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PETITIONER:

SHIVAJI DAYANU PATIL & ANR.

Vs.

RESPONDENT:

SMT. VATSCHALA UTTAM MORE

DATE OF JUDGMENT17/07/1991

BENCH:

AGRAWAL, S.C. (J)

BENCH:

AGRAWAL, S.C. (J)

RAY, B.C. (J)

CITATION:

1991 AIR 1769 1991 SCR (3) 26

1991 SCC (3) 530 JT 1991 (3) 133

1991 SCALE (2)92

ACT:

Motor Vehichles Act, 1939: Sections 2(18) and

92A--`Motor Vehicle'--Petrol tanker used for transporting

petrol--Overturned due to collision with another motor

vehicle--Damaged to the extent that it became

immobile--Whether ceases to be a `Motor Vehicle'--Death due

to explosion and fire taking place few hours after the

collision--Both connected and related events--Causal rela-

tionship between user of the vehicle and accident--Need not

be direct and proximate--Death as a result of accident

arising out of `use of Motor Vehicle'--No fault

liability--Nature and scope of.

Bombay Motor Vehicle Rules, 1989: Rules 291-A, 291-B,

297(2), 306-A to 306-D. Adjudication of claims under Section

92A of the Act-Special Procedure to be followed by Claims

Tribunal for expeditious disposal--Normal procedure pre-

scribed in respect of claims under Section 110A--Need not be

followed.

Words & Phrases: `use'--`Arising out off--Meaning of.

HEADNOTE:

Due to a collision on the highway between a Petrol

tanker and a truck, the Petrol tanker went off the road and

fell on its side at some distance from the highway. As a

result of it, petrol leaked out and collected nearby. Nearly

four hours after the collision an explosion took place

in the petrol tanker resulting in fire. A large number of

persons who had assembled near the petrol tanker sustained

burn injuries; few of them succumbed to the injuries. Re-

spondent's son was of the persons who died as such.

Respondent filed a claim before the Motor Accident

Claims Tribunal under Section 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act

for Rs.75,000 as compensation. She also claimed Rs.15,000 as

compensation under Section 92A of the Act. The Tribunal

dismissed the claim under Section 92A on the ground that the

explosion could not be said to be an accident arising out of

the use of the petrol tanker and so the provisions of Sec-

tion 92A were not attracted. It held that the explosion and

the fire which took place after about four hours of the

accident had no connec-

27

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tion with the accident and it was altogether a different and

independent accident, It also observed that the villagers

took benefit of the earlier accident and while they were

trying to pilfer petrol' from the tanker there was friction

which caused the ignition and explosion and since an outside

agency was responsible therefore the subsequent accident of

explosion and fire could not be said to be an accident

arising out of the use of the tanker.

On appeal, a Single Judge of the High Court disagreed

with the finding of the Tribunal that the explosion was a

direct consequence of the attempt to pilfer petrol from it

and further held that in view of Sub-Section (4) of Section

92A if there was a wrongful act, neglect or default on the

part of the deceased or injured, the claim under Section 92A

for compensation for no liability cannot be rejected. He

observed that the fact that at the material time, the tanker

was not driven on the highway but was lying turtle on the

side of the highway, would not make any difference and that

the tanker was a vehicle lying on the side of the highway

and would be covered by the expression 'use' in Section 92A

of the Act and so compensation would be payable under 'no

fault liability'.

The petitioners filed a Letters Patent Appeal against

the said decision and a Division Bench of the High Court

dismissed the same affirming the findings of the Single

Judge. The Bench held that the collision between the tanker

and the other vehicle which occurred earlier and the escape

of petrol from the tanker which ultimately resulted in

explosion and fire were not unconnected but related events.

It rejected the claim of the petitioners that the first

information report recorded by the police and the panchnama

indicated that the explosion and fire near the petrol tanker

had been caused by careless act of throwing away of a match

stick used for lighting a beedi or cigarette.

Aggrieved by the said decision, the petitioners pre-

ferred the present petition for special leave to appeal.

On behalf of the petitioners, it was contended that the

petrol tanker was not a motor vehicle, as defined ln Section

2(18) of the Act, at the time the explosion and fire took

place because at that time the petrol tanker was lying

turtle and was not capable of movement on the road; that

since before the explosion and fire the petrol tanker was

lying immobile it could not be said that the petrol tanker

was in use as a motor vehicle at the time of the explosion

and fire; that even if it is found that the petrol tanker

was in use as a motor vehicle at the time of the explosion

and fire, there was no causal relationship between the

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collision which took place between the petrol tanker and the

truck and the explosion and fire in the petrol tanker which

took place about four-and-half hours later and it cannot,

therefore, be said that the explosion and fire in the petrol

tanker was an accident arising out of the use of a motor

vehicle.

Dismissing the petition, this Court,

HELD: 1. Section 92A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 was

in the nature of beneficial legislation enacted with a view

to confer the benefit of expeditious payment of limited

amount by way of compensation to the victims of an accident

arising out of the use of a motor vehicle on the basis of no

fault liability. In the matter of interpretation of a bene-

ficial legislation the approach of the courts is to adopt a

construction which advances the beneficient purpose underly-

ing the enactment in preference to a construction which

tends to defeat that purpose. [39E-G]

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Motor Owners' Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Jadavji Keshavji

Modi & Ors., [1982] 1 SCR 860; Skandia Insurance Co. Ltd. v.

Kokilaben Chandravadan & Ors., [1987] 2 SCR 752, relied on.

Manjusri Raha & Ors. v.B.L. Gupta & Ors. etc., [1977] 2

SCR 944; State of Haryana v. Darshana Devi & Ors., [1979] 3

SCR 184; Bishan Devi & Ors. v. Sirbaksh Singh & Anr., [1980]

1 SCR 300; N.K.V. Bros. Ltd. v. M. Karumai Ammal and Ors.

etc., [1980] 3 SCR 101 and Gujarat State Road Transport

Corporation v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai & Anr., [1987] 3 SCR

404, referred to.

2. The petrol tanker was a vehicle manufactured for the

purpose of transporting petrol. It was a vehicle which had

been adapted for such use and was suitable for use on the

road for transporting petrol. At the time when the petrol

tanker collided with the truck on the national highway, it

was being used for the purpose of transporting petrol. It

cannot, therefore, be disputed that when the said collision

took place it was a motor vehicle as the said expression was

defined in section 2(18) of the Act. Merely because the

petrol tanker had turned turtle as a result of the collision

and was lying at a short distance away from the road, does

not mean that it had ceased to be suitable or fit for use on

the road and it had ceased to be a motor vehicle. It could

be said that as a result of the collision with the truck the

petrol tanker was damaged to such an extent that there was

no reasonable prospect of the vehicle ever being made mobile

again. In the circumstances, it cannot be held that the

petrol tanker which was a motor vehicle when it collided

with the

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truck had ceased to be a motor vehicle after the said colli-

sion and it could not be regarded a motor 'vehicle under

Section 2(18) of the Act at the time when the explosion and

fire took place. [40H; 41A-C, 42D-E]

Bolani Ores Ltd. etc. v. State of Orissa. etc., [1975] 2

SCR 138; Newberry v. Simmonds, [1961] 2 Q.B. 345 and Smart

v. Allan & Anr., [1963] 1 Q.B. 291, referred to.

