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GAHC030002022025

2026:GAU-MZ:241-DB

IN THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT

(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM & ARUNACHAL PRADESH)

CRL.A. NO. 8 OF 2025

Sri. Daniel Lalhmachhuana

S/o: Laldawngliana (L)

R/o: Rangvamual, Aizawl, Mizoram.

…….Appellant

-Versus-

1. State of Mizoram,

Represented by Secretary to the

Government of Mizoram, Home

Department, Aizawl, Mizoram.

2. Christopher Lalchhandama

F/o- X (minor),

R/o- Edenthar, Aizawl, Mizoram.

……. Respondents

– B E F O R E –

HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE NELSON SAILO

HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE KAUSHIK GOSWAMI

For the Appellant(s) : Mr. Saurabh Pradhan, Advocate.

For the Respondent(s) : Ms. Linda L. Fambawl, Public

Prosecutor, for the respondent No. 1.

Mrs. Emily L. Chhangte, Legal Aid Counsel

for the respondent No. 2.

Date on which judgment

is reserved : 26.05.2026

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Date of pronouncement

of judgment : 29.05.2026.

Whether the pronouncement

is of the operative part

of the judgment ? : No.

Whether the full judgment

has been pronounced : Yes.

JUDGMENT & ORDER (CAV)

(Kaushik Goswami, J)

Heard Mr. Saurabh Pradhan, learned counsel

appearing for the appellant. Also heard Ms. Linda L. Fambawl,

learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the State respondent;

and Mrs. Emily L. Chhangte, learned Legal Aid Counsel,

appearing for the respondent No. 2.

2] This appeal under Section 415 of BNSS, 2023, has been

preferred by the appellant Sri. Daniel Lalhmachhuana,

impugning the Judgment dated 17.02.2025 as well as order of

Sentence dated 27.02.2025 passed by the Court of learned

Special Judge, POCSO Act, 2012, Aizawl Judicial District,

Aizawl (hereinafter referred to as the “trial court”), in Sessions

Case No. 82/2022, in connection with Criminal Trial No.

974/2022, corresponding to All Women P.S. Case No.

14/2022, whereby the appellant was convicted and sentenced

under Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual

Offences Act, 2012 (hereinafter referred to as “POCSO Act”),

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read with Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860

(hereinafter referred to as the “IPC”).

3] The facts leading to the filing of the present appeal,

shorn of unnecessary details, are that on 17.03.2022, one

Smt. K. Lalrinsiami, a Social Worker attached to the District

Child Protection Unit, Aizawl, lodged an FIR before the

Officer-in-Charge of All Women Police Station, Aizawl, inter

alia alleging that, on the same day at about 4:00 p.m., she

had received telephonic information from MHIP, Zuangtui, to

the effect that one minor girl (hereinafter referred to as “X”,

in order to protect her identity), aged about 13 years, had

been induced into prostitution by the accused persons namely

Lalrinchhana and Zonunmawii. It was further alleged that the

victim girl had been sold to several males during the period

from 13.01.2022 till the latter part of February, 2022. Acting

on the basis of the aforesaid FIR, All Women P.S. Case No.

14/2022 was registered under Sections 4(1)/5(1)(a) of the

Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956, read with Section

376(3) of the IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act, and

investigation was accordingly commenced.

4] Upon completion of the investigation, a charge-sheet

came to be filed against the present appellant (A-3) along

with four other accused persons, namely, Lalrinchhana (A-1),

Zonunmawii (A-2), Andrew Lalrintluanga (A-4), and K.

Lalbiakmawia (A-5). During the pendency of the trial, accused

Andrew Lalrintluanga (A-4) absconded, as a result of which

the proceedings could not culminate in a judgment against

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him. The trial, however, proceeded against the remaining

accused persons, including the present appellant.

5] Upon consideration of the materials placed on record

and after hearing learned counsel appearing for the parties,

the trial court, by order dated 18.08.2022, framed charges

against the present appellant under Sections 4(1) and 5(1)(a)

of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956, Section 376 of

the IPC, and Section 6 of the POCSO Act. When the charges

were read over and explained to the appellant, he pleaded

not guilty and claimed to be tried. Similar charges were

framed against the other accused persons facing trial.

6] To establish the charges, the prosecution examined 17

witnesses out of the 20 witnesses cited in the charge-sheet,

including the victim girl. Upon closure of the prosecution

evidence, the present appellant was examined under Section

313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter

referred to as the “Cr.P.C.”), on 09.09.2024. The incriminating

circumstances appearing against him were put to him, which

he generally denied. While disputing the prosecution

allegations, he offered limited explanations in response to

certain questions.

