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CASE NO.:

Appeal (civil) 917-918 of 1998

Appeal (civil) 1265-66 of 2001

PETITIONER:

SMT. CHITRA KUMARI

Vs.

RESPONDENT:

VS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 14/02/2001

BENCH:

V.N. Khare & S.N. Variava.

JUDGMENT:

S. N. VARIAVA, J.

L...I...T.......T.......T.......T.......T.......T.......T..J

Leave granted in S.L.P. (C) Nos. 22436-22437 of 1997.

These Appeals can be disposed off by this common Judgment.

It must be first mentioned that these Appeals were on board

along with three other Civil Appeals. After arguments on

behalf of the Appellants had taken place Civil Appeal No.

3221 of 1991, Civil Appeal No. 3503 of 1991 and Civil

Appeal No. 4133 of 1991 were withdrawn by the Appellants

therein.

In these Appeals the Appellants have land with bungalows

in Ambala Cantonment area. As is being pointed out in

greater detail hereafter, the cases had, till this stage,

proceeded on the footing that the land was granted to the

predecessors of these Appellants on "old grant terms".

These Appeals therefore are fully covered by the decision of

this Court in the case of Chief Executive Officer vs.

Surendra Kumar Vakil reported in (1999) 3 SCC 555.

Before arguments are considered facts in these Appeals

need to be noted. In Civil Appeal Nos. 917-918 of 1998

Notice of Resumption was given on 28th September, 1973. A

Suit bearing No. 280 of 1975 was filed in the Court of

Senior Sub-Judge, Ambala, wherein the Order of resumption

was challenged. In the Suit it was, inter alia, averred as

follows:

"4. That the order of resumption of the above bungalow

is illegal, invalid, malafide, whimsical, unconstitutional

and in-effective against the rights of the plaintiffs, inter

alia, on the following grounds:-

(a) xxx xxx xxx

(b) That in the first instance, it is wholly incorrect

that the site on which the building is standing is an old

grant as alleged by the defendant No. 2. However, even

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notice of assumption, which the plaintiffs do not admit, in

that event too, the Government has no right to resume the

property in the manner as alleged. "

The Respondents in the Written Statement contended that

the land was on old grant terms and that they were entitled

to resume. The trial Judge, inter alia, raised an issue to

the following effect:

"1. Whether the impugned resumption order is illegal

and in operative as alleged in para no. 4 of the plaint

OPP."

Strictly speaking a specific and separate Issue on this

aspect would have had to be raised. Such a specific Issue

was not raised as, for reasons set out hereafter, it is

clear that this contention raised in para 4(b) was not being

pressed. However, it is arguable that Issue No. 4 as it is

framed covered, amongst others, the ground of challenge on

the basis that the land on which the building was standing

was not on old grant basis. Parties then led evidence. In

these Appeals the Appellants have not relied on the evidence

led by them. But the original record is before the Court.

It could not be shown to us that Plaintiff/Appellant led any

evidence claiming ownership of land in question or denying

title of Respondents. Admittedly documents shown to the

Court were not tendered as Exhibits. On the other hand

Respondents tendered and got marked as Exhibits, an

admission in writing by Appellants predecessors that the

land was on old grant terms, a copy of GGO No. 179 of 12th

September, 1836 and the Register of Land Records. Parties

then argued their respective cases. Ultimately, the Suit

was decreed by a Judgment dated 27th November, 1978. The

Judgment sets out the submissions which have been made under

the aforesaid Issue No. 1. In the submissions, as have

been reproduced in the Judgment, there is no submission to

the effect that the land was not under the old grant basis

and/or that the Respondents were not the owners of the land.

The entire submission, under Issue No. 1, has been on the

basis that the Appellants had not been heard before the

Notice of Resumption was issued and/or that compensation had

been fixed in an arbitrary manner. The Court has accepted

this submission and held that, without fixation of

compensation and an opportunity of being heard, an order of

resumption could not be passed. We have perused the entire

Judgment. In the entire Judgment there is no reference to

any submission that the land was not under an old grant

and/or that the Respondents were not the owners of the land.

Even though, the Suit has been decreed and a permanent

injunction passed in favour of the Appellants, the Court was

careful enough to hold as follows: "In view of the

evidence, reasons and findings set out above, a decree for

declaration is passed in favour of the plaintiffs and

against the defendants with costs, that the resumption order

is illegal, void and ineffective and is not binding upon the

plaintiffs and a decree for permanent injunction is also

passed, restraining the defendants from dispossessing the

plaintiffs from the property in dispute except in due course

of law."

