No Acts & Articles mentioned in this case
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 16
TH
DAY OF JANUARY, 2021
BEFORE
THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE V. SRISHANANDA
CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION NO.126 OF 2015
BETWEEN:
SHIVAKUMAR
S/O BHUTAIAH,
AGED ABOUT 24 YEARS
R/O TARUR, SIRA TALUK
TUMKUR DISTRICT-572125
...PETITIONER
(BY SRI. SUYOGA, ADVOCATE FOR
SRI. ARUNA SHYAM M, ADVOCATE )
AND:
THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
REPRESENTED KORA
POLICE STATION,
TUMKUR DISTRICT
REPRESENTED BY ITS
STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
HIGH COURT BUILDING,
HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
BANGALORE-560 001.
…RESPONDENT
(BY SRI.K.S.ABHIJITH,HIGH COURT GOVERNMENT
PLEADER)
R
2
* * *
THIS CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION IS FILED
UNDER SECTION 397 OF CR.P.C. PRAYING TO SET-ASIDE
THE ORDER DATED 23.12.2014 PASSED BY THE LEARNED
PRESIDING OFFICER, FAST TRACT COURT AT TUMKUR, IN
CRL.A.NO.101/2013 AND ALSO THE ORDER DATED
11.09.2013 PASSED BY THE LEARNED II-ADDL. CIVIL
JUDGE AND JMFC COURT AT TUMKUR, IN
C.C.NO.3685/2011 AND CONSEQUENTLY ACQUIT THE
PETITIONER.
THIS CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION IS COMING ON
FOR FINAL HEARING, THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE
FOLLOWING:
O R D E R
This revision petition is filed against the judgme nt in
C.C. No.3685/2011 on the file of II Additional Civil Judge
and J.M.F.C, Tumkur, wherein, the court convicted t he
accused-revision petitioner for the offences punish able
under Section 279 and 304A of Indian Penal Code (fo r
short ‘IPC’) read with Section 187 of the Indian Mo tor
Vehicles Act (for short ‘IMV Act’) and sentenced th e
accused to pay a fine of Rs.500/- for the sentence under
Section 279 of IPC and simple imprisonment for a period of
two months with a default sentence of simple
3
imprisonment for 10 days and for offence punishable under
Section 304A of IPC simple imprisonment for a perio d of
one year and a fine of Rs.1,000/- with a default sentence
simple imprisonment for 15 days and for the offence
punishable under Section 187 of IMV Act the accused was
sentenced to pay a fine of Rs.500/- with a default sentence
of simple imprisonment of 10 days which was confirmed in
Crl.A No.101/2013 on the file of Fast Track Court, Tumkur
by judgment dated 23.12.2014.
2. Brief facts which are necessary for disposal o f this
revision petition are as under:
A complaint came to be filed with the Rural Police Station,
Tumkur contending that on 21.09.2011 at about 5:40 p.m.
at Kora bus stop on National Highway-4, Narasimhasw amy
(hereinafter referred to as 'deceased' for short) who was
a postman was standing on the left side of the road in
order to hand over the post bag to a bus. At that
juncture, a lorry bearing No.KA-52-5166 driven by i ts
driver in a rash and negligent manner coming from
4
Tumkur towards Sira, dashed against deceased whereb y,
he sustained grievous injuries on his head and his head
separated from the body and he died on the spot.
3. It is further contended that the driver of the lorry ran
away from the spot without intimating the accident to the
police. On registration of the case, the police investigated
the matter in detail and Circle Inspector of Rural Police
Station, Tumkur filed a charge sheet against the accused
for the offences punishable under Sections 279 and 304A
of IPC and Section 187 of the IMV Act.
4. On receipt of charge sheet, the learned Magistra te
took cognizance of the offences alleged against the
accused and secured the presence of the accused and
charge was framed.
