As per case facts, Mohammed Mufazil, the father of minor Appellant No.2, purchased property and died, leaving his widow (Appellant No.1) and two daughters. Appellant No.1, a Pardanashin lady with ...
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA, CUTTACK
GUAP No.04 of 2024
CNR No.ODHC010157572024
(In the matter of an application under
Section 47(e) of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890)
Shamina Naaz & another ....... Appellants
-Versus-
Rimsha Taashfeen & another ....... Respondents
Advocate for the parties
For Appellants : Mr. T.K. Mishra, Advocate
For Respondent No.1 : Mr. J. Pal, Advocate
Mr. L. Senapati, Advocate
For Respondent No.2 : Mr. M.K. Dash, ASC
----------------------------
CORAM: JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR MISHRA
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---
Date of Hearing: 12.08.2026 Dated of Judgment: 07.10.2026
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
S.K. Mishra, J.
1. This Appeal under Section 47 of the Guardians
and Wards Act, 1890 is directed against the Judgment
dated 20.10.2023 passed by the learned District Judge,
GUAP/4/2024
ODHC010157572024
2026:OHC:189
Page 2 of 31
Ganjam, Berhampur in Guardian Petition No.3 of 2023,
whereby the prayer of the Appellants for appointment of
Appellant No.1 as guardian of the property of minor
Appellant No.2 and for permission to alienate the minor's
interest in the property, described in the petition, came to
be rejected.
2. The brief facts leading to the filing of the
present Appeal are that, the husband of Appellant No.1
and father of Respondent No.1 and the minor, Appellant
No.2, Mohammed Mufazil, had purchased an immovable
property at Mouza Kalarahanga, Bhubaneswar,
measuring an area of Ac.0.127 decimal, under
Registered Sale Deed No.2094 dated 26.06.1993. The
property was thereafter recorded in his name under
Khatian No.725/2253, corresponding to Plot
No.1703/4942.
2.1. Mohammed Mufazil died on 22.05.2021. The
Respondent No.1 was born on 22.04.2004 and minor
Rida Alia was born on 27.04.2013. Appellant No.1, the
minor-Appellant No.2 and Respondent No.1 are residing
Page 3 of 31
at Berhampur under the care and custody of Appellant
No.1, after the death of Mohammed Mufazil. Thereafter,
the Revenue Officer-cum-Tahasildar, Berhampur issued
Legal Heir Certificate bearing No.ELHC/2021/187336
dated 26.12.2021 declaring Appellant No.1, Respondent
No.1 and the minor-Appellant No.2 as his legal heirs.
According to the Appellants, the minor-Appellant No.2
had an equal 1/3
rd share in the said property.
2.2. It is the case of the Appellants that after the
death of Mohammed Mufazil, Appellant No.1 was
maintaining the minor-Appellant No.2 and providing her
education. Appellant No.1, being a Pardanashin lady, had
no independent and sufficient income to provide proper
education, nourishment, food and shelter to the minor.
The minor was studying in Std. IV at St. Vincent Convent
School, Berhampur.
2.3. Appellant No.1, therefore, sought permission to
sell the minor's share in the property. The property is
valuable and is fetching a good price in the market. She
undertook to utilise the sale proceeds for the education,
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maintenance and betterment of the minor and to
purchase suitable land in the name of the minor near
their residence.
2.4. It is the case of the Appellants that, the
property is situated about 170 kilometres away from their
residence and that land brokers have kept their eye on
the property. There is no male member in the family to
look after the said property. Some prospective purchasers
approached Appellant No.1 with offers of a good price. On
approaching the Sub-Registrar, Khandagiri,
Bhubaneswar, she was advised to obtain permission from
the competent Court for sale of the minor's share.
2.5. Being so advised, the Appellants filed
Guardian Petition No.3 of 2023 under Sections 29 and 31
of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, shortly, „the
Act,1890‟, before the learned District Judge, Ganjam.
They sought appointment of Appellant No.1, Shamina
Naaz, as guardian of her minor daughter, Appellant No.2,
Rida Alia. They also sought permission to sell the minor‟s
share in the property situated at Mouza Kalarahanga,
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Bhubaneswar Tahasil, under Khata No.725/2253, Plot
No.1703/4942.
3. Respondent No.1 filed a Counter before the
Court below admitting the case of the Appellants and
supported the prayer for appointment of Appellant No.1
as the guardian of the minor and for permission to sell
the minor's share.
