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W.P. No.12 of 2025

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH

AT INDORE

BEFORE

HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE VIVEK RUSIA

&

HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE BINOD KUMAR DWIVEDI

ON THE 8

th

OF OCTOBER, 2025

WRIT PETITION No. 12 of 2025

SHANTI BAI JARWAL

Versus

SMT. MANJU KUNARE AND OTHERS

Appearance:

Shri Abhinav Dhanodkar along with Ms. Prerna Dubey, learned counsel for the

petitioner.

Shri Vivek Sharan, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Shri Nitendra Vajpayee

& Ms. Rajni Vajpayee, learned counsel for respondent No.1.

Shri Anand Soni, learned Additional Advocate General along with Shri Anirudh

Malpani, learned Government Advocate for respondents No.2 & 4 / State.

Shri Romesh Dave, learned Deputy Solicitor General.

Reserved on: 08

st

October, 2025

Delivered on: 17

th

October, 2025

O R D E R

Per : Justice Vivek Rusia

The present writ petition has been filed under Article 226 of

the Constitution of India by the petitioner, a senior citizen aged about

89 years, widow of Late SuvalalJarwal, residing at House No. 304,

Ward No. 24, Sheelnath Camp, Kulkarni ka Bhatta, Indore.

FACTS OF THE CASE ARE AS FOLLOWS:-

F-2.The petitioner, who is a senior citizen as well as a parent, is

assailing the legality, propriety and jurisdictional competence of the

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order dated 13.12.2024 passed by the Additional Collector, Indore /

respondent No. 3, whereby the said order, the appellate authority has

allowed an appeal filed by Smt. Manju Kunare / respondent No. 1

( daughter) under Section 16 of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents

and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 (hereinafter referred to as the Senior

Citizens Act,2007) and thereby set aside the order dated 23.09.2024

passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Malharganj / respondent No.4

under Rule 19 of the Madhya Pradesh Maintenance and Welfare of

Parents and Senior Citizen Rules, 2009 (hereinafter referred to as the

M.P. Senior Citizen Rules, 2009).

F-3.This writ petition came before the Division Bench by way of

reference to answer the following question of law:-

''Whether an appeal under Section 16 of the Maintenance and

Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 is

maintainable only at the instance of any senior citizen or a

parent, or it is maintainable at the instance of any aggrieved

person?''

F-4.The petitioner asserts that she is the lawful owner and possessor

of the aforesaid house property, having valid title documents in her

name. She has been residing in the said house continuously for the past

forty-nine years along with her family members. It is the specific case of

the petitioner that on 12.11.2022, one PremchandKunare and his wife,

Smt. Manju Kunare /respondent no. 1 visited the subject property and

threatened the petitioner and her family members to vacate the premises

within three days, failing which they would be forcibly removed. The

petitioner approached the Police Station, Pardesipura, Indore, for

lodging a complaint, but the police authorities declined to register the

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same.

F-5.Again, on the night of 14.11.2022 at about 10:12 p.m., the

respondent no. 1 and her husband entered the premises, abused the

petitioner in public, physically assaulted her and her family members

and thereafter forcibly ousted the petitioner from the house. They also

allegedly threatened the petitioner not to approach any authority. Being

thus dispossessed, the petitioner was compelled to reside elsewhere

despite having no alternative accommodation. The petitioner then

submitted a detailed representation dated 05.04.2023 before the

Collector, Indore/respondent no. 2 in Jan Sunvai instead of invoking

provision of Rule 19 of the M.P. Senior Citizen Rules, 2009 under which

it is a duty of Sub Divisional Officer to ensure that the life and property

of senior citizens within the district are protected and that they can live

with security and dignity. No action was, however, taken on her

representation.

F-6.Aggrieved by such inaction, the petitioner approached this Court

by filing Writ Petition No. 10793 of 2023, which was disposed of on 07

July 2023 with a direction to the Collector to decide the representation

of the petitioner within one month after granting due opportunity of

hearing to all concerned parties. Pursuant to the said direction, the

matter was taken up by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Malharganj,

Indore /respondent No. 4, who afforded an opportunity of hearing to

both sides and considered what came on the material on record. The

respondent No. 4 by a detailed order dated 23.09. 2024 allowed the

application of the petitioner under Rule 19 of the M.P. Senior Citizen

Rules, 2009 and directed respondent No. 1 to vacate the subject property

and hand over peaceful possession to the petitioner within thirty days.

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F-7.Aggrieved by the said order dated 23.09.2024, respondent No. 1

preferred an appeal under Section 16 of the Senior Citizens Act,2007,

before the Additional Collector, Indore/respondent No. 3, which was

registered as Case No. 0020/Appeal/2024-25. On receipt of notice, the

petitioner appeared and raised a preliminary objection to the

maintainability of the appeal, contending that under Section 16 of the

Senior Citizens Act,2007, the right of appeal is conferred exclusively

upon "any senior citizen or a parent" aggrieved by an order of the

Tribunal and not upon any other person. The petitioner relied upon the

decision of this Court in Anil Choupda& Others v/s Subhadra

Choupda& Others in W.P. No. 18083 of 2022, decided on 18.04.2023,

and the Division Bench judgment in W.A. No. 655 of 2023, decided on

10.01.2024, wherein it was held that neither the children nor the

relatives have any locus to file an appeal under the said provision.

F-8.Despite such objection, the respondent no. 3, without deciding

the preliminary issue of jurisdiction and without granting adequate

opportunity to the petitioner to address her remaining objections,

proceeded to entertain the appeal and subsequently allowed the same

vide order dated 13.12.2024 and set aside the well-reasoned order of the

SDO dated 23.09.2024.

F-9.Hence, the petitioner has approached this court again by way of

the writ petition mainly onthe legal ground that the appellate authority

has acted wholly without jurisdiction, contrary to the plain language of

Section 16 and in disregard of binding precedent. Aggrieved by this

appellate order, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition. The

petitioner alleged that she is suffering from multiple old-age ailments

and contended that at her advanced age, she has been compelled to

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approach this Court for the second time to secure possession of her sole

residence. Petitioner emphasises that the impugned action of the

appellate authority/Respondent No.3 not only defeats the object and

purpose of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007, but also infringes her

fundamental right to life and dignity guaranteed under Article 21 of the

Constitution of India.

F-10.During the pendency of the proceedings, respondent No. 1 has

also instituted a civil suit bearing No. RCSA/1452/2024 before the

Court of the learned First Civil Judge, Indore, seeking specific

performance and permanent injunction in respect of the same property.

According to the petitioner, this civil action was initiated with mala fide

intent to create a parallel dispute over title and to frustrate the remedy

available to the petitioner under the special legislation for senior

citizens.

F-11.The writ petition came up before the writ court on 30.01.2025;

the core grievance argued by the learned counsel appearing for the

petitioner centred on the jurisdictional competence of the respondent no.

3 to entertain an appeal under Section 16(1) of the Senior Citizens Act,

2007, at the instance of respondent no. 1, who was neither a senior

citizen nor a parent. Learned counsel for the petitioner before the writ

court further submitted that the appellate provision under the Act is

unambiguously worded to limit the right of appeal only to "any senior

citizen or a parent" and not to "any aggrieved person" in general,

especially children. In support of this proposition, reliance was placed

on the decisions of this court in Anil Choupda& Others v/s Subhadra

Choupda& Others in W.P. No. 18083 of 2022, decided on 18.04.2023,

wherein it was held that appeals under Section 16 of the Senior Citizens

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Act, 2007, are not maintainable at the instance of children or relatives.

F-12.On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for respondent no.

1 before the writ court placed reliance on decision of co-ordinate bench

of this Court which have taken a contrary view in Nitin Jat & Another

v/s State of Madhya Pradesh & Others in W.P. No. 9078 of 2022

decided on 14 July 2023 wherein it was held that an appeal under

Section 16 can also be preferred by parties other than the senior citizen

or parent. Reference was also made to other decisions of various High

Courts, such as the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Smt.

Roopam @ Jyoti Sharma v/s District Magistrate, Lucknow in Writ-C

No. 21188 of 2021 decided on 18 May 2022), to the decision of the

Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Jagdish Pitamber Pawar

v/s Pitamber Pundalik Pawar in W.P. No. 36 of 2023 and to the Punjab

& Haryana High Court decision in Paramjeet Kumar Saroya v/s Union

of India reported in AIR 2014 P&H 121 all of which favour an

expansive interpretation of the appellate provision. Reference was also

made to the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens

(Amendment) Bill, 2019, which proposes a legislative amendment to

Section 16(1) by inserting the words "or any of the children or

relatives".

