IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA

AT HYDERABAD

THE HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE SRI APARESH KUMAR SINGH

AND

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G.M.MOHIUDDIN

WRIT APPEAL No.693 of 2026

(CNR No. HBHC010446172026)

DATE: 16.09.2026

Between:

Smt.Chalasani Kalyani Leela

….Appellant

And

M/s.ADR Estates Private Limited

and others.

….Respondents

JUDGMENT

Heard Sri P.Venugopal, learned Senior Counsel representing

Sri Srinivasa Rao Putluri, learned counsel for the appellant;

Sri B.Chandrasen Reddy, learned Senior Counsel representing

Sri B.Vamshidhar Reddy, learned counsel for respondent Nos.1 and

2; Sri Muralidhar Reddy Katram, learned Government Pleader for

Revenue appearing for respondent Nos.3 to 7; and Sri S.Ravi, learned

Senior Counsel representing M/s. R.S.Associates, appearing for

respondent Nos.8 to 10 and perused the record.

2. This writ appeal is preferred under Clause 15 of the Letters

Patent, against the order dated 06.05.2026 passed by the learned

Single Judge in I.A.No.2 of 2026 in W.P.No.3974 of 2026. By the

said order, the learned Single Judge dismissed I.A.No.2 of 2026 filed

2

by the appellant seeking vacation of the interim order of status quo

granted on 16.02.2026 and consequently extended the said interim

order until further orders.

Factual matrix

3. Sri V. Krishna Murthy was the absolute owner and possessor

of land admeasuring Ac.17-10 Gts. in Sy.No.140, situated at

Bachupally Village, earlier within Quthbullapur Mandal, Medchal-

Malkajgiri District. On 12.04.1982, Sri V. Krishna Murthy entered

into an agreement of sale with the appellant in respect of an extent of

Ac.10-00 Gts. out of the aforesaid land. Subsequently, on

30.08.1982, Sri V. Krishna Murthy executed a registered General

Power of Attorney (GPA) in favour of the appellant's husband.

4. On 15.10.1993 and 21.10.1993, Sri V. Krishna Murthy and his

five sons executed GPA in favour of Sri K. Seetha Ram Reddy. Acting

as GPA holder, Sri K. Seetha Ram Reddy executed three registered

sale deeds dated 17.02.1998, conveying an extent of Ac.5-30 Gts.

each in favour of three purchasers, namely Sri P. Hanumanth Rao,

Sri D. Kondal Rao and Sri M. Venkat Rao, respectively, covering the

entire extent of Ac.17-10 Gts. in Sy.No.140. The purchasers

thereafter got their names mutated in the revenue records and

obtained Pattadar Passbooks and Title Deeds.

5. Thereafter, the aforesaid purchasers conveyed their respective

extents of land in favour of respondent No.1, M/s. ADR Estates

3

Private Limited, under registered sale deeds bearing Document

Nos.10387 of 2007, 10388 of 2007 and 12065 of 2006, pertaining to

transactions dated 22.11.2006, 22.11.2006 and 02.06.2006,

respectively.

6. The appellant instituted O.S.No.86 of 1999 before the Court of

the Junior Civil Judge, Medchal, seeking specific performance of the

agreement of sale dated 12.04.1982. The suit came to be decreed

and, in execution of the decree, a registered sale deed bearing

Document No.7601 of 2000 dated 19.09.2000 was executed in favour

of the appellant.

7. The appellant thereafter instituted O.S.No.23 of 2002 seeking

declaration of title and O.S.No.159 of 2002 seeking perpetual

injunction. Both suits were dismissed by the I Additional District

Judge, Ranga Reddy District at L.B. Nagar, by a common judgment

and decree dated 14.10.2004. The learned District Judge held, inter

alia, that the appellant could not acquire title on the strength of the

sale deed dated 19.09.2000 and accepted the title claimed through

the purchasers under the earlier sale transactions. It is material to

note that the said sale transactions were of the year 1998, and not

1995.