4. The learned Government Pleader, though
appeared for Respondent No.2, did not file any Counter
opposing to such prayer. No other Objection was filed
despite publication of notice.
5. Appellant No.1 was examined as P.W.1 and
documents were marked as Exts.1 to 6 without any
objection. The Respondents did not adduce any oral or
documentary evidence.
6. The learned District Judge, Ganjam, by the
impugned judgment dated 20.10.2023 passed in
Guardian Petition No.3 of 2023, rejected the prayer of the
Appellants. Aggrieved thereby, the present Appeal has
been preferred, seeking permission to alienate the
Page 6 of 31
minor‟s share for her education, maintenance and
betterment.
7. The learned District Judge noticed that the
parties were Mohammedans. The Court, therefore,
considered the question of guardianship and alienation of
the minor‟s property under Mahomedan Law. The Court
examined whether Appellant No.1, being the mother of
the minor, could be appointed as guardian of the minor‟s
property and permitted to sell the minor‟s share.
7.1. The learned District Judge relied upon the
decision of the Supreme Court in Meethiyan Sidhiqu
vs. Muhammed Kunju Pareeth Kutty & Others ; AIR
1996 SC 1003 : (1996) 7 SCC 436. The Court referred to
Section 359 of Mulla‟s Principles of Mahomedan Law. It
was observed that the father, his executor, the paternal
grandfather and his executor are the legal guardians of
the property of a Muslim minor. No other relation,
including the mother, is the legal guardian of the minor‟s
property as of right.
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7.2. The learned Court below also referred to
Section 360 of Mulla‟s Principles of Mahomedan Law. It
was observed that, in the absence of a legal guardian, the
Court may appoint a guardian for the protection and
preservation of the minor‟s property. In doing so, the
Court has to be guided by the welfare of the minor. It was
also noticed that the mother may be appointed as
guardian of the minor‟s property in preference to the
paternal Uncle. She being a Pardanashin lady, it was also
held not to be an objection to such appointment.
7.3. The learned District Judge further referred to
Section 362 of Mulla‟s Principles of Mahomedan Law. It
was observed that a legal guardian cannot sell the
minor‟s immovable property except in the circumstances
stated therein. Such circumstances include the necessity
of sale for maintenance where the minor has no other
property, debts or legacies of the deceased, expenses
exceeding the income of the property, the property falling
into decay and absence of reasonable chance of
restitution of the property.
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7.4. On consideration of the aforesaid principles
and the evidence, the learned District Judge held that
Appellant No.1 failed to prove the essential requirements
for the relief sought. The Court noticed that Appellant
No.1 has proved the documents relating to the death of
her husband, purchase of the property and recording of
the property in his name. However, the Court found that
the same was not sufficient to establish the requirements
for granting the prayer. The Court, therefore, declined to
entertain the prayer of the Appellants (Petitioners before
the Court below). Consequently, vide the impugned
judgment dated 20.10.2023, the learned District Judge,
Ganjam, dismissed the Guardian Petition No.3 of 2023
on contest but without cost and disposed of the Guardian
Petition finally.
8. The Appellants have challenged the impugned
judgment basically on the ground that the learned
District Judge did not consider the welfare and interest of
the minor. It was contended by learned Counsel for the
Appellants that Appellant No.1, being the natural
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guardian of Appellant No.2, sought permission to sell the
minor‟s share for her education, maintenance and
betterment. It was further contended that Appellant No.1
has no independent income. Her husband, who was the
bread earner, died on 22.05.2021. The property is
situated at Kalarahanga, Bhubaneswar, about 170
kilometres from Ganjam. There is no male member in the
family to look after the property. It was also contended
that the property may be captured by land grabbers or
land brokers. It was argued that the sale consideration
would be utilised for the betterment of the minor.
8.1. It was further contended that the evidence of
Appellant No.1 as P.W.1 supported the case of the
Appellants. Her inability to state the market valuation of
the property in cross-examination was not fatal to the
application under Sections 29 and 31 of the Act, 1890.
Learned counsel for the Appellants also referred to
Section 39 under Chapter V and Chapter XVIII of Mulla‟s
Mahomedan Law, which deals with guardianship of
person and property, so also Section 7 of the Act, 1890,
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which deals with the power of the Court to make an order
as to guardianship. It was contended that, though the
mother is not the legal guardian of the minor‟s property,
she is a de facto guardian. Learned Counsel for the
Appellants further contend that the judgment of the Apex
Court, relied upon by the learned District Judge, Ganjam
is distinguishable. It was also contended that Exts.4 and
5 were not properly considered by the learned Court
below.
