1

CGHC010083452026 2026:CGHC:34942-DB

AFR

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

FA No. 48 of 2026

1 - Smt. Shakila Parveen W/o Habib Ulla Miya, Aged About 31 Years

D/o Rajab Ali, Caste-Musalman,

2 - Mu. S. Najma Ali, D/o Rajab Ali, Aged About 27 Years Caste-

Musalman,

3 - Smt. Salma Khatun, W/o Rajab Ali, Aged About 52 Years

4 - Rajab Ali, S/o Noor Mohammad, Aged About 70 Years Occupation-

Retired Employee All are R/o House No. 46, Khanji Nagar Puraina,

Telibandha, Raipur Shahar, Tahsil And District Raipur C.G.

... Appellants/Defendants

versus

1 - Smt. Nasima Ali W/o Late Naushad Ali, Aged About 33 Years

Occupation-House Wife

2 - Adib Ali, Aged About 13 Years

3 - Ku. Alishba Ali, Aged About 9 years,

No.2 & 3 are minor son and Daughter Of Late Naushad Ali, Through

Her Natural Guardian Mother Smt. Nasima Ali, all are R/o House No.

46, Khanji Nagar Puraina, Telibandha, Raipur Shahar, Tahsil And District

Raipur C.G.

4 - Mu. S. Shabnoor Ali, D/o Rajab Ali, Aged About 28 Years Caste-

Musalman, R/o House No. 46, Khanji Nagar Puraina, Telibandha,

Raipur Shahar, Tahsil And District Raipur C.G.

... Respondent(s)

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For

Appellants/Defend

ants No.1, 3, 4 & 5

:Mr.Rajkumar Pali, Advocate

For Respondents

No.1 to 3/Plaintiffs

:Mr.Sourabh Sharma, Advocate

Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice

Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge

Judgment on Board

Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice

10.08.2026

1.Heard Mr.Rajkumar Pali, learned counsel for the

appellants/defendants as well as Mr.Sourabh Sharma, learned

counsel appearing for respondents No.1 to 3/plaintiffs.

2.The appellants / defendants No.1, 3, 4 and 5 have filed the instant

first appeal against the impugned judgment dated 24.11.2025 and

decree dated 27.11.2025 passed by the learned 11

th

District

Judge, Raipur, District Raipur in Civil Suit No.42A/2029, whereby a

civil suit preferred by the plaintiffs / respondents No.1 to 3 has

been decreed in their favour.

3.Brief facts of the case are that the plaintiffs/respondents Nos.1 to 3

filed a suit seeking a declaration that the registered gift deed dated

27.03.2019 is null and void and not binding upon them, along with

a decree of permanent injunction in respect of the suit property

bearing Plot No.46, admeasuring 1500 sq. ft., situated at Rani

Durgavati Ward No.47, Khanij Nagar, Puraina Telibandha, Raipur

(C.G.). It was pleaded, inter alia, that the husband of plaintiff No.1

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and father of plaintiffs Nos.2 and 3, namely, late Naushad Ali, was

working as a contractor and was also engaged in the business of

supplying medicines, medical articles and medical machines to

various Government departments. In the year 2013, he started a

proprietorship firm in the name and style of “Alite Bio Medical” and

carried on his business thereunder. He died on 04.06.2018. The

plaintiffs further pleaded that defendant No.5 was an employee of

NMDC and, under the housing scheme of the said company, had

purchased the suit land from the Housing Board, Raipur, on

03.03.1994. According to the plaintiffs, the consideration for the

said purchase was paid by late Naushad Ali, husband of plaintiff

No.1. Thereafter, late Naushad Ali constructed a house over an

area of 1,000 sq. ft. forming part of the suit property out of his own

income. It was further pleaded that he constructed another house

over an area of 370 sq. ft. forming part of the suit property after

obtaining a loan of Rs.5,00,000/- from Bajaj Finance Company.

The plaintiffs are residing in the said house.