8. Aggrieved by the said common judgment and decree, the

appellant preferred A.S.No.4184 of 2004 against the judgment in

O.S.No.23 of 2002 and A.S.No.90 of 2005 against the judgment in

4

O.S.No.159 of 2002 before this Court. Both the appeals were

subsequently dismissed as withdrawn on 13.04.2012 and

16.04.2012, respectively.

9. The appellant thereafter filed I.A.Nos.1 and 2 of 2017 and

I.A.Nos.1 and 2 of 2018 seeking restoration of A.S.No.4184 of 2004.

All the said applications were dismissed by this Court on

20.08.2019. Aggrieved by the order dated 20.08.2019, the appellant

approached the Hon'ble Supreme Court by filing SLP (Civil) Diary

No.44154 of 2019, which was dismissed on 31.01.2020, without

prejudice to the rights of the petitioner to avail such other remedies

as may be available in law.

10. In the meantime, respondent No.1 obtained proceedings for

conversion of the subject land from agricultural to non-agricultural

use. A conversion letter was issued on 14.06.2019, followed by

proceedings dated 28.06.2019. Subsequently, the Municipal

Administration and Urban Development (MA&UD) Department

issued G.O.Ms.No.135 dated 30.07.2022 in respect of a portion of

the land in Sy.No.140/P, permitting change of land use. Respondent

No.1 and the developer also obtained requisite planning and building

permissions from the competent authorities and secured RERA

registration bearing No.P02200005071 dated 13.09.2022.

11. Respondent No.1 had earlier instituted W.P.No.31860 of 2021

seeking deletion of the appellant's sale deed bearing Document

5

No.7601 of 2000 dated 19.09.2000 from the Encumbrance

Certificate. The said writ petition was disposed of on 03.12.2021. The

appellant, who had not been impleaded in the said proceedings,

challenged the order by filing W.A.No.754 of 2022. By judgment

dated 12.12.2025, the Division Bench allowed the writ appeal, set

aside the order dated 03.12.2021 and dismissed W.P.No.31860 of

2021.

12. Following the judgment in W.A.No.754 of 2022, the appellant

submitted an application before respondent No.4 seeking updation of

the revenue records in the Bhu Bharati Portal. Pursuant thereto,

respondent No.4 issued three notices bearing No.B/3600/2025, all

dated 20.12.2025, proposing modification of the entries in respect of

the lands situated in Sy.Nos.140/1, 140/2 and 140/3 at Bachupally

Village and Mandal, Medchal-Malkajgiri District. The notices were

issued to the persons whose names were reflected in the revenue

records.

13. Respondent Nos.1 and 2 instituted W.P.No.3974 of 2026

questioning the aforesaid notices dated 20.12.2025. On 16.02.2026,

this Court directed the parties to maintain status quo in respect of

the impugned notices. The interim order was subsequently extended

from time to time. The appellant filed I.A.No.2 of 2026 seeking

vacation of the interim order. After hearing the parties, the learned

6

Single Judge, by order dated 06.05.2026, dismissed the vacate-stay

application and continued the interim order until further orders.

14. Aggrieved by the order dated 06.05.2026 passed in I.A.No.2 of

2026 in W.P.No.3974 of 2026, the appellant has preferred the

present writ appeal.

Submissions on behalf of the appellant

15. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant has

advanced the following submissions:

i) That the writ petition itself is not maintainable on the following

grounds:

a. The impugned notices dated 20.12.2025 are only show-

cause notices issued to respondent Nos.8 to 10, and no

final order has been passed by the competent authority.

