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PETITIONER:

SMT. GULWANT KAUR & ANOTHER

Vs.

RESPONDENT:

MOHINDER SINGH & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT20/07/1987

BENCH:

REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J)

BENCH:

REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J)

SHETTY, K.J. (J)

CITATION:

1987 AIR 2251 1987 SCR (3) 576

1987 SCC (3) 674 JT 1987 (3) 121

1987 SCALE (2)82

CITATOR INFO :

D 1991 SC1581 (9,10)

ACT:

Hindu Succession Act, 1956--Section 14--Hindu lady

receiving land from husband in lieu of maintenance--Suffi-

cient title to enable ripening of possession into full

ownership.

HEADNOTE:

The appellant-wife and her husband were estranged and

living apart. The husband, by a letter dated July 28, 1956,

entrusted.to the appellant the land in dispute alongwith

another piece of land and a house and agreed to pay a sum of

Rs.100 per mouth for her maintenance. After a few years, the

husband conceived the idea of selling the land in dispute.

The appellant protested by her letter dated June 15, 1966

and implored him not to sell the land. Despite this, the

husband sold the said land to the plaintiff-respondents.

The purchaser instituted a suit for an injunction re-

straining the appellants from interfering with possession,

which was contested initially on the ground that the land

had been gifted to the appellant orally by the husband, and

that title had been acquired by adverse possession. Later,

the written statement was amended and a further plea was

taken that the said land had been given in lieu of mainte-

nance and that she had become the absolute owner of the land

under Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act. All courts

found that there was no oral gift.

A Single Judge of the High Court held that the land was

given to the appellant by her husband in lieu of maintenance

and that by Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, she had

become full owner of the property.

On appeal under the Letters Patent, a Division Bench of

the High Court held that "The reading of the letter left no

meaning of doubt that there was never any intention on the

part of the husband to give away the land to the lady and

that instead of sending the total amount in cash he allowed

her to utilise the amount of ckakota for meeting her day to

day expenses", that she did not at all acquire any such

right or interest in the property as could be termed 'limit-

ed ownership' so as to permit

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577

her to take the benefit of the provisions of Section 14(1)

of the Hindu Succession Act, that "if the husband had given

over the land in dispute completely to the lady, then the

question of sending more money could not have arisen" and

reversed the Judgment of the Single Judge.

The appellant appealed to this Court. On behalf of the

respondents, it was contended that even if the land was

given to the appellant in lieu of maintenance, it must be

established that what was given to her was a limited estate

in the sense of ownership without the right of alienation

and that under Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act only

such a limited estate would blossom into an absolute estate.

Allowing the appeal, this Court,

HELD: 1.1 Section 14 is aimed at removing restrictions

or limitations on the right of a female Hindu to enjoy, as a

full owner, property possessed by her so long as her posses-

sion is traceable to a lawful origin, that is to say, if she

has a vestige of a title. It makes no difference whether the

property is acquired by inheritance or devise or at a parti-

tion or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance or

by gift or by her own skill or exertion or by purchase or by

prescription or in any other manner whatsoever. The Explana-

tion to the Section expressly refers to property acquired in

lieu of maintenance and the widow is not required to estab-

lish her further title before she could claim full owner-

ship, under Section 14(1) in respect of property given to

her and possessed by her in lieu of maintenance. [582F-H]

1.2 The very right to receive maintenance is sufficient

title to enable the ripening of possession into full owner-

ship if she is in possession of the property in lieu of

maintenance. Sub-section (2) of Section 14 is in the nature

of an exception to Section 14(1) and provides for a situa-

tion where property is acquired by a female Hindu under a

written instrument or a decree of court and not where such

acquisition is traceable to any antecedent right. [582H;

583A]

2. If a female Hindu is put in possession of property

pursuant to or in recognition of a right to maintenance, it

cannot be denied that she has acquired a limited right or

interest in the property and once that position is accepted,

it follows that the right gets enlarged to full ownership

under Section 14(1) of the Act. That is clear from the

language of Section 14(1) of the Act. [586B-C]

3.1 In the instant case, the question was not whether the

husband

578

intended to give away the land in dispute absolutely but

whether the land was given to her in lieu of maintenance. A

perusal of the letters exchanged between the husband and the

appellant-wife clearly establishes that the land in dispute

was given by the husband in lieu of maintenance. The Divi-

sion Bench of the High Court was wrong in making distinction

between day-to-day expenses and maintenance. [581F-G]

3.2 It is rather late in the day to contend that the

land which was given to the appellant in lieu of maintenance

did not vest in her absolutely. [586F]

[The Judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court

set aside and that of the Single Judge restored. ]

Eramma v. Verrupanna & Ors., [1966] 2 SCR 626, distin-

guished.

