REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2023

(Arising out of SLP (C) No.21876 of 2017)

SHRI RAM SHRIDHAR CHIMURKAR ….. APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

UNION OF INDIA & ANR. … RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

NAGARATHNA J.

Leave granted.

2. This appeal assails the judgment of the Nagpur Bench of

High Court of Judicature at Bombay, dated 30

th

November, 2015

wherein Writ Petition No. 2110 of 2003 �led by the Respondents

herein was allowed. Consequently, the judgment and order passed

by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Mumbai dated 19

th

July,

2002, whereby the Original Application �led by the Appellant

herein was allowed, has been set aside.

3. Succinctly stated, the facts giving rise to the instant appeal

are as under:

3.1. That Shridar Chimurkar was serving as a Superinten dent

in the o�ce of Respondent No. 2, Deputy Director and HO

Digitally signed by

Jatinder Kaur

Date: 2023.01.17

15:16:11 IST

Reason:

Signature Not Verified 2023 INSC 49

2

National Sample Survey Organization, Field Zonal O�ce,

Nagpur, and retired on attaining superannuation in the

year 1993. He died issueless in the year 1994, leaving

behind his wife, namely, Maya Motghare who thereafter

adopted Sri Ram Shridhar Chimurkar, the Appellant herein

as her son on 6

th

April, 1996, i.e., nearly two years after the

death of Shridar Chimurkar.

3.2. After the death of Shridar Chimurkar, his wife, M aya

Motghare and the Appellant were living in a portion of a

house owned by Prakash Motghare, the natural father of

the Appellant. Subsequently, in April, 1998, Maya Motghare

married Chandra Prakash, a widower, and began residing

with him at Janakpuri, New Delhi.

3.3. In the aforesaid background, the Appellant claimed family

pension payable to the family of the deceased government

employee, Shridar Chimurkar, from the Respondents, b y

addressing a letter in this regard, dated 18

th

January, 2000.

The claim of the Appellant was rejected by the Respondents

on the ground that children adopted by a widow of a

government servant, after the death of the governme nt

servant, would not be entitled to receive family pension as

per Rule 54 (14) (b) of the Central Civil Services (Pension)

Rules, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as “CCS (Pension)

3

Rules” for the sake of brevity). The Respondents’ decision

was communicated to the Appellant by way of letter dated

23

rd

February, 2000.

3.4. Aggrieved by the Respondents’ rejection of his claim for

family pension, the Appellant �led an Original Application,

being O.A. No. 2166 of 2001, before the Central

Administrative Tribunal, Mumbai, praying that the order of

the Respondents dated 23

rd

February, 2000 be quashed and

set aside, as being illegal and unconstitutional. Further, a

declaration that the Appellant is the adopted son of the

deceased government employee and is therefore entitled to

receive family pension, was also sought.

3.5. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Mumbai, by an o rder

dated 19

th

July, 2002, allowed O.A. No. 2166 of 2001 �led

by the Appellant and directed the Respondents to consider

the Appellant’s claim for family pension by treating him as

the adopted son of the deceased government employee,

Shridar Chimurkar. The salient �ndings of the Tribunal

may be culled out as under:

i.That Rule 54 (14) (b) of the CCS (Pension) Rules,

initially excluded sons or daughters born or adopted by

the government servant after retirement, from the

bene�t of family pension. However, by way of

4

amendments to the said Rule in the year 1990 and

1993, the bar against children born or adopted after

retirement, seeking family pension, was removed.

That the order of the Respondents dated 23

rd

February, 2000 would not survive in view of the

aforesaid amendments.

ii. That as per Sections 8 and 12 of the Hindu Adoptions

and Maintenance Act, 1956, (‘HAMA Act’, for short) the

widow of a Hindu male is competent to adopt a son or

a daughter without there being a direction/expression

of desire to that e�ect, by her deceased husband. That

the e�ect of adoption by a widow would be that the

child so adopted would be deemed to be the child of

her deceased husband also, vide Vijayalakshmamma

vs. B.T. Shankar, (2001) 4 SCC 558

(“Vijayalakshmamma”) .

iii. That the adoption of the Appellant by Maya Motghare

would be deemed to be adoption of the Appellant by

her deceased husband Shridar Chimurkar also.

