IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

APPELLATE SIDE

F.M.A. 965 of 2025

Shri Bidananda Mandal

Vs.

Union of India & Ors.

Present:

The Hon’ble Justice Madhuresh Prasad

And

The Hon’ble Justice Prasenjit Biswas

Mr. K. B. S. Mahapatra,

Mr. Panchanan Let,

Mr. Aditya Shit

… for the Appellant.

Mr. Swatarup Banerjee,

Mr. Tapan Bhanja,

Mr. Gourab Karmakar

… for the Union of India.

Judgment on : 17.07.2026

F.M.A. 965 of 2025

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Prasenjit Biswas, J:-

1. Heard the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the writ

petitioner/appellant and the learned advocate representing

the respondent/Union of India.

2. The present intra-Court appeal is directed against the

judgment and order dated 18

th

November, 2019 passed by

the learned Single Judge whereby the writ petition preferred

by the appellant came to be dismissed.

3. The facts giving rise to the present appeal, in brief, are that

the writ petitioner, while serving as a member of the Border

Security Force, was proceeded against departmentally on the

basis of a charge-sheet dated 03.10.2008 containing nine

distinct articles of charge alleging various acts of misconduct

and indiscipline in the Summary Security Force Court (SSFC).

The Commandant, by an order dated 08.10.2008, returned

findings holding all the charges proved against the petitioner

and imposed the punishment of dismissal from service as

prescribed under the relevant provisions governing the Force.

4. Aggrieved by the findings and punishment imposed in the

SSFC, the petitioner preferred a statutory appeal/petition

before the competent higher authority. The said

appeal/petition was considered and ultimately disposed of by

F.M.A. 965 of 2025

3

an order dated 30.06.2009, whereby the competent authority

rejected the contentions advanced by the petitioner and

affirmed the findings recorded by the Commandant in the

SSFC proceedings.

5. Questioning the legality and validity of the aforesaid

disciplinary proceedings as well as the appellate order, the

petitioner invoked the writ jurisdiction of this Court. The

learned Single Judge, upon an elaborate consideration of the

pleadings, the records of the disciplinary proceeding and the

submissions advanced by the parties, declined to interfere

with the orders passed by the disciplinary authority and

dismissed the writ petition by judgment and order dated

18.11.2019. It is the correctness of the said judgment which

falls for consideration before us in the present intra-Court

appeal.

6. It appears there from that the learned Single Judge has

accorded due consideration to the various allegations

advanced by the petitioner regarding the alleged procedural

irregularities said to have vitiated the disciplinary proceeding.

The learned Single Judge scrutinized the records of the SSFC

and found that the petitioner had been afforded adequate

opportunity to defend himself throughout the proceeding. It

has specifically been noticed that although sufficient

F.M.A. 965 of 2025

4

opportunity was granted to the petitioner to examine

witnesses in his defence, he consciously chose not to adduce

any evidence on his behalf. At the same time, the petitioner

fully availed himself of the opportunity to cross-examine the

prosecution witnesses produced before the SSFC. It was

further noticed that the petitioner never sought production of

any additional document nor did he complain during the

course of the proceeding that any relevant document had

been withheld from him. Upon consideration of these aspects,

the learned Single Judge arrived at the conclusion that the

disciplinary proceeding was conducted in accordance with the

prescribed procedure and that no procedural infirmity or

violation of the principles of natural justice had been

established.

7. Before us, significantly, no serious challenge has been

advanced to the findings of the learned Single Judge insofar

as the procedural aspects of the disciplinary proceeding are

concerned. The learned advocate appearing for the appellant

has not pointed out any specific procedural lapse committed

during the conduct of the SSFC nor has he demonstrated any

violation of the safeguards available to the petitioner during

the enquiry. The principal thrust of the submissions before us

is confined to the contention that the disciplinary proceeding

F.M.A. 965 of 2025

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itself stood vitiated on account of bias on the part of the

Commandant and that the conduct of the SSFC was contrary

to Rule 46 of the Border Security Force Rules, 1969

(hereinafter referred to as "the 1969 Rules").