Badri Pershad v. Smt. Kanso Devi, [1970] 2 SCR 95;

Naraini Devi v. Smt. Rano Devi and Ors., [1976] 3 SCR 55; V.

Tulasamma & Ors. v. V. Sesha Reddi (Dead) by L.Rs., [1977] 3

SCR 261; Bai Vajia (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Thakorbhai Chelabhai

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and Ors., [1979] 3 SCR 291; Santhanam v. Subramanya AIR 1977

SC 2024 and Jagannathan Pillai v. Kunjithapadam Pillai,

[1987] 2 SCC 572, referred to.

JUDGMENT:

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1112 of

1980.

From the Judgment and Order dated 13.5. 1980 of the

Punjab and Haryana High Court in L.P.A. No. 521 of 1976.

Ms. Kamini Jaiswal for the Appellants.

V.M. Tarkunde, Harbans Singh and S.K. Bagga for the

Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

CHINNAPPA REDDY, J. Major General Gurbux Singh and his

wife Gulwant Kaur were estranged and were living apart.

Their son and daughter-in-law were living with Gulwant Kaur

at Chandigarh. Gulwant Kaur was apparently complaining that

Major General Gurbux Singh was not providing her with ade-

quate maintenance. Therefore, on July 28, 1958, he wrote her

a letter, the relevant parts of which are as follows:.

579

"To,

Shrimati Gulwant Kaur,

You have been complaining that I have

not paid even a penny for maintenance for the

last seven/eight months. Here is an account

from November 1957 to July, 1958, the details

of which run as under:

XXXXXXXXXXXXX

XXXXXX

XXXXX

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

XXXXXX

Now, so far as the question of future expenses

is concerned, the maintenance shall be like

this:

FOR YOURSELF:

1. The land and house situated at

Mangwal, which was constructed with the

earning of my whole life, is entrusted to you,

the half portion of which already stands in

your name and in lieu of the produce thereof

Madanjit shall provide to you, if not more,

free lodging and boarding (expenses for

maintenance). You stay in your own home.

2. The land at Khurana is also

entrusted to you. Its produce, lease money,

etc. will fetch you a minimum of Rs. 1200

annually i.e. Rs. 100 per month for

maintenance.

3. I shall pay Rs. 100 every month for

maintenance.

xxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

XXXXXX

The letter of Gurbux Singh suggested that he was making

adequate provision for meeting the expenses of Gulwant Kaur

even at the cost of great inconvenience and discomfort to

himself and so. Gulwant Kaur was not entitled to complain.

Gulwant Kaur apparently felt disgusted and frustrated at the

tone of the letter and by her letter dated August 5, 2958,

she queried if she was not to take maintenance from

580

Gurbux Singh from who else was she to get any maintenance.

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She said that she was not demanding anything and made no

claim on him and that everything including the land and

kothi belonged to him. The Khurana land also belonged to

him. He might give her maintenance or not give her mainte-

nance as he chose. She said that she was nothing more than a

heap of dust and her life was not worth living. In another

portion of the letter, she mentioned that the Khurana land

had not yet been leased and that there had been some delay.

Other correspondence passed between the parties which is not

important for the present case. Later, after a few years,

Gurbux Singh conceived the idea of selling the Khurana land.

The wife protested. Her letter dated January 15, 1966 was as

follows:-

"Most respected husband,

Sat Siri Akal;

Previously in the summer, Col.

Gurcharan Singh told us that you want to sell

the land of Khurana. Now, on the day you

visited Sangrur, it was learnt from you that

you were interested in selling the land. I

also told you that we depend upon only that.

This land was given to me by you voluntarily.

You had written letters to me and Madanjit on

July 28, 1958 copy whereof is being sent to

you by me. Therein, it was decided that I

would continue enjoying the produce thereof

till my life. Now, on hearing that you want to

sell it, I was very much

shocked ................ Now this letter is

being written to you in order to impress upon

you not to sell the land of Khurana because

Madanjit and I depend upon it. You are very

well aware that we do not possess anything

else ................... I fully hope that

you will continue giving me this land and the

maintenance grants to me as per your decision

and will not think of selling this land. You

are aware how we are hardly mai

ntaining ourselves. I have made this prayer to

you. I have full right over it. I hope that

you will reply soon."

Gulwant Kaur's letter did not have any effect on Major

General Gurbux Singh. Instead of replying her, he sold the

Khurana land to the plaintiff-respondents on June 18, 1968.

