W.P.(C) No.6073 of 2026 Page 1 of 73

ORISSA HIGH COURT : CUTTACK

W.P.(C) No.6073 of 2026

In the matter of an Application under

Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, 1950

***

Sri Birat Chandra Dagara

Aged about 82 years

Son of Late Bishikesan Dagara

Mining Lessee

At: Ward No. 15, At/P.O.: Rairangpur

Town/District: Mayurbhanj, Odisha

Represented through his constituted

Power of Attorney

Sri Biswajaya Dagara

aged about 50 years

Son of Birat Chandra Dagara

At present residing

At: Plot No. 20, Saheed Nagar

Bhubaneswar, District: Khordha

Odisha – 751 007. … Petitioner

-VERSUS-

1. State Government of Odisha

Represented through

The Additional Chief Secretary to Government

Department of Steel and Mines

Lok Seva Bhawan, Sachivalaya Marg

Bhubaneswar, Pin: 751 001

District: Khordha, Odisha.

W.P.(C) No.6073 of 2026 Page 2 of 73

2. The Director of Mines & Geology

Heads of Department Building

Unit-V, Bhubaneswar – 751 001

District: Khordha, Odisha.

3. The Deputy Director of Mines

Baripada Circle, Baripada

At/P.O.: Baripada

District: Mayurbhanj – 757 002

Odisha. … Opposite parties.

Counsel appeared for the parties:

For the Petitioner : M/s. Sudarshan Nanda

Shishir Kumar Routray,

Lalitendu Mohapatra,

Padmanav Nayak,

Sandeep Pattnaik, Advocates.

For the Opposite parties : Mr. Pitambar Acharya,

Advocate General

Ms. Aishwarya Dash,

Additional Standing Counsel.

P R E S E N T:

HONOURABLE CHIEF JUSTICE

MR. HARISH TANDON

AND

HONOURABLE JUSTICE

MR. MURAHARI SRI RAMAN

Date of Hearing : 14.05.2026 :: Date of Judgment : 30.06.2026

JUDGMENT

W.P.(C) No.6073 of 2026 Page 3 of 73

MURAHARI SRI RAMAN, J.—

The petitioner, a lessee with respect to mining of iron

ore, craves for exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction

under Articles 226 and 227of the Constitution of India to

issue writ of mandamus to the opposite parties to allow

the lessee to enjoy the property beyond the validity

period stipulated in the supplementary lease deed by

adding period lost in not being able to operate the mines

and extend the validity period till 23.05.2026 by taking

into consideration the commencement of lease period

with effect from 24.05.1976, i.e., the date of registration

of the lease deed and, therefore, he beseeches for grant

of following relief(s):

“It is, therefore, prayed that the Hon‟ble Court may

graciously be pleased to admit this Writ Petition, a writ of

or in the nature of mandamus commanding upon and

directing the State-Respondent to treat the lease period of

the lessee in respect of Suleipat Iron Ore Mines located in

Revenue Villages Hatisikly, Nangalsila, Murumdihi,

Khandadera, Karanjharan Hill, Burudihi, Paharbhanga,

Tiakati, and Bhitarmunda Hill, Tehasil Badampahar,

District: Mayurbhanj, Odisha, covering an area of 618

hectares valid up to 23.05.2026, which is fifty years from

the date of execution of the lease deed in respect of the

said mines;

And directing the State Government to extend the lease for

a further period of twenty months i.e. 6 months as

considering the lease date from the date of duly registered

of the lease deed and fourteen months as inaction of the

W.P.(C) No.6073 of 2026 Page 4 of 73

Government authorities, for which period the lessee-

petitioner could not operate the mines due to the

negligence/lapses/latches and inaction on the part of the

opposite parties State Government;

And directing the State Government to allow the petitioner

to operate the subject mines up to a period ending on

24.06.2027 and during the said period, issue all required

challans/permits to operate the mines, subject to the

lessee abiding by and complying with all required

statutory clearances/approvals and permits;

And pass any appropriate order/orders, direction/

directions as deemed fit and proper in the facts and

circumstances of the case and to meet the ends of justice;

And for this act of kindness, the Petitioner shall as in duty

bound, ever pray.”

The facts:

2. The necessary background factual matrix as

adumbrated by the petitioner giving rise to filing of this

the writ petition is narrated hereunder.

2.1. A mining lease in Form K (prescribed under Rule 31 of

the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960) comprising area of

618.00 hectares in Hatisikly, Nangalsila, Murumdihi,

Khandadera, Karanjharan Hill, Burudihi, Paharbhanga,

Tiakati, and Bhitarmunda Hill, within Badampahar

Tehsil of Mayurbhanj District in the State of Odisha with

respect to the Suleipat Iron Ore Mines was executed

between the Collector, Mayurbhanj and Late Bajranglal

W.P.(C) No.6073 of 2026 Page 5 of 73

Padhia on 24.05.1976 with effect from 25.10.1975,

which stood transferred by dint of execution of transfer

lease deed on 10.10.1984 in favour of the petitioner-Sri

Birat Chandra Dagara, upon permission being granted

under Rule 37 of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960

vide Government Proceeding No. 8531/MG, dated

24.08.1984.

2.2. The Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation)

Act, 1957 (referred to as “MMDR Act”, for brevity)

suffered amendment in the year 2015 by virtue of

promulgation of the Mines and Minerals (Development

and Regulation) Amendment Ordinance, 2015 on

12.01.2015. Said Ordinance has been replaced by the

Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation)

Amendment Act, 2015, which stands effective from

12.01.2015. Significant amendment thereto by inserting

Section 8A in the MMDR Act, 1957, declared that all the

leases granted prior to 12.01.2015 are deemed to have

been granted for a period of 50 years. In view of such

amendment, the lease period of the petitioner got

extended for a period of fifty years. A supplementary

lease deed was executed on 01.07.2019, whereby the

lease was extended up to 24.10.2025.

2.3. In response to Letter bearing No.924/IV(AB)-SM-97/

2018, dated 12.02.2019 of Additional Secretary to

Government of Odisha in Steel and Mines Department

W.P.(C) No.6073 of 2026 Page 6 of 73

(Annexure-4), whereby acknowledging grant of lease for

thirty years from 25.10.1975 to 24.10.2005, extension of

the period of lease up to 23.10.2025 was granted, by a

representation dated 18.02.2019 the petitioner

(Annexure-5) requested for extension of validity period of

mining lease from the date of registration, i.e.,

24.05.1976, which was considered by the Government of

Odisha vide Letter bearing No.7071/III(C)-SM-3/2005,

dated 02.05.2006 issued by the Joint Secretary to

Government of Odisha in Department of Steel and Mines

(Annexure-6) by stating thus:

“I am directed to refer to your representation dated

29.08.2005 on the above subject and to say that

Government after careful consideration have been pleased

to order that as per the provision under Rule 31(2) of the

Mineral Concession Rules, 1960, the tenure of the lease

period will be taken into account from 24.05.1976,

the date of registration of lease deed for all

purposes”.

2.4. In course of arbitration case between the petitioner and

the raising company (namely, M/s. Orissa Manganese

and Minerals Ltd.) on account of violation of certain

terms and conditions appended to Letter dated

12.02.2019 by the latter company, the petitioner

approached the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India by way

of filing an Interlocutory Application bearing No.63905 of

2022 in W.P.(C) No.114 of 2014 (Common Cause Vrs.

Union of India) seeking permission to sell 40,95,96,304

W.P.(C) No.6073 of 2026 Page 7 of 73

MT of iron ore of different grades and sizes at the

Suleipat Iron Ore Mines under the supervision of the

State authorities, which was allowed vide Order dated

02.05.2022 “subject to statutory clearances and any

other orders passed by the High Court”.

2.5. With reference to Government of Odisha Letter No.10F

(Cons) 34/2014-4734/F&E, dated 10.03.2014, approval

was accorded on 23.01.2018 by the Forest Advisory

Committee constituted under Section 3 of the Central

Government under the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980

with respect to Suleipat Iron Ore Mines in Ukam,

Langalsila, Murumdihi and Bhitarmada Hills falling

under Rairangpur Forest Division in Mayurbhanj

District. Furthermore, approval of review of mining plan

along with progressive mine closure plan in respect of

Suleipat Iron Ore Mines over an area of 618 hectares

situated in Murumdihi in Badampahad Tahasil in the

District of Mayurbhanj was issued by the Government of

India in Ministry of Mines, Indian Bureau of Mines from

the Office of the Regional Controller of Mines,

Bhubaneswar on 06.05.2024. This apart, a Consent

Order being No.12926/IND-I-CON-1825, dated

16.08.2024 to discharge sewage and trade effluent under

Sections 25 and 26 of the Water (Prevention and Control

of Pollution) Act, 1974 and for existing/new operation of

the plant under Section 21 of the Air (Prevention and

W.P.(C) No.6073 of 2026 Page 8 of 73

Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 was issued by State

Pollution Control Board.

2.6. Amicable settlement

1 being reached at between the

petitioner and the raising company, a representation

dated 20.08.2024 was submitted to the Steel and Mines

Department, Government of Odisha with the prayer to

“advise the Deputy Director of Mines, Baripada to allow

the lessee for regular despatch and production from the

Suleipat Iron Ore Mines with immediate effect in

compliance of the order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court

dated 02.05.2022”. Having not paid attention to such

representation, the petitioner again submitted

representation dated 01.10.2024 for taking prompt steps

with respect to the representation already pending.

2.7. The Government of Odisha in Department of Steel and

Mines by Letter bearing No.1882/SM-MC1-MISC-0036-

2021, dated 24.02.2025 instructed the Director of Mines

and Geology instructed as follows:

“Ref: Letter dated 20.08.2024 received from Shri B. C.

Dagara

Sir,

With reference to the subject cited above, I am

directed to forward the Letter dated 20.08.2024

1

The factual scenario leading to settlement between the petitioner and the raising

company has been elaborately discussed in Judgment dated 09.07.2019

rendered by a learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.(C) No.7445 of 2019

and W.P.(C) No.7537 of 2019.

W.P.(C) No.6073 of 2026 Page 9 of 73

received from Shri B.C. Dagara and to communicate

the Government‟s approval for permitting the Lessee,

Shri B.C. Dagara, to sell the mined-out material, i.e.,

4,09,596,304 MT of iron ore, as directed by the

Hon‟ble Supreme Court vide Order dated 02.05.2022

in IA No. 60995 of 2022. This approval is subject

to verification that the Lessee has obtained all

statutory clearances and has paid the dues to

the State Government.

The resumption of mining operations will also

be contingent upon obtaining the necessary

statutory clearances and settling all

outstanding Government dues .

This matter may be treated as urgent.”

2.8. Accordingly, the Director of Mines and Geology, Odisha

by Letter bearing No.MIV(C)/28/2004/2254/DoMG,

dated 27.02.2025 instructed the Deputy Director of

Mines, Baripada not only to take steps to allow sale of

mined out iron ore in the light of Order dated

02.05.2022 of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in I.A.

No.60995 of 2022 but also for resumption of mining

operation in the leasehold area subject to fulfilment of

certain conditions. Despite such clear instructions, for

the reasons best known the Deputy Director of Mines did

not allow the lessee to operate the mines. The petitioner-

lessee was not even communicated with the Letter dated

27.02.2025 of the Director of Mines. Hence, another

representation dated 22.10.2025 was, therefore,

W.P.(C) No.6073 of 2026 Page 10 of 73

submitted to the Department of Steel and Mines for

extension of validity period of the mining lease of

Suleipat Iron Ore Mines taking recourse of provisions

contained in Section 8A of the MMDR Act as amended in

2015 read with Rule 31(2) of the Minerals Concession

Rules, 1960 (hereinafter be referred to as “MC Rules”).

Response of the opposite parties:

3. On behalf of the Steel and Mines Department, a

preliminary counter affidavit dated 07.05.2026 has come

to be filed inter alia with the following replies:

(i) By way of indenture dated 25.10.1975, original

lease was granted with effect from 25.10.1975 for a

period of thirty years. By virtue of deeming fiction

in Section 8A(3) of the MMDR Act, the mining lease

is stated to have been granted for a period of fifty

years, i.e., from its original grant on 25.10.1975.

