AFR

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD

MATTERS UNDER ARTICLE 227 No. - 3045 of 2026

Shyam Pal …..Petitioners(s)

Versus

B.S. Enterprises …..Respondents(s)

Counsel for Petitioners(s):Prakash Chandra Dwivedi, Raunak

Gupta

Counsel for Respondent(s):Kunal Shah, Nidhi

Court No. - 35

HON’BLE DR. YOGENDRA KUMAR SRIVASTAVA, J.

Heard Sri Atul Dayal, learned Senior Counsel appearing along

with Sri Prakash Chandra Dwivedi, for the petitioner and Sri Kunal

Shah, learned counsel appearing for the respondent.

2.The petitioner, claiming to be a tenant in respect of a shop situated

at 106/376, Gandhi Nagar, ‘P’ Road, Kanpur Nagar, at a monthly rent of

Rs.500/-, has filed the present petition. The respondent–landlord

instituted proceedings under Section 21(2)(a), (b) and (m) of the Uttar

Pradesh Regulation of Urban Premises Tenancy Act, 2021 (hereinafter

referred to as “the Act, 2021”), seeking release of the premises in

question on the ground that he had acquired ownership thereof by

inheritance and that the same was required for expansion of his business.

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2.1In support of the application, it was averred by way of affidavit

that the landlord was in possession of a non-residential area measuring

approximately 150 square yards, being utilized as a godown, while an

area ad-measuring about 90 square yards on the first floor was being

used as a furniture workshop. It was further stated that, in the event

possession of the premises in question is secured, the landlord would be

in a position to shift the furniture workshop to the ground floor and

utilize the first floor portion for residential purposes.

2.2It was also asserted that a notice dated 02.06.2023 had been

issued, along with an intimation purportedly under Section 4(3) of the

Act, 2021, and that the rent, as assessed on the basis of the applicable

circle rate, would be Rs.1,00,000/- per month.

3.The petitioner–tenant appeared and contested the proceedings,

inter alia asserting that the agreed rent was Rs. 500/- per month; that the

alleged enhancement of rent to Rs.1,00,000/- was impermissible under

the Act; that no valid notice had been served; and that the alleged refusal

of notice was incorrect. It was further contended that the landlord’s

requirement was not genuine and that alternative accommodations were

available to him, whereas the tenanted shop constituted the sole source

of livelihood of the petitioner.

4.The parties exchanged pleadings and filed affidavits in support of

their respective claims. The landlord reiterated his requirement of the

premises for personal use, while the petitioner denied the same and

raised objections regarding maintainability, service of notice, and

compliance with statutory requirements.

5.The Rent Authority, by order dated 19.06.2025, allowed the

release application and directed eviction of the petitioner. It recorded that

the rate of rent was Rs. 500/- per month and that there was no default in

payment of rent. The application, however, was allowed under Section

21(2)(m) of the Act, 2021 on the ground of personal requirement of the

landlord.

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6.Aggrieved, the petitioner preferred an appeal under Section 35 of

the Act, which came to be dismissed by the Rent Tribunal vide order

dated 30.01.2026, affirming the findings recorded by the Rent Authority.

7.The petitioner has now approached this Court under Article 227 of

the Constitution of India challenging the aforesaid orders.

8. The core issue that arises for consideration is whether, under the

scheme of Section 21(2)(m) of the Uttar Pradesh Regulation of Urban

Premises Tenancy Act, 2021, the landlord is merely to demonstrate that

the premises are required for his occupation, or whether such

requirement must also satisfy the test of “bona fide need” as was

contemplated under the erstwhile U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972.

