APHC010184602014
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
PRESENT:THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI CHEEMALAPATI
WRIT PETITION NO: 16209/2014
Between:
S.M.A. Khader,
The Government Of Andhra Pradesh Rep By Its Principal
and Others
Counsel for the Petitioner:
1.
P SRI RAM
Counsel for the Respondent(S):
1. G.P. FOR REVENUE
DATE: 20.12.2024
The Court made the following:
ORDER:
This writ petition has been filed questioning
UCIII(2)/99, dated 03.09.2012 and the rejection order dated 08.07.2013 and
for a consequential declaration that the petitioner is entitled to hold the urban
land declared by him, which was exempted as per G.O.Ms.No.976 dated
03.08.1997 and G.O.Ms.No.2312 dated 20.05.1980.
2. The case of the petitioner as set out in the writ affidavit in brief is
that he along with his mother and three sisters filed declarations under
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI CHEEMALAPATI
WRIT PETITION NO: 16209/2014
...PETITIONER
AND
Andhra Pradesh Rep By Its Principal ...RESPONDENT(S)
Counsel for the Petitioner:
Counsel for the Respondent(S):
G.P. FOR REVENUE
The Court made the following:
This writ petition has been filed questioning the memo No.31129/
UCIII(2)/99, dated 03.09.2012 and the rejection order dated 08.07.2013 and
for a consequential declaration that the petitioner is entitled to hold the urban
land declared by him, which was exempted as per G.O.Ms.No.976 dated
and G.O.Ms.No.2312 dated 20.05.1980.
2. The case of the petitioner as set out in the writ affidavit in brief is
that he along with his mother and three sisters filed declarations under
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
[3332]
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI CHEEMALAPATI
...PETITIONER
...RESPONDENT(S)
the memo No.31129/
UCIII(2)/99, dated 03.09.2012 and the rejection order dated 08.07.2013 and
for a consequential declaration that the petitioner is entitled to hold the urban
land declared by him, which was exempted as per G.O.Ms.No.976 dated
2. The case of the petitioner as set out in the writ affidavit in brief is
that he along with his mother and three sisters filed declarations under
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Section 6(1) of the Urban Land Ceiling Act, 1976 in C.C.Nos.2284, 2286 to
2289/76, declaring the properties devolved from his late father clearly
mentioning therein that NTS No.240, VJA measuring 1672.20 sq.mts. is
covered by a cinema theatre by name Rajakumari Talkies constructed prior to
1958 and the land in NTS No.468, VJA has on its premises an automobile
workshop constructed in the year 1966 with the building permission granted
by Municipal Corporation, Vijayawada. Along with the said declaration, the
petitioner had applied for exemption to the Industries Department, Hyderabad
for the commercial units situated in NTS Nos.240 & 468. Pursuantly, the
enquiry staff viz., Deputy Inspector of Survey, Urban Land Ceiling inspected
the above two industrial units and submitted survey sketches on 26.10.1976
showing that the land in NTS No.240 is totally covered by Cinema talkies and
though the total extent of the land in NTS No.468 is 730 sq.mts. covered by
industrial structures covering a plinth area of 229 sq.mts., and 151 sq.mts.
respectively, the enquiry staff of survey department, in a careless and casual
manner and without application of mind had wrongly computed the same as
802.67 sq.mts. Thereafter, the Government considering existence of
commercial units, issued G.O.Ms.No.976 Revenue (UCIII) Department dated
03.08.1977 exempting the total extent of 2404.85 sq.mts., in NTS Nos. 240
and 468 of Vijayawada, which are covered by Cinema talkies and automobile
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workshop. Subsequently, a draft statement under Section 8(1) of the Act was
issued on 29.09.1977, including the properties that were exemption by the
Government under G.O.Ms.No.976, dated 03.08.1977, in computation of
excess land. The petitioner filed objections to the said draft statement that in
view of the exempted granted by Government vide G.O.Ms.No.976, dated
3.8.1977, the properties covered in NTS Nos.240 and 468 should not be
computed as vacant land in his holding. Thereupon, an order dated
16.01.1978 was issued under Section 8(4) of the Act excluding the land
covered by the G.O. referred to above and declaring that the petitioner holds
292.30 sq.mts. in excess of the ceiling limit and as no modified statement
under Section 8(1) was issued as mentioned in the orders, the petitioner had
applied for exemption under 20(1)(B) of the Act for exemption of the said
surplus extent of 292.30 sq.mts., and thereafter the Government considering
the hardship factor, exempted the surplus extent of 292.30 sq.mts. under
Section 20(1)(B) of the Act under G.O.Ms.No.2312, Revenue (UCIII)
Department, dated 20.05.1980. The properties covered by the declaration
were mortgaged to Indian Bank by deposit of title deeds and as the company
of the petitioner M/s. S.M.Abdul Haq Saheb & Bros. was running in losses,
Cinema theatre and the Automobile work shop were leased out and the
petitioner has been remitting the amounts realized by way of rents to the
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Bank towards instalments payable. Thereafter, Indian Bank, filed a suit in
O.S.No.106 of 1973 against the petitioner, other co-declarants in C.Cs. and
also against partnership firm for recovery of the loan amount of
Rs.9,66,096.77 ps. and the matter went in appeal to High Court and the High
Court vide judgment dated 05.08.1991 allowed the appeal filed by Indian
Bank directing the petitioner to pay the loan amount together with interest.