3.6. Aggrieved by the judgment and order of the Tribun al, the

Respondents herein challenged the same by �ling Writ

5

Petition No. 2110 of 2013 before the Nagpur Bench of High

Court of Judicature at Bombay.

3.7. By the impugned judgment and order dated 30

th

November,

2015, the High Court allowed the said Writ Petition and

reversed reversed judgment and order passed by the

Central Administrative Tribunal, Mumbai dated 19

th

July,

2002. Hence this appeal by the original applicant.

3.8. Before proceeding further, it would be useful to encapsulate

the reasoning of the High Court for allowing the Writ

Petition �led by the appellant herein, as under:

i. That the Appellant herein could have been entitled to

receive family pension had he been legally adopted by

the deceased government servant, which was not the

case in the instant matter.

ii. That the Tribunal had erred in relying on Section 8

and 12 of the HAMA Act, 1956, which generally deals

with, inter alia, adoption by a Hindu widow.

iii. That Rule 54 (14) (b) of the CCS (Pension) Rules does

not deal with adoption by a widow of a government

servant after the death of the government servant.

4. We have heard learned Counsel, Mrs. K. Sarada Devi,

appearing on behalf of the Appellant, and learned Additio nal

6

Solicitor General of India, Mrs. Madhvi Goradia Divan, appearing

on behalf of the Union of India, and perused the mater ial on

record.

Submissions:

5. Mrs. K. Sarada Devi, learned Counsel appearing on b ehalf of

the Appellant, at the outset, contended that the High Court erred

in interfering with the �ndings of the Tribunal, without

appreciating the law on the capacity of a Hindu widow to adopt.

5.1. It was further contended that adoption made by a Hindu

widow would be deemed to be an adoption by her deceased

husband also, as per the provisions of HAMA Act, 1956,

and in view of the said position of law, the High Court

ought not to have interfered with the �ndings of the

Tribunal. That such a view has stood a�rmed by this Court

in Vijayalakshmamma wherein a declaration was made to

the e�ect that adoption by a Hindu widow would be deemed

to be adoption by her husband also.

5.2. Reliance was also placed on the text of Rule 54 (14) (b) of

the CCS (Pension) Rules, as it initially stood, as contrasted

with the text of the said provision after amendments to the

same in the years 1990 and 1993, to contend that the bar

against children born or adopted after retirement, seeking

7

family pension, was removed by way of the subsequent

amendments. Therefore, children adopted at any time after

retirement of the government servant, including children

adopted by the widow of the government servant after his

death ought to be included under the de�nition of ‘family’

for the purpose of granting family pension.

5.3. That unlike the position under classical Hindu Law, a

Hindu female under the provisions of the HAMA Act, 1956

is rendered eligible to adopt, not only acting at the behest of

her husband or on seeking his approval, but also in her

own right. Further, Section 12 thereof provides that a child

adopted shall cease to have any ties with the family of

her/his birth and shall only have ties with his adoptive

family. On a conjoint reading of the aforesaid propositions,

what emerges is that an adoption by a Hindu widow would

necessarily create a tie between the child so adopted and

her deceased husband.

In that context it was submitted that the Appellant

herein would have ties not only with Maya Motghare, his

adoptive mother, but also with her deceased husband,

Shridar Chimurkar, more so because, as on the date of

adoption, she had not re-married. That, as on the date of

adoption of the Appellant, Maya Motghare was the widow of

8

Shridar Chimurkar and therefore, the Appellant would be

the adopted son of Shridar Chimurkar also and all

enumerated consequences of such adoption would

necessarily follow.

With the aforesaid averments, it was prayed that the

present appeal be allowed by setting aside the impugned

judgment of the High Court and restoring the judgment of

the Tribunal.

6. Per contra, learned Additional Solicitor General Mrs. Madhvi

Goradia Divan, appearing on behalf of the Union of India

submitted that the impugned judgment is based on a fault less

appreciation of the law and does not call for interference by this

Court.

6.1. It was submitted that Rule 54 (14) (b) of the CCS (Pension)

Rules, does not cover adoption by a widow of a government

servant, after the death of such a government serva nt.

Therefore, the said rule could not be invoked for grant of

family pension to the Appellant herein. That the de�nition

of ‘family’ in relation to a government servant, as provided

under Rule 54 (14) (b) of the CCS (Pension) Rules, is not

expansive enough to take within its sweep a child adopted

by the widow of a government servant after his death.