3. The word 'use' has a wider connotationas to cover the

period when the vehicle is not moving and is stationary and

the use of a vehicle does not cease on account of the vehi-

cle having been rendered immobile on account of a break-down

or mechanical defect or accident. In the circumstances, it

cannot be said that the petrol tanker was not in the use at

the time when it was lying on its side after the collision

with the truck. [44F-G]

Pushpa Rani Chopra v. Anokha Singh & Ors., [1975] ACJ

396; General Managar, K.S.R.T.C. v. S. Satalingappa & Ors.,

[1979] ACJ 452 and Oriental Fire & General Insurance Co.

Ltd. v. Suman Navnath Rajguru & Ors., [1985] ACJ 243, ap-

proved.

Elliott v. Grey, [1960] 1 Q.B. 367 and Government Insur-

ance Office of New South Wales v. R.J. Green & Lloyd Pty.

Ltd., [1965] 114 CLR 437, referred to.

4.1. There is no ground for interfering with the find-

ings recorded by the High Court that those persons who

sustained injuries as a result of the explosion and fire in

the petrol tanker did not indulge in any unlawful activity

which might have caused the explosion and fire. The matter

has, therefore, to be examined in the light of the meaning

to be assigned to the words "arising out of" In the expres-

sion "accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle" in

Section 92A of the Act. [46D-E]

4.2. The words "arising out of" have been used in var-

ious statutes in different contexts and have been construed

by Courts widely as well as narrowly, keeping in view the

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context in which they have been used in a particular legis-

lation. [46F]

4.3. In the context of motor accidents the expressions

"caused by" and "arising out of" are often used in statutes.

Although both these expressions imply a causal relationship

between the accident resulting in injury and the use of the

motor vehicle but they differ in the degree of

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proximity of such relationship. As compared to the expres-

sion "caused by" the expression "arising out of" has a wider

connotation and the causal relationship is not required to

be direct and proximate and it can be less immediate. [47G;

48E]

4.4. The expression "caused by" was used in Sections

95(1)(b)(i) and (ii) and 96(2)(b)(ii) of the Act. In Section

92A of the Act, Parliament, however, chose to use the ex-

pression "arising out of" which indicates that for the

purpose of awarding compensation under Section 92A, the

causal relationship between the use of the motor vehicle and

the accident resulting in death or permanent disablementis

not required to be direct and proximate and it can be less

immediate. This would imply that accident should be connect-

ed with the use of the motor vehicle but the said connection

need not be direct and immediate. This construction of the

expression "arising out of the use of a motor vehicle" in

section 92A enlarges the field of protection made available

to the victims of accident and is in consonance with the

beneficial object underlying the enactment. [48D-E]

Mackinnon Machkenzie & Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Ibrahim Mahommed

Issak, [1970] 1 SCR 869; Government Insurance Office of New

South Wales v. R.J. Green & Ltyoyd Pl. Ltd., [1965] 114 CLR

437; Heyman v. Darwins Ltd., [1942] A.C. 356; Union of India

v. E.B. Aaby's Rederi A/S, [1975] A.C. 797 and Samick Lines

Co. Ltd. v. Owners of the Antonis P. Lemos, [1985] 2 WLR

468, referred to.

5. In the facts and circumstances of the present case,

the accident involving explosion and fire in the petrol

tanker was connected with the use of tanker as a motor

vehicle. The High Court was right in holding that the colli-

sion between the tanker and the other vehicle which had

occurred earlier and the escape of petrol from the tanker

which ultimately resulted in the explosion and fire were not

unconnected but related events and merely because there was

interval of about four to hour-and-half hours between the

said collision and the explosion and fire in the tanker, it

cannot be necessarily inferred that there was no causal

relation between explosion and fire. In the circumstances,

it must be held that the explosion and fire resulting in the

injuries which led to the death of the Respondent's son was

due to an accident arising out of the use of the motor

vehicle viz., the petrol tanker. [48G-H; 49A-B]

6. The object underlying the enactment of Section 92A is

to make available to the claimant compensation amount to the

extent of Rs.15,000 in case of death and Rs.7,500 in case of

permanent disable-

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ment as expeditiously as possible and the said award has to

be made before adjudication of the claim under Section 110A

of the Act. This would be apparent from the provision of

Section 92B of the Act which provides that a claim for

compensation under Section 92A in respect of death or perma-

nent disablement of any person shall be disposed of as

expeditiously as possible and where compensation is claimed

in respect of such death or permanent disablement under

Section 92A and also in pursuance of any right on the prin-

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ciple of fault, the claim for compensation under Section 92A

shall be disposed of in the first place. With a view to give

effect to the said directive contained in Section 92B of the

Act, the Maharashtra Government has amended the Rules and

has inserted special provisions in respect of claims under

Section 92A in Rules 291A, 291B, 297(2), 306A, 306B, 306C

and 306D of the Rules. The object underlying the said provi-

sions is to enable expeditious disposal of a claim petition

under Section 92A of the Act. The said object would be

defeated if the Claims Tribunal is required to hold a regu-

lar trial in the same manner as for adjudicating a claim

petition under Section 110A of the Act. [52B-E]

7. Rules 291A, 306A and 306B of the Bombay Motor Vehi-

cles Rules, 1989 contain adequate provisions which would

ennable the Claims Tribunal to satisfy itself in respect of

the matters necessary for awarding compensation under Sec-

tion 92A of the Act and in view of these special provisions

the Claims Tribunal is not required to follow the normal

procedure prescribed under the Act and the Rules with regard

to adjudication of a claim under Section 110A of the Act for

the purpose of making an order on a claim petition under

Section 92A of the Act. [53B-D]

JUDGMENT:

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Special Leave Petition

(Civil) No. 14822 of 1990.

From the Judgment and Order dated 16.8.1990 of the

Bombay High Court in L.P.A. No. 65 of 1990.

G.L. Sanghi, K.S.V. Murthy, S.M. Puri and Pramod Dayal

for the Petitioners.

Ashok H. Desai, George Kurian, A.P. Vaze and G.B. Sathe

for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

32

S.C. AGRAWAL, J. The questions raised for consideration

in this petition for special leave to appeal involve the

interpretation of the expression "arising out of the use of

a motor vehicle" contained in section 92A of the Motor

Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as the Act').

On October 29, 1987, at about 3 A.M., there was a colli-

sion between a petrol tanker bearing Registration No. MKL-

7461 and a truck bearing Registration No. MEH-4197 on the

National Highway No. 4 near village Kavatha, in District

Satara, Maharashtra. The petrol tanker was proceeding from

Pune side to Bangalore whereas the truck was coming from the

opposite direction. As a result of the said collision, the

petrol tanker went off the road and fell on its left side at

a distance of about 20 feet from the highway. As a result of

the overturning of the petrol tanker, the petrol contained

in it leaked out and collected nearby. At about 7.15 A.M.,

an explosion took place in the said petrol tanker resulting

in fire. A number of persons who had assembled near the

petrol tanker sustained burn injuries and a few of them

succumbed to the said injuries. One of those who died as a

result of such injuries was Deepak Uttam More. The respond-

ent is the mother of Deepak Uttam More. Petitioner No. 1 is

the owner of the said petrol tanker and Petitioner No. 2,

the insurer of the same.