8. Developing the aforesaid submission, the learned advocate for

the appellant contended that the factual background

preceding the issuance of the charge-sheet dated 03.10.2008

unmistakably establishes the Commandant had already

formed an adverse opinion against the petitioner much prior

to the initiation of the present disciplinary proceeding.

Therefore, the Commandant was disqualified from acting

either as the disciplinary authority or from conducting the

SSFC.

9. It is submitted that on an earlier occasion the very same

Commandant had proceeded against the petitioner in another

disciplinary proceeding arising out of an incident which

culminated in the petitioner being awarded twenty-eight days'

rigorous imprisonment. Subsequently, upon the petitioner

approaching the higher authorities and making complaints

alleging that the Commandant was acting with prejudice and

had become personally biased against him, the punishment

imposed in the earlier proceeding was interfered with and

reduced by the competent headquarters authority. According

F.M.A. 965 of 2025

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to the learned advocate, the interference by the superior

authority itself lends credence to the petitioner's grievance

that the Commandant had developed a predisposition against

him.

10. The learned advocate further submits that the allegation of

bias cannot be viewed in isolation with reference only to the

earlier disciplinary proceeding. He draws our attention to

several other incidents pleaded in the writ petition to

demonstrate a continuing course of conduct on the part of the

Commandant. It is alleged that the Commandant had caused

an unwarranted search of the petitioner's personal belongings

without any justifiable basis. It is further alleged that the

petitioner's original educational testimonials and other

documents were taken away from his possession and were

subsequently destroyed or rendered unavailable, thereby

causing serious prejudice to him. According to the appellant,

these incidents were not isolated occurrences but constituted

a series of acts demonstrating personal hostility and

animosity on the part of the Commandant.

11. On the basis of the aforesaid circumstances, it is argued that

the cumulative effect of the events preceding the disciplinary

proceeding was sufficient to create, in the mind of a

reasonable person, a genuine and bona fide apprehension

F.M.A. 965 of 2025

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that the petitioner would not receive an impartial and fair

adjudication at the hands of the Commandant. The learned

advocate submits that the test is not whether actual bias has

been conclusively established but whether the facts placed on

record are sufficient to give rise to a reasonable likelihood or

reasonable apprehension of bias. According to him, the

circumstances pleaded by the petitioner satisfy this well-

recognised test.

12. In support of the aforesaid proposition, reliance has been

placed upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in

Union of India and Another vs. Charanjit S. Gill and

Others, reported in (2000) 5 SCC 742 , wherein the

importance of fairness and impartiality in disciplinary

proceedings involving members of the armed forces has been

emphasised. Reliance has also been placed upon the

judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mohd. Yunus

Khan vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others , reported in

(2010) 10 SCC 539 , wherein the principles governing

allegations of mala fide and bias in disciplinary proceedings

have been discussed. Further reliance has been placed upon

the judgment of the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in

Ex. Ct. Raj Kumar vs. Union of India (LPA No. 409 of

2004).

F.M.A. 965 of 2025

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13. Placing reliance upon the aforesaid authorities, the learned

advocate contends that the legal position is no longer res

integra. According to him, once the facts pleaded disclose a

tangible and reasonable apprehension of bias or mala fide,

the disciplinary authority against whom such apprehension

exists ought not to continue with the disciplinary proceeding.

The object of the rule, according to the learned advocate, is

not merely to prevent actual bias but equally to ensure that

justice appears to have been done and that the confidence of

the delinquent employee in the fairness of the disciplinary

process is not undermined.

14. The learned advocate has further laid considerable emphasis

upon Rule 46 of the Border Security Force Rules, 1969.

