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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 

CIVIL APPEAL No.9412    OF 2019

(Arising out of SLP(C) No. 30061 of 2017)

SIRAJ AHMAD    ...APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR.     .... RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T  

Leave granted.

2. Heard the learned Counsels for the parties. 

3. The appeal challenges the Judgment and Order dated

11.09.2017,   passed   by   the   division  bench   of   Allahabad

High   Court   in   W.P.(Service   Bench)   No.   1020   of   2015,

thereby dismissing the Writ Petition filed by appellant. 

4. The facts giving rise to the present appeal are as

under:

The appellant was appointed on ad­hoc basis on the

post of Junior Engineer in the pay scale of Rs. 485­860/­

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by order dated 30.03.1987, issued by Respondent No. 1. It

is not in dispute that the said Order was issued with prior

approval of the Governor of Uttar Pradesh. It is also not in

dispute, that the said appointment was made after the post

was   advertised   and   after   the   appellant   underwent   the

selection   process   conducted   by   the   State   under   the

provisions   of   U.P.   Development   Authorities   Centralized

Services   Rules,   1985   (hereinafter   referred   as   “the   said

Rules”). Pursuant to the selection and appointment, the

appellant joined with the Agra Development Authority on

08.04.1987. While in service the appellant obtained the

degree   in   B.Sc.­Engineering   from   Aligarh   Muslim

University, Aligarh on 08.06.1987. The appellant thereafter

through proper channel communicated the respondents the

fact regarding obtaining of requisite qualification and being

eligible   for   consideration   for   promotion,   to   the   post   of

Assistant Engineer (Civil), in the Centralised Services under

Sub Rule (3) of Rule 24 of the said Rules. It is the case of

the   appellant,   that   the   State   Government   had   sought

information   from   all   the   Development   Authorities   vide

communication   dated   25.09.1987   with   regard   to   the

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number   of   Junior   Engineers   possessing   the   degree   of

Bachelor of Engineering / A.M.I.E. In compliance to the

said   communication   the   Vice­Chairman   of   Agra

Development Authority informed the State Government that

in   Agra   Development   Authority   appellant   was   the   only

Junior   Engineer,   who   was   possessing   the   degree   of

Bachelor of Engineering.

5. Since   the   appellant   was   not   promoted,   he   made

various representations to the State seeking promotion. The

appellant had claimed the promotion from 18.01.1995, i.e.

the   date   on   which   the   juniors   to   the   appellant   were

promoted. The appellant’s claim for promotion came to be

rejected on 16.04.2015. Hence the appellant approached

the   division   bench   of   the   High   Court   by   way   of   Writ

Petition.   The   petition   came   to   be   rejected.   Hence,   the

present appeal.

6. Shri P.S. Patwalia, learned Senior Counsel appearing

on behalf of appellant submits, that the appellant’s services

already stood regularised from 23.11.2002 and as such in

view of the law laid down by the Constitution Bench of this

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Court in the case of Direct Recruit Class – II Engineering

Officers   Association   vs.   State   of   Maharashtra   and

others

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,  the   appellant   was   entitled   for   promotion   by

treating  his   continuous   service   from   the   date   of   initial

appointment.

7. The learned Senior Counsel further submits that, as

a matter of fact the Allahabad High Court itself, in the case

of  Rajendra   Prasad   Dwivedi   vs.   State   of   U.P.   and

others

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, vide judgment and order dated 19.08.2011, had

directed the State Government to consider the case of said

Shri   Dwivedi   for   promotion   to   the   post   of   Assistant

Engineer after completion of 10 years of service as Junior

Engineer, provided they had a B.E./A.M.I.E. degree. 

8. It is further submitted, that vide subsequent Order

dated 09.11.2011, the Allahabad High Court had modified

its Order in view of the Judgment of the Constitution Bench

of   this   Court   in  Direct   Recruitment   of   Class   –   II

Engineering Officers Association  (supra), wherein it is

observed, that the petitioner therein, i.e. Rajendra Prasad

11990 (2) SCC 715

2Writ Petition No. 3421 of 1996

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Dwivedi,   became   eligible   for   promotion   to   the   post   of

Assistant Engineer as soon as he obtained qualification of

A.M.I.E. in 1993. He submits, that vide said Order, it was

held that if the promotion was given to any other Junior

Engineer, junior to the petitioner therein, the petitioner

therein was also eligible for promotion from the said date

along   with   consequential   benefits.   The   learned   Senior

Counsel submits that the learned Single Judge who passed

the Order in the case of Rajendra Prasad Dwivedi was the

same   learned   Judge   heading   the   bench   in   the   case   of

present appellant and, as such, there was no reason as to

why the appellant ought not to have been given the same

benefit.