8.2. Though it was neither specifically pleaded
before the Court below nor before this Court, Mr. Mishra,
learned Counsel for the Appellants submitted that the
Appellants are Sunni Muslims. Referring to Sections 359,
360, 362 and 366 of Mulla‟s Principles of Mahomedan
Law, he further submitted that the said provisions govern
the guardianship and power of legal guardians for
alienation of the property of a minor. However, the
learned Court below failed to take note of the said
provisions, so also appreciate the minor's welfare and
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evident advantage, in terms of Section 31 of the Act,
1890, while passing the impugned judgment.
9. The material facts, which are either admitted
or remain uncontroverted on the record, are these:
Mohammed Mufazil, husband of Appellant No.1 and
father of the minor and Respondent No.1, purchased the
property at Mouza Kalarahanga, Bhubaneswar, by
Registered Sale Deed No.2094 dated 26.06.1993. He died
on 22.05.2021. The minor Rida Alia is presently under
the care and custody of her mother. The Legal Heir
Certificate dated 26.12.2021 has also been produced. The
Appellants asserted that the minor has an undivided one-
third share in the property.
9.1. The Appellants pleaded that Appellant No.1
has no independent and sufficient income, that the
deceased was the bread earner of the family, that the
property is situated at a considerable distance from their
residence, and that the income/resources presently
available are insufficient to meet the minor's educational,
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maintenance and other needs. It was further pleaded that
the consideration obtained from a sale would be applied
for the minor's education, maintenance and betterment
and, to the extent possible, invested in or utilised for
acquiring suitable property near the place of their
residence.
9.2. The record further shows that Respondent
No.1, the major daughter, supported the prayer; the State
did not file any Counter Affidavit opposing the
application; no other objection was received despite
publication; and the Appellants' evidence and Exts.1 to 6
remained unchallenged by any evidence adduced by the
Respondents.
9.3. The learned District Judge passed the
impugned order, basically, relying on the decision of the
Supreme Court in Meethiyan (supra). The learned Court
below, however, proceeded on the footing that the
Appellant No.1 has failed to prove the essential
ingredients, as detailed in Meethiyan (supra), while
rejecting the prayer for alienation.
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10. Points for determination:
(i) Whether the impugned judgment is
perverse, deserving interference?
(ii) Whether the Appellant No.1, who is the
natural mother of the Appellant No-2, can
be appointed as the guardian of the
minor's property by the Court?
(iii) Whether the statutory requirements for
permission to alienate the minor's
interest, for the minor's welfare and
evident advantage, in terms of Section 31
of the Act, 1890, are satisfied?
(iv) If so, what would be the extent of the
minor's share, which may be dealt with,
and what safeguards are necessary in the
said regard?
11. Point (i) & (ii) : Perversity and Appointment
of the mother as guardian of the minor's property
under Mahomedan law:
The mother is not a legal guardian of the
minor's property as of right. In Imambandi vs.
Mutsaddi and Meethiyan Sidhiqu , AIR 1918 PC 11, it
was held that an unauthorised mother or other de facto
guardian cannot, merely, by assuming control over the
minor's property, convey the minor's immovable property
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so as to bind the minor. The learned Court below was
therefore correct only to this limited extent.
11.1. The conclusion, however, does not answer the
separate statutory question which arises in the present
case. Section 360 of Mulla's Principles of Mahomedan
Law recognises that, in default of the legal guardians
mentioned in Section 359, the Court is to appoint a
guardian for the protection and preservation of the
minor's property. Section 7 of the Act, 1890,
independently and expressly, empowers the competent
Court to appoint a guardian of the minor's property,
when such appointment is for the welfare of the minor.
Section 17 of the Act, 1890 further directs the Court to
be guided by the welfare of the minor, while considering
the proposed guardian's character, capacity, nearness of
kin and existing relationship with the minor and her
property.
11.2. In the present case, the father has died. No
Executor under his will or paternal grandfather acting as
the legal guardian of the property has been shown.
