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HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA

AGARTALA

W.P.(C) NO.244 OF 2026

Smt. Malabika Pal (Majumder)

Wife of Sri Pranab Majumder, Resident of East Shibnagar, P.O.College Post

Office, Presently residing at Dhaleswar Road no. 18, West Tripura District,

Tripura-799007.

.................Petitioner(s)

Versus

1.Union of India and Ors.

Represented by the Secretary, Ministry of Road Transport and Highways,

Transport Bhawan, 1, Parliament Street, New Delhi- 110001

2.The National Highways and Infrastructure Development Corporation

Ltd.(NHIDCL) Through its General Manager(Projects)/ Dy. General

Manager(P), PMU- Khowai/PMU- Teliamura, Tripura.

3.Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited(BPCL)

Represented by its Territory Manager(Retail), Shillong, Meghalaya.

4.The District Magistrate and Collector

West Tripura District, Agartala

................Respondent(s)

For Petitioner(s) : Mr. T.D. Majumder, Sr. Advocate,

Mr. Dalit Kalai, Advocate.

For Respondent(s) : Mr. Bidyut Majumder, Dy. SGI,

Mr. Dipankar Sharma, Addl. G.A.,

Ms. Paramita Dhar, Advocate,

Mr. Rajib Saha, Advocate.

Date of hearing : 02.07.2026.

Date of pronouncement : 13.07.2026.

Whether fit for reporting : YES.

HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. M.S. RAMACHANDRA RAO

HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE BISWAJIT PALIT

JUDGMENT & ORDER

JUDGMENT (BY CHIEF JUSTICE):

1) A retail petroleum outlet on a National Highway serves the needs of the

persons travelling in passenger vehicles on it such as cars, buses, lorries

and two wheelers who need fuel and can refuel and move on. It has

provision for rest for a while for weary travellers and also provides wash

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rooms too. It is thus indisputably a public amenity and it‟s existence on a

National Highway is in public interest.

2) However the facts of the instant case show that the officers of National

Highways & Infrastructure Development Corporation Ltd (respondent

no.2) (for short „NHIDCL‟), who have allowed such petroleum retail

outlets elsewhere in the country, have taken a stubborn and perverse view

contrary to the above public interest.

The background facts

3) The petitioner purchased under two registered sale deeds dt.8.12.2010

land at R.S.Plot No.2386 & 2395 Khatian No.580 at Mouza:Joynagar,

PS:Jirania, District: West Tripura at Jirani km 461.6275 Agartala –

Churaibari Road of NH-44. He intended to set up a petroleum retail outlet

in the said land (3025 sq.m) and approached the Bharat Petroleum

Corporation (respondent no.3) (for short „BPCL‟), a Govt. of India

enterprise .

4) On 15.11.2012 , a Letter of Intent was issued to petitioner by BPCL for

starting it. Thereafter all requisite permissions from various authorities

were taken by BPCL and petitioner such as,

(i) NOC dt.4.11.2013 by 78 RCC, GREF (predecessor of NHIDCL)

(Annexure-1)

(ii) Approval/NOC dt.19.10.2013(Annexure 2) from the District

Magistrate & Collector, West Tripura under the Petroleum Rules,

Trade licence,

(iii) Form B licence dt.11.7.2016 from the Director, Food , Civil

Supplies & Consumer Affairs, Tripura under the Tripura Motor Spirit

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and High Speed Diesel Oil (Licensing, Control and maintenance of

Supplies) Order,1980 (Annexure-3) which was renewed from time to

time,

(iv) Certificate for Consent to Operate from the Tripura state Pollution

Control Board (Annexure-4).,

In view of this, petitioner was given by BPCL dealership in

MS/HSD/Lubes in respect of the filling station at Village Kalabagan on

NH44, Mouza Joynagar on 30.12.2015 with effect from the said date

( Annexure -5).

The Memorandum of Agreement between the petitioner and

BPCL for operating a Dispensing Pump and Selling Licence was also

executed on 30.12.2015 renewable every 5 years.