4.The plaintiffs further pleaded that late Naushad Ali had repaid the

loan amount during his lifetime and, after his death, plaintiff No. 1

continued to repay the outstanding loan amount. However, some

amount is still due and payable. It was further pleaded that, after

the death of late Naushad Ali, the defendants subjected the

plaintiffs to mental and physical harassment and threatened them

with dispossession from the suit property. It was further pleaded

that defendants Nos. 1 to 3 were residing with defendant No. 5,

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although they were married women, and that they were attempting

to obtain the suit property from defendant No. 5. Under the

influence of defendants Nos. 1 to 4, defendant No. 5 executed a

registered gift deed dated 27.03.2019 in favour of defendants Nos.

1 to 4 jointly. The plaintiffs further pleaded that they have rights

and interest in the suit property and that defendant No. 5, having

no exclusive right or authority over the entire suit property, wrongly

executed the aforesaid gift deed in favour of defendants Nos. 1 to

4. According to the plaintiffs, the said gift deed is void and

ineffective against their rights. It was further pleaded that late

Naushad Ali was the only son of defendant No. 5 and had invested

a substantial amount of money in the construction of the house

situated over the suit property. Despite the same, the defendants

threatened the plaintiffs, on account of which the plaintiffs lodged a

report with the police.

5.The plaintiffs further pleaded that the execution of the gift deed

was contrary to the provisions of Muslim law relating to gifts and

that the essential requirements for a valid gift had not been

fulfilled. It was also pleaded that the plaintiffs are in possession of

a portion of the suit property measuring 370 sq. ft. and, therefore,

defendant No. 5 was not in possession of the entire suit property.

The plaintiffs further alleged that a house had also been

constructed over an area of 75 sq. ft. forming part of the suit

property. It was further pleaded that, on the basis of the registered

gift deed, defendants Nos. 1 to 4 got their names mutated in the

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revenue records and thereafter attempted to forcibly dispossess

the plaintiffs from the suit property. Consequently, the plaintiffs

instituted the suit seeking the reliefs mentioned in the prayer

clause of the plaint.

6.Defendants Nos. 1, 2, 4 and 5 submitted their joint written

statement and denied the allegations and averments made by the

plaintiffs. They pleaded that the plaintiffs had been permitted by

defendants Nos. 1 to 4 to reside in the suit property since

26.03.2019. It was further pleaded that late Naushad Ali was

engaged in private employment and, after his marriage with

plaintiff No. 1, had been residing separately from the defendants.

According to the defendants, late Naushad Ali had no relationship

with the defendants' family and had neither assisted them nor

invested any amount in the suit property. The defendants further

pleaded that defendant No. 5 had purchased the suit land from the

Housing Board on 03.03.1994 out of his own income, as he was

then in service. Thereafter, he obtained a loan from NMDC and

constructed the house over the suit property. Defendant No. 5 was

the sole owner of the suit property and, therefore, was competent

to execute the registered gift deed dated 27.03.2019 in

accordance with law in favour of defendants Nos. 1 to 4. It was

further pleaded that, pursuant to the execution of the gift deed,

possession of the property was handed over to defendants Nos. 1

to 4, who became entitled to the entire suit property. The

defendants further pleaded that the plaintiffs were residing in the

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suit property without any right or authority since 27.03.2019.

Therefore, defendants Nos. 1 to 4 were entitled to obtain vacant

possession of the portion measuring 370 sq. ft. from the plaintiffs.

On these grounds, the defendants prayed for dismissal of the suit.

7.On the basis of the pleadings of the parties and the evidence

available on record, the learned trial Court framed three issues for

determination and, after considering the material available on

record, decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiffs. Hence, the

present appeal.

