No Acts & Articles mentioned in this case
SHRI MUNSHI RAM AND ANR. A
v.
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.
AUGUST 10, 2000
[SYED SHAH MOHAMMED QUADRI AND Y.K. SABHARWAL, JJ.] B
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 :
S.14( l)(k)-Misuser of premises by tenant-Eviction of-Land leased
out on condition that land and building constructed on it should not be used for
other than residential
purpose-Tenant running a shop in the premises
Petition by landlord for eviction of tenant-Notice by Delhi Development
Authority
to landlord stating that premises being used for commercial purpose
contrary
to terms of lease, the lease deed has become void and lessor got rig hr
to re-enter-Additional Rent Controller directing tenants to pay misuser charges,
and to stop .further misuser failing which order
of eviction would be deemed to
h~ve been passed against them-Held, in view of misuser of premises and DDA
insisting
to act upon the notice, DDA cannot be directed to permit continued
misuser contrary to tem1s
of lease-Delhi Development Act, 1957-Ss. 7 and 8.
Respondent no. 3 purchased the suit premises which form part of a
building constructed
on the land given on perpetual lease by the Delhi
Improvement Trust, the predecessor
of the Delhi Development Authority,
respondent no.2, to the original lessor with the condition
that the lessee
should. not use the said land and building
that might be erected thereon
during the term
of the lease for any other purpose than for the purpose of
residential house without the consent of the lessor.
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In 1974, respomlent no. 3 filed a petition under s.14(1) (k) of the
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 seeking eviction
of the appellants, who were
tenants
in suit premises and were running a shop therein.
On 4.1.1982, the
DDA issued a notice to respondent no. 3 stating
that the said premises were
being used for commercial-cum-residential purposes, which was contrary
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to the terms of the lease and, therefore, the lease became void and the
lessor got the
right to re-enter after cancellation of lease. The notice
further stated that the lease had been cancelled by the DDA on 23.12.1981
for breach
of clause l(VI) and it would take possession of the land and the
building. Ultimately the Additional Rent Controller passed
an order on H
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6.9.1988 directing the appellants to pay within two months the past mis
user charges to respondent no. 3 for being deposited with the DDA, to pay
further compensation/charges to DDA as may be demanded by it and to
stop misuser
of the premises. The order further stated that in the event of
non-compliance with the directions, the order of eviction under s.14(1)(k)
of the Act would be deemed to have been passed against the appellants.
The
order was upheld by the Rent Control Tribunal as also by the High
Court. Aggrieved, the tenants filed the present appeal.
Dismissing the appeal, this
Court
HELD : There has been misuser of the premises in breach of Clause
l(VI) of the terms
of the lease. The ground of eviction is Clause (k) of
s.14(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. The unauthorised user would
give the
paramount lessor the right to re-enter after cancellation of the
lease deed. The Delhi Development Authority has been insisting to
act
upon the notice dated 4.1.1982 issued to respondent no. 3. The stand of the
DDA is that after due payment for past misuser, the lessee is bound to
discontinue the misuse in future.
It cannot be said that despite contraven
tion of the lease, the
paramount lessor is debarred from exercising its
rights
under the terms of the lease for absence of providing a user under
s.7 of the Delhi Development Act, 1957 in the master plan or under s.8 in
E the zonal development plan. The DDA cannot be directed to permit contin
ued misuser
contrary to the terms of the lease on the ground that zonal
development plan
of the area has not been framed. However, the appel
lants are granted two months time to comply with the
order of the Addi
tional Rent Controller. [381-B-C; 383-C;
F; G]
F Dr. K. Madan v. Krishnawati (Smt.) and Anr., [1996] 6
SCC 707, relied
on.
Narain Das v. Manohar Lal & Anr., [1988]
Sup. SCC 432, held inappli-
cable
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CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 3095 of 1990.
From the Judgment and Order dated 9.2.90 of the Delhi High Court in
C.W.P. No. 3260 of 1989.