Referring particularly to sub-rule (3) thereof, it is contended

that the Rule creates a clear statutory embargo prohibiting an

officer from trying or conducting proceedings in circumstances

where there exists a personal interest or where the officer

may reasonably be perceived to be biased. It is submitted

that the earlier conduct of the Commandant, coupled with the

incidents specifically pleaded by the petitioner, clearly brings

the present case within the mischief sought to be prevented

by Rule 46. Consequently, according to the appellant, the

Commandant lacked the competence to issue the charge-

F.M.A. 965 of 2025

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sheet, convene the SSFC and adjudicate upon the charges

levelled against the petitioner. The entire proceeding,

therefore, according to the learned advocate, stands vitiated

being contrary both to the statutory mandate contained in

Rule 46 of the 1969 Rules and the settled principles of natural

justice governing disciplinary proceedings.

15. Per contra, the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the

respondent/Union of India has stoutly opposed the

submissions advanced on behalf of the writ

petitioner/appellant and has supported the judgment and

order passed by the learned Single Bench. He submits that

the findings recorded in the disciplinary proceeding as well as

the judgment under appeal do not warrant any interference

by this Court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.

16. At the outset, the learned Advocate has drawn our attention

to the averments made in the affidavit-in-opposition filed

before the learned Writ Court, wherein each of the allegations

leveled by the petitioner had been specifically traversed and

denied. He has also taken us through the order passed by the

Deputy Inspector General (DIG) while disposing of the

petition preferred by the petitioner against the findings

recorded by the SSFC. Particular emphasis has been laid on

the detailed remarks recorded by the Deputy Inspector

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General while examining the allegations of mala fide and bias

leveled by the petitioner against the Commandant.

17. Referring to the aforesaid materials, the learned advocate

submits that a plain and meaningful reading thereof

unmistakably demonstrates the bona-fide conduct of the

Commandant throughout the relevant period. According to

him, the records completely belie the allegation that the

Commandant had acted with any personal animosity or

predetermined hostility towards the petitioner.

18. Elaborating his submissions, the learned advocate points out

that during the intervening night of 05/06 July, 2007, an

incident of firing by the petitioner at a border post had taken

place. In consequence thereof, disciplinary proceedings were

initiated and the petitioner was awarded a punishment of

twenty-eight days' rigorous imprisonment. It is submitted that

the punishment was not imposed arbitrarily or at the whims

of the Commandant but was preceded by a discreet

verification of the incident and was based upon the materials

then available before the competent authority.

19. The learned advocate further submits that the conduct of the

Commandant subsequent to the aforesaid disciplinary

proceeding completely demolishes the allegation of bias now

sought to be projected by the petitioner. He points out that

F.M.A. 965 of 2025

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when the petitioner challenged the said punishment before

the higher authorities, the very same Commandant, against

whom allegations of bias are now leveled, submitted a

detailed factual report concerning the incident. The said

report was duly considered by the Deputy Inspector General

while examining the petition preferred by the petitioner. The

remarks of the Deputy Inspector General clearly reveal that

upon consideration of the factual report submitted by the

Commandant together with the other materials available on

record, the higher authority ultimately interfered with and set

aside the punishment earlier awarded to the petitioner.

20. According to the learned advocate, had the Commandant

been actuated by personal prejudice or motivated by any

hostility towards the petitioner, he would hardly have

furnished a fair and comprehensive report enabling the

superior authority to objectively reconsider the earlier

punishment. On the contrary, the conduct of the

Commandant in placing all relevant facts before the higher

authority demonstrates that he discharged his official

responsibilities in an impartial and objective manner without

being influenced by any personal consideration. The

Commandant was merely performing his statutory and

administrative duties expected of him as the commanding

F.M.A. 965 of 2025

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officer of a disciplined force. The mere circumstance that the

petitioner happened to be the accused in the earlier Court

Martial proceeding or in the subsequent disciplinary

proceeding does not, by itself, establish that the Commandant

had any personal interest in the outcome of the proceedings

or had ceased to act fairly in discharge of his official

obligations.

