http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 10

PETITIONER:

SMT. RASHMI KUMAR

Vs.

RESPONDENT:

MAHESH KUMAR BHADA

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 18/12/1996

BENCH:

K. RAMASWAMY, S.B. MAJUMUDAR, G.T. NANAVATI

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:

J U D G M E N T

K. Ramaswamy, J.

This appeal has been placed before this Bench pursuant

to an order date 19.4.1995 passed by a two Judge Bench in

the following terms:

"A decade has gone by since

Pratibha Rai vs. Suraj Kumar & Anr,

[(1985) 2 SCC 370] - a decision by

a majority of 2:1 has governed the

scene. Having regard to its wider

ramifications and its actual

working in the last decade, we are

of the view that a fresh look to

the ratio in that case is

necessary. We, therefore, order

that this case be placed before a

three-judge Bench."

This appeal by special leave arises from the Judgment

of the Allahabad High Court dated June 19, 1992 in Criminal

Miscl. Case No.44 of 1992. The admitted facts are that the

appellant was married to the respondent on July 7, 1973 at

Lucknow according to the Hindu rites and rituals. The

parties have three children from the wedlock. It is not in

dispute that there was estrangement in the marital

relationship between the husband and the wife. It is the

case of the appellant that she was treated with cruelty and

was driven out of the marital home along with the three

children. She was constrained to lay proceedings under

Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act for restitution of

conjugal rights. The appellant was given jewellery, i.e.,

gold and silver ornaments and other household goods

enumerated in Annexures I and II and also cash by her

parents, brothers and other relatives at different

ceremonies prior to her marriage and after the marriage at

the time of bidai (farewell). She claims that all these

articles constituted her stridhana properties and were kept

in the custody of the respondent-husband. The respondent has

asked the appellant to entrust for safe custody all the

jewellery and cash mentioned in Annexure I, to his father

with the promise that on her demand whenever made, they

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 10

would be returned. Accordingly, she had entrusted them to

the appellant at Lucknow in the presence of three named

witnesses. Similarly, the household goods mentioned in

Annexure-II were entrusted by the parents of the appellant

to the respondent at the time of farewell in the presence of

three named witnesses. They lived together in Delhi in her

in-laws house. The appellant alleged in the complaint that

she was treated with cruelty in the matrimonial home and

ultimately on July 24/25, 1978 she and the children were

thrown out from the matrimonial home at duress and at the

peril of their lives. Accordingly, she was driven out from

the matrimonial home without getting an opportunity to take

with her Stridhana properties enumerated in Annexures I and

II.

She filed an application under Section 9 of the Hindu

Marriage Act for restitution of conjugal rights. Even

thereafter she went to Cochin where at the respondent-

husband was working, on October 9, 1986 and requested him to

restitute her into the conjugal society along with the

children. he promised that he would do it provided she

withdrew her application for restitution of conjugal rights.

He also promised to return the jewellery and other valuables

mentioned in Annexures I and II entrusted to him. Even after

her withdrawing the application, on October 21, 1986, he did

not take her into the conjugal society. Therefore, she was

again constrained to file second application on November 18,

1986 for restitution of conjugal rights. She also filed

application under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, 1973 (for short, the "Code") for maintenance.

Since these attempts proved unsuccessful, she made a demand

on December 5, 1987 to return the jewellery as detailed in

Annexure I and household goods mentioned in Annexure II but

the respondent flatly refused to return her stridhana

properties. Consequently, she filed a private complaint on

September 10, 1990.

After recording her statement under Section 200 of the

Code, the learned Magistrate took cognizance of the offence

and issued process to the respondent. While the respondent

appeared in the Court, he filed an application under Section

482 of the Code in the High Court to quash the proceedings.