F-13.The learned Single Judge, after examining the statutory

framework and precedents cited on both sides, noted that divergent

views had emerged from benches of this court. While in Anil Choupda

(supra) and Smt. Anuradha Pathak v/s Smt. Anshumali Pathak &

Others in W.P. No. 7917 of 2020 decided on 23.01.2025, the scope of

Section 16 was confined strictly to appeals by senior citizens or parents.

The judgment in Nitin Jat (supra) took a diametrically opposite view by

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holding that such an appeal may also be preferred by other affected

parties. The learned Single Judge further took note of similar divergence

in decisions rendered by other High Courts. Observing that such

divergence of opinion had created uncertainty in the application of the

law, the learned Single Judge concluded that an authoritative

pronouncement was warranted to settle the question. Accordingly, by

order dated 30.01.2025, the learned Single Judge directed the Registry

to place the matter before the Hon'ble Chief Justice for the constitution

of a Larger Bench to answer the following question of law:

''Whether an appeal under Section 16 of the Maintenance and

Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 is

maintainable only at the instance of any senior citizen or a

parent, or it is maintainable at the instance of any aggrieved

person''

F-14.In furtherance of the said judicial reference, when the matter

was placed before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice on the administrative

side, directions were issued vide order dated 19.09.2025 to constitute an

appropriate Larger Bench, i.e., a Three Judges Bench. The Hon'ble

Chief Justice took note of the fact that the divergence in view had arisen

between judgments rendered by Single Benches and accordingly

deemed it appropriate to constitute a Division Bench rather than a Full

Bench comprising three Judges. Hence, this matter is before us.

SUBMISSIONS OF PETITIONER'S COUNSEL

P-1.Shri Dhanodkar learned counsel commenced his submissions by

stating that the present reference deals with the construction and scope

of Section 16 of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007, which represents a

milestone in Indian social-welfare legislation conceived in direct

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response to the constitutional call embodied in Articles 21, 41, 46 and

300-A of the Constitution of India which collectively guarantee the right

to life with dignity, public assistance in cases of old age and sickness,

protection of weaker sections and security of property save by authority

of law. According to the learned counsel, the Act does not create

reciprocal rights between two equal classes but rather institutes an

exclusive code of protection for a single vulnerable class - parents and

senior citizens by imposing a corresponding legal obligation upon

children and relatives to maintain them.

P-2.Learned counsel further submitted that the enactment must

therefore be viewed not as an ordinary civil litigation but as a beneficial

and exclusive social-welfare legislation, the object of which is to secure

the constitutional promise of a dignified existence to the aged. Learned

counsel drew attention to the Statement of Objects and Reasons of

Bill No. 40 of 2007, which recites that the Bill was introduced to

"provide for more effective provisions for the maintenance and welfare

of parents and senior citizens guaranteed and recognised under the

Constitution and for matters connected therewith and incidental

thereto." The learned counsel emphasised that this declaration, when

read with the Report of the Standing Committee on Social Justice

and Empowerment dated 27 April 2007, makes it abundantly clear

that Parliament consciously intended to create a self-contained

mechanism ensuring expeditious relief to aged parents suffering neglect

and dispossession and further to restrict appellate remedies only to that

class.

P-3.Learned counsel invited the attention of the court to the

constitutional foundations of the statute contending that the right of the

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aged citizens to live with dignity has been judicially read into Article 21

since Bandhua Mukti Morcha v/s Union of India reported in (1984) 3

SCC 161 wherein Hon'ble Apex Court held that the right to life includes

the right to live with human dignity and free from exploitation. This

position was reaffirmed in Vincent Panikurlangara v/s Union of India

reported in (1987) 2 SCC 165, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court

recognised that maintenance of health and strength of workers and the

aged flows directly from Articles 39 and 41. Learned counsel further

relied on D.S. Nakara v/s Union of India reported in (1983) 1 SCC 305

wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court treated pension as a measure of socio-

economic justice and also relied on Francis Coralie Mullin v/s

Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi reported in (1981) 1 SCC 608

wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court emphasized that life under Article 21

means life with human dignity. According to learned counsel, these

authorities confirm that the duty to protect the elderly is part of

constitutional morality and the 2007 Act gives it legislative expression.

P-4.Learned counsel traced the origin of the statute to the felt

necessity identified by the National Policy for Older Persons 1999 and

by successive Law Commission Reports recommending a

comprehensive framework to ensure maintenance of parents by their

children. Learned counsel submitted that the Act finds its source in the

Concurrent List -Entry 23, which deals with social security and social

insurance, employment and unemployment, enabling Parliament and the

State Legislatures to enact such measures. Learned counsel submitted

that the Act of 2007 lays down a uniform national policy while

permitting states to frame rules under Section 32 for its implementation.

Reliance is placed on State of Punjab v/s Mohinder Singh Chawla

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reported in (1997) 2 SCC 83 wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court held that

the right to health is integral to Article 21 and imposes a correlative duty

on the State and also relied on Paschim Banga Khet Mazdoor Samity

v/s State of W.B. reported in (1996) 4 SCC 37 wherein the Hon'ble Apex

Court extended that principle to emergency medical care. Thus, the

protection of old age and health is a constitutional obligation rather than

legislative charity.

P-5.Learned counsel contended that the Act must be read not in

isolation but as part of the constitutional duties as given in Articles 41

and 47 of the Constitution, which direct the State to make effective

provision for securing public assistance in cases of old age and to

improve public health. The statute fulfils these mandates and further

refers to Article 14 and Article 19(1) (g) of the Constitution to

demonstrate that restricting appellate rights under Section 16 to senior

citizens alone does not offend equality or freedom of occupation; rather,

it represents a reasonable classification founded upon an intelligible

differentia and a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved.

The limited right of appeal preserves the beneficent character of the

statute. Reliance is placed on State of W.B. V/s Anwar Ali Sarkar,

reported in AIR 1952 SC 75, and Budhan Choudhry v/s State of Bihar,

reported in AIR 1955 SC 191, to submit that classification based on a

legitimate object is constitutionally permissible. Learned counsel

submitted that if appellate rights were extended to the children/relatives,

the object of swift and inexpensive relief to the aged would be defeated,

and hence the restriction under Section 16 advances rather than violates

constitutional equality.

P-6.Learned counsel explained the scheme of the Act, which is

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divided into seven Chapters and 32 Sections, to demonstrate its

exclusivity. Chapter I defines key expressions under Section 2, which

provides definitions such as "parent", "relative", and "senior citizen",

each focused on the beneficiary. Sections 4 to 11 create the procedure

for claiming and enforcing maintenance. Section 16, forming part of

Chapter V, reads:

"Any senior citizen or a parent, as the case may be,

aggrieved by an order of a Tribunal may, within sixty days

from the date of the order, prefer an appeal to the Appellate

Tribunal."

P-7.Learned counsel emphasised that the statutory language is plain,

unambiguous and exhaustive. It identifies the class of persons entitled to

appeal, namely "any senior citizen or a parent." Nowhere does the Act

confer that right upon "any aggrieved person." Learned counsel

emphasised that the Legislature, though familiar with the phrase "any

person aggrieved", consciously restricted the appellate right to the

specified class. The M.P. Senior Citizen Rules, 2009, in prescribing

Form I for such appeals, reproduce precisely the same language

confirming the conscious design of the legislature to confer an appellate

privilege only upon those two categories.

P-8.Learned counsel further placed reliance on the statutory rules

framed by various States and Union Territories under the Maintenance

and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007, to demonstrate

the legislative consistency across jurisdictions in implementing the

objectives of the parent statute. The learned counsel contended that this

pattern of rule-making across States further supports the view that

Section 16 is deliberately confined to senior citizens and parents alone,

as many State rules consistently retain the beneficiary-centric structure

without affording appeal rights to children or relatives, thereby rejecting

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any suggestion of legislative negligence or omission.

P-9.Learned counsel submitted that the right of appeal is not

inherent or natural but a statutory creation, and its existence, extent, and

conditions depend entirely on legislative conferment. Reliance is placed

on the decisions of Hon'ble Apex Court in Super Cassettes Industries

Ltd. v/s State of U.P. reported in (2009) 10 SCC 531and Raj Kumar

Shivhare v/s Directorate of Enforcement reported in (2010) 4 SCC 772

wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the use of the word "any" in

the context of appeals must be understood in light of the class to which

it refers. Thus, "any senior citizen or parent" cannot be read as "any

person aggrieved" to defeat its object. Learned counsel further referred

that even in ancient Roman jurisprudence, the concept of appellatio was

an exception to the principle of finality and could be exercised only

when specifically permitted. That philosophy has been consistently

adopted by Indian courts as an appeal is a matter of grace, not of right.

Reliance is placed on CCI v/s Steel Authority of India reported in

(2010) 10 SCC 744.