Page 15 of 31
Appellant No.1 is the mother, the person in whose care
and custody the minor admittedly remains, and the
person, who has been maintaining and educating her
since the death of the father. Respondent No.1, who is
the major daughter of the Appellant No.1, has expressly
supported the application. The State has filed no Counter
opposing the case. There is no material before this Court
suggesting that the proposed guardian has any adverse
interest in the minor's property or that her appointment
would be contrary to the minor's welfare. On the
contrary, the uncontroverted circumstances appearing
from the record satisfy the welfare-oriented
considerations under Sections 7 and 17 of the Act, 1890.
11.3. Hence, this Court is of the view that, the
Appellant No.1 mother does not become the legal
guardian of the minor's property (Appellant No.2) by
status alone. However, she is not disqualified from being
appointed by the competent Court as guardian of the
minor's property, when the statutory welfare
requirements are satisfied. Once appointed by the Court,
Page 16 of 31
her powers are controlled by the Act, 1890, in particular,
Sections 29 and 31 thereof. Point Nos.(i) & (ii) are
answered accordingly.
12. Point (iii): Whether the statutory
requirements for permission to alienate the minor's
interest, for the minor's welfare and evident
advantage, in terms of Section 31 of the Act, 1890,
were established before the Court below?
Section 29 of the Act, 1890 places the
immovable property of the ward under judicial control by
prohibiting transfer without previous permission of the
Court. Section 31 of the Act, 1890 then provides the
substantive test; permission may be granted in a case of
necessity or for an evident advantage to the ward. The
enquiry is therefore not whether the mother is a legal
guardian under personal law, but whether the Court,
having appointed her, is satisfied on the material before it
that a controlled sale is justified for the minor's welfare
and evident advantage.
Page 17 of 31
12.1. The Supreme Court and High Courts have
repeatedly emphasised the protective character of this
jurisdiction. In Harikrishnan vs. Sri Chanda Prabhuji
Jain Temple, reported in AIR 1962 Mad 267, it was
explained that the Court exercises a protective and
administrative jurisdiction over the ward and that the
enquiry under Section 31 of the Act, 1890 is directed to
necessity or evident advantage. In Smt. Sakshi Devi v.
State of NCT of Delhi, reported in 2014 SCC OnLine Del
2740, upkeep and maintenance of the minor as a legal
necessity was recognized and permission was accorded
for sale of the minor's undivided share, subject to
safeguards. These authorities are not Muslim-law
authorities as to who is the legal guardian, but they are
relevant to the statutory meaning and operation of
Sections 29 and 31 of the Act, 1890.
12.2. The present facts disclose more than a bare
desire to liquidate the minor's property. The father, who
was stated to be the bread earner, is no longer alive; the
mother states that she has no independent and sufficient
Page 18 of 31
income; the minor is of school-going age; the property is
situated at a substantial distance from the family's place
of residence; and the mother proposes to apply the
consideration for education, maintenance and
acquisition/investment of property for the minor. The
major daughter supports the application and there is no
opposing evidence. The cumulative circumstances,
viewed in the protective framework of Section 31 of the
Act, 1890, establish a case of necessity and, at the least,
an evident advantage to the ward.
12.3. The fact that the mother could not state the
precise market value in cross-examination cannot, by
itself, be treated as conclusive against the minor. The
statutory scheme itself supplies the answer. The Court
can protect the minor by obtaining an independent
valuation and by making the permission conditional
upon the property not being sold below the value so
ascertained and upon preservation/investment of the
minor's proceeds. The absence of an exact valuation in
the oral testimony is therefore a matter requiring a
Page 19 of 31
safeguard, not a reason to reject the application
altogether.
12.4. The apprehension stated by the Appellants
that the distant property may be exposed to neglect or
interference should not be treated as a proved allegation
of land grabbing unless supported by material.
Nevertheless, the distance of the property and the
absence of a person presently available to supervise it are
relevant practical circumstances when considered
together with the admitted need to secure the minor's
education, maintenance and future interests. Hence, this
Court is of the view that, while dealing with such kind of
issues, the learned Court below ought to have based the
order principally on the proved financial and welfare
circumstances, while treating the remaining
apprehensions with due caution. Point No.(iii) is
answered accordingly in favour of the Appellants.