21. The learned advocate further submits that the allegations

regarding mala-fide and bias were not accepted at face value

by the authorities but were subjected to independent scrutiny

by the Deputy Inspector General. He has invited our attention

to the remarks recorded by the Deputy Inspector General

wherein every allegation raised by the petitioner against the

Commandant was specifically examined. Upon such

examination, the competent authority found that none of the

allegations was supported by any contemporaneous

document, independent material or acceptable evidence. The

allegations were found to be vague, unsubstantiated and

devoid of any factual basis.

22. According to the learned advocate, the Deputy Inspector

General has rightly concluded that the allegations of mala fide

were raised only as an attempt to create an artificial

impression of bias against the Commandant so as to

F.M.A. 965 of 2025

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invalidate the disciplinary proceedings. It is submitted that

the petitioner failed to produce any material whatsoever to

substantiate his allegations regarding the alleged search of

his belongings, destruction of testimonials or any other act

suggestive of personal hostility on the part of the

Commandant.

23. The learned advocate has also referred to the petitioner's

service record to contend that the authorities had consistently

taken note of repeated instances of indiscipline and

insubordination committed by the petitioner during his

comparatively short tenure of service of about six years. It is

submitted that the repeated disciplinary proceedings initiated

against the petitioner were not reflective of any personal

vendetta but were necessitated solely by the petitioner's own

conduct. A commanding officer entrusted with the

responsibility of maintaining discipline within the Force cannot

be accused of bias merely because disciplinary action had to

be initiated against the same individual on more than one

occasion.

24. It is further contended that the petitioner has failed to lay

even the minimum factual foundation necessary for raising a

plea of reasonable apprehension of bias. Neither before the

disciplinary authority nor before the learned Writ Court has

F.M.A. 965 of 2025

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the petitioner been able to point out any objective

circumstance from which a reasonable person could infer that

the Commandant had become incapable of acting fairly. The

learned advocate submits that the settled legal position

requires something more than mere suspicion or

dissatisfaction with previous disciplinary action. The fact that

the Commandant had earlier passed an order of punishment

against the petitioner, while discharging his statutory

functions, is wholly insufficient to infer either actual bias or a

reasonable likelihood of bias.

25. The learned advocate has further submitted that an important

circumstance which completely undermines the petitioner's

case is that no objection whatsoever was raised by the

petitioner during the conduct of the SSFC. At no stage of the

proceedings did the petitioner seek recusal of the

Commandant or request that the matter be placed before any

other competent authority. The petitioner participated in the

proceedings without demur and accepted the jurisdiction of

the Commandant throughout. It is only after an adverse

finding came to be recorded that the plea of bias has been

raised. Such conduct, according to the learned advocate,

unmistakably demonstrates that the plea is a clear

F.M.A. 965 of 2025

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afterthought devised solely to avoid the consequences of the

findings recorded in the disciplinary proceeding.

26. The learned advocate has also placed reliance upon the

proviso to Rule 46 of the Border Security Force Rules, 1969.

According to him, a plain reading of the statutory provision

makes it abundantly clear that there existed no legal embargo

or statutory disqualification preventing the Commandant from

initiating disciplinary proceedings or conducting the SSFC in

the facts and circumstances of the present case. It is

submitted that Rule 46 cannot be interpreted so broadly as to

disqualify a Commandant merely because he had previously

exercised disciplinary jurisdiction against the same member of

the Force. Unless circumstances exist which objectively

establish personal interest or a real likelihood of bias, the

statutory authority remains fully competent to discharge the

functions entrusted to him under the Rules.

27. In support of the aforesaid submissions, the learned advocate

has relied upon an unreported judgment of a Coordinate

Bench of this Court in Union of India & Others vs. Ashok

Kumar Som (M.A.T. No. 932 of 2023) , wherein, according

to him, the Coordinate Bench has reiterated that previous

official dealings or disciplinary action against a delinquent

employee cannot, in the absence of cogent material, furnish a

F.M.A. 965 of 2025

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valid basis for alleging bias or disqualifying the competent

disciplinary authority from exercising jurisdiction.