The findings recorded in the suit as well as appeal proceedings by the II
Additional Subordinate Judge’s Court as well as High Court clearly establishes
that the commercial units, viz., Rajakumari Talkies and Automobile workshop
were leased out much and were under registered lease earlier to the
commencement of the Urban Land Ceiling Act and long before granting of
exemption. The Government while granting exemption vide G.O.Ms.No.976,
dated 03.08.1977 laid a condition that the land should be utilized for the
purpose of the said industry and the Government did not impose any other
condition prohibiting the alienation or leasing of the said properties and as on
today the commercial activity is still going on in the exempted properties. The
Cinema theatre and automobile workshop having been constructed with prior
permission of Vijayawada Municipal Corporation much earlier to the
commencement of ULC Act, the land covered by them shall not be trerated as
vacant land and thus the provisions of the Urban Land Ceiling Act are not
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applicable in view of Clause-II of Section 2(q) of the Urban Land Ceiling Act
and also in view of the pronouncements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Meera Gupta (AIR 1992 SC 1567) and also of the Division Bench of this Court
in 1995(3) ALT 487 (DB) that the land covered by structures existing at the
time of commencement of the Act and the land appurtenant thereto are non-
vacant lands and therefore the buildings and appurtenant land thereto should
be excluded while computing the holding of the vacant land of a person.
Further, as per Section 2(G) of the ULC Act, every building constructed before
the commencement of the ULC Act is entitled to appurtenant land of 500
sq.mts. each and also in their guidelines vide Ministry of W&H,
Lr.No.1/132/76-1, LCU(III) dated 18.11.1976 the Government of India clearly
states that non-residential buildings are entitled to an additional appurtenant
land of 500 sq.meters each and further this Court in the decision reported in
AIR 1991 A.P.84 as well as the Full Bench of Allahabad High Court in AIR
1987 ALL 232 also categorically held that every non-residential building
constructed prior to commencement of ULC Act is eligible for an allowance of
500 sq.mts. each towards the appurtenant land. In view of the same, the
property covered by “Rajakumari Talkies” constructed in 1958 and the
automobile workshop constructed in 1966 together with appurtenant land
thereto are not vacant lands and they do not attract the provisions of the
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Urban Land Ceiling Act, since if the authorities had allowed appurtenant land
of 500 sq.mts., to each building, there would not be any vacant land at all and
the land would be far less than the entitlement of the declarant. The
exemption under Section 20(1)(a) of the Act would only come into play when
there is excess land and since there is no excess land, the question of
granting exemption under Section 20(1)(a) of the Act does not arise,
however, the exemption was granted prior to determination of surplus
vacante land and thus, the exemption order Under G.O.Ms.No.976, Revenue
UCIII Department, dated 03.08.1977 is superfluous, since the provisions of
the ULC Act do not apply to the subject property, since do not come under
the purview of the Act. Further, this Court vide decision in 1998(3) ALT 471
categorically held that passing of final orders under section 8(4) and 9 of the
Urban Land Ceiling Act are mandatory and without passing such final orders
under Section 9, further proceedings are liable to be set aside. In the instant
case also, since the Special Officer & Competent Authority, ULC, Vijayawada
failed to issue the statutory proceeding under Section 9 of the Act and also
the modified statement under Section 8 of the Act and therefore, the Land
Ceiling Cases in respect of the subject property are vitiated. The case file
issued to the petitioner under Right to Information Act reveals that that since
the required information was yet to be received from the Special Officer &
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Competent Authority, issuance of final statement was held up and hence, it is
clear that the proceedings under Section 9 of the Act had not been taken
place and final statement was not issued and non-issuance of the final
statement vitiates the entire proceedings. Moreover, subject properties were
under lease even much prior to commencement of the Act and the same has
duly been mentioned in the civil suit before Subordinate Judge, Vijayawada
and Appeal before the High Court filed by the Bank and the same also was
mentioned by the Special Officer & Competent Authority in his order under
Section 8(4) of the ULC Act. Even though the properties were leased out,
none of the conditions of the G.O.Ms.No.976, dated 03.08.1977 were violated
and the commercial activity is still going on till today. Further, in the order
under Section 8(4) of the Act, dated 16.1.1978, the Special Officer &
Competent Authority computed 1550 sq.mts. in R.S.No.84/1/A in
Bhavanipuram village in the petitioner’s holding and in fact the said property
does not belong to the petitioner and the learned Subordinate Judge at
Vijayawada in O.S.No.100 of 1978 and this Court in Appeal No.863 of 1989
held that the said site does not either belong to the partnership company of
the petitioner or to the family of the petitioner and it belonged to Sri
Kantamaneni Raja Gopala Rao. However, the said extent has erroneously
been added to the holding of the petitioner and consequently declared him as
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surplus land holder and had the said extent not been included in the holdings
of the family, there would not have been any surplus land at all in the
holdings of the petitioner. While so, a show cause notice was issued in Memo
No.31129/UCIII(2)/99 dated 03.09.2012 to show cause why the exemption
granted in G.O.Ms.No.976 dated 03.08.1977 should not be withdrawn in view
of the violation of exemption conditions prescribed in the said G.O. for which,
the petitioner gave a reply on 15.04.2013 to respondent no.1 besides filing a
revision petition on 29.04.2013 under Section 34 of the Act. The respondent
no.1 by order dated 08.07.2013 rejected the revision petition stating that the
Government cannot exercise powers under Section 34 of the Act on the
revision petition at this point of time in view of the repeal Act. The show
cause notice is without jurisdiction. However, the respondent no.2 is
threatening to take action in pursuance of the show cause notice. The repeal
Act 15/99, which was adopted by the A.P.State Legislature with effect from
27.03.2008, made provisions for certain savings. Section 3 of the repeal Act
clearly mentions that the orders granting exemption under sub-section 1 of
Section 20 of the Principal Act are saved and except the above saving, the
entire Act 33/76 stands repealed. In view of the same, the Government have
no power to exercise its right to withdrawal of exemption under Section 20(2)
of the Act 33/1976 and non appreciation of this legal position vitiates the
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action of the respondents. Therefore, the memo issued by the respondents
directing the petitioner to show cause why the exemption shall not be
withdrawn is without jurisdiction, illegal and the same is liable to be set aside.