(Emphasis supplied)

It is thus to be seen that the even while decreeing the

Suit the Court has held that the Respondents could

dispossess the Plaintiffs by following due course of law.

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The question of dispossessing the Plaintiffs/Appellants

would not arise if the Appellants were the owners of the

land and the land was not under an old grant. This clearly

shows that point was not pressed before the Trial Court

and/or that if this point was pressed it has not been held

in favour of Plaintiff/Appellant. If the point was pressed

then it must be deemed to have been decided against the

Appellant as Court has permitted dispossession by following

due course of law.

The Respondents then filed an Appeal before the District

Judge, Ambala. No cross Appeal was filed by the Appellants.

The District Judge dismissed the Appeal on 6th September,

1979. We have read the Judgment of the District Judge.

Here also there is no claim that the land was not under an

old grant. The District Judge has also in the final

paragraph of his Judgment held as follows:

"9. Lest there be any misunderstanding it is clarified

that neither the assailed order dated 27.11.1978 of the

learned trial Court nor the judgment in this appeal would in

any way stand in the way of Union of India initiating

proceedings for resumption of the disputed land after

compliance of the statutory formalities."

This clarification could only have been issued, provided

it was an admitted position that the land belonged to the

Union of India and that they could resume it by following

due process of law. If there had been a claim to the

ownership of the land by the Appellants such clarification

could not have been issued.

The Respondents then filed a Second Appeal before the

High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh. During the

pendency of this Appeal, this Court in the case of Union of

India vs. Harish Chand Anand reported in 1995 Supp. (4)

SCC 113, held that the Respondents were entitled to resume

the land without prior determination of the amount of the

structure. This Court held that the view that it was a

condition precedent for the Respondents to give notice to

the parties concerned, determine the compensation and then

only resume the property was not correct. It was held that

the view taken by the Delhi High Court in the case of Raj

Singh vs. Union of India reported in AIR 1973 Delhi 169,

was a correct view and that the Government could resume the

land merely by giving one month's notice. It was held that

the amount may have to be determined after giving an

opportunity but that this could be done thereafter. As this

Court had now finally laid down the law and as the Judgment

of the Trial Court and the first Appellate Court were only

on the basis that prior opportunity of being heard had not

been given, the High Court by its Judgment dated 7th

November, 1997 reversed the Judgment of the Trial Court as

well as the first Appellate Court and dismissed the Suit.

In its Judgment the High Court observed as follows:

"It is not in dispute that the plaintiffs are in

possession of the property in dispute on what are known as

'old grant' terms. The terms are contained in order No.

179 of 12-12-1836 issued by the Governor General of India in

Council and have been produced on record."

Thus it is to be seen that before the High Court it had

not been disputed that the land was under an old grant term

and that the terms of the old grant had been produced on

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record.

At this stage, it must be mentioned that this Court

again had occasion to consider whether the view taken by the

Delhi High Court in Raj Singh's case (supra) was correct.

This Court has, in the case of Union of India & Anr. vs.

Tek Chand and ors. reported in (1999) 3 SCC 565, again

approved the view in Raj Singh's case.

As the Appellants were now non-suited on the basis of

law finally laid down by this Court, they filed on 10th

December, 1997 a Review Petition. In this Review Petition,

for the first time, they sought to raise a point that the

land was not under the old grant terms. For the first time,

after all these years, they sought to rely on certain

documents and seek a clarification from the High Court that

its comments to the effect that "it was not in dispute that

the land was on old grant terms" were not correct and that

the same should be deleted. It was now sought to be

contended that they had never admitted that the land was on

old grant terms. This Review Petition came to be dismissed

on 24th December, 1997. Thus the High Court has confirmed

that at the time when the original Appeal was argued it was

not in dispute that the land was under old grant terms.

Civil Appeals Nos. 917-918 of 1998 are filed against the

Judgment dated 10th November, 1997 and the order dated 24th

December, 1997.

In Civil Appeals arising out of SLP (C) Nos.

22436-22437 of 1997 also the bungalow and land are in Ambala

Cantonment. The notice of resumption was given on 30th

July, 1971. The Suit was filed in the Court of the

Sub-Judge, Ist Class, Ambala. In this Suit it was contended

that it was not proved that the land was on old grant terms.