The purchaser instituted the present suit out of which the

appeal arises for an injunction restraining Gulwant Kaur and

Madanjit Singh from interfering with their possession. The

defendants contested the suit initially on the ground that

the

581

land had been gifted to Gulwant Kaur orally by Major General

Gurbux Singh. It was also claimed that Gulwant Kaur had

acquired title by adverse possession. Later the written

statement was amended and a further plea was taken that the

land in dispute had been given to Gulwant Kaur in lieu of

maintenance and that she had become the absolute owner of

the land under sec. 14 of the Hindu Succession Act. All the

courts found that there was no oral gift. A learned single

Judge of the High Court who heard the second appeal held

that the Khurana Land was given to Gulwant Kaur by her

husband Major General Gurbux Singh in lieu of maintenance

and that by virtue of sec. 14 of the Hindu Succession Act,

she had become full owner of the property. On an appeal

under the Letters Patent, a Division Bench of the High Court

of Punjab & Haryana held that Gulwant Kaur was merely al-

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lowed to receive the proceeds of the land in dispute in

order to meet her day-to-day expenses and that she did not

at all acquire any such right or interest in the property as

could be termed 'limited ownership' so as to permit her to

take the benefit of the provisions of sec. 14(1) of the

Hindu Succession Act. According to the learned Judges, "If

the General had given over the land in dispute completely to

the lady then the question of sending more money could not

have arisen ..... The reading of the letter leaves no

manner of doubt that there was never any intention on the

part of the General to give away the land of village Khurana

to the lady and that instead of sending the total amount in

cash, the General allowed her to utilise the amount of

ckakota for meeting her day-to-day expenses." The Division

Bench reversed the judgment of the learned Single Judge.

We are unable to agree with the conclusions of the

Division Bench of the High Court. The question was not

whether Major General Gurbux Singh intended to give away the

Khurana land absolutely to Gulwant Kaur but whether the land

was given to her in lieu of maintenance. A perusal of the

letter dated July 28, 1958 from Major General Gurbux Singh

to Gulwant Kaur and the letter dated January 15, 1966 clear-

ly establish that the Khurana land was given to Gulwant Kaur

by Gurbux Singh in lieu of her maintenance. We are unable to

understand the distinction made by the High Court between

day-today expenses and maintenance. It was argued by Shri

Tarkunde, learned counsel for the respondents that even if

the land was given to Gulwant Kaur in lieu of maintenance,

it must be established that what was given to her was a

limited estate in the sense of ownership without the right

of alienation and that under sec. 14 of the Hindu Succession

Act only such a limited estate would blossom into an abso-

lute estate. We are unable to agree with the submission of

Shri Tarkunde. Shri

582

Tarkunde invited our attention to some decisions of this

court as supporting the preposition stated by him. We will

presently refer to all of them.

Sec. 14 of the Hindu Succession Act is as

follows:

"(1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu,

whether acquired before or after the

commencement of this Act, shall be held by her

as full owner thereof and not as a limited

owner.

Explanation--In this sub-section,

"property" includes both movable and immovable

property acquired by a female Hindu by

inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or

in lieu of maintenance or arrears of

maintenance, or by gift from any person,

whether a relative or not, before, at or

after her marriage, or by her own skill or

exertion, or by purchase or by prescription,

or in any other manner whatsoever, and also

any such property held by her as stridhana

immediately before the commencement of this

Act.

(2) Nothing contained in sub-

section (1) shall apply to any property

acquired by any of gift or under a will or any

other instrument or under a decree or order of

a civil court or under an award where the

terms of the gift, will or other instrument or

the decree, order or award prescribe a

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restricted estate in such property."

It is obvious that sec. 14 is aimed at removing restric-

tions or limitations on the right of a female Hindu to

enjoy, as a full owner, property possessed by her so long as

her possession is traceable to a lawful origin, that is to

say, if she has a vestige of a title. It makes no difference

whether the property is acquired by inheritance or devise or

at a partition or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of

maintenance or by gift or by her own skill or exertion or by

purchase or by prescription or in any other manner whatsoev-

er. The explanation expressly refers to property acquired in

lieu of maintenance and we do not see what further title the

widow is required to establish before she can claim full

ownership under sec. 14(1) in respect of property given to

her and possessed by her in lieu of maintenance. The very

right to receive maintenance is sufficient title to enable

the ripening of possession into full ownership if she is in

possession of the property in lieu of maintenance. Sub-sec.

2 of sec. 14 is in the nature of an exception to sec.

583

14(1) and provides for a situation where property is ac-

quired by a female Hindu under a written instrument or a

decree of court and not where such acquisition is traceable

to any antecedents right.