8.Learned counsel appearing for the appellants/defendants No.1, 3,

4 and 5 would submit that the impugned judgment and decree

passed by the learned trial Court are contrary to the pleadings,

evidence and material available on record and, therefore, are

liable to be set aside. It is submitted that the learned trial Court has

failed to properly appreciate the pleadings of the defendants as

well as the documentary evidence produced by them in support of

their case. Learned counsel would further submit that the property

bearing Plot No. 46, admeasuring 1500 sq. ft., was purchased by

defendant No. 5 from his own income and, therefore, defendant

No. 5 was the sole owner and holder of the entire property.

According to learned counsel, there was no contribution made by

late Naushad Ali, husband of plaintiff No. 1 and father of plaintiffs

Nos. 2 and 3, towards the purchase of the suit property. The

finding of the learned trial Court to the contrary is, therefore, based

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on an erroneous appreciation of the evidence available on record.

9.It is further submitted that defendant No. 5, being the exclusive

owner of the suit property, was legally competent to deal with the

property in any manner permissible in law. The plaintiffs had no

right, title or interest in the suit property so as to question the

transaction entered into by defendant No. 5. Learned counsel

would submit that defendant No. 5, in exercise of his lawful

ownership rights, executed the registered gift deed dated

27.03.2019 in favour of defendants Nos. 1 to 4. The said

registered document was duly proved in accordance with law and

there was no sufficient legal basis for the learned trial Court to

disregard its effect. Learned counsel would next submit that the

learned trial Court has recorded erroneous findings in paragraphs

23, 24 and 25 of the impugned judgment. It is submitted that the

learned trial Court failed to properly appreciate the registered gift

deed and the evidence led by the defendants in support thereof.

The defendants had specifically pleaded in their written statement

that the plaintiffs were residing in the suit property without any right

or authority. Despite the specific pleadings and evidence on

record, the learned trial Court wrongly held against the defendants.

Such findings, according to learned counsel, are contrary to the

evidence on record and are, therefore, unsustainable in law.

10.It is also submitted that the learned trial Court has erroneously

interpreted the gift deed on the ground that the respective shares

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of the donees were not specifically mentioned or determined

therein. Learned counsel would submit that merely because the

exact proportion of the shares of the recipients was not separately

specified in the manner understood by the trial Court, the

registered gift deed could not have been held to be ineffective or

invalid. The finding recorded by the learned trial Court in this

regard is based upon an erroneous interpretation of the document

and is not sustainable in the eye of law. Learned counsel would

further submit that the learned trial Court, without there being any

cogent or reliable evidence on record, presumed that the

defendants had permitted late Naushad Ali to construct a house

over an area of 370 sq. ft. forming part of the suit property. It is

submitted that no such permission or consent was ever granted by

defendant No. 5 or defendants Nos. 1 to 4 for construction of the

said house. The plaintiffs failed to establish any lawful right under

which late Naushad Ali could have constructed the house over the

suit property. According to learned counsel, the plaintiffs were

merely occupying the property without any lawful authority and,

therefore, the learned trial Court committed an error in recognizing

their possession as being lawful.

11.Learned counsel would further submit that the learned trial Court

has also failed to properly consider the joint written statement filed

by defendants Nos. 1, 2, 4 and 5, wherein the material allegations

and claims made by the plaintiffs were specifically denied. The

defence taken by the defendants was consistent throughout and

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was duly supported by the documentary evidence available on

record. However, the learned trial Court has failed to consider the

said defence in its proper perspective and has instead accepted

the case of the plaintiffs without there being sufficient evidence to

establish their alleged right, title or interest in the suit property. It is

lastly submitted that the findings recorded by the learned trial Court

are based on misappreciation and non-consideration of material

evidence and pleadings, resulting in an erroneous decree in favour

of the plaintiffs. Therefore, the impugned judgment and decree

deserve to be set aside and the suit filed by respondents Nos. 1 to

3/plaintiffs deserves to be dismissed.

12.Per contra, learned counsel appearing for respondents Nos. 1 to

3/plaintiffs would submit that the learned trial Court, after

considering the pleadings, oral and documentary evidence

available on record, has rightly decreed the suit in favour of the

plaintiffs. The findings recorded by the learned trial Court are

based on proper appreciation of the evidence and do not suffer

from any perversity or illegality warranting interference in appeal.

