2026 INSC 927

Civil Appeal Nos.10693-10694 of 2026 Page 1 of 17

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOS.10693-10694 OF 2026

SHRI PRAKASH NARAIN SHARMA APPELLANT

DEAD THROUGH LEGAL

REPRESENTATIVE

VERSUS

M/S. BURMAH SHELL CO -OPERATIVE RESPONDENT S

HOUSING SOCIETY (REGD) THROUGH

MANAGING COMMITTEE MEMBER SH.

P. JINDAL AND OTHERS

J U D G M E N T

ATUL S. CHANDURKAR, J.

1. Interference caused by the High Court of Delhi

1 in the writ

petition preferred by the first respondent under Articles 226 and

227 of the Constitution of India resulting in setting aside the order

passed by the learned Arbitrator under Section 61 of the Delhi Co-

operative Societies Act, 1972

2 as affirmed in appeal under Section

76 of the Act of 1972 by the Delhi Co-operative Tribunal

3 has been

questioned by the appellant in these civil appeals. While the

1

For short, ‘the High Court’

2

For short, ‘the Act of 1972’

3

For short, ‘the Tribunal’

Civil Appeal Nos.10693-10694 of 2026 Page 2 of 17

appellant contends that the High Court exceeded its writ

jurisdiction while setting aside the concurrent orders, the first

respondent justifies such interference as the said concurrent

orders failed to consider various relevant aspects resulting in

miscarriage of justice that was set right by the High Court.

2. The present proceedings have a chequered histo ry. It is

however not necessary to refer to the same in detail. Suffice it to

mention that Mr. S.N. Sharma

4 claimed to be a member of M/s

Burmah Shell Co-operative Housing Society

5, the first respondent

herein and was, thus, entitled to allotment of a plot. Complaining

of illegal deprivation in the matter of allotment of a plot, the

claimant filed a dispute before the Joint Registrar, Co-operative

Societies, Delhi, that was referred to an Arbitrator. The Society

questioned the appointment of the Arbitrator by filing a civil suit.

Despite a restraint order being passed in the civil suit, the

Arbitrator proceeded with the arbitration proceedings and passed

an ex-parte award. The Arbitrator upheld the claim of the claimant

for allotment of a plot. The said proceedings ultimately reached

this Court at the instance of the legal heir of the original claimant

in Prakash Narain Sharma vs. Burmah Shell Co -op. Housing

4

For short, ‘the original claimant’

5

For short, ‘the Society’

Civil Appeal Nos.10693-10694 of 2026 Page 3 of 17

Society Ltd

6. This Court by its judgment dated 21.08.2002 set

aside the ex-parte award and directed continuation of the

arbitration proceedings from the stage the Society was set ex-parte.

The original Arbitrator having expired in the meanwhile, he was

replaced by another Arbitrator, the Registrar, Co-operative

Societies, Delhi

7, the second respondent.

3. After remand, the Registrar concluded the arbitration

proceedings. He passed an award on 07.10.2003 holding that the

original claimant was a member of the Society and that despite

performing his duties and obligations towards the Society for

getting the plot, he was deprived of the same. The legal heir of the

original claimant, Mr. Prakash Narain Sharma was, thus, entitled

to allotment of a plot. The arbitrator accordingly accepted the claim

of the original claimant and directed the Managing Committee of

the Society to give a plot to the legal heir of the original claimant

on making full payment towards cost of the land. The said order of

the Arbitrator was challenged by the Society by preferring an

appeal under Section 76 of the Act of 1972. The Tribunal by a short

order dated 18.03.2004 upheld the Registrar ’s order and

dismissed the appeal.

