924.CRA-106-2025 & Ors.odt

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

BENCH AT AURANGABAD

CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO. 106 OF 2025

Shivshankar s/o Khandu Udtewar

Age 16 Years, Minor U/G of his father,

Khandu s/o Madhavrao Udtewar, Age : 50

years, Occupation : Labour,

R/o Shirur (T), Tal. Ahmedpur,

District Latur.

…Applicant

Versus

1Sanjay s/o Baburao Waghmare

(Deleted)

2Managing Director, D.C.C.

Bank,

Tilak Nagar, Latur,

Tal, & District Latur.

3Reliance General Insurance

Company Ltd.

MurarijiPeth, CTS No.8516/11,

Subhash Chowk, Murarji Chowk,

Murarji Peti Solapur,

Tal & Dist. Solapur 413001.

4The Deputy Registrar/Taxing

Officer

The High Court of Judicature

Of Bombay Bench at Aurangabad. …Respondents

Shri Manoj D. Shinde, Advocate a/w Shri P. C. Mayure,

Advocate h/f Shri Shrikant B. Madde, Advocate for the

Applicant.

Shri C. K. Shinde, Advocate for the Respondent No. 4.

WITH

CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO. 128 OF 2025

Page 1 of 22 2025:BHC-AUG:21275

924.CRA-106-2025 & Ors.odt

1Vilas Bayaji Thorve,

Age 69 Years, Occupation : Agri,

R/o. Nageshwadi, Tq. Patoda,

District Beed.

…Applicant

Versus

1The State of Maharashtra

Through Government Pleader,

High Court of Bombay,

Bench at Aurangabad.

2Taxing Officer

The High Court of Judicature

Of Bombay Bench at Aurangabad. …Respondents

Shri Akshay S. Jagtap, Advocate for the Applicant.

Shri B. A. Shinde, A.G.P. for the Respondent No. 1.

Shri C. K. Shinde, Advocate for the Respondent No. 2.

WITH

CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO. 127 OF 2025

1.Vilas Bayaji Thorve,

Age 69 Years, Occupation : Agri,

R/o. Nageshwadi, Tq. Patoda,

District Beed. ..Applicant

Versus

1.The State of Maharashtra

Through Government Pleader,

High Court of Bombay,

Bench at Aurangabad.

2.Taxing Officer

The High Court of Judicature

Of Bombay Bench at Aurangabad. ..Respondents

Shri Akshay S. Jagtap, Advocate for the Applicant.

Shri B. A. Shinde, A.G.P. for the Respondent No. 1.

Shri C. K. Shinde, Advocate for the Respondent No. 2.

Page 2 of 22

924.CRA-106-2025 & Ors.odt

WITH

CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO. 95 OF 2025

1.Vilas Bayaji Thorve,

Age 69 Years, Occupation : Agri,

R/o. Nageshwadi, Tq. Patoda,

District Beed. ..Applicant

Versus

1.The State of Maharashtra

Through Government Pleader,

High Court of Bombay,

Bench at Aurangabad.

2.Taxing Officer

The High Court of Judicature

Of Bombay Bench at Aurangabad. ..Respondents

Shri Akshay S. Jagtap, Advocate for the Applicant.

Shri B. A. Shinde, A.G.P. for the Respondent No. 1.

Shri C. K. Shinde, Advocate for the Respondent No. 2.

WITH

CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO. 137 OF 2025

1.Vilas Bayaji Thorve,

Age 69 Years, Occupation : Agri,

R/o. Nageshwadi, Tq. Patoda,

District Beed. ..Applicant

Versus

1.The State of Maharashtra

Through Government Pleader,

High Court of Bombay,

Bench at Aurangabad.

2.Taxing Officer

The High Court of Judicature

Of Bombay Bench at Aurangabad. ..Respondents

Page 3 of 22

924.CRA-106-2025 & Ors.odt

Shri Akshay S. Jagtap, Advocate for the Applicant.

Shri B. A. Shinde, A.G.P. for the Respondent No. 1.

Shri C. K. Shinde, Advocate for the Respondent No. 2.

Shri S. V. Natu, Shri P. F. Patni, Shri Avinash Khande,

Shri Mohit R. Deshmukh, Shri P. C. Mayure and Shri

Mahesh Swami, Advocates addressed the issue on

behalf of petitioners.

