1

CGHC010389622026 2026:CGHC:42788

NAFR

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

WPC No. 5047 of 2026

1 - Smt. Manisha Raj Chouhan W/o Mehul Chouhan, Aged About 24 Years

Elected Sarpanch, Gram Panchayat Siriyagarh, Janpad Panchayat Dabhara,

District Sakti C.G.

... Petitioner

versus

1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Principal Secretary, Panchayat

Department, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar, Nawa Raipur,

District Raipur, C.G.

2 - Collector, District Sakti C.G.

3 - Sub Divisional Officer (R) Cum Prescribed Authority (Panchayat) Dabhara

Lohara, District Balod C.G.

4 - Chief Executive Officer, Janpad Panchayat, Dabhara, District Sakti C.G.

5 - Shiv Shankar Nayak, S/o Kartikram, Aged About 27 Years Panch Ward

No. 11,

6 - Smt. Kumari Sidar, W/o Shrichand Sidar, Aged About 37 Years Panch

Ward No. 12,

7 - Smt. Anjali Sidar, W/o Ranjit Sidar, Aged About 39 Years Panch Ward No.

13,

8 - Sushila Sidar, W/o Rameshwar Sidar, Aged About 30 Years Panch Ward

No. 10,

9 - Smt. Seema Mali, W/o Dilip Mali, Aged About 33 Years Panch Ward No.

04,

10 - Smt. Gyanbai Sidar, W/o Manbodh Sidar, Aged About 49 Years Panch

Ward No. 02,

11 - Nauratan Sidar, S/o Dashrath Sidar, Aged About 37 Years Panch Ward

No. 08,

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12 - Surendra Sidar, S/o Babulal Sidar, Aged About 37 Years Panch Ward No.

09,

13 - Smt. Ganeshi Bai, W/o Manoj Chauhan, Aged About 36 Years Panch

Ward No. 07,

Respondents No.5 to 13 are R/o Gram Siriyagarh, Janpad Panchayat And

Tahsil Dabhara, District Sakti C.G.

... Respondents

For Petitioner :Mr. T.K. Jha, Senior Advocate along with Mr.

Tapan Kumar Chandra, Advocate

For State :Mr. Shobhit Mishra, Deputy GA

Hon'ble Shri Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad

Order on Board

01/10/2026

1.The petitioner, in this Writ Petition, has prayed for the following reliefs:

“10.1 Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to call

for the entire record pertaining to the instant case.

10.2 The Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to

allow this petition and set aside the impugned

notice dated 21.09.2026 (received on 24.09.2026)

(ΑΝNEXURE P/1), in the interest of Justice.

10.3 Any other relief which the Hon'ble Court

deems fit and proper in the facts and

circumstances of the case may also be provided to

the petitioner.”

2.Facts of the case in brief are that the petitioner was directly elected as

Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat Siriyagarh, Janpad Panchayat Dabhara,

District Sakti (C.G.). The SDO (Revenue)/Prescribed Authority issued a

notice dated 21.09.2026 under Rule 3(3) of the Chhattisgarh

Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, 1993, proposing a meeting for consideration

of the no-confidence motion against the petitioner, which was received

by the petitioner on 24.09.2026. The meeting was scheduled to be held

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on 01.10.2026 at 12:00 noon at the Panchayat Building, Gram

Panchayat Siriyagarh. No supporting documents were supplied along

with the notice. Nine Panchas had submitted an application for moving

the no-confidence motion on 17.09.2026, pursuant to which the

Prescribed Authority sought the relevant documents from the Chief

Executive Officer, Janpad Panchayat Dabhara. Hence, this petition.