9

6.2. It was contended that reliance placed by the learn ed

Counsel for the Appellant on Section 8 and 12 of HAMA

Act, 1956, was misplaced. That the said provisions merely

recognize that a female Hindu, including a widow, could

adopt a child under the provisions of the said Act. However,

the said provisions are irrelevant to the present case, which

pertains not merely to a question as to the capacity of a

Hindu widow to adopt, but involves issues of entitlement of

a child so adopted by a Hindu widow, to family pension on

the death of the government servant.

6.3. It was next contended that the adoption of the Appellant by

Maya Motghare, who was the widow of deceased

government servant Shridar Chimurkar, would not relate

back to the date of his retirement from service. Therefore,

the appellant could not claim family pension, in his

capacity as the adopted son of Shridar Chimurkar.

With the aforesaid averments it was prayed on behalf

of the Respondents that the present appeal be dismissed as

being devoid of merit, and the impugned judgment of the

High Court be a�rmed.

Points for Consideration:

10

7. Having regard to the submissions of the learned Senior

Counsel and learned Counsel for the respective parties , the

following points would arise for our consideration:

i. Whether a child adopted by a widow of a government servant,

subsequent to the death of the government servant would be

included within the scope of the de�nition of ‘family’ under

Rule 54 (14) (b) of the CCS (Pension) Rules, and would

therefore be entitled to receive family pension payable under

the said Rules?

ii. What order?

Legal Scheme:

8. Before proceeding further, it would be useful to refer to the

relevant provisions of the HAMA Act, 1956 and the CCS (Pension)

Rules.

8.1. HAMA Act, 1956 seeks to codify the law relating to

adoptions and maintenance among Hindus. Chapter II of

the Act pertains to adoption and prescribes inter-alia, the

manner in which an adoption is to be made, the legal

obligations created by way of adoption and the

consequences that are to follow an adoption.

8.2. Section 5 of the said Act provides that no adoption shall be

made by a Hindu, except in accordance with the provisions

11

of the Act; and any adoption made in contravention of the

provisions of the Act shall be void and shall neither create

any rights in the adoptive family, in favour of the person so

adopted, nor destroy the rights of any person in the family

of his or her birth. Further, Section 6 lists the requisites of

a valid adoption under the said Act. Section 7 pertains to

the capacity of a male Hindu to take in adoption, while

Section 8 deals with the capacity of a female Hindu to

adopt. Section 8 is relevant to the present case and is

usefully extracted as under:

“8. Capacity of a female Hindu to take in

adoption.―Any female Hindu who is of sound

mind and is not a minor has the capacity to take

a son or daughter in adoption:

Provided that, if she has a husband living, she

shall not adopt a son or daughter except with

the consent of her husband unless the husband

has completely and �nally renounced the world

or has ceased to be a Hindu or has been

declared by a court of competent jurisdiction to

be of unsound mind.”

8.3. Section 12 of HAMA Act, 1956, which is relevant to the

present case, lists the e�ects or consequences of adoption

by providing that an adopted child shall be deemed to be

the child of his or her adoptive father or mother for all

purposes with e�ect from the date of the adoption and from

such date, all the ties of the child in the family of his or her

12

birth shall be deemed to be severed and replaced by those

created by the adoption in the adoptive family. The said

provision is extracted as under:

“12. E�ects of adoption. ―An adopted child

shall be deemed to be the child of his or her

adoptive father or mother for all purposes with

e�ect from the date of the adoption and from

such date all the ties of the child in the family of

his or her birth shall be deemed to be severed

and replaced by those created by the adoption in

the adoptive family:

Provided that― (a) the child cannot marry any

person whom he or she could not have married

if he or she had continued in the family of his or

her birth;

(b) any property which vested in the adopted

child before the adoption shall continue to vest

in such person subject to the obligations, if any,

attaching to the ownership of such property,

including the obligation to maintain relatives in

the family of his or her birth;

(c) the adopted child shall not divest any person

of any estate which vested in him or her before

the adoption.”

8.4. However, the present case pertains not merely to a question

as to the capacity of a Hindu widow to adopt, but involves

issues of entitlement of a child adopted by a Hindu widow,

to family pension payable to certain categories of legal heirs

of a deceased government servant. It is necessary to refer to

the relevant Rules of the Central Civil Services (Pension)

Rules, 1972, as amended from time to time.

