1

Serial No. 01

Supplementary 1 List

HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA

AT SHILLONG

WP(C) No. 232 of 2026 with

WP(C) No. 233 of 2026

Reserved Date: 14.07.2026

Pronouncement Date: 11.08.2026

WP(C) No. 232 of 2026

Shri Mansan Manik Syiem

S/o S. Swer,

R/o Laitkor, Nongdaneng,

Hima Mylliem, East Khasi Hills District,

Meghalaya 793010.

…….. Petitioner

- Vs-

1. The Khasi Hills Autonomous District Council,

represented by its Secretary.

2. The Executive Committee,

Khasi Hills Autonomous District Council, Shillong

represented by its Secretary.

3. Secretary to the Executive Committee,

Khasi Hills Autonomous District Council, Shillong.

4. Shri. Alban Fedrick Syiem,

Acting Syiem of Mylliem Syiemship,

East Khasi Hills District.

…….. Respondents

WP(C) No. 233 of 2026

Shri. Ainam Manik Syiem,

S/o. S. Swer,

Resident of Laitkor, Nongdaneng, 2026:MLHC:863

2

Mylliem Syiemship, Shillong

East Khasi Hills District.

……… Petitioner

- Vs-

1. Khasi Hills Autonomous District Council,

represented by its Secretary.

2. The Executive Committee, Khasi Hills

Autonomous District Council, Shillong

represented by its Secretary.

3. Secretary to the Executive Committee,

Khasi Hills Autonomous District Council, Shillong.

4. Shri. Alban Fredrick Syiem,

Resident of Jaiaw Langsning, Shillong,

East Khasi Hills District, Meghalaya.

……… Respondents

Coram:

Hon’ble Mr. Justice W. Diengdoh, Judge.

Appearance:

WP(C) No. 232 of 2026

For the Petitioner/Appellant(s) : Mr. Philemon Nongbri, Adv. with

Mr. E. Lalsangluaia, Adv.

For the Respondent(s) : Mr. H.L. Shangreiso, SC, KHADC with

Mr. T. Dkhar, Adv. for R 1-3.

Mr. S. Sen, Adv. with

Ms. E. Blah, Adv.

Ms. S. Dhar, Adv. for R 4.

WP(C) No. 233 of 2026

For the Petitioner/Appellant(s) : Mr. L. Khyriem, Adv. with

Mr. W. Jyrwa, Adv. 2026:MLHC:863

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For the Respondent(s) : Mr. H.L. Shangreiso, SC, KHADC with

Mr. T. Dkhar, Adv. for R 1-3.

Mr. S. Sen, Adv. with

Ms. E. Blah, Adv.

Ms. S. Dhar, Adv. for R 4.

i) Whether approved for reporting in Yes/No

Law journals etc.:

ii) Whether approved for publication

in press: Yes/No

COMMON JUDGMENT AND ORDER

1. These two writ petitions arose from a common cause and with

identical facts and circumstances, as such, it is deemed proper and convenient to

pass a common judgment, which is done so herein.

2. In WP(C) No. 233 of 2026, the petitioner’s grievance is that he was

functioning as the Syiem of Mylliem and discharging his duties, as such, he was

served with the impugned Notification No. DC.XXVII/Genl/192/2023-2026/

dated 22.05.2026, enclosed with a Suspension Order dated 22.05.2026 issued by

the respondent No. 3, effectively notifying his suspension as the Syiem of

Mylliem, and further, that the respondent No. 4 herein was placed as Acting

Syiem in his place.

3. This, according to the petitioner was an action taken in clear violation

of all norms provided under the relevant law prevailing in this regard, that is, the

‘Khasi Hills Autonomous District (Appointment and Succession of Syiem, 2026:MLHC:863

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Deputy Syiem, Electors and Rangbah Shnong of Mylliem Syiemship) Act, 2007’

(hereinafter referred to the Act of 2007).

4. In WP(C) No. 232 of 2026, the petitioner is said to be the Deputy

Syiem of Hima Mylliem, being appointed to that position by the issuance of the

official Sanad by the Khasi Hills Autonomous District Council (KHADC) on

15.05.2024 and he has been functioning in that post since then.

5. It is also the stand of the petitioner that vide order dated 25.02.2026

(supra) the incumbent Syiem, U Ainam Manik Syiem was placed under

suspension by the respondent KHADC and the respondent No. 4 herein, Shri.

Alban Fedrick Syiem was placed as the Acting Syiem of Hima Mylliem vide

relevant notification No. DC.XXVII/Genl/192/2023-2026 dated 22.05.2026.