13. Point (iv): Extent of share and safeguards:
So far as share of minor daughter-Appellant
No.2, before dealing with the said issue, it would be apt
Page 20 of 31
to mention here that the property (both movable as well
as immovable) left by a deceased Muslim is called
“Matruka”, as held in Jamil Ahmad Vs. Vth ADJ,
Moradabad, (2001) 8 SCC 599, in Trinity
Infraventures Ltd. Vs. M.S. Murthy, 2023 SCC OnLine
SC 738 and in Zoharbee & Another Vs. Imam Khan (D)
Thr. LRs. & Others, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2252.
13.1. So far as the present lis is concerned, the
relevant principles under Mahomedan Law (updated 20th
Edition) are Section 41, Section 51, Section 56, Section
61, Section 63, Section 65 and Section 66.
13.2. Section 41 deals with the estate of deceased
Muslim which devolves upon his heirs at the moment of
his death and the heirs succeed as tenants-in-common in
specific shares. As per Section 51 , there is no distinction
in Muslim inheritance between movable and immovable
property or between ancestral and self-acquired property.
Section 56 mandates that “vested inheritance” is the
share which vests in an heir at the moment of the
ancestor‟s death. If the heir dies before distribution, the
Page 21 of 31
share of inheritance, which has vested in him, will pass
to such person as are his heirs at the time of his death.
The shares, therefore, are to be determined at each
death.
13.3. So far as Sunni Law, in Section 61, heirs are
classified as “Sharers”, “Residuaries” and “Distant
Kindred”. The same is reproduced below for ready
reference.
“61. Classes of heirs: There are there classes
of heirs, namely, (1) Sharers, (2) Residuaries,
and (3) Distant Kindred:
(1) “Sharers” are those who are entitled to a
prescribed share of the inheritance;
(2) “Residuaries” are those who take no
prescribed share, but succeed to the “residue”
after the claims of the sharers are satisfied;
(3) “Distant Kindred” are all those relations
by blood who are neither Sharers nor
Residuaries.”
13.4. As to extent of share, Section 63 mandates
that , after funeral expenses, debts and legacies, the first
step is to identify the sharers and assign their prescribed
shares. Section 63, so also table of shares in Sunni Law,
being relevant, are reproduced below:
Page 22 of 31
“63. Sharers: After payment of funeral
expenses, debts, and legacies, the first step in
the distribution of the estate, of a deceased
Mahomedan is to ascertain which of the
surviving relations belong to the class of
sharers, and which again of these are entitled
to a share of the inheritance, and, after this is
done, to proceed to assign their respective
shares to such of the sharers as are, under
the circumstances of the case, entitled to
succeed to a share. The first column in the
accompanying table contains a list of
sharers; the second column specifies the
normal share of each sharer; the third
column specifies the conditions which
determine the right of each sharer to a
share, and the fourth column sets out the
shares as varied by special
circumstances.”
“TABLE OF SHARES-Sunni Law
(1)
Shares
(2)
Normal Share
(3) Conditions under which
the normal share is
inherited
(4)
This column sets out-
(A) Shares of Sharers Nos.3,
4,5,8 and 12 as varied by
special circumstances:
(B) Conditions under which
shares Nos.1, 2, 7, 8, 11 and
12 succeed as Residuaries.
of one of two or
more
collec-
tively(b)
1. FATHER 1/6
.. When there is a child or child
of a son h.l.s.
[When there is no child or child of a
son h.l.s., the father
inherits as a residuary: see
Tab. of Res., No.3]
2. TRUE
GRANDFATHER
[sec 62 cl.(a)]
1/6
.. When there is a child or child
of a son h.l.s. and no father or
nearer True grandfather
[When there is no child or child of a
son h.l.s., the Tr.G.F.
inherits as a residuary,
provided there is no father
or nearer Tr. G.F.: see Tab.
of Res., No.4]
3. HUSBAND 1/4
.. When there is a child or child
of a son h.l.s
1/2 when no child or child of a son
h.l.s.
4. WIFE 1/8 1/8 When there is a child or
child of a son h.l.s
1/4 when no child or child of a son
h.l.s.
5. MOTHER 1/6
.. (a) When there is a child or
child of a son h.l.s., or
(b) when there are two or
more brothers or sisters,
or even one brother and
one sister, whether full
consanguine or uterine.
1/3 when no child or child of a son
h.l.s. and not more than one
brother or sister (if any), but if
there is also a wife or husband
and the father, then only 1/3 of
what remains after deducting
the wife's or husband's share.
Page 23 of 31
6. TRUE
GRANDFATHER
[sec 62 cl.(a)]
1/6
1/6
A. Maternal - when no
mother and no nearer true
grandmother either
paternal or maternal.