28. Lastly, the learned advocate submits that the very manner in

which the plea of mala fide has been raised disentitles the

petitioner from any relief. It is argued that the petitioner has

leveled serious allegations of personal mala-fide and bias

against the Commandant without even impleading him as a

party respondent in the writ proceedings. It is a settled

principle of law that whenever mala-fide is alleged against a

public officer personally, such officer must ordinarily be

impleaded by name so as to afford him an effective

opportunity to answer the allegations made against him. In

the absence of the person against whom such allegations are

directed, the Court cannot properly adjudicate upon the issue

of mala-fide. The learned advocate, therefore, submits that

the learned Single Bench was fully justified in declining to

entertain the allegations of bias and mala-fide in the absence

of the Commandant being impleaded as a party to the

proceedings.

29. On the aforesaid grounds, it is contended that the appeal is

wholly devoid of merit and deserves to be dismissed with

affirmation of the judgment and order passed by the learned

Single Bench.

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30. The principal contention advanced on behalf of the appellant

is that the disciplinary proceeding culminating in the SSFC

was vitiated on account of bias and mala fide on the part of

the Commandant, who convened and conducted the

proceedings. It is urged that the Commandant had earlier

dealt with the petitioner in another disciplinary matter and,

therefore, there existed a reasonable likelihood of bias

rendering the entire proceeding unsustainable.

31. The plea of bias, though an integral facet of the principles of

natural justice, cannot be permitted to rest upon mere

conjectures, surmises, vague suspicions or bald and

unsubstantiated allegations. It is a settled proposition of law

that every allegation of bias must be supported by a sound

factual foundation. The burden lies upon the person alleging

bias to place before the Court cogent and convincing

materials demonstrating either actual bias or the existence of

circumstances from which a reasonable, fair-minded and

informed person would entertain a genuine apprehension that

the authority concerned may not act impartially or that justice

may not only be done but also appear to have been done.

32. The test is not one of the subjective perception or personal

apprehension of the delinquent employee. The apprehension

must be objectively reasonable and founded upon tangible

F.M.A. 965 of 2025

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facts capable of leading a prudent person to conclude that

there exists a real likelihood of bias. Mere assertions,

unsupported by contemporaneous records or acceptable

evidence, are wholly insufficient to disqualify a statutory

authority from discharging the functions entrusted to it under

law.

33. Equally well settled is the principle that an adverse order

passed against a delinquent employee in an earlier

proceeding, or the mere fact that the disciplinary authority

had previously exercised jurisdiction over the employee in the

discharge of his official duties, does not, by itself, establish

either actual bias or a reasonable likelihood thereof. If such a

proposition were to be accepted, every disciplinary authority

who had occasion to deal with an employee in the course of

official functions would stand automatically disqualified from

initiating or conducting any subsequent disciplinary

proceeding against the same employee. Such an

interpretation would not only be contrary to settled legal

principles but would also seriously impede the effective

administration of disciplinary control, particularly in

disciplined forces where commanding officers are statutorily

entrusted with the responsibility of maintaining discipline and

enforcing the provisions of the governing law.

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34. Therefore, unless the materials on record disclose

circumstances giving rise to a real and reasonable

apprehension of bias, founded upon objective facts and not

merely on the subjective belief of the person proceeded

against, the disciplinary proceedings cannot be invalidated on

the ground of bias alone.

35. In the present case, the learned advocate appearing for the

Union of India has taken us through the affidavit-in-opposition

filed before the learned Single Bench, the order passed by the

Deputy Inspector General on the petition preferred by the writ

petitioner against the findings of the SSFC, as well as the

detailed remarks recorded by the Deputy Inspector General

while dealing with the allegations of mala fide and bias

leveled against the Commandant.