CORAM

:

SHAILESH P. BRAHME J.

Date on which matters closed for

judgment

:25

th

JULY 2025

Date on which judgment Is

pronounced

:07

th

August 2025

J U D G M E N T :

1.Heard both sides finally.

2.The issue involved in these revisions is as to whether

appellants, who are neither insurer, nor owner in appeal for

enhancement preferred against judgment and award of the

claims tribunal passed U/Sec. 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act

(hereafter referred as to the ‘M. V. Act’ for the sake of brevity

and convenience) can restrict the value or claim for payment

of lessor court fees at the time of filing of appeal.

3.Revisional Petitioners suffered adjudication by Claims

Tribunal and they have approached High Court, challenging the

award. The appeals preferred by them are registered, but

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924.CRA-106-2025 & Ors.odt

office raised objection of deficit Court fees. The demand is

questioned by them and the matter is referred to learned

Taxing Officer. The Taxing Officer rendered decision upholding

the office objection of deficit court fees by passing separate

orders which are under challenge, under Section 115 of the

Code of Civil Procedure.

4.It is informed by petitioners that the claim of the office for

deficit court fee is debatable and the litigants are required to

face such objection frequently. In order to settle the

controversy by my previous order, I called upon the members

of the Bar to address the issue. Accordingly with the

assistance of learned Counsels who eagerly responded, I

propose to decide these matters of general importance.

5. In Civil Revision Application No.106/2025, Appellant is

the original Claimant who had met with accident and sustained

injuries affecting his earning capacity. He had claimed Rs.

40,00,000/- as compensation before the Tribunal and paid

Court fees which was maximum before the Tribunal. His claim

was partially allowed awarding compensation of Rs. 5,50,000/-

with interest. Being aggrieved by the award and for

enhancement of compensation, appeal is preferred valuing the

claim at Rs. 1,00,000/- for purpose of Court fees. An amount of

Rs.3205/- is paid towards Court fees. The office raised

objection that Appellant is liable to pay Court fees for

difference of amount. The claim restricted to Rs. 1,00,000/- is

not accepted by the office and he is called upon to pay Rs.

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924.CRA-106-2025 & Ors.odt

24,410/- towards deficit Court fees.

6.In Civil Revision Application Nos.128/2025; 137/2025;

95/2025 and 127/2025, Appellant before Court was neither

owner, nor insurer. The vehicle involved in the accident was

purchased by him, but it was not registered with the

competent authority. The Tribunal saddled the liability by the

impugned award treating him to be the owner of the vehicle.

Hence he preferred appeals. In the foot note of the

memorandum of the appeal, it is stated that he is paying half

of the ad valorem fees as he is neither insurer, nor owner. His

claim for Court fees is objected by the office. Ultimately the

learned Taxing Officer upheld the objection and called upon

Appellant to pay full ad valorem fees.

7.Learned Counsels Mr. Manoj Shinde, Mr. Mohit Deshmukh,

Mr. S. V. Natu, Mr. Avinash Khande, Mr. P. C. Mayure canvassed

their submissions objecting the decision of the Taxing Officer in

following manner :

(i)The Appellant – Original Claimant when prefers appeal

against judgment and award passed by the Tribunal either

wholly or partially dismissing the claim would be liable to pay

Court fees as per Section 7(2)(ii) of the Maharashtra Court Fees

Act (Hereinafter referred to ‘Act’). It is permissible for such

Appellant to restrict the claim for payment of one half of ad

valorem fees.

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924.CRA-106-2025 & Ors.odt

(ii)Section 7(2) of the Act permits the Appellant to restrict

the claim to a particular amount and if he succeeds in appeal

then he/she has to make good the deficit court fees.

(iii)Once the value in the memorandum of appeal is

restricted to a particular figure, Office or Registry cannot insist

to pay Court fees either on the whole claim, if it is wholly

rejected by the Tribunal or on difference of the claim, if claim is

partially rejected. There is no prohibition in the Act to restrict

the claim.

(iv)M. V. Act is a benevolent legislation and Section 7(2) of

the Act cannot be interpreted in the manner to defeat object

sought to be achieved.