5. The accused did not plead guilty. As such trial was
held. Prosecution in order to prove the case of th e
prosecution, examined in all 11 witnesses who were
examined as PWs.1 to 11 and relied on 11 documents
5
which were exhibited and marked as Exs.P1 to P11. After
conclusion of the prosecution evidence, accused statement
as contemplated under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. was
recorded wherein, the accused denied all the incriminating
circumstances. There was no defence evidence placed by
the accused. Learned Magistrate on cumulative
consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record,
after hearing the parties, passed the order of conviction
and sentence as referred supra.
6. Being aggrieved by the judgment of the learned
Magistrate, the accused preferred an appeal before the
Fast Track Court, Tumkur in Crl.A No.101/2013.
7. First Appellate Court secured the records and af ter
hearing the parties in detail, confirmed the judgment of
the learned Magistrate and dismissed the appeal. I t is
those judgments, which are the subject matter of th is
revision petition.
6
8. Learned counsel for the revision petitioner Shri
Suyoga submits that Shri Aruna Shyam has been
appointed as Additional Advocate General and theref ore,
he may be permitted to file a memo of appearance an d
argue the matter. He is permitted to file a memo o f
appearance within a week from today.
9. This court heard the arguments of Shri Suyoga,
learned counsel for revision petitioner and Shri K. S.
Abhijith, learned High Court Government Pleader
representing the State Public Prosecutor and perused the
records.
10. Sri Suyoga submits that the trial court as well as the
first appellate court have wrongly convicted the accused
for the offence punishable under Sections 279 and 304A of
IPC read with Section 187 of IMV Act. He further contends
that the material evidence on record has not been properly
appreciated by the trial court and ignored by the f irst
appellate court. Alternatively, he submits that th e
sentence as ordered by the trial court, confirmed by the
7
first appellate court is excessive and thus sought for
allowing the revision petition by granting probatio n or
reducing the period of sentence.
11. Per contra, learned High Court Government Plead er
supported the impugned judgments and prayed for
dismissal of the revision petition.
12. In view of the rival contentions, following poi nts
arises for consideration:
(i) Whether the finding recorded by
the Magistrate that accused is responsible for
the accidental death of Narasimhaswamy
involving a lorry bearing No.KA-52-5166 on
21.09.2011 at 5:40 p.m. near Kora bus stand
on account of the rash and negligent driving of
the driver of the lorry which is confirmed by the
first appellate court in Crl. A No.101/2013 is
erroneous?
(ii) Whether the sentence as ordered
by the learned Magistrate and confirmed by the
first appellate court is excessive?
8
The above said points are answered in negative and partly
in affirmative respectively for the following reasons:-
REASONS
13. POINT NO.1: In the case on hand, even though at
the time of recording the accused statement, the accused
has denied the accident, the material available on record
especially the post mortem report, seizure of lorry, spot
sketch and the oral evidence placed by the prosecut ion
clearly establish that the deceased was a postman waiting
near Kora bus stop for handing over the post bag to a bus,
lost his life in the road traffic accident that occurred on
21.09.2011 at about 5:40 p.m. The material available on
record clearly establish that it is the negligent driving of
the accused which resulted in the accident as noted by
learned Magistrate while appreciating the testimony of eye
witnesses.
14. It is also pertinent to note that accused did not lead
his evidence or atleast file a written submission at the time
of recording the accused statement as to his version of the
9
case. Under the circumstances, the learned Magistrate was
justified in convicting the accused.
15. The learned judge in the first appellate court, re-
appreciated the material on record and concurred with the
finding recorded by the learned Magistrate.
16. This court even after re-appreciation of the e ntire
material on the record in the light of the argument s
advanced on behalf of the revision petitioner, noticed that
eyewitness - PW-2 (Yathish) did not possess any previous
enmity and animosity against accused to depose fals ely.
Therefore, the defence theory that prosecution has not
proved its case with cogent evidence cannot be
countenanced in law. Since, eye-witness has given clear
account of the incident with graphic details and with all
certainty, this court does not find any patent defect or
error of jurisdiction or legal infirmity so as to interfere with
the said finding of both the courts in this revision petition.