As stated earlier, the High Court in the impugned Order has

quashed the proceedings on two grounds, viz., (i) the

appellant did not make out any case in the complaint and

(ii) it is barred by limitation. On the ground of

limitation, the learned Judge came to the conclusion that in

October 1986 the appellant had made a demand for return of

the jewellery and gold but the respondent did not return the

same. Therefore, it furnished a cause of action. Since

complaint was laid in September 1990, it was clearly barred

by limitation the period prescribed being three years.

Smt. Indira Jaising, Learned senior counsel for the

appellant, contended that the ratio in Pratibha Rani V/s.

Suraj Kumar & Anr. [(1985) 2 SCC 370] has stood the test of

time for more than a decade though therein there was

difference of opinion between the majority and the minority

on certain aspects of the matter. The decision has never

been doubted by any other Bench. The said ration is based on

the personal law as elaborately discussed in the judgment.

Therefore, it requires reiteration. Shri Rajinder Singh,

learned senior counsel for the respondent, on the other

hand, sought to support the present reference to the three

Judge Bench on the basis of the conduct of the appellant. He

also contends that a clear demand for return of the

stridhana properties was made in October 1986 when the

respondent had refused to return the same. Since the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 10

complaint came to be filed only in September 1990, i.e.,

after a delay of 11 months from the expiry of prescribed

limitation, it is time barred. Since no application for

condonation of delay was filed, the High Court was enjoined

to dismiss the complaint as being barred by limitation. Smt.

Indira Jaisingh contended that the offence punishable under

Section 406, Indian Penal Code [for short, the "IPC"] is a

continuing offence and hence cause of action arose every day

subsequent to the refusal and, therefore, the complaint was

not barred by limitation. Shri Rajinder Singh further

contended that the respondent has always been willing to

transfer his flat in Bombay in the name of his daughters. He

also states that he has been paying every month maintenance

allowance in respect of the children. Even if the articles

which the appellant is claiming is mentioned, the respondent

is prepared to deposit the same in a fixed account in the

name of his daughters. This conduct on the part of the

respondent would militate against the conduct of the

appellant who intends to harass the respondent by filing

endless complaints. These circumstances would go to indicate

that there are no justifiable reasons for interference with

the order of the High Court. At this juncture, it is

relevant to not that several attempts made by this Court to

have the dispute settled amicably between the parties, could

not bear any fruit of success. Therefore, we are not

inclined to undertake the exercise once over.

The question that has arisen for consideration is:

whether the ratio in Pratibha Rani's case does not hold good

any more? That case also related to a complaint filed under

Section 406, IPC for breach of trust by the respondent-

husband on his refusing to return stridhana property, viz.,

jewellery, wearing apparels etc. The question that had

arisen for consideration was whether the stridhana property

was exclusive property of the appellant-wife or was a joint

property owned and held by both the spouses? Though all the

three learned Judges concurred on the point of entrustment

of the jewellery and wearing apparels to be stridhana, the

majority view was that the stridhana property was the

exclusive property of the appellant-wife and that,

therefore, the failure to return the property in the custody

of the husband to the wife constitutes breach of trust

defined under Section 405, IPC. Therefore, the offence of

breach of trust punishable under Section 406 was made out,

as per the averments contained in the complaint. The

minority view was that the property entrusted to the husband

after the marriage is joining property of the wife and the

husband. The essential requirement for constituting an

offence defined under Section 405, IPC in relation to

stridhana property, is that there should be a specific

separate agreement between the parties, whereby the property

of the wife or the husband, as the case may be, is

entrusted. In the absence of such a separate agreement for

specific entrustment, it would not be possible to draw an

inference of entrustment of custody or dominion over the

property of one spouse to the other and/or his or her close

relations so as to attract the stringent provisions of

Section 406, IPC; otherwise there would be disastrous

effects and consequences on the peace and harmony which

ought to prevail in matrimonial homes. The appropriate

remedy would appear to be by way of a civil suit for

recovery of the stridhana property.

