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PETITIONER:

SMT. ATIA MOHAMMADI BEGUM

Vs.

RESPONDENT:

STATE OF U.P. AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT15/03/1993

BENCH:

VERMA, JAGDISH SARAN (J)

BENCH:

VERMA, JAGDISH SARAN (J)

KASLIWAL, N.M. (J)

CITATION:

1993 AIR 2465 1993 SCR (2) 295

1993 SCC (2) 546 JT 1993 Supl. 544

1993 SCALE (2)167

ACT:

Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976: Section 2(o),

Explanation (C)--Urban Land--Determination of--Land

specified in master plan for a purpose other than

agriculture--Whether means land so specified in the master

plan which was in existence at the time of the commencement

of the Act--Vacant land entered into revenue or land records

as for purpose of agriculture before commencement of the Act

and prior to declaration of the masterplan--whether could be

excluded from the ambir of 'urban land'.

HEADNOTE:

The Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, came into

force in the respondent-State on 17.2.1976. The appellant

claimed exclusion of vacant land owned by her, from the

ambit of 'urban land' on the ground that it was mainly used

for the purpose of agriculture, as defined in Section 2(o)

of the Act. The land in question was entered in the revenue

or land records before the commencement of the Act as for

the purpose of agriculture. At the time when the Act came

into force there was no master plan for the city in which

the appellant's land was situated. However, a master plan

for the city was made on 24.2.1980, wherein the land in

dispute was shown.

The competent authority declared that the appellant had

19813.83 sq. mts. of vacant land in excess of the ceiling

limit, but the District Judge reduced the area of the excess

land to 6738.23 sq. mts. Against the order of the District

Judge, both sides filed writ petitions. The High Court

dismissed appellant's writ petition and partly allowed the

writ petition of the State Government. It held that the

appellant's land could not be treated as mainly used for the

purpose of agriculture by virtue of Explanation (C) because

it was shown in the master plan made on 24.2.1980.

In the appeals before this Court the correctness of the High

Court's view was challenged by the appellant and restoration

of the District Judge's order was sought.

296

Allowing the appeals, this Court,

HELD:1.1. Explanation (C) in Section 2(o) of the Urban Land

(Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976 means that if the land has

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been specified in the master plan existing at the time of

commencement of the Act for a purpose other than

agriculture, then the land should not be deemed to be mainly

used for the purpose of agriculture by virtue of the

Explanation and not if the land is specified in a master

plan prepared after the commencement of the Act The plain

language of Explanation (C) bears this construction and

requires it to be so construed in order to harmonise it with

the other provisions and scheme of the Act, eg. Sections 3

and 5. The master plan defined in Section 2(h) and referred

in the definition of 'urban laud' in Section 2(o), including

Explanation (C) therein, is a master plan prepared and in

existence at the time of commencement of the Act when by

virtue of Section 3 of the Act, rights of the holder of the

land under the Act get 'crystallised and extinguish his

right to hold any vacant land in excess of the ceiling

limit. The proceedings for determining the vacant land in

excess of the ceiling limit according to the machinery

provisions in the Act is merely for quantification, and to

effectuate the rights and liabilities which have

crystallised at the time of commencement of the Act. Just

as the holder of the land cannot by his subsequent actions

reduce the area of the vacant land in excess of the celing

limit, the authorities too cannot by any subsequent action

increase the area of the excess vacant land by a similar

action. [298G-H, 299A-C]

1.2.The construction made of these provisions by the High

Court cannot, therefore, be accepted. Accordingly, the

order passed by the District Judge determining the area of

6738.23 sq. mts. only as the vacant land in excess of the

ceiling limit is restored. [299D-E]

JUDGMENT:

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 297 & 298

of 1993.

From the Judgment and Order dated 12.11.1984 of the

Allahabad High Court in Civil Appeal Nos. 4018/80 and 5174

of 1980.

R.K. Khanna, Ms. Abha R. Sharma, Manoj Goel and Pankaj Kalra

for the Appellant.

Ms. Alka Aggrawal, R.C. Verma, Ashok K. Srivastava for the

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Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

VERMA, J. These appeals by special leave are against the

judgment and order dated 12.11.1984 of the Allahabad High

Court in Writ Petition Nos. 4018 of 1980 and 5174 of 1980

which were filed by the appellant and the State of Uttar

Pradesh against the Judgment dated 12.2.1980 of the District

Judge, Aligarh in Land Ceiling Appeal No.24 of 1978. The

competent authority declared that the appellant had 19813.83

sq. mts. of vacant land in Aligarh in excess of the ceiling

limit but the District Judge reduced the area of the excess

land to 6738.23 sq. mts. Against the order of the District

Judge, both sides filed writ petitions. The High Court

dismissed appellant's writ petition and partly allowed the

writ petition of the State Government. This has led to the

filing of these appeals against the High Court's order made

in these two writ petitions against the appellant.