K.N. Rawal, Additional Solicitor General, D.D. Thakur, A.B. Rohatgi,
H Vijay
Prakash, Siddharth Choudhary, Rajeev Sharma, T.N. Bhat, B.K. Punj,
MUNSHI RAM'" U.O.L [YK. SABHARWAL, J.] 379
B.K. Sharma, S.B. Kumar, J.M. Khanna, V.B. Saharya, S.W.A. Qadri, S.N. A
Terdol and
Ms.
Sushma Suri for the appearing parties.
The judgment
of the
Court was delivered by
Y.K. SABHARWAL, J. The appellants are tenants. The tenanted premises
are situate
in Karol Bagh Area, Delhi. The landlord is respondent no.3 whereas B Union of India and the Delhi Development Authority (for short 'DDA') are
respondents 1 and 2 respectively.
The tenanted premises are part
of building constructed on the land leased
to the original lessee
by Delhi Improvement Trust. The DDA succeeded the
said Trust. The perpetual lease,
inter alia, provides that the lessee will not use C
the land and building that may be erected thereon during the terms of the lease
for any other purpose than for the purpose
of residential house without the
consent
in writing of the lessor. Admittedly the premises are being used by the
appellants for commercial purposes.
By notice dated 4th January, 1982 issued by DDA, respondent no.3 was D
informed that the premises were being used for the purpose of commercial
cum-residential which
is contrary to the terms of the lease and the lease has
become void and the lessor has right
to re-enter after cancellation of lease. It
was further stated
in the said notice that the lease has been cancelled by DDA
on 23rd December,
198 l for breach of
Clause I(VI) and the possession of the E
plot together with the building and the fixtures standing thereon will be taken
over
by DDA. In a suit filed by respondent no.3 against DDA for grant of
permanent injunction, interim injunction was granted by civil court inter alia
noticing in the order that the owner had instituted eviction proceedings as far
back
as in 1974 against the tenants who were running their shops even at the
time
of the purchase of premises in question by the owner from its erstwhile
owner.
In 1974, respondent no.3 instituted eviction petitions against the appel-
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lants seeking their eviction under clause (k) of proviso to sub-section (1) of
Section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (for short 'the Act'). The said
clause stipulates an order
of eviction being passed against the tenant who has,
notwithstanding previous notice, used or dealt with the premises
in a manner
contrary
to any condition imposed on the landlord by the Government or the
Delhi Development Authority or the Municipal Corporation
of Delhi while
giving him a lease
of the land on which the premises are situate. The tenant
cannot resist his eviction when sought under
Section 14(1 )(k) of the Act merely H
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380 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2000] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
on the ground that the landlord had himself let out the premises for commercial
use
(Faqir
Chand v. Shri Ram Rattan Bhanot, [ 1973] 1 SCC 572). Under sub
section (11)
of Section 14 of the Act, before an order for recovery of possession
of any premises on the grounds specified in clause (k) of the proviso to sub
section
(1) of the said section is made, the Controller is required to give to the
tenant time
to comply with the conditions imposed on the landlord by any of
the authorities referred to in clause (k) or pays to that authority such amount
by way
of compensation as the Controller may direct.
The Additional Rent Controller by order dated 6th September, 1988 after
coming
to the conclusion that the
ODA is not interested in permitting the
misuse permanently or even temporarily and has threatened to re-enter the
premises, directed the appellants
to pay within two months the past mis-user
charges
to respondent no.3 for being deposited with the
ODA. The appellants
were also directed
to pay further compensation/charges as may be demanded
by
DOA in this regard. The appellants were directed to stop mis-user of the
premises within two months from the date
of the order and in the event of non
compliance
of any of these conditions, it was directed that the order of eviction
under Section 14(l)(k)
of the Act shall be deemed to have been passed against
the appellants for their eviction from the premises in question. This conditional
order
of eviction has been upheld by the Rent Control Tribunal in appeal as
also by the High Court.
