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IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA

CIVIL REVISIONAL JURISDICTION

APPELLATE SIDE

Present:-

HON’BLE JUSTICE CHAITALI CHATTERJEE DAS.

CO 2890 OF 2025

WITH

SHRACHI BURDWAN DEVELOPERS PVT.LTD.

VS

ABDUL ALIM & ORS.

WITH

CO 2892 OF 2025

WITH

CO 3194 OF 2025

For the Petitioner : Mr. Arindam Banerjee, Sr. Adv.

Mr. Swarajit Dey, Adv.,

Mr. Amit Kr. Nag, Adv.

Mr. Partha Banerjee, Adv.

Ms. Rishita Sarkar, Adv.

For the Opposite

Party no. 1 : Mr. Gopal Chandra Ghosh, Sr. Adv.

Mr. Partha Pratim Roy, Adv.

Mr. Rajkumar Gupta, Adv.

Mr. Chandan Mondal, Adv.

Ms. Poulami Chakraborty, Adv.

For the Opposite

Party No. 5 : Mr. Sarosij Dasgupta, Adv.

Mr. Saptarshi Datta, Adv.

Ms. Srinjita Ghosh, Adv.

Mr. Pourush Kanti Pal, Adv.

Mr. Debdut Hore, Adv.

Mr. P.K. Pal, Adv.

For the Opposite

Party No. 2 and 3 : Mr. Siddhartha Banerjee, Sr. Adv.

Mr. Dyutiman Banerjee, Adv.

Mr. Debjit Dutta, Adv.

Mr. Ayanava Das, Adv.

Last heard On : 06.03.2026

Judgement On : 11.06.2025

Uploaded On : 11.06.2026

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CHAITALI CHATTERJEE DAS, J. : -

1. The three revisional applications are heard analogously since all are

interrelated with each other between the same parties. The present petitioner

filed revisional applications being C.2890 of 2025, challenging the order no.

128 dated 29.7.2025 passed by the learned Executing Court, dismissing the

application filed under Section 47 of CPC being Misc. case no. 60 of 2023, C.O

no. 2892 of 2025, challenging the order No. 129 dated 29.7.2025passed in

Money Execution case no .12 of 2012 and the order no. 132 dated 6.8.2025

passed in Money Execution case no.12 of 2012 of disposal of execution

process.

The case of the petitioner

2. 254 acres of land was requisitioned by letter dated 12.12. 2003 by the

Burdwan Development Authority (henceforth to be described as BDA) for

acquisition of such land from 4 Mouzas throug h the Land Acquisition

Collector, Burdwan and pursuant to such requisition the Government issued

12 separate Notifications under section 4 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894

notifying the purpose of acquisition of land and in the month of May 2005

issued the notifications equivocally declaring that the acquisition was for

setting up of development of a Satellite Township at Burdwan.

3. The said notice was challenged by an Association of land owners being

Paschim Burdwan Krishi Kalyan Samiti, a registered group of land losers by

filing a Writ petition which was dismissed on 23/2/2007. On December, 2005,

and January 2006 notification was issued under section 6 of Land Acquisition

Act.

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4. In between on March 8, 2006, a Memorandum of Agreement was entered into

between BDA and Bengal Shrachi and in terms of the relevant terms and

conditions of the said agreement on 25th July, 2006, Bengal Shrachi deposited

Rs.1,91,75,810/- with BDA for paying the cost of acquisition in 4 L.A cases.

BDA duly deposited the said cost as received from its Private Partner, with the

Land Acquisition Collector, Burdwan from time to time. Bengal Shrachi later

on decided to develop the said land through the Special Purpose Vehicle,

Shrachi Burdwan Developers Private limited, one of its subsidiary align with

one investor namely Xander Investment Holding VI Ltd A (Mauritius based

company) incorporated for the purpose of making investments in real estate

sector in India with the knowledge and consent of BDA .

5. Land Acquisition collector duly took over the possession of the land from 2005

to 26th February, 2007 and on 26th February, 2007 BDA handed over

possession of 284.32 acres of land to Bengal Shrachi and on 15th March, 2007

Bengal Shrachi handed over pos session of 248.32 acres of land to the

petitioner in accordance with Development Rights A ssignment Agreement

dated 20th October 2006. The balance 6.420 acres of land were handed over

by BDA on 5th September, 2008. Over this acquisition process 57 reference

cases were initiated under Section 18 of L.A Act and 37 cases travelled up to

this High Court from the order passed by the reference court and such appeals

were pending. The petitioner was informed about the reference case only on

28th July 2010 when they were intimated by BDA. In the said reference cases

under section 18 of L.A. Act filed by the owners of land, the Learned judge

enhanced the amount of compensation after assessing the market price of the

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acquired land of Rs. 35,000/- per satak and directed the proforma parties to

pay to the opposite parties compensation at the enhanced rate together with

interest at the rate of 12% per annum and other awarded amount. The

petitioner was never impleaded in the said proceeding and the award was

passed beyond their knowledge.

6. In terms of the Memorandum of agreement executed in between BDA and

Bengal Shrachi on 18.3.2006, Bengal Shrachi entered into development rights

of assignment agreement with Shrachi Burdwan Developers Private Limited on

20.10.2006, during pendency of the writ petition 16280(W) 2005. Meantime in

terms of 24 awards and decree passed in the reference cases, BDA asked

Bengal Shrachi for the payment of enhanced amount. Bengal Shrachi

challenged the same by filing a writ petition, being W.P No. 9778(w) 2012. The

decree involved in the present case was put up into execution being Money

Execution case no. 12 /2012 and on 27.8.2012 an appeal was filed against the

said decree being FAT 522/2012 by BDA on 19.10.12. On 13.6.2016, the said

appeal was dismissed for non-compliance of order. In the Writ petition, so filed

being WP. 9778(w) 2012, the learned Single Judge held that Shrachi Burdwan

is a ‘person interested’ under Section 3 (b) of the Act and the “necessary party’

as well as ‘proper party’ in the reference proceeding and set aside 4 decrees

passed by the reference court. In accordance with such order, the present

petitioner filed an application under Order 1 Rule 10(2) CPC in the reference

case being L.A. case no. 40 of 2010 which was dism issed by the learned

Additional District Judge, 1st Court at Burdwan on 23.8.2017. Challenging the

order of the learned Single Judge, an appeal was filed before the Division

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Bench of this court by the land losers of four cases being MAT no. 513 of 2017,

corresponding to FMA 887 of 2019. On 11.9.2019, the Division Bench of this

court allowed the said appeal filed by the land losers and set aside the order

dated 16.2.2017 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P No. 9778 (W) 2012

with a cost of ₹2,00,000/- to be paid by Shrachi Burdwan. The matter

travelled up to Hon’ble Supreme Court by filing a Special Leave Petition on

31st November 2019.

The present petitioner also filed an application under Section 151 CPC before

the Executing court on 14.11.2017 in the M. Execution case no.5/2016 for

impleadment and such prayer was refused by the Learned Executing Court.

Against the order dated 23.8.2017 passed in Execution case the p resent

petitioner filed C.O no. 3809 of 2017.

7. The learned Single Bench of the High Court allowed all the revisional

applications filed by the State of West Bengal, BDA and Shrachi Burdwan by a

common order dated 26.2.2020 holding that the award passed in all the

Reference proceedings in connection with which respective orders in execution

petition challenged in the petition are null and void in the eyes of law, in view

of non-joinder of necessary party. The SLP was filed against such common

Judgement and order dated 26.2.2020 and it was dismissed and confirmed the

judgement and order of th e Learned Division of the High Court in

FMA887/2019 and set aside the order of Learned Single Bench passed in CO

1232 of 2018 and directed the Executing court to proceed with the execution

process. A contempt petition was filed by the present respondent no.1 against

the collector / DM in L.A case no. 21 of 2010 for non-compliance of the

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Executing Court’s order dated 29.8.2018 and 12.9.2018 and the Rule was

issued on 13.5.2025. Shrachi Bardhaman preferred SLP challenging the Rule

issued by the learned contempt court, which was disposed of on 16.5.2025,

directing Shrachi Burdwan to move before High Court without interference to

the order impugned.