The lease would remain valid till 24.10.2025. The

computation of said period of fifty year has to be in

consonance with sub-section (6) of Section 8A

which in unequivocal terms lays down that period

of fifty years shall be reckoned with respect to

leases “granted” prior to effective date for

commencement of the Mines and Minerals

(Development and Regulation) Amendment Act,

2015, i.e., 12.01.2015.

W.P.(C) No.6073 of 2026 Page 11 of 73

(ii) On application of doctrine of acquiescence/waiver,

the petitioner cannot seek for add-on period to the

last date of validity period as prayed for in the writ

petition inasmuch as the supplementary lease deed

executed on 01.07.2019 with all consciousness.

Said lease deed clearly stipulated that the tenure of

lease would remain valid till 24.10.2025 computed

from 25.10.1975.

(iii) Having acted upon on such supplementary lease

deed for around five years without any protest or

demur, at this belated stage the petitioner is

estopped from questioning the action of the

Government of Odisha in Steel and Mines

Department.

(iv) The petitioner cannot pray for resurrection of the

lease which has already been lapsed on completion

of fifty years from 25.10.1975, i.e., from the original

“grant”. Extending the period of lease beyond

24.10.2025 would be in contravention of Section 19

of the MMDR Act. The power of grant of extension

in contrast with renewal is not vested with the

opposite parties under the statute. However, after

amendment in the MMDR Act being effected in the

year 2015, there has been paradigm shift in

allotting mining leases.

W.P.(C) No.6073 of 2026 Page 12 of 73

Rejoinder affidavit of the petitioner:

4. In reply to the counter-affidavit of the opponent(s), the

petitioner sought to impress that:

i. The word “grant” is required to be construed as

“the date of registration” in view of provisions of

Rule 31 of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960.

Since the original lease was executed and

registered on 24.05.1976, fifty years would expire

on 23.05.2026.

ii. Erroneous comprehension on the part of the

Government of Odisha is manifest on record. The

petitioner by a Letter dated 18.02.2019 (Annexure-

5), i.e., prior to execution of the supplementary

lease deed on 01.07.2019 raised objection and by

referring to Letter dated 02.05.2006 of the

Department of Steel and Mines, Government of

Odisha, it was brought to the notice of the

authority concerned that “the tenure of the lease

period would be taken into account from

24.05.1976, the date of registration for the lease

deed for all purposes”.

iii. Inaction of the Government of Odisha in Steel and

Mines Department in not allowing the petitioner to

resume the mining operation as suggested in the

representation dated 22.10.2025 with specific

W.P.(C) No.6073 of 2026 Page 13 of 73

reference to Steel and Mines Department Letter

dated 02.05.2006 construing the date of “grant of

lease” for the purpose of Section 8A of the MMDR

Act as the date of “registration of lease deed” as

envisaged under Rule 31 of the MC Rules, warrants

issue of writ of mandamus to the opposite parties to

consider “24.05.1976” as the reckoning of the date

of lease instead of “25.10.1975”.

iv. Furthermore, if the date of expiry of lease period

would be treated as “23.05.2026” in place of

“24.10.2025” a period of six months would have

been added to the last date stipulated in the

supplementary lease deed. In addition thereto, for

non-consideration of the representation dated

20.08.2024 within a reasonable period, the

petitioner was deprived of proceeding with the

mining activity for a period of fourteen months,

thereby he claims to be entitled to further addition

to above six months. Therefore, in toto twenty

months additional period is to be added to the last

date, i.e., 23.05.2026, recorded in the

supplementary lease deed.

Hearing:

5. As the pleadings are complete and the last date of lease

period of fifty years in terms of Section 8A of the MMDR

W.P.(C) No.6073 of 2026 Page 14 of 73

Act was going to be elapsed on 23.05.2026, upon

consent of the counsels for the both the parties, this

Court heard the matter finally at the stage of “fresh

admission”.

5.1. Sri Sudarshan Nanda, learned Advocate assisted by

Shishir Kumar Routray, Advocate representing the

petitioner and Sri Pitambar Acharya, learned Advocate

General assisted by Ms. Aishwarya Dash, Additional

Standing Counsel were heard in the matter.

5.2. Upon conclusion of hearing, the matter stood reserved

for preparation and pronouncement of judgment/order.

Discussions and consideration of rival submissions and

arguments advanced by the counsel for the respective

parties:

6. Confining arguments Sri Sudarshan Nanda, learned

Advocate by furnishing note of arguments dated

14.05.2026 sought to press for grant of relief(s), such as:

i. To treat the lease period of the lessee-petitioner to

be reckoned from 24.05.1976, i.e., date of

registration of original lease deed, but not from

25.10.1975, i.e., the date of indenture as recorded

in the supplementary lease deed for the purpose of

computing fifty years period in terms of Section

8A(6) of the MMDR Act read with Rule 31(2) of the

MC Rules;

W.P.(C) No.6073 of 2026 Page 15 of 73

ii. To count total period lost due to fault of the

opposite parties, i.e.,

a. Six months on account of error in calculation

of period of validity (“24.10.2025” instead of

“23.05.2026”);

b. Fourteen months on account of non-

consideration of representation dated

20.08.2024 within reasonable period which

prevented the petitioner to continue with the

mining activity.

c. In toto lost periods of twenty months as stated

above are to be added to the validity period of

lease by extending the date till “23.05.2026”

instead of “24.10.2025”.

7. To examine whether the claim of the petitioner that the

period of commencement of lease would be reckoned

from the date of registration, i.e., 24.05.1976 so as to

treat 23.05.2026 as the end of fifty years envisaged in

Section 8A of the MMDR Act is just and proper, it may

deserve scrutiny of documents enclosed with the writ

petition and observations made in certain decisions

made.

7.1. It is disclosed in Letter bearing No.924-

IV(AB)/SM/97/2018, dated 12.02.2019 (Annexure-4) of

W.P.(C) No.6073 of 2026 Page 16 of 73

the Government of Odisha in Steel and Mines

Department that:

“Now the Government have been pleased to decide to

extend the validity period of above mining lease

over 618.00 hectares in Suleipat of Mayurbhanj

District under Section 8A(3) read with Section 8A(6)

of the MMDR (Amendment) Act, 2015

2 up to

24.10.2025.

The extension of validity period of the aforesaid lease is

subject to the following conditions:

1. The lessee will furnish an undertaking that he will

make the payment for the demand raised or to be

raised under Section 21(5) of the MMDR Act in

2

Relevant provisions of Sections 8A of the MMDR Act, 1957 as stood amended in

the year 2015 read as follows:

“8A. Period of grant of a mining lease for minerals other than coal, lignite and

atomic minerals.―

(1) The provisions of this section shall apply to minerals other than those

specified in Part A and Part B of the First Schedule.

(2) On and from the date of the commencement of the Mines and Minerals

(Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2015 (10 of 2015), all

mining leases shall be granted for the period of fifty years.

(3) All mining leases granted before the commencement of the Mines and

Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2015 (10 of

2015), shall be deemed to have been granted for a period of fifty years.

(4) On the expiry of the lease period, the lease shall be put up for auction as

per the procedure specified in this Act.

Provided that nothing contained in this section shall prevent the State

Governments from taking an advance action for auction of the mining

lease before the expiry of the lease period.

(5) ***

(6) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sections (2), (3) and s ub-

section (4), the period of lease granted before the date of commencement of

the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act,

2015 (10 of 2015), where mineral is used for other than captive purpose,

shall be extended and be deemed to have been extended up to a period

ending on the 31st March, 2020 with effect from the date of expiry of the

period of renewal last made or till the completion of renewal period, if any,

or a period of fifty years from the date of grant of such lease, whichever is

later, subject to the condition that all the terms and conditions of the lease

have been complied with.

***”

W.P.(C) No.6073 of 2026 Page 17 of 73

accordance with the judgment dated 02.08.2017 of

Hon‟ble Supreme Court passed in W.P.(C) No.114 of

2014

3. This undertaking will also form part of

the supplementary mining lease deed as a

Special Condition.

2. The extension of validity is without prejudice to

ongoing proceedings, if any, for lapsing or

determination of lease which have been initiated or

may be initiated in accordance to the provisions of

MMDR Act, 1957 or Rules framed thereunder.

***

4. The extension of vaiidity period of lease is subject to

the final result/outcome of the case Writ Petition

(Civil) 114/2014 (Common Cause Vrs. Union of India

and others) pending in Hon‟ble Supreme Court of

India.

***”

7.2. Sri Sudarshan Nanda, learned Advocate emphatically

submitted that the suggestion of the petitioner vide

representation dated 18.02.2019 (Annexure -5) is in

consonance with provisions of Section 8A(6) of the

MMDR Act as amended in the year 2015 read with Rule

31(2) of the MC Rules. Relevant portion of s aid

representation reflects as follows:

“In our case, the lease in question was registered on

24.05.1976. This fact was brought to the notice of your

esteem Department in the month of August, 2005 and

3

Common Cause Vrs. Union of India, (2017) 13 SCR 361 = (2017) 9 SCC 499.

W.P.(C) No.6073 of 2026 Page 18 of 73

your good office had been pleased to pass an Order vide

Letter No.7071, dated 02.05.2006 for the tenure of the

lease period, which would be taken into account from

dated 24.05.1976, the date of registration for the lease

deed for all purposes. A copy of such letter is attached

herewith.

In view of aforesaid position, commencement of the lease

period, the date mentioned in your letter under reference

dated 25.10.1975 requires correction. In place of

25.10.1975, the same should be 24.05.1976. Accordingly,

the extension of the validity period of the above

subject mining lease under Section 8A of the Mines and

Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act,

2015 should be up to 23.05.2026.

In the meantime, I also request your good office to

calculate the stamp duty and registration fees for

executing the supplementary lease deed of the mine.

Please intimate me the details of such calculation(s) as

soon as possible to enable me to execute the same.”

7.3. In response to such restrictive conditions of extension

found mentioned in the Steel and Mines Department

Letter dated 12.02.2019, the petitioner by Letter dated

18.02.2019 sought to impress upon the Government of

Odisha in Steel and Mines Department to treat

“24.05.1976” as the date of “grant” of mining lease in

place of “25.10.1975”; yet, he signed and executed the

supplementary lease deed on 01.07.2019 (Annexure-3)

with eyes wide open that the tenure of lease would

remain valid up to 24.10.2025.

W.P.(C) No.6073 of 2026 Page 19 of 73

7.4. A written instruction of the Deputy Director of Mines,

Baripada Circle, Baripada prepared in connection with

the present writ petition vide Letter dated 20.04.2026

addressed to the Director of Mines and Geology, which

was supplied by the learned Additional Standing

Counsel, is taken aid for assimilating further facts.

Relevant factual details contained in said instructions is

reproduced hereunder:

“5. In the meantime, Show Cause Notice has been

issued by the Government vide Order No.4080/SM,

dated 24.05.2018 for lapsing due to discontinuance

of mining operation for more than two years with

effect from 25.10.2015.

6. The Suleipat Iron Ore Mining Lease saved from

lapsing vide Government Proceeding No.7250/SM,

dated 11.09.2018.

7. Thereafter Government in Steel and Mines

Department vide Order dated 924/SM, dated

12.02.2019 has extended the mining lease period

under Section 8A(3) read with Section 8A(6) of the

MMDR Act, (as amended), 2015 up to 24.10.2025.

8. Accordingly, the supplementary lease deed has been

executed in respect of Suleipat Iron Ore Mines on

01.07.2019 and registered on 05.07.2019.

***

20. Further, the State Government vide Letter

No.1882/SM, dated 24.02.2025 communicated the

approval for permitting the lease to sell the mined

W.P.(C) No.6073 of 2026 Page 20 of 73

out materials lying in the leasehold area in the light

of the Order dated 02.05.2022 of Hon‟ble Supreme

Court of India in I.A. No.60995 of 2022 and also

resumption of mining operation in the leasehold area

subject to following conditions:

1. verification of all requisite statutories obtained

by the lessee in respect of the mine;

2. Settlement of all dues paid by the lessee in

respect of the mine.

21. In this connection, the lessee has been

requested vide this Office Letter No.703/Mines,

dated 03.03.2025, No.1118/Mines, dated

05.04.2025, No.1393/Mines, dated 03.05.2025,

No.1556/Mines, dated 20.05.2025 to deposit

the outstanding Government dues as well as

submit all requisite statutories for taking

further action, but lessee has not deposited the

outstanding Government dues till date.”