It was also urged that the terms of the old grant did not

permit resumption of land. However, no evidence was led to

prove that plaintiffs were owners. Plaintiff/Appellant and

his witnesses did not depose that land did not belong to the

Respondents. The Respondents had brought on record and got

exhibited an admission in writing, by the predecessors of

the Appellants, that the land was on old grant terms, the

GGO No. 179 dated 12th September, 1836 and the Register of

Land Records. In this case on the basis of evidence on

record the Trial Court dismissed the Suit.

The Appellants then filed an Appeal. In the Appeal also

it was contended that it was not proved that the land was on

old grant terms. The Appellate Court, after considering the

evidence, dismissed the Appeal on 3rd September, 1986. The

Appellants then filed a Letters Patent Appeal which was

dismissed by the High Court on 8th July, 1997. A Review

Petition was also filed and the same was also dismissed on

7th October, 1997. Thus in this case the Appellants have

lost in all Courts. All Courts have, on evidence and facts,

held against the Appellants.

It must be mentioned that, in some other case filed by

these Appellants in 1990, an application is made calling

upon the Respondents to produce the old grant and certain

other documents. In that Suit the Respondents have replied

that the original records regarding the bungalow in question

and the Notification through GGO 179 of 12th September, 1836

were applied to the Ambala Cantonment, but that the papers

showing that Ambala Cantonment was a station of the

Bangalore Army and the Notification were not available on

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record.

These are the facts in brief. Now let us consider the

submissions.

Mr. Andhyarujina submitted that his case was not

covered by the decision in Harish Chand's case (supra).

Relying on Para 4(b) of the Plaint, which has been set out

hereinabove, he submitted that his clients had always

disputed that the land was on old grant basis. He submitted

that in the Suit the old grant has not been brought on

record by the Respondents till date. He pointed out that

all that had been brought on record was the cyclostyled copy

of the Governor General in Council Order No. 179 dated 12th

September, 1836. He submitted that this was not the old

grant. He submitted that the grant would necessarily have

to be a registered document. He submitted that as the

Respondents were contending that the land was on old grant

terms, it was for the Respondents to prove their case by

producing the old grant. Mr. Andhyarujina submitted that

an admission did not confer title. He submitted that if the

Respondents were claiming to be owners of the land it was

for them to prove their ownership.

He submitted that the Appellants had ample evidence to

show that they were the owners of the land. In support of

this he relied upon a Sale Deed dated 21st April, 1926

between Milliam Robert Pearce and George Erner Sysmes on the

one hand and Lala Balmokand Bhalla on the other. In this

Deed it is recided that one Lewis Herbert Robbin had

appointed the vendors as his executors to administrate his

affairs and that the said Lewis Herbert Roobin had expired

on 1st May, 1925. It is stated that the Will had been

proved in the High Court at Lahore and that the vendors were

now the owners of the property and were selling the same.

He pointed out that the recital showed that the property was

on a perpetual lease free from rent from the Secretary of

State for India in Council. He submitted that this was a

registered document which showed that the land in question

was not under old grant terms.

Mr. Andhyarujina also relied upon a Lease dated 28th

August, 1936, wherein Lala Balmokand Bhalla had leased out a

dwelling house along with out houses and land to the

Secretary of State for India in Council. He submitted that

if the land was on old grant terms, then there was no

question of the predecessors in title of the Appellants

leasing out the land to the Secretary of State for India in

Council. Mr. Andhyarujina also relied upon another Sale

Deed dated 25th January, 1943, by which Balmokand Bhalla

sold the property to Lala Padam Pershad and Lala Mahabir

Pershad.

Mr. Andhyarujina submitted that if this land was on old

grant terms, then not only the lease would not have been

executed, but such sales could not have taken place as the

old grant terms did not permit transfer without written

permissions. At this stage it must be noticed that none of

these documents had been brought on record in the Suit.

These documents had been annexed for the first time, only in

the Review Petition filed in the High Court.

Mr. Andhyarujina submitted that earlier the Himachal

Pradesh High Court had, in the case of Durga Das Sud vs.