(v)The apprehension that Appellant is likely to extract the

services of the Court by valuing appeal at a meager amount

and by dodging to pay Court fees is misplaced.

(vi)So far as payment of Court fees is concerned, there is no

difference between the appeal preferred against rejection of

entire claim by the Tribunal and appeal preferred against

partial rejection.

(vii)The hardship, precarious condition and distress suffered

by the Appellant in most of the cases are overlooked and the

approach of the Taxing Officer is against the spirit of

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924.CRA-106-2025 & Ors.odt

enactment.

(viii)There is no ceiling on the Court fees so far as appeals

filed in High Court are concerned, which secures the interest of

the State.

8.Learned advocate Mr. C. K. Shinde for the Taxing Officer

and learned A.G.P. Mr. B. A. Shinde oppose the above referred

submissions while supporting orders passed by the Taxing

Officer. They would submit that it is not permissible in law for

the Appellant to restrict the claim to a particular value when

the appeal is against difference of amount of compensation. It

is submitted that appeal is continuation of the proceedings and

whatever Court fees is paid in the Tribunal has to be paid again

in appeal. The Court fees are designed keeping in view

expenditure on administration of justice. The human efforts,

time and energy are equally exerted for deciding restricted or

unrestricted or deprived claim. It is further submitted that

Appellate Court has to undertake the exercise in its entirety to

find out entitlement and liability. Hence entire Court fees is

payable. The demand of Court fees is justifiable. It is further

submitted that no concession can be granted in payment of

Court fees, though Motor Vehicle Act, is a beneficial legislation.

9.Having heard both sides, the issue needs to be addressed

is as to whether it is permissible for the Appellant to restrict

the relief at a particular value of the claim in the appeal for

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924.CRA-106-2025 & Ors.odt

payment of Court fees or the Appellant is obliged to pay Court

fees on the difference of amount?

10.The objection raised by the office and the decision

rendered by learned Taxing Officer is in respect of Section 7(2)

of the Act. Section 7(1) of the Act pertains to fee payable on

memorandum of appeal in case of award of compensation

under various acts for acquisition of land for public purpose.

The controversy involved in the present Revision is not in

respect of matters involving acquisition of land, but matters

involving accident under Motor Vehicle Act. For the purpose of

computation and determination of Court fees on the

memorandum of appeal against award of the Claims Tribunal is

regulated by sub-section (2) of Section 7 of the Maharashtra

Court Fees Act, which is as follows :

The Maharashtra Court Fees Act,

1 …

2 …

7. (1)……..

(2)The amount of fee payable under this Act

on a memorandum of appeal against an award of a

Claims Tribunal preferred under section 110-D VI of

the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, shall be computed as

follows:-

( i ) If such appeal is preferred by the insurer

or owner of the motor vehicle- the full ad-

valorem fee leviable on the amount at which the

relief is valued in the memorandum of appeal

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924.CRA-106-2025 & Ors.odt

according to the scale prescribed under Article 1

of Schedule I;

(ii)If such appeal is preferred by any other

person one half of ad-valorem fee leviable on the

amount at which the relief is valued in the

memorandum of appeal according to the said

scale.

Provided that, if such person succeeds in the

appeal, he shall be liable to make good the deficit, if

any, between the full ad-valorem fee payable on the

relief awarded in the appeal according to the said scale

and the fee already paid by him; and the amount of

such deficit shall, without prejudice to any other mode

of recovery, be recoverable as an arrear of land revenue.

11.Though the title of Section 7 is common for both sub-

sections, there is material difference in the manner of payment

of the Court fees. The legislative intent for the difference can

be traced to object and the purpose for which Motor Vehicle

Act is enacted. I propose to deliberate this aspect in further

part of my judgment while dealing with the object and purport

of the Act.

12.There are two categories of Appellant stipulated in Clause

Nos. (i) and (ii) of sub-section (2) of Section 7 of the Act.

Depending upon the category, the Court fees is payable either

as full ad valorem and one half of ad valorem. Injured persons

or dependents of deceased who are aggrieved by inadequate

or no compensation are covered by Sub-section (2)(ii) because

they are other persons than insurer or owner. Sub-section 2(ii)

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924.CRA-106-2025 & Ors.odt

and the proviso thereafter would indicate a concession given to

those persons/Appellants. They are permitted to pay one half

of the ad valorem fees on the amount on which the relief is

valued in the memorandum of the appeal.