P-10.Learned counsel emphasised that the Act does not define the

phrase "aggrieved person", but judicial interpretation must adhere to the

legislative objective and relied on K. Raju v/s Union of India reported

in 2021 SCC OnLine Mad 746, where the Division Bench of the

Madras High Court held that the right of appeal under Section 16 is

exclusively reserved for senior citizens or parents. The said position was

reaffirmed in Arockia Mary v/s District Collector in W.P. (MD) No.

2512 of 2025, wherein the Madurai Bench held that the appeal filed by

the children was misconceived. To further reinforce the narrowness of

the provision learned counsel relied upon the decision in S. Vanitha v/s

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Deputy Commissioner, Bengaluru Urban District reported in (2021)

15 SCC 730 wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court held that where a

definition employs the phrase "means and includes" must be construed

as exhaustive and thus learned counsel submitted that the plain words of

Section 16 being unambiguous require no further interpretation.

P-11.Learned counsel referred to Doctrine of beneficial and

exclusive legislation and submitted that the Act of 2007 is a classic

example of a beneficial and exclusive legislation one that is intended to

confer a statutory right upon a specific class of beneficiaries namely

parents and senior citizens and relied upon Vijaya Manohar Arbat v/s

Kashirao Rajaram Sawai reported in (1987) 2 SCC 278 and Shivram

A. Shiroor v/s Radhabai Kowshik reported in (1984) 1 SCC 588.

P-12.Learned counsel on the Doctrine of Casus Omissus submitted

that its lineage can be traced back to English jurisprudence under Lord

Denning and Lord Simonds, which was later adopted by the Indian

courts. The literal meaning of the Latin phrase casus omissus -"an

omitted case" which denotes a situation not provided for in a legal text

and therefore incapable of being judicially supplied. The learned counsel

relied on Bangalore Water Supply v/s A. Rajappa reported in AIR 1978

SC 548, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court, approving Lord Denning's

interpretive caution, explained that even when statutory language

appears defective, courts must not "repair" it except through legitimate

interpretive principles. Reliance was also placed on the early

constitutional decisions in Fenton v/s Hampton (1858) XI Moore P.C.

347, later cited in Maulavi Hussein Haji Abraham v/s State of Gujarat,

reported in AIR 2004 SC 3946, and Sangeeta Singh v/s Union of

India, reported in (2005) 7 SCC 484.

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P-13.Shri Dhandodkar learned counsel further referred to the Law

Lexicon and Black's Law Dictionary definitions of Casus Omissus as

"a situation not provided for by statute or contract and therefore

governed by common law." He emphasised that every modern statute is

the result of deliberate legislative choice, and where Parliament has

omitted a category, the omission must be treated as intentional.

P-14.Learned counsel referred to the interpretive decisions of Hon'ble

Apex Court on Doctrine of casus omissus beginning with Padma

Sundara Rao v/s State of Tamil Nadu reported in (2002) 3 SCC 533

wherein it was held that courts cannot read words into a statute or

supply omissions and M/s Grasim Industries Ltd. V/s Collector of

Customs, Bombay reported in (2002) 4 SCC 297 wherein the Hon'ble

Apex Court reaffirmed that a construction rendering any portion

redundant must be eschewed. The same line of reasoning was latter

reiterated in Shiv Shakti Co-operative Housing Society v/s Swaraj

Developers reported in (2003) 6 SCC 659 holding that no ground exists

for adding to or altering plain statutory words; M/s Castrol India Ltd.

v/s R.S. Joshi reported in (2003) 8 SCC 289and Balbir Singh v/s Union

of India reported in (2004) 5 SCC 427 wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court

reiterated that casus omissus must not be readily inferred.

P-15.Learned counsel also referred to Babita Lila v/s Union of India,

reported in (2016) 9 SCC 647, and Petroleum & Natural Gas

Regulatory Board v/s Indraprastha Gas Ltd., reported in (2015) 9 SCC

209. Taking support from the above decisions, learned counsel

submitted that Section 16 of the 2007 Act, by expressly limiting the

appellate right to "any senior citizen or a parent", displays a deliberate

legislative omission of children or relatives, and to insert them judicially

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would amount to creating a casus omissus where none exists. In

beneficial statutes, too, courts must remain within the bounds of textual

intent, and therefore, the appellate right cannot be extended by analogy

or equitable sympathy and stands circumscribed only by the express

legislative words.

P-16.Learned counsel then proceeded to place before this court a

detailed comparative analysis of judicial pronouncements from various

High Courts, highlighting the divergent interpretative approaches taken

with respect to the scope and extent of the appellate remedy under

Section 16 of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior

Citizens Act, 2007. It was his submission that the said provision has

been construed differently across jurisdictions giving rise to two distinct

lines of authority - first, a restrictive interpretation that confines the

appellate right exclusively to the senior citizen or parent and second, a

broader reading which extends the right of appeal to any person

aggrieved by the order of the Tribunal, including children, relatives or

third parties.

P-17.In support of the restrictive view, learned counsel referred first

to the Division Bench decision of the Madras High Court in K. Raju v/s

Union of India reported in 2021 SCC OnLine Mad 746, wherein the

Madras High Court interpreted Section 16 as conferring the right of

appeal solely upon a senior citizen or a parent. The Bench observed that

the plain language employed by the Legislature is both specific and

exhaustive and does not admit of any expanded construction. The Bench

held that had Parliament intended to provide an appellate right to "any

aggrieved person", it would have expressly done so. Notably, the Court

emphasised that the proviso to Section 16, which deals with the

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suspension of maintenance during appeal, applies only when the appeal

is instituted by a senior citizen or parent, thereby confirming the

legislative intent to exclude all other classes from the appellate fold.

P-18.This position was reiterated by a Division Bench of the

Karnataka High Court in Sri K. Lokesh v/s Bangalore District

Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Appellate

Tribunal in WA No. 254 of 2024, wherein the Karnataka High Court

reaffirmed the principle that statutory interpretation must adhere to the

express language of the enactment. Karnataka High Court cautioned

against judicial overreach by supplying words not found in the text and

declared that the absence of a negative prohibition does not give rise to a

positive entitlement. The Bench expressly declined to follow the

contrary view adopted by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in

Paramjeet Kumar Saroya (supra) and concluded that "Section 16 of the

Act can be invoked only by a senior citizen or a parent, the right of

appeal under Section 16 is not available to any other party."

P-19.The same line of reasoning found affirmation in the Division

Bench decisions of this court in Smt. Shilpi v/s Shakuntala reported in

2022 SCC OnLine MP 3312, wherein the Court dealt with a case

involving eviction sought by a ninety-year-old woman against her

relatives. The Tribunal had passed an order in her favour, which was

challenged in an appeal by the aggrieved relatives. The Division Bench

held that the right of exclusive residence and possession under the Act is

granted to senior citizens to ensure their dignity and welfare, and that

this legislative objective cannot be diluted by permitting collateral

challenges from children or third parties. The court held that the

Tribunal's jurisdiction is not intended to reopen broader civil disputes

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and that appeals under Section 16 are confined to senior citizens or

parents for whose benefit the law was enacted.

P-20.A similar conclusion was reached by this court in Dilip Marmat

v/s Collector reported in 2025 SCC OnLine MP 786, where the

Division Bench upheld the exclusive nature of the appellate remedy

under Section 16. The Court placed reliance on the decisions of the

Supreme Court in Sudesh Chhikara v/s Ramti Devi reported in 2022

SCC OnLine SC 1684 and Urmila Dixit v/s Sunil Sharan Dixit

reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2, wherein it was affirmed that the

2007 Act is intended to provide a speedy, simple and efficacious remedy

to senior citizens. The Court held that expanding the right of appeal to

persons other than those expressly mentioned in the provision would

frustrate the underlying purpose of the statute and give rise to avoidable

procedural delays.

P-21.In contrast, learned counsel acknowledged that a broader

interpretation has been adopted in certain jurisdictions, such as in

Paramjeet Kumar Saroya v/s Union of India reported in AIR 2014

P&H 121, wherein the Punjab and Haryana High Court held that in the

absence of an express prohibition, the right of appeal could be extended

to any aggrieved person. Similarly, the Bombay High Court in Riddhi

v/s Pratibha reported in 2024 SCC OnLine Bom 1690 and in Jagdish

Pitambar Pawar v/s Pitambar Pundalik Pawar in W.P. No. 36 of 2023

adopted a liberal interpretation in favour of granting appellate access to

all parties affected by orders of the Tribunal. These decisions relied on

equitable reasoning that justice and fairness require the availability of an

appellate remedy to all persons whose rights may be impacted.