6

2002 INSC 345

7

For short, ‘the Arbitrator’

Civil Appeal Nos.10693-10694 of 2026 Page 4 of 17

4. The Society, being aggrieved by the said adjudication ,

preferred a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the

Constitution of India

8 before the Delhi High Court. It was urged on

behalf of the Society that relevant material indicating the fact that

the original claimant had not been admitted as a member of the

Society had been ignored. The original claimant had in fact given

up his membership voluntarily. The High Court by its judgment

dated 06.10.2010 found that neither the Registrar nor the learned

Presiding Officer of the Tribunal had considered the relevant

material on record, which if taken into account would have

concluded the matter in favour of the Society. It was found that

the claim of membership made by the original claimant was of the

year 1952 but he was never granted any membership. He had in

fact given up his membership in the year 1951 by resigning from

the same. It was, thus, held that the original claimant was not

entitled to allotment of any plot inasmuch he had not been

admitted as a member of the Society. It was also found that there

were four members, who had a prior claim than the original

claimant for allotment of a plot. The allotment of a plot bypassing

the claim of other senior members was also not equitable. On these

8

For short, ‘the Constitution’

Civil Appeal Nos.10693-10694 of 2026 Page 5 of 17

grounds, the orders passed by the Registrar and the learned

Presiding Officer of the Tribunal were set aside. The writ petition

preferred by the Society was, accordingly, allowed. The legal heir

of the original claimant being aggrieved has, thus, come up in

these appeals.

5. Mr. Jitendra Mohan Sharma, learned Senior Advocate for the

appellant submitted that the High Court in exercise of jurisdiction

under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution was not justified in

interfering with the orders passed by the Registrar under Section

61 and the Tribunal in appeal under Section 72 of the Act of 1972.

All relevant aspects including the fact that the original claimant

was a member of the Society and was, thus, entitled to allotment

of a plot had been considered by the Registrar in the arbitration

proceedings. It was correctly held that the original claimant had

performed all his duties and obligations towards the Society for

being allotted a plot. He continued to be a member of the Society

till his death and his name was always shown in the list of

members. Referring to various documents on record that had been

taken into consideration by the Arbitrator as well as the Tribunal,

it was submitted that the direction to allot a plot to the son of the

original claimant had been rightly issued. The availability of land

Civil Appeal Nos.10693-10694 of 2026 Page 6 of 17

for such allotment was also not in issue in view of the findings

recorded by the trial Court in its judgment dated 31.03.1965 that

was subsequently affirmed by the High Court on 21.07.1972.

Without considering these aspects in a proper perspective, the

High Court erred in interfering with the said orders. The finding

recorded by the High Court that the original claimant ceased to be

a member of a Society was without appreciating the true content

of the documents on record. Referring to the decision of this Court

in Shalini Shyam Shetty and another Vs. Rajendra Shankar

Patil

9, it was submitted that the High Court committed an error in

interfering with the order passed by the Registrar and the Tribunal.

He also referred to various affidavits placed on record to

substantiate his contention that vacant plots were in fact available

for allotment. He, therefore, submitted that the impugned

judgment of the High Court be set aside and the award passed by

the Registrar in the dispute as filed, be restored.

6. On the other hand, Mr. Ashim Vachher, learned Senior

Advocate for the Society supported the impugned judgment. He

submitted that the Registrar as well as the Tribunal had failed to

examine the relevant documents on record. It was clear that the

9

2010 INSC 422

Civil Appeal Nos.10693-10694 of 2026 Page 7 of 17

membership of the original claimant had ceased in the year 1951.

Fresh membership was again sought by the original claimant in

the year 1952. The same was, however, not granted to him. No

share certificate was ever issued to the original claimant in 1952

or thereafter. Referring to various documents placed on record, it

was submitted that the High Court rightly found that if the

authorities under the Act of 1972 would have taken the same into

consideration, a decision in favour of the Society would have been

recorded. Since it was found by the High Court that relevant

documentary material was ignored by the Registrar as well as by

the Tribunal, it rightly interfered with the orders passed by the said

authorities. Moreover, the assumption that by paying a sum of

₹15,000/- in the year 1952, the original claimant would be entitled

to allotment of a plot was incorrect, especially when there were

other members seeking allotment, whose claim was prior to the

claim of the original claimant. To substantiate these contentions,

the learned Senior Advocate placed reliance on the decisions in

Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu Vs. The Motor and General

Traders

10, Special Reference No.1 of 2002

11, Raj Kumar Dey

10

1975 INSC 75

11

2002 INSC 445

Civil Appeal Nos.10693-10694 of 2026 Page 8 of 17

and others Vs. Tarapada Dey and others

12 to urge that the High

Court rightly interfered in the matter. It was, thus, submitted that

since the High Court on the basis of relevant documentary material

available on record found that the original claimant had ceased to

be a member of the Society, no case had been made out for the

impugned judgment to be set aside. It was, thus, prayed that the

civil appeals be dismissed.