13.The persons/appellants falling in category of sub-Sec. 2(ii)

are the victims of the accident. They are sufferers of physical,

mental and financial trauma due to the bodily injuries resulting

into partial or full disablement. In case of death, the sufferings

and trauma would be of such magnitude which cannot be

quantified. Many a times when the bread-earner in the family

dies, the members and the dependents of the family would

require to face emotional and social trauma as well. Bodily

injury due to accident would leave deep impact on earning

capacity or wellness. The hardship and trauma get aggravated

due to the decision rendered by the Tribunal. These distressed

persons come to the Court with bleeding heart. The

legislature has shown them a compassion to facilitate them to

prosecute the remedy effectively. A special care is being taken

by the Legislature by stipulating concession of payment of one

half of the ad valorem Court fees.

14.In both Clauses of sub-section (2), the wordings are, fee

leviable on the amount at which the relief is valued. These

words permit the Appellant to quote a value for restricting the

relief. Otherwise the wordings would have been mandatory

appellant to pay court fees on difference between the amount

awarded and the amount claimed. But this is not the text of

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924.CRA-106-2025 & Ors.odt

Clause (i) and (ii). Unlike that of sub-section (1) of Section 7, in

case of appeal arising out of acquisition of land, choice is

available to restrict claim at a particular value. In case of

appeals arising out of the accident, wordings are used with

specific purport. Once this difference between sub-section (1)

and sub-section (2) is understood, there is no difficulty to

comprehend that Appellants who are preferring appeal in

Motor Vehicle Act have the choice to restrict their relief to a

particular claim quoted in the memorandum of the appeal. In

the teeth of express provision, it is not possible to accept any

other interpretation.

15.When words are clear and unambiguous, it is not

permissible to derive any other interpretation which would

defeat the purpose of the enactment. Clause Nos. (i) and (ii) of

sub-section (2) of Section 7 give choice to the Appellant to

restrict relief to particular amount. Therefore the interpretation

of learned Taxing Officer to call upon the Appellant to pay

deficit Court fees according to difference between the amount

awarded and the amount claimed cannot be countenanced.

This approach is against the legislative intent and the express

provision of the Statute.

16.Learned Taxing Officer referred to judgment of the

coordinate bench in the matter of Govind Vs. State of

Maharashtra. In that case appeal was under Land Acquisition

Act for which Section 7(1) of Court Fees Act would apply.

Present matters are within purview of Sec. 7(2) of the Act and

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924.CRA-106-2025 & Ors.odt

therefore reliance on the said judgment is totally misplaced.

The purport and the scheme of payment of Court fees under

Section 7(2) of the Act is altogether different. The reliance

placed by the Taxing Officer on paragraph no.10 of the

judgment, is thoroughly misconceived. The explanation

appended to sub-clause (i) and (ii) of Section 7(2) is totally loss

sight of.

17.In appropriate case, this Court will delve upon the scope

of Sec. 7(1) of the Act and examine as to whether it is

permissible in appeal arising out of land acquisition to restrict

the claim to a particular value for the payment of Court fees.

18.While interpreting the provision of enactment, the

objection sought to be achieved needs to be looked into. Motor

Vehicle Act is a benevolent legislation for the persons who

meet with accident. There are provisions in the Statute

designed to assist the victims, sufferers and the stake holders

of the accident. It is not out of the context to refer to the

judgment of the Supreme Court by which the Claimants are

held entitled to receive more compensation than claimed in

the petition. The very genesis of payment of compensation is it

would be just and reasonable to mitigate sufferings and

distress’. The rules of procedure are designed to achieve the

said object. The humanistic approach of the Supreme Court is

evident from the following judgments :

A Nagappa Vs. Gurudayal Singh and others reported in

(2003) 2 SCC 274.

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924.CRA-106-2025 & Ors.odt

B.Syed Basheer Ahameed and others Vs. Mohammad

Jameel and another reported in (2009) 2 SCC 225.

19.The purposive interpretation besides literal interpretation

needs to be adopted. The paramount consideration is the

object or the purport of the Act which is sought to be achieved.

