired, he did not have the chance to meet
him in person. For the contract work, Mr. P.C. Zokaia had copied his name and
seal for the bank guarantee and because of which, the Mizoram Rural Bank
received demand notice from the Public Works Department and FIR was filed
against the petitioner. The petitioner only came to know about the same when
he was arrested by the police and it was only then he came to learn about Mr.
P.C. Zokaia and his family and the property owned by him. According to the
petitioner, since he was not aware about this issue, he has requested the Court
of Additional District Magistrate (Judicial) to find out the truth and that the
Court was proceeding with the matter. He therefore stated that the outcome of
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the Court’s verdict may be awaited.
21. With regard to the stand of the petitioner of Article of Charge Nos. III and
IV, it may be seen that in the appeal filed by him before the Chairman, Board of
Directors, Mizoram Rural Bank, he stated that Mr. M.S Dawngliana of Lunglei
Bazar Veng, who is the representative of Mr. P.C. Zokaia (late), the contractor
approached him in his house on 29.04.2005 at about 07:30 P.M., had requested
him to sign the bank guarantee with a promise to submit the necessary
documents and to deposit the required amount of security on 04.06.2005
mentioning the urgency of submission of contract application. The petitioner
simply believed him and signed on the ready printed bank guarantee form since
he knew Mr. M.S Dawngliana for the last two or three years and considered him
to be a reliable person. However, when the promise was not kept, he
approached Mr. M.S Dawngliana many times and urged him to do the needful.
He soon realized that his efforts were meaningless and he has been cheated
and he therefore personally approached and informed the Superintending
Engineer, Public Works Department, Lunglei Circle to deduct the bank guarantee
amount from the first running bill. However, his request was not acceded to by
the Superintending Engineer. The contractor drew his first running bill, which
was an amount of not less than Rs.22,00,000/- (rupees twenty two lacs)
without his knowledge. He again approached Mr. M.S Dawngliana and the
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Department officials concerned and they promised to make necessary deduction
of the bank guarantee amount from the final bill which was expected to be
drawn after two or three months. However, the contractor Mr. P.C. Zokaia
expired unfortunately. The Superintending Engineer then forwarded the case of
Mr. P.C. Zokaia to the Chief Engineer of the same Department to demand the
bank guarantee amount from the Mizoram Rural Bank. The Chief Engineer
accordingly took necessary action.
22. The petitioner approached the late contractor’s wife and Mr. M.S
Dawngliana on many occasions and asked them to deposit the bank guarantee
amount to the Head Office of the Mizoram Rural Bank. Although they accepted
the bank guarantee amount as their debt and were trying to generate the
required fund, but they have been unable to do so. According to the petitioner,
they have made a promise to repay the debt by swearing an affidavit. The
petitioner thus stated that he had committed mistake due to his simplicity, good
faith, trust on others and that it was not intentional. He also stated that he did
not demand or receive any benefit from the contractor. According to him, the
real persons who have cheated the Bank were late Mr. P.C. Zokaia and his works
Manager Mr. M.S Dawngliana. He also stated that the legal heirs of late Mr. P.C.
Zokaia promised to repay the bank guarantee amount. The petitioner thus
requested that he may be forgiven for his misconduct on humanitarian ground
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and to reduce the penalty imposed upon him to any other penalty such as
reduction in lower grade or post or lower time scale including compulsory
retirement.
23. From what has been stated above, it can be seen that the petitioner has
admitted to the charge made in Article-I of the Charge Memo in so far as the
misuse of a sum of Rs.2,59,000/- is concerned. As far the remaining balance
amount, he has claimed that the same could only be due to the correction made
from the previous wrong transaction. With regard to Article-II of the Charge
Memo, the petitioner has also admitted of having withdrawn the loan amount
while projecting the same to be a loan availed by his brother-in-law. Likewise, in
respect of Article Nos. III and IV of the Charge Memo, the petitioner admitted of
having given his signature with seal on the readily printed bank guarantee which
according to him was on good faith as can be seen from the explanation given
by him in his appeal. It may be seen that the petitioner being the Branch
Manager of the Serkawn Branch of the Mizoram Rural Bank, holds a responsible
position and one that of trust. The admission on his part that he had misused a
sum of Rs.2,59,000/- only demonstrates his lack of integrity and exploitation or
misuse of his position while working in an institution such as the Mizoram Rural
Bank. In other words, the main concern may not be the loss caused to the Bank
by illegally withdrawing and utilizing the money but it is the misuse of one’s
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position while being a responsible officer of the Bank that draws ones attention
about the desirability to retain such a Bank Officer. The petitioner from the facts
available had acted in such an irresponsible manner.