Accordingly, Point No.1 is answered in negative.
10
17. POINT NO.2: Insofar as sentence is concerned,
learned counsel for the revision petitioner has contended
that the accused was aged 22 years as on the date o f
accident and therefore, liberal and lenient view ma y be
taken by reducing the sentence. In this regard he relies
on the unreported judgment in Crl.R.P. No.100025/20 14
(Ulas Vs. State of Karnataka) and sought for grant of
probation. Paras 10 to 12 of the said order is culled out
hereunder:
"10. Though the learned counsel for the
petitioner has cited several rulings of this
Court, wherein this Court had occasion to
discuss and deal with similar cases and under
distant circumstances this Court has imposed
fine instead of imposing substantive sentence
of imprisonment for the offence under Section
304A of IPC. In some of the cases, this court
has reduced the imprisonment to a lesser
sentence. Therefore, it goes without saying
that there is discretion vested with the court
either to impose substantive sentence of
11
imprisonment or to impose fine or with both
under Section 304A of IPC.
11. In this regard, the decision cited by
the learned High Court Government Pleader in
my opinion should be borne in mind because in
this case, the Hon'ble Apex Court has virtually
issued guidelines under what circumstances
the courts have to deal with the accident
matters in imposing the sentence on the
accused person. The above cited ruling
reported in 2012(2) SCC 182 in which the
Hon'ble Apex Court has held that:
"Motor accident - Death caused by rash
and negligent driving - quantum of sentence -
considerations - Bus and truck, being driven in
a rash and negligent manner by both drivers,
collided with each other - Five persons
travelling in bus died - Trial Court convicted
both respondent - accused (drivers of bus and
truck) and directed them to undergo Rigorous
imprisonment for two years each - sentence
upheld by Sessions Judge - High Court
considering that respondent - accused had
suffered a protracted trial for about 17 years
and had already undergo custody for 15 days,
12
reduced quantum of sentence to period already
undergone but enhancing the amount to
Rs.25,000/- each."
The Apex Court has in fact disapproved
the observations made by the High Court,
holding that the Probation of Offenders Act,
1958 is not applicable to the offence under
Sections 304A of IPC, the Court held that:
"Criminal Courts cannot treat nature of
offence under Section 304A IPC as attracting
benevolent provisions of Probation of Offenders
Act - One of the prime considerations in
determining quantum of sentence for offence
of causing death or injury by rash and
negligent driving of automobiles should be
deterrence - For lessening high rate of motor
accidents due to careless and callous driving of
vehicles, courts are expected to consider all
relevant facts and circumstances bearing on
question of sentence and proceed to impose a
sentence commensurate with gravity of offence
- sentence of six months Rigorous
imprisonment and fine of Rs.5,000/- each
imposed."
13
12. In view of the above said guidelines,
this Court has to strike a balance as to what
would be the proper and correct sentence that
could be passed against the petitioner herein."
18. However, the age is not the criteria in the facts
and circumstances of this case to reduce the sentence or
to show lenience.
19. Insofar as the decision rendered in
Crl.R.P.2152/2011 in the case of S H Manjanna Vs.
State, relied on by the learned counsel for the revision
petitioner wherein, for the offence punishable unde r
Section 304-A of IPC, the co-ordinate bench of this court
proceeded to grant the benefit of probation to the accused.
The relevant portion is culled out hereunder:
"13. Having taken note of the peculiar
circumstances of the case and the principles
laid down in the judgment of the Apex Court
referred supra, the question of invoking section
4 and 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act,
does not arise in the case on hand. Due to the
14
impact two lives are lost. One is the driver and
another person who was in the cabin of the
lorry. However taking into note of the accident
is of the year 2003, and almost 16 years time
has been elapsed and instead of sending him
to serve the sentence of imprisonment for a
period of six months as imposed by the lower
appellate Court and also taking note of the
nature of job of the petitioner herein being a
driver of KSRTC and also this Court in the
earlier judgments instead of imposing sentence
of simple imprisonment, taken note of loss of
life of persons, the same can be compensated
by enhancing the fine amount and the
sentence of imprisonment can be waived off
and ordered to pay fine amount as
compensation to the L.Rs., of deceased
persons.