9.The petitioner has assailed the impugned orders contending that

the requirement set up by the landlord is neither genuine nor pressing

and is merely a pretext to evict the tenant. It is urged that the landlord is

possessed of alternative accommodations which could sufficiently meet

his alleged need, yet the same have not been considered by the

authorities below. It is further submitted that relevant material on record

has been ignored, and the proceedings are vitiated on account of non-

compliance with statutory requirements, including improper service of

notice and an impermissible attempt to enhance the rent. In support of

the aforesaid submissions, reliance has been placed on Phiroze Bamanji

Desai v. Chandrakant N. Patel

1

, wherein it has been held that the

expression “requires” must be construed to mean an element of actual

need and not a mere desire, and that such requirement must satisfy the

test of bona fide necessity. Further reliance has been placed on Shiv

Sarup Gupta v. Mahesh Chand Gupta

2

, to contend that the

requirement of the landlord must be genuine and real for eviction, and

that the Court is obliged to scrutinize the same objectively on the basis

of pleadings and evidence on record.

10.Per contra, the respondent has supported the impugned orders

contending that the requirement of the landlord stands duly established

1(1974) 1 SCC 661

2(1999) 6 SCC 222,

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within the meaning of Section 21(2)(m) of the Act, 2021 and does not

call for any further scrutiny on the touchstone of bona fide need or

comparative hardship. It is submitted that the statutory provision is clear

and unambiguous and merely requires the landlord to demonstrate that

the premises are needed for his occupation, which has been duly pleaded

and accepted by both the authorities below. In this regard, reliance has

been placed on Bhuwalka Steel Industries Ltd. v. Bombay Iron &

Steel Labour Board

3

to contend that where the language of the statute is

plain, it must be given its literal meaning and no words can be added or

read into it. Reliance has also been placed on the decision of the Court of

Appeal in Ireland v. Taylor

4

to emphasize adherence to the plain

meaning rule of interpretation. Further reliance has been placed on

Ganga Sagar Sethi and others v. Rajeev Kumar Jain

5

and Mahesh

Chandra Agarwal v. Rent Tribunal, Lucknow

6

to submit that under

the Act, 2021, the scope of inquiry is limited and once the requirement of

the landlord is established, the question of examining alternative

accommodation or comparative hardship does not arise.

11.At this stage, it would be apposite to notice the statutory

requirement as engrafted in Section 21(2)(m) of the Act, 2021. The

provision postulates only the existence of the requirement of the landlord

for occupation of the premises, without incorporating any further

condition or qualification. The relevant portion of the act is extracted

below :

“21. Protection of tenant against eviction. 21. (1) A tenant

shall not be evicted during the continuance of tenancy agreement

unless otherwise agreed to in writing by the landlord and tenant,

except in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (2) or in

accordance with the provisions of section

(2) The Rent Authority may, on an application made to it by the

landlord in such manner as may be prescribed, make an order for

eviction and recovery of possession of the premises on one or

more of the following grounds, namely:

3(2010) 2 SCC 273

4[1949] 1 K.B. 300

5 Matters under Article 227 No. 13809 of 2025

6 Writ–A No. 7791 of 2023

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(m) that the premises are required by landlord either in its

existing form, or after demolition and new construction thereof

for the purpose of its occupation by landlord.”

12.According to sub-section (2)(m) of Section 21 of the Act, 2021,

the landlord is only required to demonstrate that the premises are

required for his occupation. The provision, in its plain terms, is clearly

distinguishable from the provisions contained in the erstwhile U.P. Act

No. 13 of 1972, wherein the landlord was obligated to establish not only

his bona fide requirement but also to satisfy the test of comparative

hardship. The omission of these requirements under the present

enactment is neither incidental nor insignificant, but a conscious

legislative departure. Relevant portion under U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972, is

given below :

“21. Proceedings for release of building under occupation of

tenant-

(1) The prescribed authority may, on an application of the

landlord in that behalf, order the eviction of a tenant from the

building under tenancy or any specified part thereof if it is

satisfied that any of the following grounds exists; namely: --

(a) that the building is bona fide required either in its existing

form or after demolition and new construction by the landlord

for occupation by himself or any member of his family, or any

person for whose benefit it is held by him, either for residential

purposes or for purposes of any profession, trade or calling, or

where the landlord is the trustee of a public charitable trust, for

the objects of the trust.”

13.A perusal of the statutory framework of the Act, 2021 shows that

the legislature has employed language materially different from that

contained in the erstwhile enactment of the Act no. 13 of 1972. The

provision does not incorporate expressions such as “bona fide

requirement” or any reference to comparative hardship, which were

integral to the earlier regime. This change in phraseology assumes

significance while construing the scope and ambit of the provision.