Therefore, the writ petition, having been filed at the stage

of show-cause notices, is premature.

b. Respondent Nos.1 and 2 are not parties to the

proceedings pending before the 4

th

respondent and,

therefore, cannot maintain the writ petition without

obtaining leave of this Court.

c. The question regarding the applicability of the Telangana

Bhu Bharati (Record of Rights in Land) Act, 2025 (for

short ‘ROR Act 2025’) is yet to be considered by the 4th

7

respondent in the pending proceedings. Hence, the writ

petition is premature and liable to be dismissed.

ii) That the appellant claims valid title over the subject property

on the strength of the agreement of sale dated 12.04.1982, the

registered GPA dated 30.08.1982, the decree dated 16.12.1999

in O.S.No.86 of 1999 and the registered sale deed bearing

Document No.7601 of 2000 dated 19.09.2000, executed

through the Court in pursuance of the said decree.

iii) That respondent Nos.1 and 2 derive their title through

respondent Nos.8 to 10, who claim to have purchased the

property through the GPA holder, Sri K. Seetha Ram Reddy.

iv) That the GPAs dated 15.10.1993 and 21.10.1993 were not

executed by all the persons claiming interest in the property

and, therefore, the authority of the GPA holder to convey the

entire property is disputed.

v) That the subsequent sale deeds executed by the GPA holder in

favour of respondent Nos.8 to 10 consequently did not convey

valid title to the extent claimed by them, and the respondent

Nos.8 to 10, having no valid title, could not have conveyed a

better title to respondent No.1.

vi) That the respondent Nos.1 and 2 failed to properly disclose

material facts relating to the earlier civil proceedings. In

particular, it was contended that:

8

a. The judgments in O.S.Nos.23 of 2002 and 159 of 2002,

though adverse to the appellant, did not themselves

constitute a source of title in favour of the respondent

Nos.1 and 2.

b. The respondent Nos.1 and 2 failed to place the complete

effect of the findings recorded in the said proceedings in

their proper perspective, particularly in the context of

the appellant's claim under the sale deed dated

19.09.2000.

c. The fact that respondent Nos.8 to 10 had filed

A.S.No.109 of 2000 challenging the decree in O.S.No.86

of 1999, which was dismissed on 14.10.2004.

vii) That the learned Single Judge failed to properly consider the

judgments and legal precedents relied upon by the appellant in

support of the application seeking vacation of the interim

order. It was contended that the impugned order does not

adequately deal with the factual and legal objections raised by

the appellant.

viii) That continuation of the interim order has the effect of

restraining the statutory proceedings pending before the

competent authority, even though no final order has been

passed in the proceedings. It was contended that continuation

9

of the interim order has caused serious prejudice to the

appellant.

Submissions on behalf of the respondents

16. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for respondent Nos.1

and 2 has advanced the following submissions:

i) That the respondent Nos.1 and 2 (writ petitioners) have

sufficient locus standi to challenge the impugned notices, for

the following reasons:

a. Petitioner No.1 claims ownership and possession over

Ac.17-10 Gts. in Sy.No.140, having purchased the

property under registered sale deeds executed by

respondent Nos.8 to 10 in the year 2006.

b. Petitioner No.2 is the registered Development Agreement-

cum-GPA holder of petitioner No.1 under Document

No.27781 of 2018 dated 19.12.2018.

c. The petitioners have obtained HMDA approvals,

municipal building permissions and RERA registration

and have undertaken substantial development of the

subject property, including construction of a multi-

storied residential project.

d. Though the impugned notices are addressed to

respondent Nos.8 to 10, the proposed modification of

10

entries in the Bhu Bharati Portal would directly affect

the registered and statutory interests claimed by the

petitioners in the subject property.

e. The petitioners, therefore, cannot be treated as strangers

to the proceedings and have sufficient legal interest to

invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of

the Constitution of India. The record also indicates that

the petitioners' registered title and development interests

would be directly affected by any alteration of the

revenue entries.

ii) By placing reliance upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme

Court in Union of India v. Vicco Laboratories

1

it is

contended that, although a writ petition ordinarily would not

lie against a mere show-cause notice, interference is

permissible in exceptional circumstances, particularly where

the notice is issued without jurisdiction or the proceedings

constitute an abuse of process of law.

