succession dispute, family property, inheritance law, civil law
0  24 Oct, 2019
Listen in 01:59 mins | Read in 21:00 mins
EN
HI

Sirdar K.B. Ramachandra Raj Urs. (Dead) Through Lrs Vs. Sarah C. Urs & Ors

  Supreme Court Of India Civil Appeal /6049/2007
Link copied!

Case Background

Bench

Applied Acts & Sections

No Acts & Articles mentioned in this case

Hello! How can I help you? 😊
Disclaimer: We do not store your data.
Document Text Version

1

REPORTABLE 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.6049 OF 2007

SIRDAR K.B. RAMACHANDRA RAJ URS. (DEAD)

THROUGH LRS.                ..APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

SARAH C. URS & ORS.                        ..RESPONDENT(S)

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO.6050 OF 2007

J U D G M E N T

ARUN MISHRA, J.

1.The appeals are preferred against the judgment and order dated

13.8.2007 passed by the High Court, affirming the judgment and order

of the trial court decreeing the suit filed by the plaintiff for specific

performance of an agreement of sale. 

2.The plaintiffs filed the suit concerning suit scheduled property

inherited by Princess Leelavathi, wife of late K. Basavaraja Urs.  She

had adopted the defendant No.1 and died during the year 1958­59.

The suit scheduled property along with adjoining properties devolved

on   late   K.   Basavaraja   Urs,   father   of   K.B.   Ramachandra   Raj   Urs,

2

defendant No.1, in terms of section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act,

1956. The Plaintiff Nos.1 and 2 were the close relatives and friend of

the family of late K. Basavaraja Urs and the 2

nd

  plaintiff apart from

being a close relative and friend of Defendant No.1, was also a Legal

Advisor and Advocate of late K. Basavaraja Urs.

3.The property was let out to plaintiff No.2 in the year 1969 by late

K. Basavaraja Urs and defendant No.1.  Late K. Basavaraja Urs and

defendant No.1 sold the adjoining property to various persons vide

registered sale deeds.  Late K. Basavaraja Urs offered to sell the suit

scheduled property to the plaintiffs.  On 24.4.1979, late K. Basavaraja

Urs, represented by his son, i.e., defendant No.1 as power of attorney,

entered into an agreement to sell with the plaintiffs for a consideration

of Rs.1,50,000/­ out of which a sum of Rs.1,00,000/­ was received on

the   same   day.   The   defendant   No.1   agreed   to   obtain   a   clearance

certificate under section 230­A of the Income Tax Act as also under the

provisions of the Urban Land Ceiling Act.  The plaintiffs continued to

have   the   possession   of   suit   property   in   part   performance   of   the

agreement dated 24.04.1979 and stopped paying rent.

4.The defendant No.1 always ensured the plaintiffs to execute the

registered   sale   deed   in   terms   of   suit   agreement after   obtaining   a

clearance certificate from the Income Tax Department and under the

3

Urban Land Ceiling Act. On 1.6.1993, defendant No.1 received the

balance   sale   consideration   of   Rs.50,000/­   from   2

nd

  plaintiff   and

executed   a   stamped   receipt   in   favour   of   the   plaintiffs   with   an

undertaking to execute the deed of conveyance.

5.The defendant No.1, made the correspondence with the Income

Tax Department to obtain the Income Tax clearance. However, the

need   to   seek   permission   under   the   Urban   Land   Ceiling   Authority

vanished as per the decision of this Court concerning section 27 of the

said Act as defendant No.1 was postponing to execute the registered

sale deed on one pretext or the other.  A legal notice dated 5.6.1990

was   served,   and   after   that,   the   suit   had   been   filed   on   19.9.1990

seeking specific performance.

6.Defendant Nos.1, 2, and 4 in their written statements contended

that the 2

nd

 plaintiff claimed to be a close relative of late K. Basavaraja

Urs.   He was his lawyer and self­assumed trustee. He obtained the

signatures   of   defendant   no.1   on   blank   papers,   which   has   been

misused by the 2

nd

 plaintiff to create the agreement in question dated

24.4.1979.  It was assured that agreement was obtained as a collateral

document   to   secure   professional   charges,   which,   according   to   the

plaintiff, remained unpaid.

7.The defendants denied the receipt of the sale consideration on

4

24.4.1979   and   1.6.1993   and   also   the   subsequent   correspondence

between plaintiff No.2 and defendant No.1 and his Tax Consultant.