7.5. It is worthwhile to refer to arduous submission advanced

by the learned Advocate General with reference to

recitals of the supplementary lease deed dated

01.07.2019; relevant covenants of which are extracted

herein below:

“And Whereas period of said lease deed was valid from

date 25.10.1975 to date 24.10.2005. Subsequently the

said Mining Lease was transferred to Sri Birat Chandra

Dagara vide Government Proceeding No.8531 dated

24.08.1984 and the transfer lease deed was executed on

date 10.10.1984 vide transferred Lease Deed No.515

(Original) and 516 (Duplicate) has been registered in the

W.P.(C) No.6073 of 2026 Page 21 of 73

office of the District Sub-Registrar, Baripada on dated

06.02.1985 (hereinafter referred to as the said lease);

And Whereas after expiry of the validity period of

the said lease deed, the lessee had continued to

conduct mining operations in the said lease under

the deemed extension provisions of Section 8 of the

Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulations)

Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred as the MMDR Act)

with the permission of the party of the first part till

date 26.10.2015;

And Whereas the MMDR Act has been amended with

effect from date 12.01.2015 and Section 8A has been

inserted in the said Act, providing for extension of validity

period of lease granted in the past under the provisions of

the said Act, subject to fulfilment of conditions provided

therein;

And Whereas the Government of Odisha has decided

to extend the validity period of the above mining

lease over an area of 618.00 hectares in Suleipat of

Mayurbhanj, District under Section 8A(3) read with

Section 8A(6) of the MMDR Amendment Act, 2015

lease up to date 24.10.2025. Subject to all the

conditions in the said lease deed and subject to the

following additional conditions, as described herein below

at paragraphs Sl.No.1 to Sl.No.9 as per the Government of

Odisha, Steel and Mines Department vide Letter No.924/

SM/Bhubaneswar date 12.02.2019.

And it is hereby mutually agreed between the parties:

And Whereas this Supplementary Lease Deed is a part

and parcel of the said deed and the terms and conditions

W.P.(C) No.6073 of 2026 Page 22 of 73

are in furtherance to the term and conditions in addition

to the terms and conditions agreed to the said lease deed.

***

2. The extension of validity is without prejudice

to ongoing proceedings, if any, for lapsing or

determination of lease which have been

initiated or may be initiated in accordance to

the provisions of MMDR Act, 1957 or Rules

framed thereunder.

3. The extension of validity is without prejudice to any

action under the provisions of the Environment

(Protection) Act, Odisha Forest Act or any other law

for the time being in force in respect of any violations

committed by the lessee during the original period of

lease or the period of deemed extension, till the date

of extension of validity period of lease.

4. The extension of validity period of lease is

subject to the final result/outcome of Petition

(Civil) 114/2014 (Common Cause Vrs. Union of

India and others) pending in Hon ‟ble Supreme

Court of India.

5. The extension is subject to condition that any terms

and conditions of the original lease, if not complied

so far, shall be complied by the lessee within such

period as may be specified by a competent authority

and the lessee shall furnish an undertaking to such

effect.

Undertaking

I, Sri Birat Chandra Dagara son of Late Bisikesan

Dagara, aged about 76 years, being the Lessee of

W.P.(C) No.6073 of 2026 Page 23 of 73

Suleipat Iron Ore Mines over 618.00 hectares, do hereby

undertake that, any terms and conditions of the original

lease, if not complied so far, shall be complied by me

within such period as may be specified by the competent

authority.

Sd/-

(Birat Chandra Dagara)

01.07.2019

B.C. Dagara

Lessee

Suleipat Iron Ore Mines

Rairangpur ”

***

And Whereas, the party of the second part has

agreed to all these terms and conditions and has

agreed to execute a supplementary lease deed

accepting the extension of the validity period of

lease.

Now, therefore the period of validity of the said

lease deed is hereby extended and deemed to have

been extended up to date 24.10.2025 subject to all

terms and conditions of the said lease and the

further terms and conditions described in this

supplementary lease deed.”

7.6. Notwithstanding such clear acceptance of validity of the

tenure of lease period by way of execution of

supplementary lease deed, and the petitioner without

any demur continued with the activity for more than five

years, now wishes to turn round to contend that the

expiry of lease period ought to be treated as

W.P.(C) No.6073 of 2026 Page 24 of 73

“23.05.2026” instead of “24.10.2025”, by furnishing a

representation dated 20.08.2024 with reference to Letter

dated 02.05.2006 of the Department of Steel and Mines

(Annexure-6). The petitioner cannot take aid of such

letter inasmuch as he has executed the supplementary

lease deed being conscious of the fact that both the

parties (lessor and lessee) are ad idem of the dates for

computation of lease period of fifty years. Essentially,

therefore, the petitioner has waived the terms of said

letter dated 02.05.2006. Requiring any change or

modification in the entries of the registered

supplementary lease deed ought to be carried by way of

manner specified as is available in law, but not

otherwise.

7.7. With vehemence Sri Sudarshan Nanda, learned Advocate

advanced argument stemming on the provision of

Section 110 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882

4 that in

terms of Rule 31(2) of the MC Rules, the opposite parties

should allow the petitioner to enjoy the right to property

under Article 300A of the Constitution of India. It has

succinctly been stated in Sarda Mines Private Limited

Vrs. State of Odisha, W.P.(C) No.17676 of 2024, vide

Judgment dated 15.05.2026 that “It hardly needs to be

4

Section 110 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, stands thus:

“110. Exclusion of day on which term commences.—

Where the time limited by a lease of immoveable property is expressed as

commencing from a particular day, in computing that time such day shall

be excluded. Where no day of commencement is named, the time so

limited begins from the making of the lease.”

W.P.(C) No.6073 of 2026 Page 25 of 73

stated that statutory lease of the kind would create

vested interest in the leaseholder area and therefore, that

would constitute property to which constitutional

guarantee avails under Article 300A”. It is, therefore,

submitted that the triggering point for consideration of

reckoning of commencement of lease period is the

registration of deed, i.e., 24.05.1976, but not the date of

grant order. Referring to Gujarat Pottery Works Vrs. B.P.

Sood, AIR 1967 SC 964 it is emphasised that “grant of

mining lease” and “execution of a mining lease” are two

distinct legal events. Hence, Sri Sudarshan Nanda,

learned Advocate submitted that the mining operation of

statutory lease which is subsisting cannot be

intermeddled with by either the State nor its

functionaries unless it is shown to have been done

strictly in accordance with law.

7.8. The petitioner herein seeks to set up plea of estoppel by

referring to Letter dated 02.05.2006 (Annexure-6) to

contend that the Government of Odisha in Steel and

Mines Department having treated the date of registration

of lease deed, i.e., “24.05.1976” as the date for reckoning

the lease period, it cannot now change or modify or

ignore its view and incorporate wrong facts in the

supplementary lease deed. This Court is not taken to

any document to evince that the petitioner has taken

recourse available to him under the law for changing or

W.P.(C) No.6073 of 2026 Page 26 of 73

correcting the entries made in the registered

supplementary lease deed. Nevertheless, this Court finds

that the petitioner having accepted the tenure reflected

in the supplementary lease deed signed and executed

the same. By his own conduct, having waived the term

stipulated in the Letter dated 02.05.2006, as argued by

learned Advocate General by dint of application of the

doctrine of acquiescence, the petitioner is rather

estopped to plead contrary to the recitals contained in

the supplementary lease deed. The recitals being

incorporated in the supplementary lease deed with

consciousness and upon accepted by the parties, the

same are binding inter se the parties. It is not in dispute

that the petitioner has acted upon the terms of such

supplementary lease deed for more than five years by the

date of furnishing the representation darted 22.10.2025

(Annexure-15).

7.9. The sequence of events enumerated herein above

demonstrates that despite Letter dated 18.02.2019 of the

petitioner, he has executed the supplementary lease

deed much after said date, i.e., 01.07.2019 and

continued with the activity in terms of such deed by

being fully aware that the lease period would expire on

24.10.2025.

7.10. The question of application of waiver in contractual

matters qua mining leases has been discussed in Sarda

W.P.(C) No.6073 of 2026 Page 27 of 73

Mines Pvt. Ltd. and Another Vrs. State of Odisha and

Others, 2022 SCC OnLine Ori 85 = AIR 2022 Ori 123 .

Pertinent it is to quote the following passage therefrom:

“73. There is merit in the contention of the State that by

accepting the aforementioned lease deed in Form K,

Shri M.L. Sarda and Shri S.L. Sarda should be taken

to have, by their conduct, waived their rights to seek

the further renewal for another ten years. In this

context, the following observations in United Spirits

Ltd. (supra) [Kanchan Udyog Limited Vrs. United

Spirits Ltd., (2017) 8 SCC 237

5] are relevant:

„23. “Waiver by conduct was considered in P. Dasa

Muni Reddy Vrs. P. Appa Rao, (1974) 2 SCC

725, observing as follows:

„13. Abandonment of right is much more

than mere waiver, acquiescence or

5

In paragraph 22 of judgment in Kanchan Udyog Limited Vrs. United Spirits Ltd.,

(2017) 8 SCC 237 it has been observed as follows:

“22. The learned Single Judge framed an issue also with regard to waiver,

estoppel and acquiescence, then answered it in the negative in a singular

line, without any discussion. Waiver and acquiescence may be express or

implied. Much will again depend on the nature of the contract, and the

facts of each case. Waiver involves voluntary relinquishment of a known

legal right, evincing awareness of the existence of the right and to waive

the same. The principle is to be found in Section 63 of the Act. If a party

entitled to a benefit under a contract, is denied the same,

resulting in violation of a legal right, and does not prote st,

foregoing its legal right, and accepts compliance in anothe r form

and manner, issues will arise with regard to waiver or

acquiescence by conduct. In the facts of the present case, the conduct of

the appellant in placing orders and receiving supply of concentrates

directly from M/s VEC, for a period of nearly one year, and continuing to

do so even after it wrote to the respondent in this regard, without

recourse to any legal remedies for denial of its legal right to

receive concentrates from the respondent, undoubtedly amounts to

waiver by conduct and acquiescence by it to the new arrangement.

The plea that it was done under compulsion, and not voluntari ly,

is devoid of any material, substance and evidence. It is

unacceptable and merits no consideration. Alternatively, if it was an

assignment under Clause 5 of the agreement, there had been no

termination of the contract by the respondent.

W.P.(C) No.6073 of 2026 Page 28 of 73

laches ... Waiver is an intentional

relinquishment of a known right or

advantage, benefit, claim or privilege

which except for such waiver the party

would have enjoyed. Waiver can also be

a voluntary surrender of a right. The

doctrine of waiver has been applied in

cases where landlords claimed forfeiture

of lease or tenancy because of breach of

some condition in the contract of tenancy.

The doctrine which the courts of law will

recognise is a rule of judicial policy that a

person will not be allowed to take

inconsistent position to gain advantage

through the aid of courts. Waiver

sometimes partakes of the nature of an

election. Waiver is consensual in nature.

It implies a meeting of the minds. It is a

matter of mutual intention. The doctrine

does not depend on misrepresentation.

Waiver actually requires two parties, one

party waiving and another receiving the

benefit of waiver. There can be waiver

so intended by one party and so

understood by the other. The

essential element of waiver is that

there must be a voluntary and

intentional relinquishment of a right.