9. Per contra, Mr. V. Shekhar, learned Senior Counsel,

appearing on behalf of the State submits that, under the

rules it was necessary that the appointment was made with

concurrence   of   U.P.   Public   Service   Commission.   He

submits, undisputedly the appellant’s appointment was not

made   with   the  concurrence  of   U.P.   Public   Service

Commission. It is therefore  submitted, that as such the

appellant’s appointment will have to be termed as illegal.

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He   therefore   submits,   that   the   High   Court   has   rightly

refused  to   take   into   consideration  the   services   of   the

appellant, prior to the date on which his services came to

be regularised. 

10.The facts in the present case are not in dispute.

Undisputedly the appellant’s initial appointment in the year

1987 was after the advertisement was issued for the posts

in Centralised Services constituted under the said Rules. It

is also not in dispute, that the appellant was selected after

he underwent the entire selection process by competing

with other persons, who had also applied for the said post.

The  only issue  that   the  learned Judges  of  the  division

bench   have   found   against   the   appellant   is   that   the

appellant’s selection was not made in due consultation with

the U.P. Public Service Commission.

11.This court in the case of State of M.P. and ors. vs.

Lalit Kumar Verma

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,  after considering the Judgment of

Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of  Secy.,

State of Karnataka vs. Uma Devi(3)

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, observed thus :

3(2007)1 SCC 575

4 (2006) 4 SCC 1

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“12. The   question   which,   thus,   arises   for

consideration,   would   be:   Is   there   any   distinction

between   “irregular   appointment”   and   “illegal

appointment”? The distinction between the two terms

is apparent. In the event the appointment is made in

total disregard of the constitutional scheme as also

the recruitment rules framed by the employer, which

is “State” within the meaning of Article 12 of the

Constitution of India, the recruitment would be an

illegal   one;   whereas   there   may   be   cases   where,

although,   substantial   compliance   with   the

constitutional scheme as also the rules have been

made, the appointment may be irregular in the sense

that some provisions of some rules might not have

been strictly adhered to.”

12.It can thus be seen that this court has held that the

distinction   between   irregular   appointment   and   illegal

appointment is clear. It has been held that in the event

appointment is made in total disregard to the constitutional

scheme and the recruitment rules framed by the employer,

where the employer is a  “State”  within the meaning  of

Article 12 of the Constitution of India, the recruitment will

be   illegal   one.   It   has   however   been   held,   that   where

although, substantial compliance with the constitutional

scheme, as also the rules have been made, the appointment

would become irregular in as much as the some provisions

of some rules have been adhered to. 

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13.Subsequently another bench of this Court in the case

of State of Karnataka and Others vs. M. L. Kesari and

Others

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  also had an occasion to consider the issue. The

Court observed thus :  

“7. It is evident from the above that there is an

exception   to   the   general   principles   against

“regularisation” enunciated in Umadevi (3) [(2006) 4

SCC 1] , if the following conditions are fulfilled:

(i) The employee concerned should have worked

for 10 years or more in duly sanctioned post without

the benefit or protection of the interim order of any

court   or   tribunal.   In   other   words,   the   State

Government   or   its   instrumentality   should   have

employed the employee and continued him in service

voluntarily   and   continuously   for   more   than   ten

years.

(ii) The appointment of such employee should not

be illegal, even if irregular. Where the appointments

are not made or continued against sanctioned posts

or where the persons appointed do not possess the

prescribed   minimum   qualifications,   the

appointments will be considered to be illegal. But

where the person employed possessed the prescribed

qualifications and was working against sanctioned

posts, but had been selected without undergoing the

process   of   open   competitive   selection,   such

appointments are considered to be irregular.”