The 2

nd

  plaintiff was never permitted to put up construction on the

property   by   the   defendant   No.1.     After   the   demise   of   Princess

Leelavathi, the suit property devolved on late K. Basavaraja Urs and

defendant No.1.  The 1

st

 defendant has not conveyed his interest in the

suit property in favour of plaintiffs.   Defendants contended that no

agreement was entered into with the plaintiffs. The suit is barred by

time.

8.Defendant No.5, in his written statement, took the plea that the

property being ancestral could not have been sold by defendant No.1 to

the detriment of the 5

th

 defendant.  There was no legal necessity to sell

the property. 

9.The trial court decreed the suit and recorded a finding that the

agreement has been executed on 24.4.1979. The defendant No.1 has

admitted his signatures on the suit agreement dated 24.4.1979 and

receipt dated 1.6.1983.  Defendant No.1 for himself and as a power of

attorney holder of late K. Basavaraja Urs, executed the suit agreement

and, therefore, he cannot be permitted to contend that he is not a

party to the suit agreement in his individual capacity.   They were

required to obtain an income tax clearance certificate and after that to

5

execute the registered sale deed, in which they have failed. Late K.

Basavaraja Urs owned vast landed and house properties at Bangalore

and   Mysore.   They   were   statutorily   bound   to   obtain   a   clearance

certificate from the Income Tax Department, and as they failed to

obtain it, they cannot be permitted to contend that suit is barred by

limitation. The High Court has affirmed the findings of the trial court.  

10.The High Court has disbelieved the case set up by defendant

No.1 that he had put his signatures on blank paper.  Plaintiff No.2 was

appointed   as   Judge   of   the   High   Court   during   September   1978;

therefore, on 24.4.1979, there was no fiduciary relationship between

them.  Plaintiffs have also produced the original stamped receipt dated

1.6.1983 (Exhibit P­19) admitting the receipt of remaining Rs.50,000

by defendants No.1 in which a sum of Rs.42,000 was paid in cash and

Rs.8,000   was   paid   by   cheque.   Defendant   No.1   had   admitted   his

signatures on Exh. P­19.  Defendant No.1 also admitted that he had

encashed the cheque. The plea of the 1

st

 defendant is false and thus

cannot be accepted. The High Court has also referred to the order

passed by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal wherein the claim of 2

nd

plaintiff for exemption of Rs.50,000 under the Income Tax Act, paid to

1

st

 defendant towards the remaining sale consideration was allowed in

terms of section 54(F) of Income Tax Act. 

6

11.The High Court has further found that the defendant has taken

an inconsistent and contrary stand. The defendant was visiting 2

nd

plaintiff   all   along   insisting   on   obtaining   Income   Tax   Clearance

Certificate, which was postponed by the defendant No.1 on one pretext

or the other. The consideration has been paid under the agreement

dated 24.4.1979.

12.The High Court has found that defendant No.1 has executed the

agreement not only as power of attorney for his father but also as a

son   of   late   K.   Basavaraja   Urs.     The   stand   of   defendant   No.1   is

inconsistent.   Defendant No.1, allowed the plaintiffs to put up the

construction   in   the   suit   property.   Thus,   he   was   precluded   from

contending that he was not a party to the agreement.  The High Court

has also held that defendant No.1 has entered into the agreement and

the   entire   consideration   has   been   received,   it   is   not   considered

appropriate to grant the liquidated damage or penalty for the breach of

contract. The High Court has also held that the property was held by

Princess Leelavathi, wife of late K. Basavaraja Urs, and after her death,

the suit property devolved on late K. Basavaraj Urs and defendant No.1

under section 15 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956.

13.It was submitted by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of

the appellants that plaintiff No.2, M.P. Chandrakanta Raj Urs, was

7

elevated as Judge of the High Court.  Earlier, he was the Legal Advisor

of the late K. Basavaraja Urs. Thus, he could not have purchased the

property.   The agreement was not duly executed, and the suit was

barred by limitation.  The findings have been recorded that property

was inherited by K.B. Ram Chandra Raj Urs, i.e., defendant No. 1 from

Princess Leelavathi.  The agreement was with late K. Basavaraja Urs

and   not   with   defendant   No.1.     Defendant   No.1   did   not   execute

agreement of his share.  The Courts below erred in decreeing the suit

in toto. The suit could have been decreed to the extent of the shares of

the late K. Basavaraja Urs.  