14. In the case on hand two persons have
lost life and hence instead of ordering for
sentencing him to undergo simple
imprisonment which affects his service, it is
appropriate to impose fine of Rs.1,00,000/-
and out of that an amount of Rs.45,000/- each
can be paid in favour of the L.Rs., of the
15
deceased persons. The remaining amount of
Rs.10,000/- should go to the State."
20. But, in the case of State of Punjab Vs. Saurabh
Bakshi, reported in (2015) 5 SCC 182, it has been held
as under:
"8. It is submitted by Mr.Madhukar that
when the prosecution had been able to establish
the charges levelled against the respondent and
both the trial court and the appellate court had
maintained the sentence there was no
justification on the part of the High Court to
reduce the sentence to the period already
undergone solely on the basis that the
respondent had paid some compensation. It is
his further submission that keeping in view the
gravity of the offence that two deaths had
occurred the High Court should have kept itself
alive to the nature of the crime and should have
been well advised not to interfere with the
quantum of sentence. He has commended us to
the decisions in State of Punjab v. Balwinder
Singh [State of Punjab v. Balwinder Singh,
(2012) 2 SCC 182 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 706]
and Guru Basavaraj v. State of Karnataka [Guru
16
Basavaraj Vs. State of Karnataka, (2012) 8 SCC
734 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 594 : (2013) 1 SCC
(Cri)972] .
9. Ms Meenakshi, learned Senior Counsel,
per contra, has contended that the respondent
was quite young at the time the accident took
place and it may be an act of negligence, but the
contributory facet by the Maruti car driver
cannot be ruled out. That apart, there are
mitigating circumstances for reduction of the
sentence and in the obtaining factual matrix the
High Court has appositely adopted corrective
machinery which also reflects the concept of
proportionality. The learned Senior Counsel
would also submit that when the High Court has
exercised the discretion which is permissible
under Section 304-A IPC this Court should be
slow to interfere. It is urged by her that when
the compensation had been paid, the High Court
has kept in view the aspect of rehabilitation of
the victim and when that purpose have been
subserved the reduction of sentence should not
be interfered with. The learned Senior Counsel
has drawn inspiration from Gopal Singh v. State
of Uttarakhand [Gopal Singh v. State of
Uttarakhand, (2013) 7 SCC 545 : (2013) 3 SCC
(Cri) 608] and a recent judgment in Criminal
17
Appeal No. 290 of 2015 titled State of
M.P. v. Mehtaab [State of M.P. v. Mehtaab,
(2015) 5 SCC 197 : (2015) 2 Scale 386].
10. At the outset, it is essential to note that
the respondent stood convicted by the trial court
as well as by the appellate court. The findings
recorded by the said two courts are neither
perverse nor did they call for interference in
exercise of the revisional jurisdiction. The High
Court as we notice has been persuaded by the
factum of payment of compensation by the
respondent herein, amounting to Rs 85,000 to
the legal representatives of deceased Jagdish
Ram and his nephew and the said compensation
had been directed to be paid by virtue of the
order dated 19-9-2013 [Saurabh Bakshi v. State
of Punjab, Criminal Revision No. 2955 of 2013,
order dated 19-9-2013 (P&H)] passed by the
High Court. It is submitted by Ms Arora that
apart from the young age of the respondent at
the time of occurrence the aforesaid aspect
would constitute the mitigating factor.