3.Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned notice

convening the meeting for consideration of the no-confidence motion

has been issued without awaiting the report from the concerned Chief

Executive Officer, Janpad Panchayat, and is, therefore, illegal. He

further submits that the prescribed authority has not supplied any

document relating to the no-confidence motion to the petitioner and,

therefore, the impugned notice is illegal. He also submits that there is

no clear period of seven days between the date of receipt of the notice,

i.e., 24.09.2026, and the date fixed for the meeting, i.e., 01.10.2026,

and, therefore, the same is violative of the scheme of the Chhattisgarh

Panchayati Raj Adhiniyam, 1993. He further submits that the petitioner

is seven months pregnant and, at this stage, the proceedings relating

to the no-confidence motion are likely to adversely affect the health of

the petitioner and her unborn child. In support of the same, a copy of

the Matru Avam Bal Suraksha Card has been filed as Annexure P/4. He

further submits that the no-confidence motion has been moved on false

allegations which do not constitute any serious misconduct and has

been initiated with a mala fide intention. He also places reliance upon

the judgment in the matter of Jagdish Prasad Bhunjwa v. The State

of Madhya Pradesh and Others, (AIR 1997 MP 184).

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4.Learned State counsel opposes the submissions advanced by learned

counsel for the petitioner and submits that the impugned notice has

been issued in accordance with law unless and until the petitioner

show any prejudice which would be caused to the petitioner, the notice

of no confidence motion cannot be quashed. Even otherwise also the

notice of no confidence motion has been issued in accordance with law

while giving seven days clear time and as such there is no statutory

violation of acts or rules. From the perusal of the documents, it

appears that the concerned members of the Gram Panchayat/ Panchas

have filed an appropriate application before the concerned SDO

(Revenue)/prescribed authority stating that they have lost confidence in

the work of the Sarpanch and as such, they have sent a proposal for

removal of Sarpanch from her post. Along with the said application they

have also filed their affidavits stating that the petitioner Sarpanch has

misappropriated funds of Rs.10 lakhs, Rs.75,564/-, Rs.25,750/-

Rs.1,91,600/- and the work in respect of the aforesaid has not been

completed till date while considering the aforesaid aspects of the

matter, the concerned SDO (Revenue)/presecribed authority has

initiated a proceedings and upon verification, he found that there are

ample reasons to initiate proceedings for no confidence motion and

after due verification he has appointed the respective officers and has

issued notices to the concerned Sarpanch as well as the other

authority on 21.09.2026 and the meeting was scheduled on 01.10.2026

at 12 pm as such there is no illegality.

5.I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material

available on the record.

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6.This Court in the matter of Smt. Janki Sahu vs. State of Chhattisgarh

in WPC No.2757 of 2021, decided on 25.07.2023 has observed in

paragraph Nos.11 to 17 as under;-

“11. With respect to other grounds raised by learned

counsel for petitioner that S.D.O. has got the signature

of Panchas who submitted application for convening no

confidence motion through Chief Executive Officer is in

violation of Rule 3 (2) and 3 of the Rules of 1994.

Perusal of Rule 3 (3) of the Rules of 1994 would show

that requirement under the said rules is only that

Prescribed Authority has to satisfy himself about the

admissibility of the notice with reference to Section 21

(3) of the Act of 1993. Section 21 (3) of the Act of 1993

is extracted below for ready reference :-

“21. No-confidence motion against Sarpanch and

Up-Sarpanch. - (1) On a motion of no-confidence

being passed by the Gram Panchayat by a resolution

passed by majority of not less than three fourth of

Panchas present and voting and such majority is more

than two third of the total number of Panchas

constituting the Gram Panchayat for the time being, the

Sarpanch or Up-Sarpanch against whom such motion

is passed, shall cease to hold office forthwith.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or

the rules made thereunder a Sarpanch or an Up-

Sarpanch shall not preside over a meeting in which a

motion of no-confidence is discussed against him.

Such meeting shall be convened in such manner as

may be prescribed and shall be presided over by an

officer of the Government as the Prescribed Authority

may appoint. The Sarpanch or the Up-Sarpanch, as the

case may be, shall have a right to speak at, or

otherwise to take part in, the proceeding of the

meeting.

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(3) No-confidence motion shall not lie against the

Sarpanch or Up-Sarpanch within a period of,-

(i) one year from the date on which the

Sarpanch or Up-Sarpanch enter their respective office;

(ii) six months preceding the date on which the

term of office of the Sarpanch or Up-Sarpanch, as the

case may be, expires:

(iii) one year from the date on which previous

motion of no-confidence was rejected.

(4) If the Sarpanch or the Up-Sarpanch, as the case

may be, desires to challenge the validity of the motion

carried out under sub-section (1), he shall, within seven

days from the date on which such motion was carried,

refer the dispute to the Collector who shall decide it, as

far as possible, within thirty days from the date on

which it was received by him, and his decision shall be

final.”