14.The manner in which Section 21(2)(m) is structured indicates that

the emphasis is placed on the requirement of the premises by the

landlord for occupation, either in its existing form or after demolition

and reconstruction. The absence of additional qualifying expressions

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suggests that the provision is intended to be applied on its own terms, in

accordance with the language employed by the legislature.

15.The grounds urged by the petitioner have been duly considered.

16.The submission that the authorities below failed to consider the

actual requirement of the landlord and ignored the availability of

alternative accommodations cannot be accepted. Under Section 21(2)(m)

of the Act, 2021, the landlord is only required to demonstrate that the

premises are required for his occupation, either in its existing form or

after demolition. The earlier requirement of proving “bona fide need” or

undertaking a comparative assessment of hardship, as contemplated

under U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972, has been consciously omitted. The Court

cannot reintroduce such considerations, and consequently, the plea

regarding alternative accommodation or absence of pressing need is not

relevant for adjudication under the present statute.

17.The further contention that the landlord must still establish a

higher threshold of genuine or actual need is equally misconceived. The

exclusion of the expression “bona fide requirement” has materially

altered the legal position, and the statutory obligation stands satisfied

once the landlord asserts and demonstrates that the premises are required

for his occupation. In the present case, such requirement has been

specifically pleaded, and there is no substantive material brought on

record by the petitioner to dislodge the same. In the absence of any

credible rebuttal, the requirement stands established within the meaning

of Section 21(2)(m).

18.The allegation that the Rent Tribunal has dismissed the appeal in a

mechanical manner also does not merit acceptance. Both the Rent

Authority and the Rent Tribunal have recorded concurrent findings of

fact regarding the requirement of the landlord. Non-consideration of

aspects which are no longer germane under the statutory scheme would

not render the orders as mechanical or indicative of non-application of

mind. The findings are based on the pleadings and material on record

and do not suffer from perversity.

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19.The contention that omission of the words “bona fide

requirement” would allow eviction without pleadings or evidence is also

misplaced. The statute still requires the landlord to plead and

demonstrate his requirement; however, once such assertion remains

unrebutted by any cogent material from the tenant, the authorities are

justified in allowing the application. The provision does not envisage

any inquiry beyond the limited requirement so prescribed.

20.It is also pertinent that the eviction application was filed, inter

alia, under Section 21(2)(m) of the Act, 2021, specifically asserting

personal requirement of the landlord. The Rent Authority has allowed

the application solely on this ground, without passing any order

regarding arrears of rent, which clearly indicates that eviction has been

directed only on the basis of personal requirement as contemplated under

the said provision. The authorities below have, thus, acted strictly within

the confines of the statutory framework.

21.Reliance has been placed by the petitioner on Phiroze Bamanji

Desai (supra) to contend that the expression “requires” must necessarily

be construed to mean an element of actual need as distinguished from a

mere desire, and that such requirement must be established on the

touchstone of bona fide necessity along with other considerations such

as comparative hardship. The said decision was rendered in the context

of the Section 13(1)(g) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House

Rates Control Act, 1947, which provides that a landlord shall be entitled

to recover possession of any premises if the Court is satisfied that the

premises are “reasonably and bona fide required” by the landlord for

occupation by himself or by any person for whose benefit the premises

are held, or where the landlord is a trustee of a public charitable trust,

that the premises are required for occupation for the purposes of the

trust.

22.The principle relied upon by petitioner, arises from a statutory

framework materially different from the one governing the present case.

Under Section 21(2)(m) of the Act, 2021, the legislature has consciously

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omitted the requirement of proving “bona fide requirement” and has also

done away with any inquiry into comparative hardship. The scope of

examination, therefore, stands confined to whether the premises are

required by the landlord for his occupation. In view of this clear

legislative departure, the interpretation of the expression “requires” as

laid down in the aforesaid judgment, which is rooted in a different

statutory context, cannot be applied to proceedings under the Act, 2021.