iii) That the present case falls within the exceptions as provided in

Vicco Laboratories (supra 1), on the following grounds:

a. The impugned notices have been issued by respondent

No.4 under the ROR Act 2025 in respect of land which,

1

(2007) 13 SCC 270

11

according to the petitioners, had already been converted

from agricultural to non-agricultural use.

b. The subject land is therefore contended to fall outside

the scope of “agricultural land” under Section 2(1) of the

Act, 2025.

c. Reliance was placed on Section 5(9) of the 2025 Act to

contend that in respect of non-agricultural land, the

provisions of the Telangana Municipalities Act, 2019 and

the GHMC Act, 1955 would apply.

d. It was accordingly contended that the impugned notices

suffer from want of jurisdiction and that this Court can

interfere even at the show-cause notice stage.

iv) By placing reliance upon the judgment dated 14.10.2004 in

O.S.Nos.23 and 159 of 2002, wherein the civil Court held that

respondent Nos.8 to 10 were bona fide purchasers and that the

appellant did not acquire title by virtue of the subsequent

court-executed sale deed dated 19.09.2000, it is contended

that the said judgment, in fact, contains findings concerning

the competing claims of title and the effect of the earlier GPA

transactions and sale deeds.

v) That the findings rendered by the civil Court have attained

finality, inasmuch as, in the judgment and decree dated

12

14.10.2004 in O.S.Nos.23 and 159 of 2002, the appellant's

claim to title was rejected; that the appeals preferred against

the said judgment, being A.S.Nos.4184 of 2004 and 90 of

2005, were subsequently withdrawn; that the applications

seeking restoration of the said appeals were dismissed on

20.08.2019; that the SLP (Civil) Diary No.44154 of 2019 was

dismissed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on 31.01.2020; and

that the findings of the civil Court concerning the appellant's

title cannot be reopened in the present proceedings and

continue to bind the parties, subject to the precise scope and

effect of the orders passed in the subsequent proceedings.

vi) That the subject property has undergone substantial

development pursuant to various statutory permissions and

approvals, as the land was converted from agricultural to non-

agricultural use pursuant to proceedings dated 14.06.2019

and 28.06.2019; G.O.Ms.No.135 dated 30.07.2022 was issued

confirming change of land use in respect of a portion of the

subject land; HMDA granted technical approvals for

development of a multi-storied residential project; Building

permission was obtained from the competent municipal

authority; and the project obtained RERA registration bearing

No.P02200005071 dated 13.09.2022.

13

vii) That substantial construction has been completed and that

third-party interests have arisen in the project through sale

transactions. That the material on record supports the

existence of the conversion proceedings, HMDA approvals,

building permit and RERA registration.

viii) That the appellant has no subsisting title over the subject

property, contending that:

a. The sale deed dated 19.09.2000 in favour of the

appellant was executed pursuant to the decree in

O.S.No.86 of 1999, after the earlier GPA transactions

and sale deeds in favour of respondent Nos.8 to 10.

b. By the time the decree dated 16.12.1999 was passed and

the consequential sale deed dated 19.09.2000 was

executed, the original owners had already dealt with and

divested their rights in respect of the property through

the GPA transactions and subsequent sale deeds.

c. The appellant's subsequent court-executed sale deed

could not, according to the respondents, convey a better

title than what remained with the persons through whom

the decree was obtained.

d. Reliance was placed upon the findings in O.S.Nos.23 and

159 of 2002, wherein the civil Court held that the

14

appellant did not acquire title under the sale deed dated

19.09.2000.

ix) That the appellant had failed to disclose material facts,

including, the findings rendered by the civil Court in

O.S.Nos.23 and 159 of 2002 concerning the appellant's claim

of title; the proceedings arising out of the Memoranda of

Understanding (MoU) entered into during the subsequent

period, which, according to the respondents herein,

acknowledge the rights claimed by the writ petitioners and/or

their vendors; the withdrawal of A.S.Nos.4184 of 2004 and 90

of 2005 and the subsequent dismissal of the restoration

applications; and the dismissal of SLP (Civil) Diary No.44154 of

2019 on 31.01.2020.