13

Rule 3(1)(f) of the CCS (Pension) Rules de�nes the term

‘family pension’ in the following manner:

“Family pension means `Family Pension, 1964',

admissible under Rule 54 but does not include

dearness relief.”

Rule 54 deals, inter alia, with the amount of family

pension payable, and the procedure to be followed for

payment thereof. Rule 54(14)(b) which is relevant to the

present case, de�nes ‘family’ for the purpose of Rule 54, in

the following terms:

“(b) “family” in relation to a government

servant means –

i. Wife in the case of a male Government

servant, or husband in the case of a

female Government servant;

ia. A judicially separated wife or

husband, such separation not

being granted on the ground of

adultery and the person

surviving was not held guilty of

committing adultery;

ii. Unmarried son who has not attained

the age of twenty-�ve years and

unmarried or widowed or divorced

daughter, including such son and

daughter adopted legally”;

iii.Dependent parents;

iv.Dependent disabled siblings (i.e.,

brother or sister) of a government

servant.”

14

With that primer, we shall proceed to consider the

question as to the entitlement of a child adopted by a Hindu

widow, to family pension payable under Rule 54 of the CCS

(Pension) Rules.

Analysis:

9. Section 8 of HAMA Act, 1956 pertains to the capacity of a

female Hindu to take a son or a daughter in adoption. The said

provision permits a female Hindu who is not a minor or of

unsound mind, to take a son or daughter in adoption to herself, in

her own right. The provision requires that a female Hindu who has

a husband, shall not adopt except with the express consent of her

husband. However, no such pre-condition is applicable in relation

to a Hindu widow; a divorced female Hindu; or a female Hindu

whose husband has, after marriage, �nally renounced the world or

has been declared by a Court of competent jurisdiction to be of

unsound mind.

9.1. Therefore, there exists an unequivocal statutory declaration

as to the capacity of a female Hindu, including a widow, to

take a son or daughter in adoption, in her own right. The

question would therefore arise as to what would be the

adoptive family of a child who is adopted by a widow, or by

a married woman whose husband has completely and

�nally renounced the world, or has been declared to be of

15

unsound mind. The text of Section 12 of the Act lends

limited perspective in this regard. However, this Court has

clari�ed this aspect by declaring that, on adoption by a

widow, the adopted son or daughter is deemed to be a

member of the family of the deceased husband of the widow,

vide Sawan Ram vs. Kalawanti, A.I.R. 1967 SC 1761 .

9.2. Further, in Sitabai vs. Ramchandra, A.I.R. 1970 SC 343 ,

this Court took note of the consequences of adoption as

listed under Section 12 of the Act, and observed as follows

as to the as to the e�ects of adoption by a Hindu widow:

“5. […] It is clear on a reading of the main part

of Section 12 and Sub-section (vi) of Section

11 that the e�ect of adoption under the Act is

that it brings about severance of all ties of the

child given in adoption in the family of his or her

birth. The child altogether ceases to have any ties

with the family of his birth. Correspondingly,

these very ties are automatically replaced by

those created by the adoption in the adoptive

family. The legal e�ect of giving the child in

adoption must therefore be to transfer the child

from the family of its birth to the family of its

adoption. 

The scheme of Sections 11 and 12, therefore, is

that in the case of adoption by a widow the

adopted child becomes absorbed in the adoptive

family to which the widow belonged. In other

words the child adopted is tied with the

relationship of sonship with the deceased

husband of the widow.”

16

10. Having acknowledged the consequences of adoption und er

Hindu Law, it is necessary to highlight at this juncture that the

said provisions of the HAMA Act, 1956 determine the rights of a

son adopted by a Hindu widow only vis-à-vis his adoptive family.