12. Challenge to the proceedings of no confidence

motion is not on the ground that it was convened

contrary to the provisions as mentioned under Section

21 (3) of the Act of 1993. In the Case at hand, the

Prescribed Authority for his satisfaction have got the

signatures of the Panchas in the application placed

before him verified. After satisfying, he proceeded for

convening the no confidence motion. There is no

specific provision in this regard and therefore, once the

Prescribed Authority recorded his satisfaction that the

application is in accordance with the provisions under

Section 21 of the Act of 1993, the submission of

learned counsel for petitioner that entire proceedings is

vitiated as Prescribed Authority has not verified the

signatures himself is also not sustainable.

13. The petitioner in this writ petition has not pleaded

that she suffered serious prejudice at any stage of

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proceeding. In absence of any serious prejudice

shown, pleaded, no confidence motion carried out by

majority can not be interfered with. In democratic

system when majority of elected Panchas have posed

no confidence motion on petitioner. Provision under

Section 21 of the Act of 1993 and the Rules of 1994

only provides that no confidence motion can be

requested before the Prescribed Authority and it has to

be convened in accordance with the Rules of 1994

subject to application is not falling within the Sub-

Section 3 of Section 21 of the Act of 1993.

14. In case of Bhulin Dewangan vs State of MP &

Others {2000 (4) MPHT 69}, Full Bench of High Court

of Madhya Pradesh considered the non-compliance of

the Rules of 1994 and observed thus :-

“15. The general rule is that non-compliance of

mandatory requirement results in nullification of the Act.

There are, however, several exceptions to the same. If

certain requirements or conditions are provided by

statute in the interest of a particular person, the

requirements or conditions, although mandatory, may

be waived by him if no public interest are involved and

in such a case the act done will be valid even if the

requirements or conditions have not been performed.

This appears to be the reason for learned C.K. Prasad,

J., in Dhumadhandin v. State of M.P. (1997 (1) Vidhi

Bhasvar 49) which was followed by R.S. Garg, J., in

Mahavir Saket v. Collector, Rewa (1998 (1) JLJ 113) for

holding that mere non-compliance of first part of the

rule in fixing a meeting beyond the prescribed days of

the motion of no-confidence would not invalidate the

whole proceedings. In case of Dhumadhandin (supra),

the Sarpanch did not question the validity of the notice

calling the meeting of no-confidence and in fact had

taken chance by facing the motion. R.S. Garg, J., in

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Mahavir Saket (supra) placed reliance on the decision

of C.K. Prasad, J., in Dhumadhandin (supra) to up-hold

the passing of the no-confidence motion in the

adjourned meeting as in the meeting called within the

prescribed fifteen days the Presiding Officer was not

available. Sub-section (4) of Section 21 permits

reference of a dispute to the Collector by Sarpanch or

Up-Sarpanch against whom a notice of no confidence

motion had been passed. The proceedings of the no-

confidence motion or other proceedings under the Act

are also assailable in this Court as Constitutional Court

under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. As has

been construed by us, even though second part of the

rule requiring dispatch of notice of the meeting to the

member is mandatory, yet in every case of challenge to

the proceeding of no-confidence motion either before

the Collector or this Court, it would still be open to the

Collector or this Court to find out whether in a given

case non-compliance of any part of the rule has in fact

resulted in any failure of justice or has caused any

serious prejudice to any of the parties. The general rule

is that a mandatory provision of law requires strict

compliance and the directory one only substantial. But

even where the provision is mandatory, every non-

compliance of the same need not necessarily result in

nullification of the whole action. In a given situation

even for non-fulfillment of mandatory requirement, the

authority empowered to take a decision may refuse to

nullify the action on the ground that no substantial

prejudice had been caused to the party affected or to

any other party which would have any other substantial

interest in the proceeding. This Court under Article 227

of the Constitution has also a discretion not to interfere

even though a mandatory requirement of law has not

been strictly complied with as thereby no serious

prejudice or failure of justice has been caused. This is

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how various Single Bench decisions in which even after

finding some infraction of the second part of Rule 3 (3)