7] Ultimately, by the impugned judgment dated

17.02.2025, the learned trial court convicted the present

appellant for the offence punishable under Section 6 of the

POCSO Act read with Section 376 of the IPC and sentenced

him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of twenty

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years, along with a fine of Rs. 5,000/-, with a default

sentence of simple imprisonment for seven days.

8] The learned trial court also convicted accused

Lalrinchhana (A-1) and Zonunmawii (A-2) under the relevant

provisions of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, the POCSO

Act, and the IPC, while extending the benefit of doubt to

accused K. Lalbiakmawia (A-5) and acquitting him.

9] Aggrieved thereby, the present appeal has been

preferred by accused A-3.

10] Learned counsel appearing for the appellant submits

that, insofar as the present appellant is concerned, the

prosecution case rests entirely upon the sole testimony of the

victim, unsupported by any independent corroborative

evidence. It is contended that the testimony of the victim

cannot be regarded as wholly trustworthy, unimpeachable, or

of sterling quality so as to sustain a conviction in the absence

of corroboration. Learned counsel submits that there are

material inconsistencies in her account concerning the alleged

sexual assault attributed to the appellant, particularly

regarding the place of the incident and surrounding

circumstances. It is further argued that the victim, while

making her statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. before the

jurisdictional Magistrate, did not disclose the name of the

present appellant at all. According to the appellant, this

omission strikes at the root of the prosecution case and

materially undermines the credibility of her subsequent

testimony before the trial court. On the aforesaid basis, it is

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urged that the conviction recorded by the trial court is

unsustainable in law and warrants interference. In support of

the said submissions, reliance has been placed upon the

decision of the coordinate Bench of this Court in Ibomcha v.

State of Mizoram, in (Crl. A. No. 7 of 2020).

11] Per contra, learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the

State submits that the learned trial court, upon proper

appreciation of the evidence on record, rightly found the

testimony of the victim to be credible and trustworthy. It is

submitted that the victim had, at the earliest stage during

investigation, clearly disclosed the role of the present

appellant and specifically stated that he had sexually

assaulted her on three occasions after taking her out in his

vehicle. According to the prosecution, there is no discernible

reason for the victim to falsely implicate the appellant.

11.1] Learned Public Prosecutor further submits that the

appellant himself, in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C.,

admitted that he had taken the victim in his car, though he

denied having had sexual intercourse with her. This,

according to the prosecution, constitutes a significant

circumstance lending assurance to the prosecution version. It

is also pointed out that the coordinate Bench of this Court,

while adjudicating the appeal preferred by co-accused

Zonunmawii (A-2) in Crl. A. No. 9 of 2025, has already

affirmed the impugned judgment and upheld the findings

recorded by the trial court regarding the broader trafficking

and exploitation of the victim.

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12] Learned Legal Aid Counsel appearing for respondent No.

2/informant, while adopting the submissions advanced by the

learned Public Prosecutor, contends that the non-disclosure of

the appellant’s name in the statement recorded under Section

164 Cr.P.C. is, at best, an omission and not a contradiction of

such nature as would render the victim’s testimony unreliable.

It is submitted that a statement recorded under Section 164

Cr.P.C. is not substantive evidence and may only be used for

purposes of corroboration or contradiction in accordance with

law. Learned counsel further submits that unless the alleged

omission was specifically confronted to the witness in the

course of cross-examination in the manner known to law, the

same cannot be magnified to discredit the entire prosecution

case.

13] We have given our anxious consideration to the rival

submissions advanced on behalf of the parties and have

carefully perused the materials available on record, including

the evidence adduced before the learned trial court and the

authorities cited at the Bar.

14] Before examining the rival contentions, it would be

apposite to undertake a careful analysis of the prosecution

evidence.

15] PW-1, namely, Smt. K. Lalrinsiami, the first informant in

the case, deposed before the learned trial court that she was

working as a social worker at the District Child Protection

Office, Laipuitlang, Aizawl. According to her, on 17.03.2022 at

about 4:00 p.m., she received a telephone call from one Smt.

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Lalramthari, President of MHIP, Zuangtui, informing her that a

minor girl had been forced into prostitution by a couple with

whom she had been residing and assisting in domestic work.