6. In accordance with the Act of 2007, in the event, the Syiem is

suspended or removed, the Deputy Syiem ought to have been placed as the

Acting Syiem. However, the respondent KHADC vide communication dated

22.05.2026 has overlooked the relevant provisions of the law and has instead

appointed respondent No. 4 as the Acting Syiem of Hima Mylliem, apparently

on the ground that since the petitioner herein is the brother of the suspended

Syiem, therefore, the authority concerned has deemed it inappropriate to appoint

this petitioner as the Acting Syiem. Being aggrieved by such action, the

petitioner has approached this Court with an application assailing the said 2026:MLHC:863

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impugned action and order.

7. Mr. L. Khyriem, learned counsel for the petitioner in WP(C) No. 233

of 2026 in his argument, has submitted that the petitioner as the duly elected

Syiem of Hima Mylliem is holding a statutory post, his appointment being in

accordance with the provisions of the Act of 2007. Section 7 of the Act stipulates

that the Syiem shall hold office during his lifetime. However, within the said

provision, is found the enabling power of the Executive Committee to suspend

or remove the Syiem from office on receipt of a complaint against his

functioning. Further, it is also provided that such complaint must first be brought

to the knowledge and notification of the Durbar Hima and that the Syiem must

be given the opportunity of being heard.

8. The learned counsel has contended that in the case of the petitioner

herein, despite admitting that there is no complaint against him, the KHADC has

suspended him forcefully vide the impugned order and notification, without

following due procedure and in clear violation of the relevant provisions of the

Act of 2007.

9. Apparently, there is no evident of any complaint filed against the

petitioner, and even, if there is such complaint, Proviso 1 of Section 7 of the Act

of 2007, provides that any complaint against the Syiem should first be brought

to the knowledge and notice of the Durbar Hima. This not being done, the 2026:MLHC:863

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impugned action of suspension of the petitioner cannot be sustained in law,

submits the learned counsel.

10. It is also the contention of the learned counsel, that the respondent

KHADC being aware of the fact that the petitioner is holding a statutory post

and cannot be ousted from office unless his removal or suspension is in

accordance with Section 7 of the Act, has attempted to project that there exists a

complaint dated 11.02.2026 against the petitioner, but the same was withdrawn

vide letter dated 17.04.2026. However, the respondent KHADC has taken

cognizance of the same complaint dated 11.02.2026 that was withdrawn and

terming such action as one in suo moto, on the basis of its own complaint, has

passed the impugned order dated 22.05.2026, putting the petitioner under

suspension. This is a direct violation of the settled principle of natural justice

which mandates that no person shall be a judge in his own cause. The case of

T.H. Hosamani v. State of Karnataka (2025) SCC Online Kar 22072, para 3,

7, 11.1 and 11.3 has been cited to support this contention.

11. The second limb of argument advanced by the learned counsel is that

the respondent KHADC has acted arbitrarily and illegally and has compounded

the issue when in clear violation of the provision of Section 8 of the Act of 2007,

wherein, it is provided that in the event, the Syiem is suspended or removed from

office, the Deputy Syiem should be appointed as the Acting Syiem, however, 2026:MLHC:863

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when the Deputy Syiem is very much in office, the respondent KHADC has

appointed the respondent No. 4 as the Acting Syiem. The notification No. DC.

XXVII/Genl/192/2023-2026/ dated 22.05.2026, in this respect, has revealed that

the Deputy Syiem being found to be the younger brother of the suspended Syiem,

it was not deemed appropriate to appoint the said Deputy Syiem as the Acting

Chief/Syiem.

12. The said notification by which the respondent No. 4 was appointed

as the Acting Syiem of Mylliem Syiemship bears the signature of only one

Executive Member which action is hit by the provision of Section 25 of the Act,

which empowers the Executive Committee to authorize two or more of its

members to exercise power on its behalf, such act done, shall be deemed to have

been done so by the Executive Committee. Having failed to comply with this

provision, the appointment of the respondent No. 4 as the Acting Syiem also is

not legally tenable, such orders being patently illegal in the face of record and

incompetent, done without the sanctity of law. The case of Dondor Jana & Anr

v. Khasi Hills Autonomous District Council (KHADC), 2025 SCC Online

Megh. 449, para 3 and 8 was referred to by the learned counsel to sustained this

contention. Also, the case of Shnat Hima Nongwah Mawtamur v. Khasi Hills

Autonomous District Council (KHADC) 2025 SCC Online Megh. 885, para

5 and 6 was also referred to by the learned counsel and another case that is,

Lamphrang Rumnong and Ors. v. Khasi Hills Autonomous District Council 2026:MLHC:863

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(KHADC) 2025 SCC Online Megh. 450, para 2 and 3, was also cited in this

regard.