17. We have taken note of the respective contentions urged and

perused the material on record.

Consideration by this Court

18. The primary contention raised by the appellant is that

respondent Nos.1 and 2 have no locus standi to challenge the

impugned notices, since the notices are addressed only to

respondent Nos.8 to 10 and the respondent Nos.1 and 2 are not

parties to the proceedings before the 4

th

respondent.

19. It is pertinent to note that the concept of locus standi in the

context of Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not confined only

15

to persons who were parties to the proceedings before the statutory

authority. A person who is not a party to such proceedings may also

invoke the jurisdiction of this Court where the impugned action

directly affects such person's legally cognizable rights or interests.

20. In the present case, the material on record discloses the

following:

i) Respondent No.1 herein claims registered title over the subject

property on the basis of registered sale deeds executed by

respondent Nos.8 to 10 in the year 2006. The civil Court, in

O.S.Nos.23 and 159 of 2002, also recorded findings in favour

of respondent Nos.8 to 10 as bona fide purchasers and against

the appellant's claim under the sale deed dated 19.09.2000.

ii) Respondent No.1 herein obtained proceedings for conversion of

the subject land from agricultural to non-agricultural use. The

record further discloses subsequent statutory permissions and

approvals relating to development of the property.

iii) Respondent No.1 herein obtained HMDA approvals, municipal

building permission and RERA registration in relation to the

residential project proposed/developed on the subject property.

iv) The record further indicates that substantial development has

taken place on the property and that third-party interests have

arisen in the project through sale transactions.

16

v) Respondent No.2 herein is the registered Development

Agreement-cum-GPA holder of respondent No.1 under

Document No.27781 of 2018 dated 19.12.2018 and is stated to

be involved in the development of the subject property.

21. It is to be noted that the impugned notices have been issued by

the 4

th

respondent proposing modification of entries in the Bhu

Bharati Portal in respect of the subject land. Though the notices are

addressed to respondent Nos.8 to 10, any alteration of the revenue

entries concerning the property has the potential to directly affect the

registered and development interests claimed by respondent Nos.1

and 2 herein. Therefore, the respondent Nos.1 and 2 cannot be

regarded as persons having no legal interest in the subject matter of

the proceedings.

22. Further, the mere fact that the impugned notices are

addressed to respondent Nos.8 to 10 does not, by itself, disentitle

respondent Nos.1 and 2 from invoking the jurisdiction of this Court.

What is relevant, for the purpose of locus standi, is whether the

impugned action has a direct and legally cognizable bearing upon

their rights or interests. In the facts of the present case, such a

direct nexus is established.

23. It is also to be noted that the contention of the appellant that

the respondent Nos.1 and 2 are complete strangers to the

proceedings is not acceptable. The respondent Nos.1 and 2 claim

17

registered title through respondent Nos.8 to 10 and have placed on

record subsequent statutory permissions and development-related

transactions concerning the same property. Their interest is

consequently not merely remote or speculative.

24. As regards the contention relating to obtaining “leave”, the

requirement applicable to a third party seeking to prefer an appeal

against a decree in a civil proceeding cannot automatically be

imported into an original writ petition under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India. The maintainability of the writ petition must be

examined on the basis of the existence of a legally cognizable right or

interest and the nature of the impugned statutory action. Therefore,

the respondent Nos.1 and 2 have sufficient locus standi to invoke the

jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of

India and to challenge the impugned notices, notwithstanding that

the notices were issued to respondent Nos.8 to 10.

25. It is well-settled that a writ petition would not ordinarily lie

against a show-cause notice, as the person to whom such notice is

issued would have an adequate opportunity to place his case before

the competent authority. However, this general rule is subject to

recognized exceptions, particularly where the notice is issued without

jurisdiction or where the proceedings are found to constitute an

abuse of the process of law.

