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0  10 Aug, 2000
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Shri Munshi Ram and Anr. Vs. Union of India and Ors.

  Supreme Court Of India Civil Appeal /3095/1990
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SHRI MUNSHI RAM AND ANR. A

v.

UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.

AUGUST 10, 2000

[SYED SHAH MOHAMMED QUADRI AND Y.K. SABHARWAL, JJ.] B

Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 :

S.14( l)(k)-Misuser of premises by tenant-Eviction of-Land leased

out on condition that land and building constructed on it should not be used for

other than residential

purpose-Tenant running a shop in the premises­

Petition by landlord for eviction of tenant-Notice by Delhi Development

Authority

to landlord stating that premises being used for commercial purpose

contrary

to terms of lease, the lease deed has become void and lessor got rig hr

to re-enter-Additional Rent Controller directing tenants to pay misuser charges,

and to stop .further misuser failing which order

of eviction would be deemed to

h~ve been passed against them-Held, in view of misuser of premises and DDA

insisting

to act upon the notice, DDA cannot be directed to permit continued

misuser contrary to tem1s

of lease-Delhi Development Act, 1957-Ss. 7 and 8.

Respondent no. 3 purchased the suit premises which form part of a

building constructed

on the land given on perpetual lease by the Delhi

Improvement Trust, the predecessor

of the Delhi Development Authority,

respondent no.2, to the original lessor with the condition

that the lessee

should. not use the said land and building

that might be erected thereon

during the term

of the lease for any other purpose than for the purpose of

residential house without the consent of the lessor.

c

D

E

F

In 1974, respomlent no. 3 filed a petition under s.14(1) (k) of the

Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 seeking eviction

of the appellants, who were

tenants

in suit premises and were running a shop therein.

On 4.1.1982, the

DDA issued a notice to respondent no. 3 stating

that the said premises were

being used for commercial-cum-residential purposes, which was contrary

G

to the terms of the lease and, therefore, the lease became void and the

lessor got the

right to re-enter after cancellation of lease. The notice

further stated that the lease had been cancelled by the DDA on 23.12.1981

for breach

of clause l(VI) and it would take possession of the land and the

building. Ultimately the Additional Rent Controller passed

an order on H

377

A

B

c

D

378 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

6.9.1988 directing the appellants to pay within two months the past mis­

user charges to respondent no. 3 for being deposited with the DDA, to pay

further compensation/charges to DDA as may be demanded by it and to

stop misuser

of the premises. The order further stated that in the event of

non-compliance with the directions, the order of eviction under s.14(1)(k)

of the Act would be deemed to have been passed against the appellants.

The

order was upheld by the Rent Control Tribunal as also by the High

Court. Aggrieved, the tenants filed the present appeal.

Dismissing the appeal, this

Court

HELD : There has been misuser of the premises in breach of Clause

l(VI) of the terms

of the lease. The ground of eviction is Clause (k) of

s.14(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. The unauthorised user would

give the

paramount lessor the right to re-enter after cancellation of the

lease deed. The Delhi Development Authority has been insisting to

act

upon the notice dated 4.1.1982 issued to respondent no. 3. The stand of the

DDA is that after due payment for past misuser, the lessee is bound to

discontinue the misuse in future.

It cannot be said that despite contraven­

tion of the lease, the

paramount lessor is debarred from exercising its

rights

under the terms of the lease for absence of providing a user under

s.7 of the Delhi Development Act, 1957 in the master plan or under s.8 in

E the zonal development plan. The DDA cannot be directed to permit contin­

ued misuser

contrary to the terms of the lease on the ground that zonal

development plan

of the area has not been framed. However, the appel­

lants are granted two months time to comply with the

order of the Addi­

tional Rent Controller. [381-B-C; 383-C;

F; G]

F Dr. K. Madan v. Krishnawati (Smt.) and Anr., [1996] 6

SCC 707, relied

on.

Narain Das v. Manohar Lal & Anr., [1988]

Sup. SCC 432, held inappli-

cable

G

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 3095 of 1990.

From the Judgment and Order dated 9.2.90 of the Delhi High Court in

C.W.P. No. 3260 of 1989.

