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CASE NO.:

Appeal (civil) 1671 of 2002

PETITIONER:

S.R. EJAZ

Vs.

RESPONDENT:

THE TAMIL NADU HANDLOOM WEAVERSCO-OPERATIVE SOCIETY LTD.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 26/02/2002

BENCH:

M.B. Shah & B.N. Agrawal

JUDGMENT:

Shah, J.

Leave granted.

The appellant who was forcibly and illegally dispossessed since

May 1986 from the tenanted premises by his landlord is moving from

pillar to post for getting justice. Unfortunately, after considering all

the relevant facts which were brought on record, the High Court

remanded the proceedings under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act,

1963 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") for reconsideration by the

trial court. It is apparent that the whole purpose of proceedings under

Section 6 of the Act is frustrated by such order. The procedure under

Section 6 of the Act is summary and its object is to prevent self help

and to discourage people to adopt any foul means to dispossess a

person. Dispossession of a tenant should be in accordance with law.

It is the submission of the appellant that as Proprietor of India

Watch House, he was doing business in tenanted premises situated at

843, Anna Salai Madras for more than 35 years. Subsequently, the

respondent the Tamilnadu Handloom Weavers Co-operative Society

Ltd., Madras purchased the said premises and, therefore, the appellant

was paying rent regularly to it.

In 1978, respondent filed Civil Suit for getting the premises

vacated from the appellant. During the pendency of the proceedings,

appellant gave a power of attorney to one Muralidhar Balani to run

business of India Watch House, hence Balani was getting the said

shop re-modelled. However, on 20th May, 1986 at about 7.30 p.m.,

while the work of re-modelling of shop was going on, one Mr.

Anakaputhur Ramalingam and about 20 Co-Optex Workers with the

help of police forcibly trespassed into the tenanted premises. They

took forcible possession despite the fact their Civil Suit for eviction

was pending in the court.

On the same day, appellant filed a complaint but the police did

not take any action on it. On 21st May, 1986, the complaint was sent

to the Commissioner of Police, Chennai for immediate action against

the trespassers. On 31st May, 1986 telegraphic complaints were sent

to the Director General of Police and the Inspector General of Police.

Thereafter, on 16th June, 1986, appellant filed Writ Petition No.5382

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of 1986 for a direction to the police to take appropriate action on the

complaint filed by the appellant. That writ petition was allowed by

the High Court on 3rd May, 1988 and the Court directed the CB CID

to investigate the complaint of the appellant. On such direction, CB

CID registered the offence punishable under Sections 143, 147, 149,

323, 341 and 441 of IPC. The main accused Anakaputhur

Ramalingam was arrested on 19th July, 1988. Thereafter, on

18.6.1991, the Government of Tamilnadu accorded sanction to

prosecute the case against the accused. Hence, the CB CID police

filed the charge sheet against all the accused for the offence

punishable under sections 147, 149, 441, 352, 380 and 341 of IPC in

the Court of Addl. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Chennai.

It is alleged by the appellant that accused succeeded in pressurizing

and influencing the Government to withdraw the prosecution against

all accused and thereafter public prosecutor filed an application for

withdrawal of the prosecution. Permission to withdraw the

prosecution case was granted by the ACMM on 15th October, 1993.

In the meantime, within a period of six months from the date of

dispossession, on 25.9.1986, appellant filed OS No.6998 of 1986 for

restoration of possession under Section 6 of the Act. Respondent filed

written statement and pleaded that appellant had informed them that

he has vacated the premises and it was open to the respondent to take

the possession either on 19th or 20th May, 1986. Therefore,

possession was taken in presence of the police constables. The trial

court dismissed the suit. Against the said judgment and order,

appellant preferred C.R.P. No.1818 of 1996 before the High Court of

Madras. Considering the facts stated above, the High Court allowed

the petition. However, the High Court held that in the interest of

justice the matter requires to be remanded to the trial court for fresh

consideration of the evidence and proper disposal. That order is

challenged in this appeal.

From the facts narrated above, it is apparent that pending suit

filed by the respondent for evicting the appellant, the respondent took

forcible possession of the tenanted premises, for that purpose

appellant had lodged criminal complaint on the same day and as no

action was taken, he had informed various authorities immediately.

Despite the representation made to the higher authorities as police had

not taken any action, appellant preferred Writ Petition before the High

Court and the High Court directed the CB CID to investigate the case.

Thereafter the charge sheet was submitted; Government granted

sanction; however, for the reasons best known to it, the Government

withdrew the criminal proceedings. This would clearly establish that

appellant was in possession of the premises and pending suit, he was

forcibly dispossessed. Hence, in such circumstances if matter is

remanded for reconsideration after lapse of 15 years, the whole

purpose of summary suit under Section 6 of the Act for taking

possession would be frustrated. The facts were eloquent and no

further evidence was necessary nor anything was required to be re-

appreciated. It is to be stated that admittedly there is no document to

indicate that appellant willingly handed over the possession of the suit

premises. If appellant was prepared to hand over the possession of the

suit premises willingly a consent decree would have been obtained in

a pending suit which was filed in 1978. In any case, there was no

necessity of taking possession by use of force in presence of police. If

the appellant had willingly handed over possession, he would not have

immediately lodged the criminal complaint and made representation

to the higher authorities for taking action nor he would have filed a

writ petition for appropriate directions. Hence, this contention does

not deserve to be accepted by any process of reasoning.

In our view, if such actions by the mighty or powerful are

condoned in a democratic country, nobody would be safe nor the

citizens can protect their properties. Law frowns upon such conduct.

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The Court accords legitimacy and legality only to possession taken in

due course of law. If such actions are condoned, the fundamental

rights guaranteed under the Constitution of India or the legal rights

would be given go bye either by the authority or by rich and

influential persons or by musclemen. Law of jungle will prevail and

'might would be right' instead of 'right being might'. This Court in

State of U.P. and others vs. Maharaja Dharmander Prasad Singh

and others [(1989) 2 SCC 505] dealt with the provisions of Transfer

of Property Act and observed that a lessor, with the best of title, has

no right to resume possession extra-judicially by use of force, from a

lessee, even after the expiry or earlier termination of the lease by

forfeiture or otherwise. Under law, the possession of a lessee, even

after the expiry or its earlier termination is juridical possession and

forcible dispossession is prohibited. The Court also held that there is

no question of Government withdrawing or appropriating to it an extra

judicial right of re-entry and the possession of the property can be

resumed by the Government only in a manner known to or recognized

by law.

In this view of the matter, this appeal is allowed. Impugned

judgment and order passed by the High Court is set aside. The suit

filed by the plaintiff-appellant for restoration of possession of the suit

property is decreed. The respondent is directed to hand over the

possession of the premises within one month to the appellant.

Further, we strongly deprecate the high handed action taken by the

respondent in taking forcible possession from a tenant and direct the

respondent to pay Rs.50,000/- as costs to the appellant.

J.

(M.B. Shah)

J.

February 26, 2002. (B.N. Agrawal)

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