Challenging the aforesaid orders, Mr.D.D.Thakur submits that since the
appellants are prepared
to pay such amount of penalty as compensation as may
be determined by the Controller
to be payable to
DOA till the matter of
regularisation of user is finally decided by the said authority, the case be
remanded
to the Rent Controller for such a determination. Learned counsel
F places strong reliance on the decision in the case of
Narain Das v. Manohar
Lal
&
Am:, [ 1988] Supp. SCC 432. In the said case, an order of eviction passed
under Section 14( I )(k) was set aside
by this Court and the case was remitted
to the Controller to determine the quantum of penalty payable to the
ODA for
the purpose
of wrong user of property by changing it from residential to
G commercial purpose and directing that the tenant will bear the burden of
penalty as may be determined. The said decision has no applicability to the
facts
of the present case since in that case the
DOA did not press the notice
for cancellation
of the lease and for this reason the case was
remitted to the
Controller for determining the penalty.
In view of resolution of the
DOA, a
statement was made on its behalf
in that case that the lease would not be
H cancelled pursuant to the notice which had been sent to the owner.
Under these
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MUNSHI RAM v. U.0.1. [Y.K. SABHARWAL, J.] 381
circumstances, in the relied upon decision there was no threat of cancellation A
of the lease which is a pre-condition for an order of eviction under clau>c (k)
of proviso to sub-section (I) of Section 14 of the Act. The Court made it clear
that in the event
of fresh notice being issued by
DOA to the landlord for
cancellation
of the lease in his favour, the landlord would be free to take action
against the tenant in accordance with law and the decision
of this Court shall
not operate as a bar
to such proceedings.
Unlike the facts of the relied upon
case, in the present case the DOA has been insisting to act upon the notice dated
4th January, 1982 sent
to respondent no.3. That has been the clear stand of ODA in proceedin6S before the Additional Rent Controller. The Secretary of
the ODA to the same effect has filed an affidavit in this Court as well. The stand
of the ODA is that after due payment for past misuser, the lessee is bound to
discontinue the misuse in future. A statement showing action taken by DOA
against misuser of premises in the vicinity of the premises in question has also
been filed.
Mr. Kirti Rawal, learned
Addi.Solicitor General appearing for DOA
submits that the DOA is not contemplating to regularise the misuser and in case
the misuser is not stopped, the ODA will act upon the notice and re-enter the
premises. In this state
of affairs, the decision in Narain Das case (supra) can
be
of no assistance to the appellants.
Next, Mr.Thakur relies upon (i) the order dated 3rd January, 1983 passed
by Lt.Governor of Delhi inter alia stating that the issue of notices and further
action under misuser clause in the various areas
of Delhi may be suspended till
the matter has been reviewed at a high level or in the next meeting
of
ODA;
(ii) the affidavit of the Secretary of Delhi Development Authority of February,
1
983 filed in the High Court of Delhi in another case in a second appeal inter
alia
stating that the further show cause notice has been suspended for the time
being and even the prosecution for the misuse has been suspended for the time
being as per the order
of the Lt.Governor as there is a likelihood of permission
being granted for commercialisation
of the area in accordance of the provisions
of the master plan/zonal plan after charging certain dues, and (iii) to a some
what similar statement as in (ii) given in another case by the Commissioner
(Land),
ODA. Reliance on these documents is wholly misplaced for more than
one reason. Firstly, these documents pertain to 1980s whereas in the present
case the Commissioner (Land Disposal), DOA has filed an affidavit even in
September, 1998 inter alia stating that though a scheme dated 12/17 Septem
ber, 1996 has been forwarded by DOA to the Ministry of Urban Affairs and
Employment for approval
of the Government of India for promotion of Karol
Bagh area as special area and for promotion
of commercial use on ground floor
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382 SUPRE.\1E COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
on the basis of location but the examination of the plan of the premises in
question shows that the disputed area falls outside the area of the scheme which
is under consideration with DOA and the Union of India. In nutshell, the
affidavit is that in respect
of the area in question there is no proposal under
consideration lo allow commercial user. Secondly, we do not have the facts
of
cases in which the abovenoted affidavit was filed by the Secretary of
ODA or
statement was given by Commissioner (Land Disposal), ODA. Thirdly, we are
considering not a violation
of master or zonal plan but breach of a term of lease,
which paramount lessor
is unwilling to condone. In the present case, it is not
necessary to decide
as to the effect of the proposal sent by
DOA to Central
Government
to allow commercial user since the ground of eviction is clause
C (k) as aforesaid where the question is about breach of a term of lease and the
lessor has declined
to regularise the misuser for future. Learned Additional
Solicitor General submits that the
DOA is not only serious in pursuing the
action taken
by it on account of misuser but it is duty bound to do so.