The respondent, as the legal representative of her

deceased son, filed a claim petition before the Motor Acci-

dent Claims Tribunal, Satara (`Claims Tribunal') under

section 110 of the Act claiming Rs.75,000 as compensation

from the petitioners. She also made a claim for payment of

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Rs. 15,000 as compensation under section 92A of the Act. It

appears that claim petitions were also filed by the legal

representatives of other persons who had died as a result of

the burn injuries sustained by them in the explosion and

fire in the petrol tanker. The petitioners contested the

claim petitions filed by the respondent and other claimants

under section 92A of the Act and raised objection with

regard to the jurisdiction of the Claims Tribunal to enter-

tain such petitions on the ground that explosion and fire

resulting in injuries to the deceased could not be said to

be an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle.

The Claims Tribunal decided all the claim petitions filed

under Section 92A of the Act by a common order dated Decem-

ber 2, 1989 whereby the said petitions were dismissed on the

ground that the explosion could not be said to be an acci-

dent arising out of the use of the petrol tanker and that

the provisions of section 92A of the Act were not attracted.

The Claims Tribunal was of the view that the explosion and

the fire which took place after about four

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hours had no connection whatsoever with the accident which

took place at 3 A.M. and that the explosion and the fire was

altogether an independent accident. The Claims Tribunal also

observed that the villagers tried to take the benefit of the

earlier accident and tried to pilfer petrol from the petrol

tanker and while thus pilfering the petrol there was fric-

tion which caused ignition and explosion and since an out-

side agency was responsible for the explosion and fire which

situation was created by the villagers themselves the explo-

sion could not be said to be an accident arising out of the

use of the tanker. The respondent filed an appeal against

the said order of the Claims Tribunal before the High Court.

The said appeal was allowed by a learned Single Judge of the

High Court by judgment dated February 5, 1990. The learned

Single Judge disagreed with the finding of the Claims Tribu-

nal that the explosion was a direct consequence of the

attempt to pilfer petrol from the tanker and observed that

the Tribunal was not justified in proceeding on the assump-

tion that all the injured persons and deceased were engaged

in pilfering the petrol and the explosion was a direct

consequence of the same. The learned Single Judge also held

that in view of sub-section (4) of section 92A of the Act if

there is a wrongful act, neglect or default on the part of

the deceased or the injured, the claim under section 92A of

the Act for compensation for no fault liability cannot be

rejected. With regard to the applicability of section 92A of

the Act, the learned Single Judge observed that the fact

that at the material time the tanker was not being driven on

the Highway but was lying turtle on its side would make no

difference and that it was a vehicle lying on the side of

the Highway and would be covered by the expression 'use' in

section 92A of the Act and compensation would be payable

under no fault liability of section 92A of the Act. He,

therefore, directed payment of Rs. 15,000 as compensation

under section 92A of the Act to the respondent. The Peti-

tioners filed a Letters Patent Appeal against the said

decision of the learned Single Judge which was dismissed by

a Division Bench of the High Court by judgment dated August

16, 1990. The Appellate Bench of the High Court has affirmed

the finding of the learned Single Judge that there was no

evidence whatsoever that the person or persons in respect of

whose deaths compensation had been claimed under section 92A

were themselves committing theft or pilferage of petrol at

the time of their deaths and that these victims could have

only been curious by-standers at the site of the accident.

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The learned Judges have observed that the expression 'use of

a motor vehicle' covers a very wide field, a field more

extensive than which might be called traffic use of the

motor vehicle and that the use of a vehicle is not confined

to the periods when it Was in motion or was moving and that

a vehicle would still be is use

34

even when it was stationary The learned Judges were of the

view that merely' because there Was interval of about four

and half hours between the collision of the petrol tanker

and the explosion and fire in the tanker, it cannot be

necessarily inferred that there was no causal relation

between earlier event and the later incident of explosion

and fire and that the earlier collision if not the cause was

at least the main contributory factor for the subsequent

explosion and fire in the tanker in question inasmuch as the

tanker was carrying petrol which was a highly combustible

and volatile material and after the collision-the petrol

tanker had fallen on one of its sides on sloping ground

resulting in escape of highly inflammable petrol and there

was grave risk of explosion and fire from the petrol coming

out of the tanker and the tanker was allowed to remain in

such a dangerous condition for hours without any effort

being made to prevent such great hazard of fire and explo-

sion from petrol escaping from the tanker. According to the

learned Judges, the collision between the tanker and the

other vehicle which occurred earlier and the escape of

petrol from the tanker which ultimately resulted in explo-

sion and fire were not unconnected but related events. The

learned Judges rejected the submission made on behalf of the

petitioners that in the instant case the first information

report recorded by the police and the panchanama indicated

that the explosion and fire near the petrol tanker had been

caused by careless act of throwing away of a match stick

used for lighting a beedi or cigarette. The learned Judges

held that the papers and documents filed before the Claims

Tribunal under rule 306B of the Bombay Motor Vehicles Rules,

1959 did not establish that the fire was ignited by someone

carelessly throwing a match stick. Feeling aggrieved by the

said decision of the Appellate Bench of the Bombay High

Court, the petitioner have filed this petition for special

leave to appeal. A notice for final disposal was issued on

the petition and the learned counsel for the parties have

been heard at length.

Shri G.L. Sanghi, the learned counsel appearing for the

petitioners, has urged that in the instant case, it cannot

be said that the explosion and fire in the petrol tanker

which occurred at about 7.15 A.M., i.e., nearly four and

half hours after the collision involving the petrol tanker

and the other truck, was an accident arising out of the use

of a motor vehicle and therefore, the claim petition filed

by the respondent could not be entertained under section

92-A of the Act. Shri Sanghi has made a three-fold submis-

sion in this regard. In the first place, he has submitted

that the petrol tanker was not a motor vehicle as defined in

section 2(18) of the Act at the time when the explosion and

fire took place because at that time the petrol tanker was

lying turtle and was

35

not capable of movement on the road. The second submission

of Shri Sanghi is that since before the explosion and fire

the petrol tanker was lying immobile it could not be said

that the petrol tanker, even if it be assumed that it was a

motor vehicle, was in use as a motor vehicle at the time of

the explosion and fire. Thirdly, it has been submitted by

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Shri Sanghi that even if it is found that the petrol tanker

was in use as a motor vehicle at the time of the explosion

and fire, there was no causal relationship between the

collision which took place between the petrol tanker and the

truck at about 3 A.M. and the explosion and fire in the

petrol tanker which took place about four and half hours

later and it cannot, therefore, be said that explosion and

fire in the petrol tanker was an accident arising out of the

use of a motor vehicle.