5) Another agreement dt.30.3.2015 (Annexure-6) was executed by His

Excellency the President of India and the BPCL, for construction of an

approach /access road with necessary provision for drainage, signage and

markings to the new retail outlet. The land on which this approach road

was to be constructed was Government land under Patta No.580,

Dag.No.2386, 2395 of Village Kalabagan, Mouza Jayanagar, Sheet no 2,

West Tripura district. This agreement also enabled the BPCL to provide

drinking water and toilet facilities, drainage works etc.

6) Clause 4(xiv) of the above agreement stated that the Oil Company shall

have to enter into an agreement for signing the license deed for 5 years

with the Highway Administration (as per Highway Administration

Rule,2004) for use of the NH land for which the Oil Company has to pay

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Rs.2 lakhs as one time license fee. This amount was paid by petitioner

and receipt thereof was also acknowledged by the 78 RCC, GREF

(predecessor of NHIDCL) (Annexure-6).

7) The said petroleum retail outlet was being operated by petitioner as the

dealer of BPCL from 2016.

8) It appears that this stretch of NH-44 was transferred from the GREF to

the Public Works Department (PWD) on 4.4.2015. Subsequently it was

entrusted to NHIDCL for development and maintenance vide a Gazette

Notification S.O.4026 (E ) dt.20.8.2018.

Order dt.30.1.2026 of NHIDCL

9) An order dt.30.1.2026 (Annexure-7) was issued by NHIDCL to BPCL

stating that it:

(a) intends to improve and widen the existing NH-08 to four lane with

paved shoulder , that land at Km.461.6275 falls within the approved

alignment of the Champaknagar- Kheyerpur Section of NH-08.

(b) land acquisition proceedings for the said project have been duly

completed under the National Highways Act, 1956 (for short „NH

Act,1956‟) and that land already vests with the Govt. of India as Section

3D declaration for the said land has already been published,

(c) that as per the agreement dt.30.3.2015 (Annexure -6), the licence was

valid for 5 years only, and was required to be renewed thereafter, and no

document or record evidencing renewal after 2013, has been submitted

to or is available with the NHIDCL, and therefore the continued

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occupation and operation of the retail outlet of BPCL being run by the

petitioner was without valid authorisation.

10) So in exercise of powers conferred under clause 7 of license deed r/w

Section 29(4) and Section 26 of the Control of National Highways (Land

and Traffic) Act, 2002, it revoked the NOC/Authorisation granted to

BPCL for operation of the Petrol Pump/ Retail outlet with immediate

effect on the pretext that there was non-renewal of license and

unauthorised occupation of NH land.

11) It is further stated that the continued operation of the petrol pump within

the acquired Right of Way obstructs execution of the approved highway

alignment, adversely affects public safety and project implementation,

and constitutes unauthorised occupation in violation of Section 26 and

29(4) of the Control of National Highways (Land and Traffic) Act, 2002.

12) This order is not preceded by any show cause notice or hearing though it

affects the civil rights of petitioner and BPCL. There has been a gross

violation of principles of natural justice by NHIDCL.

13) This order deliberately omits to mention that BPCL had applied online

on the portal of Ministry of Roads, Transport and Highways of the Govt.

of India for renewal of licence by paying the requisite fees of Rs.10,000/-

way back on 19.6.2024 (Annexure -8 –pg.53 and 55 of WP papers) (Also

Annexure R1 to counter of BPCL).

The Land Acquisition proceedings and their fate

14) Coming to the plea of NHIDCL of acquisition of petitioner‟s land under

the NH Act, 1956, no doubt a preliminary notification dt.1.2.2024 under

Section 3A (1) of the said Act was issued to acquire the petitioner‟s

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land, but the petitioner had objected to the use of her land for the said

purpose by giving representation dt.9.2.2024 to the LA Collector, Addl.

District Magistrate and Collector, West Tripura, Agartala.

15) But this representation of petitioner objecting to acquisition was totally

ignored and declaration under Section 3D was issued on 12.3.2024 by the

said officer stating that in public interest, petitioner‟s land vested upon

the Central Government.

16) Even thereafter petitioner gave another representation dt.23.8.2024, but

that too was ignored.

W.P.No.580 of 2024 and order dt.5.9.2024 therein

17) Petitioner then filed W.P.No.580 of 2024 in this Court which was

disposed off on 5.9.2024 stating that the LA Collector, Addl. District

Magistrate and Collector, West Tripura, Agartala had not considered the

above representations, and a direction was given to the said officer to

consider the same in 4 weeks.