8. On 21.5.2025, High Court discharged the Rule issued against the collector in

the contempt proceeding upon deposit of the decretal amount of Rs.₹2, 70, 80,

540/- before the executing court and after seeking unconditional apology by

the contemnor. The state of West Bengal through the Special Land Acquisition

Officer conveyed it’s no objection to the learned Contempt court and also to the

petitioner and decree holder by a letter dated 20.5.2025. In that case the

decree holders were allowed to withdraw the deposited amount. An objection

was then raised by Shrachi Burdwan under S ection 47 of C.P.C being Misc

case no. 60 of 2023 against the executability of the decree in M.Execution case

no. 12 of 2012, impleading only one Awardee namely Abdu l Aleem that is

petitioner no.2. The learned Executing court meantime permitted the decree

holders on 30.7.2025 to withdraw the deposited decretal amount and BDA did

not raise any objection. The decretal amount has been presently handed over

and deposited to bank account of the respective respondents which has been

duly acknowledged.The petitioner challenged the orders passed in the Misc.

case filed under section 47 of the code of civil procedure and also against the

order of dismisiing the application under Section 47 CPC.

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9. Under the above factual score, the argument advanced by Mr. Arindam

Banerjee the learned Senior Advocate representing the petitioner in all the

three revisional applications, are as follows;

Submission made on behalf of the petitioners

10. It is submitted that the petitioner herein being a Special Purpose Vehicle

formed under PPP ( public purpose, partnership) to be constructed to be a

representative of BDA, being a party to the proceeding under section 18 of the

land Acquisition Act, 1894, and as such the petitioner is entitled to apply

under section 47 of code of civil procedure for the decree to be declared void

and inexecutable on the ground of non impleadment of Bengal Shr achi

Developers Private Limited being a necessary party and “person interested” in

disbursing compensation under Section 3(b) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

The learned Senior advocate in this regard relied upon the decisions relied on

before the learned Single Judge court in WP9778 (W) of 2012, which are as

follows. Himalayan Tiles and Marble (p) Limited versus Frangis Victor

Coutinho (Dead) by LRs.

1

, paragraph 8 and 14, Neelagangabai versus State

of Karnataka

2

, Neyvely Lignite Corporation Ltd. Versus special Tahsildar

(Land Acquisition.) Neyvely

3

, paragraph 12 to 14, Hindu Kanya Maha

vidyalaya Jind vs municipal committee, Jind

4

, Santosh Kumar versus

Central Warehousing Corporation, AIR 1986 SC 1164, and lastly

Peerappa Hanmantha Harijan (dead) by LRs vs state of Karnataka

5

.

1

(1980) 3 SCC 223

2

(1990) 3 SCC 617

3

(1995)1 SCC 221

4

AIR 1988 SC 2139

5

(2015) 10 SCC 469.

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11. The further point raised by the learned Senior advocate that section 47 of the

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 is not maintainable being void as the petitioner

had not been made a party either before the Collector when the Award under

Section 11 of the land Acquisition Act, 1894 had been made or before the

reference court in the reference under Section 18 of the land Acquisition Act,

1894 initiated at the instance of the land losers. The order of dismissal of the

application by the learned reference Court made under Section 47 of the Code

of Civil Procedure held that the Section 47 would not be maintainable at the

instance of the petitioner who is not a party to the reference proceeding under

section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, therefore, the learned reference

court failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it under law in not deciding

the merits of the petitioner’s objection to the executability of the decree and

hence liable to interfered with .

12. The alternative submission made by the learned senior advocate in his

written notes of argument that even assuming that no proc eeding under

section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 could have been filed by the

petitioner being not a representative of a party, the same could not result in

the Misc. case being dismissed as ‘not maintainable” on such score alone. It is

strenuously argued that an objection as to the execution of a void decree can

be made by any party at any time of the proceeding, and even by a person not

being a party to the proceeding, in the event, the said decree has some adverse

civil consequence on the third person. Therefore, when the objection raised

regarding executability of a decree on the ground of nullity of the decree it was

the duty of the Executing court to decide such question and mere wrong

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captioning of the Misc. Case as a proceeding under Section 47 of the Code of

Civil Procedure, 1908 would not denude the power of the Executing court or

the obligation to decide on such iss ue of maintainability.Therefore, the

Executing court manifestly failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it under

the law in refusing to decide the petitioner’s objection only on the ground that

an application under Section 47 of the code of civil procedure, 1908 would not

be maintainable at the instance of the petitioner.

13. The contention of the learned senior advocate regarding the question of the

decree being null and void for non-inclusion of necessary party, it is always

open to challenge the execution case even by that aggrieved party and relied

upon the decision of Anisminic Ltd vs Foreign Compensation Commission

6

where it was held by the majority of the House of Lords as follows;

a) Lack of jurisdiction can happen in many ways.

b) Whenever an authority is tasked with the obligation to decide a question,

the resultant final order passed by the authority may be a nullity, not only in a

case where the authority lacked in jurisdiction to decide such question, but

also in a case where, at the entry level, the authority had the jurisdiction to

decide such question, but during the course of its enquiry/adjudication, lost

jurisdiction in view of, interalia, the enquiry/administration being violative of

the principles of Natural Justice, if a relevant and vital question is not

considered by the said authority, and irrelevant or extraneous material is

considered by the authority and in other instances of like nature. In such a

case, the final outcome of the adjudicatory process, being the final order,

6

(1969) 2 AC 147

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would be a nullity, notwithstanding the fact that at the initiation of the

proceeding, the concerned adjudicating Authority had jurisdiction to consider

and deal with the question.

14. It is further contended that the above law relating to the final outcome of an

adjudicatory process being a nullity, even in spite of the fact that adjudicator

concerned had jurisdiction to enter into the process of adjudication, is now

part of the law applicable in India. In this regard relied upon the decision of

Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Shri M.L Sethi versus RP Kapur

7

, where

the above mentioned passage from Anisminic Limited has been quoted. That

apart in Dhurandar Prasad Singh versus Jai Prakash Univ ersity and

others

8

, it was held that executing court can allow objection under Section 47

of the Code to the executability of the decree if it is found that it is void ab

initio and a nullity . Therefore, if the aforesaid principal applied to the facts of

the present case, it would bring about the consequences that without

impleading the petitioner as a party respondent, the award passed by the

reference court is a nullity and therefore when the process of adjudication

continued and ended without hearing the petitioner, it resulted in a gross

violation of the principle of natural justice in so far the petitioner is concerned

and therefore the final order/ decree is also a nullity.

15. In order to substantiate that how the present petitioner is coming within the

definition of “person interested” it is argued that the compensation payment

would ultimately to be borne by the predecessor of the petitioner, Bengal

Shrachi, the petitioner herein and it’s trite that even a person has to bear the

7

(1972) 2 SCC 427

8

(2001) 6 SCC 534

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expenses for acquisition, he would beca me a “person interested” in the

payment of compensation, simply on the age old principal that he who suffers

an adverse Civil consequence whether in an administrative or judicial action,

must be given an opportunity of hearing, leads to the inevitable conclusion

that the exclusion of the petitioner from the array of parties and the

continuous and completion of section 18 proceedings behind the back of the

petitioner without affording the petitioner an opportunity of hearing in the

matter, would amount to gross violation of principles of natural justice.

Therefore, the final order though ultimately passed by the reference court

which initially had jurisdiction to enter into the reference would be a nullity.

Once it is alleged to be a nullity the person raising such allegation has the

right to approach the executing court in a proceeding for execution of such

null and void decree. The executing court has acted with gross failure in the

exercise of jurisdiction vested in it under the law as it was the solemn

obligation of the executing court to decide the question relating to nullity as

raised by the petitioner, and the court ought to have looked into the substance

and not the form of the objection. Accordingly, it would be necessary and

interest of justice if the order passed by the executing court, refusing to decide

the question raised by the petitioner, though objection to the executability of

the decree was raised this court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India

would be pleased to set aside the order impugned and direct the executing

court to decide the said question on merit.