11. In Mehtaab case [State of M.P. VS.
Mehtaab, (2015) 5 SCC 197 : (2015) 2 Scale
386] a two-Judge Bench was dealing with the
18
case under Section 304-A IPC wherein the
respondent was convicted under Sections 304-A
and 337 IPC and sentenced to undergo one
year's and three months' rigorous imprisonment,
respectively. The High Court had reduced the
sentence to 10 days. It is apt to note here that
in that case the deceased had received injuries
due to shock of electric current. The Court took
note of the submission of the learned counsel for
the State and proceeded to opine as follows:
(SCC p. 199, paras 6-7)
“6. The learned counsel for the State
submitted that the respondent-accused
had installed a transformer in his field and
left the electric wires naked which was a
negligent act. The deceased Sushila Bai
died on account of the said naked wire
which had high voltage and was not visible
in the dark. The offence having been fully
proved by the evidence on record, the
High Court was not justified in reducing
the sentence to 10 days which was not
just and fair. Even if liberal view on
sentence of imprisonment was to be taken,
the High Court ought to have enhanced
the sentence of fine and awarded a
19
reasonable compensation as a condition
for reduction of sentence.
7. We find force in the submission. It
is the duty of the Court to award just
sentence to a convict against whom charge
is proved. While every mitigating or
aggravating circumstance may be given
due weight, mechanical reduction of
sentence to the period already undergone
cannot be appreciated. Sentence has to be
fair not only to the accused but also to the
victim and the society. It is also the duty
of the court to duly consider the aspect of
rehabilitating the victim. Unfortunately,
these factors are missing in the impugned
order. No cogent reason has been
assigned for imposing only 10 days'
sentence when an innocent life has been
lost.”
12. After so stating the Court referred to
the decision in Suresh v. State of
Haryana [(2015) 2 SCC 227 : (2015) 2 SCC
(Cri) 45] and enhanced the compensation taking
note of the financial capacity of the accused-
respondent therein, and directed as follows:
20
(Mehtaab case [State of M.P. v. Mehtaab, (2015)
5 SCC 197 : (2015) 2 Scale 386] SCC p. 200,
paras 10-11).
“10. As already observed, the
respondent having been found guilty of
causing death by his negligence, the High
Court was not justified in reducing the
sentence of imprisonment to 10 days
without awarding any compensation to the
heirs of the deceased. We are of the view
that in the facts and circumstances of the
case, the order of the High Court can be
upheld only with the modification that the
accused will pay compensation of Rs 2
lakhs to the heirs of the deceased within
six months. In default, he will undergo RI
for six months. The compensation of Rs 2
lakhs is being fixed having regard to the
limited financial resources of the accused
but the said compensation may not be
adequate for the heirs of the deceased. In
such a situation, in addition to the
compensation to be paid by the accused,
the State can be required to pay
compensation under Section 357-A CrPC.
21
11. As per the judgment of this Court
in Suresh [(2015) 2 SCC 227 : (2015) 2
SCC (Cri) 45] , the scheme adopted by the
State of Kerala is applicable to all the
States and the said scheme provides for
compensation up to Rs 5 lakhs in the case
of death. In the present case, it will be
appropriate, in the interests of justice, to
award interim compensation of Rs 3 lakhs
under Section 357-A CrPC payable out of
the funds available/to be made available
by the State of Madhya Pradesh with the
District Legal Services Authority, Guna. In
case the accused does not pay the
compensation awarded as above, the
State of Madhya Pradesh will pay the
entire amount of compensation of Rs 5
lakhs within three months after expiry of
the time granted to the accused.”
13. In our considered view the decision in
the said case has to be confined to the facts of
that case. It cannot be said as a proposition of
law that whenever an accused offers acceptable
compensation for rehabilitation of a victim,
regardless of the gravity of the crime under
22
Section 304-A IPC, there can be reduction of
sentence.
