CRL.REV.P. 591/2023 Page 1 of 18

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

% Judgment reserved on : 05.12.2025

Judgment pronounced on : 16.02.2026

+ CRL.REV.P. 591/2023 & CRL.M.A. 14085/2023

SMT SUNIL .....Petitioner

versus

STATE GOVT OF NCT OF

DELHI & ORS. ..... Respondents

Advocates who appeared in this case:

For the Petitioner : Mr. Shailender Dahiya, Adv. along with

petitioner

For the Respondent : Mr. Ritesh Kumar Bahri, APP for the State

along with Ms. Divya Yadav, Adv.

SI Inderjeet Yadav, PS Punjabi Bagh.

Mr. J.P. Sengh with Mr. Deepak Kumar

Mishra, Mr. Sidheesh Yadav & Mr. Prince

Mishra, Advs. for R-2 & R-3.

CORAM

HON’BLE MR JUSTICE AMIT MAHAJAN

JUDGMENT

1.The present petition is filed, inter alia, challenging the order on

charge dated 06.01.2023 (hereafter ‘impugned order’), passed in SC

No. 734/18 arising out of FIR No. 351/18 (‘FIR’), registered at Police

Station Punjabi Bagh, whereby the learned Additional Sessions Judge

(‘ASJ’), West District, Tis Hazari Courts discharged the accused

CRL.REV.P. 591/2023 Page 2 of 18

respondents of the offence under Section 306 of the Indian Penal

Code, 1860 (‘IPC’).

2.The brief facts of the present case are as follows:

2.1.On 04.07.2018, the husband of the petitioner/ complainant

committed suicide by hanging himself from a ceiling fan at his home.

During search of the victim’s body, a suicide note was found in the

pocket of his shirt and taken into custody. Subsequently, on

10.07.2018, the FIR was registered against Respondent Nos. 2 and 3

for the offences under Sections 306/506/34 of the IPC on the basis of

the statement of the petitioner. It is the case of the prosecution that the

victim used to ply his own vehicle and also run a general store at their

home. Allegedly, at the instance of the victim, Respondent No.2 had

advanced a loan of ₹15 lakhs to one Sharif Khan, who had repaid only

a sum of ₹4 lakhs. In addition to the said sum, the victim had also

taken a loan of ₹1.5 lakhs. It is alleged that Respondent No.2 used to

frequent the house of the victim regularly to demand repayment of the

loan with interest. Allegedly, Respondent No.2 and Respondent No.3

(son of Respondent No.2) used to threaten the entire family and they

used to tell the victim that he would be sent to prison or kidnapped if

the loan amount was not repaid. Allegedly, the accused persons

frequently disturbed the victim through calls as well.

2.2.On the date of the incident, Respondent No.2 had telephonically

demanded the money from the victim and badly threatened him. After

receiving the call, the victim told the complainant that Respondent

CRL.REV.P. 591/2023 Page 3 of 18

No.2 had asked him to return the money on the same day or to commit

suicide. Allegedly, the victim told the petitioner that it would be better

to commit suicide than to get humiliated on a daily basis. Thereafter,

the petitioner along with her mother-in-law had gone to the grocery

shop. On return, when the petitioner’s mother-in-law went inside the

house, she saw the victim hanging from the ceiling fan. When the

petitioner entered the room, she found that the victim’s mobile phone

was ringing and it was Respondent No.2 who was calling the victim.

2.3.The note which was recovered from the victim mentioned that

he was committing suicide due to harassment by Respondent No.2. It

was mentioned that the victim had borrowed ₹1,50,000/- from

Respondent No.2 and given a blank cheque against the same, and

Respondent No.2 was making demands for repayment after adding

interest at the rate of 10%. It was further mentioned that Respondent

No.2 had taken lakhs of rupees from the victim, but he was threatening

to send the victim to jail. The translation of the suicide note of the

victim (extracted from a translated copy of the FIR that is attached

with the petition) reads as under:

“I Vijender Singh am taking this step due to Dal Chand Yadav. I

had borrowed a sum of Rs.150000/ - from him and in lieu of that I

had given a blank cheque who is now saying after calculating

interest@ 10% it become 25 lakhs rupees. He had taken lakhs of

rupees from me and threatened me to send in jail due to

harassment caused by him I am taking this step. The phone number

of Dal Chand Yadav is 9312202463, 9312202463 Vijender Singh

and I have no complaint against any person”

CRL.REV.P. 591/2023 Page 4 of 18

2.4.During investigation, inquiry was made from Mohd. Sharif who

stated that he had taken a total loan of ₹15 lakhs from Respondent

No.2 at the interest rate of 10% in two trenches and returned ₹11.5

lakhs, however, the remaining amount could not be paid due to some

reason. He further stated that the victim had asked him to repay the

loan many times and informed him that Respondent No.2 was

pressuring the victim, abusing him and insulting him. He further stated

that Respondent No.2 had told the victim that if Respondent No.3

came to know about non-payment of loan, it would be worse for the

victim. Further, he stated that the victim informed him that

Respondent No.3 had threatened him while visiting his house.

2.5.During further investigation, CDR of mobile phones of the

accused and the victim were analysed and it was found that although

Respondent No.2 was in regular touch with the victim, but there were

no calls between Respondent No.3 and the victim.

2.6.By the impugned order, the learned Trial Court observed that a

prima facie case had been made out against the accused persons for

the offence under Sections 506/34 of the IPC. Both the accused were

however discharged for the offence under Section 306 of the IPC after

observing that mere demand of return of loaned amount cannot be

deemed to be akin to instigating or abetting or aiding in commission of

suicide. It was observed that the material on record did not indicate

any overt act on part of the accused which fell within the meaning of

abetment compelling the victim to commit suicide.

CRL.REV.P. 591/2023 Page 5 of 18

2.7.Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner has filed the present

petition.

3.The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the learned

Trial Court has failed to appreciate that it was the provocation as well

as threats extended by the accused that ultimately led the victim to

commit suicide. He submitted that the accused persons constantly

harassed the victim and made his life miserable. He further submitted

that on the date of the incident as well, Respondent No.2 called the

victim and threatened him.

4.He submitted that the accused were in the business of lending

money to people and charging exorbitant rate of interest on the same,

and they used to threaten the borrowers with the help of blank signed

papers including blank signed cheques.

5.He submitted that the present case is not one of mere demand of

loaned amount. He submitted that the method adopted by the accused

to recover money, which involved harassing and defaming the victim

as well as making regular physical visits in front of his family

members, pushed the victim to commit suicide. He submitted that the

same is also evident by the fact that even on the date of the incident,

Respondent No.2 had called the victim 6-7 times and threatened him.

He submitted that the statement of the petitioner clearly indicates that

prior to committing suicide, after receiving one such call from

Respondent No.2, the victim had told her that it was better to commit

suicide than to live such a humiliating life. He submitted that the

CRL.REV.P. 591/2023 Page 6 of 18

suicide note also specifically mentions that the victim committed

suicide due to harassment by Respondent No.2.

6.He submitted that the learned Trial Court was only required to

see as to whether a prima facie case is made out and not conduct a

mini trial.

7.The learned counsel for Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 submitted that

the learned Trial Court has rightly discharged the said accused for the

offence under Section 306 of the IPC. He submitted that the only

allegation against the accused is of pestering the victim for return of

the loaned amount and mere vague or bald allegations of harassment

in this regard are not sufficient to make out the offence of abetment.

8.He submitted that no direct or reasonable nexus is made out

between the suicide and any of the alleged acts of the accused. He

submitted that it is alleged that the victim was threatened that he will

be sent to jail for non-payment of dues, however, the same is also not

sufficient to frame charge of abetment of suicide as the victim had the

option of availing his remedies in law.

9.He submitted that there was an inordinate delay of six days in

registration of the FIR, which indicates that the allegations against

Respondent No.3, who is not named in the suicide note, are an

afterthought.