13. Finally, the learned counsel has submitted that the letter of the law

not being followed by the KHADC, the impugned order of suspension as well as

the impugned notification of appointment of the respondent No. 4 as the Acting

Syiem is liable to be set aside and quashed. The learned counsel has reiterated

that when law requires a thing to be done in a certain manner, it has to be done

in that manner or not at all, to support this contention the following authorities

has been cited:

i) State of Uttar Pradesh v. Singhara Singh, AIR (1964) SC

358, para 7 and 8;

ii) Ramchandra Keshav Adke v. Govind Joti Chabare,

(1976) 1 SCC 559, para 25;

iii) Dhanajaya Reddy v. State of Karnataka, (2001) 4 SCC 9,

para 23, 25 and 26; and

iv) J. Jayalalithaa and Ors. v. State of Karnataka, (2014) 2

SCC 401, para 34 and 35.

14. It is the prayer of the learned counsel that since an illegal and

arbitrary act having been perpetrated upon the petitioner dislodging him from

his rightful position, the impugned order of suspension dated 22.05.2026 (supra) 2026:MLHC:863

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may be set aside and quashed and/or to pass such further orders as this Court

may deem fit and proper.

15. Mr. Philemon Nongbri, learned counsel for the petitioner in WP(C)

No. 232 of 2026 has submitted that the grievance of the petitioner is against the

arbitrary, illegal and discriminatory action of the respondent KHADC in denying

him his statutory appointment to the post of Acting Syiem of Hima Mylliem, in

the said position being vacant due to the suspension of the incumbent Syiem and

the subsequent appointment of the respondent No. 4 as the Acting Syiem of

Hima Mylliem.

16. It is the submission of the learned counsel that the petitioner is the

duly approved and recognized Deputy Syiem of Hima Mylliem issued vide

official Sanad dated 15.05.2024. Section 8(1) of the 2007 Act has vested a direct

statutory right upon the petitioner to be appointed as the Acting Syiem in the

event the Syiem is suspended. However, being denied to be appointed to such

post on the ground that he is the younger brother of the suspended Syiem, the

same not being a valid legal ground, the fact being that Section 9(1) of the Act

of 2007 provides that the Deputy Syiem is nominated by the Syiem from

amongst the adult brothers or nephews of the Syiem. Section 8(1) of the Act

provides that at any time the office of the Syiem falls vacant, the Executive

Committee may by order in writing appoint the Deputy Syiem to act as an Acting 2026:MLHC:863

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Syiem.

17. By the appointment of the respondent No. 4 as the Acting Syiem, the

above-mentioned provision of law has been violated and runs contrary to the

well settled principle “that where a power is given to do a certain thing in a

certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all”, which principle

has been reiterated in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Singhara Singh,

AIR 1964 SC 358, para 7 and 8 and also in the case of Dhanajaya Reddy v.

State of Karnataka (2001) 4 SCC 9, para 23 and 24 and also in a catena of

judgments by the Supreme Court.

18. Therefore, the action of the respondent KHADC in appointing the

respondent No. 4 as the Acting Syiem having no sanction of law, the same is

liable to be quashed, submits the learned counsel.

19. Mr. H.L. Shangreiso, learned Sr. counsel and Special counsel

appearing for the respondent Nos. 1-3/KHADC, in his response on behalf of such

respondents has submitted that an understanding of the background history of

the relationship between the KHADC and the office of the petitioner as Syiem

of Mylliem may have to be briefly looked into.

20. In this respect, it is maintained that the District Council having

constitutional authority to administer the Tribal areas under Article 244(1) read

with the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India and the Syiem of Mylliem 2026:MLHC:863

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having customary authority to administer both customary and statutory duties

under the customary law and various legislative enactments which is purely

governed by the principle of employer and employee, that is, master-servant

relationship as the Chief (Syiem) is no more than an Administrative Officer

appointed by the Executive Committee of the Council under Section 5 of the Act

of 2007, therefore, he submits that there is a jural relationship between the

council and the Syiem. This proposition has been fortified by the judgment of

the Supreme Court in the case of T. Cajee v. U Jor Manik Siem & Anr., AIR

1961 SC 276, para 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12.

21. The next contention of the learned Sr. counsel is that, the Executive

Committee being the appointing authority as provided under Section 5 of the

2007 Act, therefore, it also has the inherent power to suspend the Syiem pending

enquiry, though such provision, is not expressly mentioned under Section 7 of

the said Act. However, this power is impliedly inherent, the same derived from

the authority under Section 5 read with Section 16 of the General Clauses Act as

well as Section 30 of the Meghalaya Interpretation and General Clauses Act,

1972. The case of Balvantray Ratilal Patel v. State of Maharashtra, AIR

1968 SC 800, para 3 and 4 as well as the case of Probodh Kumar Bhomick v.

University of Calcutta, 1994 SCC Online Cal 239, para 24, 25, 49, 50 and 53

has been referred to by the learned Sr. counsel to project this contention. 2026:MLHC:863

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22. It is the further submission of the learned Sr. counsel that though