Fazal Ali, J., speaking for himself and Sabyasachi

Mukherjee, J., as he then was, held that the possession of

Saudayika or stridhana of a Hindu married female during

coverture is absolutely clear and unambiguous. She is the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 10

absolute owner of her stridhana property and can deal with

it in any manner she likes. She may spend the whole of it or

give it away at her own pleasure by gift or will without any

reference to her husband. Ordinarily, the husband has no

right or interest in it with the sole exception that in

times of extreme distress, as in famine, illness or the

like, the husband can utilise it but he is morally bound to

restore it or its value when he is able to do so. This right

is purely personal to the husband and the property so

received by him in marriage cannot be proceeded against even

in execution of a decree for debt passed against the

husband. If in spite of demands for return of the articles,

the husband refuses to return them to the wife, it amounts

to an offence of criminal breach of trust. The stridhana

property is not a joint property of the wife and the

husband. Section 27 of the Hindu Marriage Act merely

provides another remedy of suit to recover from the husband

or the persons to whom the stridhana property was entrusted.

The mere factum of the husband and the wife living together

does not entitle either of them to commit a breach of

criminal law and if one does, then he or she will be liable

for all the consequences of such breach. By mere living in

matrimonial home the stridhana does not become joint

property of the spouses. It is also not a partnership

property between the wife and the husband. The concept of

partnership is alien to the stridhana property under the

personal law. Therefore, entrustment of stridhana, without

creating any right in the husband except, putting the

articles in the possession, does not entitle him to use the

same to the detriment of his wife without her consent. The

husband has no justification for not returning the said

articles as and when demanded by the wife; nor can he burden

her with loss of business by using the said properties which

were never intended by her while entrusting possession of

the stridhana. The husband being only a custodian of the

stridhana of his wife, cannot be said to be in joint

possession thereof and does not acquire a joint interest in

the property. It was, therefore, concluded that the custody

or entrustment of the stridhana with the husband does not

amount to partnership in any sense of the term nor does the

stridhana becomes a joint property. It was held in para 60

of the judgment that taking all the allegations made in the

complaint, by no stretch of imagination it could be said

that they do not prima facie amount to an offence of

criminal breach of trust against the respondent. Thus there

could be no room for doubt that all the facts stated in the

complaint constitute an offence under Section 406, IPC and

the appellant could not be denied the right to prove her

case at the trial by pre-empting it at the very inception by

the order passed by the High Court. Accordingly, it was

quashed. Direction was given to proceed with the trial from

the stage at which stay was granted by this Court. The only

difference of point was whether there should be special

agreement of entrustment. Varadarajan, J. elaborately dealt

with the special agreement and had held that in view of the

fact that wife and husband have dominion over the wife's

property jointly, proof of special agreement of entrustment

is an essential ingredient.

In Mayne's Hindu Law & Usage [13th Edn.] edited by

Justice Alladi Kuppuswami, former Chief Justice of Andhra

Pradesh High Court, in paragraph 644 at page 877 it is

stated that "Katyayana indicates a cross-classification of

stridhana [Vivadachintamani vide p.259; Jha HLS II, 529-31;

Apararka, 21 MLJ (Jour.) 428. He further states: "that which

is obtained by a married woman or by a maiden, in the house

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 10

of her husband or of her father, from her brother (from her

husband) or from her parents, is stridhana [Vide: Katyayna

cited in Mit., II, xi, 5; Smritichandrika, IX, ii,4-5; V.