16. These Revisional applications arise out of interlocutory order passed in

execution proceedings to the detriment of the petitioner and in the event the

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lead matter whereby the final order dismissing the application under section

47 of the code of civil procedure has been challenged, is disposed of the

outcome of the other revisional application would be likely to follow such

outcome. Accordingly, it is submitted that the lead revisional application be

allowed and the executing court be directed to consider the objection relating

executability as raised by the petitioner on the ground of the ultimate final

order of the reference “being a nullity, upon exercising the inherent power of

the court under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Submission made by the Opposite P arty no 2 & 3

17. On behalf of opposite parties no.2 & 3 the learned advocate, Mr Siddharth

Banerjee raises the preliminary objection regarding the locus standi of Bengal

Shrachi and Shrachi Burdwan on the ground of their absence in the

acquisition proceedings and in determination of compensation under the Land

Acquisition Act, 1894. It is the contention of the learned advocate that it was

BDA who requisitioned for acquisition of approximately 254 acres of land from

4 Mouzas by letter dated 12.12.2003 through the land acquisition,

Collector,Burdwan , expressly undertaking to bear the entire cost of

acquisition and hence BDA stood as “requiring body”, while the state of West

Bengal was the “acquiring authority” and neither Bengal Shrachi nor Shrachi

Burdwan made any requisition whatsoever to the state; consequently, neither

entity can be regarded as requiring body in law.

18. The state issued 12 notifications under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act,

1894 declaring that the acquisition was for a public purpose and that public/

government expenses and hence it squarely falls under part II of the Act,

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rendering part VII (acquisition for a company) wholly inapplicable as the act

does not contemplate a hybrid or PPP mode of acquisition, combining parts II

& VII. It is further contended that the declaration under Section 6 conclusively

affirm that the lands were acquired for public purpose and at the public

expense. Such declarations are final and binding upon the State, BDA and all

downstream entities. The further stand taken by the Learned Advocate, that

Bengal Shrachi was selected through a bidding process for implementation of

its project and Shrachi Bardhaman is merely an assignee and Special Purpose

Vehicle created under a Deed of Assignment dated 20.10.2006 for execution of

the project. It is further argued that Shrachi Burdwan has unequivoc ally

admitted that the land was acquired for the purpose of BDA and further in

affidavit filed by Bengal Shrachi in WP N o. 16280 (W) of 2005 it was

categorically admitted that Bengal Shrachi acted only as an agent/developer

/contractor of BDA therefore, any subsequent contradictory stand,

demonstrably, mala fide and legally impermissible. That apart the award was

declared during July–August 2006 and possession was taken on 26.2.2007

upon the land vested in the State, free from all encumbrances. The state

handed over possession to BDA on the same date. Srachi Burdwan received

the land much later under a registered lease of dated 27.8.2010, making it a

post-acquisition allottee with no statutory or equitable right in the acquisition

19. It is further submitted by Mr. Banerjee, that when the land is acquired for

public purpose, time is the essence in determination and payment of

compensation and duty is cast on the state to pay requisite compensation to

the landowner at the earliest. Any attempt made by Srachi Burdwan , in

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collusion with the state and BDA, to interfere with such process constitute a

direct infringement of the respondent’s constitutional right under article 300 A

and the idea of a welfare state which is a fraud upon the statute and

landowner. After the award dated 21 May, 2012 was dismissed on 13.6.2016

in F.A.T 184 of 2016, as filed by BDA for non-compliance was again challenged

by BDA in FAT 66 of 2016, which was also dismissed as ‘not pressed’. That

apart Shrachi Burdwan has repeatedly attempted to re-open settled issues and

its first belated Challenge in W.P number 9778 (W) 2012 was dismissed by the

Division Bench in FMA 887 of 2019, which categorically denied the locus of

Shrachi Burdwan. The said judgement was expressly affirmed by the Hon’ble

Supreme Court in C.O. 5856 of 2019 and constitutes binding precedent. The

subsequent attempt was made by filing multiple revisional application, and the

Single Bench erroneously held Shrachi Burdwan as a ‘person interested’ and a

necessary party which was set aside by the Hon’ble Supreme Court with

explicit direction to proceed with execution. Third attempt was made by filing

objection under Section 47 is nothing but as a re-litigation, which is squarely

barred by Res-judicata and principles of finality. The limited liability granted

by this court in earlier civil appeal was confirmed strictly to 8 proceedings

under Section 54 of the Act and any stretch of imagination did not extend to

reach out revisional jurisdiction and such liberty cannot override or dilute the

binding the ratio decidendi whereby Hon’ble Supreme Court a ffirmed the

judgement passed in FMA887 of 2019 and set aside the contrary view of the

single bench. No appeal has been preferred by Shrachi Burdwan against the

present award and an y such right, if assumed stands long, waived by

deliberate inaction.

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20. It is further his contention that the order of the executing court dated

9.1.2018, rejecting the claim of Shrachi Burdwan as a “person interested” was

never challenged and has attained finality and therefore the reference court’s

order under Section 18 dated 23.8.2017 stands restored by the Hon’ble

Supreme Court. It is a settled proposition of law that the requiring body may

be a proper party under Section 50 but is never a person interested under

Section 3(b) of the Act. The argument advanced that an inter se dispute

between BDA and Shrachi under MOA dated 8.3.2006, do not bind the land

losers, and the amount paid by Shrachi towards lease, premium or rent ,lost

their character upon being credited to BDA/state funds and cannot be claimed

as Shrachi’s money for purposes of compensation. In this regard relied upon

the case of Pratibha Nema and ors . vs State of M.P

9

and Naihati

Municipality vs Chinmoyee Mukherjee and O rs.

10

.

21. The learned Advocate further relied upon the decision of Shyam Behari and

Ors. Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and O rs.

11

, State of West Bengal Vs P.N

Talukdar

12

with regard to the objections raised assailing the validity of

Section 4 and 6 notification and seek to nullify concluded acquisition

proceedings and impermissible collateral attack by precedent. Therefore, the

lands in present case having not being acquired at the behest of Shrachi and is

an allotee under the lease agreement dated 27.8.2010 from the BDA is not a

‘person interested’, not having any right to participate in assessment of

compensation proceeding under section 18 of the Act or having right to be

9

AIR 2003 SC 3140

10

AIR 1997 SC 378

11

AIR 1965 SC 427

12

AIR 1965 SC 646

Page 16 of 47

heard. Shrachi Burdwan if cannot be a pa rty in the reference proceeding

cannot have any say in execution proceeding, and hence the objection under

Section 47 CPC is not maintainable. No appeal can also be maintained for

having no locus under Section 54 of the Act. Furthermore the award dated

21.5.2012 was passed jointly in favour of three awardees, Abdul Aleem, Abdul

Aziz, and Abdul Rahim, but is several in nature. The objection under Section

47 was filed only against Abdul Alim, leaving the awards in favour of the other

two awardees untouched and fully satisfied. The revisional court cannot

enlarge the scope beyond what was originally challenged. Challenged to the

award in favour of two awardees is waived and became settled. Abdul Rahim

already died on 2.10.2017.

22. The learned Advocate further discussed the scope of section 47CPC which is

extremely narrow and the executing court and as well as the revisional court

under Section 115 CPC cannot adjudicate third-party claims, examine

disputed facts, or travel beyond the decree. The present objection validates the

binding term of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rahul .S.Shah, Pradeep Mehra, and

Periyammal. The objection is further barred by limitation under Section 137 of

the limitation Act having been filed long after knowledge of the award and

execution process only after exhausting all attempts up to the Hon’ble

Supreme Court and relied upon the case of Rasomoy Mitra and Kerala State

Electricity Board in support of such contention. In terms of the judgement

BDA deposited the decretal amount in the executing court with no objection to

withdrawal by decree holder/landowners and they have already withdrawn the

same to the full and final satisfaction. The execution process has been closed

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and now the third-party like Shrachi Burdwan cannot really get the award

under the garb of Section 47 CPC. Accordingly prayed for dismissal of the

revisional applications with costs.