Learned counsel would submit that the appellants have failed to

establish that defendant No. 5 was the exclusive owner of the

entire suit property or that the consideration for its purchase was

paid solely from his income. On the contrary, the plaintiffs had

specifically pleaded and led evidence that late Naushad Ali,

husband of plaintiff No. 1 and father of plaintiffs Nos. 2 and 3, had

contributed towards the property and had incurred substantial

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expenditure for construction of the house situated over a portion of

the suit land.

13.It is further submitted that the plaintiffs are in possession of the

residential house constructed over an area of 370 sq. ft. and that

the defendants failed to establish that such possession was

unauthorized. The plea that late Naushad Ali had constructed the

house without the consent or permission of defendant No. 5 is not

supported by any cogent evidence. Learned counsel would further

submit that the registered gift deed dated 27.03.2019 cannot, by

itself, establish a valid transfer in favour of defendants Nos. 1 to 4.

The plaintiffs specifically challenged the validity of the gift deed on

the ground that the essential requirements of a valid gift under

Muslim law were not fulfilled. Mere registration of the document

does not dispense with the requirement of proving a valid gift in

accordance with law. It is also submitted that the learned trial Court

rightly considered the contents of the gift deed and found that the

respective shares of the donees were not clearly ascertainable.

The appellants have failed to demonstrate any perversity or

material illegality in the said finding.

14.Learned counsel would submit that the defendants failed to prove

that the plaintiffs were occupying the suit property merely with their

permission or that their possession subsequently became

unauthorized. The learned trial Court, upon appreciation of the

evidence, rightly rejected the said defence. Lastly, it is submitted

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that the appellants have failed to point out any material error in the

impugned judgment. The findings recorded by the learned trial

Court are findings of fact based on the evidence available on

record. Therefore, the appeal is devoid of merit and deserves to be

dismissed and the impugned judgment and decree deserve to be

affirmed.

15.We have heard learned counsel appearing for the

appellants/defendants Nos.1, 3, 4 and 5 as well as learned counsel

appearing for respondents Nos.1 to 3/plaintiffs and have carefully

perused the pleadings of the parties, the oral and documentary

evidence available on record, the findings recorded by the learned

trial Court and the grounds raised in the present appeal.

16.The learned trial Court, on the basis of the pleadings of the parties,

framed the necessary issues for determination and, upon

appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the

parties, decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiffs. The principal

controversy involved in the present appeal is as to whether the

registered gift deed dated 27.03.2019 executed by defendant No.5

in favour of defendants Nos.1 to 4 was validly executed and

completed in accordance with Muslim law and whether the same is

binding upon the plaintiffs so as to entitle the appellants to interfere

with their possession over the suit property.

17.The first question that arises for consideration is whether

defendant No.5, even assuming him to be the exclusive owner of

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the suit property, validly transferred the same in favour of

defendants Nos.1 to 4 by way of the registered gift deed dated

27.03.2019. It is the specific case of the appellants that defendant

No.5 had purchased Plot No.46, admeasuring 1500 sq. ft., from his

own income and was, therefore, the exclusive owner thereof and

competent to deal with the property in accordance with law. There

can be no quarrel with the general proposition that an owner is

competent to transfer his property in accordance with law.

However, the question that arises for consideration in the present

case is not merely whether defendant No.5 had title over the suit

property, but whether the alleged gift in favour of defendants Nos.1

to 4 was validly completed in accordance with the requirements of

Muslim law and, consequently, whether it could operate to the

prejudice of the plaintiffs, who were admittedly in possession of a

portion of the suit property.