14.This court held, that where the appointment are not

made or continued against sanctioned posts or where the

5(2010) 9 SCC 247

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persons appointed do not possess the prescribed minimum

qualifications, the appointment will be considered to be

illegal. However, when the person employed possessed the

prescribed   qualifications   and   is   working   against   the

sanctioned   posts,   but   had   been   selected   without

undergoing the process of open competitive selection, such

appointments are considered to be irregular. 

15.As already discussed herein above, the appellant had

applied in pursuance to the advertisement issued by State

for   the   post   in   the   Centralised   Services   under   the

provisions of the said rules. The appellant had participated

in the selection process along with the other competitors.

The appellant  was  possessing the requisite  qualification

and   was   selected   after   competing   with   others   and   was

appointed against the sanctioned posts for a period of One

year.   Undisputedly   the   appellant   thereafter   has

continuously   rendered   his   services,   till   the   date   of

regularisation of his services i.e. on 23.11.2002 and even

thereafter till date. As such appellant’s case would be on a

much   better   pedestal   that   the   one   which   fall   for

consideration in the case of M.L. Kesari (Supra).

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16.It can thus be seen that the only issue which is

found against the appellant is that prior to appointment

there   was   no   concurrence   of   the   U.P.   Public   Service

Commission. It can thus be seen that the appointment of

the appellant at the most can be termed as irregular and

not illegal.

17.It   will   be   apposite   to   refer   to   the   following

observations of the constitution bench judgment of this

Court in the case of Direct Recruit Class II Engineering

Officers Association  (supra), the constitution bench has

observed thus 

“13. When   the   cases   were   taken   up   for   hearing

before us, it was faintly suggested that the principle

laid down in Patwardhan case [(1977) 3 SCC 399:

1977   SCC   (L&S)   391:   (1977)   3   SCR   775]   was

unsound and fit to be overruled, but no attempt was

made   to   substantiate   the   plea.   We   were   taken

through the judgment by the learned counsel for the

parties   more   than   once   and   we   are   in   complete

agreement with the ratio decidendi, that the period of

continuous officiation by a government servant, after

his appointment by following the rules applicable for

substantive   appointments,   has   to   be   taken   into

account for determining his seniority; and seniority

cannot   be   determined   on   the   sole   test   of

confirmation, for, as was pointed out, confirmation is

one   of   the   inglorious   uncertainties   of   government

service   depending   neither   on   efficiency   of   the

incumbent   nor   on   the   availability   of   substantive

vacancies.   The   principle   for   deciding   inter   se

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seniority has to conform to the principles of equality

spelt   out   by   Articles   14   and   16.   In Baleshwar

Dass v. State of U.P. [(1980) 4 SCC 226: 1980 SCC

(L&S)   531:   (1981)   1   SCR   449]   and Delhi   Water

Supply   and   Sewage   Disposal   Committee v. R.K.

Kashyap [1989 Supp (1) SCC 194: 1989 SCC (L&S)

253:   (1989)   9   ATC   784]   ,   with   which   we   are   in

agreement.   In Narender   Chadha v. Union   of

India [(1986)   2   SCC   157:   1986   SCC   (L&S)   226:

(1986)   1   SCR   211]   the   officers   were   promoted

although without following the procedure prescribed

under the rules, but they continuously worked for

long   periods   of   nearly   15­20   years   on   the   posts

without   being   reverted.   The   period   of   their

continuous officiation was directed to be counted for

seniority as it was held that any other view would be

arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 16. There is

considerable force in this view also. We, therefore,

confirm the principle of counting towards seniority

the   period   of   continuous   officiation   following   an

appointment   made   in   accordance   with   the   rules

prescribed for regular substantive appointments in

the service.”

18.The constitution bench in unequivocal terms holds

that,   if   an   appointment   is   made   by   way   of   stopgap

arrangement  without   considering   the   claims   of   all   the

eligible   persons   and   without   following   the   rules   of

appointment, the experience of such appointment cannot

be   equated   with  the   experience   of   a   regular   appointee,

because   of   qualitative   difference   in   the   appointment.   It

however   holds,   that   if   the   appointment   is   made   after

considering the claims of all eligible candidates and the

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appointee continues in the post uninterruptedly till the

regularisation of his service in accordance with the rules

made for regular substantive appointments, there is no

reason   to   exclude   the   officiating   service   for   purpose   of

seniority.

19.The constitution bench concludes thus :

“47. To sum up, we hold that:

A)  Once an incumbent is appointed to a post

according to rule, his seniority has to be counted

from   the   date   of   his   appointment   and   not

according to the date of his confirmation. 