P-22.However, disagreeing with this line of authority, learned counsel

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submitted that the restricted view as enunciated in the decisions of the

Madras, Karnataka and this Court is doctrinally sound and legally

sustainable. Learned counsel urged that the wider interpretation rests on

impermissible assumptions of legislative omission and is contrary to the

established rule against judicial legislation. Learned counsel contended

that the omission to include "any aggrieved person" in Section 16 is

deliberate and must be respected as a conscious legislative choice. To

hold otherwise would violate the doctrine of casus omissus and

transgress the outer bounds of interpretive legitimacy.

P-23.Learned counsel further submitted that the decisions in Smt.

Shilpi (supra) and Dilip Marmat (supra), both rendered by Division

Benches of this Court, are in faithful alignment with the text, context

and constitutional objectives of the 2007 Act. Learned counsel

submitted that these decisions have preserved the protective structure of

the Act without enabling reciprocal or adversarial rights to those very

persons against whom relief is statutorily contemplated. Learned

counsel thus prayed that this court hold that only a senior citizen or a

parent may maintain an appeal under Section 16 of the Act.

SUBMISSION BY SHRI ROMESH, DEPUTY SOLICITOR

GENERAL

P-24.Shri Romesh Dave learned counsel submitted that the right to

file an appeal under this section is not open to everyone. It is a special

and limited right given only to a "senior citizen or a parent" and not to

any other person, such as a child, relative, or third party. Learned

counsel began by pointing to the clear wording of Section 16(1) of the

Senior Citizens Act, 2007 to submit that these words are simple, direct,

and restrictive and Parliament had used precise language to limit who

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may appeal i.e.….only senior citizens and parents which shows that the

Legislature meant to give the right of appeal only to those two groups

and not to anyone else.

P-25.Learned counsel further submitted that when the law is clear, the

Court must read it as it is. The first rule of interpretation is to follow the

plain meaning of the words. If the Legislature had intended to include

others, it would have said so. Expanding the provision by adding words

that Parliament did not use would amount to judicial legislation, which

would change a simple, protective law into a complex and technical

process. Learned counsel submitted that the purpose of the Senior

Citizens Act, 2007, is to help old and helpless people quickly and

simply, without long legal fights, but if the courts allow others, like

children or relatives, to appeal, it will turn a quick and protective system

into a slow and complex one.

P-26.Learned counsel submitted that the Senior Citizens Act, 2007, is

a social welfare law created to protect and support elderly parents and

senior citizens who cannot maintain themselves. Learned counsel

submitted that every feature of the Act, such as summary inquiries,

conciliation by the Tribunal, limited legal representation and shorter

time limits, was incorporated in the Act by the Parliament to ensure a

speedy and simple process. Learned counsel further submitted that the

appellate stage was meant only to allow elderly claimants to get quick

correction of errors and not to give opportunity for the children or

relatives to delay justice. If every respondent could appeal, it would

create delay, increase extra cost and unnecessary complications,

defeating the very object of the law.

P-27.Learned counsel submitted that the Parliamentary record clearly

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shows that lawmakers never intended to allow anyone other than senior

citizens or parents to appeal. During the parliamentary debates, there

were discussions about how the Tribunal should work and how quickly

relief should be given, but there was no suggestion to allow appeals by

respondents or third parties. Learned counsel submitted that this silence

is not accidental but is a deliberate choice by Parliamentary lawmakers

who wanted the law to stay simple and elderly-focused and not become

another technical and time-consuming legal process. Hence, Section 16

must be read as a conscious restriction meant to prevent long litigation

and to protect the rights of the elderly.

P-28.Learned counsel submitted that, from a practical point of view,

allowing all "aggrieved" persons to appeal would undermine the purpose

of the act. For instance, usually the people directed to pay maintenance

are children or relatives, and if they are allowed to go into an appeal in

every case, the elderly would be forced into long and tiring court battles,

which is not the intention of the statute. Learned counsel also submitted

that the proviso to Section 16, requiring that payment must continue

during the appeal, was never meant to expand the right of appeal but

only to ensure that the elderly person continues to receive maintenance

while the appeal filed by the senior citizen is pending, and it cannot be

used as a reason to give everyone a right of appeal.

P-29.Learned counsel discussed the contrary judgment of the Punjab

& Haryana High Court in Paramjit Kumar Saroya (supra), wherein the

court had allowed even children and relatives to appeal. Learned counsel

submitted that this decision is not correct because it relied on two

principles, purposive interpretation and casus omissus, to create a right

that the Legislature never intended.

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P-30.Learned counsel humbly submitted that the High Court had

reasoned that to avoid hardship, both these principles must be used;

however, this is incorrect because Parliament did not forget to include

other appellants, but it chose not to include them. The omission was

intentional and not accidental, and the omission was done as Parliament

wanted finality, not multiple appeals and hence Paramjit Kumar Saroya

(supra) should not be treated as a persuasive authority.

P-31.Learned counsel concluded that the words, structure, and

purpose of Section 16 all point to one conclusion that the right of appeal

belongs only to a senior citizen or a parent. This limited construction

best serves the purpose of the Act, which is to give elderly people a

quick and affordable remedy. Allowing others to appeal would frustrate

that purpose and reopen the door to lengthy litigation. Hence, learned

counsel urged that this court hold that an appeal under Section 16 of the

Senior Citizens Act, 2007, is maintainable only at the instance of a

senior citizen or a parent and that the view of the Punjab & Haryana

High Court in Paramjit Kumar Saroya should not be followed as it goes

beyond what Parliament intended.

SUBMISSIONS BY ADDITIONAL ADVOCATE GENERAL

S-1.Shri Anand Soni, Learned Additional Advocate General

appearing for the state, submitted that the question referred to the larger

bench must be resolved through an interpretation that furthers the

remedial object of the Act, harmonises its structure and accords to all

constitutional guarantees of equality and fairness. Learned A.A.G.

submitted that the Senior Citizens Act, 2007, is a piece of beneficial

social legislation intended to provide summary and effective protection

to parents and senior citizens. Sections 7 and 16 of the Senior Citizens

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Act, 2007, when read together, form an integrated procedural code

wherein Section 7 creates a Maintenance Tribunal while Section 16

establishes limited appellate supervision, and thus read as a whole, the

design of the statute is to secure substantive justice through speed, not to

restrict procedural fairness.

S-2.Referring to the statutory language, Learned A.A.G. submitted

that Section 16(1) which, on a literal reading appears to confer a right of

appeal upon "any senior citizen or parent" however emphasized that the

first proviso of Section 16 which requires that "on appeal, the children

or relative who is required to pay any amount shall continue to pay to

such parent the amount so ordered" plainly contemplates that the

appellant could also be a child or relative meaning thereby if this

interpretation is not adopted, the proviso would otherwise become

nugatory which violates the established rule that no word or clause of a

statute should be rendered superfluous and relied on RBI v/s Peerless

General Finance reported in (1987) 1 SCC 424).

S-3.Learned A.A.G. submitted that the omission is not deliberate but

accidental and is a casus omissus which the Courts are empowered to

reconcile through purposive construction. Reliance was placed on

Board of Muslim Wakfs (Rajasthan) v/s Radha Kishan reported in

(1979) 2 SCC 468 wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court held that a

construction defeating a remedial purpose must be eschewed and further

also relied on Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. v/s Essar Power Ltd.

reported in (2008) 4 SCC 755 wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court

recognized the permissibility of "exceptional construction" to prevent

absurd or unjust results.

S-4.Learned A.A.G. also relied on the Maintenance and Welfare of

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Parents and Senior Citizens (Amendment) Bill, 2019, which proposes

to substitute the words "senior citizen or parent" with "senior citizen,

parent, child or relative." Although the Bill is pending, Learned A.A.G.

urged that it furnishes persuasive evidence of legislative intent and

reveals that Parliament itself considered the omission inadvertent.

Learned A.A.G. submitted that under the mischief rule of Heydon's

Case, courts may adopt an interpretation that suppresses the mischief

and advances the remedy, and the 2019 Bill demonstrates that the

mischief lay in one-sided appellate access. Thus, even without the

amendment, Section 16 must be construed in a manner that causes the

legislative correction.

S-5.Turning to precedents, learned A.A.G. traced two divergent

interpretive lines. The literal line as reflected in the decision of Madras

High Court in K. Raju v/s Union of India reported in W.P. No. 29988 of

2019, the decision of the Karnataka High Court in K. Lokesh (supra),

the decisions of this court in Anil Choupda (supra) and Smt. Anuradha

Pathak (supra), wherein the courts have confined the right of appeal to

senior citizens and parents on the principle that a right of appeal is

purely statutory. In contrast, the purposive line commencing with the

decision of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Paramjeet Kumar

Saroya (supra), the decisions of Bombay High Court in Jagdish

Pitambar Pawar (supra) and Riddhi Dawle (supra), the decision of

Delhi High Court in Rakhi Sharma v/s State in W.P. No. 2895 of 2021,

the decision of Allahabad High Court in Smt. Roopam (supra) and the

decision of this Court in Nitin Jat (supra), wherein the courts have read

Section 16 as permitting an appeal by any affected party. Learned

A.A.G. submitted that these latter judgements give life to the first

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proviso, avoid procedural anomaly and conform to the remedial nature

of the enactment.