Argument made by BDA

23. The learned Advocate representing BDA argued that after having full

knowledge about the entire process of acquisition they entered into agreement

with Bengal Shrachi for the purpose of development and in terms of the

agreement BDA after acquisition of land handed over the same to Bengal

Shrachi and in accordance with the specific terms and condition the Bengal

Shrachi paid the compensation amount but after passing of the award

enhancing the compensation by the Learned L.A court they refused to pay the

same. However subsequently by virtue of the order passed by the Contempt

court the entire payment is made over to the parties and hence this proceeding

is nonest in the eye of law. It is further submitted that the petitioner is having

no locus standi to move this revisional application as he is not the requiring

body. BDA further adopts the argument advanced by the Respondent no. 2 &

3.

Analysis

24. Heard the submissions of the learned Advocates. On the above facts and

circumstances as placed before this court, this court is of the view that before

delving into the bottom of the case, it is necessary to look into the overall facts

and to revisit the provision of law under which the land was acquired and

purpose of such acquisition. By letter dated 12.12 2003, the proposal for

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acquisition of land was given by Burdwan Development Authority to the

collector, land acquisition department Burdwan for acquisition of land in 4

Mouzas for development of Satellite Township Project, and the request was

made to the collector to acquire 257.81 acres of land and to handover its

possession to the Burdwan Development Authority to enable them to develop

the proposed project. It was further mentioned that the cost of acquisition will

be borne by BDA . It is clear from the notice inviting expression of interest that

BDA is a statutory authority of the government of West Bengal formed under

the West Bengal Town and Country Planning and Develo pment Act 1979

charged with the control of land use and intends to take up the Infrastructure

Development activities through suitable Public Private Partnership project.

Therefore, undisputedly it was a public partnership project had some terms

and conditions where BDA to take all steps to acqui re the project and

handover the same free from all encumbrances and encroachment to the

private partner in accordance with the project implementation schedule to be

fixed after mutual discussion. The notification under section 4 /6 of the Act, I

of 1894 to all concerned dated 10.5.2005, 1.12.2005 were issued on behalf of

Government of West Bengal, Land a nd Land Reforms department , Land

Acquisition .On giving a cursory glance to the affidavit filed by BDA in the writ

petition 16280 (W) of 2025, it is clear that Bengal Shrachi was only interested

with the job of developing the said land and the ownership of the said land to

be remain with BDA. The record further discloses that Bengal Shrachi already

invested around ₹11, 17, 99, 824 crores, being a renowned builder and have

an experience of promoting various big projects in West Bengal. The affidavit in

opposition used by Bengal Shrachi as found from the record filed in the writ

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petition being WP no. 16280 (w) of 2008.It was specifically stated on oath that

after acquisition of the said land, it will not be transferred in favour of Bengal

Shrachi and BDA will be the actual owner of the said land. Moreover, the said

project is built for public purpose as because it will be sold to public after

development. Therefore, there is no dispute with regard to the fact that the

property was acquired for a public purpose, namely for creating infrastructure

for setting up a Satellite Township in Bardhaman City and for improvement of

the same. The Acquisition was at the expense of the BDA in the form of

requiring body, and BDA is raising fund with the help of private participation

in implementing the aforesaid public purpose.

25. By way of affidavit in opposition BDA also made statement in the above

mentioned writ petition that in terms of the land Acquisition Act, the land was

acquired and such acquisition was within the purview of public purpose as

envisaged in Section 3(f) of the land Acquisition Act 1894 and after that

declaration under section 6 has been published in newspaper and the award

was made and compensation paid in view of acquisition of the said land by

state of Bengal on behalf of BDA as requiring body. Accordingly, the entire

compensation was made over by BDA to the state of West Bengal and the State

of West Bengal has paid the compensation to the persons concerned. It was

mentioned in the affidavit in opposition by BDA that the entire compensation

has been paid by BDA. In this case, there are rounds of litigation at the

instance of the present petitioner, who has come to this entire scenario by

entering into an agreement with the BDA on 21st day of August 2010, along

with Shrachi Burdwan whereas lessee the name of Shrachi Burdwan

Page 20 of 47

Developers Pvt. Ltd it is mentioned, and as confirming party name of Bengal

Shrachi Housing Development Limited. According to such agreement, BDA

invited expression of interest from reputed company/developers for suitable

private partners for association in the township project and by the MOA, BDA

had accepted the confirming party that is Bengal Shrachi who will pay the

entire cost of construction, develop the project, prepared all design and

drawing develop its infrastructural facilities. The MOA was executed between

BDA and Bengal Shrachi on 8th March, 2006.

In clause 5 of the same it provides that company shall pay the actual cost of

acquisition of the land together with all applicable incidentals, as maybe

determined by the land Acquisition Collector, Burdwan in accordance with the

provision of land Acquisition Act, 1984. It was further agreed that the company

would also bear additional cost in connection with the acquisition like

subsequent payment to the land losers in pursuance of the court orders, etc if

any on actual basis. Therefore, the right of the present petitioner Shrachi

Burdwan Development Private Limited, emanated from the agreement entered

into with BDA on 27th day of August 2010. In the said agreement the specific

details of the parties were described and it reveals that Shrachi Burdwan is a

lessee and Bengal Shrachi Housing Limited is a confirming party. The project

land was also described which was accepted BDO Memo no . 305/BDA on

November 8,2004 and such land to be used as per development plan of BDA .

It further disclose that Memorandum of Agreement dated 8th March, 2006

between BDA and confirming party and by a letter of BDA being Memo no .

195/BDA dated 1st March 2007, whereby the confirming party has been

Page 21 of 47

accorded “No objection” certificate to special purpose vehicle to implement the

Satellite Township Project in due compliance of the terms of and condition of

MOA . The process of acquisition commenced in the year 2005 /2006 when

there was no existence of Shrachi Burdwan Pvt ltd /petitioner herein. It was

Bengal Shrachi who deposited ₹1,91,75,810 with BDA for paying the cost of

Acquisition in 4 LA cases. Therefore, it is evident that at the time of process of

Acquisition, the present petitioner was not into the forey and his right derived

from an agreement entered into between BDA,Shrach i Burdwan and Bengal

Shrachi as confirming party with certain terms and conditions entered into

between them. In terms of the relevant provision of section 18, as discussed

above of the Land Acquisition Act and specially when the instant project was

only for public purpose which is governed under part II of the Act and not

under part VII which is acquisition for a company and hence the stand taken

by the petitioner that it was a public purpose, partnership and the petitioner

to be constituted as a representative of BDA is not tenable in the eye of Law.

26. The challenge before this court as assailed by the petitioners in three

revisional applications are the refusal by the executing court to implead the

petitioner as a party to the execution proceeding, secondly the petitioners are

aggrieved with the order dated 29th July 2925 dismissing the application filed

under Section 47 Cr.P.C and against the order dated 30.7.25 refusing to stay

the further proceeding of the execution case.

27. Upon giving an anxious consideration of the facts and circumstances of the

case it is evident although the petitioner tried to be a party in the proceeding

with the contention that they are the representative of BDA and hence party

Page 22 of 47

interested and necessary party ,such contention though was accepted by the

Learned Co-ordinate Bench but set aside by the Division Bench of this court

and duly affirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The observations made by

the Division Bench as well as the Hon’ble Apex Court questions the locus of

the petitioner which was found not established. The learned senior advocate

relied upon all the judgement relied before the learned single Bench regarding

the locus standi of the present petitioner and those were duly dealt with by the

learned Single Bench, where the definition of a ‘person interested’ given in

section 18 was discussed. In Himalaya Tiles and Marble (p) Limited (Supra)

it was held that the definition of person interested must be liberally construed,

so as to include a body, local authority, or a company for whose benefit the

land is acquired and who is bound under an agreement to pay the

compensation. The question was raised that how can it be said that a person

for whose benefit the land is acquired and who is to pay the compensation is a

person interested even though it’s take maybe extremely vital.