of the Rules of 1994, the resolution of no-confidence

motion passed was not invalidated on the ground that

no substantial prejudice thereby was caused to the

affected parties. The intention of the legislature has to

be gathered from the provisions contained in Section

21 and the Rule 3 (3) framed thereunder. The

provisions do evince an intention that a meeting of the

no-confidence motion be called within a reasonable

period of not later than 15 days and every member has

to be informed of the same seven days in advance. A

notice of no-confidence motion is required to be moved

by not less than 1/3rd of the total number of elected

members as required by first Proviso to Sub-rule (1) of

Rule 3 and can be lawfully carried by a resolution

passed by majority of not less than 3/4th of the

Panchas present and voting and such majority has to

be more than 2/3rd of the total number of Panchas

constituting the Panchayat in accordance with

subsection (1) of Section 21 of the Act. This being the

substance of the provisions under the Act and the

rules, a mere non-compliance of second part of Sub-

rule (3) would not in every case invalidate the action

unless the Collector while deciding the dispute under

Sub-section (4) of Section 21 or this Court in exercise

of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the

Constitution comes to the conclusion that such non-

compliance has caused serious prejudice to the

affected office bearer or has otherwise resulted in

failure of justice.

15. In case of Sahasram Jangde & Ors vs. State of

Chhattisgarh & Others {2013 (4) CGLJ 526}, this

Court observed as under :-

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"6.When the law laid down by the full Bench of M.P.

High Court and Division Bench of this Court is applied

to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen that

respondent No.6 Sarpanch has not raised any ground

before the Additional Collector that because of the fact

that meeting was convened on 8th day from the date of

dispatch of notice and not on 9th day, and thus clear 7

days notice was not issued, she has suffered grave

prejudice in preparing herself for the meeting and there

being no such finding by the Additional Collector in the

impugned order, it will be taken as if no prejudice has

been caused to respondent No.6 Sarpanch and thus in

absence of prejudice or failure of justice, the Additional

Collector has wrongly set aside the resolution of the

Gram Panchayat declaring the no-confidence motion to

be passed. It is also to be seen that once this Court in

the earlier writ petition has held that the earlier

resolution of the Gram Panchayat passing no-

confidence motion in May, 2011 having been annulled

on technical grounds, the bar against moving of

another motion within one year would not apply, the

SDO(Revenue) should not have sought opinion from

the Chief Executive Officer, Janpad Panchayat or from

the Deputy Director Panchayat. However, by doing so,

he wasted 7 days in the process. Therefore, once the

no confidence motion has been passed the democratic

norms and the statutory provisions cannot be left at the

mercy of the prescribed authority when the law is well

settled in the case of Bhulin Dewangan(Supra).

Declaring the resolution of the Gram Panchayat which

has passed the no confidence motion by majority as

illegal would render the wish of the house nugatory and

the Sarpanch who has lost the confidence of the house

shall be allowed to function without any mandate in her

favour. Such interpretation of Rule is neither

permissible nor contemplated and this Court will not

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allow such effort of the prescribed authority to frustrate

the will of the house by adopting dilatory tactics on the

pretext of seeking legal opinion or opinion from the

higher authorities. Learned counsel for respondent

No.6 has relied on judgment of M.P. High Court in the

matter of Jugraj Singh Markam Vs. Dhannalal Maravi

and others : 2003 (4) MPLJ 378. However, in view of

the discussion made above, and particularly the law

laid down by the Full Bench of the M.P. High Court and

the peculiar facts of this case, the said judgment relied

upon by respondent No.6 has no application and is

distinguishable. In the result, the writ petition succeeds

and is allowed. The impugned order dt. 28.06.2012

passed by the Additional Collector is set aside.

Consequently respondent No.6 no longer remains as

Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat, Dahida, Tahsil

Sarangarh District Raigarh."

16. In the aforementioned decision, the Court have

held that every non-compliance of mandatory

provisions need not necessarily resulted nullification of

the whole action and in the given situation of non-

fulfillment of the mandatory provisions the authority

empowered to take decision may refuse to nullify the

action on the ground that no substantial prejudice has

been caused to the party affected.