Memo dt.24.12.2025 issued by the LA Collector

18) . But the said authority again issued memo dt.24.12.2025 holding that

NHIDCL had stated that alignment of the proposed expansion cannot be

changed, and so the land acquisition has to be proceeded with

notwithstanding petitioner‟s objection thereto. Petitioner was asked to

receive compensation. There was no independent application of mind to

the various objections raised by petitioner to the preliminary notification.

W.P.(C) No.72 of 2026 and order dt.12.3.2026 therein .

19) Petitioner challenged this Memo dt.24.12.2025 in this Court by filing

W.P.(C) No.72 of 2026.

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20) A learned single Judge of this Court on 12.3.2026 held that under the

NH Act,1956, the competent authority must pass a reasoned written order

resolving objections before finalizing land acquisition, that the Memo

dt.24.12.2025 was issued without application of mind, and that the

decision to acquire the land of petitioner was taken without following due

process of law. He declared the said memo as illegal and set it aside.

21) The judgment of the learned single judge is stated by counsel for the

State Government to have been questioned by the State Govt. officials in

a Writ Appeal, which is stated to be pending.

22) It is an undeniable fact that the right conferred on a land owner to object

to use of the land for purposes mentioned in the Section 3A of the NH

Act,1956 is a substantive right and it has been held by the Supreme Court

that the person whose property is being or is intended to be acquired

should have a proper and reasonable opportunity of persuading the

authorities that the acquisition of property can be avoided. The view of

the learned single Judge in the said W.P No.72 of 2025 is in conformity

with the view taken by the Supreme Court and other High Courts.

23) In Kolkata Municipal Corpn. v. Bimal Kumar Shah

1

, the Supreme

Court held that in cases of land acquisition, notice of acquisition is

mandatory, the property owner has a right to object to acquisition, and the

hearing of such objections must be meaningful and not a sham. It

declared:

“33.2.1. Following the right to a meaningful and effective prior

notice of acquisition, is the right of the property-bearer to

communicate his objections and concerns to the authority

1

(2024) 10 SCC 533, at page 551

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acquiring the property. This right to be heard against the

proposed acquisition must be meaningful and not a sham.

33.2.2. Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, Section

3(1) of the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property

Act, 1952, Section 15 of the Right to Fair Compensation and

Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and

Resettlement Act, 2013, and Section 3-C of the National

Highways Act, 1956, are some statutory embodiments of this

right.

33.2.3. Judicial opinions recognising the importance of this right

are far too many to reproduce. Suffice it to say that that the

enquiry in which a landholder would raise his objection is not a

mere formality17.” ( emphasis supplied)

24) In Renu Gupta v. Union of India

2

, a learned single Judge of the Delhi

High Court held that the acquisitioning authority under the NH Act,1956

is not expected to merely reproduce the clarification issued by the NHAI

to the objections raised by the land owners, but has to give specific

reasons in disallowing or allowing the objections as the case maybe.

25) In R. Natarajan v. Union of India

3

, a Division Bench of the Madras

High Court has also taken the similar view that rejection of objection

under Section 3-C (2) of the NH Act, 1956 cannot be made simply on

ground that the technical expert/consultant (NHAI) has already prepared

detailed project report. It held that nothing is reflected from the order

passed by the Collector that the objections raised by the appellants were

even considered or dealt with by the authority. Moreover no reasons have

been assigned while rejecting the objection. It held that there was total

2

2019 SCC OnLine Del 7891 : (2019) 258 DLT 773 : (2019) 198 AIC 624

3

2010 SCC OnLine Mad 5651 : (2010) 5 LW 868 : (2010) 6 CTC 337 : (2011) 2 Mad LJ 527, at page

876

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non-application of mind on the part of the authority while passing the

order rejecting the objection under Section 3C(2) of the Act. It held as

under:

“18. A perusal of the order shows that the Competent Authority

disallowed the objection not on the ground that there was no

substance in the objection, rather on the ground that the

technical expert/consultant (NHAI) has already prepared

detailed project report, land acquisition work was started and

the project work is under progress. The objection was also

disallowed on the ground that since the land is acquired for

public interest, and compensation is paid under Section 3-G of

the Act, the objection so raised is bound to be rejected. We are

really shocked and surprised to see the order and the manner of

exercising power under Section 3(2) of the Act. The order

clearly shows that the authority passed the order purely on the

basis that the technical experts have already given their opinion.