Before we proceed to deal with the aforesaid submissions

of Shri Sanghi, it would be relevant to mention that section

92A of the Act forms part of Chapter VII-A which was intro-

duced in the Act by Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1982

(Act 47 of 1982). The said Chapter bears the heading "LI-

ABILITY WITHOUT FAULT IN CERTAIN CASES" and contains sec-

tions 92A to 92E. The purpose underlying the enactment of

these provisions, as indicated in the Statement of Objects

and Reasons appended to the Bill, was as follows:

"There has been a rapid development of road

transport during the past few years and large

increase in the number of motor vehicles on

the road. The incidence of road accidents by

motor vehicles has reached serious propor-

tions. During the last three years, the number

of road accidents per year on the average has

been around 1.45 lakhs and of these the number

of fatal accidents has been around 20,000 per

year. The victims of these accidents are

generally pedestrians belonging to the less

affluent sections of society. The provisions

of the Act as to compensation in respect of

accidents can be availed of only in cases of

accidents which can be proved to have taken

place as a result of a wrongful act or negli-

gence on the part of the owners or drivers of

the vehicles concerned. Having regard to the

nature of circumstances in which road acci-

dents take place, in a number of cases, it is

difficult to secure adequate evidence to prove

negligence. Further, in what are known as

"hit-and-run" accidents, by reason of the

identity of the vehicle involved in the acci-

dent not being known, the persons affected

cannot prefer any claims for compensation. It

is, therefore, considered necessary to amend

the

36

Act suitably to secure strict enforcement of

road safety measures and also to make, as a

measure of social justice, suitable provisions

first for compensation without proof of fault

or negligence on the part of the owner or

driver of the vehicle and, secondly, for

compensation by way of solatium in cases in

which the identity of the vehicle causing an

accident is unknown..... "

In this context, it may be pointed out that before the

said amendment this Court had highlighted the need for

legislation providing for no fault liability in motor acci-

dents claims in a number of decisions. (See: Manjusri Raha &

Ors. v. B.L. Gupta & Ors. etc., [1977] 2 SCR 944; State of

Haryana v. Darshana Devi & Ors., [1979] 3 SCR 184; Bishan

Devi & Ors. v. Sirbaksh Singh & Anr., [1980] 1 SCR 300 and

N.K.V. Bros. Ltd. v. M. Karumai Ammal and Ors. etc., [1980]

3 SCR 10 1.

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Section 92A which made provision for liability to pay

compensation in certain cases on the principle of no fault

read as under:

"92-A. Liability to pay compensation in cer-

tain cases on the principle of no fault--(1)

Where the death or permanent disablement of

any person has resulted from an accident

arising out of the use of a motor vehicle or

motor vehicles, the owner of the vehicle

shall, or, as the case may be, the owners of

the vehicles shall, jointly and severally, be

liable to pay compensation in respect of such

death or disablement in accordance with the

provisions of this section.

(2) The amount of compensation which shall be

payable under sub-section (1) in respect of

the death of any person shall be a fixed sum

of fifteen thousand rupees and the amount of

compensation payable under that sub-section in

respect of the permanent disablement of any

person shall be a fixed sum of seven thousand

five hundred rupees.

(3) In any claim for compensation under sub-

section (1), the claimant shall not be re-

quired to plead and establish that the death

or permanent disablement in respect of which

the claim has been made was due to any wrong-

ful act, neglect or default of the owner or

owners of the vehicle or vehicles concerned or

of any other person.

37

(4) A claim for compensation under sub-section

(1) shall not be defeated by reason of any

wrongful act, neglect or default of the person

in respect of whose death or permanent disa-

blement the claim has been made nor shall the

quantum of compensation recoverable in respect

of such death or permanent disablement be

reduced on the basis of the share of such

person in the responsibility for such death or

permanent disablement."

Section 92-B preserved the right to pay compensation for

death or permanent disablement under other provisions of the

Act and it provided as follows:

"92-B. Provisions as to other right to claim

compensation for death or permanent disable-

ment (1) The right to claim compensation under

Section 92A in respect of death or permanent

disablement of any person shall be in addition

to any other right (hereafter in this section

referred to as the right on the principle of

fault) to claim compensation in respect there-

of under any other provision of this Act or of

any other law for the time being in force.

(2) A claim for compensation under

Section 92A in respect of death or permanent

disablement of any person shall be disposed of

as expeditiously as possible and where compen-

sation is claimed in respect of such death or

permanent disablement under Section 92A and

also in pursuance of any right on the princi-

ple of fault, the claim for Compensation under

Section 92A shall be disposed of as aforesaid

in the first place.

(3) Notwithstanding anything con-

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tained in subsection (1), where in respect

of the death or permanent disablement of any

person, the person liable to pay compensation

under section 92A is also liable to pay com-

pensation in accordance with the right on the

principle of fault, the person so liable shall

pay the first-mentioned compensation and--

(a) if the amount of the first-

mentioned compensation is less than the amount

of the second-mentioned, he shall be liable to

pay (in addition the first-mentioned compensa-

tion) only so much of the second-mentioned

compen-

38

sation as is equal to the amount by which it

exceeds the first-mentioned compensation;

(b) if the amount of the first-men-

tioned compensation is equal to or legs than

the amount of the secondmentioned compensa-

tion, he shall not be liable to pay the sec-

ond-mentioned compensation."

In section 92-C of the Act, the expression 'permanent

disablement for the purpose of Chapter VII-A was explained.

Section 92-D made the provisions of Chapter VII-A applicable

in relation to any claim in respect of death or permanent

disablement of any person under the Workmen's Compensation

Act, 1923 (8 of 1923) resulting from an accident of the

nature referred to in sub-section (1) of section 92-A.

Section 92-E of the Act gave overriding effect to the provi-

sions of Chapter VII-A over any other provisions of the Act

or of any law for the time being in force.

In Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation v. Ramanbhai

Prabhatbhai & Anr., [1987] 3 SCR 404 a reference has been

made to the background in which Chapter VII A was introduced

in the Act and it has been observed:

"When the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855' was

enacted there were no motor vehicles on the

roads in India. Today, thanks to the modern

civilisation, thousands of motor vehicles are

put on the road and the largest number of

injuries and deaths are taking place on the

roads on account of the motor vehicles acci-

dents. In view of the fast and constantly

increasing volume of traffic, the motor vehi-

cles upon the roads may be regarded to some

extent as coming within the principle of

liability defined in Rylands v. Fletcher,

[1968] LR. 3 HL 330, 340. From the point of

view of the pedestrian the roads of this

country have been rendered by the use of the

motor vehicles highly dangerous. `Hit and run'

cases where the drivers of the motor vehicles

who have caused the accidents are not known

are increasing in number. Where a pedestrian

without negligence on his part is injured or

killed by a motorist whether negligently or

not, he or his legal representatives as the

case may be should be entitled to recover

damages if the principle of social justice

should have any meaning at all. In order to

meet to some extent the responsibility of the

society to the

39

deaths and injuries caused in road accidents

there has been a continuous agitation through

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out the world to make the liability for dam-

ages arising out of motor vehicles accidents

as a liability without fault. In order to meet

the above social demand on the recommendation

of the Indian Law Commission Chapter VIIA was

introduced in the Act. (pp. 4 15-4 16)"

In that case, this Court after taking note of the provi-

sions contained in section 92A has further observed:

"It is thus seen that to a limited extent

relief has been granted under section 92-A of

the Act to the legal representatives of the

victims who have died on account of motor

vehicles accidents. Now they can claim

Rs.15,000 without proof of any negligence on

the part of the owner of the vehicle or of any

other person. This part of the Act is clearly

a departure from the usual common law princi-

ple that a claimant should establish negli-

gence on the part of the owner or driver of

the motor vehicle before claiming any compen-

sation for the death or permanent disablement

caused on account of a motor vehicle accident.