I lend support for literal and purposive interpretation of

provision of Sec. 7(2) of the Act from the following judgments :

a.Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. and another Vs. Cherian

Varkey Construction Co. Pvt. Ltd. and others (2010) 8

SCC 24 for the purpose of statutory interpretation, principles

are laid down in para Nos. 20 to 21.6 by the Supreme Court,

which are as follows :

20. The principles of statutory interpretation are well

settled. Where the words of the statute are clear and

unambiguous, the provision should be given its plain and normal

meaning, without adding or rejecting any words. Departure from

the literal rule, by making structural changes or substituting

words in a clear statutory provision, under the guise of

interpretation will pose a great risk as the changes may not be

what the Legislature intended or desired. Legislative wisdom

cannot be replaced by the Judge’s views. As observed by this

Court in somewhat different context :

“When a procedure is prescribed by the Legislature, it is

not for the court to substitute a different one according

to its notion of justice. When the Legislature has spoken,

the Judges cannot afford to be wiser.” (See : Shri Mandir

Sita Ramji vs. Lt. Governor of Delhi – (1975) 4 SCC 298).

21. There is however an exception to this general rule. Where

the words used in the statutory provision are vague and

ambiguous or where the plain and normal meaning of its words or

grammatical construction thereof would lead to confusion,

absurdity, repugnancy with other provisions, the courts may,

instead of adopting the plain and grammatical construction, use

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924.CRA-106-2025 & Ors.odt

the interpretative tools to set right the situation, by adding

or omitting or substituting the words in the Statute. When

faced with an apparently defective provision in a statute,

courts prefer to assume that the draftsman had committed a

mistake rather than concluding that the Legislature has

deliberately introduced an absurd or irrational statutory

provision. Departure from the literal rule of plain and

straight reading can however be only in exceptional cases,

where the anomalies make the literal compliance of a provision

impossible, or absurd or so impractical as to defeat the very

object of the provision. We may also mention purposive

interpretation to avoid absurdity and irrationality is more

readily and easily employed in relation to procedural

provisions than with reference to substantive provisions.

b.Shailesh Dhariyawan Vs. Mohan Balkrishna Lulla reported

in (2016) 3 SCC 619 : principles of purposive interpretation are

laid down in following paragraphs :

31.The aforesaid two reasons given by me, in addition to the

reasons already indicated in the judgment of my learned Brother,

would clearly demonstrate that provisions of Section 15(2) of the

Act require purposive interpretation so that the aforesaid objective/

purpose of such a provision is achieved thereby. The principle of

'purposive interpretation' or 'purposive construction' is based on

the understanding that the Court is supposed to attach that

meaning to the provisions which serve the 'purpose' behind such a

provision. The basic approach is to ascertain what is it designed to

accomplish? To put it otherwise, by interpretative process the

Court is supposed to realise the goal that the legal text is designed

to realise. As Aharan Barak puts it:

“Purposive interpretation is based on three components:

language, purpose, and discretion. Language shapes the

range of semantic possibilities within which the interpreter

acts as a linguist. Once the interpreter defines the range, he

or she chooses the legal meaning of the text from among the

(express or implied) semantic possibilities. The semantic

component thus sets the limits of interpretation by

restricting the interpreter to a legal meaning that the text

can bear in its (public or private) language.”3

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924.CRA-106-2025 & Ors.odt

32. Of the aforesaid three components, namely, language, purpose

and discretion 'of the Court', insofar as purposive component is

concerned, this is the ratio juris, the purpose at the core of the text.

This purpose is the values, goals, interests, policies and aims that

the text is designed to actualize. It is the function that the text is

designed to fulfil.

33. We may also emphasize that the statutory interpretation of a

provision is never static but is always dynamic. Though literal rule

of interpretation, till some time ago, was treated as the 'golden

rule', it is now the doctrine of purposive interpretation which is

predominant, particularly in those cases where literal

interpretation may not serve the purpose or may lead to absurdity.