ANALYSIS

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10.At the outset, it is relevant to note that the scope of interference

by High Courts while exercising revisional jurisdiction in a challenge

to order framing charge is well settled. The power ought to be

exercised sparingly, in the interest of justice, so as to not impede the

trial unnecessarily. It is not open to the Court to misconstrue the

revisional proceedings as an appeal and reappreciate the material on

record. At the same time, it is well-settled that the Court may interfere

if the allegations are patently absurd and the basic ingredients of the

offence, for which the charge is framed, are not made out [Ref. Amit

Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander: (2012) 9 SCC 460].

11.The Hon’ble Apex Court, in Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar

Samal : (1979) 3 SCC 4, dealt with the scope of enquiry a judge is

required to make with regard to the question of framing of charges.

Inter alia, the following principles were laid down by the Court:

“10. Thus, on a consideration of the authorities mentioned above,

the following principles emerge:

(1) That the Judge while considering the question of framing the

charges under Section 227 of the Code has the undoubted power to

sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out

whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been

made out.

xxx

(3) The test to determine a prima facie case would naturally

depend upon the facts of each case and it is difficult to lay down a

rule of universal application. By and large however if two views

are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence

produced before him while giving rise to some suspicion but not

grave suspicion against the accused, he will be fully within his

right to discharge the accused.”

CRL.REV.P. 591/2023 Page 8 of 18

(emphasis supplied)

12.The Hon’ble Apex Court, in the case of Sajjan Kumar v. CBI :

(2010) 9 SCC 368, has culled out the following principles in respect

of the scope of discharge and framing of charge, while observing that

a prima facie case would depend on the facts and circumstances of

each case. The relevant paragraphs read as under :

“21. On consideration of the authorities about the scope of

Sections 227 and 228 of the Code, the following principles emerge:

(i) The Judge while considering the question of framing the

charges under Section 227 CrPC has the undoubted power to sift

and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out

whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been

made out. The test to determine prima facie case would depend

upon the facts of each case.

(ii) Where the materials placed before the court disclose grave

suspicion against the accused which has not been properly

explained, the court will be fully justified in framing a charge

and proceeding with the trial.

(iii) The court cannot act merely as a post office or a mouthpiece

of the prosecution but has to consider the broad probabilities of

the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents

produced before the court, any basic infirmities, etc. However, at

this stage, there cannot be a roving enquiry into the pros and

cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was

conducting a trial.

(iv) If on the basis of the material on record, the court could form

an opinion that the accused might have committed offence, it can

frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is

required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused

has committed the offence.

(v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the

material on record cannot be gone into but before framing a charge

the court must apply its judicial mind on the material placed on

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record and must be satisfied that the commission of offence by the

accused was possible.

(vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the court is required to

evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to

find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value

disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the

alleged offence. For this limited purpose, sift the evidence as it

cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that the

prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common

sense or the broad probabilities of the case.

(vii) If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to

suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial

Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this

stage, he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or

acquittal.”

(emphasis supplied)

13.In State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao : 2023 SCC

OnLine SC 1294, the Hon’ble Apex Court has discussed the

parameters that would be appropriate to keep in mind at the stage of

framing of charge/discharge, as under:

“7. It is trite law that application of judicial mind being necessary

to determine whether a case has been made out by the prosecution

for proceeding with trial and it would not be necessary to dwell

into the pros and cons of the matter by examining the defence of the

accused when an application for discharge is filed. At that stage,

the trial judge has to merely examine the evidence placed by the

prosecution in order to determine whether or not the grounds are

sufficient to proceed against the accused on basis of charge sheet

material. The nature of the evidence recorded or collected by the

investigating agency or the documents produced in which prima

facie it reveals that there are suspicious circumstances against

the accused, so as to frame a charge would suffice and such

material would be taken into account for the purposes of framing

the charge. If there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against

the accused necessarily, the accused would be discharged, but if

the court is of the opinion, after such consideration of the material

CRL.REV.P. 591/2023 Page 10 of 18

there are grounds for presuming that accused has committed the

offence which is triable, then necessarily charge has to be framed.