Rights and entitlements of an adopted son of a Hindu widow, as

available in Hindu Law, as against his adoptive family, cannot

axiomatically be held to be available to such adopted son, as

against the government, in a case speci�cally governed by extant

pension rules. The provisions of the HAMA Act, 1956, as discussed

above, relate generally to the capacity of the female Hindu to take

a son or daughter in adoption and the e�ects that follow such an

adoption. The said provisions do not lend much assistance in the

instant case which does not pertain to the rights of the adoptee

such as the Appellant herein under Hindu Law, but to his rights

and entitlements under the CCS (Pension) Rules. There exists a

vital di�erence between the rights of an adopted son under Hindu

Law and his rights to draw family pension, which creates a burden

on the public exchequer. It is therefore necessary to determine the

rights and entitlements of the Appellant having regard to Rule 54

(14) (b) of the CCS (Pension) Rules.

10.1. Rule 54 deals, inter alia, with the amount of family pension

payable, and the procedure to be followed for payment

thereof. Rule 54(14)(b) which is relevant to the present case,

17

de�nes ‘family’ for the purpose of Rule 54. It is the case of

the Appellant that a “son or daughter adopted legally” by a

government servant is eligible to claim family pension after

the death of the government servant, and therefore, such

bene�t ought to be extended in his favour also. That,

although he was adopted by the widow of a government

servant, he must be deemed to be the adopted son of the

deceased government servant and therefore allowed the

bene�t of family person.

11. This matter calls for an interpretation of the phrase “in

relation to a government servant” as appearing in Rule 54 (14)(b) of

the CCS (Pension) Rules.

In order to engage with this prong of the matter, i.e., e�ect of

the phrase “in relation to a government servant” as appearing in

Rule 54 (14)(b) of the CCS (Pension) Rules, in determining the

Appellant’s entitlement to family pension, it may be useful to refer

to the decision of this Court in Doypack Systems Pvt. Ltd. vs.

Union of India, (1988) 2 SCC 299 on the interpretation of the

phrase “in relation to”:

In the said case, this Court held as follows, while interpreting

the phrase “in relation to” in the context of the Swadeshi Cotton

Mills Company Limited (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings)

Act, 1986:

18

“50. The expression "in relation to" (so also

"pertaining to"), is very broad expression

which pre-supposes another subject matter.

These are words of comprehensiveness

which might have both a direct signi�cance

as well as an indirect signi�cance depending

on the context…In this connection reference

may be made to 76 Corpus Juris Secundum

at pages 620 and 621 where it is stated that

the term "relate" is also de�ned as meaning

to bring into association or connection

with. It has been clearly mentioned that

"relating to" has been held to be equivalent

to or synonymous with as to "concerning

with" and "pertaining to". The expression

"pertaining to" is an expression of expansion

and not of contraction.”

[Emphasis by me]

11.1. The use of the phrase “in relation to” in statutes is with a

view to bring one person or thing into association or

connection with another person or thing. The direct or

indirect nature of such association or connection depends

on the context. In Rule 54(14)(b) of the CCS (Pension) Rules,

the phrase “in relation to a government servant” would

indicate that the categories of persons listed thereunder,

such as wife, husband, judicially separated wife or

husband, son or unmarried daughter who has not attained

the age of twenty-�ve years, adopted son or daughter, etc.

are sought to be brought into association with the deceased

government servant. The context requires that association

or connection of such persons with the deceased

19

government servant must be direct and not remote. The

said Rule requires that the family member must have a

close nexus with the deceased government servant, and

must have been dependent on him during his lifetime.

Therefore, a son or daughter adopted by the widow of a

deceased government servant, after the death of the

government servant, could not be included within the

de�nition of ‘family’ under Rule 54(14)(b) of the CCS

(Pension) Rules.

12. It may also be appropriate to refer to the decision of this

Court in Poonamal vs. Union of India, (1985) 3 SCC 345 ,

wherein the purpose for which ‘family pension’ is granted, was

highlighted by this Court in the following words:

“Family pension came to be conceptualised in

the year 1950. When a Government servant die

in harness or soon after retirement, in the

traditional Indian family on the death of the only

earning member, the widow or the minor

children were not only rendered orphans but

faced more often destitution and starvation.

Traditionally speaking the widow was hardly in a

position to obtain gainful employment. She

su�ered the most in as much as she was

deprived of the companionship of the husband

and also became economically orphaned. As a

measure of socioeconomic justice family pension

scheme was devise to help the widows tie over

the crisis and till the minor children attain

majority to extend them some succour. This

appeared to be the underlying motivation in

devising the family pension scheme. It was

20

liberalised from time to time. The liberalisation

was however subject to the condition that the

Government Servant had in his life time agreed

that he shall make a contribution of an amount

equal to two months' emoluments or Rs. 5,000

whichever is less out of the death-cum-

retirement gratuity. Those Government servants

who did not accept this condition were denied

the bene�t of family pension scheme.”