K.N. Rawal, Additional Solicitor General, D.D. Thakur, A.B. Rohatgi,

H Vijay

Prakash, Siddharth Choudhary, Rajeev Sharma, T.N. Bhat, B.K. Punj,

MUNSHI RAM'" U.O.L [YK. SABHARWAL, J.] 379

B.K. Sharma, S.B. Kumar, J.M. Khanna, V.B. Saharya, S.W.A. Qadri, S.N. A

Terdol and

Ms.

Sushma Suri for the appearing parties.

The judgment

of the

Court was delivered by

Y.K. SABHARWAL, J. The appellants are tenants. The tenanted premises

are situate

in Karol Bagh Area, Delhi. The landlord is respondent no.3 whereas B Union of India and the Delhi Development Authority (for short 'DDA') are

respondents 1 and 2 respectively.

The tenanted premises are part

of building constructed on the land leased

to the original lessee

by Delhi Improvement Trust. The DDA succeeded the

said Trust. The perpetual lease,

inter alia, provides that the lessee will not use C

the land and building that may be erected thereon during the terms of the lease

for any other purpose than for the purpose

of residential house without the

consent

in writing of the lessor. Admittedly the premises are being used by the

appellants for commercial purposes.

By notice dated 4th January, 1982 issued by DDA, respondent no.3 was D

informed that the premises were being used for the purpose of commercial­

cum-residential which

is contrary to the terms of the lease and the lease has

become void and the lessor has right

to re-enter after cancellation of lease. It

was further stated

in the said notice that the lease has been cancelled by DDA

on 23rd December,

198 l for breach of

Clause I(VI) and the possession of the E

plot together with the building and the fixtures standing thereon will be taken

over

by DDA. In a suit filed by respondent no.3 against DDA for grant of

permanent injunction, interim injunction was granted by civil court inter alia

noticing in the order that the owner had instituted eviction proceedings as far

back

as in 1974 against the tenants who were running their shops even at the

time

of the purchase of premises in question by the owner from its erstwhile

owner.

In 1974, respondent no.3 instituted eviction petitions against the appel-

F

G

lants seeking their eviction under clause (k) of proviso to sub-section (1) of

Section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (for short 'the Act'). The said

clause stipulates an order

of eviction being passed against the tenant who has,

notwithstanding previous notice, used or dealt with the premises

in a manner

contrary

to any condition imposed on the landlord by the Government or the

Delhi Development Authority or the Municipal Corporation

of Delhi while

giving him a lease

of the land on which the premises are situate. The tenant

cannot resist his eviction when sought under

Section 14(1 )(k) of the Act merely H

A

B

c

D

E

380 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2000] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

on the ground that the landlord had himself let out the premises for commercial

use

(Faqir

Chand v. Shri Ram Rattan Bhanot, [ 1973] 1 SCC 572). Under sub­

section (11)

of Section 14 of the Act, before an order for recovery of possession

of any premises on the grounds specified in clause (k) of the proviso to sub­

section

(1) of the said section is made, the Controller is required to give to the

tenant time

to comply with the conditions imposed on the landlord by any of

the authorities referred to in clause (k) or pays to that authority such amount

by way

of compensation as the Controller may direct.

The Additional Rent Controller by order dated 6th September, 1988 after

coming

to the conclusion that the

ODA is not interested in permitting the

misuse permanently or even temporarily and has threatened to re-enter the

premises, directed the appellants

to pay within two months the past mis-user

charges

to respondent no.3 for being deposited with the

ODA. The appellants

were also directed

to pay further compensation/charges as may be demanded

by

DOA in this regard. The appellants were directed to stop mis-user of the

premises within two months from the date

of the order and in the event of non­

compliance

of any of these conditions, it was directed that the order of eviction

under Section 14(l)(k)

of the Act shall be deemed to have been passed against

the appellants for their eviction from the premises in question. This conditional

order

of eviction has been upheld by the Rent Control Tribunal in appeal as

also by the High Court.