Section 26 of the Act of 2007 has annulled the provisions contained in the

“United Khasi Jaintia Hills Autonomous District, (Appointment and Succession

of Chiefs and Headman) Act, 1959”, however, the said general law of 1959 will

remain applicable and supplementary to the Act of 2007 with regard to the

process of suspension pending enquiry. The case of KHADC v. Charlestone

Sohtun and Ors (2002) 8 Supreme 576, para 4 as well as the case of Soutish

Youroin v. State of Meghalaya and Ors reported in (2012) 4 GLR 444, para

6, 8 and 9 and the case of Salwan Singh Sandhu v. State of Delhi and Ors.,

2001 SCC Online Del 442, para 9 has been cited in this regard.

23. On the objection to the alleged action of the relevant

authority/KHADC to initiate suo-moto disciplinary proceedings against the

petitioner/Syiem, the learned Sr. counsel has reiterated that, this is an exercise

of inherent power provided under Section 5 read with Section 7 of the 2007 Act,

and as such, such power cannot be controlled or hindered by the word

“Complaint” mentioned in Section 7. When the authority is aware of the

misconduct or wrong doing of the Syiem, it is not necessary that a formal

complaint has to be received from a third party. Power to initiate suo-moto

enquiry proceedings has also been recognized by the Supreme Court in the case

of Raymond Woolen Mills Limited v. M.R.T.P. Commission and Ors.,

reported in (1993) 2 SCC 550, para 2 and 26. 2026:MLHC:863

13

24. The fact that the petitioner herein, is aware of the Executive

Committee proceedings against him, since several demand notices and show

cause notices have been issued against him, and also that there was a hearing on

a suo-moto proceeding against him, which he had willingly participated by

submitting show cause reply etc., as regard the complaint which was eventually

withdrawn on 17.04.2026 (supra), therefore, at this point of time, the learned Sr.

counsel submits that the petitioner is not permitted to question the jurisdiction of

the Executive Committee (EC) in this regard, the principle of waiver being

squarely applicable in his case.

25. On the appointment of the respondent No. 4 as Acting Syiem which

is also the subject matter of WP(C) No. 232, the learned Sr. counsel has

submitted that under the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and taking

recourse to a reasonable option, the judicious discretion exercised by the EC

under proviso to Sub-Section (1) of Section 8 in appointing the respondent No.

4 as Acting Syiem is a decision adopted by the EC which is rational and prudent,

considering the fact that on the suspension of the petitioner, there must be a stop

gap arrangement, and further, considering the seriousness of the allegation

against the petitioner/Syiem, the Deputy Syiem being the brother of the

suspended Syiem could not have been appointed as Acting Syiem. Even

assuming but not admitting that the consultation with the Executive Durbar is

mandatory, following the “doctrine of necessity”, the course taken by the EC is 2026:MLHC:863

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found justified, the case of Union of India v. K.G. Soni (2006) 6 SCC 794, para

13 and 14 as well as the case of Babasaheb Wasde v. Monahar Gangadhar

Muddeshwar and Ors, (2024) 11 SCC 705, para 17, 18 and 20 was referred to

by the learned Sr. counsel, in this regard.

26. As to the objection taken on non-application of Section 25 of 2007

Act, that is, that the relevant notification appointing the respondent No. 4 as the

Acting Syiem not being in conformity with the said provision, the learned Sr.

counsel has submitted that the EC as a collective body has taken its statutory

decision vide resolution/minutes dated 21.05.2026 suspending the writ petitioner

pending enquiry and by appointing respondent No. 4 as Acting Syiem, to take

appropriate steps in furtherance to the said collective decision which is purely

for administrative convenience, the EC has delegated such task to two EC

members for issuing communication/notification etc., however, the EC never

delegates its collective power to the said two EC members under Section 25 of

the Act. Therefore, there can be no grievance by the petitioner in this respect as

the decision of the EC has been conveyed to him eventually.

27. The learned Sr. counsel has also refuted the contention of the

petitioner as regard the application of Section 8 of the said Act of 2007, by

submitting that this provision simply provides that the EC by order in writing

appoints the Acting Syiem, which was done so vide the original decision of the 2026:MLHC:863

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EC dated 21.05.2026 and the subsequent notification dated 22.05.2026. That,

such communication, if signed by a single EC member, such action will not

vitiate the collective EC original/resolution dated 21.05.2026. As such, the

apprehension of the petitioner in this regard is not well founded.

28. The petitioners in both the writ petitions not being entitled to any

relief, as such, the respective writ petitions being devoid of merits, the same may

be dismissed by this Court, submits the learned Sr. counsel.