17. In absence of raising any specific grounds that

members against whom no confidence motion is

carried stating that she suffered grave prejudice in the

procedure adopted for convening the no confidence

meeting no such finding can be recorded.

7.The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of K Umadevi vs.

Government of Tamil Nadu and Others reported in {2025 (8) SCC

263 } held in paragraph 27 to 29 which reads as under:-

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“ 27. Article 21 of the Constitution of India though at

first blush appears to be a colourless article, it is a

potent provision pregnant with wide width and scope

having received extensive and liberal construction at

the hands of this Court.

28. Article 21 reads thus:

“21. Protection of life and personal liberty.—

No person shall be deprived of his life or personal

liberty except according to procedure established by

law.”

29. By judicial interpretation, it has been held that life

under Article 21 means life in its fullest sense; all that

which makes life more meaningful, worth living like a

human being. Right to life includes all the finer graces

of human civilisation, thus rendering this fundamental

right a repository of various human rights. Right to life

also includes the right to health. Right to live with

human dignity and the right to privacy are now

acknowledged facets of Article 21.

8.Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Manisha Ravindra

Panpatil vs. State of Maharashtra and Others reported in {2024 SCC

OnLine SC 2690}held in paragraph Nos.8 to 10 as under:-

8. At this juncture, we would like to note that the

vagaries of the present factual matrix is far from unique

and is unfortunately somewhat of a norm. While there

is no doubt in our mind that the private respondents

may have operated in a discriminatory manner, what is

more worrying is the casual approach adopted by

government authorities in summarily removing an

elected representative. This is all the more concerning

when the representative in question is a woman and

elected in the reservation quota, thereby indicating a

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systemic pattern of prejudicial treatment, permeating

through all levels of administrative functioning.

9. This scenario gets further exacerbated when we as a

country are attempting realize the progressive goal of

gender parity and women empowerment across all

spheres, including public offices and most importantly

adequate women representative in the elected bodies,

such instances at the grass-root level cast a heavy

shadow on any headway that we may have achieved.

10. That being said and having regard to the facts and

circumstances of the case at hand, we see no credible

and convincing material on record to substantiate the

private respondents' allegations of encroachment of

government land by the appellant before or post her

election as Sarpanch. All that we would like to reiterate

is that the matter of removal of an elected public

representative should not be treated so lightly,

especially when it concerns women belonging to rural

areas. It must be acknowledged that these women who

succeed in occupying such public offices, do so only

after significant struggle.

9.The Hon’ble Surpreme Court in the matter of Hamsaanandini Nanduri

vs. Union of India and Others reported in {2026 SCC OnLine SC

402} held in paragraphs 21 to 24 and 109 as under:-

21. The protection of maternity leave is a basic human

right, as it recognizes conditions that are necessary for

the full development of human personality and

realization of equality. It embodies an essential

component required to promote equality at workplace

and safeguards maternal and child health. In other

words, it dignifies motherhood.

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22. Maternity benefit or the payment in lieu of such

leave is intended to support women during the phase of

early motherhood by providing economic security when

they are most engaged in the care and nurture of a

young child. This act of support recognizes that

motherhood entails sustained physical, emotional, and

social exertion which demands time, financial stability

and resources.

23. The concept of maternity benefit acknowledges the

ability of a woman to exercise her reproductive choices

without fear of losing her employment, more particularly,

the economic security. Thus, it ensures that motherhood

does not become a factor for exclusion at workplace.

24. In the aforesaid context, the right of maternity

protection recognizes the biological as well as

caregiving realities associated with motherhood, and

seeks to correct structural inequalities that women face

in employment. It represents the State's commitment to

uphold human dignity, equal treatment at work, and

broader ideals of social justice.

109. A three Judge Bench of this Court in Suchita

Srivastava v. Chandigarh Admn., reported in (2009) 9

SCC 1 : (2009) 3 SCC (Civ) 570 , affirmed the

reproductive rights of the appellant-victim, who was

allegedly raped while staying in a Government-run

welfare institution, when she expressed her willingness

to carry the pregnancy till its full term despite being

diagnosed with mild mental retardation.

The Court declined to discount her decision on the

ground that it was “questionable” and instead looked

beyond prevailing social prejudices to accord primacy to

her right to make reproductive choices under Article 21.