14.Learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents

has supported the judgment and decree passed by the courts below.  It

is further submitted that no case for interference is made out in the

appeals given the concurrent findings of facts recorded by the courts

below. The appeals deserve to be dismissed. 

15.We deem it appropriate to place on record that learned counsel

for the parties had taken time to file the compromise, if reached. We

have been informed that no compromise could be arrived at between

the parties.  Be that as it may.  We proceed to decide the appeals on

merits.

16.The   concurrent   findings   are   recorded   as   to   receipt   of

8

consideration and execution of the agreement to sell.   There is no

doubt about it that M.P. Chandrakanta Raj Urs (Plaintiff No.2) was

earlier a counsel and legal advisor to K. Basavaraja Urs, but when the

agreement had been executed, he was not a lawyer and became a

Judge   of   the   High   Court.   There   are   concurrent   findings   recorded

concerning the execution of the agreement, and it has been rightly

found established that signatures were not obtained on blank papers.

There   is   concurrent   finding   recorded   by   the   courts   below   that

consideration has been paid.  Thus, no case for interference is made

out in the aforesaid findings.

17.The courts below have found that correspondence was made by

defendants No.1 to obtain Income Tax clearance.  The suit has been

held not to be barred by limitation.   Given the facts and material

placed on record, no interference is called for with those findings also.

18.Learned senior counsel submitted that agreement to sell dated

24.4.1979 was between “late K. Basavaraja Urs and “Smt. Sarah C.

Urs', wife of M.P. Chandrakantaraj Urs and P. Chandrakantaraj Urs,

son of Late R. Putturaj Urs”. There was no dispute concerning 

½ share

of K.B. Ram Chandra Raj Urs, which he had inherited from Princess

Leelavathi.  Thus, the suit could not have been decreed in toto; it could

have been decreed only to the extent of the share of late K. Basavaraja

9

Urs in the property.  In support of his contention, he has relied upon

the   decision   of   this   Court   in  R.S.   Madanappa   (deceased)   v.

Chandramma & Anr., AIR 1965 SC 1812.

19.The statement of plaintiff No. 2 has been pointed out, indicating

that he was aware that there were equal shares of K. Basavaraja Urs

and   K.   B.   Ramchandra   Raj   Urs   (defendant   No.1)   in   the   property.

Thus, plaintiff No.2 cannot plead that they were induced by erroneous

belief while entering into agreement, by the conduct of defendant No.1.

The   plea   of   estoppel   is,   thus,   not   attracted.     There   is   no   proper

foundation   in   the   pleading   regarding   the   plea   of   estoppel.   The

submission raised by learned counsel on behalf of respondent is that

defendant No.1 acted as power of attorney holder of his father and

received the sale consideration also.  As such he is bound by the plea

of estoppel to contend to the contrary.

20.It is necessary to consider the agreement.   The agreement is

extracted hereunder:

“THIS AGREEMENT TO SELL is made on 24

th

day of April 1979

BETWEEN SRI K. BASAVARAJ URS, son of Late Sri Muddaraj

Urs, aged about 84 years, residing at 1-A (old No.5), Palace Road,

Bangalore – 560 001 (hereinafter referred to as the “VENDOR” which

expression shall unless the context otherwise required include the

heirs, assigns, administrators, successors and legal representatives of

the VENDOR) of the one part AND SMT. SARAH C. URS, the wife

of Sri M.P. Chandrakantaraj Urs and SRI P CHANDRAKANTARAJ

URS, son of late Sri R Putturaj Urs, residing at 1B Palace Road,

Bangalore – 560001, (hereinafter called the "PURCHASERS" which

expression shall unless the context otherwise requires to include their

heirs, assigns, administrators, successors and legal representatives of

10

the other part.

WHEREAS the VENDOR is the absolute owner of the property at

1B, Palace Road, Bangalore – 560001, an whereas the VENDOR is

desirous of disposing of the said house together with the plot of land,

fixtures, fittings, etc. of Rs.1,50,000/- (Rupees One Lakh Fifty

Thousand only) and the PURCHASERS are agreeable to buy the same

at the said price.

NOW THEREFORE, THIS DEED/ WITNESSETH AS FOLLOWS:

(1)That the VENDOR shall free from encumbrances the said property

situated at q-B Palace Road, Bangalore – 560 001, and the

PURCHASER shall buy the same at the said prices and on the

conditions hereinafter mentioned;

(2)That the said property consists of a single-storeyed house with the

following boundaries:-

On the EAST: No.1-C

On the WEST: Vacant land of VENDOR

On the NORTH: Storm Drain

On the SOUTH: By Common Road

(3)That the consideration of the house shall be payable as follows:-

A sum of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh Only) paid on the date of

this agreement and the balance of Rs.5,40,000/- (Rupees Fifty

Thousand only payable on or before 23.4.1984.