29. Mr. S. Sen, learned counsel for respondent No. 4 in his submission

to defend the action of the respondent KHADC in appointing the said respondent

as the Acting Syiem has submitted that Section 8 of the Act provides for

appointment of Acting Syiem. However, the first proviso in the section has

bestowed discretionary power to the District Council to appoint an Acting Syiem

other than the Deputy Syiem, as such, any Khasi male adult belonging to the

Mylliem Syiem Clan can, in the wisdom of the EC be appointed as the Acting

Syiem. Though while exercising such power, the Executive Committee has the

discretion to consult the Executive Durbar, being a discretion, not consulting the

Executive Durbar, would not render the appointment of the Acting Syiem illegal,

as such, the action of the EC in this regard, cannot be faulted, considering the

peculiar situation as far as the relationship of the suspended Syiem and the

Deputy Syiem as brothers is concerned. 2026:MLHC:863

16

30. This Court having heard the learned counsels for the respective

parties and noting the pleadings presented herein, is made to understand that the

main dispute to be decided in this lis, is the legal validity of the action of the

respondent/KHADC in placing the petitioner Shri Ainam Manik Syiem [WP(C)

No. 233 of 2026] under suspension as Syiem of Hima Mylliem, vide the

impugned Notification dated 22.05.2026(supra).

31. Another aspect of the matter is the appointment of the respondent No.

4 as the Acting Syiem of Hima Mylliem, when the petitioner in WP(C) No. 232,

who is the current Deputy Syiem is the rightful claimant, such action being

contrary to the relevant provision of the Act of 2007.

32. However, at the outset, in view of the contention of the learned Sr.

counsel for the respondent/KHADC as regard the jural relationship between the

petitioner (Syiem) and the District Council vis-a vis the authority of the T. Cajee

case, this Court will deal with this issue first to bring a correct perspective in the

light of the facts and circumstances of this case.

33. That the Supreme Court in the said case of T. Cajee has gone into the

legislative history of how the former Khasi States (twenty-five of them) with the

Chiefs (Syiem) presiding over such States, prevalent in the pre-1947 period, their

position and status was defined under the Constitution of India after the same

came into effect in 1950. 2026:MLHC:863

17

34. At para 4 and 5 of the said T. Cajee case, mention has been made that

after the paramountcy of the British Government lapsed, a new relationship was

established between the twenty-five Chiefs and the Government of India by

means of the Instrument of Accession which was accepted by the Governor-

General of India on August 17, 1948. By this, all administrative arrangements

between the Government of India and the State of Assam on one hand and the

Khasi States on the other were to continue, subject to certain exceptions as to

judicial and administrative powers.

35. At para 5, 6, 7, 8 & 9, the Supreme Court has exhaustively dwelled

on the position of law after the Constitution came into force, wherein, the

administrative power of the twenty-five Khasi States came to an end and that the

governance of these States was to be carried out under the provisions of the Sixth

Schedule. On a discussion about the Sixth Schedule, what emerges is the

existence of the Autonomous District Council(s) within the areas covered by the

Sixth Schedule at para 9, wherein, it was observed that the Siem(Syiem), “…was

thus no more an administrative officer appointed by the District Council by

virtue of its powers under para 2(4) of the Schedule and working under its

control...”

36. When it comes to the method or process of appointment and removal

of the Syiem, the essence of this has been projected by the learned Sr. counsel 2026:MLHC:863

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for the KHADC by reference to certain portions found at para 11 of the said T.

Cajee case, the same of which are extracted herein below for reference:

“11. In this case, the District Council when it confirmed the

appointment of the respondent laid down certain terms by virtue of

its power of administration and so far as the respondent is concerned

those terms would govern the relations between him and the District

Council in respect of all matters including his removal from the office

of Siem. As pointed out by this Court in Parshotam Lal Dhingra v.

Union of India, (1958) SCR 828, 841, the conditions of service of a

government servant appointed to a post are regulated by the terms of

the contract of employment, express or implied, and subject thereto,

by the rules applicable to the members of the particular service. In

the absence of such general rules, the particular terms offered to a

particular officer on his appointment would govern the relationship

between the appointing authority and the person appointed in that

particular case. It would therefore be wrong to hold that the

respondent could not be removed from his office after his

appointment in accordance with the terms on which he was

appointed…

… the power to appoint would include from its very nature, being

inherent in it, the power of removal, for it can hardly be contended

that though the appointment might be made, the authority making the

appointment would have no power to remove a person once

appointed. In this particular case there can be no difficulty

whatsoever because when the District Council confirmed the

appointment of the respondent it laid down the terms on which the

appointment will be held as well as the terms on which the

respondent could be removed from the office…

… We are therefore of opinion that the respondent being an officer

appointed to carry on the administration by the District Council

could be removed by it in accordance with the terms and conditions

of his appointment.”