To that extent the substantive law of the

country stands modified." (pp. 41.6-4 17)

It is thus evident that section 92-A was in the nature

of a beneficial legislation enacted with a view to confer

the benefit of expeditious payment of a limited amount by

way of compensation to the victims of an accident arising

out of the use of a motor vehicle on the basis of no fault

liability. In the matter of interpretation of a beneficial

legislation the approach of the courts is to adopt a con-

struction which advances the beneficient purpose underlying

the enactment in preference to a construction which tends to

defeat that purpose. The same approach has been adopted by

this Court while construing the provisions of the Act. See:

Motor Owners' Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Jadavji Keshavji Modi &

Ors., [1982] 1 SCR 860 and Skandia Insurance Co. Ltd. v.

Kokilaben Chandravadan & Ors., [1987] 2 SCR 752.

The expression 'arising out of the use Of motor vehi-

cles" was also used by Parliament in sub-section (1) of

section 110 of the Act wherein provision was made for con-

stitution of Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals for speedy and

expeditious adjudication of claims of compensation in re-

spect of accidents involving death or bodily injuries to

40

persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles or damages

to any property of a third party so arising or both. Fur-

thermore, by subsection (1) of section 94 of the Act an

obligation was imposed that no person shall use except as a

passenger or cause or allow any other person to,use a motor

vehicle in a public place, unless there is in force in

relation to the use of the vehicle by that person or that

other person, as the case may be, a policy of insurance

complying with the requirements of Chapter VIII of the Act.

Section 95 prescribed the requirements of such insurance

policies as well as limits of liability. In clause (b) of

sub-section (1) of section 95, it was laid down that the

policy of insurance required must be a policy which insures

the person or classes of persons specified in the policy to

the extent specified in sub-section (2) against (i) any

liability which may be incurred by him in respect of the

death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any

property of a third party caused by or arising out of the

use of the vehicle in a public place and (ii) the death of

or bodily injury to any passenger of a public service vehi-

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cle caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a

public place. While construing the expression "arising out

of the use of a motor vehicle" in sub-section (1) of section

92-A of the Act, regard will have to be had to the fact that

expressions to the same effect were also contained in sec-

tions 95 and 110 of the Act.

The first submission of Shri Sanghi is based on the

definition of the expression "motor vehicle" contained in

sub-section (18) of section 2 of the Act which was as under:

"2(18) "motor vehicle" means any mechanically

propelled vehicle adapted for use upon roads

whether the power of propulsion is transmitted

thereto from an external or internal source

and includes a chassis to which a body has not

been attached and a trailer, but does not

include a vehicle running upon fixed rails or

a vehicle of a special type adapted for use

only in a factory or in any other enclosed

premises"

Shri Sanghi has urged that the word "adapted" in the

aforesaid provision has been construed by this Court in

Bolani Ores Ltd. etc. v. State of Orissa etc., [1975] 2 SCR

138 to mean suitable or fit for use on the roads and that in

the instant case, it cannot be said that at the time when

the explosion and fire took place the petrol tanker which

was lying turtle was suitable or fit for use on the road. We

find it difficult to accept this contention. The petrol

tanker was a vehicle manufactured for the purpose of trans-

porting petrol. It was a vehicle which had been

41

adapted for such use and was suitable for use on the road

for transporting petrol. At the time when the petrol tanker

collided with the truck on the national highway, it was

being used for the purpose of transporting petrol. It can-

not, therefore, be disputed that when the said collision

took place it was a motor vehicle as the said expression was

defined in section 2(18) of the Act. Did it cease to be

motor vehicle after the collision with the truck on account

of its lying turtle on its side at some distance from the

road as a result of the said collision? In our view, this

question must be answered in the negative. Merely because

the petrol tanker had turned turtle as a result of the

collision and was lying at a short distance away from the

road, does not mean that it had ceased to be suitable or fit

for use on the road and it had ceased to be a motor vehicle.

No material has been placed on record to show that the

petrol tanker would not have been in a position to move

after it was put back on the wheels.

The question whether a vehicle has ceased to be a me-

chanically propelled vehicle has been considered by the

English Courts in cases involving prosecution for offence

under Section 15 of the Vehicles (Excise) Act, 1949 which

imposed a penalty on a person using on a public road any

mechanically propelled vehicle for which a licence under the

said Act was not in force. In Newberry v. Simmonds, [1961] 2

Q.B. 345 the prosecution was in respect of a motor-car whose

engine had been stolen some time prior to the period in

question. It was contended by the owner that since the

engine of the motor-car had been stolen it had ceased to be

a mechanically propelled vehicle. Negativing the said con-

tention, it was held.

"We are, however, satisfied that a motor-car

does not cease to be a mechanically propelled

vehicle upon the mere removal of the engine if

the evidence admits the possibility that the

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engine may shortly be replaced and the motive

power restored." (p. 350)

In Smart v. Allan & Anr., [1963] 1 Q.B. 291 a similar

question arose. Here the defendant had bought a car for

Pounds 2 and subsequently sold it as scrap for 30s. It was

found that the engine was in a rusty condition and was

incomplete and it did not work, and there was no gear-box or

electric batteries; and the car was incapable of moving

under its own power, having been towed from place to place

and that it could only have been put in running order again

by supplying a considerable number of spare parts and ef-

fecting considerable repairs, the ' cost of which would have

been out of all proportion to its value. In

42

support of the prosecution it was urged that every vehicle

which starts its life as a mechanically propelled vehicle

remains such until it is physically destroyed. Rejecting the

said contention, Lord Parker, C.J. observed:

" ...... it seems to me as a matter of

common sense that some limit must be put, and

some stage must be reached, when one can say:

"This is so immobile that "it has ceased to be

a mechanically propelled vehicle." Where, as

in the present case, and unlike Newberry v.

Simmonds, there is no reasonable prospect of

the vehicle ever being made mobile again, it

seems to me that, at any rate at that stage, a

vehicle has ceased to be a mechanically pro-

pelled vehicle". (p. 298)

We are inclined to agree with this formulation.

In the instant case, it cannot be said that the petrol

tanker as a result of the collision with the truck was

damaged to such an extent that was no reasonable prospect of

the vehicle ever being made mobile again. In the circum-

stances, it cannot be held that the petrol tanker which was

a motor vehicle when it collided with the truck had ceased

to be a motor vehicle after the said collision and it could

not be regarded a motor vehicle under Section 2(18) of the

Act at the time when the explosion and fire took place.

The second submission of Shri Sanghi was that even if it

be assumed that at the time when the explosion and fire took

place in the petrol tanker it was a motor vehicle, the

tanker was not being used as a motor vehicle at that time

inasmuch as it was lying immobile on its side. It is, howev-

er, not disputed by Shri Sanghi that at the time when the

petrol tanker had collided with the truck, it was being used

as a motor vehicle but his submission was that the said user

came to an end on such collision when the petrol tanker

turned turtle and was rendered immobile. This contention

postulates a restricted meaning for the word "use" in the

expression "use of the motor vehicle" by confining it to a

situation when the vehicle is mobile. The learned counsel,

for the respondent has, on the other hand, suggested a wider

connotation for the word "use" so as to include the period

when the vehicle is stationary and has invited our attention

to the observations in Elliott v. Grey, [1960] 1 Q.B. 367;

Government Insurance Office South Wales v. R.J. Green &

Lloyd Pty. Ltd., [1965] 114 CLR 437; Pushpa Rani Chopra v.