B. Paternal - when no
mother, no father, no
nearer true grandmother
either paternal or
maternal, and no
intermediate true grand-
father.
7. DAUGHTER 1/2
2/3
When no son
[With the son she becomes a
residuary, see Tab, of Res.,
No. 1.]
8. SON’S
DAUFHTER h.l.s.
[sec 62. Cl. (f)
e.g.
1/2
2/3
When no (1) son, (2),
daughter, (3) higher
son's son, (4) higher
son's daughter. or (5)
equal son's son. (d)
When there is only one daughter, or
higher son’s daughter but no
(1) son, (2) higher son’s son,
or (3) equal son’s son, the
daughter or higher son’s
daughter will take ½ and the
son’s daughter h.1.s.
(whether one or more) will
take 1/6 i.e, 2/3 – ½ [With
an equal son’s son she
becomes a residuary; she
Tab. of Res., No.2].
(i) Son’s Daughter 1/2
2/3
When no (1) son, (2) daughter,
or (3) son's son.
When there is only one daughter,
the son's daughter (whether
one or more) will take 1/6, if
there be no son, or son's son.
[With the son's. son she
becomes a residuary: see
Tab. of Res., No. 2.]
(ii) Son’s Son’s
Daughter
1/2
2/3
When no (1) son, (2) daughter,
(3) son's son, (4) son's
daughter, or (5) son's
son's.
When there is only one daughter or
son's daughter, the son’s
son’s daughter (whether one
or more) will take 1/6, if
there be no (1) son, (2) son’s
son or (3) son’s son’s son.
[With the son's son’s son she
becomes residuary: see Tab.
of Res., No. 2.]
9. UTERINE
BROTHER
10. or SISTER
1/6
1/3
When no (1) child, (2) child of
a son h.l.s, (3) father of
(4) true grandfather.
11. FULL SISTER 1/2
2/3
When no (1) child, (2) child of
a son h.l.s., (3) father (4)
true grandfather, or (5)
full brother.
[With the full brother she becomes a
residuary: see Tab. of Res.,
No.5.]
Page 24 of 31
12. CONSANGUINE
SISTER
1/2
2/3
When no (1) child, (2) child of
a son h.l.s., (3) father,
(4) true grandfather, (5)
full brother, (6) full
sister, or (7)
consanguine brother.
But if there is only one full sister
and she succeeds as a sharer,
the consanguine sister
(whether one or more) will take
1/6, provided she is not
otherwise excluded from
inheritance. [With the
consanguine brother she
becomes a residuary: see Tab.
of Res., No. 7.]
(b) The collective share is always divided equally among those to whom it is allotted.
(c) A Mahomedan can have as many as four wives at a time.
(d) If there be son’s son and son’s son’s daughter, the former is a higher son’s son in relation to
the latter. If there be a son’s son and son’s daughter the former is a lower son’s son in
relation to the latter. And if there be a son’s son and son’s daughter or a son’s son’s
daughter, the former is in equal son’s son in relation to the latter, both being equally removed
from the deceased.”
(Emphasis supplied)
13.5. Section 65 mandates, after satisfaction of the
Sharers, any residue ordinarily devolves upon the
Residuaries in the prescribed order. Section 66
commands that where there is a residue after satisfying
the Sharers but there is no Residuary, the residue to the
Sharers in proportion to their shares, i.e., “Return” or
“Radd”. The husband and wife do not take Return so long
as there is another heir.
13.6. The legal heir certificate establishes the stated
relationship of the heirs, but it should not be treated by
itself as a conclusive adjudication of the fractional shares
under Mahomedan Succession Law. The permission shall
therefore operate only in respect of the minor's lawful
Page 25 of 31
undivided share, as established from the succession/title
material on record.
13.7. In the instant case, on the stated facts as
detailed above, pertaining to the suit property, no other
objection was filed despite publication of notice, opposing
to such prayer, or disputing the share of the legal heirs.
Hence, as per the materials on record, the widow
(Appellant No.1) would be entitled to 1/8
th share. The two
daughters, including the Appellant No.2, together
therefore take 7/8
th of the estate of the deceased father.