18

26. In Vicco Laboratories (supra 1), the Hon'ble Supreme Court

has held as follows:

“31. Normally, the writ court should not interfere at the stage

of issuance of show-cause notice by the authorities. In such a

case, the parties get ample opportunity to put forth their

contentions before the authorities concerned and to satisfy

the authorities concerned about the absence of case for

proceeding against the person against whom the show-cause

notices have been issued. Abstinence from interference at the

stage of issuance of show-cause notice in order to relegate

the parties to the proceedings before the authorities

concerned is the normal rule. However, the said rule is not

without exceptions. Where a show-cause notice is issued

either without jurisdiction or in an abuse of process of law,

certainly in that case, the writ court would not hesitate to

interfere even at the stage of issuance of show-cause notice.

The interference. at the show-cause notice stage should be

rare and not in a routine manner. Mere assertion by the writ

petitioner that notice was without jurisdiction and/or abuse

of process of law would not suffice. It should be prima facie

established to be so. Where factual adjudication would be

necessary, interference is ruled out.

27. In the present case, respondent Nos.1 and 2 have questioned

the jurisdiction of the 4

th

respondent primarily on the ground that

the subject land had already been converted from agricultural to

non-agricultural use pursuant to proceedings dated 28.06.2019. It is

further contended that G.O.Ms.No.135 dated 30.07.2022 was issued

in respect of change of land use of a portion of the subject land and

that the property was thereafter developed pursuant to HMDA

approvals, municipal building permissions and RERA registration.

Substantial construction is stated to have been undertaken and flats

sold, resulting in third-party interests.

19

28. Reliance is also placed upon Section 5(9) of the ROR Act, 2025,

which, according to respondent Nos.1 and 2, recognizes the

applicability of the Telangana Municipalities Act, 2019 and the

GHMC Act, 1955 in respect of non-agricultural land. On this basis, it

is contended that the provisions of the ROR Act, 2025 invoked in the

impugned notices may not apply to the subject land after its

conversion to non-agricultural use.

29. The aforesaid contention raises a specific jurisdictional issue

and cannot, at this stage, be regarded as a mere assertion without

prima facie foundation. The material on record discloses the

conversion of the subject land and its subsequent development

pursuant to statutory permissions and approvals. Whether, in these

circumstances, the 4

th

respondent could initiate proceedings under

the ROR Act, 2025 is a matter requiring consideration on merits.

Therefore, this Court is of the view that the writ petition cannot be

rejected as premature at the show-cause notice stage.

30. There is also a significant aspect relating to the competing

claims of title. The civil Court, in its judgment dated 14.10.2004 in

O.S.Nos.23 and 159 of 2002, adjudicated the rival claims and, inter

alia, held that the appellant did not acquire title by virtue of the sale

deed executed through Court pursuant to the decree in O.S.No.86 of

1999. The said judgment also recognized the title of the appellant's

20

vendors' transferees and rejected the appellant's claim in respect of

the said property.

31. Further, the said findings have remained undisturbed in the

subsequent proceedings referred to before us. The appeals filed

against the judgment were withdrawn, the applications seeking

restoration were dismissed, and the SLP filed before the Hon'ble

Supreme Court was also dismissed. Thus, the findings rendered by

the competent civil Court, to the extent relevant to the present

controversy, cannot be ignored while examining the prima facie basis

of the appellant's claim.

32. In this background, the appellant’s claim of title, having

already been negatived by the competent civil Court, cannot by itself

furnish a basis to reject the jurisdictional challenge raised by

respondent Nos.1 and 2. At this stage, this Court confines itself to

the prima facie jurisdictional issue and does not finally adjudicate

upon the merits of the proceedings proposed under the impugned

notices.

33. It is also relevant to advert to the findings of the learned Single

Judge wherein the learned Single Judge has made the following

observations:

21. It is the specific case, of the writ petitioners that the

impugned notices issued by respondent No.4-The Revenue

Divisional Officer, are ultra vires, as the said notices were

issued by invoking the provisions under the Telangana Bhu

Bharati (Record of Rights in Land) Act, 2025 (for brevity, ‘the

21

Act, 2025), in respect of a land, which has already been

converted from agricultural to non-agricultural use, and

subjected to development after obtaining necessary

permissions and approvals, and therefore, the provisions of

the Act, 2025, would not apply to the land in question.