18.The learned trial Court has rightly examined the validity of the

disputed gift deed in the light of the principles governing Hiba

under Muslim law. Under Muslim law, a gift is a voluntary transfer

of property without consideration and, for a valid Hiba, the

essential requirements are: (i) a declaration of gift by the donor; (ii)

acceptance of the gift by or on behalf of the donee; and (iii)

delivery of possession of the subject-matter of the gift. These are

the essential ingredients for completion of a valid gift. Mere

execution or registration of an instrument does not, by itself,

dispense with the requirement of establishing a valid Hiba in

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accordance with Muslim law.

19.The aforesaid principle assumes significance in the present case

as the appellants have principally relied upon the registered gift

deed dated 27.03.2019. The fact that the document is registered

may establish its execution and registration in accordance with the

provisions applicable to registration of documents; however,

registration by itself cannot conclusively establish that all the

essential requirements of a valid Hiba have been fulfilled. The

validity and legal effect of the transaction are, therefore, required to

be examined with reference to the pleadings, surrounding

circumstances and evidence adduced by the parties.

20.So far as the first two requirements, namely, declaration and

acceptance of the gift, are concerned, the learned trial Court has

noticed that the disputed gift deed contains recitals to the effect

that defendant No.5, as donor, intended to gift the property in

favour of defendants Nos.1 to 4 and that the donees had accepted

the gift. The signatures/thumb impressions of the parties also

appear on the document. Thus, to that extent, the requirements

relating to declaration and acceptance may be said to have been

substantially established. However, the crucial question which

remains for consideration is whether there was actual delivery of

possession of the subject-matter of the gift to the donees so as to

complete the Hiba.

21.On this aspect, the evidence assumes considerable significance.

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The plaintiffs have consistently pleaded that they are residing in

the residential portion constructed over approximately 370 sq. ft. of

the suit property. Their specific case is that late Naushad Ali,

husband of plaintiff No.1 and father of plaintiffs Nos.2 and 3, had

constructed the said portion and that the plaintiffs have continued

to reside therein. On the other hand, the defendants have asserted

that the plaintiffs are unauthorized occupants and that possession

of the entire suit property was delivered to defendants Nos.1 to 4

pursuant to the execution of the gift deed.

22.The mere recital contained in the gift deed that possession of the

gifted property was delivered to the donees cannot, in the facts

and circumstances of the present case, be treated as conclusive

proof of actual delivery of possession of the entire suit property.

The evidence on record establishes that, even after execution of

the gift deed dated 27.03.2019, the plaintiffs continued to remain in

possession of the portion measuring approximately 370 sq. ft. The

appellants have not produced any cogent or convincing evidence

demonstrating any overt act by defendant No.5 whereby

possession of the entire suit property was actually and effectively

delivered to defendants Nos.1 to 4.

23.It is also significant that defendants Nos.1 to 3 are the daughters

of defendant No.5, whereas defendant No.4 is his wife. The parties

are closely related and their residence in the suit property is not

seriously disputed. In such circumstances, physical delivery of

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possession may not, in every case, require actual physical

dispossession of the donor; nevertheless, there must be some

cogent evidence of an overt act or conduct indicating that the

donor had divested himself of possession and that the donees had

assumed possession in pursuance of the gift. In the present case,

there is no satisfactory evidence establishing such delivery of

possession of the entire subject-matter of the gift.

24.The continued possession of the plaintiffs over a specific portion of

the suit property is, therefore, a material circumstance. The

defendants have failed to establish that the plaintiffs were

dispossessed from the said portion pursuant to the gift deed or that

defendants Nos.1 to 4 assumed exclusive possession thereof. On

the contrary, the plaintiffs continued in possession even after

execution of the disputed gift deed. Thus, the essential

requirement of delivery of possession of the entire subject-matter

of the gift has not been satisfactorily established by the

defendants.

25.The learned trial Court has also considered the principle of Musha,

relating to an undivided share in property. In the present case, the

suit property comprises Plot No.46, admeasuring 1500 sq. ft.,

together with the construction standing thereon. The disputed gift

deed was executed in favour of four donees jointly; however, their

respective shares in the property have not been specifically

identified or separated in the gift deed. At the same time, a portion

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of the suit property measuring approximately 370 sq. ft. admittedly

remains in the possession of the plaintiffs.