The voluntary choice is the essence of

waiver. There should exist an

opportunity for choice between the

relinquishment and an enforcement of the

right in question. ***‟

W.P.(C) No.6073 of 2026 Page 29 of 73

24. Waiver could also be deduced from

acquiescence, was considered in Waman

Shriniwas Kini Vrs. Ratilal Bhagwandas & Co.,

1959 Supp (2) SCR 21, observing as follows:

„13. *** Waiver is the abandonment of a right

which normally everybody is at liberty to

waive. A waiver is nothing unless it

amounts to a release. It signifies

nothing more than an intention not to

insist upon the right. It may be

deduced from acquiescence or may be

implied. ***‟

***”

7.11. In the context of mandatory nature of provisions of issue

of notice before proceeding with the matter by the

statutory authority, whether such sine qua non

requirement could be waived by the party concerned by

its own conduct, it has been held in the case of

Commissioner of Customs Vrs. Virgo Steels, (2002) 4 SCC

316 as follows:

“8. We will next consider the requirement of

Section 28 of the Act [Customs Act, 1962] and

the applicability of the principle of waiver to

the said requirement of that section. While so

doing, it is to be noted that our discussion of Section

28 of the Act is with reference to the section as it

stood at the relevant time and not with reference to

the existing Section 28 of the Act. The Tribunal by

the impugned order has held that in the absence of a

notice under Section 28 of the Act, the recovery of

W.P.(C) No.6073 of 2026 Page 30 of 73

duty which has escaped collection, is impermissible

in law. While accepting this argument, the Tribunal

has placed reliance on a judgment of this Court in

Collector of Customs Vrs. Tin Plate Co. of India Ltd.,

(1997) 10 SCC 538. It is true that in the course of the

above-cited judgment, this Court had held that a

notice under Section 28 is a condition

precedent, but having perused the said

judgment carefully, we are of the opinion that

this Court used the expression “condition

precedent” with reference to issuance of notice

under Section 28 and not with reference to the

jurisdiction of the proper officer under that

section. While the absence of notice may invalidate

the procedure adopted by the proper officer under

the Act, it will not take away the jurisdiction of the

officer to initiate action for the purpose of recovery of

duty escaped. This is because of the fact that the

proper officer does not derive his power to initiate

proceedings for recovery of escaped duty from

Section 28 of the Act. Such power is conferred on

him by other provisions of the Act which mandate

the proper officer to collect the duty leviable. By a

perusal of Chapter V of the Act in which Section 28

is found, it is seen that the charging section which

authorises the levy of customs duty is found in

Section 12 of the Act. Section 17 contemplates the

procedure for making an assessment in regard to

duty payable while sub-section (4) of Section 17

makes a provision to empower the proper officer to

reassess the imported goods for duty if it is found

that the assessment made at the time of importation

was based on incorrect or false information. Section

142 of the Act found in Chapter XVIII provides for

actual recovery of sums due to the Government. A

W.P.(C) No.6073 of 2026 Page 31 of 73

cumulative reading of these provisions found in the

Act clearly shows that the jurisdiction of a proper

officer to initiate proceedings for recovery of duty

which has escaped collection, is not traceable to

Section 28. The power to recover duty which has

escaped collection is a concomitant power arising out

of the levy of customs duty under Section 12 of the

Act, and the same does not emanate from Section 28

of the Act. In our opinion, Section 28 only provides

for the procedural aspect for recovery of duty, hence,

any irregularity committed by a proper officer in

following the procedure laid down in Section 28

would not denude that officer of his jurisdiction to

initiate action for recovery of escaped duty but it

may make such proceedings initiated by that officer

voidable. In that view of the matter, in our opinion,

the term “condition precedent” used in the case of

Tin Plate Co., (1997) 10 SCC 538 is referable to the

procedural requirement of Section 28 and not to the

jurisdictional aspect of the proper officer to recover

the escaped duty. In the said view of the matter, we

are of the opinion that the law laid down by this

Court in Tin Plate Co. Case, (1997) 10 SCC 538 is

that issuance of a notice under Section 28 is a

mandatory requirement of that section, with which

we are in agreement. We also notice the very

important fact that in that case the question of

waiver did not arise and what was considered by

this Court was the contention of the Revenue that a

subsequent letter written by the Revenue after the

expiry of the period of limitation would cure the

defect of non-issuance of a notice.

9. The next question for our consideration is: can

a mandatory requirement of a statute be

W.P.(C) No.6073 of 2026 Page 32 of 73

waived by the party concerned? In answering

this question, we are aided by a catena of

judgments of this Court as well as of the Privy

Council. We will first refer to the judgment of the

Privy Council which has been consistently followed

by the Supreme Court in a number of subsequent

cases involving similar points. In Vellayan Chettiar

Vrs. Govt. of Province of Madras, AIR 1947 PC 197 :

74 IA 223 the Privy Council held that even though

Section 80 CPC is mandatory, still non-

issuance of such notice would not render the

suit bad in the eye of the law because such

non-issuance of notice can be waived by the

party concerned. In the said judgment, the

Privy Council held that the protection provided

under Section 80 is a protection given to the

person concerned and if in a particular case

that person does not require the protection he

can lawfully waive his right.

10. In the case of Dhirendra Nath Gorai Vrs. Sudhir

Chandra Ghosh, AIR 1964 SC 1300 = (1964) 6 SCR

1001 this Court followed the judgment of the Privy

Council in Vellayan Chettiar, AIR 1947 PC 197 = 74

IA 223 and held that even though the requirement of

Section 35 of the Bengal Money Lenders Act is

mandatory in nature, such mandatory requirement

could be waived by the party concerned. On a true

construction of Section 35 of that Act, this Court held

that the said section is intended only for the benefit

of the judgment-debtor and, therefore, he can

waive the right conferred on him under the

said section.

W.P.(C) No.6073 of 2026 Page 33 of 73

11. In the case of S. Raghbir Singh Gill Vrs. S.

Gurcharan Singh Tohra, 1980 Supp SCC 53 this

Court negatived an argument that the requirement of

Section 94 of the Representation of the People Act,

1951 cannot be waived. This argument was

based on the principle that public policy

cannot be waived. Rejecting the said argument,

this Court held that the privilege conferred or

a right created by a statute, if it is solely for

the benefit of an individual, he can waive it. It

also held that where a prohibition enacted is

founded on public policy, courts should be slow to

apply the doctrine of waiver but if such privilege

granted under the Act is for the sole benefit of

an individual as is the case under Section 94

of the Representation of the People Act, the

person in whose benefit the privilege was

enacted has a right to waive it because the

very concept of privilege inheres a right to

waiver.

12. In Krishan Lal Vrs. State of J&K, (1994) 4 SCC 422

this Court while considering the requirement of

furnishing a copy of inquiry proceedings under

Section 17(5) of the J&K (Government Servants)

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1962 held following the

judgment in V. Chettiar case, AIR 1947 PC 197 = 74

IA 223 and D.N. Gorai, AIR 1964 SC 1300 = (1964) 6

SCR 1001 that though the requirement

mentioned in Section 17(5) of the Act was

mandatory, the same can be waived because

the requirement of giving a copy of the

proceedings of the inquiry mandated by

Section 17(5) of the Act is one which is for the

benefit of the individual concerned.

W.P.(C) No.6073 of 2026 Page 34 of 73

13. In Martin & Harris Ltd. Vrs. VIth ADJ, (1998) 1 SCC

732 this Court while considering the provision of

Section 21(1)(a) first proviso of the U.P. Urban

Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction)

Act, 1972 negatived a contention advanced on

behalf of the appellant therein that the said

provision was for public benefit and could not be

waived. It held that it is true that such benefit

enacted under the said proviso covered a class

of tenants, still the said protection would be

available to a tenant only as an individual,

hence, it gave the tenant concerned a locus

poenitentiae to avail the benefit or not. It also

held that the benefit given under the said

section was purely personal to the tenant

concerned, hence, such a statutory benefit

though mandatory, can be waived by the

person concerned.

14. From the ratio laid down by the Privy Council and

followed by this Court in the above-cited judgments,

it is clear that even though a provision of law is

mandatory in its operation if such provision is

one which deals with the individual rights of

the person concerned and is for his benefit, the

said person can always waive such a right .

15. Bearing in mind the above-decided principle in

law, if we consider the mandatory requirement

of issuance of notice under Section 28 of the

Act, it will be seen that that requirement is

provided by the statute solely for the benefit of

the individual concerned, therefore, he can

waive that right. In other words, this section casts

a duty on the officer to issue notice to the person

W.P.(C) No.6073 of 2026 Page 35 of 73

concerned of the proposed action to be taken. This is

not in the nature of a public notice nor any person

other than the person against whom the proceedings

are initiated has any right for such a notice. Thus,

this right of notice being personal to the person

concerned, the same can be waived by that

person.

16. If the above position in law is correct, which we

think it is, M/s. Virgo Steels, having specifically

waived their right for a notice, cannot now be

permitted to turn around and contend that the

proceedings initiated against them are void for want

of notice under Section 28 of the Act, so as to

frustrate the statutory duty of the Revenue to

demand and collect customs duty which M/s Virgo

Steels had intentionally evaded.”

7.12. The written instructions of the Deputy Director of Mines

vide Letter dated 20.04.2026, as supplied by the learned

Additional Standing Counsel assisting the learned

Advocate General, contains the following facts:

“1. Originally the Mining Lease of Suleipat Iron Ore

Mines over an area of 582.04 hectares have been

granted in favour of Sri Bajranglal Paia vide

Government Proceeding No.III(C)M. 8/70-6076/MG,

Bhubaneswar, dated 21.08.1970.

2. Further, the said area has been revised to 618.00

hectares and granted in favour of Sri Padia vide

Government Proceeding No.III(C) MG-4/75-5737,

dated 12.06.1975 and time has been allowed up to

25.10.1975 for execution of lease deed vide

W.P.(C) No.6073 of 2026 Page 36 of 73

Government Letter No.III(C) MG-4/75-10990/MG,

Bhubaneswar dated 06.10.1975.

3. Accordingly, the lease deed was executed on

25.10.1975 for a period of 30 years and registered

on 24.05.1976.”

7.13. The petitioner, transferee of the leasehold mines by dint

of transfer lease deed executed on 10.10.1984, was

aware of existence of Letter dated 02.05.2006 of the

Department of Steel and Mines. Despite such fact within

knowledge of both the lessor (Steel and Mines

Department) as well as the lessee (the petitioner), the

supplementary lease deed being executed was registered

by specifically mentioning therein that the terms thereof

have been accepted. Following covenants in the said

deed dated 01.07.2019 (Annexure-3) are placed

hereunder for better comprehension:

“8. The lessee will execute a supplementary lease deed

for the extended period and the above conditions

and undertakings will form part of such deed.

***

Now therefore, the period of validity of the said lease

deed is hereby extended and deemed to have been

extended up to 24.10.2025 subject to all terms and

conditions of the said lease and the further terms and

conditions described in this supplementary lease deed.”

7.14. In the considered view of this Court such fact of

acceptance and agreement between the parties cannot

W.P.(C) No.6073 of 2026 Page 37 of 73

be changed or modified at the instance of one of the

parties without taking legally available recourse and

especially in the view afore-referred decisions. It can

thus be stated that even though a provision of law is

mandatory in its operation if such provision is one which

deals with the individual rights of the person concerned

and is for his benefit, the said person can always waive

such a right. Having acted upon such supplementary

lease deed dated 01.07.2019 for more than five years

before furnishing representation (Annexure-15), it is

deemed apposite to hold that the petitioner has waived

his right, if there be any.

7.15. It may deserve to have reference to Sarda Mines Pvt. Ltd.

and Another Vrs. State of Odisha and Others, 2022 SCC

OnLine Ori 85 = AIR 2022 Ori 123

6 wherein after taking

note of judgments of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in

the case of Common Cause Vrs. Union of India, (2016) 11

SCC 455, this Court held that:

“66. *** At the outset it requires to be noticed that the

changes brought about to the MMDR Act by the

MMDR Amendment 2015 introduced a new regime in

the context of mining leases in the country. The SOR

of the MMDR Act Amendment Bill 2015

acknowledged that the mining sector had been

subjected to numerous litigations in the earlier three

years and many important judgments had been

6

Civil Appeal being Nos. 8995 and 8996 of 2022 wherein challenge against the

Judgment dated 10.01.2022 of this Court are pending.

W.P.(C) No.6073 of 2026 Page 38 of 73

pronounced by the Supreme Court of India besides

the judgments on the issue of allocation of natural

resources which had a direct relevance to the grant

of mineral concessions. The SOR proceeded to note

as under:

„4. The present legal framework of MMDR Act,

1957, does not permit the auctioning of mineral

concessions. Auctioning of mineral concessions

would improve transparency in allocation.

Government would also get an increased share

of the value of mineral resources. Some

provisions of the law relating to renewals of

mineral concessions have also been found to be

wanting in enabling quick decisions.