Nothing is reflected from the order that the objection raised by

the appellants were even considered or dealt with by the

authority. Moreover no reasons have been assigned while

rejecting the objection. In our opinion, there is total non-

application of mind on the part of the authority while passing

the order rejecting the objection under Section 3(2) of the Act.

19. It is true that a limited right has been given to the land

owner or person interested under Section 3(2) of the Act to file

objection to the acquisition proceedings. But such a right given

to the person is not an empty formality, rather it is a substantive

right. It has been consistently held by the Supreme Court that

the person whose property is being or is intended to be acquired

should have a proper and reasonable opportunity of persuading

the authorities that the acquisition of property can be avoided.

20. Coming back to the order again, by which objection was

disallowed, admittedly no reasons had been assigned. Although

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the authority was exercising the statutory duty to invite

objection, hear the parties, and take a decision either allowing

or disallowing the objection, the authority was bound to assign

valid reasons. As per the 14th Report relating to Judicial

Administration in India, the Law Commission recommended that

even in administrative decision, provisions should be made that

it should be accompanied by reasons.”(emphasis supplied)

26) The next question which arises is :

“If the Memo dt.24.12.2025 rejecting the objections filed by

petitioner by the LA Collector was set aside by this Court on

12.3.2026 in W.P. No.72 of 2025, what effect does it have on the

final declaration issued under section 3D of the NH Act,1956?”

27) In our opinion, before the declaration is issued under Section 3D of the

NH Act, 1956 , there ought to be a valid consideration of the land

holder‟s objections under Section 3C (2). If the Memo dt.24.12.2025

deciding those objections of petitioner to use of the land for purpose

mentioned in the Section 3A notification, was set aside in judgment

dt.12.3.2026 in W.P.No.72 of 2025 by the learned single Judge, any

declaration issued under Section 3D of the act by the respondents would

be void and ineffective. More so, when the single Judge did not permit

fresh consideration by the respondents of those objections by passing a

fresh order.

28) Our view is supported by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case

of Competent Authority v. Barangore Jute Factory

4

.

4

2005 (13) SCC 477 at para 11, pages 486-487)

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In that case, the Supreme Court held that each step is a

consequence of earlier step, and in that sense all the steps are linked to

the initial notification for acquisition under Sections 3-A(1) and (2). In

that case, the initial notification had been held to be not in accordance

with law. It held that “When the foundation goes, rest of the edifice falls.”

And the invalid notification under Section 3-A renders all subsequent

steps invalid. Therefore, it declared the vesting of land in the Central

Government to be not lawful and held that it does not advance the case of

the competent authority or NHAI. The initial notification having been

invalidated, there can be no legal or valid vesting of land in favour of the

Central Government.

29) We may also refer to the reply dt.6.2.2026 given by BPCL to the

NHIDCL as regards it‟s Notice dt.30.1.2026 which raises significant

grounds opposing the action taken in the letter dt.30.1.2026 issued by

NHIDCL.

30) BPCL contended that originally the retail outlet was given

NOC/Authorisation by NHIDCL‟s predecessor i.e., 78 RCC, General

Reserve Force (GREF) then managing NH-08 on 14.11.2013 without

any reservation or limitation along with requisite approval of the

District Magistrate & Collector, West Tripura. The subsequent transfer

of management of the highway stretch from GREF to PWD and

thereafter to NHIDCL was purely an administrative transition and it

did not ipso facto extinguish or invalidate permissions lawfully granted

by it‟s predecessor when no objection or deficiency was ever

communicated to BPCL at any stage.

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They further contended that BPCL had infact made application

for renewal of the NOC/Authorisation to Ministry of Road, Transport

and Highways along with deposit of requisite fees, but despite receipt

of it, no decision on renewal was taken by NHIDCL; and BPCL had a

legitimate expectation that the matter would be processed in

accordance with law; and absence of a renewal order on record of

NHIDCL cannot be used to label BPCL‟s occupation as unauthorized.