Anokha Singh & Ors., [1975] ACJ 396;

43

General Manager, K.S.R.T.C. v. S. Satalingappa & Ors.,

[1979] ACJ 452 and Oriental Fire & General Insurance Co.

Ltd. v. Suman Navnath Rajguru & Ors., [1985] ACJ 243.

Elliott v. Grey, supra related to prosecution for of-

fence under section 35(1) of the Road Traffic Act, 1930 for

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using a motor car on road without there being in force in

relation to such user an insurance policy in respect of

third-party risks complying with the requirements of Part 2

of the said Act. The motor car of the appellant was standing

on the road outside the appellant's house for the past few

months, after it broke down and in the meanwhile the insur-

ance cover of the motor car had terminated. While it was

thus parked, another motor vehicle had collided with appel-

lant's motor car. On that date, the appellant had cleaned

the car, sent the battery to be recharged and had replaced

the old carburettor with a new one. The car could not be

mechanically propelled because the engine would not work. On

behalf of the appellant it was urged that the ordinary use

of the words "to use" in relation to a motor car contem-

plates some active movement, either driving it or taking

part in a journey in it or moving it and the word "use" is

quite inapt in relation to a motor car which cannot be used

because it is out of action. The said contention was reject-

ed. The word "use"was construed in a wider sense to mean "to

have the advantage of a vehicle as a means of transport

including for any period or time between journeys". In

taking this view, Lord Parker, C.J. stated that he was

influenced by the fact that section 35. appeared in Part 2

of the Road Traffic Act under the heading "Provisions

against third party risks arising out of the use of motor

vehicles" which is intended for protection of third parties.

Similarly in Government Insurance Office of New South

Wales v. R.J. Green & Lloyd Pty. Ltd., supra Barwick, CJ,

while construing the word 'use' in Motor Vehicles (Third

Party Insurance) Act, 1942-1951 (N.S.W.) has observed that

the said Act indicated an intention to cover a very wide

field, a field more extensive than what might be called the

traffic use of the motor vehicle. The learned Chief Justice

has further observed: "In my opinion, the relevant use of

the vehicle cannot be confined to the periods it is in

motion, or its parts moving in some operation. It may be in

use though stationary".

In Pushpa Rani Chopra & Ors. v. Anokha Singh & Ors.,

supra a learned Judge of the Delhi High Court, while con-

struing the word 'use' in section 110 of the Act, has held

that the said word has been used in a wider sense and it

covers all employments of the motor vehicle on the

44

public places including its driving, parking, keeping sta-

tionarys repairing, or leaving unattended on the road or for

any other purpose. In that case, the truck in question was

stationary as its axle had broken down and it was parked on

the road at the time of the accident.

In General Manager, K.S.R.T.C. v. S. Satalingappa and

Ors.,' supra the vehicle in question was a transport bus

which was stationed by its driver on a slope unattended. The

bus suddenly started moving and dashed against a tea shop.

It was held by a Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court

that the bus was in use at that time.

In Oriental Fire & General Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Suman Nav-

nath Rajguru and Ors., supra a petrol tanker was parked

near' the footpath on the road in front of a petrol pump and

it burst and explOded causing fatal injuries to a passerby.

A Division Bench of the Bombay High Court rejected the

contention that at the material time, the petrol tanker was

not in 'use'.

These decisions indicate that the word "use", in the

context of motor vehicles, has been construed in a wider

sense to include the period when the vehicle is not moving

and is stationary, being either parked on the road and when

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it is not in a position to move due to some break-down or

mechanical defect. Relying on the abovementioned decisions,

the Appellate Bench of the High Court had held that the

expression "use of a motor vehicle" in section 92-A covers

accidents which occur both when the vehicle is in motion and

when it is stationary. With reference to the facts of the

present. case the learned Judges have observed that the

tanker in question'while proceeding along National Highway

No. 4 (i.e. while in use) after colliding with a motor lorry

was lying on the side and that it cannot be claimed that

after the collision the use of the tanker had ceased only

because it was disabled. We are in agreement with the said

approach of the High Court. In our opinion, the word "use"

has a wider connotation to cover the period when the vehicle

is not moving and is stationary and the use of a vehicle

does not cease on account of the vehicle having been ren-

dered immobile on account of a break-down or mechanical

defect or accident. In the circumstances, it cannot be said

that the petrol tanker was not in the use at the time when

it was lying on its side after the collision with the truck.

The only other question which remains to be considered

is whether the explosion and fire which caused injuries to

the deceased son of the respondent can be said to have taken

place due to an

45

accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle viz. the

petrol tanker. Shri Sanghi has urged that the expression

'arising out of the use of a motor vehicle' implies a causal

relationship between the user of the motor vehicle and the

accident which has resulted in death or disablement and that

in the present case it cannot be said that the explosion and

fire which took place in the petrol tanker four and half

hours after' the collision and after the tanker had turned

turtle was an accident arising out of the use of the petrol

tanker. In this regard, Shri Sanghi has emphasised that the

persons who sustained injuries as a result of the explosion

and fire in the-petrol tanker were pilfering petrol which

had leaked out from the petrol tanker and the explosion and

fire was the result of the said unlawful activity of those

persons and that it was not on account of the user of the

petrol tanker. Shri Sanghi, in this 'connection, has placed

reliance on the decision in Mackinnon Machkenzie & Co. Pvt.

Ltd. v. Ibrahim Mahommed Issak, [1970] 1 SCR 869 wherein

this Court has construed the expression 'arising out of

employment' appearing in section 3 of the Workmen's Compen-

sation Act, 1923 and has laid down that there must be a

causal relationship between the accident and the employment.

Shri Sanghi has urged that similarly there must be a causal

relationship between the accident and the user of the motor

vehicle for the purpose of maintainability of a claim under

section 92A of the Act.

With regard to the submission of Shri Sanghi that the

persons who sustained injuries as a result of the explosion

and fire in the' petrol tanker were pilfering petrol which

had leaked out from the tanker and that the explosion and

fire was the result of this unlawful activity of those

persons, we find that Claims Tribunal has recorded a finding

that persons from the village Kavatha had gathered with

their tins and barrels with the intention to pilfer petrol

from the tanker and while pilfering the petrol probably

ignition was caused by friction, but the said finding of the

Claims Tribunal has not been upheld by the High Court. The

learned Single Judge has observed:

"The learned member was influenced by the fact

that certain villagers were trying to pilfer

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from the tanker to indicate that the explosion

was a direct consequence of the attempt of

pilfering the petrol from the tanker. In my

view, the learned member was not justified in

proceeding on the assumption that all the

injured and the deceased were engaged in

pilfering the petrol and the explosion was a

direct consequence of the same...............

It would not be just to hold that all the

injured as also the deceased

46

who met their fate on account of the explosion

were all engaged in the crime of pilfering of

the petrol."