Consequently, there has been a slowdown in

the grant of new concessions and the renewal

of existing ones. As a result, the mining sector

started registering a decline in production

affecting the manufacturing sector which

largely depends on the raw material provided

by mining sector. The Government has

therefore felt it necessary to address the

immediate requirements of the mining sector

and also to remedy the basic structural defects

that underlie the current impasse.

5. In view of the urgent need to address these

problems, the Mines and Minerals

(Development and Regulation) Amendment

Ordinance, 2015 was promulgated on 12th

January, 2015. The present Bill is to replace

this Ordinance. This bill is designed to put in

place mechanic for:

(i) Eliminating discretion;

W.P.(C) No.6073 of 2026 Page 39 of 73

(ii) Improving transparency in the allocation

of mineral resources;

(iii) Simplifying procedures;

(iv) Eliminating delay in administration, so as

to enable expeditious and optimum

development of the mineral resources of

the country;

(v) Obtaining for government an enhanced

share of the value of the mineral

resources of the country; and

(vi) Attracting private investment and the

latest technology;‟

67. The SOR further explained some of the significant

features of the MMDR Amendment Bill, 2015 and in

particular the following:

„(i) Removal of discretion; auction to be sole

method of allotment : The amendment seeks to

bring in utmost transparency by introducing

auction mechanism for the grant of mineral

concessions. The tenure of mineral leases has

been increased from the existing 30 years to 50

years. There is no provision for renewal of

leases.‟

68. Therefore, it is claimed that after the MMDR

Amendment Bill which became effective on 12th

January, 2015, the concept of renewal of mining

leases was virtually non-existent. This is an

important factor to be kept in mind while

appreciating what the effect on the arrangements

previous to the amendment would be.

W.P.(C) No.6073 of 2026 Page 40 of 73

***

76. In Common Cause Vrs. Union of India (supra)

[Vide, (2016) 11 SCC 455], the Supreme Court

had occasion to interpret Section 8A as

inserted by the 2015 Amendment which came

into effect from 12th January, 2015. The

dispute between the parties before the Court was

crystallized in para 23 as under:

„23. There is a serious dispute between the rival

parties with reference to the interpretation of

Sections 8A(3), 8A(5) and 8A(6) of the MMDR

Act. Whilst the contention of learned counsel

appearing for the petitioner-Common Cause is,

that the benefit of sub-sections (3), (5) and (6) of

Section 8A, will extend only to such mining

leases as were subsisting on the date of

introduction of the amendment— 12.01.2015; it

is the contention of learned counsel

representing the leaseholders, that the above

postulation, at the hands of learned counsel for

the non-applicants, is wholly misconceived,

and would result in a misreading of the

amended Section 8A of the MMDR Act.‟

77. Having analyzed the SOR of the Bill the Supreme

Court explained as under:

„29. From a perusal of the extract reproduced

above, it is apparent, that the insertion of

Section 8A into the MMDR Act, was to

address the hardship faced by

leaseholders, besides other reasons, due to

the second and subsequent applications

for renewal, remaining unattended at the

W.P.(C) No.6073 of 2026 Page 41 of 73

hands of the State Government. The

instant amendment to the MMDR Act,

introduced a uniform original grant

period of fifty years, for all mining

leaseholders. It also excluded renewal(s),

after the expiry of the original lease

period. Accordingly, no renewal

application can now be filed (after

12.01.2015). Under sub-sections (5) and (6) of

Section 8A, in our view, such leaseholders who

had moved applications for renewal of

captive/non-captive mines, would be entitled to

continue up to 31.03.2030/31.03.2020. The

“Objects and Reasons” for the amendment to

the MMDR Act aim at remedying the position

which emerged upon the interpretation of the

provisions of the MMDR Act, as they existed

hitherto before. The instant amendment was

also directed at remedying the grievances of

the mining industry due to “second and

subsequent renewals” remaining pending. And

also, because the provisions of law relating to

renewals had been found to be wanting. The

above view is also endorsed by the fact, that

Section 8A(9) deals with a situation wherein

“…renewal has been rejected…”. It is

therefore apparent, that sub-sections (5)

and (6) of Section 8A of the amended

MMDR Act are aimed at situations,

wherein an application for renewal

(validly made) has remained unattended.

Therefore, for no fault of the leaseholder, he

would be subjected to an arbitrary prejudice. It

needs to be clarified, that since an application

for renewal cannot be filed after 12.01.2015,

W.P.(C) No.6073 of 2026 Page 42 of 73

an application for renewal as would be treated

as having been validly made, ought to have

been made before 12.01.2015. We are of the

view, that out of the three contingencies

contemplated under sub-sections 8A(5) and

8A(6), referred to above, the first of the

contingencies positively, pertains to a situation,

wherein applications validly made for renewal,

were pending without any final decision at the

hands of the State Government. Because in the

absence of a renewal application, the

leaseholder can be taken to have already

expressed his disinterest, to continue mining

operations. Therefore logically, the words “…

with effect from the date of expiry of the period

of renewal last made …”, should relate to an

expired lease prior to 12.01.2015, in relation to

which a valid application for renewal had

already been made.‟

78. Thereafter, in para 37 the conclusions of the

Supreme Court in this regard was summarized.

Relevant to the case on hand and the conclusions at

paras 37.1 and 37.6 which read as under:

„37.1 A leaseholder would have a subsisting mining

lease, if the period of the original grant was

still in currency on 12.01.2015. Additionally, a

leaseholder whose original lease has since

expired, would still have a subsisting lease, if

the original lease having been renewed, the

renewal period was still in currency on

12.01.2015. Such a leaseholder, would be

entitled to the benefit of Section 8A of the

amended MMDR Act.

W.P.(C) No.6073 of 2026 Page 43 of 73

***

7

37.6 Consequent upon the amendment of Section 8A

of the MMDR Act, the regime introduced

through sub-sections (5) and (6) thereof,

provides for three contingencies where benefits

have been extended to leaseholders whose

lease period had earlier been extended by a

renewal. Firstly, for a leaseholder whose

renewal period had expired before 12.01.2015,

and the leaseholder had moved an application

for renewal at least twelve months before the

leaseholder's existing lease was due to expire,

7

Paras 37.2 and 37.5 of Common Cause Vrs. Union of India (supra) [Vide, (2016)

11 SCC 455 reads thus:

“37.2. A leaseholder who had not moved an application for renewal of a mining

lease (which was due to expire, prior to 12-1-2015), at least twelve

months before the existing lease was due to expire, under the provisions

of the unamended MMDR Act and the Mineral Concession Rules will be

considered as not a valid/subsisting leaseholder after the expiry of the

lease period. The provisions of the amended MMDR Act will therefore not

enure to the benefit of such leaseholder.

37.3. A leaseholder who has moved an application for renewal (of the

original/first or subsequent renewal) of a mining lease, at least twelve

months before the existing lease was due to expire and on consideration

such an application has been rejected will be considered as not a

valid/subsisting leaseholder. The provisions of the amended Section 8-A

of the MMDR Act will not enure to the benefit of such leaseholder because

of the express exclusion contemplated for the above exigency under

Section 8-A(9) of the amended MMDR Act.

37.4. A leaseholder who has moved an application for “first renewal” of the

original mining lease, at least twelve months before the original lease was

due to expire, and such application has not been rejected, will be

considered to be a valid leaseholder having a subsisting right to carry on

mining operations till the expiry of two years after 18-7-2014 i.e. up to 17-

7-2016 as is apparent from a conjoint reading of the unamended and

amended Rule 24-A of the Mineral Concession Rules. Such leaseholder

would have the benefit of sub-sections (5) and (6) of Section 8-A of the

amended MMDR Act.

37.5. A leaseholder who had moved a second (third or subsequent) rene wal

application under Section 8(3) of the unamended MMDR Act, at least

twelve months before the renewed lease was due to expire and whose

application had not been considered and rejected [though not entitled to

any benefit under the unamended Section 8-A of the MMDR Act and the

amended Rule 24-A(6) of the Mineral Concession Rules] up to 12-1-2015

would still have the benefit of sub-sections (5) and (6) of Section 8-A of the

amended MMDR Act in view of the situation sought to be remedied by the

Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2015.”

W.P.(C) No.6073 of 2026 Page 44 of 73

and whose application has not been

considered and rejected, the lease period

would stand extended up to 31.03.2030/

31.03.2020 (in the case of captive/non-captive

mines, respectively). Additionally, a

leaseholder whose period of renewal would

expire after 12.01.2015, but before 31.3.2030/

31.03.2020, the lease period would stand

extended up to 31.03.2030/31.03.2020 (in the

case of captive/non-captive mines,

respectively). Secondly, where the renewal of

the mining lease already extends to a period

beyond 31.03.2030/31.03.2020 (in the case of

captive/non-captive mines, respectively), the

lease period of such leaseholders, would

continue up to the actual period contemplated

by the renewal order. Thirdly, a leaseholder

would have the benefit of treating the original

lease period as of fifty years. Accordingly, even

during the renewal period, if the period of the

mining lease would get extended (beyond the

renewal period) by treating the original lease

as of fifty years, the leaseholder would be

entitled to such benefit. Out of the above three

contingencies provided under sub-sections (5)

and (6) of Section 8A, the contingency as would

extend the lease period farthest, would ensure

to the benefit of the leaseholder.”

79. In view of the amendment to Section 8A of the

MMDR Act read with its interpretation as above by

the Supreme Court of India, this Court is not

persuaded by the argument of learned Senior

Counsel for the petitioner that a deliberate attempt

has been made by the State Government to

W.P.(C) No.6073 of 2026 Page 45 of 73

misinterpret Section 8A(6) of the MMDR Act. The

expression “till the completion of the renewal period

if any” cannot be interpreted in this case as renewal

up to 13th August, 2031. In the absence of an

express clause in the lease deed that permits such

renewal de hors the statutory provisions, the period

of renewal cannot extend beyond 13th August,

2021. The expression “till the completion of the

renewal period” occurring Section 8A(6) of the MMDR

Act

8 can only be 13th August, 2021. Section 8A(6)

read with Section 8(4) of MMDR Act as amended

does not permit any automatic extension of the lease

deed. The interpretation placed on Section 8A by the

Supreme Court in Common Cause (supra) is final

and binding and does not admit of any departure

therefrom. In the present case, what SMPL is

seeking is an automatic renewal on the basis of

orders and documents prior to 12th January 2015.

None of that can hold good in light of the

amendments brought about to the MMDR Act and in

particular Section 8A (6) of the MMDR Act.”

7.16. Situation dealt in Sarda Mines Pvt. Ltd. and Another Vrs.

State of Odisha and Others, 2022 SCC OnLine Ori 85 =

AIR 2022 Ori 123 pertained to the following:

“1. These are three writ petitions and one contempt

petition filed by M/s. Sarda Mines Pvt. Ltd. (SMPL)

8

Meaning and purport of use of fiction in the language of provisions of Section 8A

of the MMDR Act can be conceived of vide, Bhavnagar University Vrs. Palitana

Sugar Mill, (2003) 2 SCC 111:

“If you are bidden to treat an imaginary state of affairs as real, you must surely,

unless prohibited from doing so, also imagine as real the consequences and

incidents which, if the putative state of affairs had in fact existed, must inevitably

have flowed from or accompanied it.” [See, East End Dwellings Co. Ltd. Vrs.

Finsbury Borough Council, 1951 (2) All England Reports 587].

W.P.(C) No.6073 of 2026 Page 46 of 73

(Petitioner No. 1) and its Director and Shareholder

(Petitioner No. 2).

2. In W.P.(C) No. 3115 of 2021, the petitioners have

sought a direction to the opposite party-Department

of Steel and Mines, State of Odisha (DSM) to execute

a lease deed in favour of petitioner No. 1 (SMPL) “for

the remaining bifurcated period of 10 years of the 30

years period” in terms of the directions dated 28th

June and 18th December, 1991 of this Court in OJC

No. 2567 of 1984 and 30th June 1998 in OJC No.

1803 of 1986 and also in terms of the order dated

11th February, 1999 passed by the DSM.