31) To this reply given by BPCL, a letter dt.19.3.2026 was sent to BPCL by

NHIDCL referring to certain letters Annexure R-2 dt.dt.4.5.2024 and

dt.10.5.2024 allegedly written by it to BPCL requesting submission of

documents pertaining to technical approval and licence renewal of the

retail outlet and complaining that they were not sent. BPCL was asked to

furnish technical approval copy along with license renewal documents in

15 days.

32) There is no mention in the said letter dt.19.3.2026 of NHIDCL of the

further letter dt.9.5.2024 (Annexure R3 filed by NHIDCL) of BPCL

informing NHIDCL that they have engaged an NH consultant for Access

permission Work in the name of petitioner‟ retail outlet, that the said

consultant had already visited the said retail outlet and survey has been

done as per built construction area, that application preparation is under

process, and seeking further 15 days time to complete the process.

33) As pointed out above, an application for renewal with relevant

documents were uploaded on the website of the Ministry of Road

Transport & Highways, Govt. of India on 19.6.2024, but the reply

dt.19.3.2026 also makes no reference to it.

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34) Instead the NHIDCL pressurized the District Magistrate & Collector to

pass an order dt.11.6.2026 cancelling the licence given under the

Petroleum Rules,2002 to petitioner on the pretext that renewal of

NOC/authorization did not happen at the instance of BPCL.

35) This conduct of NHIDCL has to be termed malafide and perverse for the

reason that it obviously does not want BPCL, a Govt. of India enterprise,

which is keen to run the retail outlet through the petitioner and provide

facilities/amenities to travelers of motor vehicles on the road, to provide

the said amenities.

36) In it‟s counter affidavit, it is contended by NHIDCL that petitioner has

no locus standi to file the Writ Petition and seek renewal of

NOC/Authorisation /License deed in favor of BPCL.

37) We do not agree with this contention at all since it is the petitioner who

has invested her land and money to run the retail petroleum outlet as a

dealer of BPCL and is undoubtedly affected by the action of NHIDCL.

The retail outlet in question is located in petitioner‟s property and it‟s

acquisition under the NH Act, 1956 was questioned by petitioner in WP

.No.72 of 2026 and he had succeeded. The BPCL is supporting the

petitioner‟s stand in the Writ Petition. She undoubtedly has locus standi

to file the Writ Petition.

38) The concept of locus standi in Writ Petitions has been considerably

widened by the Supreme Court in several cases.

39) In Ghulam Qadir v. Custodian (Evacuee Property)

5

, the Supreme Court

declared that the orthodox rule of interpretation regarding the locus standi

5

(2002) 1 SCC 33, at page 54

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of a person to reach the court has undergone a sea change with the

development of constitutional law in our country and the constitutional

courts have been adopting a liberal approach in dealing with the cases or

dislodging the claim of a litigant merely on hyper-technical grounds.

If a person approaching the court can satisfy that the impugned

action is likely to adversely affect his right which is shown to be having

source in some statutory provision, the petition filed by such a person

cannot be rejected on the ground of his not having the locus standi. In

other words, if the person is found to be not merely a stranger having no

right whatsoever to any post or property, he cannot be non-suited on the

ground of his not having the locus standi.

40) Judged by this test the petitioner undoubtedly has locus standi to file the

Writ petition as she is directly affected by the revocation of licence

granted to BPCL by NHIDCL.

41) The other contention of respondent NHIDCL is that petitioner is seeking

to enforce a purely contractual right which is not permitted in Art.226 of

Constitution of India.

This contention is without any merit for the reason that by the

arbitrary, unreasonable and perverse decision of NHIDCL in violation of

the constitutional mandate under Art.14 to act fairly, reasonably, the

rights of not only BPCL under the contract dt.30.3.2015 but also of the

petitioner who is running the retail outlet as agent of BPCL, under

Art.19(1)(g) and Art.300-A of the Constitution of India, were seriously

jeopardized.

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42) In Unitech Ltd. v. Telangana State Industrial Infrastructure Corpn.