xxx

12. The primary consideration at the stage of framing of charge is

the test of existence of a prima-facie case, and at this stage, the

probative value of materials on record need not be gone into. This

Court by referring to its earlier decisions in the State of

Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa, (1996) 4 SCC 659 and the State

of MP v. Mohan Lal Soni, (2000) 6 SCC 338 has held the nature of

evaluation to be made by the court at the stage of framing of the

charge is to test the existence of prima-facie case. It is also held at

the stage of framing of charge, the court has to form a presumptive

opinion to the existence of factual ingredients constituting the

offence alleged and it is not expected to go deep into probative

value of the material on record and to check whether the material

on record would certainly lead to conviction at the conclusion of

trial.”

(emphasis supplied)

14.The Court at the stage of framing of charge is required to

evaluate the material only for the purpose of finding out if the facts

constitute the ingredients of the alleged offence. At this stage, the

Court ought to look at the limited aspect of whether, given the material

placed before it, there is grave suspicion against the accused which is

not properly explained. Though, for the purpose of conviction, the

alleged offences must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.

15.The present case is one where the victim ex facie appears to

have committed suicide due to financial distress. The petitioner/

complainant, who is the wife of the victim, is aggrieved by the

discharge of the accused persons for the offence under Section 306 of

the IPC.

CRL.REV.P. 591/2023 Page 11 of 18

16.Before undertaking the task of determining as to whether a

prima facie case for the offence under Section 306 of the IPC is made

out against the accused persons, it is imperative to first appreciate the

law in relation to the offence under Section 306 of the IPC. The

aforesaid provision reads as under:

“306. Abetment of suicide.—If any person commits suicide,

whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punishable

with imprisonment of either description for a term which may

extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.”

17.The said provision is to be read in conjunction with Section 107

of the IPC, which deals with abetment. The same reads as under:

“107. Abetment of a thing.—A person abets the doing of a thing,

who—

First.—Instigates any person to do that thing; or

Secondly.—Engages with one or more other person or persons in

any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal

omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order

to the doing of that thing; or

Thirdly.—Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the

doing of that thing.

Explanation 1.—A person who, by wilful misrepresentation, or by

wilful concealment of a material fact which he is bound to disclose,

voluntarily causes or procures, or attempts to cause or procure, a

thing to be done, is said to instigate the doing of that thing.

Explanation 2.—Whoever, either prior to or at the time of the

commission of an act, does anything in order to facilitate the

commission of that act, and thereby facilitates the commission

thereof, is said to aid the doing of that act.”

18.It is well-settled that the offence under Section 306 of the IPC

can only be attracted where the accused has actively indulged in

instigating, conspiring or aiding in the commission of suicide. Mens

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rea of the accused to abet the commission of suicide is a sine qua non

for attracting the aforesaid provision [Ref. Randhir Singh v. State of

Punjab : (2004) 13 SCC 129].

19.In the case of Shenbagavalli and Ors v. The Inspector Of

Police, Kancheepuram District And Anr. : 2025 INSC 607, the

Hon’ble Apex Court has delineated the ingredients of the offence

under Section 306 of the IPC, and observed as under:

“15. ….In large number of judgments of this Court it stands

established that the essential ingredients of the offense under

Section 306 IPC are (i) the abetment; (ii) intention of the accused

to aid and instigate or abet the deceased to commit suicide.

Merely because the act of an accused is highly insulting to the

deceased by using abusive language would not by itself constitute

abetment of suicide. There should be evidence suggesting that the

accused intended by such act to instigate the deceased to commit

suicide.”