A single bench by order dated 24.08.2011 clearly ruled that only Section 20(1)
of the Act 33/1976 was saved under Section 3 of the repealed Act 15/99 and
consequently held that Section 20(2) is not available for the Government to
withdraw the exemption granted under the Act 33/1976. Therefore, the
impugned memo is without jurisdiction and the issue involved in this writ
petition is squarely covered by the judgment in Writ Petition No.26474 of
2009, dated 24.08.2011.
3. The contents of the counter-affidavit filed by the 2
nd
respondent, in
brief, are that one Kadiyala Venkateswara Rao, who is lessee of Rajakumari
Talkies, filed statement under Section 6(1) of ULC Act duly declaring the
urban property held by their firm Shree Corporation before the Competent
Authority. Originally, the land belongs to the petitioner and the Competent
Authority, after hearing arguments from both the sides had issued draft
statement under Section 8(1) and notice under Section 8(3) of ULC Act,
calling for objections. The land owner filed an application before the
Government to exempt the above land along with the land covered in NTS
No.468 of Vijayawada and pursuantly the Government after receipt of the
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proposals from the Director of Industries, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad, the
Commissioner for Land Reforms and Urban Land Ceiling, Hyderabad had
exempted the land admeasuring 2404.85 sq.mts. in NTS No.240 and NTS
No.468 vide G.O.Ms.No.976, dated 03.08.1977 under Section 20(1)(a) of the
ULC Act, while issuing the said G.O., NTS No.240 was mentioned instead of
NTS No.92 for the land covered by Rajakumari Talkies and despite sending
necessary proposals for modification, the Government did not modify the said
NTS number so far. The petitioner, his mother and sisters also filed
statements under Section 6(1) of the ULC Act including the subject properties
among other properties and the then Special Officer, after examining the
documents submitted by declarants and report submitted by enquiry officer
had declared the sister and mother of the petitioner as surplus landholders to
an extent of 1792.30 sq.mts. vide office order Rc.C.C.No.2284, 2286 to
2289/76, under Section 8(4) of the ULC Act, dated 16.01.1978. The
application submitted by the petitioner to exempt the land under Section
20(1) (b) of the ULC Act, has been considered by the Government after
receipt of proposals from Special Officer and Competent Authority, ULC,
Vijayawada and Commissioner of Land Reforms and Urban Land Ceiling,
Hyderabad and an extent of 292.30 sq.mts of land was exempted vide
G.O.Ms.No.2312, Revenue (UC.II) Department, dated 20.05.1980, after
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allowing the statutory limit of 1500 sq.mts. Thereafter, since the petitioner
had violated the conditions imposed by the Government and without obtaining
permission from the Government, constructed a multistoried complex by third
parties in T.S.No.468 by removing the workshop, necessary proposals were
submitted to the Government to cancel the exemption granted for the said
land as he has leased out the workshop to M/s.Saboo brothers, Vijayawada,
thereby the Government vide Memo No.375/UC-III/82-85, Revenue UC-III
Department, dated 04.01.1995 had asked why the exempted land could not
be withdrawn by the Government under the provisions of the ULC Act and in
response, he submitted a reply stating that Rajakumari Talkies were leased
out in the year 1969 and the workshop was leased out in 1976. Thereafter,
the Government, upon receipt of the report from the office of the Competent
Authority, Urban Land Ceiling to the effect that the land Cinema theater was
leased out to other and the land in NTS No.468 is concerned the same is in
occupation of the third party and a multistoried commercial complex was
constructed therein; issued the impugned memo to Sri SMA Khadar asking
him as to why the exemption granted in G.O.Ms.No.976, dated 3.8.1977
should not be withdrawn in view of violation of the exemption conditions
prescribed in the said G.O. Thereafter, the petitioner filed revision petition
before the Government under Section 34 of the ULC Act requesting to revise
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the order dated 16.01.78 earlier issued under Section 8(4) of the Act passed
by the Special Officer and Competent Authority and the Government in Memo
No.31129/UC-III (2) 1999-26 Rev.UC-III Department, dated 08.07.2013 has
informed the declarant that ULC Act was repealed by Repeal Act, 1999,which
was adopted by the State of A.P. with effect from 27.03.2008 and in the said
Repeal Act, section 34 of the principal Act, 1976 is not saved and thereby the
petitioner filed this writ petition. It is incorrect to state that the land in NTS
No.468 is only 730 sq.mts and the ULC staff upon careful measurement of the
land confirmed the extent to be 802.67 sq.mts and moreover the petitioner
himself admitted that he is having 802.67 sq.mts in NTS NO.468. The
Government had exempted on conditional basis on the condition that the
subject lands should be utilized for the purpose of said industry. It is incorrect
to state that the buildings constructed prior to the commencement of the Act,
do not attract the provisions of the ULC Act. Since the declarant had not
applied to Government to reopen the file in terms of the decision in Meera
Gupta vs. State Government of West Bengal for cancellation of the
exemption granted under Section 20(1)(a) of the ULC Act on the ground that
since the subject premises are covered with buildings by the date of coming
into force of the Act, the subject lands cannot be computed as vacant land.