24. The petitioner has also raised a grievance that he was not supplied with a
copy of the Enquiry Report, but on perusal of the appeal filed by him, he has
nowhere taken such a stand. Instead, he has stated that he be given a lesser
penalty in view of the fact that the misconduct committed by him was due to his
simplicity and an act done in good faith. Therefore, the claim of the petitioner
that the impugned dismissal order from service is vitiated due to non-supply of
the Enquiry Report, at this stage is not only belated but found to be an
afterthought. The contention of the petitioner that the order by which his
appeal has been disposed of is a non-speaking order, also appears to be of no
consequence in view of the fact that the appeal was rejected vide
communication dated 30.11.2007 and the petitioner has chosen to challenge the
same by filing the present writ petition only in the year 2024 after 17 years. It
may also be noticed that the Enquiry Report dated 17.04.2007 also goes to
show that the same is nothing, but a report which says that the petitioner
admitted to the Article of Charge Nos. I and II and also admitted that he had
issued the bank guarantee to Mr. P.C. Zokaia for an amount of Rs.6,32,764.10/-
and Rs.12,65,528.20/- on 30.04.2005.
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25. The Apex Court in the Case of S.S. Balu v. State of Kerala, reported in
(2009) 2 SCC 479, in the given facts and circumstances of the case held that
it is a well settled principle of law that delay defeats equity. That it is now a trite
law that where the writ petitioner approaches the High Court after a long delay,
reliefs prayed for may be denied on the ground of delay and laches irrespective
of the fact that they are similarly situated to the other candidates who obtained
the benefit of the judgment. The said decision was relied upon by the Apex
Court in Chairman/Managing Director, Uttar Pradesh Power
Corporation and Others v. Ram Gopal (supra).
26. The Apex Court in Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad and Others
v. B. Karunakar and Others (supra), held that if non-supply of the report
would have made no difference to the ultimate findings and the punishment
given, the Courts/Tribunals should not interfere with the order of punishment. In
the present case, it may be seen that the petitioner has admitted to the
misconduct committed by him and has prayed for a lenient view by reducing the
penalty in the appeal. However, the same was rejected and the petitioner has
chosen not to approach this Court since the rejection of his appeal on
30.11.2007 for long 17(seventeen) years.
27. The Apex Court in Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra
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(supra), in the given facts and circumstances of the case held that in
departmental proceedings, the disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts
and in case an appeal is presented to the appellate authority, the appellate
authority has also the power and jurisdiction to re-appreciate the evidence and
come to its own conclusion on facts being the sole fact finding authority. Once
the findings of fact based on re-appreciation of evidence are recorded, the High
Court in writ jurisdiction ordinarily would not interfere with the same.
28. Learned Legal Aid Counsel for the petitioner had tried to impress upon this
Court that there is no period of limitation for filing a writ petition. While
accepting the said proposition, this Court however, is of the view that non-
prescription of period of limitation to file a writ petition by itself would not justify
filing of a writ petition after an inordinate delay. As already stated, the petitioner
in the instant case, has approached this Court after more than 17(seventeen)
years, after he was dismissed from service and his appeal rejected by the
appellate authority. Further, the admission on his part to almost all the charges
only shows that no prejudice has been caused to him even if the Enquiry Report
was not given to him.
29. Further, having regard to the principle that delay defeats equity, besides
other considerations, this Court is of the considered view that the petitioner
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cannot be said to have any legitimate grievance.
30. In view of above, the writ petition is found to be devoid of any merits and
the same is dismissed. No cost.
JUDGE
Comparing Assistant
In a significant ruling, the Gauhati High Court, in the case of Sh. Chawngsangliana v. The Chairman and Disciplinary Authority, Mizoram Rural Bank and Anr. (WP(C)/41/2024), delivered on October 9, 2026, reinforced crucial principles regarding departmental disciplinary proceedings and the doctrine of laches in writ petitions. This judgment, available on CaseOn, serves as a vital precedent for understanding the limitations imposed by inordinate delays in seeking judicial remedy, particularly in employment-related disputes.
Sh. Chawngsangliana, a former Branch Manager of Mizoram Rural Bank, faced a Memorandum of Charge on October 11, 2006, detailing several serious allegations:
In his initial defence, the petitioner:
However, in his later appeal, the petitioner changed his stance on Articles III and IV, admitting he signed the bank guarantee forms on "good faith" after being approached by Mr. M.S. Dawngliana, Mr. Zokaia's representative, who promised to submit necessary documents and security. He claimed he was cheated and had no intention to cause loss, seeking a reduced penalty.
Following the charges and defence, an Enquiry Report was submitted on April 17, 2007. Based on this report and the petitioner's defence, the Chairman of the respondent Bank dismissed the petitioner from service with immediate effect on June 7, 2007.
The petitioner filed an appeal on July 17, 2007, pleading for reconsideration of the dismissal, arguing his misconduct wasn't intentional or habitual, and he had the goodwill to repay the loan. He sought a lesser penalty like reduction in grade or compulsory retirement. The Board of Directors rejected his appeal on August 21, 2007, communicated to him on November 30, 2007.
Crucially, the petitioner did not challenge this rejection until 2024, approximately 17 years later. He claimed he wasn't given a copy of the Enquiry Report until 2021, when he obtained it through an RTI application. He also stated he only learned in March 2021 that the Public Works Department had admitted its demand notice to the Bank was illegal, making him believe he hadn't caused financial loss, which prompted him to finally approach the court.