(emphasis supplied)

20.The petitioner’s case is helmed on the argument that the accused

persons had instigated the deceased to commit suicide by constant

harassment. In the case of Mahendra Awase v. State of M.P. : (2025)

4 SCC 801, adverting to a catena of relevant judgments, the Hon’ble

Apex Court observed that to satisfy the requirement of instigation, the

accused should have created such circumstances which left the

deceased with no option except to commit suicide. Cautioning against

dilution of the higher threshold prescribed under Section 306 of the

IPC, it was observed that the aforesaid offence appears to be casually

resorted to by the police. The Hon’ble Apex Court emphasised that

conduct of proposed accused should be assessed from a practical point

CRL.REV.P. 591/2023 Page 13 of 18

of view. The Hon’ble Apex Court also cautioned against mechanical

framing of charges in this respect. In that case as well, the deceased

had mentioned in his suicide note that the accused lender had been

harassing him for repayment of loan. Discharging the accused, it was

observed that performing duty of realising outstanding loans cannot be

said to have instigated the deceased to commit suicide. The relevant

portion is as under:

“17. M. Mohan v. State [M. Mohan v. State, (2011) 3 SCC 626 :

(2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 1] followed Ramesh Kumar v. State of

Chhattisgarh [Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2001) 9

SCC 618 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 1088] , wherein it was held as under :

“41. This Court in SCC para 20 of Ramesh

Kumar [Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2001)

9 SCC 618 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 1088] has examined different

shades of the meaning of “instigation”. Para 20 reads as

under : (SCC p. 629)

‘20. Instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or

encourage to do “an act”. To satisfy the requirement of

instigation though it is not necessary that actual words

must be used to that effect or what constitutes instigation

must necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the

consequence. Yet a reasonable certainty to incite the

consequence must be capable of being spelt out. The

present one is not a case where the accused had by his acts

or omission or by a continued course of conduct created

such circumstances that the deceased was left with no

other option except to commit suicide in which case an

instigation may have been inferred. A word uttered in the

fit of anger or emotion without intending the

consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be

instigation.’

In the said case this Court came to the conclusion that

there is no evidence and material available on record

wherefrom an inference of the appellant-accused having

CRL.REV.P. 591/2023 Page 14 of 18

abetted commission of suicide by Seema (the appellant's

wife therein) may necessarily be drawn.”

xxx

19. As has been held hereinabove, to satisfy the requirement of

instigation the accused by his act or omission or by a continued

course of conduct should have created such circumstances that the

deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide. It

was also held that a word uttered in a fit of anger and emotion

without intending the consequences to actually follow cannot be

said to be instigation.

xxx

23. This Court has, over the last several decades, repeatedly

reiterated the higher threshold, mandated by law for Section

306IPC (Now Section 108 read with Section 45 of the Nyaya

Sanhita, 2023) to be attracted. They however seem to have

followed more in the breach. Section 306IPC appears to be

casually and too readily resorted to by the police. While the

persons involved in genuine cases where the threshold is met

should not be spared, the provision should not be deployed

against individuals, only to assuage the immediate feelings of the

distraught family of the deceased.

24.The conduct of the proposed accused and the deceased, their

interactions and conversations preceding the unfortunate death

of the deceased should be approached from a practical point of

view and not divorced from day-to-day realities of life.

Hyperboles employed in exchanges should not, without anything

more, be glorified as an instigation to commit suicide. It is time

the investigating agencies are sensitised to the law laid down by

this Court under Section 306 so that persons are not subjected to

the abuse of process of a totally untenable prosecution. The trial

courts also should exercise great caution and circumspection and

should not adopt a play it safe syndrome by mechanically framing

charges, even if the investigating agencies in a given case have

shown utter disregard for the ingredients of Section 306.”

(emphasis supplied)

21.It is the case of the petitioner that the chain of circumstances

along with the alleged provocation of Respondent No.2 on 04.07.2018

CRL.REV.P. 591/2023 Page 15 of 18

make it evident that Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 pushed the victim to

commit suicide. It is stressed that the statement of the petitioner as

well as another borrower (Mohd. Sharif) shows that the accused

respondents used to recover money at an exorbitant rate of interest,

and they used to threaten borrowers that they will be sent to jail in

case of non-payment of dues. Reliance is also placed on the CDR

connectivity between Respondent No.2 and the victim as well as the

suicide note of the victim where he had named Respondent No.2 as

the reason behind committing suicide.