Union of India reported in AIR 1972 HP 26, taken the view

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that principles of natural justice had to be complied with

and that no notice of resumption could be given unless and

until compensation was first fixed after hearing the

concerned parties. He pointed out that the Allahabad High

Court had taken the same view in the case of Mohan Agarwal

vs. Union of India reported in AIR 1979 All. 170. He

submitted that this was the law which prevailed. He

submitted that because of this law the trial Court took an

easy way out and decided his clients' suit only on the

narrow point of principles of natural justice not having

been followed. He submitted that it has nowhere been

mentioned that his clients had not pursued or had given up

their case that the land was not on old grant terms. He

submitted that merely because the Trial Court took an easy

way out and did not decide all the points urged by his

clients would be no reason for depriving the Appellants of

their valuable right. He submitted that as his clients had

succeeded in the trial Court they did not need to file an

Appeal. He submitted that before the first Appellate Court

also his clients succeeded. He submitted that only in 1995,

in Harish Chand's case (supra), this Court overruled the

view taken by Allahabad High Court and the Himachal Pradesh

High Court and approved a contrary view taken by the Delhi

High Court in Raj Singh's case (supra). He submitted that

the trial Court and Appellate Court decided in his clients

favour only on the basis of the law then existing. He

submitted that the Courts chose to decide the case merely on

one point, even though his clients had at all stages not

given up the case that the land was not on old grant terms.

He submitted that his client cannot be made to suffer

because the Courts chose not to decide other aspects.

Mr. Andhyarujina relied upon Section 110 of the Indian

Evidence Act and submitted that whenever a question arises

whether any person is the owner of anything of which he is

shown to be in possession, the burden of proving that he is

not the owner is on the person who affirms that he is not

the owner. He submits that the Appellants and their

predecessors in title have been in possession since at least

1926. He submits that the burden was entirely on the

Respondents to show that they were not the owners. He

submits that the only way that the burden could have been

discharged was to produce the old grant. He submits that

merely producing a Register in which it has been mentioned

that the property is on old grant terms is not sufficient.

He submits that the Register and the copy of GGO 179 of 1836

would be secondary evidence. He submitted that such

evidence would be barred under the provisions of Section 91

of the Indian Evidence Act unless it was shown that the old

grant was not available. He submitted that in this case no

evidence had been led to show that the old grant, if there

was one, had been lost or misplaced or that it was not

available. He submitted that mere production of Register or

a cyclostyled copy of the terms of the grant was no evidence

at all.

In support of his submission he relied upon the case of

Union of India vs. Purushotam Dass Tandon reported in 1986

(Supp) SCC 720. In this case Allahabad Polytechnic filed an

interpleader Suit as there was a dispute between the persons

who had let out the property to them and the Union of India

as to the ownership of the property. In the interpleader

Suit the question was whether the person who had let out the

property to the Polytechnic was the owner or whether the

Union of India was the owner of that property. The Court

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held that the burden to prove its title was on the Union of

India and that it should discharge their burden by producing

the old grant. The Court held that the Court should know

the terms and the date of the grant and that an admission in

a standard draft for seeking permission of the Cantonment

Board for transfer was no proof of title. However, to be

noted, this was a case where the question of title of the

Union was in serious dispute.

Mr. Andhyarujina also relied upon the authority in the

case of P. T. Anklesaria vs. H. C. Vashistha reported

in AIR 1980 Bombay 9. In this case the land and house in

the Pune Cantonment were sought to be resumed. Resumption

was challenged on the ground that this was not Government

land. It was held that it cannot be said that all land in

the Cantonment were Government land and there was no land of

private ownership in the Cantonment. It was held that it

had first to be established that the land belonged to the

Government. It was held that even though there may be

entries in the Register of the Government, those entries

raised no presumption that they are true, until the contrary

is proved. It must also be mentioned that this matter

ultimately came up before this Court. This Court has

remitted the matter back to the High Court with permission

to the Union to lead proper evidence, if it so chose. This

again was a case where there was a dispute whether the land

belonged to the Government.

Mr. Andhyarujina then submitted that there was nothing

to show that the GGO No. 179 dated 12th September, 1836

applied to Ambala. He submitted that there was nothing to

show that Ambala was part of the Bengal Army. In this

behalf he referred to the reply filed by the Respondents,

wherein it has been stated as follows:

"8. G.G.O. 179 of 12.9.1836 is applicable to all the

cantonments of India. For the purpose of administration the

Bengal Army was organized in two portions the Bengal Command

and the Punjab Command. The Punjab Command included the

Peshwar Cantonment. Notes on old grant terms in Military

Land Manual are being filed as ANNEXURE-R- 2."

He submitted that in support of this contention the

Respondents were relying upon the Extract from the Military

Land Manual which had been annexed to the said Affidavit.

He pointed out that in this Extract there was not a word

about Ambala. He submitted that in the Rejoinder the

Appellants have denied that Ambala fell within the Bengal

Army.