Challenging the aforesaid orders, Mr.D.D.Thakur submits that since the

appellants are prepared

to pay such amount of penalty as compensation as may

be determined by the Controller

to be payable to

DOA till the matter of

regularisation of user is finally decided by the said authority, the case be

remanded

to the Rent Controller for such a determination. Learned counsel

F places strong reliance on the decision in the case of

Narain Das v. Manohar

Lal

&

Am:, [ 1988] Supp. SCC 432. In the said case, an order of eviction passed

under Section 14( I )(k) was set aside

by this Court and the case was remitted

to the Controller to determine the quantum of penalty payable to the

ODA for

the purpose

of wrong user of property by changing it from residential to

G commercial purpose and directing that the tenant will bear the burden of

penalty as may be determined. The said decision has no applicability to the

facts

of the present case since in that case the

DOA did not press the notice

for cancellation

of the lease and for this reason the case was

remitted to the

Controller for determining the penalty.

In view of resolution of the

DOA, a

statement was made on its behalf

in that case that the lease would not be

H cancelled pursuant to the notice which had been sent to the owner.

Under these

·-

MUNSHI RAM v. U.0.1. [Y.K. SABHARWAL, J.] 381

circumstances, in the relied upon decision there was no threat of cancellation A

of the lease which is a pre-condition for an order of eviction under clau>c (k)

of proviso to sub-section (I) of Section 14 of the Act. The Court made it clear

that in the event

of fresh notice being issued by

DOA to the landlord for

cancellation

of the lease in his favour, the landlord would be free to take action

against the tenant in accordance with law and the decision

of this Court shall

not operate as a bar

to such proceedings.

Unlike the facts of the relied upon

case, in the present case the DOA has been insisting to act upon the notice dated

4th January, 1982 sent

to respondent no.3. That has been the clear stand of ODA in proceedin6S before the Additional Rent Controller. The Secretary of

the ODA to the same effect has filed an affidavit in this Court as well. The stand

of the ODA is that after due payment for past misuser, the lessee is bound to

discontinue the misuse in future. A statement showing action taken by DOA

against misuser of premises in the vicinity of the premises in question has also

been filed.

Mr. Kirti Rawal, learned

Addi.Solicitor General appearing for DOA

submits that the DOA is not contemplating to regularise the misuser and in case

the misuser is not stopped, the ODA will act upon the notice and re-enter the

premises. In this state

of affairs, the decision in Narain Das case (supra) can

be

of no assistance to the appellants.

Next, Mr.Thakur relies upon (i) the order dated 3rd January, 1983 passed

by Lt.Governor of Delhi inter alia stating that the issue of notices and further

action under misuser clause in the various areas

of Delhi may be suspended till

the matter has been reviewed at a high level or in the next meeting

of

ODA;

(ii) the affidavit of the Secretary of Delhi Development Authority of February,

1

983 filed in the High Court of Delhi in another case in a second appeal inter

alia

stating that the further show cause notice has been suspended for the time

being and even the prosecution for the misuse has been suspended for the time

being as per the order

of the Lt.Governor as there is a likelihood of permission

being granted for commercialisation

of the area in accordance of the provisions

of the master plan/zonal plan after charging certain dues, and (iii) to a some­

what similar statement as in (ii) given in another case by the Commissioner

(Land),

ODA. Reliance on these documents is wholly misplaced for more than

one reason. Firstly, these documents pertain to 1980s whereas in the present

case the Commissioner (Land Disposal), DOA has filed an affidavit even in

September, 1998 inter alia stating that though a scheme dated 12/17 Septem­

ber, 1996 has been forwarded by DOA to the Ministry of Urban Affairs and

Employment for approval

of the Government of India for promotion of Karol

Bagh area as special area and for promotion

of commercial use on ground floor

B

c

D

E

F

G

H

A

B

382 SUPRE.\1E COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

on the basis of location but the examination of the plan of the premises in

question shows that the disputed area falls outside the area of the scheme which

is under consideration with DOA and the Union of India. In nutshell, the

affidavit is that in respect

of the area in question there is no proposal under

consideration lo allow commercial user. Secondly, we do not have the facts

of

cases in which the abovenoted affidavit was filed by the Secretary of

ODA or

statement was given by Commissioner (Land Disposal), ODA. Thirdly, we are

considering not a violation

of master or zonal plan but breach of a term of lease,

which paramount lessor

is unwilling to condone. In the present case, it is not

necessary to decide

as to the effect of the proposal sent by

DOA to Central

Government

to allow commercial user since the ground of eviction is clause

C (k) as aforesaid where the question is about breach of a term of lease and the

lessor has declined

to regularise the misuser for future. Learned Additional

Solicitor General submits that the

DOA is not only serious in pursuing the

action taken

by it on account of misuser but it is duty bound to do so.