36. The principal circumstance relied upon by the writ petitioner is

that during the intervening night of 05/06 July, 2007, the

petitioner was proceeded against for an incident involving

firing at a border post, for which he was awarded twenty-

eight days' rigorous imprisonment. According to the

petitioner, since the Commandant had dealt with that earlier

proceeding, he became biased against the petitioner and was

consequently disqualified from conducting the subsequent

SSFC proceedings.

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37. The documents placed before us reveal that although the

punishment in the earlier proceeding had initially been

imposed upon a discreet verification of the incident, when the

petitioner subsequently approached the higher authorities

challenging the said punishment, the very same Commandant

against whom allegations of bias are now leveled submitted a

comprehensive factual report to the superior authority. The

Deputy Inspector General, upon considering such report and

the materials on record, ultimately set aside the punishment

awarded to the petitioner.

38. Had the Commandant been actuated by any personal

animosity or predetermined hostility against the petitioner,

there was no conceivable reason for him to furnish a report

objectively placing all relevant facts before the superior

authority, knowing fully well that such report might ultimately

result in the punishment being interfered with in favour of the

petitioner. On the contrary, the conduct of the Commandant

demonstrates fairness in placing the factual position before

the competent authority without attempting to sustain the

earlier punishment at all costs. Far from supporting the

allegation of bias, the said circumstance substantially

demolishes the very foundation upon which such allegation

rests.

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39. The Deputy Inspector General has also examined the other

allegations of mala fide and bias raised by the petitioner

against the Commandant. The remarks recorded by the

superior authority disclose that each of those allegations was

independently examined and none was found to be

substantiated by any contemporaneous record or acceptable

evidence. The allegations were found to be vague,

unsupported and bereft of particulars. We find no material

before us to take a different view from the conclusions so

arrived at by the superior authority.

40. The record further indicates that during a relatively short span

of service, the petitioner had repeatedly been found involved

in acts of indiscipline and insubordination. The disciplinary

actions initiated against him, therefore, cannot by themselves

be characterised as evidence of personal hostility. A

disciplinary authority discharging statutory functions in

dealing with repeated acts of misconduct cannot be presumed

to be biased merely because disciplinary proceedings were

initiated on more than one occasion. Acceptance of such a

proposition would virtually incapacitate every commanding

officer from exercising disciplinary jurisdiction over a member

of the Force merely because previous disciplinary action had

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been taken against him. Such an interpretation would defeat

the very object of maintaining discipline in a disciplined force.

41. Equally significant is the fact that the petitioner never raised

any objection regarding the alleged bias of the Commandant

at the time when the SSFC proceedings were actually

conducted. No request appears to have been made seeking

recusal of the Commandant or transfer of the proceedings to

any other competent authority. The petitioner fully

participated in the proceedings without protest and accepted

the jurisdiction of the Commandant throughout. It is only

after an adverse finding was returned that the plea of bias

came to be projected. Such conduct considerably weakens the

credibility of the allegation and lends support to the

submission advanced on behalf of the respondent that the

plea is nothing but an afterthought devised to overcome the

adverse findings recorded in the disciplinary proceeding.

42. The proviso to Rule 46 of the Border Security Force Rules,

1969, also does not create any absolute prohibition

preventing the Commandant from exercising jurisdiction

merely because he had previously dealt with the delinquent in

another matter. Unless circumstances exist which reasonably

establish a real likelihood of bias, the statutory authority

cannot be said to be disqualified from performing the duties

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entrusted to him under the Rules. No such exceptional

circumstance has been established in the facts of the present

case.

43. We also find merit in the objection raised on behalf of the

Union of India that serious allegations of mala-fide have been

leveled against the Commandant without even impleading

him by name as a party respondent. It is a settled principle

that where mala-fides are specifically alleged against a public

officer, such officer should ordinarily be impleaded so as to

afford him an opportunity to meet the allegations personally.