14. In this context, we may refer with
profit to the decision in Balwinder Singh [State
of Punjab v. Balwinder Singh, (2012) 2 SCC 182
: (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 706] wherein the High
Court had allowed the revision and reduced the
quantum of sentence awarded by the Judicial
Magistrate, First Class, for the offences
punishable under Sections 304-A, 337, 279 IPC
by reducing the sentence of imprisonment
already undergone, that is, 15 days. The Court
referred to the decision in Dalbir Singh v. State
of Haryana [Dalbir Singh v. State of Haryana,
(2000) 5 SCC 82 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1208] and
reproduced two paragraphs which we feel
extremely necessary for reproduction:
(Balwinder Singh case [State of
Punjab v. Balwinder Singh, (2012) 2 SCC 182 :
(2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 706] , SCC pp. 186-87, para
12)
“12. … ‘1. When automobiles have
become death traps any leniency shown
to drivers who are found guilty of rash
driving would be at the risk of further
23
escalation of road accidents. All those
who are manning the steering of
automobiles, particularly professional
drivers, must be kept under constant
reminders of their duty to adopt utmost
care and also of the consequences
befalling them in cases of dereliction.
One of the most effective ways of
keeping such drivers under mental vigil
is to maintain a deterrent element in the
sentencing sphere. Any latitude shown to
them in that sphere would tempt them to
make driving frivolous and a frolic."
21. It is pertinent to note that in Sourab Bakshi's
case, the Hon'ble Apex Court referred the decisions
rendered in the case of (1) State of Punjab Vs. Balwinder
singh [(2012) 2 SCC 182]; (2) Nagabhushanam Vs. Sta te
of Karnataka reported in 2008 5 SCC 730; (3)
Gurubasavaraj Vs. State of Karnataka reported in (2012) 8
SCC 734; and (4) State of Karnataka Vs. Sharanappa
Basanagouda Aregowda reported in (2002) 3 SCC 738 a nd
various other judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court
regarding passing of appropriate sentence for an offence
24
punishable under Section 304A IPC and came to the
conclusion that showing leniency or ordering compensation
for reduction of the sentence would only result in mis-
placed sympathy and mockery of justice. The Hon'bl e
Apex Court also specifically ruled that the lives of poor
cannot be dealt with lightly. It also ruled that the lives of
pedestrians is always in an uncertainty if professi onal
drivers are dealt lightly. The drivers of vehicles involving
rash and negligent act should not be made to feel t hat
they are the 'Emperors of all they survey'. The court also
rules that young age is not the sole criteria for reduction of
sentence.
22. Applying the principles enunciated in the said
decisions to the facts of this case, the offence un der
Section 304A of IPC is a distinct class of offence, where the
Hon'ble Apex Court felt the necessity of passing
appropriate sentence of imprisonment and not to jum p to
grant probation for such class of offence. Accordingly, the
judgments rendered by the coordinate bench of this court,
25
relied on by the learned counsel for the Revision Petitioner
in CRL.RP. No.100025/2014, (Ulas Vs. State of Karnataka)
and CRL.RP. No.2152/2011 (S.H. Manjanna and State o f
Karnataka) are not of much avail in accepting the prayer
for grant of probation.
23. For the offence under Section 304A of IPC
maximum punishment that could be awarded is two yea rs.
Further, it is pertinent to note that accused did not offer
his version as to the incident. The necessity of offering
explanation by the accused in a matter of this natu re is
desirable so as to arrive at a proper finding while
adjudging the guilt as well as for passing an appropriate
sentence. If the accused deliberately fails to make use of
such an opportunity or fail to place defence evidence, the
Trial judge has to assess the materials on record a s is
placed by the prosecution alone.