23.Reliance placed by the respondent on Bhuwalka Steel Industries

Ltd. (supra) is to emphasize the principle of statutory interpretation that

where the language of a provision is clear and unambiguous, it must be

given its plain meaning and no external aids or interpretative additions

can be resorted to; further, that the Court cannot supply a casus omissus

where the legislature has consciously omitted certain expressions. The

relevant extract from the judgment is as follows:

“44. It must, at this juncture, be noted that in spite of Section

2(11), which included the words “but for the provisions of this

Act is not adequately protected by legislation for welfare and

benefits of the labour force in the State”, these precise words

were removed by the legislature and the definition was made

limited as it has been finally legislated upon. It is to be noted that

when the Bill came to be passed and received the assent of the

Vice-President on 5-6-1969 and was first published in the

Maharashtra Government Gazette Extraordinary, Part IV on 13-

6-1969, the aforementioned words were omitted. Therefore, this

would be a clear pointer to the legislative intent that the

legislature being conscious of the fact and being armed with all

the Committee reports and also being armed with the factual

data, deliberately avoided those words. What the appellants are

asking was to read in that definition, these precise words, which

were consciously and deliberately omitted from the definition.

That would amount to supplying the casus omissus and we do

not think that it is possible, particularly, in this case. The law of

supplying the casus omissus by the courts is extremely clear and

settled that though this Court may supply the casus omissus, it

would be in the rarest of the rare cases and thus supplying of this

casus omissus would be extremely necessary due to the

inadvertent omission on the part of the legislature. But, that is

certainly not the case here.”

24.In Bhuwalka Steel Industries Ltd. (supra), the Supreme Court

reiterated the settled principle of statutory interpretation that where the

legislature has consciously omitted certain words from the final

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enactment, such omission is indicative of deliberate legislative intent,

and it is not open to the Court to read those words back into the

provision, as doing so would amount to supplying a casus omissus. It

was also observed that such judicial supplementation is permissible only

in the rarest of cases where the omission is clearly inadvertent, and not

where it is deliberate. The judgment thus underscores that a provision

must be interpreted as it stands, and neither expanded nor curtailed by

importing considerations which the legislature has consciously chosen to

exclude.

25. The principle relating to casus omissus is well settled. In State of

Jharkhand v. Govind Singh

7

, the Supreme Court held that a casus

omissus cannot be supplied by the Court except in a case of clear

necessity and when such necessity is discernible from the four corners of

the statute itself. It was further observed that a casus omissus ought not

to be readily inferred, nor can the Court, under the guise of

interpretation, create or fill in omissions in the statutory scheme, as that

would amount to legislating. The Court emphasized that statutory

provisions must be construed as a whole so as to give effect to the

legislative intent, and unless the language leads to manifest absurdity or

defeats the object of the enactment, it is not open to the Court to read

into the statute words which are not there. Relevant portion of the

judgment is as follows:

21. Two principles of construction — one relating to casus

omissus and the other in regard to reading the statute as a whole

— appear to be well settled. Under the first principle a casus

omissus cannot be supplied by the court except in the case of

clear necessity and when reason for it is found in the four

corners of the statute itself but at the same time a casus omissus

should not be readily inferred and for that purpose all the parts of

a statute or section must be construed together and every clause

of a section should be construed with reference to the context

and other clauses thereof so that the construction to be put on a

particular provision makes a consistent enactment of the whole

statute. This would be more so if literal construction of a

particular clause leads to manifestly absurd or anomalous results

which could not have been intended by the legislature. “An

intention to produce an unreasonable result”, said Danckwerts,

L.J. in Artemiou v. Procopiou [(1966) 1 QB 878 : (1965) 3 All

7(2005) 10 SCC 437

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ER 539 : (1965) 3 WLR 1011 (CA)] (All ER p. 544 I), “is not to

be imputed to a statute if there is some other construction

available”. Where to apply words literally would “defeat the

obvious intention of the legislation and produce a wholly

unreasonable result”, we must “do some violence to the words”

and so achieve that obvious intention and produce a rational

construction. [Per Lord Reid in Luke v. IRC [1963 AC 557 :

(1963) 1 All ER 655 : (1963) 2 WLR 559 (HL)] where at AC p.