The corollary of the above rule is that

where the initial appointment is only ad hoc and

not according to rules and made as a stop­gap

arrangement, the officiation in such post cannot

be   taken   into   account   for   considering   the

seniority.

B)  If the initial appointment is not made by

following the procedure laid down by the rules

but   the   appointee   continues   in   the   post

uninterruptedly   till   the   regularisation   of   his

service in accordance with the rules, the period

of officiating service will be counted.

…….”

20.It can thus clearly be seen, that the Constitution

Bench   in   unequivocal   terms   holds   that,   if   the   initial

appointment is not made by following the procedure laid

down by the rules, but the appointee continues in the post

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uninterruptedly   till   the   regularisation   of   his   service   in

accordance with the rules, the period of officiating service

will be counted.  

21.It is not in dispute, that except the concurrence of

the U.P. Public Service Commission the appointment of the

appellant   has   been   made   after   following   the   procedure

prescribed   under   the   said   Rules.   The   appellant   has

uninterruptedly served till the regularisation of his service

which was made in accordance with the rules. It can thus

be   seen   that   the   case   of   present   appellant   is   squarely

covered by the judgment of the Constitution Bench in the

case   of  Direct   Recruit   Class   II   Engineering   Officers

Association (supra).

22.It is further to be noted that the Respondent had

issued an office memorandum dated 11.03.1994 thereby,

providing for relaxation of the condition which prescribed

minimum 10 years service in the post of Junior Engineer.

Schedule­3   to   the   said   Rules   provided,   that   for   being

eligible to the promotion of Assistant Engineer along with

the educational qualification a candidate must possess 10

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years service, in the post of Junior Engineer on 01

st

 July of

the selection year. By the said office memorandum, the

Government provided that 5% of the posts out of 50%

promotional   quota   are   to   be   reserved   by   extending

relaxation   to   such   of   the   Junior   Engineers,   who   have

passed B.E. or A.M.I.E. examination. It further provided,

that   in   case   candidates   possessing   B.E.   /   A.M.I.E.

examination were not available, the post should be filled in

from non Graduate Junior Engineers. As discussed herein

above, it is to be noted that the Government had also

sought information from the Development Authorities with

regard to the number of persons possessing the requisite

B.E.   /   A.M.I.E.   degree.   In   response   to   the   said

communication   the   Agra   Development   Authority   had

intimated the respondent state the name of the appellant

being the only person possessing the said qualification.

23.We further fail to appreciate as to how the same High

Court could have considered the case of two employees

differently when they were similarly circumstanced. It is not

in dispute that the present appellant as well as Rajendra

Prasad Dwivedi were selected through the same selection

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process though their orders of appointment differs. It will

be appropriate to refer to the observation  made  by the

Allahabad High Court in Writ Petition No. 3421 of 1996 in

the case of  Rajendra Prasad Dwivedi vs. State of U.P.

which reads thus:

“Upon perusal of the Government Orders dated 26th

of August, 1992 as well as 11th of March, 1994, I

find   force   in   the   submission   of   the   petitioner,

therefore,  I   am   of   the   view   that   as   soon   as   the

petitioner obtained the qualification of AMIE in 1993,

he   became   eligible   for   promotion   to   the   post   of

Assistant   Engineer.   Though   only   gaining   the

qualification does not create right of promotion, but I

am of the view that if thereafter any promotion has

been   given   to   others   particularly   junior   to   the

petitioner, the petitioner is liable to be considered for

promotion   from   the   said   date   alongwith

consequential benefits.

In   light   of   the   law   laid   down   by   the   Hon'ble

Supreme   Court,   in   the   case   referred   to   here­in­

above,  I hereby also observe that the fact that the

petitioner was not confirmed in the service, shall not

come in the way of the petitioner's promotion as an

impediment and the petitioners services even on ad

hoc basis on the post of Junior Engineer shall be

taken   into   consideration   for   the   purpose   of

promotion to the higher post. Accordingly a direction

is   issued   to   the   respondents   to   consider   the

petitioner's   case   for  promotion   to  the   higher   post

from the date of promotion of his junior within two

months, after receipt of a certified copy of this order”

(emphasis supplied)

24.The   above   judgment   of   the   learned   Single   Judge

dated 09.11.2011 was carried in appeal before the division

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bench   of   the   said   court.   The   division   bench   of   the

Allahabad High Court in Special Appeal No. 75 of 2012 in

State   of   U.P.   Vs.   R.   P.   Dwivedi  in   its   Order   dated

13.02.2014 observed thus:

“On due consideration of rival submissions, we find

considerable force in the arguments of respondent.