7. We have heard the learned Senior Advocates for the parties

at length and we have gone through their written submissions

placed on record. We have also perused the relevant documentary

material forming part of the record before the Arbitrator as well as

the Tribunal. Having given our thoughtful consideration to the

entire matter, we are of the considered opinion that no case has

been made out for this Court to interfere with the impugned

judgment of the High Court.

8. The core issue that requires consideration is with regard to

membership of the original claimant of the Society. While the

original claimant claims to have been inducted as a member of the

Society in the year 1952 after which he discharged necessary

obligations in that regard, the Society contends that the original

12

1987 INSC 248

Civil Appeal Nos.10693-10694 of 2026 Page 9 of 17

claimant having resigned from his membership in the year 1951,

he was never inducted as a member thereafter. The Arbitrator as

well as the Tribunal have proceeded on the basis that having been

inducted as a member of the Society, it had to be presumed that

he continued to be a member of the Society during his lifetime,

especially as his name was shown in the list of members. The High

Court, in exercise of jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the

Constitution, however, found that the documents on record

indicated that the claim of membership as made by the original

claimant since 1952 was without any basis, as such claim was

never accepted by the Society but was in fact categorically rejected.

The question that, thus, arises for consideration is whether the

High Court, in exercise of certiorari jurisdiction, was justified in

interfering with the orders passed by the Arbitrator and the

Tribunal or whether it exceeded its jurisdiction in doing so?

9. For seeking an answer to the aforesaid question, it would be

first necessary to refer to the orders passed by the Arbitrator and

the Tribunal. As noted above, in the earlier round of litigation the

proceedings were remanded to the Arbitrator under Section 61 of

the Act of 1972 to decide the dispute as raised by the original

claimant with regard to his membership and consequent

Civil Appeal Nos.10693-10694 of 2026 Page 10 of 17

entitlement to allotment of a plot. According to the Arbitrator, the

original claimant had been admitted as a member. His offer of an

amount of ₹15,000/- for a larger plot of land was not accepted by

the Society, thus, leading to filing of the dispute. It was held that

the plea of resignation from membership as well as subsequent re-

entry for settlement of accounts was not tenable as said contention

was not supported by any reason nor by law. The Arbitrator, thus,

proceeded to presume that the original claimant continued to be a

member of the Society during his lifetime and his name was shown

in the list of members. On that basis, the Society was directed to

allot a plot to the legal heir of the original claimant on the condition

that the legal heir would apply for transfer of membership and

make full payment towards the cost of the land.

10. The Society challenged this order by preferring an appeal

under Section 76 of the Act of 1972. The Tribunal in its short order

held that though the original claimant ha d resigned from

membership in 1951, the Managing Committee of the Society

decided to admit him as a member as a special case for clearing

the suspense items as the accounts had to be settled. It also

referred to the fact that the name of the original claimant figured

in the list provided by the Society to the Civil Court in 1965 as well

Civil Appeal Nos.10693-10694 of 2026 Page 11 of 17

as in the High Court in 1972. The Tribunal, therefore, refused to

interfere with the order of the Arbitrator.

11. In the writ petition preferred by the Society, the High Court

noted that the decisions of the Arbitrator as well as of the Tribunal

were cryptic and almost bereft of reasoning. It found that the claim

of membership made by the original claimant was of the year 1952,

which indicated that his resignation from membership in 1951 was

not in issue. It found that the list of membership relied upon by

the legal heir of the original claimant was of the year 1951. It,

therefore, upheld the stand of the Society that since an amount of

₹25/- was lying in the suspense account of the Society, the name

of the original claimant was shown as a non-plot holder member.