Additionally, the petitioner had been acquitted in a criminal trial (Trial No. 141/2006) related to the same events on March 29, 2010, receiving the benefit of doubt.
The primary legal questions before the Gauhati High Court were:
The right to be furnished with an enquiry report before a final decision on punishment is a component of natural justice, as established in cases like Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad and Others v. B. Karunakar and Others. However, this rule is not absolute; if the non-supply of the report makes no difference to the ultimate findings and punishment, courts generally do not interfere.
While Article 226 of the Constitution of India (writ jurisdiction) does not prescribe a specific period of limitation, the equitable doctrine of "laches" applies. Courts, as seen in cases like S.S. Balu v. State of Kerala and Chairman/Managing Director, Uttar Pradesh Power Corporation Limited and Others v. Ram Gopal, routinely deny relief to petitioners who approach the court after an inordinate and unexplained delay, as "delay defeats equity." The maintainability of a writ petition in such circumstances is decided by considering the facts and circumstances of each case, as held in Smt. Sudama Devi v. Commissioner and Others.
Departmental disciplinary proceedings and criminal trials operate on different standards of proof. A criminal conviction requires proof "beyond reasonable doubt," whereas departmental proceedings require only a "preponderance of probabilities." Therefore, an acquittal in a criminal case does not automatically invalidate or impact the findings of a departmental inquiry, a principle reiterated in Ajit Kumar Nag v. General Manager (PJ), Indian Oil Corporation Limited.
The disciplinary authority is considered the sole judge of facts in departmental proceedings. Courts, in their writ jurisdiction, ordinarily do not interfere with factual findings or the penalty imposed unless the decision is perverse, unreasonable, or no reasonable person properly instructed in law would have passed it. This was established in cases like Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra.
The Court carefully considered the petitioner's own statements. For Articles I and II, he explicitly admitted to misusing bank funds and manipulating loan disbursements, albeit with explanations and pleas for forgiveness. For Articles III and IV, while initially denying involvement, his appeal clearly stated he had signed the bank guarantee forms based on trust and promises, later feeling cheated. These admissions were crucial because they demonstrated the petitioner's direct involvement in the alleged misconduct. The Court noted that the Enquiry Report itself largely reflected these admissions.
The petitioner argued that the non-supply of the Enquiry Report prejudiced him. However, the Court found this claim to be "belated" and an "afterthought." His appeal, filed in 2007, did not raise this grievance, focusing instead on seeking leniency for his actions, which he attributed to "simplicity and good faith." Given his own admissions and the fact that the Enquiry Report primarily reiterated these admissions, the Court concluded that no actual prejudice was caused to him by the non-supply of the report. This aligns with the principle from Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar, where non-supply of a report is not fatal if it makes no difference to the outcome.
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The most significant hurdle for the petitioner was the "inordinate delay" of 17 years in filing the writ petition. The Court acknowledged that while there's no statutory limitation for writ petitions, the doctrine of laches applies rigorously. The petitioner's explanations for the delay – late receipt of the Enquiry Report via RTI in 2021 and unawareness of the PWD's stance on the demand notice until 2021 – were not deemed sufficient to excuse such a prolonged delay in challenging a dismissal from 2007. The Court strongly emphasized that "delay defeats equity," citing S.S. Balu v. State of Kerala and Chairman/Managing Director, Uttar Pradesh Power Corporation Limited and Others v. Ram Gopal. The Court highlighted that the petitioner had ample opportunity to approach the court after his appeal was rejected in 2007.
The Court reiterated that the petitioner's acquittal in the criminal trial did not automatically negate the findings of the departmental inquiry. The standard of proof differs; criminal cases demand proof "beyond reasonable doubt," while disciplinary proceedings require only a "preponderance of probabilities." Given the petitioner's admissions in the departmental context, the criminal acquittal was not a basis for overturning the dismissal, as supported by Ajit Kumar Nag v. General Manager (PJ), Indian Oil Corporation Limited.
The Court underscored that the disciplinary authority is the "sole judge of facts." Given the petitioner's admissions and the nature of the misconduct (misuse of a position of trust as a Branch Manager), the decision to dismiss was well within the disciplinary authority's purview. The appellate authority also upheld this decision. The Court found no grounds to interfere with these concurrent findings, aligning with the principles laid down in Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra.
The Gauhati High Court found the writ petition to be "devoid of any merits" and dismissed it. The Court held that the petitioner could not claim any legitimate grievance, primarily due to the inordinate delay in seeking remedy and the fact that his own admissions negated any claim of prejudice from procedural lapses like the non-supply of the enquiry report. No costs were awarded.
The Gauhati High Court dismissed the writ petition filed by a former bank manager challenging his dismissal from service nearly 17 years prior. The Court found that the petitioner's inordinate delay in approaching the judiciary, combined with his own admissions of misconduct, outweighed his arguments regarding procedural irregularities like the non-supply of the enquiry report. Emphasizing that "delay defeats equity" and that disciplinary authorities are the primary fact-finders, the Court upheld the dismissal, reinforcing the distinct standards of proof between criminal and departmental proceedings.
This judgment is an important read for lawyers and law students alike, offering critical insights into several key areas:
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