The reason is that the widow first takes her fixed Qur‟an
share of 1/8
th
,
because the deceased left children. The
two daughters together take their fixed share of 2/3
rd
because there is no son. The fixed shares therefore total
19/24
th
,
leaving 5/24
th as residue. Since, on the assumed
facts, there is no residuary heir, the doctrine of Return
(Radd) applies. The widow does not participate in “Radd”
while another heir exists; the 5/24
th residue therefore
return to the two daughters in proportion to their shares.
Page 26 of 31
Their aggregate entitlement consequently becomes 7/8
th,
divided equally between them, i.e., 7/16
th each.
13.8. As to safeguards of the share of the minor in
the property, Section 31(2) and (3) of the Guardians and
Wards Act, 1890 expressly permit the Court to attach
conditions. Having regard to the protective purpose of the
Act,1890 and the fact that the proposed guardian is also
the beneficiary's mother, it would be appropriate to
impose the following safeguards: (a) an up-to-date
independent valuation of the property by the competent
revenue/valuation authority shall be obtained; (b) the
minor's share shall not be sold below the verified market
value attributable to that share, subject to any higher
price obtained; (c) the sale shall be effected only after
prior permission/confirmation in the manner directed by
the guardianship Court; (d) the mother shall furnish the
bond and surety required by Section 34; (e) the entire net
sale consideration attributable to the minor shall be
deposited in a fixed deposit or other Court-approved
secure investment in the minor's name under the
Page 27 of 31
guardianship of Appellant No.1, except such portion as
the Court, on a specific application, permits to be used
for the minor's education, maintenance or other
demonstrable welfare need; and (f) the guardian shall file
the sale deed, proof of receipt of consideration and an
account statement before the guardianship Court within
a fixed period. Point No.(iv) is answered accordingly.
Result
14. On a cumulative consideration of the
pleadings, the uncontroverted evidence, the statutory
Scheme and the authorities referred to above, this Court
is satisfied that the approach of the learned Court below
was too narrow to reject the application without
examining whether she ought to be appointed by the
Court as guardian and whether a controlled sale would
amount to necessity or evident advantage to the minor.
15. The impugned judgment dated 20.10.2023
passed in Guardian Petition No.3 of 2023 is therefore set
aside. The Appeal is allowed and stands disposed of.
Page 28 of 31
16. Appellant No.1, Shamina Naaz, is appointed as
guardian of the property of minor Appellant No.2, Rida
Alia, for the limited purposes of protection, management
and the transaction authorised by this judgment
pertaining to the property, which was the subject matter
in Guardian Petition No.3 of 2023, subject to the
Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 and the following
conditions:-
(i) The minor's exact lawful undivided share, as
detailed above, shall first be verified from the
title and succession material. Permission shall
be extended only to that share and not to any
larger interest.
(ii) The learned guardianship Court shall obtain or
verify an independent current valuation of the
property. The minor's share shall not be sold
for less than the value attributable to that
share in the verified valuation, unless the
Court, for recorded reasons, approves a higher
or otherwise legally permissible price.
Page 29 of 31
(iii) The sale shall be effected only with prior
compliance before the learned guardianship
Court, including execution of the requisite
bond/surety and completion of such notice or
confirmation procedure as the Court considers
necessary.
(iv) The net consideration attributable to the minor
shall be deposited/invested in a secure fixed
deposit or other Court approved instrument in
the minor's name under the guardianship of
Appellant No.1. Withdrawal of the principal
shall require further order of the competent
Court, except to the extent expressly permitted
under this judgment or subsequent order by
the competent Court for the minor's
demonstrable education, maintenance, health,
residence or other welfare.
(v) Appellant No.1 shall submit to the learned
guardianship Court, within the period fixed by
that Court, preferably, within six weeks of
Page 30 of 31
receipt of the sale consideration, a certified
copy of the sale deed, proof of the sale
consideration actually received, the
deposit/investment receipt relating to the
minor's share and a statement of account.
(vi) The guardian shall act as a person of ordinary
prudence and shall not utilise the minor's
money for her personal purposes or for the
benefit of any third person.
(vii) The permission granted by this Judgment is
confined to the minor's lawful share and does
not enlarge the title of any other co-sharer.
17. It is clarified that this Court has not treated
the mother as the natural or legal guardian of the minor's
property under Mahomedan Law. The authority to
manage and alienate the minor's property flows from her
appointment by the competent Court and from the
conditional permission granted under the Guardians and
Wards Act, 1890.