If it brings about an end which is at variance with the purpose of

statute, that cannot be countenanced. Not only legal process

thinkers such as Hart and Sacks rejected intentionalism as a

grand strategy for statutory interpretation, and in its place they

offered purposivism, this principle is now widely applied by the

Courts not only in this country but in many other legal systems as

well.

c.The Full Bench in the matter of Kanhaiyyalal Sonbaji

Gajbhiye Vs. Bhartiya Jgruti Shikshan Sanstha Sawari (Javahar

Nagar and others reported in 2020(6) MH.L.J. 595 highlights

that interpretation process is amalgamation of literal and

purposive objects in following manner :

14. The arguments so put-forward present different view

points and would require for their appreciation detailed

examination of relevant provisions of the The Maharashtra

Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service)

Regulation Act, 1977 (for short “Act, 1977”) and the Rules,

1981, in the light of well established principles of

interpretation of statutes. After all, any interpretative process

is governed by the set principles, precepts and doctrines. In

law, it begins with an effort to ascertain true intention of the

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924.CRA-106-2025 & Ors.odt

legislature or the rule making authority through the words

used in the statute or rule and if necessary, by making a

resort to other aids, which may be internal or external to the

statute. When only plain meaning is considered, the approach

is literal and when the meaning is found out with reference to

object and purpose of an enactment, the method is purposive.

However, now it is well established that the intention of the

legislature assimilates two aspects: in one aspect it carries the

concept of “meaning” or what the words mean and in another,

it takes along the idea of “purpose and object”. Any

interpretative process thus is an amalgamation of literal and

purposive approaches. This formulation has received the

approval of the Supreme Court and is called “cardinal

principle of construction” (see Union of India V/s. Elphinstone

Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd. [AIR 2001 SC 724]).

15. It may be added here that even for knowing of the

meaning the words convey, apart from litera legis, the context

of the letters assumes importance. In the case of Reserve

Bank of India V/s. Peerless Finance and Investment Co.,

(1987) 1 SCC 424 it was held that the interpretation must

depend on the text and the context, they being the bases of

interpretation. It was observed that if the text was the

texture, context was what lent it colour. It was also held that,

such interpretation as would make textual interpretation

match the contextual, would be the best kind of interpretation.

As regards the search for discovery of purpose of the statute, it

has been held, one need not be restricted to the internal aid

furnished by the statute itself, that is, the text and the context

of the provision under construction, and one may look beyond

them. Other provisions contained in the same enactment,

statement of objects and reasons or the preamble to the

enactment, existing state of the law, other statutes in pari

materia, if any, and the mischief which the statute intends to

remedy, would all be useful tools in the construction of a

statute. These aids widen the concept of “context”, in which

the text is to be read and understood. A useful reference in

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924.CRA-106-2025 & Ors.odt

this regard may be made to the principles laid down in the

cases of Premchand Jain V/s. R.K. Chhabra, (1984) 2 SCC 302,

Bhagwan Baksh Singh (Raja) Vs. Secretary of State, AIR 1940

PC,1982, Utkal Contractors and Joinery Pvt. Ltd. V/s. State of

Orissa, (1987) 3 SCC 279 and District Mining Officer V/s. Tata

Iron and Steel Company, AIR 2001 SC 3134.

20.I am of the considered view that purposive or literal

interpretation of sub-section (2) leaves no iota of doubt to

conclude that it is permissible for the Appellant to restrict his

relief to a particular value and to pay Court fees accordingly. I

therefore do not concur with the observations of learned Single

Judge in paragraph no. 5 of Vivek Badgire Vs. Saheblal

Moinuddin. There is no provision either in the Motor Vehicle

Act or in the Maharashtra Court Fees Act to indicate that it is

not permissible to restrict the claim for the purpose of Court

fees.

21.The proviso to sub-section (2) indicates that the Appellant

is under obligation to pay full ad-valorem fees on the relief

awarded in the appeal. The appellants falling in Clause No. (ii)

is given concession of payment of one half of ad valorem Court

fees for time being and if they succeed in appeal, they would

have to make good the deficit Court fees. Therefore it is not

that the concession of payment of one half of ad valorem Court

fees is in its perpetuity. The specific intent for incorporating

the concession of one half of ad valorem Court fees at the

beginning and that too for time being is in view of peculiar

circumstances in which appeal would be preferred.