May., IV, x, 8 etc.]. Under the caption "Yautaka and

ayautake", it is stated that "Yautaka is that which is given

at the nuptial fire... It includes all gifts made during the

marriage ceremonies. Ayautaka is gift made before or after

marriage. Saudayika includes both Yautaka and Ayautaka and

received from strangers. It is defined to be gifts from

affectionate kindered". In support thereof, he relied on

Venkatareddy v. Hanumant [(1993) 57 Bom 85] and Muthukaruppa

v. Sellathammal [(1916) 39 Mad. 298 at 300 and see para

No.10] At page 881, in paragraph 650, sub-para (4), it is

stated that "So also gifts or grants to her by strangers,

whether made during coverture or when she is a widow, will

be her stridhana" [Vide Salemma v. Lutchmana [(1998) 21 Mad

100]. In paragraph 652 on page 882, it is stated that "the

absolute dominion of a woman over her saudayika property was

admitted from the earliest times". Katyayana declares: "The

independence of women who have received the saudayika wealth

is desirable (in regard to it), for it was given (by their

kindered) for their maintenance out of affection. The power

of women over saudayika at all times is absolute both in

respect of gift and sale, according to their pleasure, even

in (the case of) immovables". The Smiritichandrika would

confine saudayika to yautaka or the like, received by a

woman from her own parents or persons connected with them,

in the house of either her father or her husband, from the

time of her betrothment to the completion of the ceremony to

be performed on the occasion of her entering her lord's

house. But his view has not been followed. The texts of

Katyayana and Vyasa have been explained by other

commentators as including gifts received by her from her

husband, and from others after her marriage. The decisions

of the courts have taken the same view. Provided the gift is

made by her husband or her parents or by relatives either of

her husband or of parents, it is immaterial whether it is

made before marriage, at marriage or after marriage. It is

equally her saudayika. In other words, saudayika means all

gifts and bequests from relations but not gifts and bequests

from strangers. Saudayika of all sorts are absolutely at a

woman's own disposal. She may spend, sell, devise or give it

away at her own pleasure. In support of that conclusion,

footnote No.6 cites several decisions including Venkata Rama

v. Venkata Suriya [(1880) 2 Mad 333] and Muthukaruppa v.

Sellathammal [(1916) 39 Mad 298] etc. It is stated

thereafter that her husband can neither control her in her

dealings with it, nor use it himself. But he may take it in

case of extreme distress, as in a famine, or for some

indispensable duty, or during illness, or while a creditor

keeps him in prison. Even then he would appear to be under

at least a moral obligation to restore the value of the

property when able to do so. What he has taken without

necessity, he is bound to repay with interest. This right to

take the wife's property is purely a personal one in the

husband. If he does not choose to avail himself of it, his

creditors cannot proceed against her properties. The word

`take' in the text of Yajanavalkya means `taking' and

`using'. Hence if the husband taking his wife's property in

the exceptional circumstances mentioned in the text does not

actually use it, the wife still remains its owner and the

husband's creditors have no claim against the property.

A woman's power of disposal, independent of her

husband's control, is not confined to saudavika but extends

to other properties as well. Devala says: "A women's

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 10

maintenance (vritti), ornaments, perquisites (sulka), gains

(labha), are her stridhana. She herself has the exclusive

right to enjoy it. Her husband has no right to use it except

in distress...". In "N.R. Raghavachariar's "Hindu law -

Principles and Precedents" [8th Edn.] edited by Prof. S.

Venkataraman, one of the renowned Professors of Hindu law

para 468 deals with "Definition of Stridhana". In para 469

dealing with "Sources of acquisition" it is stated that the

sources of acquisition of property in a women's possession

are: gifts before marriage, wedding gifts, gifts subsequent

to marriage etc. Para 470 deals with "Gifts to a maiden".

Para 471 deals with "Wedding gifts" and it is stated therein

that properties gifted at the time of marriage to the bride,

whether by relations or strangers, either Adhiyagni or

Adhyavahanika, are the bride's stridhana. In para 481 at

page 426, it is stated that ornaments presented to the bride

by her husband or father constitute her Stridhana property.

In para 487 dealing with "powers during coverture" it is

stated that saudayika meaning the gift of affectionate

kindered, includes both Yautaka or gifts received at the

time of marriage as well as its negative Ayautaka. In

respect of such property, whether given by gift or will she

is the absolute owner and can deal with it in any way she

likes. She may spend, sell or give it away at her own

pleasure.