D

E

F

G

Mr. Thakur also referred to the provisions of the Delhi Development Act,

1957 (for short 'the DD Act')

to contend that plans thereunder have not

specified any particular use

of the area where the building is situate. Chapter

III

of the DD Act deals with Master

Plan and Zonal Development Plans.

Section 7 provides for the DDA to carry out a civic survey and prepare a master

plan for Delhi. Section 8 provides for preparation

of a

Zonal Development Plan

for each of the zones into which Delhi may be divided and also refers as to

what aspects may be contained in the said Plan. The land use is one such aspect.

Mr. Thakur contends that neither the master plan for the year 1990-2001 shows

that the permissible user

of the area in question is only residential nor zonal

development plan under Section 8

of the DD Act has been framed providing

for only residential use. Reference has also been made

to Section 14 which

inter a/ia provides that after the coming into operation of any of the plans in

a zone, no person shall use or permit

to be used any land or building in that

zone otherwise than in conformity with such plan. The proviso

to the said

section stipulates that it shall

be lawful to continue to use upon such terms and

conditions as may be prescribed by regulations, any land or building for the

purpose and

to the extent for and to which it is being used on the date on which

such plan comes into force. Section 57(1)(!) stipulates making

of regulations

to provide for terms and conditions subject

to which user of lands and buildings

in contravention

of plans may be continued. Learned counsel contends that the

impugned eviction orders deserve

to be set aside as even regulations under

H Section 57(1)(!) have not been framed by DDA providing for terms and

<

MUNSHI RAM v. U.0.1. [Y.K. SABHARWAL, J.] 383

conditions on which continued user in contravention

of plans may be permit­

ted. None

of the aforesaid provisions have any applicability to the present case.

We are not concerned with the contravention as postulated by

Section 14 of

th~ DD Act. The question whether master plan and/or zonal plans provide or

not for any use is not relevant for this matter. As already noted, we are

concerned with the breach

of the terms of the lease. It is not in dispute that the

commercial use is contrary to the use permissible under the lease. The para­

mount lessor has taken action to terminate the lease for contravention

of the

terms thereof. It cannot be held that despite contravention

of the lease, the

paramount lessor is debarred for exercising its rights under the terms

of the

lease for absence

of providing a user under

Section 7 in the master plan or

under Secti11n 8 in the Zonal Development Plan.

In Dr. K. Madan v. Krishnawati (Smt.) and Anr., [1996] 6 SCC 707, this

Court has held that where the premises are used in a manner contrary

to any

condition imposed on the landlord

by the Government or the Delhi Develop­

ment Authority or Municipal Corporation

of Delhi, then the landlord will be

entitled

to recovery of possession under

Section 14(l)(k) of the Act and that

sub-section

(11) of

Section 14 of the Act enables the Controller to give another

opportunity to the tenant

to avoid an order of eviction. The first opportunity

to the tenant is given when the notice is served on him by the landlord and the

second opportunity

is given when an conditional order under

Section 14(11)

of the Act is passed directing the tenant to pay the amount by way of compen­

sation for regularisation

of user up to the date of stopping the misuser and

further directing stoppage

of unauthorised user. The continued unauthorised

user would give the paramount lessor the right

to re-enter after the cancellation

of the lease deed. As already noticed, the

DOA is insisting on stoppage of

misuser. The misuser is contrary to the terms of lease. The DOA cannot be

directed

to permit continued misuser contrary to the t'erms of the lease on the

ground that zonal development plan

of the area has not been framed.

For the aforesaid reasons, we find no merit in the appeal and

It

IS

accordingly dismissed. We, however, grant to the appellants two months time

to comply with the order of the Additional Rent Controller dated 6th Septem­

ber, 1988. There will be no order as to the costs.

R.P. Appeal dismissed.

A

B

c

D

E

F

G

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