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22.It’s a common knowledge that even if some amount is

awarded by the Tribunal, the amount would not get disbursed

unless a recourse to execution is taken for realizing the

amount awarded by the Tribunal. In case a total rejection of the

claim hardship is of greater magnitude. It cannot be lost sight

of that the Claimant has to pay entire Court fees in the

Tribunal, notwithstanding decision of the claim. Considering

these situations concession to restrict the relief to a particular

value is provided. This aspect is totally ignored by the Taxing

Officer while compelling the Appellant to pay Court fees

according to difference between the amount awarded and the

amount claimed.

23.It needs to be mentioned that there can be no difference

in the appeal preferred by Claimant against complete rejection

of his claim and partial rejection of his claim. In both

circumstances, the Appellant is entitled to restrict the relief to

a particular value for payment of Court fees. Therefore the

decision of learned Single Judge in the matter of Vivek

Ravikumar Badgire (supra) on which the reliance is placed by

learned Taxing Officer cannot be made applicable. In that case

entire claim was rejected by the Tribunal and while preferring

appeal, relief was restricted to a particular amount. The above

aspect is not brought to the notice and it is recorded that such

a restriction is not permissible in the eyes of law.

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924.CRA-106-2025 & Ors.odt

24.The apprehension is expressed during the course of

submission by learned Counsel Mr. C. K. Shinde that Court fees

are designed to meet expenditure on the administration of the

justice and equal amount of energy, time and human efforts

are exerted notwithstanding quantum of court fees. This

submission cannot be accepted for the reason that the human

efforts, energy and time would not go waste because

ultimately before receiving the payment Appellant is required

to pay deficit Court fees. The Appellant who is receiving benefit

of appellate jurisdiction cannot escape from the liability of the

payment of deficit Court fees. The defaulted court fees is

recoverable as land revenue as per rule.

25.It is relevant to notice that sub-section (2) of Section 173

stipulates that no appeal should lie against award of a claim

Tribunal, if the amount in dispute in the appeal, is less than

Rs.1,00,000/-. This provision suppresses mischief and prohibits

persons who are likely to take disadvantage of valuing the

relief at extremely meager sum and availing adjudication.

Therefore I do not find that there is any possibility of taking

disadvantage of the concession engrafted in the Section 7(2).

26.One cannot be oblivious of the fact that Court fees are

not in the nature of taxes or the commission. There is no

profiteering purpose in charging the Court fees. Court fees is

for the purpose of meeting the expenditure for administration

of justice. There is ceiling on the payment of Court fees even if

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924.CRA-106-2025 & Ors.odt

the money claim exceeds a particular limit. The Legislature has

struck a balance of not imposing the ceiling on the payment of

Court fees on memorandum of appeal preferred in the High

Court.

27.My attention is adverted to the different decision of the

learned Single Judge referred in the impugned order. With

respect, I am of the considered view that the above aspect of

the matter has not been dealt with. Those cannot be made

applicable to the cases. Impugned judgment and order in Civil

Revision Application No.106/2025 is perverse and liable to be

quashed. It is noticed that learned Taxing Officer is frequently

relying upon the decision referred in the impugned judgment in

deciding Court fees claims. He is expected to undertake

rectified approach.

28.Civil Revision Application No.106/2025 is allowed and

impugned order is quashed.

29.In the remaining matters, the Appellant claims to be the

purchaser of the vehicle which is yet to be registered with the

Department. In that context, he is claiming himself to be

covered by clause (ii) of Section 7(2). I have already recorded

that Appellant has to pay full ad valorem fees. Only question is

as to when to pay the same. Even if Appellant is treated to be

the owner and held liable by the Tribunal, a concession of

payment of one half of ad valorem fees, would not absolve him

from payment of deficit Court fees in the future. In that view of

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924.CRA-106-2025 & Ors.odt

the matter, I find that there is no impediment in treating the

Appellant to be any other person and permitting him to pay

one half of ad valorem fees.

30.Impugned order in that cases are quashed and set aside.

Civil Revision Application Nos.128/2025; C. R. A. No. 137/2025;

C. R. A. No. 95/2025 and C. R. A. No. 127/2025 are allowed,

thereby quashing impugned judgment and orders.

[ SHAILESH P. BRAHME ]

JUDGE

bsb/Aug. 25

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