It is thus clear that the properties gifted to her

before the marriage, at the time of marriage or at the time

of giving farewell or thereafter are her stridhana

properties. It is her absolute property with all rights to

dispose at her own pleasure. He has no control over her

stridhana property. Husband may use it during the time of

his distress but nonetheless he has a moral obligation to

restore the same or its value to his wife. Therefore,

stridhana property does not become a joint property of the

wife and the husband and the husband has no title or

independent dominion over the property as owner thereof.

In this backdrop, the question that arises for

consideration is: whether the fact of a wife's having been

driven out from the matrimonial home without taking along

with her stridhana properties, amount to entrustment with

the husband within the meaning of Section 405, IPC? Section

405 defines "Criminal breach of trust thus:

"405. Criminal breach of trust. -

Whoever, being in any manner

entrusted with property, or with

any dominion over property,

dishonestly misappropriates or

converts to his own use that

property, or dishonestly uses or

disposes of that property in

violation of any direction of law

prescribing the mode in which such

trust is to be discharge, or of any

legal contract, express or implied,

which he has made touching the <??>

of such trust, or wilfully suffers

any other person so to do, commits

"criminal breach of trust".

It is not necessary to refer to the Explanations to the

said section for the purpose of this case. Hence they are

omitted.

Thus when the wife entrusts her stridhana property with

the dominion over that property to her husband or any other

member of the family and the husband or such other member of

the family dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 10

own use that property or wilfully suffers any other person

to do so, he commits criminal breach of trust. The essential

ingredients for establishing an offence of criminal breach

of trust as defined in Section 405 and punishable under

Section 406, IPC with sentence for a period upto three years

or with fine or with both, are: [i] entrusting any person

with property or with any dominion over property; [ii] the

person entrusted dishonestly misappropriating or converting

to his own use that property; or dishonestly using or

disposing of that property or wilfully suffering any

direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is

to be discharged, or of any legal contract made touching the

discharge of such trust. The expression "entrustment"

carries with it the implication that the person handing over

any property or on whose behalf that property is handed over

to another, continues to be its owner. Entrustment is not

necessarily a term of law. It may have different

implications in different contexts. In its most general

significance, all its imports is handing over the possession

for some purpose which may not imply the conferment of any

proprietary right therein. The ownership or beneficial

interest in the property in respect of which criminal breach

of trust is alleged to have been committed, must be in some

person other than the accused and the latter must hold it on

account of some person or in some way for his benefit. In

Pratibha Rani's case, the majority has extensively

considered the words "entrustment" of and "dominion" over

the property. All the case law in that behalf was

exhaustively considered obviating the necessity to tread

once over the same. In order to establish entrustment of

dominion over the property, both the majority and minority

relied on in particular the judgment of this Court in Velji

Raghavji Patel v. State of Maharashtra [(1965) 2 SCR 492]

wherein it was held that in order to establish entrustment

of dominion over the property to an accused person, mere

existence of that person's dominion over the property is not

enough. It must be further shown that his dominion was the

result of entrustment. The question therein pertained to the

entrustment with the dominion over the partnership property

by one partner to the other. It was held that the

prosecution must establish that the dominion over the assets

or particular assets of the partnership was by a special

agreement between the parties. The property of the

partnership being a partnership asset, every partner has a

right o or a dominion over it. It was held that special

agreement was necessary to constitute an offence of criminal

breach of trust defined under Section 405, IPS. In view of

the finding that stridhana property is the exclusive

property of the wife on proof that she entrusted the

property or dominion over the stridhana property to her

husband or any other member of the family, there is no need

to establish any further special agreement to establish that

the property was given to the husband or other member of the

family. It is always a question of fact in each case as to

how property came to be entrusted to the husband or any

other member of the family by the wife when she left the

matrimonial home or was driven out therefrom. No absolute or

fixed rule of universal application can be laid down in that

behalf. It requires to be established by the complainant or

the prosecution, depending upon the facts and circumstances

of the case, as to how and in what manner the entrustment of

the stridhana property or dominion over her stridhana came

to be made to the husband or any other member of the family

or the accused person, as the case may be. We are in

respectful agreement with the majority view in Pratibha

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 10

Rani's case and consequently requires no reconsideration.