6

,

the Supreme Court has held that recourse to the jurisdiction under Article

226 of the Constitution is not excluded altogether in a contractual matters

where the State or it‟s instrumentality has acted arbitrarily , unfairly or

unreasonably in that arena. A public law remedy is available for

enforcing legal rights subject to well-settled parameters. It declared:

“ 38……However, to clear the ground, it is necessary to postulate

that recourse to the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution

is not excluded altogether in a contractual matter. A public law

remedy is available for enforcing legal rights subject to well-settled

parameters.

39. A two-Judge Bench of this Court in ABL International Ltd. v.

Export Credit Guarantee Corpn. of India Ltd.

7

[ABL International]

analysed a long line of precedent of this Court15 to conclude that

writs under Article 226 are maintainable for asserting contractual

rights against the State, or its instrumentalities, as defined under

Article 12 of the Indian Constitution.

39.1. Speaking through N. Santosh Hegde, J. the Court held : (ABL

International case14, SCC p. 572, para 27)

“27. … the following legal principles emerge as to the

maintainability of a writ petition:

(a) In an appropriate case, a writ petition as against a State or an

instrumentality of a State arising out of a contractual obligation is

maintainable.

(b) Merely because some disputed questions of fact arise for

consideration, same cannot be a ground to refuse to entertain a writ

petition in all cases as a matter of rule.

6

(2021) 16 SCC 35, at page 59 :

7

(2004) 3 SCC 553

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(c) A writ petition involving a consequential relief of monetary

claim is also maintainable.”

This exposition has been followed by this Court, and has been

adopted by the three-Judge Bench decisions of this Court in State of

U.P. v. Sudhir Kumar Singh

8

and Popatrao Vyankatrao Patil v.

State of Maharashtra

9

.

39.2. The decision in ABL International, cautions that the plenary

power under Article 226 must be used with circumspection when

other remedies have been provided by the contract. But as a statement

of principle, the jurisdiction under Article 226 is not excluded in

contractual matters.

39.3. Article 23.1 of the development agreement in the present

case mandates the parties to resolve their disputes through an

arbitration. However, the presence of an arbitration clause within a

contract between a State instrumentality and a private party has not

acted as an absolute bar to availing remedies under Article 22618.

39.4. If the State instrumentality violates its constitutional mandate

under Article 14 to act fairly and reasonably, relief under the plenary

powers of Article 226 of the Constitution would lie. This principle was

recognised in ABL International : (ABL International case, SCC p.

572, para 28)

“28. However, while entertaining an objection as to the

maintainability of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution

of India, the court should bear in mind the fact that the power to issue

prerogative writs under Article 226 of the Constitution is plenary in

nature and is not limited by any other provisions of the Constitution.

The High Court having regard to the facts of the case, has a

discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. The Court

has imposed upon itself certain restrictions in the exercise of this

power. (See Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks19.) And

this plenary right of the High Court to issue a prerogative writ will

8

(2021) 19 SCC 706

9

(2020) (19) SCC 241

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not normally be exercised by the Court to the exclusion of other

available remedies unless such action of the State or its

instrumentality is arbitrary and unreasonable so as to violate the

constitutional mandate of Article 14 or for other valid and legitimate

reasons, for which the Court thinks it necessary to exercise the said

jurisdiction.”

(emphasis supplied)

39.5. Therefore, while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226,

the Court is entitled to enquire into whether the action of the State or

its instrumentalities is arbitrary or unfair and in consequence, in

violation of Article 14. The jurisdiction under Article 226 is a

valuable constitutional safeguard against an arbitrary exercise of

State power or a misuse of authority.

39.6. In determining as to whether the jurisdiction should be

exercised in a contractual dispute, the Court must, undoubtedly

eschew, disputed questions of fact which would depend upon an

evidentiary determination requiring a trial. But equally, it is well

settled that the jurisdiction under Article 226 cannot be ousted only

on the basis that the dispute pertains to the contractual arena. This is

for the simple reason that the State and its instrumentalities are not

exempt from the duty to act fairly merely because in their business

dealings they have entered into the realm of contract. Similarly, the

presence of an arbitration clause does (sic not) oust the jurisdiction

under Article 226 in all cases though, it still needs to be decided from

case to case as to whether recourse to a public law remedy can

justifiably be invoked.