S-6.Learned A.A.G., then relying on the Doctrine of Purposive

Construction, Doctrine of Harmonious ConstructionandDoctrine of

Casus Omissus, submitted that courts cannot ordinarily supply

omissions; however, where an omission is clearly unintended and

ignoring it would defeat the object of the statute, the judicial

supplementation is permissible. Learned A.A.G. also relied on the

Doctrine of Equality of Arms and Natural Justice to submit that

procedural fairness demands parity of appellate opportunity. Learned

A.A.G. placed reliance on State of West Bengal v/s Anwar Ali Sarkar

reported in (1952) 1 SCC 1 to submit that a classification conferring

appeal rights only upon one side, though both are parties to the same

quasi-judicial proceeding, violates Article 14. Learned A.A.G. submitted

that the present classification in the Senior Citizens Act, 2007, lacks

rational nexus to the object of the statute since the welfare of elders can

be protected even while granting limited appellate access to the opposite

side under protective conditions.

S-7.Learned A.A.G. to reinforce that extending appellate access

would not undermine but rather strengthen the protective scheme, drew

parallels with other beneficial enactments such as under Section 29 of

the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, where

appeals lie "by the aggrieved person or the respondent" yet interim

protection orders under Section 23 continue pending appeal. Under the

Consumer Protection Act, 2019, in Sections 41, 51, and 67 and the

Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016, in Sections

43(5) and 58, appeals are open to "any person aggrieved", but protective

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asymmetries such as pre-deposit obligations on the opposite party are

safeguarded for the beneficiary class. Similarly, Section 173 of the

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and Section 30 of the Employees'

Compensation Act, 1923, provide reciprocal rights of appeal subject to

deposit or substantial-question-of-law requirements. These acts

demonstrate a legislative pattern of appellate powers given to both sides

combined with protective measures, whereas Section 16, by contrast, is

a one-sided provision that the 2019 Bill explicitly seeks to correct.

S-8.Further invoking comparative and constitutional analogy,

Learned A.A.G. referred to the evolution of appellate rights under

criminal procedure. Historically, only the State could appeal an acquittal

under Section 378 CrPC, but the 2009 amendment inserted a proviso to

Section 372, granting victims a right to appeal and placed reliance on

Mallikarjun Kodagali v/s State of Karnataka reported in (2019) 2 SCC

752. Learned A.A.G. submitted that this development illustrates how

procedural parity enhances legitimacy without undermining protection

of the beneficiary class, and this same rationale applies to children or

relatives under the Senior Citizen Act, 2007, whose property and

livelihood rights are protected under Articles 21 and 300-A and may be

directly affected by Tribunal orders. Thus, the Doctrine of Fair

Procedure demands an appellate forum for both sides.

S-9.Learned A.A.G. submitted that recognising appeals by "any

aggrieved person" does not dilute the welfare orientation of the Act

because the continuation of payment proviso already secures the

maintenance /subsistence allowance of the senior citizen pending

appeal, and Rule 19 of the M.P. Senior Citizen Rules, 2009 ensures

expedited disposal. Rather, an appeal by both parties enhances the

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finality and accuracy of decisions, which ultimately reinforces elder

protection. Thus, Learned A.A.G. prayed that this court adopt a

purposive-harmonious interpretation, declaring that appeals by children

or relatives are maintainable.

SUBMISSION BY SHRI VIVEK SHARAN, SENIOR ADVOCATE

FOR RESPONDENT NO.1

R-1.Shri Vivek Sharan, learned senior counsel, submitted that the

central question referred by the learned Single Bench – "whether an

appeal under Section 16(1) is available only to a senior citizen or a

parent or to any aggrieved person" must be answered in favour of a

liberal construction extending the appellate remedy to all persons

directly affected by the order. Restricting the right of appeal solely to

parents or senior citizens would create a situation where children,

relatives or transferees against whom an erroneous order is passed under

Section 23 are all left without an efficacious remedy, which cannot be

the legislative intent of a welfare enactment.

R-2.Learned senior counsel submitted that the judgments referred to

in the order of reference itself reveal a clear divergence among High

Courts, but the dominant view favours the inclusive interpretation.

Learned senior counsel referred decisions of this court and various other

high courts, such as Anil Choupda (supra), Smt. Roopam (supra), Nitin

Jat (supra), Smt. Anuradha Pathak (supra), Jagdish Pitamber Pawar

(supra)and Riddhi v/s Pratibha reported in 2024 SCC OnLine Bom

1690, wherein all these decisions, the courts have recognised that the

right of appeal should be available to any aggrieved person. Learned

senior counsel further relied particularly on Paramjeet Kumar Saroya

(supra), wherein the Punjab and Haryana High Court treated the

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omission of the words "children or relatives" in Section 16 as a casus

omissus and read them into the provision to prevent injustice. Learned

senior counsel submitted that the only contrary view is that of the

Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court in Sri K. Lokesh (supra),

which learned senior counsel humbly submitted that proceeds on a

hyper-literal construction and should not be followed.

R-3.Learned Senior Counsel pointed out that Section 16(1) of the

Senior Citizens Act, 2007, suffers from textual ambiguity. The phrase

"any senior citizen or a parent" appears restrictive, yet when read with

Sections 23 and 27, it becomes clear that the Act contemplates orders

directly affecting third parties - children or transferees excluding them

from the appellate remedy would render the statute unbalanced and

arbitrary, contrary to the principles of fairness under Articles 14 and

300-A of the Constitution. Hence, the provision must be construed to

confer a remedy on any aggrieved person.

R-4.Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the parliamentary

debates on the amendment bill expressly acknowledged the need to

extend the right of appeal to children and relatives and proposed

insertion of those words in Section 16(1) of the Senior Citizens Act,

2007, demonstrating that the legislative intention was always to make

the remedy available to all aggrieved parties. This amendment is

clarificatory and hence must be applied retrospectively.

R-5.Learned Senior Counsel then elaborated on the doctrine of

casus omissus, contending that where an omission is clearly inadvertent

and supplying it is essential to give effect to the legislative purpose, the

court is competent to read the statute accordingly. Learned senior

counsel relied upon the following judgements of Hon'ble Apex Court:

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Child in Conflict with Law v/s State of Karnataka reported in (2024) 8

SCC 473), Singareni Collieries Co. Ltd. v/s Vemuganti Ramakrishnan

Rao reported in (2013) 8 SCC 789, Union of India v/s Rajiv Kumar

reported in (2003) SCC OnLine 710), Sangeeta Singh v/s Union of

India reported in (2005) 7 SCC 484), Union of India v/s

Shardindureported in (2007) 6 SCC 276) and Prakash Gupta v/s SEBI

reported in (2021) 17 SCC 451). Relying on the above judgments,

learned senior counsel submitted that the courts must justly supply an

omission, where the legislative purpose would otherwise be defeated,

especially in beneficial statutes like the present one.

R-6.Learned Senior Counsel also cited Grid Corporation of Orissa

Ltd. v/s Eastern Metals and Ferro Alloys reported in (2011) 11 SCC

334 and Shailesh Dhairyawan v/s Mohan Balkrishna Lulla reported in

(2016) 3 SCC 619 to reiterate that a purposive construction should be

preferred to a literal one where the latter defeats the object of the statute

and also cited S. Vanitha (supra) wherein it was held that courts must

read social-welfare legislation liberally to effectuate its purpose. In

conclusion, learned senior counsel submitted that Section 16 must be

interpreted in a manner that advances the object of the Act and ensures

fairness to all affected parties and that the omission of the words

"children or relatives" is a curable casus omissus.

APPRECIATION & CONCLUSION

A-1The question which we are required to answer is "whether an

appeal under Section 16 of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and

Senior Citizens Act, 2007 is maintainable only at the instance of any

senior citizen or a parent, or it is maintainable at the instance of any

aggrieved person ?"

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A-2.The Senior Citizen Act, 2007, is an act to provide more effective

provisions for the maintenance and welfare of parents and senior

citizens, which is granted and recognised under the Constitution. The

Definition 2(d) defines the word "parent" means a father or mother,

whether biological, adoptive or stepfather or stepmother, irrespective of

whether they are a senior citizen or not, because it is separately defined

in Definition 2 (h), according to which a citizen of India who has

attained the age of 60 years or above. Therefore, as per these two

definitions, there are only two categories of persons, i.e. parent and

senior citizen, for whose benefits this Act has been promulgated.