37. Again, what would be observed herein is that the Syiem could be

removed (or suspended) by the District Council only in accordance with the 2026:MLHC:863

19

terms and conditions of his appointment, which by now is well crystalized in the

prevailing statute governing the same. In this regard, the Supreme Court in the

said T. Cajee case has referred to the law, then in force which observation is

found at para 14 which reads as follows:

“14. Before we part with this case we should like to point out that

a law has now been passed, namely, the United Khasi-Jaintia Hills

Autonomous District (Appointment and Succession of Chiefs and

Headmen) Act, 1959 (2 of 1959), which came into force in October

1959. It deals with the appointment of Chiefs and Headmen as well

as their removal and suspension (as a punishment). The word "Chief"

includes a Siem, a Lyngdoh, etc. and the respondent would therefore

be a chief within the meaning of this Act and further action may be

taken accordingly.”

38. This Court could not but agree with what has been observed herein

above in the context of the controversy raised in this petition. However, as to the

law which covers the subject of appointment and removal of the Syiem of

Mylliem, there is no denying the fact that since 2007, ‘The Khasi Hills

Autonomous District (Appointment and Succession of Syiem, Deputy Syiem,

Electors and Rangbah Shnong of Mylliem Syiemship) Act, 2007’ now holds the

field. Section 1 of the Act reads thus:

“1. Short title, Extent and Commencement: -

(1) This Act may be called the Khasi Hills Autonomous District

(Appointment and Succession of Syiem, Deputy Syiem,

Electors and Rangbah Shnong of Mylliem Syiemship) Act,

2007.

(2) It shall applies to the whole of the Mylliem Syiemship.

(3) It shall come into force at once.” 2026:MLHC:863

20

39. In the context of the T. Cajee case, the predominance of the 1959

Act(supra) has now been replaced by the Act of 2007 by virtue of the provision

of Section 26 of the Act of 2007 which reads as follows:

“26. Annulment:-

The provisions contained in the United Khasi-Jaintia Hills

Autonomous District (Appointment and Succession of Chiefs and

Headmen) Act, 1959 as amended, shall on and from the

commencement of this Act, no longer be operative as far as the Hima

Mylliem is concerned.”

40. Thus, we see that the Act of 1959 having been annulled, it practically

means that it has been repealed and with the coming in force of the Act of 2007,

this Act has since become inoperative. Considered in what has been held in the

T. Cajee case as far as the application of the said Act of 1959 to the case of the

petitioner herein is concerned, by applying the concept of ‘legal fiction’, the Act

of 2007 can be said to be prevalent then. The argument of the learned Sr. counsel

that the said Act of 1959 remained applicable and supplementary to the Act of

2007 with regard to suspension pending enquiry, this contention is found

unfounded in view of the observations made above, as it is clear that any

prospective action, sought to be taken up, recourse to the 1959 Act, will no

longer be available to the Executive Committee.

41. The case of Surjakumar Okram and Ors (supra) is found relevant and

applicable in this regard, where at para 22 and para 23 of the same, the Supreme 2026:MLHC:863

21

Court has observed as follows:

“22. In Kay v. Goodwin, (1830) 6 Bing 576 at p. 582, Tindal, C.J.

stated:

"I take the effect of repealing a statute to be to obliterate it

as completely from the records of Parliament as if it had never

been passed; and it must be considered as a law that never existed

except for the purpose of those actions which were commenced,

prosecuted and concluded whilst it was an existing law."

23. In State of U.P. v. Hirendra Pal Singh, (2011) 5 SCC 305,

this Court was of the following opinion: (SCC p. 314, para 22)

"22. It is a settled legal proposition that whenever an Act is

repealed, it must be considered as if it had never existed. The object

of repeal is to obliterate the Act from the statutory books, except for

certain purposes as provided under Section 6 of the General Clauses

Act, 1897. Repeal is not a matter of mere form but is of substance.

Therefore, on repeal, the earlier provisions stand obliterated/

abrogated/wiped out wholly...."

42. Coming to the contention of the learned Sr. counsel as to the master-

servant relationship between the petitioner (Syiem) and the District Council and

the power to appoint and dismiss in such circumstances, what is noticed is that

the Syiem in this case was not directly appointed by the District Council, but by

virtue of the provision of Section 4 of the Act of 2007, the Syiem after being

duly elected by the electoral college, the District Council under Section 5 then

appoints him to such office. Therefore, it invariably follows that, if such Syiem

is to be removed or suspended, first there must be a formal complaint, and

secondly, such complaint must be brought to the knowledge of the Durbar Hima

as provided under Section 7. On a harmonious reading of the provisions of 2026:MLHC:863

22

Sections 4, 5 and 7 respectively, it can be said that the process of removal and

suspension of the Syiem cannot be resorted to by the District Council without

the knowledge of the Durbar Hima or by resorting to an express provision in this

respect, the same being clearly absent in the Act, as has been admitted to by the

learned Sr. counsel. There is no concept of an implied or inherent power in this

regard since there is no saving clause in Section 7 or any other provisions of the

Act to infer application of such power by the District Council in this regard. The

case of Bavantray Ratilal Patel (supra) and other cases cited to support this

contention are found not applicable under the facts and circumstances herein.