There was no resolution granting membership to the original

claimant pursuant to his application in 1952 nor could the original

claimant produce any membership certificate. The amount of

₹15,000/- was not accepted by the Society from the original

claimant as he was not a member. It, thus, noted that arguments

raised by the Society had not been considered at all. It, therefore,

held that the Arbitrator was not justified in proceeding on the

presumption that the original claimant continued to be a member

during his lifetime. It also examined the aspect of equities in favour

Civil Appeal Nos.10693-10694 of 2026 Page 12 of 17

of the parties and held that merely on the basis of contributing

₹25/- in the year 1952, a claim for allotment of a plot was not

justifiable, especially when there were prior claimants also seeking

allotment of a plot. The conclusion recorded by the High Court

while explaining the reason for its interference as contained in

paragraph 13 of the impugned judgment reads as under:

“13. In view of the above, we accept the writ petition and set aside the

orders of both the authorities below inasmuch as they are not only cryptic

but they fail to discuss the relevant facts and the issues, and which if would

have been done the same would have resulted in a decision in favour of the

petitioner society. We, therefore, set aside the impugned order dated

18.3.2004 passed by the DCT and Award dated 7.10.2003 and dismiss the

claim petition as filed by respondent No.l and his father for grant of a plot

in the petitioner society. The parties are left to bear their own costs.”

12. Before proceeding to examine whether the High Court , in

exercise of certiorari jurisdiction, could have set aside the

concurrent orders of the Arbitrator and the Tribunal, it would be

advantageous to refer to a few decisions in this regard. In General

Manager, Electrical Rengali Hydro Electric Project, Orissa and

others Vs. Sri Giridhari Sahu and others

13, this Court examined

in detail the permissibility of exercise of certiorari jurisdiction.

After referring to the decision of the Constitution Bench in Hari

Vishnu Kamath Vs. Syed Ahmad Ishaque and others

14 as well

13

2019 INSC 1020

14

1954 INSC 122

Civil Appeal Nos.10693-10694 of 2026 Page 13 of 17

as various other decisions, it has been held as under:

“29. On the conspectus of the decisions and material, we would hold

as follows:

The jurisdiction to issue writ of certiorari is supervisory and

not appellate. The Court considering a writ application of

Certiorari will not don the cap of an Appellate Court. It will not

reappreciate evidence. The Writ of Certiorari is intended to

correct jurisdictional excesses. A writ of prohibition would issue

when a Tribunal or authority has not yet concluded its

proceedings. Once a decision is rendered by a body amenable to

Certiorari jurisdiction, certiorari could be issued when a

jurisdictional error is clearly established. The jurisdictional

error may be from failure to observe the limits of its jurisdiction.

It may arise from the procedure adopted by the body after validly

assuming jurisdiction. It may act in violation of principles of

natural justice. The body whose decision which comes under

attack may decide a collateral fact which is also a jurisdictional

fact and assume jurisdiction. Such a finding of fact is not

immune from being interfered with by a Writ of Certiorari. As far

as the finding of fact which is one within the jurisdiction of the

court, it is ordinarily a matter ‘off bounds’ for the writ court. This

is for the reason that a body which has jurisdiction to decide the

matter has the jurisdiction to decide it correctly or wrongly. It

would become a mere error and that too an error of fact.

However, gross it may amount to, it does not amount to an error

of law. An error of law which becomes vulnerable to judicial

scrutiny by way of Certiorari must also one which is apparent

on the face of the record. As held by this Court in Hari Vishnu

Kamath (supra), as to what constitutes an error apparent on the

face of the record, is a matter to be decided by the court on the

facts of each case. A finding of fact which is not supported by

any evidence would be perverse and in fact would constitute an

error of law enabling the writ court to interfere. It is also to be

noticed that if the overwhelming weight of the evidence does not

support the finding, it would render the decision amendable to

certiorari jurisdiction. This would be the same as a finding

which is wholly unwarranted by the evidence which is what this

Court has laid down [See M/s. Perry and Co. Ltd (supra)].”

In Central Council for Research in Ayurvedic Sciences

and another Vs. Bikartan Das and others

15, this Court reiterated

15

2023 INSC 733

Civil Appeal Nos.10693-10694 of 2026 Page 14 of 17

that a finding of fact based on no evidence or purely on surmises

or conjectures could be regarded as an error of law. In paragraphs

63 and 64, it was held as under:

“63. However, we may clarify that findings of fact based on ‘no evidence’ or

purely on surmises and conjectures or which are perverse points could be

challenged by way of a certiorari as such findings could be regarded as an

error of law.