A-3.Definition 2(a) defines the "children" which includes son,

daughter, grandson and grand-daughter, and all should be major. Apart

from children, the ''relative'' under Definition 2(g) means any legal heir

of the childless senior citizen who is not a minor and is in possession of

or would inherit his property after his death.

A-4.Definition 2(j) defines the ''Tribunal'' which is constituted under

Section 7, and it is called the Maintenance Tribunal. Since this act deals

with the welfare of parents and senior citizens, the welfare is also

defined in Definition 2(k), which is provision for food, health care,

recreation centres and other amenities necessary for the senior citizens.

A-5.By virtue of Section 3, this Act has been given overriding effect

over all enactments, keeping in mind the welfare intention behind its

enactment.

A-6.Chapter II deals with the ''Maintenance of Parents and Senior

Citizens. Section 4 deals with the maintenance of a parent and a senior

citizen who is unable to maintain himself from his own earnings or

property owned by him. They can make an application under Section 5

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against one or more of their children and against such relatives referred

to in Clause (g) of Section 2 if they have no children. Section 4(3) & (4)

casts an obligation upon children and relatives, as the case may be, to

maintain parents or senior citizens, as the case may be, having sufficient

means. Therefore, the children have not been given any option to deny,

but are under an obligation to maintain their parents and the senior

citizens, as the case may be.

A-7.Under Section 5, the cognizance by the Tribunal can be taken

suo motu or on an application preferred by senior citizens or parents, as

the case may be. Sections 5 & 6 further provide the procedure and

jurisdiction of a Maintenance Tribunal. In this procedure, the children or

the relatives get a complete opportunity to defend themselves against

their parents or senior citizens.

A-8.Section 7 provides for the establishment of the Maintenance

Tribunal, under which the State Government notify in the official

gazette about the constitution of each Sub-division one or more

Tribunals, and such Tribunal shall be presided over by an officer not

below the rank of Sub-Divisional Officer of a State. The procedure to be

adopted for conducting an inquiry under Section 5 shall be a summary

procedure with all powers of the Civil Court for the purpose of taking

evidence on oath and of enforcing the attendance of witnesses and of

compelling the discovery and production of documents, etc. After

completing the procedure, the order of maintenance is liable to be

passed under Section 9. Section 9(2) provides for minimum

maintenance, which shall not exceed ten thousand rupees per month.

Section 11 gives power to enforce the order of maintenance.

A-9.There is a provision of the constitution of the Appellate Tribunal

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under Section 15, under which the State Government may, by

notification in the Official Gazette, constitute one Appellate Tribunal for

each district to hear the appeal against the order of the Tribunal, which

shall be presided over by an officer not below the rank of District

Magistrate. Section 15 is reproduced below:-

''15.Constitution of Appellate Tribunal

1.The State Government may, by notification in the Official

Gazette, constitute one Appellate Tribunal

for each district to hear the appeal against the order of the

Tribunal.

2.The Appellate Tribunal shall be presided over by an

officer not below the rank of District Magistrate.''

A-10.As per Section 15, the constitution of the Appellate Tribunal

is only to hear the appeal against the order of the Tribunal. Section

16, which requires consideration/ interpretation in this case, as to

who can file an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal. For ready

reference, Section 16 is reproduced below:-

''16.Appeals

1.Any senior citizen or a parent, as the case may be,

aggrieved by an order of a Any senior citizen or a parent, as

the case may be, aggrieved by an order of a Tribunal may,

within sixty days from the date of the order, prefer an appeal

to the Appellate Tribunal:

Provided that on appeal, the children or relative who is

required to pay any amount in terms of such maintenance

order shall continue to pay to such parent the amount so

ordered, in the murmcr directed by the Appellate Tribunal:

Provided further that the Appellate Tribunal may,

entertain the appeal alter the expiry of the said period of sixty

days, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by

sufficient cause from preferring the appeal in time.

2.On receipt of an appeal, the Appellate Tribunal shall,

cause a notice to be served upon the respondent.

3.The Appellate Tribunal may call for the record of

proceedings from the Tribunal against whose order the appeal

is preferred.

4.The Appellate Tribunal may, after examining the appeal

and the records called for either allow or reject the appeal.

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5.The Appellate Tribunal shall, adjudicate and decide upon

the appeal Hied against the order of the Tribunal and the order

of the Appellate Tribunal shall be final:

Provided that no appeal shall be rejected unless an

opportunity has been given to both the panics of being heard

in person or through a duly authorised representative.

1.The Appellate Tribunal shall make an endeavour to

pronounce its order in writing within one month of the receipt

of an appeal.

2.A copy of every order made under sub-section (3) shall

be sent to both the panics free of cost.''

A-11.As per plain and simple language of Section 16(1), the right

to file an appeal is given only to a senior citizen or a parent, as the

case may be, aggrieved by an order of a Tribunal, within sixty days

from the date of the order. As per the proviso, the Appellate Tribunal

has the power to entertain the appeal beyond the period of sixty days

if the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause. On receipt of the

appeal, the Appellate Tribunal shall cause a notice to be served upon

the respondent. In the appeal. The Appellate Tribunal has the power

to call the record of a Maintenance Tribunal.

A-12.Sub-section (4) of section 14 gives a power to the Appellate

Tribunal to either allow or reject the appeal. It is important to note here

that the Appellate Tribunal has not given power to set aside or quash the

order of the Tribunal because the same is in favour of the parents or a

senior citizen. By reading Section 16(1) & (4) conjointly, it gives

impression that in the appeal filed by senior citizens or parents the order

of Tribunal by which their case has either been dismissed or less amount

of maintenance has been fixed, the Appellate Tribunal after examining

the appeal and the record, may either allow the appeal by granting

maintenance or enhanced it or maintained the order of Tribunal as the

case may be.

A-13.Learned senior counsel for the petitioner submitted that the

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proviso to section 16(1) of the Act gives the impression that the children

or relatives can also prefer an appeal because during the pendency of the

appeal, they are continued to pay such maintenance amount so ordered.

We are of the opinion that this proviso has been inserted to deal with the

situation that, in case of enhancement claimed by the parent in the

appeal, the children will continue to pay the maintenance, and, as part of

that, the Appellate Tribunal has not been given any power to stay the

order of the Tribunal. Even if the senior citizens or parents file an

appeal, that will not operate to stay on the order of the Tribunal, and

children and relatives are liable to pay the maintenance during the

pendency of the appeal. Therefore, Section 16(1) confines the right of

appeal only to senior citizens or parents, not to children or relatives. The

Appellate Tribunal, in an appeal, either allow the appeal or rejects the

appeal, maintaining the order of the Tribunal.

A-14.Again, emphasis has been laid on sub-section (5) of Section 16,

which gives authority to the Appellate Tribunal to adjudicate or decide

the appeal against the order of the Tribunal unless the opportunity has

been given to both parties. Even if it is provided in the Act, it goes

without saying. If the appellate authority is constituted and power has

been given to entertain the appeal, then naturally the Appellate Authority

/ Tribunal is liable to adjudicate and decide the appeal by giving an

opportunity to both parties. There is any intention of Parliament that the

right to file an appeal has been given to children or relatives. Since this

Act has been enacted for the welfare of the parents and senior citizens,

therefore, the Appellate Authority is required to pass the order within

one month from the date of receipt of the appeal, and there is a finality

of the order.

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A-15.It has been brought on record that now a bill has been prepared

to be presented before the Parliament for amendment in Section 16(1)

for the purpose of giving right of appeal to the children and relatives,

meaning thereby, the Government is conscious that at present such a

right is not available in Section 16(1), therefore, such an amendment is

required. Hence, unless the bill is passed and the right to file an appeal

is given to the children and relatives, no appeal would be maintainable

at the instance of aggrieved persons.

A-16.Recently, the Apex Court in the case of Urmila Dixit (supra) has

discussed the intention of the Central Government behind bringing this

Act as beneficial legislation. Paragraphs 8 to 18 are reproduced below:-

''8.To answer the issue at hand, it is imperative for this Court

to discuss the rules of interpretation to be applied when

interpreting a beneficial legislation akin to the Act at hand.

While dealing with certain provisions of the Motor Vehicles

Act, this Court, in Brahmpal v. National Insurance

Company, observed that a beneficial legislation must receive

a liberal construction in consonance with the objectives that

the concerned Act seeks to serve.