43. It can also be said that in the T. Cajee case, the Supreme Court has

maintained that the Syiem is an Administrative Officer of the District Council,

but this does not necessarily mean that there exists a master-servant relationship

between the two in the strictest sense of the term, this aspect of the matter having

been explained in the preceding paragraphs herein.

44. That the contention of the KHADC is that the complaint against the

petitioner (Syiem) was taken up by the District Council on a sou-moto initiation,

where power to look into misconduct or wrongdoing by the Syiem warrants no

formal complaint by a third party, even, if this contention is accepted prima facie,

it still does not answer the question as to whether such complaint is required to

be first placed before the Durbar Hima or not to initiate disciplinary action 2026:MLHC:863

23

against the delinquent, contrary to the express provision in Section 7. This, not

having been done so by the District Council or the Executive Committee for that

matter, such action falls foul of the legal procedure and therefore, cannot stand

the scrutiny of law.

45. The authority in the case of Singhara Singh (supra) cited by the

learned counsel for the petitioner is relevant to the discussion supra, as far as the

interpretation of the application of the provisions of the Act of 2007 to the case

of the petitioner is concerned. Para 8 of the said judgment reads as follows:

“8. The rule adopted in Taylor v. Taylor (1876) 1 Ch D 426 is well

recognised and is founded on sound principle. Its result is that if a

statute has conferred a power to do an act and has laid down the

method in which that power has to be exercised, it necessarily

prohibits the doing of the act in any other manner than that which

has been prescribed. The principle behind the rule is that if this were

not so, the statutory provision might as well not have been enacted.

A Magistrate, therefore, cannot in the course of investigation record

a confession except in the manner laid down in Section 164. The

power to record the confession had obviously been given so that the

confession might be proved by the record of it made in the manner

laid down. If proof of the confession by other means was permissible,

the whole provision of Section 164 including the safeguards

contained in it for the protection of accused persons would be

rendered nugatory. The section, therefore, by conferring on

Magistrates the power to record statements or confessions, by

necessary implication, prohibited a Magistrate from giving oral

evidence of the statements or confessions made to him.”

46. By the same yardstick, if the case of the petitioner in WP(C) No. 232

is to be considered, the office of the Deputy Syiem or Syiem Khynnah has

received legal sanction by virtue of Section 9 of the said Act of 2007. The 2026:MLHC:863

24

qualification to occupy such office is that the incumbent should be an adult

brother or nephew of the Syiem. The petitioner herein is the brother of the

suspended Syiem who was placed in office, being duly qualified, during the

tenure of the said suspended Syiem. As such, there is no complaint as to his

qualifications.

47. Section 8 of the Act provides for the appointment of an Acting

Syiem, in the event, the office of the Syiem falls vacant as a result of dead,

resignation, retirement due to old age, removal or suspension. In such a situation,

it is incumbent upon the Executive Committee to appoint the Deputy Syiem to

act as an Acting Syiem, who shall then exercise all the powers and functions of

the Syiem. There is an exception to this, that is, when a situation so warrants, the

Executive Committee may in consultation with the Executive Durbar, appoint

any Khasi male adult belonging to the Syiem Mylliem Clan who fulfills the

qualifications required, as the Acting Syiem of Mylliem Syiemship.

48. The relevant notification in this regard, would indicate that the

respondent No. 4 was appointed as the Acting Syiem purely on the ground that

the present Deputy Syiem is found to be the younger brother of the suspended

Chief (Syiem). This notification on the face of it, is legally flawed, since the

premise upon which the respondent No. 4 has been appointed as the Acting

Syiem is hit by the provision of Section 8 of the said Act of 2007, wherein, it has 2026:MLHC:863

25

been specifically provided that only the Deputy Syiem is to be appointed as the

Acting Syiem, the fact that he is the brother of the Syiem cannot be a

disqualification in this regard as the provision of Section 9 mandates the

appointment of a Deputy Syiem from amongst the brothers and nephews of the

incumbent Syiem. There is also nothing on record to show that the appointment

of the respondent No. 4 as the Acting Syiem, not being a brother or nephew of

the incumbent Syiem was done so as an outcome of any consultation by the

Executive Committee with the Executive Durbar.