39.7. The jurisdiction under Article 226 was rightly invoked by the

Single Judge and the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High

Court in this case, when the foundational representation of the

contract has failed. TSIIC, a State instrumentality, has not just

reneged on its contractual obligation, but hoarded the refund of the

principal and interest on the consideration that was paid by Unitech

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over a decade ago. It does not dispute the entitlement of Unitech to

the refund of its principal.”

43) The next contention of the respondent no.2 is that the license deed

dt.30.3.2015 had expired on 31.3.2020, and thereafter no order of renewal

had been granted, and so no vested right to continue to operate the retail

outlet, can be claimed by petitioner.

44) Firstly, the proposal to acquire the petitioner‟s land for road widening

into four lane which seems to be the main reason for to stop the running

of the retail petroleum outlet, has now got stalled and is incapable of

execution in view of the judgment dt.12.3.2026 in WP .No.72 of 2025.

Since there is no vesting of land in the Union of India or NHIDCL, there

is no impediment to allow the retail outlet to continue to function.

45) Secondly, a petroleum retail outlet is a public amenity intended for

benefit of travellers using motor vehicles on the National Highway for

refueling, resting or using of wash rooms etc. It is undeniable on several

National High ways, such petroleum outlets exist and the National

Highways (Land and Traffic) Act, 2002 and the Highways

Administration Rules, 2004 Rules specifically permit such petroleum

outlets. It is inexplicable why the NHIDCL wishes to stop the running of

the subject retail outlet and we can only presume that this attitude is

adopted for some sinister reason or oblique motive.

46) Thirdly, even if there was a lapse on the part of BPCL to apply for

renewal of licence before it lapsed on 31.3.2020, it had been allowed it to

run till 30.1.2026 by the respondents as undoubtedly they did not find

anything inherently objectionable. If a Govt. Enterprise like BPCL is

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seeking to continue to run the retail outlet in petitioner‟s land through

petitioner, it is unreasonable that NHIDCL, another Govt. Enterprise

wants to deny it such opportunity.

47) The harping by the NHIDCL of lack of renewal after 31.3.2020 does not

impress us at all because when BPCL, a Govt. Enterprise wants to run the

outlet, NHIDCL should graciously grant a fresh license instead of

stubbornly sticking to it‟s malafide stand. It is indeed a shame that

NHIDCL is playing a game of one up man ship vis-à-vis BPCL, another

Govt. enterprise, ignoring the public interest which would be served by

permitting the running of petitioner‟s retail outlet on the National

Highway.

48) More so, when it can also grant a fresh license under clause 2.10 of the

guidelines dt.26.6.2020 issued by the Ministry of Road Transport &

Highways, Govt. of India. But from 19.6.2024 when BPCL uploaded it‟s

renewal application till 19.3.2026, NHIDCL did not consider the said

application in proper perspective and never told BPCL about the fresh

renewal aspect. This too is something we cannot ignore.

49) The plea of delay, laches and acquiescence raised by NHIDCL is

untenable since the impugned order was issued on 30.1.2026 and the Writ

was filed on 31.3.2026. The further plea that the Writ petition is also

premature contradicts the plea of laches raised by NHIDCL. It shows it‟s

desperation to somehow or other defend it‟s arbitrary action by raising

untenable and absurd pleas.

50) The fact that in para 26 of the counter affidavit , NHIDCL denies that

BPCL even applied for a renewal , though material has been filed by both

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petitioner and BPCL of uploading of such renewal application by BPCL

on 19.6.2024, shows the extent to which NHIDCL would stoop to sustain

it‟s arbitrary action.

51) Thus they have raised false, frivolous and vexatious pleas instead of

acting like a model litigant.

52) In Popatrao Vyankatrao Patil v. State of Maharashtra

10

, it was held

by the Supreme Court that the State should be a model litigant and should

not put forth false, frivolous, vexatious, technical (but unjust) contentions

to obstruct the path of justice. It held:

“14. This Court, has time and again held, that the State should

act as a model litigant. In this respect, we can gainfully refer to

the following observations made by this Court in Urban

Improvement Trust, Bikaner v. Mohan Lal11 : (SCC pp. 515-

16, paras 6-9)

“6. This Court has repeatedly expressed the view that

Governments and statutory authorities should be model or ideal

litigants and should not put forth false, frivolous, vexatious,

technical (but unjust) contentions to obstruct the path of justice.