Page 31 of 31
18. The learned guardianship Court shall issue the
necessary guardianship certificate/order and take
consequential steps for valuation, bond/surety, deposit of
sale proceeds and accounting in accordance with law, as
detailed above.
19. This Court is hopeful that the Appellant No.1
shall cooperate with the learned guardianship Court, who
shall do the needful at the earliest, as directed/observed
above.
20. Office is directed to send a copy of this
Judgment urgently to the learned Court below for
information and necessary action, as detailed above.
…….……………………
S.K. MISHRA, J.
Orissa High Court, Cuttack.
Dated, the 7
th
October, 2026 /Prasant
In a significant ruling, the High Court of Orissa recently addressed the complex interplay between the **Guardianship of Minor's Property** and **Mahomedan Law on Guardianship**. This judgment, `GUAP No.04 of 2024 (Shamina Naaz & another vs. Rimsha Taashfeen & another)`, underscores the paramount importance of a minor's welfare, even when traditional personal laws present obstacles. This case, like countless others available on CaseOn, highlights crucial aspects of legal guardianship and property alienation, providing invaluable insights for legal professionals.
The core of this appeal revolved around four critical questions:
The High Court meticulously reviewed the principles of Mahomedan Law, particularly drawing from Mulla's Principles of Mahomedan Law (Sections 359, 360, 362, 366, 41, 51, 56, 61, 63, 65, and 66). It reiterated the established position that under Mahomedan Law, the father, his executor, the paternal grandfather, and his executor are considered legal guardians of a minor's property. No other relation, including the mother, holds this status as a matter of right. The Court referenced `Imambandi vs. Mutsaddi and Meethiyan Sidhiqu` (AIR 1918 PC 11) and `Meethiyan Sidhiqu vs. Muhammed Kunju Pareeth Kutty & Others` (AIR 1996 SC 1003) to underscore that an unauthorised mother or a *de facto* guardian cannot, simply by assuming control, convey a minor's immovable property.
Crucially, the Court also examined the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 (hereinafter, 'the Act, 1890'), specifically Sections 7, 17, 29, 31, and 34. Section 7 empowers the competent Court to appoint a guardian for a minor's property, guided by the minor's welfare (Section 17). Section 29 places the ward's immovable property under judicial control, prohibiting transfer without court permission, while Section 31 outlines the substantive test for granting such permission: necessity or evident advantage to the ward. The Court also referred to precedents like `Harikrishnan vs. Sri Chanda Prabhuji Jain Temple` (AIR 1962 Mad 267) and `Smt. Sakshi Devi v. State of NCT of Delhi` (2014 SCC OnLine Del 2740), which highlight the protective and administrative nature of the Court's jurisdiction under the Act.
The High Court acknowledged the District Judge's finding that the mother is not a legal guardian of the minor's property under Mahomedan Law as of right. However, it held that the lower court erred by failing to consider its powers to appoint a guardian under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, guided by the paramount consideration of the minor's welfare.
The Court observed the following uncontroverted facts:
These cumulative circumstances, viewed through the protective lens of Section 31 of the Act, 1890, were found to establish a clear case of necessity and evident advantage for the minor. The Court also dismissed the notion that the mother's inability to state the precise market value in cross-examination was fatal to the application, asserting that the Court could obtain an independent valuation and impose suitable conditions to safeguard the minor's interests. For legal professionals looking to understand these nuances more deeply, CaseOn.in offers 2-minute audio briefs that concisely summarize complex rulings, making it easier to grasp the implications of such judgments.
Applying Sunni Mahomedan Law, the Court determined the shares:
The High Court ultimately set aside the District Judge's judgment dated 20.10.2023, allowing the appeal. It clarified that while the mother is not a natural or legal guardian of the minor's property under Mahomedan Law, her authority to manage and alienate the minor's property stems from her appointment by the competent Court and the conditional permission granted under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890.
Appellant No.1, Shamina Naaz, was appointed as the guardian of minor Appellant No.2, Rida Alia's property, for limited purposes of protection, management, and the authorized transaction, subject to stringent conditions:
This judgment is a crucial read for legal professionals and students specializing in family law, property law, and personal laws (especially Mahomedan Law). It illustrates:
It serves as a precedent for navigating situations where a mother, despite not being a traditional legal guardian of property, can be empowered by the court to act in her child's best interest, demonstrating the judiciary's commitment to ensuring the welfare of minors.
All information provided in this article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult with a qualified legal professional for advice on specific legal issues.
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