3. The prayer in W.P.(C) No. 6905 of 2021 is for

quashing of a demand notice dated 8th February,

2021 issued by the Joint Director of Mines, Joda,

District: Keonjhar (JDM) (opposite party No. 1) in the

writ petition directing the petitioner to pay a sum of

Rs.2045.51 crores as compensation on excess

production; quashing the notice dated 20th May,

2021 issued by the JDM asking SMPL not to cross

the pro rata limit of production against the quantity

stipulated in the Environmental Clearance (EC),

accorded by the Ministry of Environment and Forest

(MoEF), Government of India and in case the said

limit is already reached, to stop production

immediately; to quash a letter dated 21st May, 2021

by which SMPL was informed by the JDM that on

verification from the I3MS login, it was found that

SMPL had already achieved production of 22,75,848

MT thus crossing the pro rata limit of production and

therefore, SMPL was asked to stop production of iron

ore in the mines „immediately‟.

W.P.(C) No.6073 of 2026 Page 47 of 73

4. In the third writ petition i.e. W.P.(C) No. 17905 of

2021, SMPL, Petitioner No. 1 and its Director and

Shareholder (Petitioner No. 2) have challenged an

order dated 20th May, 2021 issued by DSM,

Government of Odisha, retrospectively revising the

date of renewal of lease deed which was executed

on 14th August, 2001 to 1st August 1964.

5. Apart from the above, CONTC No. 3650 of 2021 has

been filed by SMPL alleging that the Opposite Parties

have wilfully disobeyed the order dated 7th June,

2021 passed by this Court in I.A. No. 7623 of 2021

in W.P.(C) No. 6905 of 2021.”

7.17. In the case at hand the petitioner has been harping at

adding a period of twenty months during which he could

not operate the mines, but his case is not with respect to

“renewal” or “extension”

9. Careful reading of Section 8

10

juxtaposed with Section 8A of the MMDR Act, it is

9

For conceptual understanding with respect to distinctive feature between the

words “renewal” and “extension”, see, Provash Chandra Dalui Vrs. Biswanath

Banerjee, 1989 Supp (1) SCC 487; Gajraj Singh Vrs. STAT, (1997) 1 SCC 650;

Ambica Quarry Works Vrs. State of Gujarat, (1987) 1 SCC 213; Rural Litigation

and Entitlement Kendra Vrs. State of U.P., 1989 Supp (1) SCC 504; State of M.P.

Vrs. Krishnadas Tikaram, 1995 Supp (1) SCC 587; Gujarat Electricity Board Vrs.

Shantilal R. Desai, AIR 1969 SC 239 = (1969) 1 SCR 580; Krupajal SHG, Balasore

Vrs. State of Odisha, WA No.907 of 2025, vide Judgment dated 09.09.2 025 of

this Court.

10

Relevant provisions of Section 8 of the MMDR Act as amended by virtue of the

Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment, 2015 stand

thus:

“8. Periods for which mining leases may be granted or renewed.―

(1) The provisions of this section shall apply to minerals specified in Part A of

the First Schedule.

(2) The maximum period for which a mining lease may be granted shall not

exceed thirty years:

Provided that the minimum period for which any such mining lease may

be granted shall not be less than twenty years.

(3) A mining lease may be renewed for a period not exceeding twenty yea rs

with the previous approval of the Central Government.

***”

W.P.(C) No.6073 of 2026 Page 48 of 73

eminent that the stress is laid on the word “grant” of

mining lease. As is manifest from record that after the

supplementary lease deed being executed on

01.07.2019, seeking permission to issue transit permit

for removal of ore from the leasehold area to facilitate

sale of mined out ores of specified quantity, the

petitioner approached the Hon’ble Supreme Court of

India by way of filing I.A. No.63905 of 2022 in W.P.(C)

No.114 of 2014 (Common Cause Vrs. Union of India) ,

wherein the following order was passed on 02.05.2022:

“I.A. No. 63905/2022

The applicant seeks permission to sell 4,09,596,304 MT

of iron ore of different grades and sizes at the Sulaipat

Iron Ore Mines under the supervision of the State.

Additionally, the applicant also seeks directions to the

State of Odisha to issue transit permits for removal of ore

from the leasehold areas.

Heard learned counsel for the applicant and counsel for

the State. Learned counsel for the State has no objection if

the prayers in the present application are allowed by this

Court.

At this juncture, learned counsel appearing for the private

third party raised an objection to the instant interlocutory

application. He submits that certain orders have been

passed by the High Court to not to lift the material.

Taking into consideration the submission made by

learned counsel for the parties, we grant the prayer

sought in the present application subject to

W.P.(C) No.6073 of 2026 Page 49 of 73

statutory clearances and any orders passed by the

High Court.

I.A. No. 63905/2022 stands disposed of.”

7.18. It does clearly emanate from the above order that the

petitioner sought permission to sell iron ore of different

grades and sizes at the Suleipat Iron Ore Mines under

the supervision of the State and prayed for directions to

the State of Odisha to issue transit permits for removal

of ore from the leasehold areas of specified quantity of

mined out ores. It is apparent from the said order that

the prayers of the petitioner in said interlocutory

application were allowed “subject to statutory clearances

and any orders passed by the High Court”.

7.19. While matter so stood, it transpires from the

representation dated 20.08.2024 (Annexure-8) that in

W.P.(C) No.8495 of 2022, filed by the raising company,

viz., Orissa Manganese and Minerals Ltd., vide Order

dated 07.04.2022 a direction was issued to the authority

concerned to consider the representation and pass

reasoned speaking order. It is asserted by the petitioner

that a review petition, being RVWPET No.181 of 2022,

was filed before this Court, which stood “dismissed as

not pressed” vide Order dated 01.08.2024.

W.P.(C) No.6073 of 2026 Page 50 of 73

7.20. In a case between the present petitioner and M/s. Orissa

Manganese & Minerals Ltd., being W.P.(C) No. 17649 of

2020, the following order was passed on 16.02.2022:

“2. The petitioner was operating a mining lease for

Iron Ore at Suleipat in the district of

Mayurbhanj with effect from April, 2010

through the raising contractor, M/s. Orissa

Manganese & Minerals Ltd.-opposite party No.

4. Due to dispute between the two, arbitration

clause was invoked leading up to an award by

way of amicable settlement.

3. Due to non-adherence to the agreed terms, both the

petitioner and opposite party No.4 filed their

respective execution applications before the Learned

District Judge, Mayurbhanj-Baripada. Learned

District Judge, Mayurbhanj-Baripada passed an

order dated 21st July 2020 in the execution filed by

opposite party No. 4, which is a subject matter of

challenge by the petitioner in the present writ

application. Further, challenge has been laid to the

order dated 23

rd July, 2020 passed by the Mining

Officer, Baripada Circle, Baripada, whereby the

petitioner-Birat Chandra Dagara was restrained

from dispatching of Iron Ore temporarily and

maintained the present position till the dispute

between the parties was resolved.

4. After issue of notice and filing of respective counters,

now memo has been filed, whereby the Petitioner

has prayed for an unconditional withdrawal of the

writ petition. Learned counsel for the petitioner thus

prays to withdraw the writ petition.

W.P.(C) No.6073 of 2026 Page 51 of 73

5. Accordingly the writ petition is dismissed as

withdrawn.”

7.21. It is disclosed from the representation dated 20.08.2024

that the petitioner insisted for implementation of Order

dated 02.05.2022 passed in I.A. No.63905 of 2022 by

the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India. Therefore, in

essence permission to sell specific quantity of mined out

iron ore of different grades and sizes at the Suleipat Iron

Ore Mines under the supervision of the State was

allowed and transit permits for removal of mined out ore

from the leasehold areas were to be granted for the said

purpose.

7.22. Since the petitioner has appended undertaking in the

supplementary lease deed dated 01.07.2019 to abide by

the extension of validity period of lease subject to the

final outcome of the case in Writ Petition (Civil) No.114

of 2014

11, and being aware of date of expiry of tenure of

lease, consciously signed and executed the

supplementary lease deed on 01.07.2019 to the effect

that the date of lease would reckon from 25.10.1975. To

reiterate it is evident from supplementary lease deed that

it was executed/indenture was made on 25.10.1975, but

registered on 24.05.1976 (vide recital at page 2 of

supplementary lease deed). Such material fact is also

found available on the document titled “Transfer of

11

Disposed of vide Judgment dated 02.08.2017 [Neutral Citation: 2017 INSC 700].

W.P.(C) No.6073 of 2026 Page 52 of 73

Mining Lease” in terms of Rule 37A of the MC Rules,

wherefrom it is discernible that:

“Whereas by virtue of an indenture of lease dated

the 25

th day of October 1975 and registered as

No.3562 on 29.05.1976 (date) in the office of the Sub-

Registrar of Mayurbhanj, Baripada (place) ”

7.23. Furthermore, notwithstanding Letter dated 02.05.2006

(Annexure-6) and despite such fact being brought to the

notice of the Government of Odisha in Steel and Mines

Department by way of representation dated 18.02.2019

(Annexure-5), the petitioner having waived such fact,

has agreed to execute and register the supplementary

lease deed on 01.07.2019; thereby he (lessee) is said to

have acquiesced with the fact that the date “25.10.1975”

is to be reckoned as the date for the purpose of

computation of fifty years as contemplated under sub-

sections (3) and (6) of Section 8A of the MMDR Act.

7.24. The argument advanced by Sri Sudarshan Nanda,

learned Advocate by referring to principles of waiver,

acquiescence and/or estoppels is repelled hereby.

7.25. The learned Advocate General vociferously argued that

in view of sub-rule (1) of Rule 31 of the MC Rules lease

deed in the prescribed form is required to be executed

within six months of the order or within such further

period as the State Government may allow in this behalf.

Laying emphasis on sub-rule (2) thereto, which has been

W.P.(C) No.6073 of 2026 Page 53 of 73

introduced with effect from 18.01.2000 by virtue of

Notification No.GSR 56(E), dated 17.01.2000 by way of

substitution, it is exposited that the original lease deed

being executed on 25.10.1975, the position of law as

existed on that date is required to be applied. It is true

that the amendment of MC Rules came into force with

effect from 18.01.2000. On the date(s) of execution and

registration of lease deed, sub-rule (1) of Rule 31 existed.

The learned counsel for the petitioner is not in a position

to answer the provision in sub-rule (2) that existed

during the relevant period when the lease deed was

granted. Thus, there being no dispute with regard to

“grant of mining lease” in consonance with Rule 31(1),

this Court does not find any anomaly or incongruity in

the supplementary lease deed specifying the validity

period to be up to 24.10.2025, which was accepted with

all consciousness by the petitioner.

7.26. This Court on scrutiny of factual details discussed by co-

ordinate Bench of this Court in Sarda Mines Private

Limited Vrs. State of Odisha, W.P.(C) No.17676 of 2026,

vide Judgment dated 15.05.2026 [2026 SCC OnLine Ori

2303] finds that suspension order was under challenge

therein and the petitioner has been filing representations

way back in the year 2014 being aggrieved by such

suspension order. The Court on factual analysis of that

case, distinct from the present case, allowed the writ

W.P.(C) No.6073 of 2026 Page 54 of 73

petition and directed to add period lost with regard to

non-operation of the mines.

7.27. Here on distinctive material facts, this Court does not

find force to countenance the contention of Sri

Sudarshan Nanda, learned Advocate that the

supplementary lease deed executed on 01.07.2019

between the Collector and District Magistrate,

Mayurbhanj (for and on behalf of the Government of

Odisha) and Sri Birat Chandra Dagara (Lessee of

Suleipat Iron Ore Mine, Rairangpur) needs to be

interpreted as if the lease was granted from the date of

registration of the original lease deed on 24.05.1976 so

that fifty years would expire on 23.05.2026, but not from

the date of indenture, i.e., 25.10.1975.

8. Sri Sudarshan Nanda, learned Advocate by referring to

Order dated 02.05.2022 of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of

India in I.A. No.63905 of 2022 claimed that due to

lethargic attitude of the Department of Steel and Mines,

the petitioner could not operate the mines for around

twenty months.