The next question is; whether the appellant has made

out any prima facie case of entrustment in that behalf? A

reading of the complaint clearly indicates that her parents

entrusted the property to the respondent at the time of her

farewell from her parents house in Lucknow. They lived

together in matrimonial home in Deli. Three children were

born from the wedlock and during that period she had

retained the custody of the property. When she left the

matrimonial home she had not taken the property with her.

She has specifically averred that when she went in October

1978 to Cochin requesting the respondent-husband to take her

into matrimonial home along with the children, he promised

to take her in the conjugal society and also that he would

return the jewellery to her subject to the condition that

she should withdraw her application filed under Section 9 of

the Hindu Marriage Act for restitution of conjugal rights

and accordingly she had withdrawn the application. The

learned Single Judge failed to correctly appreciate her

evidence recorded under Section 200 of the Code that she

made a demand for return of the jewellery and household

goods. On the other hand, a fair reading of it would

indicate that when she met the respondent in Cochin and

requested to take her and children to home he promised to do

so on her withdrawing the case for restitution of conjugal

rights. Threat the husband promised to return them but he

did not keep up his promise. The sequences that followed

were that she filed another case for restitution of conjugal

rights and an application for maintenance and thereafter she

filed the complaint under Section 406, IPC. A fair reading

of the averments would clearly indicate that a prima facie

case of entrustment of the jewellery and the household goods

had been made out. The learned Judge was not right in

jumping to the conclusion that the averments made by the

respondent in the counter-affidavit disclosed that no

entrustment was made of the jewellery, cash and household

goods and other movables enumerated in Annexures I and II

details of which are not material for our purpose. In the

light of the above, we are of the view that a prima facie

case of entrustment had been made out by the appellant as

the stridhana properties were not returned to her by the

husband. Obviously, therefore, the learned Magistrate,

having taken cognizance of the offence, had issued process

for appearance of the respondent. It is fairly settled legal

position that at the time of taking cognisance of the

offence, the Court has to consider only the averments made

in the complaint or in the charge-sheet filed under Section

173, as the case may be. It was held in State of Bihar v.

Rajendra Agrawalla [(1996) 8 SCC 164] that it is not open

for the Court to sift or appreciate the evidence at that

stage with reference to the material and come to the

conclusion that no prima facie case is made out for

proceeding further in the matter. It is equally settled law

that it is open to the Court, before issuing the process, to

record the evidence and on consideration of the averments

made in the complaint and the evidence thus adduced, it is

required to find out whether an offence has been made out.

On finding that such an offence has been made out and after

taking cognizance thereof, process would be issued to the

respondent to take further steps in the matters. If it is a

charge-sheet filed under Section 173 of the Code, the facts

stated by the prosecution in the charge-sheet, on the basis

of the evidence collected during investigation, would

disclose the offence for which cognisance would be taken by

the court to proceed further in the matter. Thus it is not

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 10

the province of the court at that stage to embark upon and

sift the evidence to come to the conclusion whether offence

has been made out or not. The learned Judge, therefore, was

clearly in error in attempting to sift the evidence with

reference to the averments made by the respondent in the

counter-affidavit to find out whether or not offence

punishable under Section 406, IPC had been made out.