577 (All ER p. 664 I) he also observed:“This is not a new

problem, though our standard of drafting is such that it rarely

emerges.”]

22. It is then true that, “when the words of a law extend not to

an inconvenience rarely happening, but due to those which often

happen, it is good reason not to strain the words further than they

reach, by saying it is casus omissus, and that the law intended

quae frequentius accidunt”. “But”, on the other hand, “it is no

reason, when the words of a law do enough extend to an

inconvenience seldom happening, that they should not extend to

it as well as if it happened more frequently, because it happens

but seldom”. (See Fenton v. Hampton [(1858) 11 Moo PC 347 :

6 WR 341] .) A casus omissus ought not to be created by

interpretation, save in some case of strong necessity. Where,

however, a casus omissus does really occur, either through the

inadvertence of the legislature, or on the principle quod semel

aut bis existit praetereunt legislatores, the rule is that the

particular case, thus left unprovided for, must be disposed of

according to the law as it existed before such statute — casus

omissus et oblivioni datus dispositioni communis juris

relinquitur; “a casus omissus”, observed Buller, J. in Jones v.

Smart [ ITR 44 : 99 ER 963] (TR at p. 52 : ER at p. 967), “can in

no case be supplied by a court of law, for that would be to make

laws”.

26.In view of the aforesaid principles laid down by the Supreme

Court, it is clear that statutory provisions must be interpreted on the basis

of their plain language, and the Court cannot read into them words or

conditions which the legislature has consciously omitted. Applying the

same to Section 21(2)(m) of the Act, 2021, once the legislature has

deliberately excluded the expression “bona fide requirement” and any

element of comparative hardship, it is not open to the Court to import

such requirements under the guise of interpretation. Any attempt to

reintroduce notions of “genuine,” “pressing,” or “bona fide” while

construing the expression “required” under Section 21(2) (m) would

amount to supplying a casus omissus, which is impermissible. The

provision must, therefore, be given effect as it stands, confining the

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inquiry strictly to whether the premises are required by the landlord for

his occupation.

27. A useful exposition of the meaning of the expression “requires” is

found in the decision of the Court of Appeal in Ireland v. Taylor

8

wherein it was observed that the term “requires” is satisfied if the

landlord establishes a genuine intention to occupy the premises, and does

not necessarily import an element of reasonableness or need. It was

further held that, so long as the intention of the landlord is real and not a

mere pretence, it is not for the Court to examine the reasonableness of

such intention or to substitute its own assessment in place thereof. The

Court clarified that the word “requires” cannot be equated with

“reasonably requires” or “needs,” and that the inquiry is confined to the

genuineness of the landlord’s intention to occupy. It is pertinent to refer

to the observations of Lord Tucker :

“The evidence of Mr. Taylor, one of the landlords, was that he

required possession of the house so that he might use the large

lounge as a studio for portrait painting, for which purpose it was

suitable by reason of its size and lighting…...If Mr. Taylor, in

fact, desires to get possession of this house and genuinely

intends to use it for this purpose I can see no ground for saying

that he does not "require" it within the meaning of sub-para. (i)

of para. (8) of sub-s. (3) of s. 5, which contains the words "the

premises are required for occupation by himself." If he required

it for this purpose, then his wife who was living with him clearly

also required it apart altogether from the other reasons which sho

gave in evidence some of which clearly could not be

substantiated. The referee had interpreted the word "required" as

if it meant "needed," somewhat on the lines of the words

"reasonably required”. …….in my opinion, in this part of the

section the landlord must be the sole arbiter of his own

requirements, provided he proves that he, in fact, desires

possession and genuinely intends to occupy.”