22.At the outset, it is relevant to note that the case of Respondent

No.3 stands on a significantly better footing as he is not named in the

suicide note and he has no CDR connectivity with the deceased. The

role of the said accused is only borne from the statements of the

petitioner and Mohd. Sharif.

23.Even so, applying the principles in the aforesaid judgments to

the facts of the present case, it is apparent that no ground is made out

to frame charges against either of the accused.

24.As has been appreciated by the learned Trial Court, the present

case is one where the instigation is alleged on account of alleged

harassment and pestering by the accused persons for repayment of

dues. The learned Trial Court has righty opined that mere demand of

return of loan amount cannot be said to be an act of instigation or

abetment. Although much emphasis is laid on the calls received by the

deceased on the day of his death and the petitioner has sought to argue

CRL.REV.P. 591/2023 Page 16 of 18

that the manner of demanding repayment constitutes as harassment, in

the opinion of this Court, even if the allegations are taken at the

highest, such incessant pestering still falls short of instigation.

25.Harassment in the present case is alleged on account of

exuberant rate of interest, threats of jail, visits to the home of deceased

and constant calls by Respondent No.2. In allegations, there is also

mention of a remark made by Respondent No.2 on one call, soon

before the victim committed suicide, where he asked the victim to pay

the dues or to commit suicide. Pertinently, in his suicide note, the

deceased has only mentioned the threat of jail as the reason of

harassment.

26.Insofar as the remark in relation to suicide is concerned, even if

the same is taken at the highest, such words of casual nature employed

in heat of the moment are to be seen from a practical point of view,

and the same alone does not reflect intention on part of the accused to

incite the deceased into committing suicide. Even as per the statement

of the petitioner, the remark only appears to be made in an attempt to

pressure the deceased into making payment of the remaining dues.

27.As far as the rate of interest is concerned, it is evident that the

accused were charging the same rate of interest from other borrowers

as is evident from the statement of witness Mohd. Sharif. Arguendo,

presuming that the accused were loan sharks who were involved in

charging usurious rates of interest, at best, such conduct will only

attract liability under relevant provisions governing money lending.

CRL.REV.P. 591/2023 Page 17 of 18

The mere act of levying high rate of interest, even if predatory, does

not ipso facto amount to incitement to commit suicide, especially in

the absence of any overt act from which instigation can be inferred.

28.Merely pursuing the borrower by way of repeated calls, or

making occasional house visits where harsh words are said in the

moment, for repayment are also not sufficient to prima facie raise

grave suspicion against the accused qua instigating suicide.

29.Simple harassment is insufficient to make out a case of

abetment and by no stretch of imagination can it be said that the

accused created a scenario that left the deceased with no other option

but to commit suicide. As has also been righty appreciated by the

learned Trial Court, in the face of threats of jail, the victim had the

option of repaying the debt and facing legal consequences.

Alternatively, in case the charged interest was indeed usurious, the

deceased was entitled to refuse payment and pursue his legal remedies

in this regard instead.

30.It is imperative to appreciate that although financial distress and

‘harassment’ by Respondent No.2 (who was seeking to recover dues)

may have been the motivating factors behind the suicide of the

deceased, as is canvassed from the suicide note and statement of the

petitioner, culpability cannot be attracted against the accused in

absence of any mens rea. Even if the allegations of harassment are

presumed to be correct, in their capacity as lenders, the intent of the

accused appears to be to only pressurise the deceased to recover the

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loan amount and not to instigate the deceased into committing suicide.

As also appreciated by this Court in the case of Laxmi Jha & Anr v.

State & Anr: 2025: DHC:8234, while conduct of a person may be a

reason for the victim to take their life, in the absence of active

instigation, the said conduct cannot be equated with abetment to

suicide.

31.In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court finds no reason to

interfere with the discharge of the accused respondents for the offence

under Section 306 of the IPC.

32.The present petition is dismissed in the aforesaid terms. Pending

application also stands disposed of.

33.It is clarified that the observations made in this order are only

for the purpose of deciding the present petition and shall not influence

the outcome of trial.

AMIT MAHAJAN, J

FEBRUARY 16, 2026

“SK”