The Court held that the Medical Termination of

Pregnancy Act, 1971, recognizes and respects the

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personal autonomy of a woman in matters relating to

reproduction. The Court further directed the respondents

to ensure that adequate medical facilities were provided

so as to safeguard her health and well-being during the

course of the pregnancy. The relevant observations read

thus:—

“22. There is no doubt that a woman's right to make

reproductive choices is also a dimension of “personal

liberty” as understood under Article 21 of the

Constitution of India. It is important to recognise that

reproductive choices can be exercised to procreate as

well as to abstain from procreating. The crucial

consideration is that a woman's right to privacy, dignity

and bodily integrity should be respected. This means

that there should be no restriction whatsoever on the

exercise of reproductive choices such as a woman's

right to refuse participation in sexual activity or

alternatively the insistence on use of contraceptive

methods. Furthermore, women are also free to choose

birth control methods such as undergoing sterilisation

procedures. Taken to their logical conclusion,

reproductive rights include a woman's entitlement to

carry a pregnancy to its full term, to give birth and to

subsequently raise children. However, in the case of

pregnant women there is also a “compelling State

interest” in protecting the life of the prospective child.

Therefore, the termination of a pregnancy is only

permitted when the conditions specified in the

applicable statute have been fulfilled. Hence, the

provisions of the MTP Act, 1971 can also be viewed as

reasonable restrictions that have been placed on the

exercise of reproductive choices.

xxx

59. Lastly, we have urged the need to look beyond

social prejudices in order to objectively decide whether

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a person who is in a condition of mild mental retardation

can perform parental responsibilities.

60. The findings recorded by the expert body which had

examined the victim indicate that the continuation of the

pregnancy does not pose any grave risk to the physical

or mental health of the victim and that there is no

indication that the prospective child is likely to suffer

from a congenital disorder. However, concerns have

been expressed about the victim's mental capacity to

cope with the demands of carrying the pregnancy to its

full term, the act of delivering a child and subsequent

childcare. In this regard, we direct that the best medical

facilities be made available so as to ensure proper care

and supervision during the period of pregnancy as well

as for post-natal care.”

(Emphasis supplied)

10. The Honble Supreme Court in the matter of Sonam Lakra vs.

State of Chhattisgarh and Others in Civil Appeal No.12326 of 2024

decided on 14.11.2024 held in paragraph Nos.14 and 15 as under:-

14. It deeply concerns us that there is a recurring

pattern of similar cases, where administrative authorities

and village panchayat members collude to exact

vendettas against female Sarpanches. Such instances

highlight a systemic issue of prejudice and

discrimination. More recently, in Civil Appeal No.

10913/2024, titled 'Manisha Ravindra Panpatil v. The

State of Maharashtra', decided on 27.09.2024, we

observed that cases involving female Sarpanches often

reveal a pervasive pattern of unfair treatment across

various levels of administrative functioning. Alarmingly,

the removal of an elected female representative,

especially in rural and remote areas, is frequently

17

treated as a casual matter, wherein disregarding

principles of natural justice and democratic processes is

treated as a time-honored tradition. This entrenched

bias is particularly disheartening and demands serious

introspection and reform.

15. In this context, we must emphasize that as a nation

striving to become an economic powerhouse, it is

distressing to witness such incidents occurring

consistently and being normalized, so much so that they

bear striking similarities even in geographically distant

regions. Administrative authorities being custodians of

actual powers and affluent enough, should lead by

example, making efforts to promote women's

empowerment and support female-led initiatives in rural

and remote areas. Instead of adopting regressive

attitudes that discourage women in elected positions,

they must foster an environment that encourages their

participation and leadership in governance.

11.From the perusal of the record, it appears that the proceedings for

consideration of the no-confidence motion against the petitioner, who is

the directly elected Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat Siriyagarh, Janpad

Panchayat Dabhara, District Sakti, were initiated on the basis of an

application submitted by nine Panchas on 17.09.2026 before the SDO

(Revenue)/Prescribed Authority. The said Panchas have alleged loss of

confidence in the petitioner and have sought initiation of proceedings

for her removal from the office of Sarpanch. It further appears that the

Prescribed Authority, thereafter, called for the relevant record from the

Chief Executive Officer, Janpad Panchayat Dabhara and, without

awaiting the said record/report, issued the impugned notice dated

21.09.2026, fixing 01.10.2026 at 12:00 noon for consideration of the

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no-confidence motion. The petitioner admittedly received the said

notice on 24.09.2026.