Further, since the Act was repealed in Andhra Pradesh with effect from
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27.03.2008 saving the exemptions under Section 20(1)(a) of ULC Act, the
case of the petitioner for providing benefits under the decision referred to
supra deserves no consideration. The petitioner, pursuant to issuance of the
order under Section 8(4) of the Act by the Competent Authority, had
approached the Government and filed exemption application for granting
exemption to the above industries and thereupon the Government had asked
the Special Officer and Competent Authority and pursuantly the matter was
referred to the Inspector of Survey for furnishing the particulars and as the
Inspector of Survey had caused delay in sending the reply, the Government
had exempted the above two industries under Section 20(1)(b) of the ULC Act
and therefore, the question of issuance of statutory proceedings under
Section 9 of ULC Act does not arise. The declarant in violation of the
exemption granted vide G.O.Ms.No.976, dated 03.08.1977, disposed of the
land admeasuring 802.67 sq.mts. to others wherein a multistoried complex
was constructed. The declarant himself had admitted in his statement about
possessing an extent of 1550 Sq.mts. in R.S.No.84 of Bhavanipuram and
accordingly, the same was included in the holdings of the declarant and the
averment contra is false. Since the declarant had violated the conditions of
Section 20(1)(a) of the ULC Act and disposed of the exempted land to third
party, who occupied and constructed a multistoried complex in the exempted
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land, the impugned proceedings came to be issued, since the repealed Act
saves the exemptions granted under section 20(1)(a) of the Act and the
exempted lands continue to be surplus lands and violation of conditions gives
right to the Government to withdraw the exempted lands after due process of
law. Accordingly, the impugned proceedings were issued. The writ petition
being meritless deserves dismissal.
4. The respondent no.2-joint Collector filed additional affidavit
contending that a Special Surveyor and Special Revenue Inspector were
deputed to inspect the land and submit ground report in relation to the
property situated in NTS No.468 (R.S.No.601, Revenue Ward No.10) of
Vijayawada and they found that the subject land is used for commercial
purpose and the subject land was occupied by a three storey building (G+3)
for commercial purpose with the name “MALABAR GOLD & DIAMONDS” and
the location of the said building is matching with the boundaries mentioned in
the schedule submitted by the declarant at the time of submitting declarations
before the competent authority. It revealed in the enquiry that Malabar Gold
& Diamonds had taken the land on lease since 10 years from Mallineni
Trading Pvt. Ltd. and thus the writ petitioner had violated the conditions of
exemption issued vide G.O.Ms.No.976, dated 03.08.1977 even before the
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repeal of the ULC Act, 1976 and there is continuous exchange of notices/
correspondences since 1955, regarding the said violation of conditions.
5. Heard Sri Patanjali, learned counsel, for Sri P.Sri Ram, learned
counsel for the petitioner and Sri Vishnu Teja, learned Special Government
Pleader.
6. During the course of arguments, the learned counsel for the
petitioner confined his arguments only in relation to the property covered by
NTS No.468, which is one of the properties exempted under G.O.Ms.No.976,
dated 03.08.1977.
7. The learned counsel for the petitioner, while reiterating the contents
of the writ affidavit, would contend that the property covered under NTS
No.468 (R.S.No.601, Revenue Ward No.10), which was exempted from the
operation of ULC Act by the Government vide G.O.Ms.No.976, dated
03.08.1977 was leased out under registered lease deed much prior to
granting of exemption as evidenced by the observations made in the
proceedings initiated by Indian Bank, Governorpet, Vijayawada Branch for
realization of the loan facility availed by the petitioner upon creation of
equitable mortgage over the subject property vide O.S.No.106 of 1973 by the
learned II Additional Subordinate Judge, Vijayawada and in A.S.No.97 of 1982
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by this Court and moreover the condition laid in the exemption G.O. is only to
the effect that the land should be utilized for the purpose of the said industry
and there was no condition prohibiting alienation or leasing out of the
property and since commercial activity is still going on, there was no violation
of any conditions at all. The learned counsel would further contend that as
per section 3 of the repeal Act 15/99, the orders granting exemption under
Sub-Section 1 of Section 20 of the Principal Act are saved and except granting
exemption the entire Act was repealed and therefore, the Government have
no power to exercise its right to withdrawal of exemption under section 20(2)
of the Act 33/1976. However, without having any authority or jurisdiction, the
memo came to be issued and under the guise of such an unsustainable memo
now the second respondent is threatening to take action in pursuance thereof.