In the same decision, Somervell, L. J has observed that

“The referee in his report construed "requires" as meaning

"needs," and came to the conclusion that the landlords did not

need this large house. …...The learned judge did not regard

"requires" as meaning "reasonably requires or needs," but as a

somewhat stronger word than "intends". …….In Clift v. Taylor,

it is said that any real ambiguity of language ought to be

resolved in favour of maintaining common law rights. I doubt if

there is any real ambiguity. "Requires" may, of course, have

different senses in different contexts. In its present context it is, I

8[1949] 1 K.B. 300

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think, satisfied if a landlord establishes, as these landlords did,

that he wants and intends to occupy the premises. Apart from the

Act that is his common law right, If the legislature had intended

to place some burden on him of establishing that he was

reasonable or not unreasonable in requiring what was his own,

plain words would have been used. Of course, if a court came to

the conclusion that the evidence of intention was false and that

the landlord did not genuinely intend to occupy the premises, the

claim would fail. There is, however, no trace of any finding to

this effect. On this view it is unnecessary to consider the

question of "reasonableness."

28. The aforesaid observations unequivocally demonstrate that the

expression “requires” does not import an obligation upon the landlord to

establish reasonableness or necessity in an objective sense, but is

satisfied once a genuine and bona fide intention to occupy the premises

is established. The Court expressly disapproved of substituting judicial

assessment in place of the landlord’s own requirement and held that, so

long as the intention is real and not a mere pretence, the landlord is the

sole arbiter of his requirement. The enquiry, therefore, stands confined to

the genuineness of the intention, and not its reasonableness.

29.Reliance placed by the petitioner on Shiv Sarup Gupta (supra) is

misplaced and distinguishable. The said judgment was rendered in the

context of Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, which

specifically governs eviction on the ground of bona fide residential

requirement, coupled with the statutory condition that the landlord must

not have any other reasonably suitable residential accommodation. The

legislative framework under the Delhi Act is thus materially different.

30.In a recent decision of this Court, in Mahesh Chandra Agarwal

(supra), it has been observed that under Section 21(2)(m) of the Act,

2021, the landlord is only required to demonstrate that the premises are

needed for his own occupation, and the earlier requirement of

establishing “bona fide need” or undertaking any comparative

assessment of hardship, as was contemplated under the repealed Act of

1972, no longer survives. It was further held that once the requirement of

the landlord for personal occupation is established and remains

uncontroverted, there is no scope for interference with the orders of

eviction passed by the authorities below.

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31. A similar position has been noted by this Court in Ganga Sagar

Sethi (supra), wherein it was observed that with the enforcement of the

U.P. Regulation of Urban Premises Tenancy Act, 2021, the earlier regime

under U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 stood materially altered. The Court took

note of the legislative shift whereby the requirement of establishing

“bona fide need” and undertaking a comparative assessment of hardship

has been consciously done away with, and the statutory focus now

stands confined to the “requirement” of the landlord. It was held that in

view of the clear legislative intent, the Rent Authority is required to

adjudicate the claim strictly within the framework of Section 21(2)(m) of

the Act, 2021, without importing considerations of bona fide need or

comparative hardship as were applicable under the repealed enactment.

32. The Act of 2021 marks a paradigm shift from the earlier regime

under the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972, particularly in the matter of eviction

on the ground of landlord’s requirement. While the earlier enactment

mandated a rigorous inquiry into “bona fide requirement” coupled with a

comparative assessment of hardship between the landlord and the tenant,

the present Act consciously departs from that framework.

33. The scheme of Section 21(2)(m) of the Tenancy Act, 2021, when

read in its plain and unambiguous terms, makes it evident that the

legislature has departed from the earlier statutory framework. Unlike the

provisions contained in the erstwhile U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972, the

requirement of establishing bona fide need coupled with comparative

hardship is conspicuously absent. The legislative intent, therefore,

appears to be to simplify the ground of eviction by requiring the landlord

to merely demonstrate that the premises are required for his occupation.

34.The omission of the expression “bona fide requirement” assumes

significance and materially alters the nature of adjudication under the

present enactment. Consequently, the scope of inquiry stands confined to

examining whether the requirement of the landlord for occupation of the

premises is made out, either in its existing form or after reconstruction.