12.The first contention raised by learned counsel for the petitioner is that

the impugned notice has been issued without awaiting the

report/documents called for from the Chief Executive Officer, Janpad

Panchayat Dabhara. However, from the scheme of Section 21 of the

Chhattisgarh Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, 1993 and Rule 3 of the

Chhattisgarh Panchayat (Gram Panchayat Ke Sarpanch Tatha Up-

Sarpanch Ke Viruddh Avishwas Prastav) Rules, 1994, it is apparent

that the Prescribed Authority is required to satisfy itself regarding the

admissibility of the notice and thereafter proceed in accordance with

the prescribed procedure. The mere fact that the Prescribed Authority

had called for certain documents from the Chief Executive Officer

would not, by itself, render the subsequent proceedings void unless the

petitioner demonstrates that such course of action has resulted in

violation of any mandatory statutory requirement or has caused

substantial prejudice to her.

13.In the present case, however, the petitioner has specifically pleaded

that no supporting material or documents forming the basis of the no-

confidence motion were supplied to her along with the impugned

notice. The allegations made by the Panchas are stated to relate, inter

alia, to alleged misappropriation of substantial amounts and non-

completion of certain works. When such allegations form part of the

material relied upon for initiating the proceedings, the question whether

the petitioner was afforded a meaningful opportunity to know and meet

the allegations against her assumes significance. The principles of

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fairness and natural justice require that the affected elected

representative should have reasonable knowledge of the material

relied upon against her so as to enable her to effectively participate in

the proceedings.

14.It is true that, as held by the Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High

Court in Bhulin Dewangan (supra), every infraction of the Rules relating

to a no-confidence motion would not automatically result in nullification

of the entire proceedings and the Court is required to examine whether

the alleged non-compliance has caused substantial prejudice or failure

of justice. The said principle has also been noticed and followed by this

Court in Smt. Janki Sahu (supra) and Sahasram Jangde (supra). Thus,

the question is not merely whether there has been a technical

deviation, but whether the procedure adopted has materially affected

the right of the petitioner to participate effectively in the proceedings.

15.In the present case, the petitioner has also raised a specific objection

with regard to the period of notice. The impugned notice is dated

21.09.2026 and was received by the petitioner on 24.09.2026, whereas

the meeting for consideration of the no-confidence motion was fixed on

01.10.2026 at 12:00 noon. Therefore, the petitioner had a period of

only seven calendar days from the date of actual receipt of the notice

to the date fixed for the meeting. The question whether the statutory

requirement of seven days' notice has been complied with has to be

examined with reference to the date of service/receipt of the notice and

the applicable statutory provision, particularly when the petitioner

specifically asserts that she did not have seven clear days' effective

notice to prepare herself for the proceedings.

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16.At this stage, this Court is also required to consider the peculiar

circumstance pleaded by the petitioner regarding her pregnancy. The

petitioner has placed on record her Matru Avam Bal Suraksha Card as

Annexure P/4 and has specifically stated that she is presently carrying

a pregnancy of about seven months. The said fact has not been

specifically disputed by the respondents. The petitioner has contended

that compelling her to participate in proceedings relating to the no-

confidence motion at this advanced stage of pregnancy would

adversely affect her health and the health of the unborn child. The right

to health has been recognised as an integral facet of the right to life

guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The Hon'ble

Supreme Court in K. Umadevi (supra), while considering the scope of

Article 21, has reiterated that the right to life includes the right to health

and the right to live with human dignity. Likewise, in Hamsaanandini

Nanduri (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has emphasised the

constitutional significance of maternity protection, maternal health and

the dignity associated with motherhood. It is also relevant to take note

of the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Manisha Ravindra

Panpatil (supra), and Sonam Lakra (supra), wherein the Court has

emphasised that the removal of an elected female representative,

particularly in rural areas, cannot be dealt with casually and that

principles of fairness, natural justice and democratic functioning are

required to be duly respected.