Mr. Yogeshwar Prasad on behalf of the Appellants, in

Civil Appeals arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 22436-22437 of

1997, supported Mr. Andhyarujina in his arguments. He

further submitted that in his case it was all along disputed

that the land was on old grant. He submitted that the grant

had not been produced in this case. He pointed out that in

the subsequent Suit which was filed in 1990 it had been

admitted that these papers were not available. He submitted

that Ambala became a Cantonment only in 1845. Threfore, GGO

179 of 1836 could not possibly apply to Ambala. He

submitted that in his case also there was no proof to show

that the land was on old grant terms. Mr. Yogeshwar Prasad

also relied on certain Sale Deeds and a Lease Deed.

However, these have been produced, for the first time, in

this Appeal.

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On the other hand, Mr. Rohtagi submitted that in Civil

Appeal Nos. 917-918 of 1998 it was an admitted position

that the land was on old grant terms. He submits in Civil

Appeals (arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 22436-22437 of 1997)

that on facts all Courts had held in favour of the

Respondents. He points out that in both the cases the

Appellants or the predecessors had given affidavits

admitting the fact that the land was on old grant terms. He

points out that the affidavits were tendered in evidence and

marked as exhibits and/or are on record. He submits that

the notices of resumption were given in 1971 and 1973. He

submits that Mr. Andhyarujina's clients have litigated for

the last approximately 17 years on an admitted position that

the land was on old grant terms. He submits that it is now

too late in the day and would be a travesty of justice if

they were to be permitted to resile from the admitted

position and at this belated stage be allowed to contend

that the land did not belong to the Government. He submits

that Mr. Yogeshwar Prasad's clients have lost in all Courts

on facts and have not been able to show that the findings of

the Courts below are not based on evidence in that case.

Mr. Rohtagi pointed out, from the original records

which were available in this Court, that in Civil Appeal

Nos. 917-918 of 1998 the Appellants had given evidence. He

pointed out that in the evidence there was not even a

statement that the Appellants or their predecessors were the

owners of the property and/or that the Government was not

the owner of the land. He points out that in this case the

documents which have been relied upon by Mr. Andhyarujina

were not part of the record and had been surreptitiously

brought on record by way of Review Petition only after the

High Court delivered the impugned Judgment. He further

points out that in the Civil Appeals (arising out of SLP (C)

Nos. 22436-22437 of 1997) some documents have been produced

for the first time in the Appeal and are now sought to be

relied upon. He submits that the ratios laid down, in the

cases of P. T. Anklesaria and Purushotam Dass Tandon

(supra), have no application to these cases. He submits

that those were cases where it was denied that the land was

on old grant terms. He submits that in those cases the

Government was required to prove that it was the owner and

had failed to do so. He submits that in one of these cases

it has been an admitted position that the land was on old

grant terms and in the other all Courts have, on facts, held

in favour of the Respondents. He further points out that,

even though it was not necessary, in Civil Appeal Nos.

917-918 of 1998, the witness of the Government had given

evidence that this is a Government land. He points out that

the witness has produced the Register of land records

showing that the land is on old grant terms. He points out

that the witness has produced GGO 179 dated 12th September,

1836. He submits that even in Civil Appeals (arising out of

SLP (C) Nos. 22436-22437 of 1997) the Government has

produced the Register of Land records and the GGO. He

submits that in both the cases the Government has produced

written admissions of the parties or their predecessors that

the land was on old grant terms.

He submits that these cases are fully covered by the

authority of this Court in Surendra Kumar Vakil's case

(Supra). He further submits that an admission is a strong

piece of evidence and is relevant and admissible by virtue

of Section 21 of the Indian Evidence Act. He submits that

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such an admission would be binding unless he is able to

explain away such admission. He submits that neither of the

Appellants have given any explanation or even stated that

the admission was given under force or compulsion. He

submits that counsel cannot for the first time, in arguments

during SLP, supply explanation on behalf of their clients.

He submits that the Appellants have no case at all and the

Appeals must be dismissed.

We have considered the rival submission. In our view

Mr. Rohtagi is quite right. It is now too late in the day

for Mr. Andhyarujina's clients to take a contrary stand.

Mr. Yogeshwar Prasad's clients have on facts lost in all

Courts below. Notice to produce documents, given belatedly

in some other case, is of no relevance so far as these

Appeals are concerned. The practice of annexing irrelevant

documents and trying to rely on them for the first time in

the Appeal or in Review Petitions in the High Court should

be deprecated.