28. In the instant case, this point was agitated before the learned executing court

when the petitioners filed the application under Order 1 Rule 10 (2) of Code of

Civil Procedure and the learned court held that the terms of agreement entered

in between Burdwan, Shrachi and BDA or Burdwan Shrachi and Bengal

Shrachi are not binding upon the present petitioners/land losers or the State

as none of them are parties in the said agreement/contracts. In terms of the

agreement, Shrachi is required to pay additional compensation, if any to the

land looser, and if that be so the court was of the view that BDA is at liberty to

recover the same from Shachi and pay the same to the actual looser. The

Page 23 of 47

Division Bench while deciding appeal filed against the order passed by the

single bench dealt with the legal questions which are as follows.

“I) whether the first respondent herein, in its capacity

as the person implementing as the public project for

which the land was acquired under an agreement

with the requiring body would be a “person

interested” within the meaning of Section 3(b) of the

Act of 1894.

II) Whether the first respondent herein, in such status,

was entitled to be a party to the reference

proceedings under Section 18 of the Act of 1894.

III) Whether either the reference court or the land-

losers who had sought the references for

enhancement of compensation was obliged to issue

any notice to the first respondent herein , enjoying the

status as indicated above, or implead such person in

the reference cases before any enhancement of

compensation could be allowed in the reference.

IV) Were the writ petitioners entitled to the order that

they have obtained?

29. The Division Bench discussed the Act of 1894, which en visages the

acquisition of land by the state for any public purpose or at the behest of a

company and the Act provides for publication of a preliminary notification

under section 4 thereof, the hearing of objections from persons interested in

any land which has been notified under section 4(1) of the Act in accordance

with Section 5A thereof and issuance of declaration that the land is required

for public purpose or for a company issued under section 6 of the Act. For all

Page 24 of 47

practical purposes, the physical possession of the acquired land may be taken

over upon publication being made under Section 6 of the Act and the

collector’s award being declared, though matters pertaining to the final

compensation and the like, may take years thereafter. It was also discussed

that the Act of 1894 provides for an extraordinary situation since the land is to

be acquired for a direct public purpose, or for a private body, for the larger

interest of the economy, the physical access to the land and the right to use

the same is given paramount importance and the rights of the land losers, qua

the receipt of due compensation need not be conclusively assessed by the time

the nature and character of the acquired land is irreversibly changed and such

land is forever lost to the land losers. It was also discussed that the proviso to

Section 6(1) of the Act of 1894 mandates that no declaration under section 6 of

the act shall be made unless the compensation to be awarded for such

property is to be paid by a company, or wholly or partly out of public revenues

or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority.

30. The Division Bench further discussed definition of company which includes

companies as defined in Section 3 of Companies A ct, 1956, other than

government companies and also includes private registered societies and

private cooperative societies, government companies and registered societies

and cooperative societies controlled by the government are included within the

definition of corporation owned or controlled by the State in Section 3(cc) of the

act of 1894. Therefore, from the interpretation of the provisions envisaged in

the Act of 1894, regarding acquisition of the land for the public purpose or for

the company clearly defined and in the instant case from the content of the

Page 25 of 47

notification, there remains no ambiguity that the acquisition was made for the

purpose of development of Burdwan Satellite Township that is for public

purpose and lands were acquired after complying with all required formalities

and also in accordance with the law the compensation as decided by the state

Authority was paid. In terms of section 18 of Land Acquisition Act, if any

person interested who has not accepted the award may apply before the

collector for measurement of the land and determination of the quantum of

compensation. Section 18 reads as follows.

“18: Reference to court.

1) any person interested, who has not accepted the

award may by written application to the collector,

require that the matter be referred by the collector for

the determination of the court, whether his objection

be to the measurement of the land, the amount of the

compensation, the person to whom it is payable or the

apportionment of the compensation among the

persons interested.

2) the application shall state the grounds on which

objection to the is taken:

Provided that every such application shall be made-

a) if the person making it was present or

represented before the collector at the time

when he made his award, within six weeks

from the date of the collector’s award;

b) In other cases, within six weeks of the

receipt of the notice from the collector under

Section 12, Sub-Section (2), or within six

Page 26 of 47

months from the date of the collector’s award,

which your period shall first expire.”

31. Before the Division Bench, the learned Advocate appeared on behalf of the

land losers referred the second proviso to Section (1) of the Act of 1894 to

emphasise that it matters a little whether, Shrachi Burdwan would be merely

discharging the obligation of the requiring body in terms of an agreement with

the requiring body and according to them, in s uch a scenario, Shrachi

Burdwan would not aquire any status, independent of the body to be entitled

to have a voice in courts in the reference proceedings or any say in the matter

of assessment of the compensation to be paid to the land losers. It was further

contended that the moment the court recognise that the acquisition was made

for public purpose, it endorsed the declaration that was made under section 6

of the Act of 1894, and as a consequence, the compensation to be awarded for

the acquisition was to be paid wholly or partly out of public revenues or some

fund controlled or managed by a local authority or else the declaration would

never have been made.

Section 50 of the Act of 1894 reads as follows:-

“50. Acquisition of land at cost of a local authority or company.

1) Where the provisions of this act put in force for the

purpose of acquiring land at the cost of any fund

controlled or managed by a local authority or of any

company, the charges of and incidental to such

acquisition shall be defrayed from or of such fund or

company

Page 27 of 47

2) In any proceeding held before a collector or court in

such cases the local authority or company concerned

may appear and adduce evidence for the purpose of

determining the amount of compensation;

Provided that no such local authority or company

shall be entitled to demand reference under section

18.”

32. It is apparent from the record as well as from the submissions advanced that

the writ petitioners claimed and filed objection under Section 5A of the Act of

1894, which was deemed to be rejected upon declaration is being issued under

section 6 of the Act that the land proposed to be acquired was required for the

public purpose, and the Division Bench held that therefore, the principal

ground urged by the petitioners about the purpose for which such acquisition

was made or that it was made for private profit making exercise because of

involvement of private promoters was dismissed upon the court, expressing

satisfaction that the acquisition was for public purpose and noticing that the

recurring body was a development of authority constituted by state

government under the Act of 1979 for the Burdwan planning area, an area

declared as such under the State Act of 1979.

33. The Division Bench of this court meticulously discussed all the judgements

relied upon before the learned Single Bench as well as before the Division

Bench by the learned Senior advocate, Mr. Arindam Banerjee representing the

petitioner .The Learned Senior advocate referred to the concept of Public

Private partnership in the Act of 2013, that has now replaced the Act of 1894

and Section3 (zb) of the Act of 2013 which defines “Requiring body” which is

Page 28 of 47

placed along with Section 95 thereof and it correspondence to section 50 of the

Act of 1894, but specifically a right to the requiring body to appear and adduce

evidence for the purpose of determining compensation before the collector. The

submission made on behalf of the present petitioner that the present

Acquisition Act of 1894 to be guided by the subsequent legislation, was not

accepted by the learned Division Bench. It was clearly observed that,;

“First, the Act of 2013 makes a deliberate departure

from its predecessor statute in such regard. Secondly,

Shrachi Burdwan cannot be seen to be the requiring

body in the milieu of the subject acquisition.”

34. The distinction was drawn between a person covered by the expression

“person interested” in Section 3(b) of the Act of 1894 and the expression “Any

person interested’ in Section 18 thereof. This argument was also discussed and

held that “the expression “any person interested” in section 18 of the Act gives

such person a right to refer the collector’s award for determination of the court and

any expansive meaning attributed to such expression has to be tempered by the

prohibition in the proviso to section 50 of the Act of 1894.”