64. Thus, from the various decisions referred to above, we have no

hesitation in reaching to the conclusion that a writ of certiorari is a high

prerogative writ and should not be issued on mere asking. For the issue of

a writ of certiorari, the party concerned has to make out a definite case for

the same and is not a matter of course. To put it pithily, certiorari shall issue

to correct errors of jurisdiction, that is to say, absence, excess or failure to

exercise and also when in the exercise of undoubted jurisdiction, there has

been illegality. It shall also issue to correct an error in the decision or

determination itself, if it is an error manifest on the face of the proceedings.

By its exercise, only a patent error can be corrected but not also a wrong

decision. It should be well remembered at the cost of repetition that

certiorari is not appellate but only supervisory.”

13. From the aforesaid decisions, it is evident that though the

scope for interference in exercise of certiorari jurisdiction would be

limited, an error of law evident from the record is open to correction

by the High Court. If a finding is recorded without there being any

evidence on record or a finding is recorded without any supporting

document, whatsoever, a case for interference would be made out

since such finding would amount to an error of law. In Shalini

Shyam Shetty and another (supra), the distinction between the

jurisdiction under Article 226 and Article 227 was explained and

it was held that the powers conferred operated in different fields.

The ratio of the said decision is not applicable as the writ petition

Civil Appeal Nos.10693-10694 of 2026 Page 15 of 17

before the High Court was under both the Articles.

14. When the material on record is examined in the aforesaid

context, it becomes clear that the Registrar as well as the Tribunal

glossed over relevant documentary material on record. The High

Court in the impugned judgment has indicated the same which

according to us is the correct position obtaining from the record of

the case. These documents include the resignation of the original

claimant and its acceptance as recorded in the Minutes of the

Managing Committee Meeting held on 05.05.1951 followed by

transfer of the share of the original claimant to another member

on 18.08.1951, the rejection of the original claimant’s application

for membership as per the Minutes of the Managing Committee

Meeting dated 05.11.1952 as well as the rejection of the request of

the original claimant to permit him to pay the deposit for a plot of

land as late as on 04.11.1979. The Arbitrator failed to consider

these documents that were available on record , which if

considered, would have resulted in only one finding, that the

original claimant was not a member of the Society. Instead, it

proceeded on the assumption that the original claimant continued

to be a member during his lifetime. The perversity in the finding of

the Registrar is evident from the following observations made in

Civil Appeal Nos.10693-10694 of 2026 Page 16 of 17

his order dated 07.10.2003 which read as under:

“…The plea of resignation of Sh. S. N. Sharma and his subsequent re-entry

to settle some accounts are· not tenable as they are neither supported by

any reason nor by the law. It has to be presumed that he continued to be a

member of the society till the end of his life and his name continued to be

shown in the list of members…”

15. The Tribunal in its cryptic order consisting of six paragraphs

affirmed this finding. In our view, the High Court was fully justified

in causing interference with these orders by observing that if the

relevant documents had been taken into consideration, the same

would have resulted in a decision in favour of the Society. We,

therefore, hold that no fault can be found with the exercise of

certiorari jurisdiction by the High Court.

16. The High Court also rightly, in our view, took into account

equitable considerations while interfering in exercise of certiorari

jurisdiction. In the light of the fact that there were four prior

claimants seeking allotment of a plot, the claim of the original

claimant was rightly disregarded. This is another reason not to

interfere with the High Court’s adjudication.

17. Since we have found that the original claimant was never

admitted as a member of the Society and, thus, not entitled to seek

allotment of a plot, it is not necessary to go into the issue as

regards actual availability of a plot. Though learned Senior

Civil Appeal Nos.10693-10694 of 2026 Page 17 of 17

Advocates for the parties addressed the Court on this aspect, it is

not necessary to record any finding in that regard as the original

claimant had not been admitted to the membership of the Society

and, hence, the question of allotment of a plot would not arise at

all.

18. For all the aforesaid reasons, we are not inclined to interfere

with the impugned judgment of the High Court. Consequently, the

Civil Appeals are dismissed with no orders as to cost. Pending

Interlocutory Applications are also disposed of.

…...………………………..J.

[ UJJAL BHUYAN ]

.…..………………………..J.

[ATUL S. CHANDURKAR]

NEW DELHI,

AUGUST 31, 2026.