24. In this regard, this court places reliance on the
judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Ravi
26
Kapur Vs. State of Rajasthan reported in (2012) 9 SCC
284 it has been held as under:
"39. It is true that the prosecution is
required to prove its case beyond reasonable
doubt but the provisions of Section 313 Cr.P.C.
are not a mere formality or purposeless. They
have a dual purpose to discharge, firstly, that
the entire material parts of the incriminating
evidence should be put to the accused in
accordance with law and, secondly, to provide
an opportunity to the accused to explain his
conduct or his version of the case. To provide
this opportunity to the accused is the mandatory
duty of the Court. If the accused deliberately
fails to avail this opportunity, then the
consequences in law have to follow, particularly
when it would be expected of the accused in the
normal course of conduct to disclose certain
facts which may be within his personal
knowledge and have a bearing on the case."
25. In the case on hand, on conclusion of the
prosecution witnesses, at the time of recording the
accused statement, accused denied all the incrimina ting
27
circumstances. He did not lead any evidence or place on
record his version as to the incident. Nor, did he furnish
any written submission so as to accept the same as part of
the record as is contemplated u/s.313 of Cr.PC.
26. As such, by following the dictum in Ravi Kapur's
case cited supra, when the accused has deliberately failed
to offer his explanation to put forth his case, it is needless
to emphasize that the consequences under law should
follow. The same has been done by the learned Magistrate
while passing the sentence of imprisonment of one year in
the absence of any mitigating circumstances that wa s
placed before the Trial Court.
27. It is also pertinent to note that the State did not
challenge the sentence as is imposed by the learned
Magistrate seeking enhancement of the sentence. As
such, as far as the State is concerned, the sentence as is
passed by the learned Magistrate has become final. But it
is also pertinent to note that the learned Magistrate has
28
ordered simple imprisonment for two months for the
offence punishable under Section 279 of IPC as well.
28. Whenever an accused is convicted for the offe nce
punishable under Sections 279 and 304A of IPC, a
separate sentence needs to be ordered in respect of both
counts is a question that often arises.
29. The law in this regard is no longer resintegr a.
Gainfully, this court places its reliance on the judgment of
the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Gurubasavaraj @
Bennishettappa Vs. State of Karnataka reported in
(2012) 8 SCC 734, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has
held as under:
"14. The next limb of submission of the
learned counsel for the appellant is that when he
has been acquitted under Section 279 IPC, he
cannot be punished in respect of the other
offences as the allegation of rash and negligent
act cannot be treated to have been proven. The
aforesaid submission, on a first blush, may look
quite attractive, but on a deeper scrutiny of the
judgment passed by the appellate Court, it melts
29
into total insignificance. The learned Appellate
Judge, after due appreciation of the evidence on
record as expected of an appellate Court, has
come to the conclusion that the accused was
driving the vehicle in a rash and negligent
manner. After ascribing some reason, he has
thought it apposite that a separate sentence
should not be imposed under Section 279 IPC,
and accordingly, he has set aside the sentence
awarded by the trial Court.
30. Applying the above principles of law to the case on
hand, in view of the fact that only one victim is involved in
the present case, ordering separate imprisonment for the
offence punishable under Section 279 of IPC by the Trial
Court is incorrect which has been ignored by the fi rst
appellate court. Accordingly, the sentence as ordered by
the Trial Court for the offence punishable under Se ction
279 of IPC needs to be set aside.
31. Accordingly, to that extent, sentence as is ordered by
the learned Magistrate and confirmed by the first Appellate
Court needs interference by this court by setting aside the
30
sentence of imprisonment of two months for the offe nce
punishable under Section 279 of IPC. Accordingly, point
No.2 is answered partly in the affirmative and following
order is passed:-
ORDER
Revision Petition is allowed-in-part. While
maintaining the order of conviction for the offence
punishable under Sections 279 and 304A of IPC and
Section 187 of IMV Act, the sentence of imprisonmen t
ordered for the offence punishable under Section 27 9 of
IPC is set-aside. Rest of the sentence stands unalt ered.
The accused is directed to surrender before the Trial
Court for serving the sentence.
Office is directed to return the Trial Court Recor ds
forthwith, with a copy of this order so as to enable the Trial
Court to issue modified conviction warrant.
Sd/-
JUDGE
Chs/PL*
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