35. It was clearly held by the learned Division Bench that it is doubtful Shrachi

Burdwan can even be regarded as a “person interested” within the meaning of

relevant expression in Section 3 (b) of the Act of 1894, and the petitioner did

not take any steps to be completed in the reference proceeding or even

bothered to prefer any appeal against such orders. There remains no doubt

that Shrachi Burdwan was aware of the references and the order passed there

in. At any rate with exercise of minimum diligence, Shrachi Burdwan should

have been aware of the pendency of the references and contemporaneously

Page 29 of 47

aware of the orders of enhancement. Even o therwise, in view of the status

under the agreement with the requiring body, Shrachi Burdwan ought to have

kept self-informed of the references, the progress made there in and the fate

their off; and no argument to the contrary made by Shrachi Burdwan can be

countenanced in the equitable jurisdiction exercised under Article 226 of the

Constitution. The learned Division Bench also negated the stand taken by the

present petitioner that it was the duty of the land losers or the reference court

to implead the petitioner or issue notice of the reference proceeding to it. It was

lastly held that Shrachi Burdwan could never have been recognised to be ‘Any

person interested’ within the meaning of Section 18(1) of the Act of 1894 and

had no right to challenge the order granted or the annulment of the orders of

enhanced compensation passed by the reference court in the light of its

conduct and dates, unable and abject failure to protect its perceived rights

with the degree of diligence that was expected of it. It was further held that;

“it cannot be said by any stretch of imagination, that

it was the duty of either the land, losers or the

reference court to implead Shrachi Burdwan or issue

notice of the reference proceeding to it. Even upon

applying the dictum of Constitution Bench judgement

in UP Awas , Shrachi Burdwan could not have been

regarded by the reference court suo motu as the

requiring body or the person for whose benefit the

acquisition was made.”

36. The view of the learned Division Bench as appears “the Shrachi Burdwan is

not left without a remedy. Once he discharge its unequivocal obligation under

the agreement with BDA to put the requiring body in funds to satisfy the decree,

Page 30 of 47

obtained by the appellants herein , Shrachi Burdwan may, subject to the laws of

limitation, bring an action against partner BDA if it perceives BDA to have

colluded with the appellants herein or to have otherwise unlawfully facilitated,

the Appellants herein to obtain undeserving orders of enhancement of

compensation. But before the forum to which such action is carried, Shrachi

Burdwan would have to contain exactly the opposite of what it has conversed in

these proceedings before the writ court and in this appeal, Shrachi Burdwan

would then have to assert that since it was neither a requiring body in the

acquision of the land, nor a person for whose benefit the exercise was

undertaken, it’s right to proceed against BDA for damages, remain unaffected by

the reverse that it suffers in this appeal and, on the contrary, is strengthened

thereby. If the relevant forum holds otherwise, and the claim is repelled, BDA

would only be a victim of its conduct or of its erroneous perception of having

suffered any prejudice by the end, enhanced awards.”

37. The legal question that was raised was answered to this extent that ‘it is

doubtful that Shrachi Bardawan in its capacity as the person implementing the

public project for which the land was acquired under the agreement with the

requiring body, maybe regarded as a “person interested” as per the definition in

Section 3(b) of the Act of 1894”. It was also decided that Shrachi Burdwan in

such status was not entitled to be a party to the reference proceeding under

Section 18 of the Act of 1894. Neither the reference court nor the land losers

were obliged to issue any notice of the reference proceeding to Shrachi

Burdwan. The Division Bench with such observation clearly held as per the

status of the petitioner Shrachi Burdwan is not entitled to be a party in the

Page 31 of 47

reference proceeding under Section 18 of the Act of 1894 and the writ

petitioners were not entitled to any relief in the light of the Shrachi Burdwan’s

dismal conduct and accordingly set aside the appeal being FMA 887 of 2019.

Assailing such order Shrachi Burdwan went up to Hon’ble Supreme Court by

filing Civil Appeal No. 5856 of 2021. Arifa Khatoon and ors. also moved SLP

before Hon’ble Supreme Court against the judgement and order dated

26.2.2020 passed in C.O No. 1232 of 2018 whereby also the learned single

Bench held the award passed enhancing the compensation awarded in respect

of a reference proceeding is null and void and the award passed by the

reference court enhancing the compensation was set aside. Hon’ble Supreme

Court by a common judgement affirmed the order passed by the Learned

Division Bench and set aside the order passed by the learned single Bench.

38. The point was raised that in view of the definition of Section 3 (b) of the Act

Shrachi Burdwan can it said to be a person interested as the ultimate liability

to pay the enhanced compensation would be upon the appellant and he was

not included as a party in the reference court under Section 18 of the Act and

was not heard by the reference court. It was observed by the Hon’ble Supreme

Court that-

“Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of

the case and particularly when the locus of the

appellant Shrachi Burdwan to challenge the

judgment and award passed by the Reference

Court is seriously disputed and whether the

appellant, Shrachi Burdwan can be said to be a

“person interested” within the definition of

Section 3(b) of the Land Acquisition Act and

Page 32 of 47

thereby the appellant can challenge the

judgment and award passed by the Reference

Court enhancing the compensation are all

disputed question of facts are all contentious

issues, we are of the opinion that learned single

judge of the High Court ought not to have

entertained the writ petition under Article 226 of

the Constitution of India and not to have set

aside the judgement and award passed by the

reference court, enhancing the amount of

compensation under the provisions of the land

Acquisition Act.”

The order passed by the learned single judge in civil appeal number 5857–

5880 of 2021 was also set aside being not sustainable at law.

39. The learned Senior Advocate Mr. Arindam Banerjee, draws the attention of

this court to the paragraph 15 of the judgement delivered by the Hon’ble

Supreme Court, where by civil appeal was dismissed but it was observed that:-

“it will be open for the appellant/Shrachi

Burdwan Developers Private Limited to pursue

whatever other remedies may be availabl e to

them in accordance with law ,which may be

including filing of appeal under section 54 of the

Land Acquisition Act ,however subject to the

leave to appeal granted by the High Court for

which the appellant has to file a proper

application n for leave to appeal and satisfy the

High court that the appellant company can be

said to be the person interested under Section 3

(b) of the Land Acquision Act and that the

Page 33 of 47

appellant company has a locus to prefer appeal

under Section 54 of the Land Acquision Act”.

It was further observed that:-

“It will be open for the land owners to challenge

the locus of the appellant -Shrachi Burdwan as a

person inducted within the definition of section

3(b) of the land Acquisition Act and to contend

that the applicant has no locus to challenge the

judgement and award passed by the reference

court. All the aforesaid questions are kept open

to be considered by the High Court as and when

such application is preferred along with the

appeals.”

40. Therefore from the observation it is evident that, the Hon’ble Supreme Court

kept open the issue of the locus of the present petitioner to be decided by the

High Court which may be including filing of appeal under Section 54 of Land

Acquision Act and to take all other remedies may be available to them in

accordance with law . It is specific stand of the learned Senior Advocate that in

view of such leverage given to the petitioner the petitioner filed the application

for addition of party in the Execution case since by the time the execution

proceeding was initiated which was turned down by the Learned executing

Court giving rise to filing of the revisional application as it was not the

mandate of the Hon’ble Apex court that the petitioner can only filed the appeal.

In the observation of the Hon’ble Supreme Court a specific condition was even

expressed that such appeal under Section 54 Of L.A Act can be filed subject to

leave granted by the High Court satisfying about the locus of the petitioner

company that they are person interested Unser Section 3(b) of the Land

Page 34 of 47

Acquisition Act. As it appears that the petitioner company never prayed for any

leave to file appeal before any Court nor filed any appeal as directed by the

Hon’ble court but interpreting the order “which may include’ which according

to Mr. Arindam Banerjee the learned Senior Advocate has opened a wider

scope to approach the executing court by filing a petition under Section 47 of

CPC coupled with two application under Section 151 CPC .The learned

executing court by the order dated 29th July 2025 dismissed all the

applications. The learned Executing court observed that Section 47 CPC deals

with the question arising between the parties to th e suit or their

representatives apropos the execution, discharge or satisfaction of a decree

and it is no longer integra that the executing court cannot go beyond the

decree between the parties to the suit or their representatives. It was clearly

observed that the petitioner is neither a party nor the representative of any

party of the original land Acquisition case. More so the executing court cannot

act as an appellate court or revisional court.