In the absence of the concerned officer as a party, the

allegations remain unilateral assertions incapable of proper

adjudication. The fact that the writ petitioner chose not to

implead the Commandant despite attributing personal mala-

fides to him, leads to an inference that the allegations

necessarily lose much of their legal efficacy and cannot

constitute a valid basis for invalidating the disciplinary

proceedings.

44. The reliance placed by the appellant on decision of the

Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Charanjit S.

Gill &Ors. (supra) does not lend support to the case made

out by the applicant/writ petitioner. In Charanjit S. Gill

&Ors. (supra) the Apex Court considered the competence

F.M.A. 965 of 2025

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desirability of appointing a judge advocate in a General Court

Martial who was an officer of a rank lower than the officer

facing the trial. Such appointment was done without any

consideration of the need for making such an appointment.

The Apex Court therefore, upheld the High Court’s view in the

following terms:

“In other words a Judge Advocate appointed with

the Court Martial should not be an officer of a rank

lower than that of the officer facing the trial unless

the officer of such rank is not (having due regard to

the exigencies of public service) available and the

opinion regarding non-availability is specifically

recorded in the convening order. As in the instant

case, the Judge Advocate was lower in rank to the

accused officer and no satisfaction/opinion in terms

of sub-rule (2) of Rule 40 was recorded, the

Division Bench of the High Court was justified in

passing the impugned judgment, giving the

authorities liberty to initiate fresh court martial

proceedings, if any, if they are so advised in

accordance with law and also in the light of the

judgment delivered by the High Court.”

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45. No such facts arise for consideration in the present case, as is

evident from our consideration above. The judgment in the

case of Charanjit S. Gill &Ors. (supra) therefore, in our

opinion has no application to the facts and circumstances of

the present case. Insofar as judgement in the case of Mohd.

Yunus Khan (supra) we find that in the said case the

Battalion Commandant had appeared as a witness and proved

the disobedience of office orders of imposition of punishment.

After appearing as a witness in the enquiry, he also passed

the order of punishment. The Apex Court further took note of

the fact that if the disciplinary authority wanted to consider

the past conduct of the employee while imposing punishment,

the employee was entitled to a notice thereof, which was not

done. It was rendered under such facts and circumstances

which have no application to the facts and circumstances of

the present case. This judgment also is not applicable in the

present case. The writ petitioner also relied upon Division

Bench judgment of Delhi High Court in the case of Ex. Ct. Raj

Kumar (supra), which was rendered under a different set of

facts where an allegation not stated in the charge memo and

not supported in the enquiry was sought to be held proved.

This judgment therefore, does not have any application in the

facts and circumstances of the present case.

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46. The reliance placed by the respondent upon the decision of

the Coordinate Bench in Union of India & Ors. vs. Ashok

Kumar Som (M.A.T. No. 932 of 2023) also lends support to

the well-established principle that previous official dealings

with a delinquent employee, or the discharge of statutory

disciplinary functions, do not by themselves establish bias or

a reasonable apprehension thereof.

47. On an overall assessment of the entire materials on record,

we are satisfied that the petitioner has utterly failed to

establish either actual bias or any reasonable likelihood of

bias on the part of the Commandant. The allegations are

founded upon assumptions rather than objective facts and do

not satisfy the legal threshold required to invalidate

disciplinary proceedings conducted under the statutory

framework governing the Force.

48. We are, therefore, unable to accept the contention that the

proceedings of the SSFC stood vitiated on account of bias or

mala-fide. The learned Single Judge was fully justified in

declining to interfere with the disciplinary proceedings on such

unsupported allegations. We find no infirmity in the view so

taken.

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49. Accordingly, the submissions advanced on behalf of the writ

petitioner on the issue of bias and mala-fide fail and stand

rejected.

50. Consequently, the appeal, being devoid of merit, is liable to

be dismissed.

51. There will be no order as to costs.

52. Urgent Photostat certified copy of this order, if applied for, be

supplied to the parties upon compliance with all requisite

formalities.

I agree.

(Madhuresh Prasad, J.)

(Prasenjit Biswas, J.)