The next question that needs to be answered is: whether

the complaint filed by the appellant in September 1990 is

time barred? Section 468 of the Code prescribes period of

limitation. Under sub-section (3) thereof, the period of

limitation shall be three years if the offence is punishable

with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not

exceeding three years, Since the offence alleged to have

been committed by the respondent is punishable under Section

406, viz., criminal breach of trust, and the punishment of

imprisonment which may extend to three years or with fine or

with both, the complaint is required to be filed within

three years from date of the commission of the offence. It

is seen that the appellant has averred in paragraphs 21 and

22 of the complaint that she demanded from the respondent

return of jewellery detailed in Annexure I and household

goods mentioned in Annexure II on December 5, 1987 and the

respondent flatly refused to return the stridhana of the

complainant-wife. In paragraph 22 of the complaint, it is

stated that the complainant was forced to leave the

matrimonial home in the manner described and the stridhana

mentioned in Annexures I and II belonging to the complainant

was entrusted to the respondent-accused which he refused to

return to the complainant. Thus she has averred that the

respondent "has illegally, dishonestly and mala fidely

retained and converted it to his own use which is clearly a

criminal breach of trust in respect of the aforesaid

property". The complaint was admittedly filed on September

10, 1990 meaning within three years from the date of the

demand and refusal by the respondent. The learned Judge

relied upon her evidence recorded under Section 200 of the

Code. The learned counsel for the respondent read out the

text of the evidence to establish that the appellant had

demanded in October 1986 for return of the jewellery and

that the respondent refused to do the same. Thus it

constitutes refusal from which date the limitation period

began to run and the complaint have been filed in September

1990, is time barred, i.e., beyond three years. That view of

the learned Judge is clearly based on the evidence torn of

the context without reference to the specific averments made

in the complaint and the evidence recorded under section 200

of the Code. As stated earlier, the sequence in which the

averments came to be made was the voluntary promise of the

respondent and his failure to abide by the promise. It is

incongruous to comprehend the demand for return of jewellery

etc, at the stage when she was persuading him to take her

into matrimonial home. Accordingly, we hold that the

complaint was filed within the limitation.

The question, therefore, whether it is a continuing

offence and limitation began to run everyday loses its

relevance, in view of the above finding. The decisions cited

in support thereof, viz., Vanka Radhamanohari (Smt.) v.

Vanka Venkata Reddy & Ors. [(1993) 3 SCC 4] and Balram Singh

vs. Sukhwant Kaur [(1992) Crl. L.J. 792 F.B. (P&H)] hence

need not be considered. It is well settled legal position

that the High Court should sparingly and cautiously exercise

the power under Section 482 of the Code to prevent

miscarriage of justice. In State of Himachal Pradesh v. Shri

Pirthi Chand & Anr. [JT 1995 (9) 411] two of us [K.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 10 of 10

Ramaswamy and S.B. Majmudar, JJ.] composing the Bench and in

State of U.P. Vs. O.P. Sharma [(1996) 7 SCC 70], a three-

Judge Bench of this Court, reviewed the entire care law on

the exercise of power by the High Court under Section 482 of

the Code to quash the complaint or the charge-sheet or the

First Information Report and held that the High Court would

be loath and circumspect to exercise its extraordinary power

under Section 482 of the Code or under Article 226 of the

Constitution. The Court would consider whether the exercise

of the power would advance the cause of justice or it would

tantamount to abuse of the process of the Court. Social

stability and order require to be regulated by proceeding

against the offender as it is an offence against the society

as a whole. This cardinal principle should always be kept in

mind before embarking upon the exercise of the inherent

power vested in the Court. Same view was taken in State of

Haryana & Ors. v. Bhajan lal & Ors. [(1992) Supp. 1 SCC 355]

and G.L. Didwania & Anr. v. Income Tax Officer & Anr.

[(1995) Supp. SCC 25] etc.

Considered from this perspective, we hold that the High

Court was wholly wrong in quashing the

complaint/proceedings, under Section 432 of the Code. The

appeal is accordingly allowed. The judgment of the High

Court is set aside. We make it clear that all the

observations in the judgment on merits are only to find out

prima facie case whether the High Court would be justified

in the exercise of its power under Section 482. The trial

Court will have to decide the case on its own merits in the

light of the evidence that may be led at the trial without

being influenced in any manner by our observations made

hereinabove. The trial Court is directed to proceed from the

stage the complaint was pending at the time of quashing, to

take further steps in accordance with law.