(4)The VENDOR has delivered possession of the house, which is the

subject matter of this agreement to the PURCHASERS on this day.

(5)This agreement shall subject to permission, express or implied, being

granted under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act. In the

event such permission is not granted, the advance of Rs.1,00,000/-

(Rupees One Lakh only) paid shall be refunded to the PURCHASERS

by the VENDOR:

(6)That in the event of the sale not materializing through the default of

the VENDOR, the amount of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh Only)

shall be refunded to the PURCHASERS with interest at 10 percent per

annum from the date hereof to the date of refund;

(7)That in the event of the sale not materializing through the default of

the PURCHASERS, 10 percent of the consideration money shall be

forfeited as earnest money and the balance refunded by the VENDOR

to the PURCHASERS out of the advance of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees

One lakh only) received by the former;

(8)VENDOR or his Power of Attorney shall cause all licences etc., to be

sanctioned for any additions or alterations to be made to the premise

before the actual transfer of title in terms of this agreement.

IN WITNESS where of the parties have set their hands the day and the

year first above mentioned.

Sd/-

SELLER

WITNESSES:

1.Sd/-

2.Sd/-

PURCHASERS”

11

A bare reading of the agreement described above makes it clear

that agreement is between late K. Basavaraja Urs through power of

attorney, K.B. Ramchandra Raj Urs.  The “Vendors” is mentioned as K.

Basavaraja Urs and not K.B. Ramchandra Raj Urs.  Thus, it cannot be

said that K.B. Ramchandra Raj Urs had executed the agreement on his

behalf, concerning his share in the property.   There is no whisper

about the same in the agreement.  The position mentioned above may

indicate that plaintiffs were misled by the Power of Attorney holder

that   only   late   K.   Basavaraja   Urs   was   the   exclusive   owner   of   the

property.  When we consider the statement of M.P Chandrakanta Raj

Urs (Plaintiff No.2), it clearly indicates that he was well aware of the

fact that Princess Leelavathi owned the property and upon her death

the property devolved upon, in equal shares and he was aware of the

other sale deeds executed (Exhs. P 43, P­44, P­45, P­46).  It is clear

that   plaintiff   No.2   was   aware   as   to   the   extant   title   of   K.B.   Ram

Chandra Raj Urs in the property and also the fact that it was a joint

family property.  In the plaint, the plaintiffs have not taken the plea of

estoppel, and now the case was set up that property had been sold by

defendant No.1 in his capacity without any such plea in the plaint.

Thus, plaintiff No.2 was well aware of the fact as to the title of K.B.

Ramchandra Raj Urs in the property and that late K. Basavaraja Urs

12

did not exclusively own the property.

21.The plea of estoppel in view the decision of this court in  R.S.

Madanappa (deceased) v. Chandramma & Anr. , (supra) is not attracted,

in which the Court has held that estoppel by conduct could not arise

when a person concerned knew the right position relating to the title in

property in his possession, he could not plead that he was induced to

hold an erroneous belief because of the conduct of real owner of that

property.  This court has observed thus: 

“6. We will consider the question of estoppel first. The conduct of the

first defendant from which the learned counsel wants us to draw the

inference of estoppel consists of her attitude when she was served

with a notice by the plaintiff, her general attitude respecting Bangalore

properties as expressed in the letter dated 17th January 1941, written

by her to her stepmother and the attestation by her and her husband on

3rd October 1944, of the will executed on 25th January 1941 by

Maddanappa. In the notice dated 26th January 1948, by the plaintiff’s

lawyer to the first defendant it was stated that the plaintiff and the first

defendant were joint owners of the suit properties which were in

possession of their father and requested for the cooperation of the first

defendant in order to effect the division of the properties. A copy of

this notice was sent to Maddanappa, and he sent a reply to it to the

plaintiff's lawyers. The first defendant, however, sent no reply at all.