It is evident from the passage quoted above that fam ily

pension was devised as a means to help the dependents of the

deceased government servant tide over the crisis and to extend to

them some succour. Therefore, the de�nition of the term ‘family’

cannot be extended to include those persons who were not even

dependents of the government servant, at the time of his death.

12.1. The cannon of construction described in the princi ple,

Nocitur a Sociis, may be applied to the present case. The

said principle posits that the meaning of a phrase must be

construed having regard to the words immediately

surrounding it. In the present case, the heirs listed under

Rule 54(14)(b) of the CCS (Pension) Rules are the

immediate dependents of the deceased government

servant. Therefore, persons who were not dependant on

the government servant prior to his death cannot be held

to be included in the de�nition of ‘family’ under Rule

54(14)(b) of the CCS (Pension) Rules.

21

13. Further, we are unable to �nd favour with the argument of

the learned Counsel for the Appellant that since the bar contained

in Rule 54(14)(b) of the CCS (Pension) Rules against children born

or adopted after retirement, seeking family pension, was removed

by way of the subsequent amendments to the provision, children

adopted at any time after retirement of the government servant,

including children adopted by the widow of the government

servant after his death ought to be included under the de�nition

of ‘family’ for the purpose of granting family pension. T he

provision could not be as expansive as suggested by the learned

Counsel for the Appellant. It is necessary that the scope of the

bene�t of family pension be restricted only to sons or daughters

legally adopted by the government servant, during his/he r

lifetime. The de�nition of ‘family’ is narrowly worded under the

CCS (Pension) Rules, in the speci�c context of the entitlement to

‘family pension’ and in relation to the government serva nt.

Therefore, the word “adoption” in Rule 54(14)(b)(ii) of the CCS

(Pension) Rules, in the context of grant of family pension, must be

restricted to an adoption made by a government servan t during

his/her lifetime and must not be extended to a case of adoption

made by a surviving spouse of the government servant after

his/her death. This is because the object of the provision is to

lend succour to a son till he attains the age of twenty-�ve years

22

and unmarried or widowed or divorced daughter; similarly to the

adopted son or unmarried adopted daughter when such an

adoption had been made by the government servant dur ing

his/her lifetime.

14. Further, a case where a child is born to the decea sed

government servant after his death has to be contrasted with a

case where a child is adopted by the widow of a governm ent

servant after his death. The former category of heirs are covered

under the de�nition of family since such a child would be a

posthumous child of the deceased government servant. The

entitlement of such a posthumous child is wholly distinct from a

child being adopted subsequent to the demise of the government

servant by the surviving spouse. The reason for the same is not far

to see. This is because the deceased government servant would

have had no relationship with the adopted child which would have

been adopted subsequent to his demise, as opposed to a

posthumous child. Therefore, the de�nition of the word “family” in

relation to a government servant means various categor ies of

persons coming within the nomenclature of the word “family” and

all persons who would have had a familial relationship with the

government servant during his lifetime. Any other interpretation

would lead to abuse of the provision in the matter of grant of

family pension.

23

15. It is also observed that the decision of this Court in

Vijayalakshmamma would not aid the case of the Appellant. The

said case is inapplicable to the facts of the present case for the

reason that the said case pertains to the right of a widow to adopt

and the right of inheritance of a child so adopted. The present case

is concerned only with the de�nition of ‘family’ under the CCS

(Pension) Rules. The said de�nition is a restrictive and speci�c one

and cannot be expanded to take within its sweep, all he irs, as

provided under Hindu law, or other personal laws. It is trite that in

construing a word in a statute, caution has to be exercised in

adopting a meaning ascribed to that word or concept in another

statute.

16. In light of the reasons assigned hereinabove, the p resent

appeal is liable to be dismissed and is, accordingly, dismissed. The

judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, dated 30

th

November, 2015, is hereby a�rmed.

Parties to bear their respective costs.

….…………………………..J.

(K.M. JOSEPH)

….…………………………..J.

(B.V. NAGARATHNA)

NEW DELHI;

17 JANUARY, 2023