The Appellate Bench affirming the said finding of the

learned Single Judge has laid down:

"The learned Single Judge has also rightly

pointed out that there was also no evidence

whatsoever that the person or persons in

respect of whose deaths compensation had been

claimed under section 92-A were themselves

actually committing theft or pilferage of

petrol at the time of their deaths. These

victims could have been only curious bystand-

ers at the site of the accident.... We find

that in the instant case the papers and docu-

ments including the F.I.R. and the panchnama

produced before the Tribunal did not establish

that the fire was ignited by someone careless-

ly throwing a match stick."

We find no ground for interfering with these findings

recorded by the High Court and we must proceed on the basis

that the persons who sustained injuries as a result of the

explosion and fire in the petrol tanker were not indulging

in any unlawful activity which may have caused the said

explosion and fire. The matter has, therefore, to be exam-

ined in the light of the meaning to be assigned to the words

"arising out of" in the expression "accident arising out of

the use of a motor vehicle" in section 92-A.

The words "arising out of" have been used in various

statutes in different contexts and have been construed by

Courts widely as well as narrowly, keeping in view the

context in which they have been used in a particular legis-

lation.

In Heyman v. Darwins Ltd., [1942] A.C. 356 while con-

struing the arbitration clause in a contract, Lord Porter

expressed the view that as compared to the word "under", the

expression "arising out of" has a wider meaning. In Union of

India v. E.B. Aaby's Rederi A/S, [1975] A.C. 797 Viscount

Discount Dilhorne and Lord Salmon stated that they could not

discover any difference between the expression "arising out

of" and "arising under" and they equated "arising out of" in

the arbitration clause in a Charter Party with "arising

under".

In Samick Lines Co. Ltd. v. Owners of the Antonis P.

Lemos, [1985] 2 WLR 468 the House of Lords was considering

the question

47

whether a claim for damages based on negligence in tort

could be regarded as a claim arising out of an agreement

under section 20(2)(1)(h) of the Supreme Court Act, 1981 and

fell within the Admiralty jurisdiction of the High Court.

The words "any claim arising out of any agreement relating

to the carriage of goods in a ship or to the use or hire of

a ship" in section 20(2)(i)(h) were held to be wide enough

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to cover claims, whether in contract or tort arising out of

any agreement relating to the carriage of goods in a vessel

and it was also held that for such an agreement to come

within paragraph (h), it was not necessary that the claim in

question be directly connected with some agreement of the

kinds referred to in it. The words "arising out of were not

construed to mean "arising under" as in Union of India v.

E.B. Aaby's A/S, supra which decision was held inapplicable

to the construction of section 20(2)(1)(h) and it was ob-

served by Lord Brandon:

"With regard to the first point, I would

readily accept that in certain contexts the

expression "arising out of" may, on the ordi-

nary and natural meaning of the words use, be

the equivalent of the expression "arising

under", and not that of the wider expression

"connected with". In my view however; the'

expression "arising out of' is, on the ordi-

nary and natural meaning of the words used,

capable, in other contexts; of being the

equivalent of the Wider expression "connected

with". Whether the expression "arising out of

has the narrower or the wider meaning in any

particular ease must depend on the context in

which it is used".

keeping in view the context in Which the expression was used

in the statute it was construed to have the wider meaning

viz. "connected With".

In the context of motor accidents the expressions

"caused by" and "arising out of" are often used in statutes.

Although both these expression's imply a causal relation-

ship: between the accident resulting in injury and the use

of the motor vehicle but they differ in the degree of prox-

imity of such relationship. This distinction has been lucid-

ly brought out in the decision of the High Court of Austra-

lia in Government Insurance Office of N. S.W. v. R.J.

Green's, case supra wherein Lord Barwick, CJ has stated:

"Bearing in mind the general purpose of the

Act I think the expression 'arising out of

must be taken to require a less

48

proxionship of the injury to the relevant use

of the vehicle than is required to satisfy the

words `caused by'. It may be that an associa-

tion of the injury with the use of the vehicle

while it cannot be said that that use was

causally related to the injury may yet be

enough to satisfy the expression 'arise out

of' as used in the Act and in the policy." (p.

433)

In the same case, Windeyer, J. has observed as under:

"The words 'injury caused by or arising out of

the use of the vehicle' postulate a causal

relationship between the use of the vehicle

and the injury. `Caused by' connotes a `di-

rect' or 'proximate' relationship of cause and

effect. 'Arising out of' extends this to a

result that is less immediate; but it still

carries a sense of consequence." (p. 447)

This would show that as compared to the expression

"caused by", the expression "arising out of" has a wider

connotation. The expression "caused by" was used in sections

95(1)(b)(i) and (ii) and 96(2)(b)(ii) of the Act. In section

92-A, Parliament, however, chose to use the expression

"arising out of" which indicates that for the purpose of

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awarding compensation under section 92-A, the causal rela-

tionship between the use of the motor vehicle and the acci-

dent resulting in death or permanent disablement is not

required to be direct and proximate and it can be less

immediate. This would imply that accident should be connect-

ed with the use of the motor vehicle but the said connection

need not be direct and immediate. This construction of the

expression "arising out of the use of a motor vehicle" in

section 92-A enlarges the field of protection made available

to the victims of an accident and is in consonance with the

beneficial object underlying the enactment.

Was the accident involving explosion and fire in the

petrol tanker connected with the use of tanker as a motor

vehicle? In our view, in the facts and circumstances of the

present case, this question must be answered in the affirma-

tive. The High Court has found that the tanker in question

was carrying petrol which is a highly combustible and vola-

tile material and after the collision with the other motor

vehicle the tanker had fallen on one of its sides on sloping

ground resulting in escape of highly inflammable petrol and

that there was grave risk of explosion and fire from the

petrol coming out of the tanker. In the

49

light of the aforesaid circumstances the learnedJudges of

the High Court have rightly concluded that the collision

between the tanker and the other vehicle which had occurred

earlier and the escape of petrol from the tanker which

ultimately resulted in the explosion and fire were not

unconnected but related events and merely because there was

interval of about four to four and half hours between the

said collision and the explosion and fire in the tanker, it

cannot be necessarily inferred that there was no Causal

relation between explosion and fire. In the circumstances,

it must be held that the explosion and fire resulting in the

injuries which led to the death of Deepak Uttam More was due

to an accident arising out of the use of the motor vehicle

viz. the petrol tanker No. MKL 7461.

Shri Sanghi has also raised a question as to the proce-

dure to be followed by the Claims Tribunal while/adjudicat-

ing claims under section 92A of the Act and has submitted

that such claims have to be adjudicated upon like other

claims under section 110A of the Act and that claimant must

first adduce evidence to establish his/her case and that the

owner as well as the insurer of the vehicle in question must

have a right to adduce evidence to rebut the same. In this

context, it may be mentioned that procedure for adjudication

of a claim petition under Section 110A of the Act by the

Accident Claims Tribunal is contained in Rules 291 to 311 of

the Bombay Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989, (hereinafter referred

to as 'the Rules'). The said Rules prescribe a form for

filing a claim petition and the documents to be filed along-

with it (Rule 291), examination of the applicant (Rule 293),

issue of notice to the opposite party (Rule 297), filing of

written statement by the opposite party (Rule 298), framing

of issues (Rule 299), recording of evidence (Rules 300 and

301), local inspection (Rule 302) and judgment and award of

compensation (Rule 306).