9.This Court in K.H. Nazar v. Mathew K. Jacob reiterated

the above expositions and stated that:

“11.Provisions of a beneficial legislation have to be

construed with a purpose-oriented approach. [Kerala

Fishermen's Welfare Fund Board v. Fancy Food, (1995)

4 SCC 341] The Act should receive a liberal construction

to promote its objects. [Bombay Anand Bhavan

Restaurant v. ESI Corpn., (2009) 9 SCC 61 : (2009) 2

SCC (L&S) 573 and Union of India v. Prabhakaran

Vijaya Kumar, (2008) 9 SCC 527 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri)

813] Also, literal construction of the provisions of a

beneficial legislation has to be avoided. It is the Court's

duty to discern the intention of the legislature in making

the law. Once such an intention is ascertained, the statute

should receive a purposeful or functional interpretation

[Bharat Singh v. New Delhi Tuberculosis Centre, (1986)

2 SCC 614 : 1986 SCC (L&S) 335]

…

13.While interpreting a statute, the problem or

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mischief that the statute was designed to remedy should

first be identified, and then a construction that

suppresses the problem and advances the remedy should

be adopted. [Indian Performing Rights Society Ltd. v.

Sanjay Dalia, (2015) 10 SCC 161 : (2016) 1 SCC (Civ)

55] It is settled law that exemption clauses in beneficial

or social welfare legislations should be given strict

construction [Shivram A. Shiroor v. Radhabai Shantram

Kowshik, (1984) 1 SCC 588] . It was observed in

Shivram A. Shiroor v. Radhabai Shantram Kowshik

[Shivram A. Shiroor v. Radhabai Shantram Kowshik,

(1984) 1 SCC 588] that the exclusionary provisions in a

beneficial legislation should be construed strictly so as to

give a wide amplitude to the principal object of the

legislation and to prevent its evasion on deceptive

grounds. Similarly, in Minister Administering the Crown

Lands Act v. NSW Aboriginal Land Council [Minister

Administering the Crown Lands Act v. NSW Aboriginal

Land Council, 2008 HCA 48: (2008) 237 CLR 285],

Kirby, J. held that the principle of providing purposive

construction to beneficial legislations mandates that

exceptions in such legislations should be construed

narrowly.”

(emphasis supplied)

10.More recently, in Kozyflex Mattresses (P) Ltd. v. SBI

General Insurance Co. Ltd., this Court held the definition of

a consumer under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 to

include a company or corporate person in view of the

beneficial purpose of the Act.

11.While considering the provisions of the Medical

Termination of Pregnancy Act, this Court in X2 v. State (NCT

of Delhi), reiterated that interpretation of the provisions of a

beneficial legislation must be in line with a purposive

construction, keeping in mind the legislative purpose.

Furthermore, it was stated that beneficial legislation must be

interpreted in favour of the beneficiaries when it is possible to

take two views.

12.It is in the above background that we must proceed to

examine the Act. The statement of object and reasons of the

Act indicates the purpose behind the enactment, as relied

upon by this Court in S. Vanitha v. Deputy Commissioner,

Bengaluru Urban District and Ors., is:

“Traditional norms and values of the Indian society laid

stress on providing care for the elderly. However, due to

withering of the joint family system, a large number of

elderly are not being looked after by their family.

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Consequently, many older persons, particularly widowed

women are now forced to spend their twilight years all

alone and are exposed to emotional neglect and to lack

of physical and financial support. This clearly reveals

that ageing has become a major social challenge and

there is a need to give more attention to the care and

protection for the older persons. Though the parents can

claim maintenance under the Code of Criminal

Procedure, 1973, the procedure is both time-consuming

as well as expensive. Hence, there is a need to have

simple, inexpensive and speedy provisions to claim

maintenance for parents.”

13.The preamble of the Act states that it is intended towards

more effective provisions for maintenance and welfare of

parents and senior citizens, guaranteed and recognised under

the Constitution.

14.Therefore, it is apparent, that the Act is a beneficial piece

of legislation, aimed at securing the rights of senior citizens,

in view of the challenges faced by them. It is in this backdrop

that the Act must be interpreted and a construction that

advances the remedies of the Act must be adopted.

15.Before adverting to the provisions of the Act, we must be

cognizant of the larger issue that this case presents, i.e., the

care of senior citizens in our society. This Court in Vijaya

Manohar Arbat Dr v. Kashirao Rajaram Sawai and Anr.

highlighted that it is a social obligation for both sons and

daughters to maintain their parents when they are unable to do

so.

16.In Badshah v. Urmila Badshah Godse and Anr., this

Court observed that when a case pertaining to maintenance of

parents or wife is being considered, the Court is bound to

advance the cause of social justice of such marginalised

groups, in furtherance of the constitutional vision enshrined in

the preamble. Recently, this exposition came to be reiterated

in Rajnesh v. Neha and Another.

17.While issuing a slew of directions for the protection of

senior citizens in Ashwani Kumar v. Union of India, this

Court had highlighted:

“3.The rights of elderly persons is one such

emerging situation that was perhaps not fully foreseen

by our Constitution-framers. Therefore, while there is a

reference to the health and strength of workers, men and

women, and the tender age of children in Article 39 of

the Constitution and to public assistance in cases of

unemployment, old age, sickness and disablement and in

other cases of undeserved want in Article 41 of the

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Constitution, there is no specific reference to the health

of the elderly or to their shelter in times of want and

indeed to their dignity and sustenance due to their age.

4.Eventually, age catches up with everybody and

on occasion, it renders some people completely helpless

and dependent on others, either physically or mentally or

both. Fortunately, our Constitution is organic and this

Court is forward looking. This combination has resulted

in path-breaking developments in law, particularly in the

sphere of social justice, which has been given

tremendous importance and significance in a variety of

decisions rendered by this Court over the years. The

present petition is one such opportunity presented before

this Court to recognise and enforce the rights of elderly

persons—rights that are recognised by Article 21 of the

Constitution as understood and interpreted by this Court

in a series of decisions over a period of several decades,

and rights that have gained recognition over the years

due to emerging situations.”

(emphasis supplied)

18.Keeping in mind the beneficial intention of the statute

and the above expositions, we now proceed to consider the

issue at hand.''

A-17.In the aforesaid judgment, the Apex Court has finally

concluded that the Senior Citizen Act is a beneficial piece of

legislation aimed at securing the rights of senior citizens, and in this

backdrop, it must be interpreted, and a construction that advances the

remedies of the act must be adopted.At this stage it is necessary

to look into the verdict of the the Supreme Court of India given in the

case of Renaissance Hotel Holdings Inc. v/s B. Vijaya Sai reported

in (2022) 5 SCC 1 as under:-

''67.Another principle that the High Court has failed to notice

is that a part of a section cannot be read in isolation. This

Court, speaking through A.P. Sen, J., in BalasinorNagrik

Coop. Bank Ltd. v. Babubhai Shankerlal Pandya

[BalasinorNagrik Coop. Bank Ltd. v. Babubhai Shankerlal

Pandya, (1987) 1 SCC 606] , observed thus : (SCC p. 608,

para 4)

“4. … It is an elementary rule that construction of a

section is to be made of all parts together. It is not

permissible to omit any part of it. For, the principle that

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the statute must be read as a whole is equally applicable

to different parts of the same section.”

This principle was reiterated by this Court in

Kalawatibai v. Soiryabai [Kalawatibai v. Soiryabai,

(1991) 3 SCC 410] : (SCC p. 418, para 6)

“6. … It is well settled that a section has to be read in its

entirety as one composite unit without bifurcating it or

ignoring any part of it.”

66.It is thus trite law that while interpreting the provisions of

a statute, it is necessary that the textual interpretation should

be matched with the contextual one. The Act must be looked

at as a whole and it must be discovered what each section,

each clause, each phrase and each word is meant and

designed to say as to fit into the scheme of the entire Act. No

part of a statute and no word of a statute can be construed in

isolation. Statutes have to be construed so that every word has

a place and everything is in its place. As already discussed

hereinabove, the said Act has been enacted by the legislature

taking into consideration the increased globalisation of trade

and industry, the need to encourage investment flows and

transfer of technology, and the need for simplification and

harmonisation of trade mark management systems. One of the

purposes for which the said Act has been enacted is

prohibiting the use of someone else's trade mark as a part of

the corporate name or the name of business concern. If the

entire scheme of the Act is construed as a whole, it provides

for the rights conferred by registration and the right to sue for

infringement of the registered trade mark by its proprietor.

The legislative scheme as enacted under the said statute

elaborately provides for the eventualities in which a

proprietor of the registered trade mark can bring an action for

infringement of the trade mark and the limits on effect of the

registered trade mark. By picking up a part of the provisions

in sub-section (4) of Section 29 of the said Act and a part of

the provision in sub-section (1) of Section 30 of the said Act

and giving it a textual meaning without considering the

context in which the said provisions have to be construed, in

our view, would not be permissible. We are at pains to say

that the High Court fell in error in doing so.