8.1. It is submitted by the learned Advocate that as equity

demands, said lost periods are to be compensated by

extending the period adequately. Drawing attention to

Letter dated 24.02.2025 (Annexure-13) issued by the

Government of Odisha in Steel and Mines Department

W.P.(C) No.6073 of 2026 Page 55 of 73

indicating approval to sell ore to the tune of

40,95,96,304 MT as directed by Order dated 02.05.2022

of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India and resumption of

mining operations would be contingent upon obtaining

necessary statutory clearances and settling all

outstanding Government dues, it is alleged that said

letter was not communicated to the petitioner. Such

approval was accorded in consideration of representation

dated 20.08.2024 of the petitioner. In furtherance

thereto, a Letter dated 27.02.2025 (Annexure-14) was

issued by the Director of Mines and Geology addressed

to the Deputy Director of Mines, Baripada indicating

follow up action in the matter of allowance of the

Government of Odisha as stated above. It is hence

submitted that there was inaction on the part of the

Government from 20.08.2024 in consideration of the

representation of the petitioner and added to that the

opposite parties did not bother to communicate the letter

of approval.

8.2. It is submitted that on 22.10.2025 the petitioner

furnished a representation to the Department of Steel

and Mines, requesting to consider the computation of

lease period of fifty years from the date of registration of

the lease deed, i.e., 24.05.1976 and extend another six

months by rectifying or treating the validity period as

“23.05.2026” instead of “24.10.2025”. Besides this,

W.P.(C) No.6073 of 2026 Page 56 of 73

another additional period of fourteen months, i.e., from

20.08.2024 to 24.10.2025 during which inaction of the

State Government is perceived is to be added therefrom.

In effect, the petitioner claims addition/extension of

twenty calendar months from 24.10.2025 as a

compensatory measure for the loss he sustained.

8.3. It is further submitted that despite receipt of the

letter/representation dated 22.10.2025, the Government

of Odisha in Department of Steel and Mines did not

respond. Perceiving delay in consideration of such

representation, the petitioner sent a Reminder Letter

dated 24.12.2025 to the Government for consideration of

claim at an early stage.

8.4. It is, therefore, contended that since no action has been

taken, this writ petition deserves to be allowed in favour

of the petitioner.

8.5. This Court, in consideration of anxiety shown by the

petitioner and upon diligent analysis of documents

enclosed with the writ petition coupled with arguments

advanced, feels it apt to clarify that having held in the

foregoing paragraph(s) that the validity period as per

supplementary lease deed dated 01.07.2019 was up to

24.10.2025; but the writ petition has been filed after the

said date, i.e., on 20.02.2026. At paragraph 12 of the

writ petition it has been asserted that the petitioner

W.P.(C) No.6073 of 2026 Page 57 of 73

submitted representation dated 22.10.2025 (Annexure-

15), just two days prior to the date of expiry of tenure of

lease computed from 25.10.1975 and around six years

after execution of supplementary lease deed.

8.6. If at all the petitioner wished to have rectification of the

mistake in the said supplementary lease deed dated

01.07.2019 for the purpose of computing the validity

period or reckoning the date of commencement of the

lease period for ascertaining expiry day of fifty years

therefrom ought to have taken recourse or step available

in law; rather the fact on record revealed that having

accepted the validity period as stipulated in the said

supplementary lease deed, he continued his mining

activity. In the considered opinion of this Court the

representation dated 22.10.2025 submitted at the fag

end knowing fully well that the period of lease would

expire on 24.10.2025 the petitioner cannot take

advantage of extension of twenty months as claimed.

8.7. In the case of C. Jacob Vrs. Director of Geology & Mining,

(2008) 14 SCR 634 it has been observed as follows:

“7. Every representation to the Government for

relief, may not be replied on merits.

Representations relating to matters which have

become stale or barred by limitation, can be rejected

on that ground alone, without examining the merits

of the claim. In regard to representations unrelated

to the department, the reply may be only to inform

W.P.(C) No.6073 of 2026 Page 58 of 73

that the matter did not concern the department or to

inform the appropriate department. Representations

with incomplete particulars may be replied by

seeking relevant particulars. The replies to such

representations cannot furnish a fresh cause of

action or revive a stale or dead claim.

8. When a direction is issued by a court/tribunal to

consider or deal with the representation, usually the

directee (person directed) examines the matter on

merits, being under the impression that failure to do

may amount to disobedience. When an order is

passed considering and rejecting the claim or

representation, in compliance with direction of

the court or tribunal, such an order does not

revive the stale claim, nor amount to some kind

of „acknowledgment of a jural relationship‟ to

give rise to a fresh cause of action.

9. When a Government servant abandons service to

take up alternative employment or to attend to

personal affairs, and does not bother to send any

letter seeking leave or letter of resignation or letter of

voluntary retirement, and the records do not show

that he is treated as being in service, he cannot after

two decades, represent that he should be taken

back to duty. Nor can such employee be treated as

having continued in service, thereby deeming the

entire period as qualifying service for purpose of

pension. That will be a travesty of justice. Where

an employee unauthorizedly absents himself and

suddenly appears after 20 years and demands that

he should be taken back and approaches court, the

department naturally will not or may not have any

record relating to the employee at that distance of

W.P.(C) No.6073 of 2026 Page 59 of 73

time. In such cases, when the employer fails to

produce the records of the enquiry and the order of

dismissal/removal, court cannot draw an adverse

inference against the employer for not producing

records, nor direct reinstatement with back wages

for·20 years, ignoring the cessation of service or the

lucrative alternative employment of the employee.

Misplaced sympathy in such matters will encourage

indiscipline, lead to unjust enrichment of the

employee at fault and result in drain of public

exchequer. Many a time there is also no application

of mind as to the extent of financial burden, as a

result of a routine order for back-wages.

10. We are constrained to refer to the several facets of

the issue only to emphasize the need for

circumspection and care in issuing directions for

„consideration‟. If the representation is on the

face of it is stale, or does not contain

particulars to show that it is regarding a live

claim, courts should desist from directing

„consideration‟ of such claims.”

8.8. In Union of India Vrs. C. Girija, (2019) 2 SCR 131 it has

been observed that:

“13. This Court again in the case of Union of India and

Others Vrs. M.K. Sarkar, (2010) 2 SCC 59 on belated

representation laid down following, which is

extracted below:

„15. When a belated representation in regard

to a „stale’ or „dead’ issue/dispute is

considered and decided, in compliance

with a direction by the court/tribunal to

W.P.(C) No.6073 of 2026 Page 60 of 73

do so, the date of such decision cannot be

considered as furnishing a fresh cause of

action for reviving the „dead’ issue or time-

barred dispute. The issue of limitation or

delay and laches should be considered with

reference to the original cause of action and not

with reference to the date on which an order is

passed in compliance with a court‟s direction.

Neither a court‟s direction to consider a

representation issued without examining

the merits, nor a decision given in

compliance with such direction, will

extend the limitation, or erase the delay

and laches.‟

14. Again, this Court in State of Uttaranchal and

Another Vrs. Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari and

Others, (2013) 12 SCC 179 had occasion to consider

question of delay in challenging the promotion. The

Court further held that representation relating to a

stale claim or dead grievance does not give rise to a

fresh cause of action. In Paragraph Nos. 19 and 23

following was laid down:

„19. From the aforesaid authorities it is clear as

crystal that even if the court or tribunal directs

for consideration of representations relating to

a stale claim or dead grievance it does not give

rise to a fresh cause of action. The dead cause

of action cannot rise like a phoenix. Similarly, a

mere submission of representation to the

competent authority does not arrest time.

23. In State of T.N. Vrs. Seshachalam, (2007) 10

SCC 137, this Court, testing the equality clause

on the bedrock of delay and laches pertaining

W.P.(C) No.6073 of 2026 Page 61 of 73

to grant of service benefit, has ruled thus: (SCC

p. 145, para 16)

„16. *** filing of representations alone

would not save the period of

limitation. Delay or laches is a

relevant factor for a court of law to

determine the question as to whether

the claim made by an applicant

deserves consideration. Delay and/or

laches on the part of a Government

servant may deprive him of the

benefit which had been given to

others. Article 14 of the Constitution of

India would not, in a situation of that

nature, be attracted as it is well known

that law leans in favour of those who are

alert and vigilant.‟

15. This Court referring to an earlier judgment in P.S.

Sadasivaswamy Vrs. State of Tamil Nadu, (1975) 1

SCC 152 noticed that a person aggrieved by an

order of promoting a junior over his head should

approach the Court at least within six months or at

the most a year of such promotion. In Paragraph

No.26 and 28, following was laid down:

„26. Presently, sitting in a time machine, we may

refer to a two-Judge Bench decision in P.S.

Sadasivaswamy Vrs. State of T.N., (1975) 1

SCC 152, wherein it has been laid down that:

(SCC p. 154, para 2)

„2. *** A person aggrieved by an order of

promoting a junior over his head should

approach the Court at least within six

W.P.(C) No.6073 of 2026 Page 62 of 73

months or at the most a year of such

promotion. It is not that there is any

period of limitation for the courts to

exercise their powers under Article

226 nor is it that there can never be a

case where the courts cannot

interfere in a matter after the

passage of a certain length of time.

But it would be a sound and wise

exercise of discretion for the courts to

refuse to exercise their extraordinary

powers under Article 226 in the case

of persons who do not approach it

expeditiously for relief and who

stand by and allow things to happen

and then approach the Court to put

forward stale claims and try to

unsettle settled matters.‟

28. Remaining oblivious to the factum of delay and

laches and granting relief is contrary to all

settled principles and even would not remotely

attract the concept of discretion. We may

hasten to add that the same may not be

applicable in all circumstances where certain

categories of fundamental rights are infringed.

But, a stale claim of getting promotional

benefits definitely should not have been

entertained by the Tribunal and accepted by

the High Court.‟ ***”

8.9. With the background facts as narrated in the foregoing

paragraphs and delineated legal perspective enunciated

by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India as referred to

W.P.(C) No.6073 of 2026 Page 63 of 73

above, this Court, therefore, restrains itself from

exercising extraordinary discretionary power under

Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India.

Conclusion:

9. In the wake of aforesaid discussion and for the reasons

ascribed hitherto, this Court being conscious of the fact

that the covenants of lease deed are binding between the

parties and if at all the petitioner was not agreeable to

the stipulated validity period up to 24.10.2025 instead of

23.05.2026 as reflected in the supplementary lease deed,

it could not have executed said deed on 01.07.2019. The

record evinces that in response to Letter dated

12.02.2019 of the Government of Odisha in Steel and

Mines Department (Annexure-4), the petitioner brought

to the notice of concerned authority with specific

reference to Letter dated 02.05.2006 (Annexure-6) of the

said Department of the Government of Odisha

requesting to treat “24.05.1976” as the date for

reckoning of grant of lease for the purpose of

computation of fifty years in order to derive benefit of

sub-sections (3) and (6) of Section 8A of the MMDR Act

as amended in the year 2015 read with Rule 31(2) of the

MC Rules, by way of Letter dated 18.02.2019 (Annexure-

5); yet while signing the supplementary lease deed on

01.07.2019 he undertook to abide by all the terms and

conditions stipulated therein. Therefore, it can safely be

W.P.(C) No.6073 of 2026 Page 64 of 73

said that the petitioner waived and/or acquiesced with

and accepted the date of validity period as 24.10.2025 as

recorded in the supplementary lease deed. This apart,

there is no iota to depict that the petitioner thereafter

immediately took up remedial measures to rectify or

modify such date of validity as was available to him

under law.

9.1. On the score of computation of fifty years for the

purpose of extension of tenure of lease this Court finds

no merit in the submissions and the arguments

advanced by Sri Sudarshan Nanda, learned Counsel for

the petitioner.

10. Being consciously aware of the facts, terms and

conditions stated in the supplementary lease deed the

petitioner executed by putting his signature and said

deed was registered on 01.07.2019 with the stipulation

as to validity of period of lease would be up to

24.10.2025 computed from 25.10.1975 (fifty years in

terms of Section 8A of the MMDR Act). Nonetheless, he

approached the authority concerned by way of

representation at the fag end, i.e., 22.10.2025

(Annexure-15), this Court refrains itself from passing

any order directing the opposite parties to consider the

representation by treating the date of registration of

original lease deed, i.e., 24.05.1976 as the date of

commencement of lease period so that the expiry of

W.P.(C) No.6073 of 2026 Page 65 of 73

tenure of lease would get extended till 23.05.2026; doing

so would be contradictory to the covenants of

supplementary lease deed which are binding between

the Government of Odisha (lessor) and Sri Birat Chandra

Dagara (lessee). This Court is not oblivious that it is not

empowered to rewrite the contract for the parties.