However, to adjudicate this issue of jurisdiction, a detailed

counter affidavit from the official respondents is essential,

which has not been filed so far in the present writ petition. In

the above backdrop of the case, this Court is of the prima

facie opinion that the present writ petition is maintainable.

34. In view of the above, this Court finds no error in the aforesaid

approach of the learned Single Judge. The challenge before the writ

Court is not founded merely on an assertion that the show-cause

notices are erroneous on facts. A specific jurisdictional objection has

been raised, supported by the conversion proceedings, subsequent

development permissions and the statutory provision relied upon by

the respondent Nos.1 and 2. Thus, where determination of the

jurisdictional issue requires the response of the official respondents

and examination of the statutory scheme, the writ petition cannot be

rejected as premature.

35. The contention that the learned Single Judge failed to consider

the objections relating to locus standi and maintainability is not

borne out and is, in fact, contradicted by the record. The impugned

order deals with both issues, notices the direct bearing of the

impugned action on the interests of respondent Nos.1 and 2, and,

relying upon Vicco Laboratories (supra 1), holds that the

jurisdictional objection warrants consideration.

22

36. A perusal of the impugned order shows that the learned Single

Judge considered both the objections relating to locus standi and

maintainability and recorded reasons for rejecting them. With regard

to locus standi, the learned Single Judge noticed that the impugned

notices, though addressed to respondent Nos.8 to 10, had a direct

bearing on the rights and interests claimed by respondent Nos.1 and

2. On maintainability, the learned Single Judge relied upon Vicco

Laboratories (supra 1) and found that the jurisdictional objection

raised by respondent Nos.1 and 2 warranted consideration.

Therefore, the contention that these issues were not considered is

not borne out by the record.

37. The further contention of the appellant that the learned Single

Judge failed to consider the judgments and legal precedents relied

upon by the appellant also does not persuade us to interfere with the

order under appeal. The learned Single Judge has considered the

principle laid down in Vicco Laboratories (supra 1) and applied the

same to the facts and circumstances of the present case. Merely

because every contention or authority cited by a party is not

separately dealt with, it cannot be said that the relevant objections

were not considered, particularly when the essential issues have

been identified and answered by the learned Single Judge.

38. The appellant has also contended that the impugned notices

are only show-cause notices and that no final order has been passed

23

by the competent authority. However, where a specific jurisdictional

objection is raised and the Court finds that such objection has prima

facie substance, the mere fact that the impugned action is at the

stage of a show-cause notice would not render the writ petition non-

maintainable. In the present case, the learned Single Judge has

found that the jurisdictional issue requires consideration after the

official respondents place their stand on record.

39. It is to be noted that the interim protection is intended to

preserve the subject matter of the writ petition and prevent the

impugned notices from causing irreversible consequences. The

material on record indicates substantial development of the subject

property and creation of third-party interests.

40. At this interlocutory stage, the balance of convenience also lies

in maintaining the existing position. Respondent Nos.1 and 2 rely on

the 2006 transactions, subsequent conversion and development

permissions, building approval and RERA registration, and assert

that flats have been constructed and sold. The appellant’s claim of

title has already been considered and negatived by the competent

civil Court. Altering the existing position pending adjudication of the

jurisdictional challenge may cause prejudice to respondent Nos.1

and 2 and third-party purchasers.

41. In these circumstances, this Court finds no error in the

exercise of discretion by the learned Single Judge in dismissing the

24

application seeking vacation of the interim order and in continuing

the interim protection. The order under appeal is based on the

material available on record and the reasons assigned therein cannot

be said to be perverse, arbitrary or contrary to the settled principles

governing interlocutory relief.