49. Furthermore, the objection of the petitioner in WP(C) No. 232 of

2026 that the notification, appointing the respondent No. 4 as the Acting Syiem

was issued vide notification No. DC.XXVII/Genl/192/2023-2026/ dated

22.05.2026, the same being issued under the hand and signature of only one

Executive Member, that is, Executive Member, i/c Elaka Administration etc.,

when Section 25 of the Act prescribes exercise of such power, on being

authorized and on behalf of the Executive Committee to be by two or more of its

members, therefore, the said notification being signed by only one Executive

Member, the same not being a proper notification, such contention is also found

acceptable by this Court. The authority referred to by the learned counsel for the

petitioner in the case of Iaineh Nongkhlaw v. State of Meghalaya (2025) SCC

Online Megh. 526 is found relevant in this respect, wherein, this Court at para

3, 4 and 5 of the said judgment has held as follows: 2026:MLHC:863

26

“3. Mr. K. Paul, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner at the

outset points out that the impugned order has been passed by only

one Executive Member of the Executive Committee, Khasi Hills

Autonomous District Council which is contrary to the provision of

Section 25 of the Khasi Hills Autonomous District (Appointment and

Succession of Syiem, Deputy Syiem, Electors and Rangbah Shnong

of Mylliem Syiemship) Act, 2007. He submits that the provision of

Section 25 mandates that two or more members will be authorized to

exercise power of the Executive Committee. He submits that the

impugned order, as such, is incompetent.

4. Mr. T.T. Diengdoh, learned Senior Counsel appearing for

the Khasi Hills Autonomous District Council does not dispute the

submission made on behalf of the petitioner.

5. In view of the above, without going into the merits of the case,

the impugned order dated 02-05-2024 is hereby set aside and

quashed leaving the matter to the Executive Committee of the District

Council Court for reconsideration.”

50. Similarly, the learned counsel for the petitioner has also referred to

the case of Dondor Jana & Anr v. Khasi Hills Autonomous District Council

(KHADC), 2025 SCC Online Megh. 449, wherein, para 3 and 8 of the judgment

which are relevant are quoted herein below:

“3. Mr. T.T. Diengdoh, learned Senior counsel assisted by Mr. R.

Kharsyad, learned counsel for the respondents Nos. 1 & 2, when the

matter has taken up today has fairly submitted that on thorough

examination of the materials especially the impugned order, the same

seems to be without any authority and without any jurisdiction,

inasmuch as, the same has not been passed in accordance with

Rule-31 of The Assam and Meghalaya Autonomous Districts

(Constitution of District Councils) Rules, 1951, which

mandates that an order passed by an individual member of the

Executive Committee on a matter pertaining to his subject, the

same should be in furtherance to a discussion or authorization,

which appears to be absent in the instant case.

2026:MLHC:863

27

8. It appears that the dispute that has arisen is with regard the

proposed expansion of the Village footpath used by the villagers

through the petitioners' land, which is sought to be expanded to a

regular motorable road. As observed above, though attempts have

been made to try to resolve the matter, inasmuch as, the same is of

vital public interest and wellbeing of the villagers, the same having

borne no fruit, the matter had then proceeded before this Court.

Today, however on the submissions of the parties especially the

submissions of the learned Senior counsel for the respondents Nos. 1

& 2, with regard to the validity of the impugned order, this matter

therefore will necessarily have to be remanded to the Executive

Committee, as it is patent on the face of the order itself that the

same has been authored by a single member without any

reference to a discussion or authority vested on him as per Rule-31

of The Assam and Meghalaya Autonomous Districts (Constitution

of District Councils) Rules, 1951.”

51. The authorities cited by the respective parties has been perused and

only what is found relevant, has been noted and referred to herein to the

exclusion of the others.

52. In any view of the matter, on the basis of what has been observed

hereinabove, this Court is of the considered opinion that the action of the

respondent KHADC as far as the suspension of the petitioner/Syiem of Mylliem

[WP(C) No. 233 of 2026] is concerned, the same has been done so dehors the

provisions of the Act of 2007. Accordingly, the related impugned notifications,

including the suspension order is hereby set aside and quashed.

53. The respondent KHADC is hereby directed to forthwith reinstate the

petitioner/Syiem as the Syiem of Mylliem, the appointment of the respondent

No. 4 as the Acting Syiem is also hereby set aside and quashed. 2026:MLHC:863

28

54. In the event, this Court having decided that the suspension of the

incumbent Syiem has not been carried out in accordance with law, the grievance

of the petitioner in WP(C) No. 232 of 2026 no longer subsist, he will continue

to remain as the Deputy Syiem.

55. It is made clear that the merits of the alleged complaint or the

substance of it, made against the petitioner/Syiem has not been discussed herein

as it is found not relevant, the same being the subject matter of the proposed

enquiry. Since the very initiation of the enquiry and the accompanied suspension

has been set aside and quashed in these proceedings, the complaint per se has

become redundant.

56. Petitions disposed of. No costs.

Judge

2026:MLHC:863