65.We find that the High Court has failed to take into

consideration two important principles of interpretation. The

first one being of textual and contextual interpretation. It will

be apposite to refer to the guiding principles, succinctly

summed up by Chinnappa Reddy, J., in the judgment of this

Court in RBI v. Peerless General Finance & Investment Co.

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Ltd. [RBI v. Peerless General Finance & Investment Co. Ltd.,

(1987) 1 SCC 424] : (SCC pp. 450-51, para 33)

“33.Interpretation must depend on the text and the

context. They are the bases of interpretation. One may

well say if the text is the texture, context is what gives

the colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are important.

That interpretation is best which makes the textual

interpretation match the contextual. A statute is best

interpreted when we know why it was enacted. With this

knowledge, the statute must be read, first as a whole and

then section by section, clause by clause, phrase by

phrase and word by word. If a statute is looked at, in the

context of its enactment, with the glasses of the statute-

maker, provided by such context, its scheme, the

sections, clauses, phrases and words may take colour and

appear different than when the statute is looked at

without the glasses provided by the context. With these

glasses we must look at the Act as a whole and discover

what each section, each clause, each phrase and each

word is meant and designed to say as to fit into the

scheme of the entire Act. No part of a statute and no

word of a statute can be construed in isolation. Statutes

have to be construed so that every word has a place and

everything is in its place. It is by looking at the

definition as a whole in the setting of the entire Act and

by reference to what preceded the enactment and the

reasons for it that the court construed the expression

“Prize Chit” in Srinivasa [Srinivasa Enterprises v. Union

of India, (1980) 4 SCC 507] and we find no reason to

depart from the court's construction.”

A-18.In the case of Suresh Chikara (supra), the Apex Court has held

that the Senior Citizens Act, 2007, has been enacted for the purpose of

making effective provisions, maintenance and welfare of parents and

senior citizens guaranteed and recognised under the Constitution. The

maintenance Tribunal has been established under Section 7 to exercise

various powers under the Act.

A-19.Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the writ petitioner

submitted that the State Government has framed the rules in which

Chapter III deals with the procedure prescribed for the Appellate

Tribunal. As per Rule 15 M.P. Senior Citizen Rules, an appeal aggrieved

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by an order of the Tribunal shall be filed before the Appellate Tribunal

in Form 1. Therefore, in this rule, the word 'aggrieved' is used; thus,

whosoever is aggrieved by the order of the Tribunal, may be children or

a relative, may prefer an appeal. In the rule the word aggrieved is used

because the same word is used in Section 16(1) of the Senior Citizen

Act, 2007 which says that "any senior citizen or parent, as the case may

be, aggrieved by an order", therefore, the word 'aggrieved' in Rule 15 is

there only for an appeal to be filed by senior citizen or parent not by any

person.

A-20.It is a settled law that the rules made under the act cannot give a

new right or an expansion of right more than given in the parent act. The

rule has to be read within the scope of the act. Section 32 of Senior

Citizens Act, 2007 give a power to the State to make rules and as per

sub-section (2), without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing

power, the State Government may provide rule for holding an enquiry

under Section 5 and sub-section (1) of Section 8 of the Act and the

maximum maintenance allowance which may be ordered by the

Tribunal under Section 9(2), therefore, no such power has been given to

frame a rule for giving right of appeal by the State Government which

has not been given by the Parliament under the Act. Thus, the contention

of Shri Sharan, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent No.1, is not

acceptable.

A-21.Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent has laid

down much emphasis on a judgment passed by Punjab and Haryana

High Court in the case of Paramjeet Kaur (supra), in which the Division

Bench had held that Section 16(1) of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 must

read to provide for a right of appeal to any of affected person as there is

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no negative provision in the act denying the right of appeal other than

parents and senior citizen. The Writ Court of this High Court in the case

of Nitin Jaat (supra) placed reliance on this judgment and remanded the

matter back to the Appellate Tribunal to entertain the appeal filed by the

children. Because of this order, the learned Writ Court in this matter has

requested the Chief Justice to refer this issue to a Larger Bench. As

discussed above, the language of Section 16(1) of the Senior Citizens

Act, 2007, has to be read as it is without any addition or subtraction.

Had there been any intention of the lawmakers to give a right of appeal

to children or relatives, simply aggrieved person would have been used

in Section 16. The entire act has been brought into force only for the

welfare of senior citizens therein; therefore, the right to approach the

Tribunal as well as the Appellate Tribunal has been given to them only.

A-22.The Division Bench of High Court of Bangalore in the case of

Sri K. Lokesh (supra) has distinguished the Division Bench of the

judgment passed by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of

Paramjeet Kaur (supra), by observing that it is held by the Supreme

Court that when right to appeal is not created, such right cannot be

assumed by logical analysis or in a situation where there is no provision

restricting such right to appeal. It is also observed that when the right to

appeal is created/provided to a class, it is only to be understood that the

other class is excluded or not provided by such an act. Para 44 & 45 are

reproduced below:-

''44.Further, the principle that appeal being a statutory right

and no party have a right to file appeal except in accordance

with the prescribed procedure is well-settled. The right of

appeal may be lost to a party in face of relevant provisions of

law in appropriate cases. Thus, the right to appeal is not a

right which can be assumed by logical analysis much less by

exercise of inherent jurisdiction. It should essentially be

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provided by the law in force. In absence of any specific

provision creating a right in a party to file an appeal, such

right can neither be assumed nor inferred in favour of the

party.

45.The reasoning of the Punjab and Harayana High Court

that there is no negative provision in the Act denying the right

of appeal to other party cannot be countenanced. As observed

herein-above, it is held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that

when right to appeal is not created, such right cannot be

assumed by logical analysis or in a situation where there is no

provision restricting such right to appeal. When right to

appeal is created/provided to class, it is only to be understood

that other class is excluded or not provided with such right.

The provision need not in specific debar other class from right

of appeal.''

A-23.The last contention of the learned senior counsel for the

petitioner is that if right of appeal is not given under Section 16 of the

Senior Citizens Act, 2007, then they are remediless and they cannot

approach even civil Court as the jurisdiction of civil Court is barred

under Section 27, especially in respect of any matter to which any

provision of this act applies. It is further submitted that even the civil

Court cannot grant an injunction in respect of anything which is done

or intended to be done by or under this Act. Shri Sharan, learned

Senior Counsel for the respondent No.1 elaborated above submission

that in a given facts and circumstances that where the learned

Tribunal passes an order without authority or beyond the territorial

jurisdiction or with a malafide intention without considering the other

legal issue, in such situation, there would be no remedy of appeal for

the children and they will have to comply the order of the tribunal.

A-24.Needless to advise them that the remedy of writ petition under

Article 226 of the Constitution of India is always available to any citizen

of this country to challenge the order of a statutory authority, quasi-

judicial authority, tribunal, even a civil court, etc. All the matters which

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travel up to the Supreme Court at the instance of the children or a

relative, the writ petitions were filed in the High Court directly

challenging the order of maintenance and all the writ petitions were

maintained. Therefore, it cannot be said that if the right of appeal is not

given to children or relatives, under Section 16 of the Senior Citizens

Act, 2007, they are remediless. As discussed above, the purpose of the

act is to provide more speedy and effective provisions for the

maintenance and welfare of parents and senior citizens as guaranteed

and recognised under the Constitution of India. Thus, two-tier remedies

are provided under this act, the first is by way of a filing application

before the Maintenance Tribunal, and the second is by way of an appeal

before the Appellate Tribunal. If the Tribunal passes a favourable order

or rejects the claim, then further remedy has been provided to the senior

citizens or parents to go into the appeal either to seek modification,

enhancement of the order passed by the Tribunal, or to get an order or

maintenance against the rejection of the claim. Under Section 16(4), the

Appellate Tribunal may either allow or reject the appeal, but the order of

the Tribunal is not liable to be set aside or quashed if there is an order of

maintenance. Under any circumstances, the children are duty-bound to

maintain their parents.

C-1.In view of the above discussion, we respectfully disagree with

the view taken by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of

Paramjeet Kaur (supra), therefore, we are of the opinion that the view

taken by the Single Bench of this Court in the case of Nitin Jaat (supra)

is not a correct view hence, the same is hereby overruled.

C-2.We hereby answer the sole question of law that an appeal

under Section 16 of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and

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Senior Citizens Act, 2007, is maintainable only at the instance of any

senior citizen or a parent, and it is not maintainable at the instance of

any aggrieved person.

Let the writ petition be listed before a Single Bench.

(VIVEK RUSIA)

J U D G E

(BINOD KUMAR DWIVEDI)

J U D G E

Ravi