Learned counsel for the appellant argued for restoration of

the District Judge's order whereby an area of 6738.23 sq.

mts. was declared to be in excess of the ceiling limit as

against 19813.83 sq. mts. declared by the competent

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authority. The High Court set aside the District Judge's

order on the construction it made of Explanation (C) in

Section 2(o) defining 'urban land' in the Urban Land

(Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. The definition of

'urban land' in Section 2(o) excludes from its ambit, land

which is mainly used for the purpose of agriculture.

Thereafter, the Explanation for the purpose of clause (o)

defining 'urban land' and clause (q) defining 'vacant land'

is given. Clause (A) of the Explanation defines

'agriculture'. There is no dispute that the vacant land of

which exclusion is claimed by the appellant on the ground

that it is mainly used for the purpose of agriculture is so

used according to the definition of 'agriculture'. There is

also no dispute that clause (B) of the Explanation is

satisfied by the appellant since the land was entered in the

revenue or land records before the appointed day as for the

purpose of agriculture. The only dispute is with regard to

clause (C) of the Explanation which reads as under:-

"(C) Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (B) of

this Explanation, land shall not be deemed to be mainly used

for the purpose of agriculture if the land has been

specified in the master plan for a purpose other than

agriculture;"

298

There is no dispute that the Act came into force in the

State of Uttar Pradesh on 17.2.1976 and there was no master

plan for that area in Aligarh at that time. However, a

master plan for Aligarh was made on 24.2.1980 wherein the

land in dispute was shown. The High Court has taken the

view that the appellant's land could not be treated as

mainly used for the purpose of agriculture by virtue of

Explanation (C) because it was shown in the master plan made

on 24.2.1980. The correctness of this view has been

challenged in these appeals.

Some other provisions of the Act which are material for

deciding this question may now be referred. Section 2

enacts that except as otherwise provided in the Act, on and

from the commencement of the Act, no person shall be

entitled to hold any vacant land in excess of the ceiling

limit. Accordingly, the right of the person to hold any

vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit ceased on the

date of commencement of the Act even though determination of

the excess area had to be made under the machinery

provisions, thereafter, in accordance with the prescribed

procedure. The area of vancant land in excess of the

ceiling limit held by the appellant has, therefore, to be

determined as on 17.2.1976 when the Act came into force in

the State of Uttar Pradesh. Clause (a) of Section 2 defines

'appointed day' to mean the date of introduction of the Bill

in Parliament in relation to any State to which this Act

applies in the first instance like the State of Uttar

Pradesh and that date to 28.1.1976. Section 5 of the Act

provides that any transfer made of vacant land in excess of

the ceiling limit at any time during the period commencing

on the appointed day and ending with the commencement of

this Act shall be ineffective and the land so transferred

shall be taken into account in calculating the extent of

vacant land held by such person. This is a further

indication that determination of the area of vacant land in

excess of the ceiling limit under the Act is to be made with

reference to the date of commencement of the Act and the

right and liability of the holder of the land for this

purpose under the Act crystallises on the date of commence-

ment of the Act unaffected by any subsequent events. The

scheme of the Act supports the construction that the

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aforesaid Explanation (C) means that if the land has been

specified in the master plan existing at the time of

commencement of the the Act for a purpose other than

agriculture, then the land shall not be deemed to be mainly

used for the purpose of agriculture by virtue of the

Explanation and not if the land is specified in a master

plan prepared after the commencement of the Act. The plain

299

language of Explanation (C) bears this construction and

requires it to be so construed in order to harmonise it with

the other provisions and scheme of the Act. Just as the

holder of the land cannot by his subsequent actions reduce

the area of the vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit

the authorities too cannot by any subsequent action increase

the area of the excess vacant land by a similar action. The

'master plan' defined in Section 2(h) and referred in the

definition of 'urban land' in Section 2(o), including

Explanation (C) therin, is obviously a master plan prepared

and in existence at the time of commencement of the Act when

by virtue of Section 2 of the Act, rights of the holder of

the land under the Act get 'crystallised and extinguish his

right to hold any vacant land in excess of the ceiling

limit. The proceedings for determining the vacant land in

excess of the ceiling limit according to the machinery

provisions in the Act is merely for quantification, and to

effectuate the rights and liabilities which have crys-

tallised at the time of commencement of the Act. The

contrary view taken on the construction made of these

provisions by the High Court cannot, therefore, be accepted.

On the above conclution, there is no dispute that the order

made by the District Judge has to be restored.

Consequently, the impugned orders made by the High Court in

the two writ petitions before it are set aside and the order

dated 12.2.1980 passed by the District Judge determing the

area of 6738.23 sq. mts. only as the vacant land in excess

of the ceiling limit is restored. The appeals are,

accordingly, allowed in this manner, to this extent. No

costs.

N.P.V.

Appeals allowed.

300