26.In these circumstances, the learned trial Court was justified in

examining whether the subject-matter of the gift was sufficiently

identifiable and whether the respective interests of the four donees

were capable of being ascertained. Where an undivided interest in

property is purportedly gifted to several donees without

specification of their respective shares and without effective

delivery of possession, the principle relating to Musha becomes

relevant. The underlying principle is intended to avoid uncertainty

or confusion regarding the subject-matter of the gift and the

corresponding delivery of possession.

27.It is true that the doctrine of Musha has been relaxed by Courts in

appropriate cases and cannot be applied mechanically. However,

in the present case, the learned trial Court has not declared the gift

invalid solely on the ground of Musha. The said circumstance has

been considered cumulatively with the absence of satisfactory

evidence regarding delivery of possession and the continued

possession of the plaintiffs over a defined portion of the suit

property. Therefore, the finding recorded by the learned trial Court

cannot be said to be based upon an isolated or erroneous

application of the doctrine.

28.The submission of learned counsel for the appellants that

defendant No.5 was the exclusive owner of the suit property and,

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therefore, the plaintiffs had no locus to question the gift deed, also

cannot be accepted. Even assuming that defendant No.5 was the

absolute owner of the suit property, any transfer made by him was

required to satisfy the legal requirements applicable to the

particular mode of transfer. The plaintiffs were certainly entitled to

challenge the validity and binding nature of the gift deed,

particularly when the appellants sought to rely upon the same for

interfering with the plaintiffs' existing possession.

29.Another material circumstance is the long-standing possession of

the plaintiffs. From the pleadings and evidence on record, it

emerges that plaintiff No.1 had been residing in the suit property

since her marriage with late Naushad Ali in the year 2005. It has

further been pleaded and supported by evidence that late Naushad

Ali constructed a residential portion measuring approximately 370

sq. ft., including a room and lat-bath, over the suit property. The

plaintiffs have continued to reside in the said portion.

30.The defendants have sought to characterize the possession of the

plaintiffs as unauthorized from 27.03.2019. However, the evidence

on record does not establish that the plaintiffs were inducted into

possession merely as temporary or unauthorized occupants. Their

long-standing residence in the property and the construction raised

by late Naushad Ali during his lifetime are relevant circumstances.

The defendants have also failed to produce any cogent material

demonstrating that defendant No.5 had objected to such

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construction at the relevant time or that the plaintiffs had been

directed to vacate the premises prior to execution of the disputed

gift deed.

31.The learned trial Court has also considered the plea relating to

licence. A licence may be express or implied and may arise from

the conduct of the parties. In the present case, the continued

residence of plaintiff No.1 in the suit property since the year 2005,

followed by construction of the residential portion by late Naushad

Ali without any contemporaneous objection by defendant No.5,

constitutes a relevant circumstance for determining the nature of

the plaintiffs' possession. The learned trial Court was, therefore,

justified in examining the plaintiffs' possession from the standpoint

of permissive possession and the protection available to such

possession in law.

32.The appellants have failed to demonstrate that the conclusion

reached by the learned trial Court in this regard is unsupported by

evidence. On the contrary, the finding is based upon the

relationship between the parties, the long-standing residence of

the plaintiffs, the construction raised over the suit property and the

subsequent attempt of the defendants to interfere with the plaintiffs'

possession on the strength of the disputed gift deed.

33.It is a settled principle that even a person claiming ownership

cannot take the law into his own hands and forcibly dispossess a

person who is in settled possession. If the defendants claimed a

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superior right to possession on the strength of the gift deed, they

were required to establish the validity and legal effect of the said

transaction and to seek appropriate relief in accordance with law.

They could not, merely on the basis of the disputed document,

forcibly interfere with the settled possession of the plaintiffs.