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35. This evident shift is reflected in the legislative omission of

expressions such as “bona fide requirement” and in the complete

absence of any provision mandating a comparative hardship analysis.

Such omissions cannot be treated as accidental; rather, they signify a

conscious legislative intent to narrow the scope of adjudication.

36. It is a settled principle of statutory interpretation that the Court

cannot supply a casus omissus. An omission in the statute cannot be

filled by judicial interpretation unless such necessity is evident from the

scheme of the Act itself. The Court must construe the provision as it

stands and give effect to the legislative intent as expressed, without

adding or subtracting words. Where the legislature has consciously

omitted a requirement, it is not open to the Court to reintroduce it under

the guise of interpretation. Any such exercise would amount to

legislating, which lies beyond the judicial function. Accordingly, the

statutory provision must be applied in its plain terms, and no additional

conditions can be read into it by implication.

37. In view of the altered statutory position, the Court is not required

to undertake a comparative assessment of hardship between the parties,

nor is it expected to scrutinize the degree or genuineness of the need in

the manner contemplated under the repealed enactment. The jurisdiction

is limited to ascertaining the existence of the requirement as pleaded by

the landlord.

38. In the absence of the expression “bona fide requirement,” the

landlord is only required to demonstrate that the premises are needed for

his occupation, either in its existing form or after demolition. Once such

requirement is duly asserted, the onus shifts upon the tenant to

specifically deny the same and substantiate such denial with cogent

material. A mere bald or vague plea would not suffice to rebut the

statutory ground.

39. Consequently, the nature of adjudication under the Act, 2021

stands fundamentally altered. The focus is no longer on testing the

degree, urgency, or genuineness of the landlord’s need in comparison

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with the tenant’s hardship, but is limited to examining whether the

requirement, as pleaded, exists. Once such requirement is established

and remains unrebutted by cogent material, the statutory ground for

eviction stands satisfied.

40.In the present case, though a denial of the landlord’s requirement

has been set up in the pleadings, the same remains unsubstantiated. No

substantive material has been brought on record, either before the

authorities below or before this Court, to dislodge the claim that the

premises are required for personal occupation. The pleadings, in this

regard, lack material particulars and are not supported by any credible

evidence in rebuttal. Consequently, the defence raised by the tenant does

not create any real or substantial doubt as to the genuineness of the

landlord’s requirement.

41. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds that the orders

passed by the Rent Authority and the Rent Tribunal are in consonance

with the statutory scheme of Section 21(2)(m) of the Act, 2021 and do

not suffer from any perversity, illegality, or jurisdictional error. The

requirement of the landlord having been duly established within the

limited scope of the provision, and there being no material on record to

dislodge the same, no ground for interference is made out in exercise of

supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

42.Learned counsel, at this stage, has sought an indulgence, praying

for an additional time of eight months to vacate the premises in question.

43.Counsel appearing for the respondent submits that he has no

objection to the prayer so made by the petitioner.

44.Having regard to the aforesaid and in view of the request so made

by counsel for the petitioner, while dismissing the petition, this Court

grants eight months' time to the petitioner to vacate and handover

peaceful possession of the premises in question, to respondent-landlord,

on or before 2nd December, 2026, subject to the following conditions:

(i) The tenant-petitioner shall file an undertaking before the Rent

Authority, Kanpur Nagar, to the effect that he shall handover peaceful

16

A 227 No.3045 of 2026

possession of the premises in question, to the respondent-landlord on or

before 2

nd

December, 2026;

(ii) The said undertaking shall be filed within a period of two weeks

from today; and

(iii) The tenant-petitioner shall also regularly deposit a monthly

amount of Rs.2000/- towards 'use and occupation charges' by the 7th day

of each month, during the period of extended occupation.

45.It is made clear that in the event of default in compliance of any of

the aforesaid conditions, the protection granted by this Court, shall stand

vacated automatically and it shall be open to the respondent-landlord to

seek execution of the order passed in the Rent Case in accordance with

law.

46.Subject to the aforesaid directions, the petition stands dismissed.

(Dr. Yogendra Kumar Srivastava, J.)

April 2, 2026

RKK/-