10.1. The question whether add-on period of twenty months

due to circumstances which alleged to have prevented

the lessee from operating mining during subsistence of

lease period could be directed to be added to the original

lease period as stipulated in the lease deed in exercise of

power under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of

India fell for consideration of this Court in Ramesh

Prasad Sao Vrs. State of Odisha, 2019 (III) ILR-CUT 613.

Having taken note of provisions of the MMDR Act inter

alia Section 8A(6) as amended in the year 2015 and

nuances of Form K prescribed under Rule 31 of the MC

Rules, 1960, the claim of the petitioner therein was

negative with the following observations:

“2. The petitioner, who is the Lessee in respect of Guali

Iron Ore Mines situated over an area of 365.026

hectares in village Guali, Panduliposi, Topadihi,

Loidapada and Rugudihi and Sidhamatha reserve

forest under Barbil Tahasil in Champua Sub-Division

of Keonjhar district, has filed the present writ

petition seeking restoration of the lost period (from

27.06.2013 to 16.05.2014, i.e., 10 months and 20

days and from 23.05.2015 to 10.04.2018, i.e., 34

W.P.(C) No.6073 of 2026 Page 66 of 73

months and 19 days); thus total period of 45 months

and 09 days, for which the Lessee could not operate

its mines due to interruptions/disruptions caused

which was beyond the control of the Lessee, more

particularly when such disruptions were caused

mainly by the act or omission on the part of the

authorities of the State Government. He further

submitted that various legal proceedings are

pending before this Court and the Hon‟ble Supreme

Court in respect of the mines in question.

***

13. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties

and perused the record.

13.1 In view of MMDR Amendment Act, 2015, and more

particularly there is no extension on record after

2013 and the petitioner having accepted the

supplementary lease deed of 2015 up to 31st

March, 2020, in our considered opinion, it

would not be appropriate to extend the lease

period or grant the petitioner 45 months and 9

days contrary to Section 8A(6) of the MMDR Act.

The lease period which was accepted by both the

sides up to 31st March, 2020 is in consonance with

the MMDR Amendment Act, 2015. In that view of the

matter, the petitioner cannot be allowed to operate

the mines beyond 31st March, 2020, which will

contravene the provision under Section 8A(6) of the

MMDR Act. In that view of the matter, the contention

of the petitioner that the affidavit which was filed

before the Hon‟ble Supreme Court and referred to

hereinabove with reference to the present context,

cannot yield any benefit to the petitioner in view of

the explanation of learned Advocate General to the

W.P.(C) No.6073 of 2026 Page 67 of 73

effect that the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, in a

proceeding pending before it, directed the State

Government to give list of each mine holders,

whether they have complied with the statutory

requirement or not. Having accepted the

supplementary lease, without any demur in

2015, the petitioner cannot possibly raise any

objection for the period prior to execution of

the said lease. However, it will not be appropriate

to allot the mining lease in favour of a Government

owned Corporation as per provisions of Section-17A

of MMDR Act. But, here it is at such preliminary

stage of decision making process by the State

Government, Section-17A will not come into play.

14. In view of the discussions made above, the case

laws those are pressed into service by learned

counsel for the petitioner are not applicable to the

facts and circumstances of the present case, since in

those cases, order of cancellation of lease was found

to be illegal. But, in the instant case, it was not

cancellation of lease but non-extension of the lease.

In view of Clause-4 of Form-K (Part-IX), referred

to and reproduced hereinabove, the petitioner

will not be disturbed for a period of six months

beyond the lease period, i.e., 31st March, 2020

so as to enable him to remove the stacked

materials and machineries etc. It is made clear

that the petitioner cannot operate the mining

beyond 31st March, 2020.

15. With the aforesaid observations and direction, the

writ petition is disposed of.”

W.P.(C) No.6073 of 2026 Page 68 of 73

10.2. Taking into consideration the decision rendered in

Ramesh Prasad Sao Vrs. State of Odisha, 2019 (III) ILR-

CUT 613 this Court in yet another case, being JDL Lime

Stone and Dolomite Mines Vrs. State of Odisha, 2024 SCC

OnLine Ori 1024

12 observed as follows:

“29. Referring to the statement of objects and reasons

behind the enactment of the Act 10 of 2015, the

Karnataka High Court in the case of Shantipriya

Minerals Pvt. Ltd. Vrs. State of Karnataka, 2020

SCC OnLine Kar 414 has held that one of the basic

objects of the Act 10 of 2015 was to make

auction as the only mode of grant of mining

concession as the existing provisions of the

MMDR Act did not permit auctioning of mineral

concessions. Another object was to eliminate

discretion and improve transparency in the

allocation of mineral resources. Another salient

feature, inter alia, of Act 10 of 2015 was „removal of

discretion‟ and the introduction of the auction to be

the sole method of allotment of mineral concession.

By the amendment, the tenure of the mining

lease was extended from 30 years to 50 years.

We respectfully concur with the view taken by the

Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court in the

case of Shantipriya Minerals Pvt. Ltd. (supra) while

referring to the basic objects of Act 10 of 2015.

12

Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C) No.5529 of 2024 before the Hon’ble

Supreme Court of India challenging the Judgment dated 20.02.2024 rendered

in W.P.(C) No.11475 of 2023 got dismissed with the following Order dated

11.03.2024:

“1 We are not inclined to entertain the Special Leave Petition under Article

136 of the Constitution of India.

2 The Special Leave Petition is accordingly dismissed.

3 Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of. ”

W.P.(C) No.6073 of 2026 Page 69 of 73

30. After having observed so, the Karnataka High Court

in case of Shantipriya Minerals Pvt. Ltd. (supra) has

viewed that by virtue of sub-section (4) of Section 8-A

of the MMDR Act, 1957, wherever extension of

mining lease is granted under any of the provisions

of Section 8-A on expiry of the extended lease period,

the lease had to be put up for auction and, extension

beyond the period provided in sub-Section 6 of

Section 8-A of the Act cannot be granted. We are in

respectful agreement with the said view also of the

Karnataka High Court in the case of Shantipriya

Minerals Pvt. Ltd. (supra).

31. The division Bench of this Court in the case of

Ramesh Prasad Sao (supra) had the occasion to deal

with a similar circumstance where the petitioner of

that case claimed restoration of lost period relying on

clause-4 of Form-K, Part-IX of Mineral Concessions

Rules, 1960, the force majeure clause on the similar

ground that interruption/disruption were caused for

a considerable period of 10 months and 20 days,

mainly, on account of the act or omission on the part

of the authorities of the State Government and

pendency of the various legal proceedings before

this Court and the Supreme Court in respect of mines

in question in that case. This Court, after having

referred to the decisions in the case of Beg Raj Singh

Vrs. State of U.P., (2003) 1 SCC 726 and Dharam

Veer Vrs. Union of India, 1988 (II) ILR-Delhi 71

concluded in paragraph 13.1 which reads as under:

“***”

32. We find substance in the submissions made by Mr.

Parija, learned Advocate General that the present

case is squarely covered by the coordinate Bench

W.P.(C) No.6073 of 2026 Page 70 of 73

decision of this Court in the case of Ramesh Prasad

Sao (supra). We see no reason, based on the

submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioners to

take a different view than what was taken by this

Court in the case of Ramesh Prasad Sao (supra).

33. It would be pertinent at this juncture to notice

that admittedly, the supplementary lease deed

was executed on 30.03.2016. Under an order

passed by the Director of Mines, the lessee was

allowed to resume the mining operation from

05.11.2015. The original lessee, without any demur,

accepted the terms of the lease deed which not only

mentioned the date, i.e., 20.02.2024 up to which the

validity period of the lease was being extended, but

it contained specific reasons why such extension

was being granted up to 20.02.2024 with reference

to Section 8-A of the MMDR Act. The lessee

continued its mining operation on the strength

of the said supplementary lease deed without

raising any objection and, thus, knowing it

fully well that the validity period of the lease

was up to 20.02.2024.

34. As has been noted above, it is not the case of the

lessee that there was any disruption or interruption

in carrying out the mining activities after resumption

from 05.11.2015 till date. The lessee knew that by

virtue of Section 8-A of the MMDR Act, the validity

period of the lease was being extended up to

20.02.2024 upon completion of 50 years from the

date of the original lease, i.e., 21.02.1974. It

transpires from the pleadings on record that more

than 06 years after execution of lease deed, the

lessee made a representation on 04.07.2022 before

W.P.(C) No.6073 of 2026 Page 71 of 73

the Principal Secretary to Department, Department of

Steel and Mines (opposite party No. 1) to restore the

mining lease period for 03 years and 10 months

invoking clause-4 of Part-IX of the original lease

deed dated 21.02.1974 read with Rule 12(1)(ff) of

the Rules of 2016).

35. The lessee, in our considered opinion, cannot

be permitted to raise a grievance now after

having specifically agreed to the validity

period of the lease up to 20.02.2024. After

having agreed to the terms and conditions of

the supplementary lease deed and acted

thereupon, the lessee cannot turn around and

raise a grievance in relation to the period

before the execution of the supplementary

lease deed, which the lessee had not raised at

any point in time. The doctrine of acquiescence

is an equitable doctrine, which applies when a

party having a right stands by and sees

another dealing in a manner inconsistent with

that right, while the act is in progress and

after violation is completed, which conduct

reflects his assent or accord. He cannot

afterwards complain. (See Pravakar Vrs. Joint

Director, Sericulture Department, (2015) 15 SCC 1).

The term acquiescence means silent assent, tacit

consent, concurrence, or acceptance.

36. It is noteworthy that an argument has been

advanced on behalf of the petitioners that

there cannot be any estoppel against the law

and the period during which the lessee was not

allowed to continue mining operation, was

required to be added beyond the period of 50

W.P.(C) No.6073 of 2026 Page 72 of 73

years by operation of force majeure clause in

the original lease deed read with Rule 12(1)(ff)

of the Rules of 2016. We do not find any force

in such submission. Firstly, for the reason that we

have concurred with the view taken by a Division

Bench of the Karnataka High Court in the case of

Shantipriya Minerals Pvt. Ltd. (supra) to the effect

that the period of a lease cannot be extended

beyond that prescribed period under the

provisions of Section 8-A of the MMDR Act.

Further, the case of lessee cannot be distinguished

from the case of Ramesh Prasad Sao (supra) on the

ground that was a case of an extension under sub-

section (6) of Section 8-A of the MMDR Act. Sub-

section (6) of Section 8-A is not a non-obstante

clause and applies in such cases where the mineral

is used other than captive purpose and provides that

in such circumstance, the same shall be extended

and be deemed to have been extended up to a

period ending on 31.03.2020 with effect from the

date of the expiry of renewal of lease made or till

completion of renewal period, if any, or a period of

50 years from the date of grant of such lease,

“whichever is later” subject to the condition that all

the terms and the conditions of the lease have been

complied with. Sub-section (3) of Section 8-A of the

Act is clear in its expression and states that the

mining lease granted before the commencement of

the Act of 2015 shall be deemed to have been

granted for a period of 50 years. On the expiry of the

lease period, Section 4 in no certain terms, stipulates

that the lease shall be put up for auction as per the

procedure specified in the MMDR Act.

W.P.(C) No.6073 of 2026 Page 73 of 73

37. Keeping in mind the statement of objects and

reasons for the enactment of Act 10 of 2015

and the lessee‟s tacit consent at the time of

execution of the lease deed for a period up to

20.02.2024, we are of the opinion that no case

is made out for the addition of period beyond

50 years, i.e., beyond 20.02.2024 applying

force majeure clause, in the present proceeding

under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

38. We, therefore, do not find any merit in the writ

petition, which is, accordingly, dismissed.”

10.3. In such view of the matter, on the facts and in the

circumstances of the case, this Court declines to

exercise its power under Articles 226 and 227 of the

Constitution of India to direct the authority concerned to

consider the representation vide Annexure-15 series.

11. Under the above premises, this writ petition, being

devoid of merit, is dismissed.

12. In the result, the writ petition including pending

Interlocutory Application(s), if any, stands disposed of;

but in the circumstances, there shall be no order as to

costs.

I agree.

(HARISH TANDON) (MURAHARI SRI RAMAN)

CHIEF JUSTICE JUDGE

High Court of Orissa, Cuttack

The 30

th June, 2026//Aswini/Bichi/MRS