Therefore, the memo impugned is liable to be aside. Accordingly, prayed to
allow the writ petition.
In support of his contentions, the learned counsel for the petitioner
relied on the decisions in Surender Raj Jaiswal and another vs. The
Principal Secretary to Government, Revenue, (U.C.III), Department
and another
1
and State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Hariram
2
.
1
. Orders of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh dated 24.08.2011 passed in W.P.No.26474 of 2009
2
. (2013) 4 SCC 280
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8. On the other hand, the learned Special Government Pleader, would
submit that the declarant has violated the conditions of Section 20(1)(a) of
the ULC Act and disposed of the exempted land to third party, who
constructed a multistoried complex with the name “MALABAR GOLD &
DIAMONDS” in the exempted land and therefore, the memo impugned in this
writ petition was issued. The learned Special Government Pleader would
further contend that as per clause (b) of Section 3(1) of the repeal Act; the
validity of any exemption order under Section (1) of Section 20 of the
Principal Act and also the action taken thereunder are declared immune from
the consequences of repeal. Section 3(1)(b) of the Repeal Act does not
expressly bar or take away the rights and liabilities under an exemption order
and Section 6 of the General Clauses Act becomes applicable with all its force,
and hence, the repeal of the Principal Act, would not affect the rights,
privileges, obligation or liability, acquired, accrued, or incurred under the
principal Act qua section 20(1) exemption order. Therefore, since the
petitioner has violated the exemption granted to him, the conditions of grant
would come into play and pursuantly the notice impugned in this writ petition
has been issued directing the petitioner to show cause as to why the
exemption granted in G.O.Ms. No.976, dated 03.08.1977 for the land in NTS
No.468, Block No.10, Vijayawada, should not be withdrawn for violating the
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conditions prescribed in the said G.O. There are no merits in the writ petition
and the same deserves dismissal. Accordingly, prayed to dismiss the writ
petition.
In support of his contentions, the learned Special Government Pleader
relied on the decisions in Maharashtra Chamber of Housing Industry,
Mumbai and others vs. State of Maharashtra and another
3
and
Bombay Wire Ropes Ltd., and another vs. State of Maharashtra and
others
4
.
9. Perused the material available on record and considered the
submissions made by both the learned counsel.
10. At the outset it is relevant here to mention that the petitioner while
assailing the Memo 31129/UC.III(2)/1999, dated 03.09.2012 and the rejection
orders passed vide Memo.No.31129/UC.III(2)/1999-26, dated 08.07.2013
prayed for a declaration that the petitioner is entitled to hold the urban land
declared by them, which was exempted as per G.O.Ms.No.976 dated
03.08.1997 and G.O.Ms.No.2312, dated 20.05.1980. However, the relief
sought in relation to the property situated in NTS No.240 and the property
3
. 2014 SCC Online Bom 1083
4
. 2019 SCC online Bom 264
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W.P.No.16209 of 2014
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exempted under G.O.Ms.No.2312, dated 20.05.1980 was not pressed and the
relief sought in the writ petition is confined only in respect of the property
exempted as per G.O.Ms.No.976, dated 03.08.1997 viz., the land measuring
2,404.85 Sq.Mts. in N.T.S.No.468 (R.S.No.601 Revenue Ward No.10) of
Vijayawada village in Vijayawada Urban Agglomeration. It is the specific
contention of the petitioner that he had never violated any of the conditions
of exemption. Therefore, it is needless to consider the contentions and
submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties either with regard to
the other property exempted under G.O.Ms.No.976, dated 03.08.1997 and
also the property exempted under G.O.Ms.No. 2312, dated 20.05.1980 or with
regard to the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the parties in
relation to the rejection order dated 08.07.2013, other than the ones
concerned to violation or not of the conditions of exemption granted in
G.O.Ms.No.976, dated 03.08.1997, regarding the property situated in NTS
No.468.
11. There is no dispute regarding granting of exemption to the subject
property. For quick reference the Government Order under which the said
exemption was granted to the petitioner in relation to the subject property
and another property is extracted hereunder:
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W.P.No.16209 of 2014
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“Whereas Shri S.M.A.Khader, S/o.S.M.A.Haq, Vijayawada hold vacant land
measuring 2,404.85 sq.Mts. in N.T.S.No.240 (Block No.6, Revenue Ward No.7)
and N.T.S.No.468 (R.S.No.601 Revenue ward No.10) of Vijayawada village in
Vijayawada Urban Agglomeration which is in excess of the ceiling limit
prescribed in Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, (Central Act, 33 of
1976).