In Bramma v. Verrupanna, [1966] 2 SCR 626 on the death

of the last male holder, his two step mothers who had no

vestige of title to the properties got possession of the

properties and in answer to a suit by the rightful heirs,

one of them claimed that she had become full owner of the

property under sec. 14 of the Hindu Succession Act. The

Supreme Court pointed out that the object of sec. 14 was to

extinguish the estate called limited estate and to make a

Hindu woman who would otherwise be a limited owner, a full

owner of the property but it was not to confer a title on a

female Hindu, who did not in fact possess any vestige of

title. The case did not deal with the case of Hindu a woman

who was given property in lieu of maintenance and in whom

therefore a right or interest was created in the property.

In Badri Pershad v, Smt, Kanso Devi, [1970] 2 SCR 95.

The Court pointed out that a Hindu widow who after the death

of her husband obtained properties under a partition award

between herself and her sons, would be entitled to an abso-

lute estate under sec. 14(1) of the Act and that merely

because the partition was by means of an arbitration award,

sec. 14(2) would not be attracted. It was made clear that

sec. 14(2) was in the nature of a proviso or an exception to

sec. 14(1) and that it came into operation only if the Hindu

woman required the property in any of the methods indicated

therein for the first time without their being any pre-

existing right in her to the property. The principle of the

case far from supporting Shri Tarkunde's submission supports

the submission of the appellants,

In Naraini Devi v. Smt. Rano Devi and Ors., [1976] 3 SCR

55 the case of Badri Pershad v. Smt. Kanso Devi (supra) was

distinguished on the ground that the widow had no pre-exist-

ing right in the property which she obtained under an award

and therefore, the case fell squarely within sec. 14(2) of

the Hindu Succession Act.

In Tulasamma v. Sesha Reddi, [1977] 3 SCR 261, it was

clearly laid down that sec. 14(1) would be applicable to

property given to a female Hindu in lieu of maintenance. It

was also made clear that sec. 14(2) would apply only to

cases where the acquisition of property was made by a Hindu

female without any pre-existing right. It was said.

"It will, therefore, be seen that sub-sec. (1) of sec.

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584

14 is large in its amplitude and covers every kind of acqui-

sition of property by a female Hindu including acquisition

in lieu of maintenance and where such property was possessed

by her at the date of commencement of the Act or

subsequently acquired and possessed, she would become the

full owner of the property. Now, sub-section (2) of sec. 14

provides that nothing contained in sub-sec. (1) shall apply

to another property acquired by way of gift or under a will

or any instrument or under a decree by order of a civil

court or under an award when the terms of the gift, will or

other instrument or the decree, order or award prescribed a

restricted estate in such property. This provision is more

in the nature of a proviso or an exception to sub-sec. (1)

and it was regarded as such by this court in Badri Pershad

v. Kanso Devi (supra) ...................................

...........................................................

It is, therefore, clear that under the Shastric Hindu Law a

widow has a right to be maintained out of joint family

property and this right would ripen into a charge if the

widow takes the necessary steps for having her maintenance

ascertained and specifically charged in the joint family

property and even if no specific charge is created, this

right would be enforceable against joint family property in

the hands of a volunteer or a purchaser taking it with

notice of her claim. The right of the widow to be maintained

is of course not a jus in rem, since it does not give her

any interest in the joint family property but it is certain-

ly jus ad rem, i.e., a right against the joint family

property. Therefore, when specific property is allotted to

the widow in lieu of her claim for maintenance, the allot-

ment would be in satisfaction of her jus ad rem, namely, the

right to be maintained out of the joint family property. It

would not be a grant for the first time without any preex-

isting right, in the widow. The widow would be getting the

property in virtue of her pre-existing right, the instrument

giving the property being merely a document effectuating

such pre-existing right and not making a grant of the

property to her for the first time without any antecedent

right 'or title. There is also another consideration which

is very relevant to this issue and it is that, even if the

instrument were silent as to the nature of the interest

given

585

to the widow in the property and did not, in

so many terms, prescribe that she would have a

limited interest, she would have no more than

a limited interest in the property under the

Hindu Law 'as it stood prior to the enactment

of the Act and hence a provision in the

instrument prescribing that she would have

only a limited interest in the property would

be, to quote the words of this Court in Nirmal

Chand's case (supra), "merely recording the

true legal position" and that would not

attract the applicability of sub-section (2)

but would be governed by sub-section (1) of

section 14. The conclusion is, therefore,

inescapable that where property is allotted to

a widow under an instrument, decree, order or

award prescribes a restricted estate for her

in the property and sub-section (2) of section

14 would have no application in such a case."