We find it difficult to construe the conduct of the first defendant in not

replying to the notice and is not cooperating with the plaintiff in

instituting a suit for obtaining possession of the properties as

justifying the inference of estoppel. It does not mean that she

impliedly admitted that she had no interest in the properties. It is true

that in Ex. 15, which is a letter sent by her on 17th January 1941, to

her stepmother she has observed thus:

“I have no desire whatsoever in respect of the properties

which are at Bangalore. Everything belongs to my father. He has

the sole authority to do anything…. We give our consent to

anything done by our father. We will not do anything.”

But even these statements cannot assist the appellants because

admittedly, the father knew the true legal position. That is to

say; the father knew that these properties belonged to

Puttananjamma and that he had no authority to deal with these

properties. No doubt, in his written statement, Maddanappa had

13

set up a case that the properties belonged to him by virtue of the

declaration made by Puttananjamma at the time of her death, but

that case has been negatived by the courts below. The father’s

possession must, therefore, be deemed to have been, to his

knowledge, on behalf of the plaintiff and the first defendant.

There was thus no possibility of an erroneous belief about his

title being created in the mind of Maddanappa because of what

the first defendant had said in her letter to her stepmother.

7. Insofar as the attestation of the will is concerned, the appellants’

position is no better. This “will” purports to make a disposition of the

suit properties along with other properties by Maddanappa in favour

of Defendants 3 to 8. The attestation of the will by the first defendant

and her husband, would no doubt affix them with the knowledge of

what Maddanappa was doing, but it cannot operate as estoppel against

them and in favour of Defendants 3 to 8 or even in favour of

Maddanappa. The will could take effect only upon the death of

Maddanappa and, therefore, no interest in the property had at all

accrued to Defendants 3 to 8, even on the date of the suit. So far as

Maddanappa is concerned, he, as already stated, knew the true

position and, therefore, could not say that an erroneous belief about

his title to the properties was created in his mind by reason of the

conduct of the first defendant and her husband in attesting the

document. Apart from that, there is nothing on the record to show that

by reason of the conduct of the first defendant Maddanappa altered his

position to his disadvantage.

8. Mr. Venkatarangaiengar, however, says that subsequent to the

execution of the will, he had effected further improvements in the

properties and for this purpose, spent his own moneys. According to

him, he would not have done so in the absence of assurance like the

one given by the first defendant and her husband to the effect that they

had no objection to the disposition of the suit properties by him in any

way he chose to make it. The short answer to this is that Maddanappa,

on his own allegations, was not only in possession and enjoyment of

these properties ever since the death of Putananjamma but had made

improvements in the properties even before the execution of the will.

In these circumstances, it is clear that the provisions of Section 115 of

the Indian Evidence Act, which contain the law of estoppel by

representation, do not help him.”

22.Thus, it is clear that there was no possibility of erroneous beliefs

in the mind of the plaintiffs as to title position in the property.   No

doubt about it that defendant No.1 has acted as a power of attorney,

but at the same time, did not act in his capacity as the owner of the

property.  The ownership of K.B. Ramchandra Raj Urs was known to

14

the plaintiffs. In spite of that the plaintiffs have not set up the case to

bind the share of K.B. Ramchandra Raj Urs.  They have not pleaded in

the plaint that K.B Ramchandra Raj Urs owned the property. There is

no whisper as to the title of K.B. Ramchandra Raj Urs in the plaint.

They needed to plead the facts to attract the plea of estoppel. That has

not been done.  Thus, the agreement which had been executed was not

concerning share of defendant No.1, but of late K. Basavaraja Urs as

his power of attorney. 

23.In   view   of   the   agreement   and   the   admission   made   by   the

plaintiffs, we are of the opinion that it would be appropriate to modify

the decree passed by the courts below to the extent of 50 per cent of

the shares of the deceased late K. Basavaraja Urs and to set it aside

with respect to the remaining 

½ share of K.B. Ramchandra Raj Urs

(defendant No.1) in the property, since the property devolved under

section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act.

24.Thus, we hold that the plaintiffs to be entitled only to the extent

of 

½ share in the suit property. The decree to the remaining extent is

set   aside.     The   plaintiffs   would   not   be   entitled   to   refund   of   any

consideration as by now the worth of property has increased manifold.

25.We direct the trial court to divide the property in two equal

proportions and it be given to the parties.  Let the division be carried

15

out within four months by the Trial Court.  The appeals are allowed to

the extent mentioned above.  No costs.

.................................J.

               [ ARUN MISHRA ] 

.................................J.

               [ S. ABDUL NAZEER ] 

NEW DELHI;

OCTOBER 24, 2019.

Reference cases

Description

Legal Notes

Add a Note....