2. AND WHEREAS the entire extent of land measuring 2,404.85 Sq.Mts. is
essential to run the Cinema Theatre and Work Shop.
3. AND WHEREAS the Government consider it expedient in the public interest to
exempt the land mentioned in Para two above from the provisions of Chapter-
III of the said Act.
4. NOW, THEREFORE, in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (a) of sub-
section (1) of Section 20 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976
(Central Act, 33 of 1976) the Governor of Andhra Pradesh hereby exempts the
land measuring 2,404.85 Sq.Mts. in N.T.S.No.240 (Block No.6 Revenue Ward
No.7) and N.T.S.No.468 (R.S.No.601 Revenue Ward No.10) of Vijayawada
village in Vijayawada Urban Agglomeration mentioned in Para two above
subject to the condition that the said land should be utilized for the purpose of
said Industry.”
12. The terms of the Government Order in unequivocal terms says that
the land in NTS No.468 was exempted from the operation of the provisions of
the Urban Land Ceiling Act subject to the condition that the said land should
be utilized for the purpose of running workshop.
13. The additional affidavit filed by the 2
nd
respondent- Joint collector
and Competent Authority, Urban Land Ceiling, Vijayawada and the reports of
the Special Revenue Inspector & Special Surveyor, ULC, Vijayawada dated
02.08.2024 and 03.08.2024 and the photographs annexed to the said
additional affidavit show that the land in NTS No.468 exempted under
G.O.Ms.No.976, dated 03.08.1977 was covered with a three storey building
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21
(G+3) used for commercial purpose with the name MALABAR GOLD &
DIAMONDS and enquiries reveal that the said firm has taken the said land on
lease from Mallineni Trading Private Limited and therefore, the petitioner had
violated the conditions of exemption issued vide G.O.Ms.No.976, dated
03.08.1977.
14. Section 3 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act,
1999, which is adopted by the State of Andhra Pradesh with effect from
27.03.2008, reads thus:
“3. Savings – (1) the repeal of the principal Act shall not affect-
(a) the vesting of any vacant land under sub-section (3) of section 10,
possession of which has been taken over by the State Government or any
person duly authorised by the State Government in this behalf or by the
competent authority;
(b) the validity of any order granting exemption under sub-section (1)of
section 20 or any action taken therunder , notwithstanding any judgment of
any Court to the contrary;
(c) any payment made to the State Government as a condition for granting
exemption under sub-section (1) of section 20.
(2)Where-
(a) any land is deemed to have vested in the State Government under sub-
section (3) of section 10 of the principal Act but possession of which has not
been taken over by the State Government or any person duly authorised by
the State Government in this behalf or by the competent authority; and
(b) any amount has been paid by the State Government with respect to such
land, then, such land shall not be restored unless the amount paid, if any,
has been refunded to the State Government.”
15. In the decision in Maharashtra Chamber of Housing Industry,
Mumbai and others (supra 3) relied on by the learned Special Government
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22
Pleader, Full Bench of Bombay High Court while deciding the issue as to
whether the associations which have taken benefit of the schemes under
Section 20 of the ULC Act and constructed buildings subject to the condition
that they have to surrender certain number flats to the State Government,
could be allowed to contend that, in view of repeal of ULC Act, their
obligations under the said scheme do not survive and there is no need for
them to surrender flats to the government, held thus:
“196. It is settled that a saving provision in a repeal statute is not exhaustive of
the rights, obligations so saved or rights that survives the repeal as is clear from
the judgment of the Constitution Bench in the case of Bansidhar v. State of
Rajasthan reported in (1989) 2 SCC 557. It is, therefore, imperative that section 6
of the General Clauses Act which provides for the effect of a repeal, stands
completely attracted. Section 6(c) of the General Clauses Act provides that the
repeal shall not affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, ‘accrued
or incurred under any enactment was repealed unless a different intention
appears.
197. A proper examination of the provisions of the Repeal Act and more
particularly the provisions of sections 3 and 4 do not indicate that it would be the
intention of the Legislature to save the validity of a section 20(1) Exemption Order
to exclude the enforcing power being applicability of Chapter III of the Principal
Act being one of the conditions under the exemption order. It cannot be said that
the rights accrued and the liabilities incurred under section 20(1) exemption order
stands completely effaced when the validity of such an exemption order has been
saved by the provisions of section 3(1)(b) of the Repeal Act. As no such contrary
intention can be gathered from the provisions of the Repeal Act, the petitioner's
contentions that the validity of the exemption order as saved by section 3(1)(b) of
the Repeal Act is valid de hors the conditions of the exemption order cannot be
accepted on the basis of the plain wordings of section 3(1)(b) of the Repeal Act. In
the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Shantibai Gaikwad v. Shivajibhai
Haribhai, reported in (2001) 5 SCC 101, the Supreme Court has once again
recognized the principle that a repealing statute is not exhaustive and does not
automatically extinguish accrued rights unless they are taken away completely.