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Mr. Thakur also referred to the provisions of the Delhi Development Act,
1957 (for short 'the DD Act')
to contend that plans thereunder have not
specified any particular use
of the area where the building is situate. Chapter
III
of the DD Act deals with Master
Plan and Zonal Development Plans.
Section 7 provides for the DDA to carry out a civic survey and prepare a master
plan for Delhi. Section 8 provides for preparation
of a
Zonal Development Plan
for each of the zones into which Delhi may be divided and also refers as to
what aspects may be contained in the said Plan. The land use is one such aspect.
Mr. Thakur contends that neither the master plan for the year 1990-2001 shows
that the permissible user
of the area in question is only residential nor zonal
development plan under Section 8
of the DD Act has been framed providing
for only residential use. Reference has also been made
to Section 14 which
inter a/ia provides that after the coming into operation of any of the plans in
a zone, no person shall use or permit
to be used any land or building in that
zone otherwise than in conformity with such plan. The proviso
to the said
section stipulates that it shall
be lawful to continue to use upon such terms and
conditions as may be prescribed by regulations, any land or building for the
purpose and
to the extent for and to which it is being used on the date on which
such plan comes into force. Section 57(1)(!) stipulates making
of regulations
to provide for terms and conditions subject
to which user of lands and buildings
in contravention
of plans may be continued. Learned counsel contends that the
impugned eviction orders deserve
to be set aside as even regulations under
H Section 57(1)(!) have not been framed by DDA providing for terms and
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MUNSHI RAM v. U.0.1. [Y.K. SABHARWAL, J.] 383
conditions on which continued user in contravention
of plans may be permit
ted. None
of the aforesaid provisions have any applicability to the present case.
We are not concerned with the contravention as postulated by
Section 14 of
th~ DD Act. The question whether master plan and/or zonal plans provide or
not for any use is not relevant for this matter. As already noted, we are
concerned with the breach
of the terms of the lease. It is not in dispute that the
commercial use is contrary to the use permissible under the lease. The para
mount lessor has taken action to terminate the lease for contravention
of the
terms thereof. It cannot be held that despite contravention
of the lease, the
paramount lessor is debarred for exercising its rights under the terms
of the
lease for absence
of providing a user under
Section 7 in the master plan or
under Secti11n 8 in the Zonal Development Plan.
In Dr. K. Madan v. Krishnawati (Smt.) and Anr., [1996] 6 SCC 707, this
Court has held that where the premises are used in a manner contrary
to any
condition imposed on the landlord
by the Government or the Delhi Develop
ment Authority or Municipal Corporation
of Delhi, then the landlord will be
entitled
to recovery of possession under
Section 14(l)(k) of the Act and that
sub-section
(11) of
Section 14 of the Act enables the Controller to give another
opportunity to the tenant
to avoid an order of eviction. The first opportunity
to the tenant is given when the notice is served on him by the landlord and the
second opportunity
is given when an conditional order under
Section 14(11)
of the Act is passed directing the tenant to pay the amount by way of compen
sation for regularisation
of user up to the date of stopping the misuser and
further directing stoppage
of unauthorised user. The continued unauthorised
user would give the paramount lessor the right
to re-enter after the cancellation
of the lease deed. As already noticed, the
DOA is insisting on stoppage of
misuser. The misuser is contrary to the terms of lease. The DOA cannot be
directed
to permit continued misuser contrary to the t'erms of the lease on the
ground that zonal development plan
of the area has not been framed.
For the aforesaid reasons, we find no merit in the appeal and
It
IS
accordingly dismissed. We, however, grant to the appellants two months time
to comply with the order of the Additional Rent Controller dated 6th Septem
ber, 1988. There will be no order as to the costs.
R.P. Appeal dismissed.
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