After the enactment of section 92-A, amendments have

been made in the Rules in 1984.

In Rule 291A which has been inserted by such amendments,

it has been provided that:

"Notwithstanding anything contained in rule

291, every application, for a: claim under

section 92A shall be filed before the Claims

Tribunal in triplicate and shall be signed by

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the appellant and the following documents be

appended to every such application, namely,

50

(i) Panchnama of the accident;

(ii) First information report;

(iii) Injury CertifiCate or in case of death,

postmortem report or death certificate and;

(iv) a certificate regarding ownership and

insurance particulars of vehicle involved in

the accident from the Regional Transport

Officer or the Police".

Rule 297 was substituted by the fallowing, provision:

"297. Notice to opposite party (1) If the

application is not

dismissed under rule 296, the Claims Tribunal

shall, on an application in writing made to it

by the applicant, sent to the owner or the

driver of the vehicle or both from whom the

applicant claims relief (here in after re-

ferred to as "the opposite party") and the

insurer, a copy of the application, together

with a notice of the date on which it will

dispose of the application, and may call Upon

the parties to produce on that date any evi-

dence which they may wish to tender.

(2) Where the applicant makes a claim

for compensation under section 92A, the Claims

Tribunal shall give notice to the owner and

insurer, if any, of the vehicle involved in

the accident directing them to appeal on a

date not later than ten days from the date of

issue of such notice The date so fixed for

such appearance shall also be not later than

fifteen days from the receipt of the claims

application filed by the claimant. The Claims

Tribunal shall state in such notice that in

case they fail to appear on such appointed

date the Tribunal will, proceed ex parte on

the presumption that they have no contention

to make against the award of compensation."

Rule 306 A empowers the Claims Tribunal to obtain what-

ever supplementary information and documents which may be

found necessary from the police, medical and other authori-

ties and proceed to award the claim whether the parties who

were given notice to appear or not on the appointed date.

Rule 306B lays down:

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"(1) The Claims Tribunal shall proceed to

award the claim of compensation under section

92A on the basis of (i) registration certifi-

cate of the motor vehicle involved in the

accident;

(ii) insurance certificate or policy relating

to the insurance of the vehicle against third

party risks;

(iii) panchnama and first information report;

(iv) post-mortem certificate or death certifi-

cate; or certificate of injury from the medi-

cal officer; and

(v) the nature of the treatment given by the

medical officer who has examined the victim.

(2) The Claims Tribunal in passing

orders, shall make an award of compensation of

fifteen thousand rupees in respect of the

death and of seven thousand five hundred

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rupees in respect of the permanent disablement

to be paid by insurer or owner of the vehicle

involved in the accident.

(3) Where compensation is awarded to

two or more persons, the Claims Tribunal shall

also specify the amount payable to each of

them.

(4) The Claims Tribunal in passing

order under subrule (2) shall direct the

insurer or owner of the vehicle involved in

the accident to pay the amount of compensation

to the claimant within two weeks from the date

of the said order.

(5) The Claims Tribunal shall as far

as possible dispose of the application for

compensation within forty-five days from the

date of receipt of such application".

Rule 306C prescribes the procedure of disbursement of

compensation under Section 92A to the legal heirs in case of

death. The submission of Shri Sanghi is that in spite of the

aforesaid amendments which have been introduced in the Rules

after the enactment of section 92A, the Claims Tribunal is

required to follow the procedure contained in the other

rules before awarding compensation under section 92A of the

Act. In other words, it must proceed to adjudicate the claim

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after the opposite party is afforded an opportunity to file

the written submission under Rule 298, by framing issues

under Rule 299 and after recording evidence in accordance

with rules 300 and 301 and that it is not permissible for

the Claims Tribunal to make an order purely on the basis of

the documents referred to in Rules 29 IA, 306A and 306B. In

our opinion, the said submission of Shri Sanghi cannot be

accepted. The object underlying the enactment of section 92A

is to make available to the claimant compensation amount to

the extent of Rs. 15,000 in case of death and Rs.7,500 in

case of permanent disablement as expeditiously as possible

and the said award has to be made before adjudication of the

claim under section 110A of the Act. This would be apparent

from the provisions of section 92B of the Act. Section

92B(2) of the Act provides that a claim for compensation

under section 92A in respect of death or permanent disable-

ment of any person shall be disposed of as expeditiously as

possible and where compensation is claimed in respect of

such death or permanent disablement under section 92A and

also in pursuance of any right on the principle of fault,

the claim for compensation under section 92A shall be dis-

posed of'as aforesaid in the first place. With a view to

give effect to the said directive contained in section 92B

of the Act, the Maharashtra Government has amended the Rules

and has inserted special provisions in respect of claims

under section 92A in rules 291A, 291B, 297(2), 306A, 306B,

306C and 306D of the Rules. The object underlying the said

provisions is to enable expeditious disposal of a claim

petition under Section 92A of the Act. The said object would

be defeated if the Claims Tribunal is required to hold a

regular trial in the same manner as for adjudicating a claim

petition under section 110 A of the Act. Morever, for award-

ing compensation under section 92A of the Act, the Claims

Tribunal is required to satisfy itself in respect of the

following matters:

(i) an accident has arisen out of the use of a

motor vehicle;

(ii) the said accident has resulted in

permanent disablement of the person who is

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making the claim or death of the person whose

legal representative is making the claim;

(iii) the claim is made against the

owner and the insurer of the motor vehicle

involved in the accident;

The documents referred to in Rules 291A and 306B will

enable the Claims Tribunal to ascertain the necessary facts

in regard to these matters. The panchnama and the First

information Report will show

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whether the accident had arisen out of the use of the motor

vehicle in question. The Injury Certificate or the post-

mortem report will show the nature of injuries and the cause

of death. The Registration Certificate and Insurance Certif-

icate of the motor vehicle will indicate who is the owner

and insurer of the vehicle. In the event of the Claims

Tribunal feeling doubtful about the correctness or genuine-

ness of any of these documents or if it considers it neces-

sary to obtain supplementary information or documents, Rules

306A empowers the Claims Tribunal to obtain such supplemen-

tary information or documents from the Police, medical or

other authorities. This would show that Rules 291A, 306A and

306B contain adequate provisions which would enable the

Claims Tribunal to satisfy itself in respect of the matters

necessary for awarding compensation under section 92A of the

Act and in view of these special provisions which were

introduced in the Rules by the amendments in 1984, the

Claims Tribunal is not required to follow the normal proce-

dure prescribed under the Act and the Rules with regard to

adjudication of a claim under section 110A of the Act for

the purpose of making an order on a claim petition under

section 92A of the Act.

In the result, we find no merit in this special leave

petition which is accordingly dismissed. By order dated

January 7, 1991, while directing issue of notice on the

special leave petition, it was ordered that the issue of the

said notice shall be subject to the condition that the

petitioners shall deposit a sum of Rs.5,000 in the Registry

of this Court towards cost of the respondent and that the

notice shall be issued only after the amount of cost has

been deposited and the said amount shall be paid over to the

respondent on her putting in appearance in this Court and

the payment of the amount of cost to the respondent shall be

irrespective of the result of the special leave petition. In

view of the said order, no further direction with regard to

costs is necessary.

G.N. Petition dismissed.

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