34.So far as the relief of permanent injunction is concerned, the

plaintiffs specifically pleaded that, after execution of the disputed

gift deed, the defendants asserted rights thereunder and

threatened to dispossess them from the suit property. The plaintiffs

were admittedly in possession of the residential portion. The

circumstances emerging from the record, therefore, establish a

reasonable apprehension of interference with their possession.

The plaintiffs were consequently justified in seeking protection of

their possession by way of permanent injunction.

35.The learned trial Court, while granting the relief of permanent

injunction, has restrained the defendants from interfering with the

possession of the plaintiffs over the suit property and from creating

any third-party interest therein. Such relief is consequential upon

the finding regarding the invalidity and non-binding nature of the

disputed gift deed and the established possession of the plaintiffs.

The relief granted by the learned trial Court is, therefore, consistent

with the pleadings and evidence on record and does not warrant

interference.

36.The appellants have also contended that the learned trial Court

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failed to consider the documentary evidence produced by them.

However, upon a careful examination of the impugned judgment, it

is evident that the learned trial Court considered the disputed gift

deed as well as the rival pleadings and evidence and thereafter

recorded its findings. Merely because the conclusion arrived at by

the learned trial Court is adverse to the appellants cannot, by itself,

lead to a conclusion that the relevant evidence was ignored or not

considered.

37.The appellants have failed to demonstrate any material

contradiction, perversity, misreading of evidence or patent illegality

in the findings recorded by the learned trial Court. The findings are

based upon appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence

and application of the principles governing Hiba under Muslim law.

38.Upon an overall consideration of the pleadings, evidence and

surrounding circumstances, this Court is of the considered view

that the plaintiffs have succeeded in establishing that, although the

registered gift deed dated 27.03.2019 was executed by defendant

No.5 in favour of defendants Nos.1 to 4, the defendants have failed

to establish that the gift was validly completed in accordance with

the essential requirements of Hiba, particularly the requirement of

effective delivery of possession of the entire subject-matter of the

gift. The further circumstance that the gift was made jointly in

favour of four donees without clear specification of their respective

shares, coupled with the continued possession of the plaintiffs over

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a defined portion of the suit property, lends further support to the

conclusion arrived at by the learned trial Court.

39.Consequently, the finding recorded by the learned trial Court on

Issue No.1 that the registered gift deed dated 27.03.2019 is void

and not binding upon the plaintiffs does not suffer from any

illegality, perversity or infirmity warranting interference by this

Court. The said finding is hereby affirmed.

40.So far as Issue No.2 is concerned, the plaintiffs have established

their continued and settled possession over the concerned portion

of the suit property and have also established the threat of

interference by the defendants on the basis of the disputed gift

deed. The learned trial Court was, therefore, justified in granting

the relief of permanent injunction restraining the defendants from

interfering with the plaintiffs' possession and from creating any

third-party interest in the suit property. The finding recorded on

Issue No.2 is based upon proper appreciation of the evidence and

calls for no interference.

41.In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds no justifiable

ground to interfere with the judgment dated 24.11.2025 and decree

dated 27.11.2025 passed by the learned 11

th

District Judge, Raipur,

District Raipur, in Civil Suit No.42-A/2029. Consequently, the

present first appeal, being devoid of merit, is liable to be and is

hereby dismissed. The judgment and decree passed by the

learned trial Court are hereby affirmed.

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44. Parties shall bear their own costs.

45. Advocate fees as per rules.

46. A decree be drawn accordingly.

Sd/- Sd/-

(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha)

Judge Chief Justice

Bablu

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Head-Note

Under the Muslim law, a valid Hiba requires declaration by the

donor, acceptance by or on behalf of the donee, and delivery of

possession. Mere execution or registration of a gift deed, or a recital of

delivery therein, does not suffice where the donor or a third party

continues in possession; failure to prove effective delivery of possession

of the entire gifted property renders the Hiba invalid.