In Bai Vajia v. Thakorbhai Chelabhai, [1979] 3

SCR 291, the court referred to the earlier

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judgment in Tulsamma's case and

said, "All the three Judges were thus

unanimous in accepting the appeal on the

ground that Tulsamma's right to maintenance

was a pre-existing right, that it was in

recognition of such a right that she obtained

property under the compromise and that the

compromise therefore did not fall within the

ambit of sub-section (2) of section 14 of the

Act but would attract the provisions of sub-

section (1) thereof coupled with the

Explanation thereto. With respect we find

ourselves in complete agreement with the

conclusions arrived at by Bhagwati and Fazal

Ali, JJ., as also the reasons which weighed

with them in coming to those conclusions."

Shri Tarkunde particulary relied on the

following passage in Bai Vajia v. Thakorbhai's

case:

"A plain reading of sub-section(1)

makes it clear that the concerned Hindu female

must have limited ownership in property, which

limited ownership would get enlarged by the

operation of that sub-section. If it was

intended to enlarge any sort of a right which

could in no sense be described as ownership,

the expression "and not as a limited owner"

would not have been used at all and becomes

redundant, which is against the well-

recognised

586

principle of interpretation of statutes that

the Legislature does not employ meaningless

language."

We do not understand the court as laying down that what was

enlarged by sub-sec. 1 of sec. 14 into a full estate was the

Hindu woman's estate known to Hindu law. When the court uses

the word 'limited estate', the words are used to connote a

right in the property to which the possession of the female

Hindu may be legitimately traced, but which is not a full

right of ownership. If a female Hindu is put in possession

of property pursuant to or in recognition of a right to

maintenance, it cannot be denied that she has acquired a

limited right or interest in the property and once that

position is accepted, it follows that the right gets en-

larged to full ownership under sec. 14(1) of the Act. That

seems to us to follow clearly from the language of sec.

14(1) of the Act.

In Sellammal v. Nellammal, AIR 1977 SC 1265, the court

held that property allotted to a Hindu widow in lieu of her

maintenance in recognition of her pre-existing right became

her the asbolute property.

In Santnanam v. Subramanya, AIR 1977 SC 2024, it was

again held that property in the possession of a widow of the

deceased coparcener which had been allotted to her for life

in lieu of maintenance without power of alienation became

her absolute property under s. 14(1) of the Act with powers

of alienation.

In Krishna Das v. Venkayya, AIR 1978 SC 36 1, it was

reiterated that where a widow was put in possession of joint

family property in lieu of her right to maintenance, her

right to the property became enlarged into an absolute

estate under s. 14(1). We, therefore, think that it is

rather late in the day for Shri Tarkunde to contend that the

Khurana land which was given to Gulwant Kaur in lieu of

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maintenance did not vest in her absolutely.

We may finally refer to a recent decision of this Court

in Jagannathan Pillai v. Kunjithapadam Pillai, [1987] 2 SCC

572 where Thakkar and Ray, JJ. pointed out.

" On an analysis of Section 14(1) of the

Hindu Succession Act of 1955, it is evident

that the legislature has abolished the concept

of limited ownership in respect of a Hindu

female and has enacted that any property

possessed by her would thereafter be held by

her as a full owner. Section 14(1) would come

into operation if the property

587

(Sic) at the point of time when she has an

occasion to claim or assert a title thereto.

Or, in other words, at the point of time when

her right to the said property is called into

question. The legal effect of section 14(1)

would be that after the coming into operation

of the Act there would be no property in

respect of which it could be contended by

anyone that a Hindu female is only a limited

owner and not a full owner. (We are for the

moment not concerned with the fact that sub-

section(2) of section 14 which provides that

Section 14(1) will not prevent creating a

restricted estate in favour of a Hindu female

either by gift or will or any instrument or

decree of a civil court or award provided the

very document creating title unto her confers

a restricted estate on her). There is nothing

in Section 14 which supports the proposition

that a Hindu female should be in actual

physical possession or in constructive

possession of any property on the date of the

coming into operation of the Act. The

expression 'proposed' has been used in the

sense of having a right to the property or

control over the property. The expression 'any

property possessed by a Hindu female whether

acquired before or after the commencement of

the Act' on an analysis yields to the

following interpretation:

(1) Any property possessed by a Hindu

female acquired before the commencement of the

Act will be held by her as a full owner

thereof and not as a limited owner.

(2) Any property possessed by a Hindu

female acquired after the commencement of the

Act will be held as a full owner thereof and

not as a limited owner."

In view of the foregoing discussion, we allow the ap-

peal, set aside the judgment of the Division Bench of the

High Court and restore that of the learned single Judge.

N.P.V. Appeal

allowed.

588