The Repeal Act in no manner expressly takes away the applicability of the
conditions under section 20(1) exemption order. In fact the intention of the
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W.P.No.16209 of 2014
23
legislature is to wholesomely save the validity of an exemption order which ipso
facto include the teeth namely to take action under Chapter III of the Principal Act
in case of breach of the condition under which an exemption has been granted for
the beneficiary of the section 20(1) of the order.
198. The petitioners contention that for some reason the scheme under a section
20(1) order could not be completed and hence the exemption order cannot be
enforced due to the repeal of the Principal Act, cannot be accepted. Once the
legislature holds an exemption order issued under section 20(1) to be valid, all
incidental powers which are necessary to preserve its validity would be available to
the State. This would be firstly by virtue of the clear provisions of section 3(1)(b)
of the Repeal Act and secondly by virtue of the provisions of section 6 of the
General Clauses Act. Any other interpretation would be nothing short of doing a
violence to the solemn intention of the legislature in saving the validity of an
exception order by in view of the express provisions of section 3(1)(b) of the
Repeal Act.
199. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the legal position as would emerge can
be summarized as under:—
(a) section 3(1)(b) of the Repeal Act saves the validity of an order granting
exemption under sub-section (1) of section 20 or any action taken
thereunder, notwithstanding any judgment of any Court to the contrary.
(b) this would mean that the validity of section 20(1) exemption order is saved
in every regard so as to hold the same valid for all the purposes.
(c) the phrase “validity” would mean that an exemption order would be
construed to be valid in regard to all the rights and liability attached to such
an exemption order. These rights and liabilities may be either of the
beneficiary of the exemption order or the Government.
(d) As section 3(1)(b) of the Repeal Act does not expressly bar or take away
the rights, and liabilities under an exemption order, section 6 of the General
Clauses Act becomes applicable with all its force, and hence, the repeal of
the Principal Act, would not affect the rights, privileges, obligation or
liability, acquired, accrued, or incurred under the Principal Act qua a section
20(1) exemption order.
(e) Any other interpretation would render section 3(1)(b) of the Repeal Act to
the extent it saves the validity of a section 20(1) exemption order
meaningless, as section 3(1)(b) of the Repeal Act not only saves the validity
of section 20(1) exemption order but also any action taken thereunder
notwithstanding any judgment of any Court to the contrary.
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(f) If the Legislature in so many words has saved the validity of a section 20(I)
exemption order then it would be absurdity to say that on one hand the
legislature has saved its validity and on the other hand such a validity
would be required to be read as meaningless in view of repeal of the
Principal Act.
(g) The arguments of the petitioners that what is saved under section 3(1)(b)
of the Repeal Act are only actions which stand completed and closed, is per
se not acceptable for the reason that such interpretation would only be
possible when there is no saving clause in the repealing statute. More
particularly it is also unacceptable in view of a saving clause of the nature
section 3(1)(b) of the Repeal Act provides. A plain reading of section
3(1)(b) definitely cannot be construed to attribute such a meaning to
section 3(1)(b).
(h) The Repeal Act, if construed in its entirety, manifest a clear intention of the
Legislature to save the validity of a section 20(1) exemption order in totality
including its enforceability as observed by my learned brother.”
16. In the above decision, the Full Bench held at point (d) of Para-181
as follows:
“181 in the light of the above discussion, my answers to the questions
referred to the Full Bench are as follows:
(a) x x x x x x
***********
(d) Question (3)(b) in the Affirmative, with a clarification that the order of
exemption can be implemented or enforced otherwise than by recourse to
the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regularization) Act, 1976. The State may
enforce the order together with its conditions through a Court of law or
devise any legislative or executive means to implement the order of
exemption and its conditions. The enforceability of the order, and legality
of the measure adopted for its implementation will, however, have to be
decided in the facts and circumstances of each individual case.
xxxxxxxxxx”
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W.P.No.16209 of 2014
25
17. Therefore, the enforceability of the order of exemption and legality
of the measure adopted for its implementation will, however, have to be
decided in the facts and circumstances of each individual case.
18. As stated supra, the condition imposed while granting exemption in
the instant case is that the land in NTS No.468 covered by the subject G.O.
shall only be used for the purpose of running workshop. In the case covered
by the decision referred to above Maharashtra Chamber of Housing
Industry, Mumbai and others (supra 3), the condition imposed was that
the association shall handover certain number of constructed flats to the
Government. Therefore, keeping in view the observations made at para-
181(d) of the judgment referred to supra, the decision arrived at by the Full
Bench of Bombay High Court at paras-196,197,198 and 199 extracted above
cannot be made applicable to the facts of the case on hand, since the
condition imposed in the instant case while granting exemption was that the
premises shall only be used for the purpose of running workshop, whereas
the condition imposed in the case covered by the Maharashtra Chamber of
Housing Industry, Mumbai and others (supra 3) was that certain number
of constructed flats are to be handed over to the Government i.e. to say the
exemption granted created an interest in favour of the Government in the
flats to be handed over to the Government.