We may refer to some of the decisions in this behalf.

7. In Dilbagh Rai Jarry v. Union of India12 this Court

extracted with approval the following statement [from an earlier

decision of the Kerala High Court (P.P. Abubacker case13, AIR

pp. 107-08, para 5)] : (SCC p. 562, para 25)

„25. … “5. … The State, under our Constitution, undertakes

economic activities in a vast and widening public sector and

inevitably gets involved in disputes with private individuals. But

it must be remembered that the State is no ordinary party trying

10

(2020) 19 SCC 241, at page 245 :

11

(2010) 1 SCC 512

12

(1974) 3 SCC 554

13

AIR 1972 KERALA 103

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to win a case against one of its own citizens by hook or by

crook; for the State‟s interest is to meet honest claims, vindicate

a substantial defence and never to score a technical point or

overreach a weaker party to avoid a just liability or secure an

unfair advantage, simply because legal devices provide such an

opportunity. The State is a virtuous litigant and looks with

unconcern on immoral forensic successes so that if on the merits

the case is weak, Government shows a willingness to settle the

dispute regardless of prestige and other lesser motivations

which move private parties to fight in court. The layout on

litigation costs and executive time by the State and its agencies

is so staggering these days because of the large amount of

litigation in which it is involved that a positive and wholesome

policy of cutting back on the volume of law suits by the twin

methods of not being tempted into forensic showdowns where a

reasonable adjustment is feasible and ever offering to extinguish

a pending proceeding on just terms, giving the legal mentors of

Government some initiative and authority in this behalf. I am

not indulging in any judicial homily but only echoing the

dynamic national policy on State litigation evolved at a

Conference of Law Ministers of India way back in 1957.” ‟

8. In Madras Port Trust v. Hymanshu International14 this

Court held : (SCC p. 177, para 2)

„2. … It is high time that Governments and public authorities

adopt the practice of not relying upon technical pleas for the

purpose of defeating legitimate claims of citizens and do what is

fair and just to the citizens. Of course, if a Government or a

public authority takes up a technical plea, the Court has to

decide it and if the plea is well founded, it has to be upheld by

the court, but what we feel is that such a plea should not

ordinarily be taken up by a Government or a public authority,

unless of course the claim is not well founded and by reason of

14

(1979) 4 SCC 176

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delay in filing it, the evidence for the purpose of resisting such a

claim has become unavailable.‟

9. In a three-Judge Bench judgment of Bhag Singh v. State (UT

of Chandigarh)15 this Court held : (SCC p. 741, para 3)

„3. … The State Government must do what is fair and just to the

citizen and should not, as far as possible, except in cases where

tax or revenue is received or recovered without protest or where

the State Government would otherwise be irretrievably be

prejudiced, take up a technical plea to defeat the legitimate and

just claim of the citizen.‟” (emphasis supplied)

53) During the pendency of the Writ Petition, NHIDCL had dug a deep

trench along the northern boundary of the retail petrol pump severing

access to the main road, to further scuttle the case of petitioner. Such

action is in our opinion totally unwarranted and amounts to trying to

overreach this Court‟s exercise of jurisdiction. Such conduct cannot be

countenanced.

54) For all the aforesaid reasons, the Writ Petition is allowed with costs of

Rs.1,00,000/- to be paid by NHIDCL to petitioner within four months

from today. The impugned proceedings dt.30.1.2026 (Annexure-7),

Notice dt.19.3.2026 (Annexure-9) ,notice dt.8.4.2026 issued by NHIDCL

and the District Magistrate and Collector, West Tripura on 11.6.2026 and

all other consequent proceedings are set aside. The BPCL shall submit a

fresh proposal for license on terms similar to what was granted on

30.3.2015 to enable it to run the petroleum retail outlet in the subject land

through the petitioner within 2 weeks, and on receipt thereof, the

15

(1984) 3 SCC 737

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NHIDCL shall take a decision keeping in mind this order and

communicate the same to BPCL and petitioner within 4 weeks thereafter.

There shall be no interference with the retail outlet of petitioner or access

to it for a period of one month after it‟s decision is communicated to

petitioner.

(BISWAJIT PALIT), J (M.S. RAMACHANDRA RAO), CJ