In Civil Appeal Nos. 917-918 of 1998 it is clear that,

at all stages, the case has progressed on the basis that it

was not disputed that the land was on old grant terms. Of

course, in the Plaint, in Para. 4(b) it had been averred

that the land was not on old grant terms. However, except

for making such an averment that point has clearly not been

pressed at any stage. In evidence given by the plaintiff

and/or on his behalf, there is no statement that the land

was of plaintiff ownership and/or that the land did not

belong to the Government. During trial the documents, now

sought to be relied upon by Mr. Andhyarujina were neither

produced nor tendered nor got marked as Exhibits. Were they

produced Respondents would have had an opportunity to cross

examine the witnesses and show that the averments in the

documents were not correct and/or to explain how and why

lease was taken by the Secretary of the State. It is clear

that the averments in para 4(b) of the Plaint were not

pressed. That they were not pressed is also clear from the

Judgment of the Trial Court. It sets out all the arguments

of the parties. No submission on the question of ownership

of land by the Plaintiff and/or that the land was not on old

grant terms has been recorded. If it was argued and their

submissions were not recorded cross objections should have

been filed particularly when in the last paragraph the Trial

Court clarifies that the Government could resume the land

after following due procedure of law. There could be no

question of resumption if it was being disputed that the

Government was the owner of the land. If Mr. Andhyarujina

is right and the parties had not given up this contention,

then it would be worse for the Appellants inasmuch as it

would then mean that the trial Court had not accepted

Plaintiffs/Appellants claim to ownership of land and had

negatived it.

The Appellants never went in Appeal against the Judgment

of the Trial Court. Even when the Respondents went in

Appeal no cross objections were filed. Even before the

first Appellate Court it has not been stated that their

submissions were not dealt with and/or that the portion of

the Judgment permitting resumption, after due process of

law, could not have been granted. On the contrary the first

Appellate Court is also clarifying that the Government can

resume after following due process of law. This shows that

even before the first Appellate Court it was an admitted

position that the Government was the owner of the land and

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that the land was on old grant terms.

When the Respondents went in Second Appeal before the

High Court, at this stage also, no cross objections were

filed. Before the High Court it was not disputed that the

land was on old grant terms. The High Court has so recorded

in its Judgment. It is settled law that one has to proceed

on basis of what has been recorded by the Court. If any

party feels aggrieved of what has been recorded by the

Courts a clarification has to be sought from that same

Court. In this case the clarification was sought, by way of

Review Petition, to which as stated above, fresh documents

were purported to be attached for the first time. The High

Court has rejected the Review Petition. The High Court has

thus confirmed that at the time the Second Appeal was argued

it was not disputed that the land was on old grant terms.

This Court has to go by what has been recorded in the

Judgement. What is recorded in the Judgment is supported by

the conduct of the parties inasmuch as no evidence was led

to dispute the fact, no documents were tendered or marked as

Exhibits and no submissions were made on this aspect. That

it was not disputed that the land was on old grant terms is

also supported by what has been recorded in the Judgments of

the trial court and the First Appellate Court. There is no

evidence that the written admissions were taken forciby

and/or that they were not binding or not correct.

Admissions are relevant evidence if not explained away.

Thus these cases have been fought over the last 17 years on

an admitted position. Mr. Rohtagi is right that it would

be a travesty of justice and would amount to permitting

parties to misuse laws delays if at this stage they are

permitted to change their stand and take contentions which

are contrary to what has been the admitted position all

these years.

In Civil Appeals (arising out of SLP (C) Nos.

22436-22437 of 1997) all the Courts below have given

concurrent findings of fact. We see no infirmity in these

findings. The findings of fact are based on evidence before

the Trial Court and require no interference.

Once it is admitted that land was on old grant terms it

is irrelevant to argue that it is not shown that Ambala was

under the Bengal Army. The same would be the position when

on evidence Court has held that land is on old grant terms.

It may only be mentioned that even in the three Appeals

which were withdrawn, it had been an admitted position that

the land was on old grant terms. As that position could not

be controverted and as those parties were fully covered by

Surendra Kumar Vakil's case (supra), those Appeals were

withdrawn.

In these Appeals, the principles laid down in Purushotam

Dass Tandon's case and P. T. Anklesaria's case (supra)

would not apply. In our view, these Appeals are fully

covered by the ratio laid down in Surendra Kumar Vakil's

case. In our view there is no infirmity in the impugned

Judgments of the High Courts. Accordingly, these Appeals

are dismissed. There will, however, be no Order as to

costs.