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W.P.No.16209 of 2014
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19. In the decision relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner in
Surender Raj Jaiswal & another (supra 1), while dealing with the similar
question as to whether permission is necessary to change use the land
covered under the exemption proceedings for other purposes, a coordinate
bench of this court while was at Hyderabad, after extracting Sections 3 and 4
of the Repeal Act 15/99, held thus:
“From a perusal of the aforesaid provisions under Section 3 and 4 of the
Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act of 1999, it is clear that the
orders granting exemption under sub-section (1) of Section 20 of the principal
Act are saved. It is also clear from a perusal of the provisions under Section
3(1)(c) of the Repealing Act that repeal of the principal Act shall not affect
any payments made to the State Government as a condition for granting
exemption under sub-section (1) of Section 20 of the principal Act. But, at the
same time, the provision under sub-section (2) of Section 20 is not saved.
Section 20(1) of the principal Act empowers the Government to exempt any
land subject to certain conditions, but under sub-section (2) of Section 20 of
the principal Act, the Government was empowered to withdraw such
exemption in cases where conditions are violated. A harmonious reading of
the provisions under Sections 20(1) and 20(2) of the principal Act, coupled
with Section 3 of the Repealing Act, makes it clear that the order granting
exemption is saved only with a view to avoid repayment of any amounts
collected by the State Government, while granting exemptions. When the
principal Act itself is repealed on the ground that it has failed to achieve the
objective expected of it, it is not open for the 1
st
respondent-Government to
refuse permission in the instant case, only on the ground that the conditions
imposed in the order granting exemption shall continue to operate. In the
absence of any saving clause, saving sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the
principal Act, even in cases where conditions are violated, Government is not
empowered to withdraw the exemptions granting under Section 20(1) of the
principal Act, after coming into force of the Urban Land (Ceiling Regulations)
Repeal Act, 1999. In the absence of such power, and further, in view of the
Repealing Act itself, the conditions imposed in the order granting exemption,
have become unenforceable and are non-est. In the absence of initiation of
proceedings or withdrawal of exemption granted under Section 20(1) of the
principal Act before the enforcement of the Urban Land (Ceiling and
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W.P.No.16209 of 2014
27
Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999, the land, which is exempted, will become a
free-hold land, and hence, the stand of the respondents that even after
coming into force of the of the Repealing Act,1999, the conditions imposed in
the order granting exemption under Section 20(1) of the principal Act shall
continue to operate, cannot be accepted. The said interpretation will run
contra to the every objection of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation)
Repeal Act,1999. Said view also gains support from the other provisions of
the Repealing Act, particularly Section 4, which states that all proceedings
relating to any order made or purported to be made under the principle Act,
pending immediately before the commencement of the Urban Land (Ceiling
and Regulation) Repeal Act of 1999, shall stand abate, except in cases where
possession is taken by the State Government or any person duly authorized
by the State Government on behalf of the competent authority. Having regard
to the provisions under Section 20(1) and (2) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and
Regulation) Act, 1976 and the provisions under Section 3 and 4 of the Urban
Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act,1999, it is to be held that in cases
where the vacant land is exempted under Section 20 of the principal Act and
where such exemption is not withdrawn before the enforcement of the
Repealing Act,1999, such land will become the free-hold land irrespective of
any conditions with regard to usage of the exempted land. As held above, as
the land in question has become the free-hold land in view of the Repealing
Act,1999, there appears no reason or justification for not granting permission
to use the land covered by exemption proceedings, for the purpose of
multiplex theatre-cum-shopping complex. In a strict sense, no such
permission is necessary, but, when the competent authority under the Greater
Hyderabad Municipal Corporation Act has not received the application,
petitioner had to approach the Government, and as permission is denied by
misconstruing the various provisions of the Repealing Act,1999, the impugned
order is liable to be set aside.”
20. In the case covered under the decision referred to supra-1, when
the petitioners therein sought permission of the authorities to change use of
the land covered under the exemption from Cinema hall to Multiplex Theatre-
cum-shopping complex, the same was denied by the authorities by issuing a
memo. The said memo with the observations referred above was set aside by
coordinate bench of this Court holding that after coming into force of the
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W.P.No.16209 of 2014
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Repealing Act,1999, the said land would become a free-hold land and as such
no permission whatsoever is required for changing use of the land.
21. In the instant case, as stated supra, it is contended in the additional
counter that use of the land exempted under G.O.Ms.No.976, dated
03.08.1977 was changed and a three storey building was built therein and
therefore the petitioner had violated the terms of exemption and the
proceedings impugned in the writ petition has been issued directing the
petitioner to submit explanation as to why the exemption granted under
G.O.Ms.No.976 cannot be withdrawn.
22. In view the observations made by a coordinate bench of this Court,
as the land became a free hold land in view of the provisions of the Repealing
Act, 1999, issuance of the impugned memo calling upon the petitioner to
show cause as to why exemption cannot be withdrawn, is unsustainable and
the same is liable to be set aside.
23. As already stated above, this Court is not inclined to go into the
other aspects raised by the parties, since the petitioner had confined the relief
so far as the property situated in NTS No.468 covered under G.O.Ms.No.976,
dated 03.08.1977.
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24. In the above view of the matter, this writ petition is allowed, setting
aside the memo No.31129/UCIII(2)/99, dated 03.09.2012. There shall be no
order as to costs.
Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed.
JUSTICE RAVI CHEEMALAPATI
Note: L.R.copy be marked.
B/o
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