41. It is unambiguously clear and held by the Division Bench affirmed by the

Hon’ble Apex court that despite having knowledge about the reference

proceeding the petitioner never tried to be impleaded as party in the reference

proceeding and waited till the award was passed and subsequently enhanced

and the decree was put into execution . The petitioner has miserable failed to

satisfy the Division Bench of Calcutta High Court as well as the Apex court

about their locus to be impleaded in the reference proceeding and therefore the

appropriate remedy would have been before the appellate authority against

the award passed in the reference proceeding . He cannot be otherwise said to

Page 35 of 47

be interested person in the subsequent proceeding, when the reference was

filed for enhancement of the compensation. The leverage given by the Hon’ble

Supreme Court to the petitioner to take appropriate measures can never be

interpreted to raise the same issue and to challenge the decree/award passed

by the reference court considering the same as null and void since passed

without giving him an opportunity of hearing. The learned Division Bench of

this Court meticulously discussed the status of the petitioner in view of the

law laid down and the said observation has been duly affirmed by the Hon’ble

Supreme Court however allowed the petitioner to prove his locus in the original

proceeding. BDA filed the appeal challenging the decree being F.A184 of 2016,

got dismissed on 13.6.2016 for non- compliance and again BDA challenged it

in FAT 66 of 2016 which was dismissed as “not pressed”.

42. The present petitioner has filed an application to recall such order which is

yet to be decided and therefore at present, there is no appeal pending

challenging the award passed by the reference court in enhancing the

compensations despite the opportunity given by the Hon’ble Supreme Court .

The petitioner left no stone unturned and filed the application under section

47 CPC in the execution case filed in connection with such award despite

being aware about the scope of Section 47 CPC being extremely narrow. A

third party claim to examine disputed facts cannot be adjudicated and the

executing court also cannot travel beyond the decree. Section 47 CPC reads as

under;

“47. Questions to be determined by the court

executing degree;

Page 36 of 47

1) all questions arising between the parties to the suit

in which the decree was passed, or their

representatives, and relating to the execution,

discharge or satisfaction of the decree, shall be

determined by the court, executing the degree and not

by a separate suit.

****

3) where a question rises as to whether any person is

or is not the representative of a party, search question

shall, for the purposes of this section be determined

by the court.

Explanation I- for the purpose of this section, plaintive

whose suit has been dismissed and a defendant

against whom a suit has been dismissed, our parties

to the suit.

Explanation II;-

a) for the purposes of this section, a purchaser of

property at a sale in execution of a decree shall be

deemed to be a party to the suit in which the decree is

passed; and

b) all questions relating to the delivery of possession

of such property to such purchase purchaser or his

representative shall be deemed to be questions

relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of

the decree within the meaning of this section.”

Page 37 of 47

43. In the decision as relied upon by the learned advocate, representing the

respondents 2 & 3 in Anand Chandra Panda Dead Through Lrs. versus

Collector, Keonjhar and another

13

held that-

“on a reading of Section 47 of the CPC, it becomes

evident that all questions arising between the parties

to the suit in which the decree was passed or their

representatives relating to the execution discharge or

satisfaction of the decree must be determined by the

court, executing the degree and not by a separate

suit. This manifest the questions must be determined

during the process of the execution of the degree. It is

during the pendency of the execution and proceeding,

and not subsequently when the execution proceeding

is closed and the decree has been executed to the

satisfaction of the executing court.”

In the instant case, in view of the subsequent orders passed by the learned

single bench in the contempt proceeding, filed by the land losers after the

application under section 47 CPC was dismissed, and the decree was executed

after being satisfied, directed the amount as deposited with BDA to be paid to

the land losers and accordingly the same has been paid. Therefore, practically

their remains nothing to be adjudicated further in this proceeding, unless the

present petitioner could prove their locus before the appropriate forum to

challenge the proceeding.

44. In the decision of R.P.A. Valliammal vs R. Palanichami

14

held that:-

13

2026 SCC OnLine SC 121

14

(1997) 10 SCC 209

Page 38 of 47

“Section 47 postulates that all questions

arising between the parties to the suit in which

the degree was passed or their representative

and relating to the execution, discharge or

satisfaction of the decree, shall be determined by

the court, executing the decree and not by a

separate suit”.

The petitioner has not been able to prove as of now that he is the

representative of the judgement debtor or any of the parties to the original

proceeding. The judgement delivered by the Supreme Court in Dhurandhar

Prasad Singh (supra) the power of the court under Section 47 of the Civil

Procedure Code, 1908 was discussed and held that objections under Section

47 to executability of decree held can be allowed if it is found that decree is

void ab initio and a nullity . This judgement has been relied upon by both the

learned advocates and much emphasis has been given by t he learned Senior

advocate, Mr. Arindam Banerjee that since no opportunity was given to the

petitioner in the original reference proceeding hence any decree passed without

offering opportunity to the necessary party to be treated as a nullity and hence

petitioner is entitled to raise the objection, even at the stage of execution of

such decree, where he was not a party.

45. In order to buttress such argument, the learned Advocate Mr Siddharth

Banerjee relied upon the paragraph 24 of the said judgement where it was held

that the exercise of power under Section 47 of the code is microscopic and lies

in a very narrow inspection hole. More so when the present petitioner was very

much aware about the proceeding initiated for granting compensation and

subsequently, the reference filed for enhancement of the compensation when

Page 39 of 47

they did not participate in the proceeding or made any attempt to be

impleaded and belatedly filed their first objection by filing a writ petition and

became successful, but such order of the learned single judge was set aside by

the Hon’ble Division Bench and affirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court can in

no manner be assailed such decree as a void ab intio which would enable the

petitioner to reopen the case by allowing the application under section 47 of

code of civil procedure. Careful perusal of the judgement further reveals that in

that case situations were discussed where the decree can be said to be void or

only without jurisdiction, for example maybe transaction against a minor

without being represented by his next friend. Such a transaction is a good

transaction against the whole world. So far as the minor is concerned, if he

decides to avoid the same and succeeds in avoiding it by taking records to

appropriate proceeding, the transaction becomes void from the very beginning.

In the same decision also, a situation was taken note of as discussed in

Marshalsea case

15

that:-

“…when a court has jurisdiction of the cause, and

proceeds inverso ordine or erroneously, there the

party who sues, or the officer or minister of the court

who execute the precept for process of the court, no

action lies against them. But when the court has not

jurisdiction of the cause, there are the whole

proceeding is coram non judice, and actions will lie

against them without any regard of the precept or

process…..”

15

(1612) 10 Co Rep 68b: 77 ER 1027

Page 40 of 47

46. In the instant case no such situation arose and the learned reference court

passed the award enhancing the compensation in accordance with law and the

award was put into execution. The petitioner approached the executing court

to be impleaded as a party which was refused and the order of the learned

single judge permitting the petitioner to be included as a party was set aside

by the Division Bench and duly affirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

Despite liberty is granted to the petitioner, no appeal has been preferred as of

now against such award and the appeal preferred by BDA was dismissed being

noted, and an application is now pending for recalling the order of dismissal of

the initial appeal filed by BDA and filed the application under Section 47 of

Code of Civil Procedure.

47. The present petition clearly mentioned that the District Magistrate issued

12 separate notifications under section 4 of the land Acquisition Act, notifying

that the land needed for the purpose of a project in the month of April 2005, in

May 2005, and in the month of December 2005, and January 2006, the notice

under Section 6 was issued by th e land and land reforms department

Declaring that the land needed for setting up of the project. The Bengal

Shrachi entered into the agreement of assignment in the year 2006 with the

present petitioner Shrachi Burdwan where under Bengal Shrachi investor,

Xander Investment holding VI limited a Mauritius based company incorporated

for the purpose of making investments in a real estate sector in India as

permitted under regulatory regime, agreed to develop the same project through

the petitioner Shrachi Burdwan as a special purpose vehicle, the SPV and by

the side agreement Bengal Shrachi assigned and transferred all its rights, a

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title and interest in the development of the state project to the petitioner

Shrachi Burdwan but at no point of time any of the land loser was a party to

the said agreement. No intimation was ever given regarding such deed of

assignment to the land losers or the purpose for which the acquisition of land

as declared was changed. Even if any such assignment is permitted by BDA

and if not followed subsequently the entire dispute lies between BDA and the

developers and the subsequent assignees which has been categorically

observed by the Hon’ble Division Bench affirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme

Court.