The   condition   of   length   of   ten   years'   service   was

relaxed. The respondent, though appointed on ad­

hoc basis as Junior Engineer on 24.02.1987, had

obtained the degree of AMIE on 10.10.1993 before

Sri   Sunil  Dutt   Sharma   and   Sri   Sajid   Hasan   who

passed the examination in 1994. As the vacancies

were   available   and   the   private   respondent   was

qualified to be considered for promotion in 1993, he

should   have   been   considered   even   prior   to   the

aforesaid persons. ....”

(emphasis supplied)

25.The State had also carried the said matter by way of

Special   Leave   Petition  Civil   (CC)   No.   13830­31   of   2014

before this court. The SLP also came to be dismissed on

12.01.2015.   The   state   thereafter   preferred   a   Review

Petition, seeking review of the Judgment of division bench

in the case of State of U.P. vs. Rajendra Prasad Dwivedi

by way of Review Petition No. 188 of 2015. The said Review

Petition is also dismissed.

26.The   only   ground   on   which   the   High   Court   has

refused to consider the case of the appellant is that in the

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case   of   Rajendra   Prasad   Dwivedi,   the   court   had   not

considered the issue with regard to non­concurrence of the

U.P. Public Service Commission. At the cost of repetition as

discussed herein above the appointment of the appellant at

the most can be considered as irregular and not illegal.

27. It is to be noted that the appellant has obtained

the Bachelor of Science (Engineering) degree in the year

1987 and though Rajendra Prasad Dwivedi had obtained

the A.M.I.E. in 1993, taking into consideration that Sunil

Dutt Sharma and Sajid Hasan had obtained the degree of

A.M.I.E. in 1994, the said Rajendra Prasad Dwivedi was

held to be entitled for promotion on 18.01.1995 i.e. the date

on which the said Sajid Hasan and Sunil Dutt Sharma were

promoted as Assistant Engineer from Junior Engineer. We

fail to appreciate the approach of the High Court in denying

the promotion to the appellant when all the other three i.e.

namely Rajendra Prasad Dwivedi, Sajid Hasan and Sunil

Dutt Sharma were appointed in the year 1987 through the

same   selection   process   and   though   Rajendra   Prasad

Dwivedi had obtained the degree in 1993 and Sajid Hasan

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and Sunil Dutt Sharma had obtained the same in 1994

whereas   the   appellant  had   obtained   the  said   degree  in

1987. 

28. It could thus be seen that, in view of the office

memorandum dated 11.03.1994, the appellant was entitled

to be promoted immediately after the issuance of the said

office memorandum as he possessed the requisite degree

when the said office memorandum was issued. In any case

the appellant is entitled to be promoted with effect from

18.01.1995 i.e. the date on which the juniors to him were

promoted. 

29.As already discussed, the non­concurrence with the

U.P. Public Service Commission, at the most would make

the appointment of the appellant irregular and not illegal.

We are therefore of the considered view that the High Court

erred in dismissing the petition of the appellant. The appeal

deserves to succeed on more than one ground.

30.Hence, the following order: 

(i)The appeal is allowed;

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(ii)The Judgment and Order passed by the High

Court   dated   11.09.2017   is   quashed   and   set

aside;

(iii)The  Order  passed  by  the   Respondent   No.  1,

dated 16.04.2015 is quashed and set aside. 

(iv)It is held and declared that the petitioner is

entitled to promotion to the post of Assistant

Engineer   (Civil)   from   the   date   on   which   his

junior possessing the Bachelor of Engineering /

A.M.I.E.   has   been   promoted   with   all

consequential benefit.

(v)In the facts and circumstances, there shall be

no order as to costs.

…....................CJI.

                             [S.A. BOBDE]

......................J.

                                                  [B.R. GAVAI]

......................J.

                                                  [SURYA KANT]

NEW DELHI;

DECEMBER 13, 2019.