42. A careful reading of the judgment in O.S.Nos.23 and 159 of

2002 dated 14.10.2004 reveals that the learned I Additional District

Judge recorded the following findings:

28. Thus, I hold that the plaintiff failed to establish her title

over the suit schedule property by virtue of Ex.A6 sale deed

or by adverse possession and the title of the defendants is

upheld and the plaintiff's right to question the same is also

negatived, the plaintiff is not entitled for any declaration

asked by her. Accordingly, these two issues are answered

against the plaintiff.

29. In the preceding paras, it has been found that the plaintiff

failed to establish her possession of the suit land, as on the

date of the suit and her claim of adverse possession also is

negatived. Such being the case the plaintiff will not be

entitled for injunction against the defendants. Accordingly,

these issues are answered against the plaintiff.

30. Consequent upon my findings on issue No.1 to 3, that the

plaintiff is not entitled for declaration and injunction in her

favour, the suit is dismissed with costs.

43. The judgment in A.S.No.109 of 2000 dated 14.10.2004 held

that the decree in O.S.No.86 of 1999 was not binding on the vendors

of the respondent Nos.1 and 2. The appeals in A.S.Nos.4184 of 2004

and 90 of 2005 were dismissed as withdrawn on 13.04.2012 and

16.04.2012 respectively; the restoration applications were dismissed

on 20.08.2019, leaving the issues relating to the MOU dated

25

12.04.2012 open, and the SLP was dismissed on 31.01.2020. Thus,

the findings of the competent civil Court against the appellant's claim

to title and possession, including the finding that the appellant did

not acquire title under the sale deed obtained through Court,

remained undisturbed in the subsequent proceedings and are

relevant to the present controversy.

44. The record also refers to MoU dated 11.12.2007 and

28.05.2008 entered into between the parties. The appellant disputes

the MOU dated 12.04.2012 and has raised contentions regarding the

same. The subsequent proceedings also indicate that the issues

relating to the said MOU were expressly left open. Thus, this Court

does not consider it necessary, at this stage, to record any final

finding regarding the validity, enforceability or effect of the disputed

MOU.

45. Moreover, the respondent Nos.1 and 2 have raised a specific

jurisdictional objection based upon the conversion of the subject

land from agricultural to non-agricultural use and the subsequent

development carried out pursuant to statutory permissions. They

have also relied upon Section 5(9) of the ROR Act, 2025, to contend

that the statutory regime applicable to non-agricultural land is

different. The aforesaid circumstances, therefore, disclose a prima

facie jurisdictional issue warranting consideration by the learned

Single Judge on merits.

26

Conclusion

46. For the foregoing reasons, this Court is of the considered view

that the respondent Nos.1 and 2 have sufficient locus standi to

challenge the impugned notices and that the writ petition is

maintainable in view of the prima facie jurisdictional issue raised

therein. The findings of the competent civil Court rejecting the

appellant's claim to title and possession have remained undisturbed

and are relevant to the present controversy. The learned Single

Judge was justified in dismissing the vacate stay petition and

continuing the interim protection. Thus, this Court finds no legal

infirmity in the order dated 06.05.2026 passed by the learned Single

Judge in I.A.No.2 of 2026 in W.P.No.3974 of 2026 warranting

interference by this Court.

47. Accordingly, this Writ Appeal is dismissed. The order dated

06.05.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge in I.A.No.2 of 2026 in

W.P.No.3974 of 2026 is hereby affirmed. The interim order of status

quo granted by the learned Single Judge on 16.02.2026 and extended

from time to time shall continue to operate until final disposal of the

writ petition. The learned Single Judge is requested to dispose of the

writ petition on merits, as expeditiously as possible, preferably within

a period of six (6) weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this

judgment. The learned Single Judge shall consider the matter on

27

merits after taking into account the counter affidavit, if any, filed by

the official respondents and the replies filed by the respective parties.

As a consequence, all pending miscellaneous petition, if any,

shall stand closed. No costs.

_______________________________

APARESH KUMAR SINGH, CJ

______________________________

G.M.MOHIUDDIN,J

Date:16.09.2026

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