48. Before this court the challenge is made against the said order of the

Executing court dismissing refusing to entertain the application filed under

Section 47 of CPC and in view of the facts and circumstances the observations

made by the Hon’ble Apex court affirming the observation of the Hon’ble

Division Bench ,there is no room left to hold that the executing court acted

with gross failure in exercise of jurisdiction vested in it under the law as the

decree was void being passed by not impleading the petitioner as in the

execution proceeding since under public purpose, partnership the petitioner is

to be construed as a representative of BDA . This stand was negated at every

stage since this proceeding emanated in terms of land Acquisition Act Of 1894.

In the decision of Anisminic Ltd. (supra) decided the issue of lack of

jurisdiction which may arise in various ways which include absence of

formalities or things which are conditions precedent before the tribunal may at

the end make an order that it has no jurisdiction to make. The aforesaid

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proposition finds reflection in the observation of one of their Lordship, which

reads as under-

“Lack of jurisdiction may arise in various ways.

There may be an absence of those formalitie s or

things which are conditions precedent to the tribunal

may at the end, make an order that it has no

jurisdiction to make. Or, in the intervening stage,

while engaged in a proper enquiry, the tribunal may

depart from the rules of natural justice.; or it may ask

itself the wrong questions; or it may take into account

matters which it was not directed to take into

account. Thereby it would step outside its jurisdiction.

It would turn its enquiry into something not directed

by the Parliament and failed to make the enquiry

which the parliament did direct. Any of these things

would cause it purported decision to be a nullity.’”

49. In the present case as on date the petitioner has not taken any steps

against BDA for violation of any terms of the agreement which was also

observed by the Hon’ble Division bench .In view of the law lay down in this

regard, lack of jurisdiction and the explanations found in various judicial

announcement, this court do not find any substance regarding maintainability

of the revisional applications by the petitioners. Challenging the orders passed

by the executing court refusing to entertain the application under Section 47

of the Code of Civil Procedure, refusing to implead the petitioner as a party to

the execution proceeding and also disposing of the execution case in terms of

the award passed by the reference Court finally after being satisfied with the

Decree as the entire amount of compensation was deposited and withdrawn by

the land losers. It is clearly evident that a contempt application was filed by

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the Land losers in connection with Money Execution case being 12 of 2012

where the specific direction was given to the District Magistrate, Purba

Burdwan to comply the order dated. 29.8.2018 and 12.9.2018 and accordingly

the District Magistrate undertook the compliance. And as a consequence a

certificate proceeding was also initiated. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the

case of Rahul S. Shah versus Jinendrakumar Gandhi

16

has held that-

“…..the benefit of section 47 CPC cannot be availed

to conduct a retrial causing failure of realisation of

the fruits of the decree. Section 47 is intended to

prevent multiplicity of suits .It simply lays down the

procedure and the form whereby the court reaches a

decision. For the applicability of the section, two

essential requisites have to be kept in mind. Firstly,

the question must be the one arising between the

parties and secondly, the dispute relate to the

execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree.

Thus, the objective of section 47 is to prevent

unwanted litigation and dispose of all objections as

expeditiously as possible.”

50. This court is of the view that the petitioner in order to delay and drag the

proceeding without settling their initial onus to prove their locus to interfere

into the reference proceeding under Section 18 of land Acquisition Act, 1894

continue with their filing of application applications before the executing court

as well as before this revisional court, knowing fully well that these are not the

appropriate forum to decide the locus. That apart, the proceeding has reached

to fate accompli as the degree has not only been discharge, but the payment is

16

(2021) 6 SCC 418

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already made to the land losers and the prayer made by the petitioners to pass

any direction to behold such amount by the land losers until the status of the

present petitioners are established, does not find any leg to stand on. It is

decided as of now that the Appellant is not a person interested since the land

was not acquired for the purpose of appellant, and he has no right to question

the award. The Lessee company of the award land is neither a beneficiary not

an interested person under Section 3(b) all Section 9 of the act and is not

entitled to participate in the award proceeding. It is decided that Lessee

Company being post acquisition allottee of land is neither necessary, not

proper, but not interested person and nor has any locus to be heard in the

matter of determination of compensation. There is a distinction between the

acquisition under II public purpose at public expense and under part VII

acquisition for company of the L.A act 1894, and in this case, it is clearly

under part II for public purpose at public expense.

51. In the case of M/S ultra Tech cement Limited versus M ast Ram and

others

17

the dispute relates to ownership of subject land and health cannot be

an impediment to legitimate rights of original land owners to receive

compensation. Payment of full and final compensation to land owner is a

precursor to taking position of land sought to be acquired from such persons.

In the said case in notice under Section 4 of A.A act 1894 was issued by state

of Himachal Pradesh, declaring its intention toward the subject land

measuring 56 to 14 Vega for the purpose of acquiring the land was to create a

safety zone surrounding the mining area. During the acquisition proceedings

of the land owners did not allow the authorities to undertake the evaluation of

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2024 INSC 709

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their houses, trees structures for the purpose of determination of

compensation, and the proceeding was challenged before High Court and an

ad interim order was granted the acquisition proceeding by the High Court.

The petition was ultimately dismissed on the ground that acquisition of the

lands was for a public purpose and then the award was passed b y the LA

collector in terms of Section 24(1)(a) of the Right to Fair Compensation and

Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013

and determine the compensation. Being dissatisfied with the award petition

was filed with a prayer to pass a supplementary award after 2020, finding the

compensation for the damage caused to the structures and standing crops and

accordingly direction was passed to the supplementary award which was also

passed during pendency of this acquisition proceeding JAL entered into an

agreement with Apple, M/s. Ultra Tech cement for transfer of the cement

project in question, the dispute arose as to who should pay the compensation

amount determined under the supplementary award to the land losers and the

High Court relying on the terms of the scheme, passed the order, directing the

Appellant to pay the compensation amount at the first instance and left it open

for them to recover the same from JAL letter, if permissible in law. The matter

went up to Hon’ble Supreme Court where role of the state under Article 300 A

of the Constitution was discussed and it was found that the amount

determined as compensation under the supplementary award was not paid to

the land owners for a period of more than two years and no effort was made by

the state to get the same paid at an hour. It was held that time is of the

essence in determination and payment of compensation, as is evident from the

judgement in Kukreja construction Company and others versus State of

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Maharashtra and others.

18

, where also it was decided that “once the

compensation has been determined, the same is payable immediately without

any requirement of a representation or request by the landowners and the duty

is cast on the state to pay such compensation to the land losers otherwise, there

would be a breach of Article 300A of the Constitution.” Further, it is found that

the state of Himachal Pradesh did not ensure payment of compensation to the

respondent number 1 to 6 before taking possession of their land when Section

38(1) indicates that the payment of full and final compensation to the

landowners is a pre-to taking possession of the land sought to be acquired

from such persons.

Conclusion

52. Therefore in summation of supra and after considering entire facts and

circumstances this court do not find any merit in the case.

53. This Court further is of the view that the petitioner has persistently raised

the same contention before different forums ,notwithstanding that the issue

stands conclusively settled by the Supreme Court .In absence of any

appropriate challenge to the said decision ,such proceedings are hit by res

judicata and constitute an unwarranted consumption of precious judicial

time.

54. Accordingly the Revisional applications being C.O. 2890 of 2025, 2892 of

2025 and 3194 of 2025 are hereby dismissed with cost of Rs.1,00,000/-/- to

be paid to the Calcutta High Court Legal Aid Services Committee.

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55. All other connected applications are hereby disposed of.

56. Urgent certified copy if applied by any of the parties to be supplied subject to

observance of all formalities.

(CHAITALI CHATTERJEE DAS, J.)