17.At the same time, this Court is conscious of the fact that the right of the

elected Panchas to move a no-confidence motion is also a statutory

and democratic right and the Court cannot interdict such proceedings

merely because the elected Sarpanch is facing inconvenience. The

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authorities are required to balance both aspects, namely, the statutory

right of the Panchas to seek consideration of a no-confidence motion

and the right of the petitioner to receive a fair and reasonable

opportunity to participate in the proceedings without compromising her

health or the health of her unborn child. In the facts of the present

case, the petitioner has not merely raised a general plea of

inconvenience. She has specifically pleaded that she is seven months

pregnant and has produced documentary material in support thereof.

Further, the impugned notice was received by her on 24.09.2026 and

the meeting was fixed for 01.10.2026. The petitioner has also

specifically raised a grievance regarding non-supply of the material

forming the basis of the proposed no-confidence motion. These

circumstances, considered cumulatively, require appropriate

consideration by the Prescribed Authority before proceeding further

with the no-confidence motion. This Court is of the considered view

that, at this stage, it would not be appropriate to adjudicate upon the

truth or otherwise of the allegations levelled by the Panchas against the

petitioner. Likewise, no finding is being recorded regarding the ultimate

validity of the proposed no-confidence motion. The limited question

requiring consideration is whether, in the peculiar facts and

circumstances of the present case, the proceedings should be

permitted to continue on the date originally fixed without the Prescribed

Authority first considering the specific grievances raised by the

petitioner.

18.Having regard to the advanced stage of pregnancy pleaded by the

petitioner, the documents placed on record in support thereof, the

grievance regarding non-supply of the supporting material, and the

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objection regarding the period of notice, this Court is of the view that

the petitioner deserves an opportunity to place all her grievances

before the competent Prescribed Authority. Such course would also

ensure that the statutory rights of the Panchas are not defeated and, at

the same time, the petitioner is afforded a fair opportunity in

accordance with law.

19.Accordingly, without expressing any opinion on the merits of the

allegations contained in the proposed no-confidence motion or on the

validity of the claims made by either side, the no-confidence

proceedings pursuant to the impugned notice dated 21.09.2026 are

deferred for the present. The petitioner is directed to submit a fresh

detailed application before the SDO (Revenue)/Prescribed Authority,

Dabhara, raising all her objections, including the objection regarding

the period of notice, non-supply of supporting documents/material, and

her present medical condition, along with the relevant documents.

Upon receipt of such application, the SDO (Revenue)/Prescribed

Authority shall consider the same objectively and in accordance with

the provisions of the Chhattisgarh Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, 1993 and

the Rules framed thereunder. While considering the application, the

Prescribed Authority shall also take into consideration the medical

condition of the petitioner and the documents produced by her in

support thereof, while keeping in view the statutory rights of the

Panchas who have initiated the no-confidence proceedings.

20.The Prescribed Authority shall thereafter take an appropriate decision

in accordance with law after affording reasonable opportunity of

hearing to all concerned parties. If the proceedings are required to be

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deferred in view of the petitioner's medical condition, the Prescribed

Authority shall fix an appropriate future date in accordance with the

statutory scheme and shall ensure that the petitioner is provided the

material/documents upon which the proposed no-confidence motion is

sought to be considered, subject to such documents being part of the

record and otherwise legally disclosable. Consequently, the Writ

Petition is allowed and the matter is remanded to the SDO

(Revenue)/Prescribed Authority, Dabhara, District Sakti, for

consideration afresh in accordance with law and in the light of the

observations made hereinabove.

21.The petitioner shall file her detailed application along with the relevant

medical documents and other objections before the concerned

authority forthwith. The Prescribed Authority shall consider the same

without being influenced by any observation made in this order, as this

Court has not expressed any opinion on the merits of the allegations or

on the ultimate validity of the no-confidence motion.

22.It is made clear that this Court has not expressed any opinion on the

merits of the proposed no-confidence motion, the allegations levelled

against the petitioner, or the defence sought to be raised by the

petitioner. All such questions are left open to be considered by the

competent authority in accordance with law.

Sd/-

(Amitendra Kishore Prasad)

Judge

Priyanka