She further deposed that upon receiving the said information,

she proceeded to Zuangtui to enquire into the matter and met

the victim girl. During such interaction, the victim disclosed to

her that she had been forced into prostitution by accused

Zonunmawii and her husband, namely, Lalrinchhana. The

victim further informed her that she complied with the

directions of the accused persons out of fear of being

physically assaulted. PW-1 also stated that during her

interaction with the accused persons, namely, Lalrinchhana

and Zonunmawii, she came to learn that they used to receive

money in exchange for permitting the victim to sleep with

strangers for a night, charging amounts of Rs. 4,000/- and

Rs. 1,500/-. She further deposed that the victim informed her

that she could not even recollect the number of persons with

whom she had been compelled to have sexual intercourse.

The FIR lodged by her was exhibited as Exhibit P-2.

16] During cross-examination by the learned defence

counsel appearing for the present appellant (A-3), PW-1

stated that she had no personal knowledge regarding the

involvement of the present appellant in the alleged offence.

She further admitted that she had not personally witnessed

any act of sexual assault being committed upon the victim.

17] PW-2, namely, the victim girl (“X”), deposed that she

had been residing in the house of accused Lalrinchhana and

Zonunmawii at Edenthar Vengchhak, where she used to assist

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them in household chores. According to her, initially the

accused persons treated her well and had even celebrated her

birthday on 12.01.2022. However, on the following day, i.e.,

13.01.2022, the accused persons sent her with a man who

had arrived in a white car. According to PW-2, accused

Zonunmawii represented the said individual to be her uncle

and informed her that he was taking her to his house for

food. Instead, the said individual allegedly took her to a

secluded area and forcibly subjected her to sexual intercourse

despite her resistance. PW-2 further deposed that, as a

consequence of the said act, she experienced pain and

bleeding. She further stated that after the incident, the said

individual dropped her near the residence of the accused

persons, where accused Zonunmawii and her husband were

waiting by the roadside. PW-2 further deposed that she did

not disclose the incident to the accused persons, as she had

by then realised that they themselves had sent her with the

said individual for such purpose.

17.1] PW-2 further deposed that, from the aforesaid day

onwards, the accused persons repeatedly sent her with

different men after communicating with them over mobile

phones. She stated that she had personally seen such

communications on the mobile phone of accused Zonunmawii.

According to her, whenever she refused to accompany the

persons chosen by the accused persons, she was subjected to

physical assault. She further deposed that the present

appellant (A-3) sexually assaulted her on three separate

occasions at different places, and on each such occasion

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dropped her near the residence of Lalrinchhana and

Zonunmawii in a metallic/silver coloured vehicle. She also

deposed that accused Andrew Lalrintluanga (A-4) had

sexually assaulted her inside the house of the present

appellant.

17.2] PW-2 further deposed that accused K.

Lalbiakmawia (A-5) was the last person who sexually

assaulted her in his Bolero vehicle. She stated that while

returning thereafter, Lalrinchhana and Zonunmawii joined

accused K. Lalbiakmawia (A-5) in the said vehicle, and both of

them consumed liquor by the roadside after stopping the

vehicle. Taking advantage of the situation, she escaped from

the vehicle and sought shelter at the residence of one of her

friends, namely, Smt. Thutiami. During her testimony, PW-2

also stated that she could not recollect all the dates on which

she had been subjected to sexual assault by the accused

persons.

17.3] PW-2 further deposed that while she was staying

at the residence of her friend, Smt. Thutiami, accused

Zonunmawii came to know ab out her whereabouts.

Thereafter, her friend dropped her at the residence of one of

her relatives, from where she proceeded to Leithum village

and subsequently to Champhai. She stated that she remained

at Champhai for four nights before returning to Aizawl. She

also stated that her statement had been recorded before the

Court, which was exhibited as Exhibit P-1.

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18] During cross-examination by the learned defence

counsel appearing for the present appellant (A-3), PW-2

admitted that more than ten male persons had been involved

in the sexual exploitation to which she had been subjected.

She clarified that she herself had not lodged any written

complaint before the police against the accused persons. She

denied the suggestion that she had represented herself to be

above eighteen years of age before the accused persons. She

further denied the suggestion that the present appellant had

never sexually assaulted her or taken her anywhere. She also

denied the suggestion that she had been tutored by the police

or by any other person to falsely implicate the accused

persons.

19] PW-3, namely, Smt. Zonunsangi, the paternal

grandmother of the victim, deposed that the victim was born

on 12.01.2009 and was the daughter of her son,

Lalchhandama. She further stated that after the separation

between her son and the victim’s mother, the victim had been

residing with her father. According to PW-3, towards the end

of the year 2021, the victim left her father’s house after being

scolded for not studying properly. She further deposed that in

January 2022, accused Lalrinchhana (A-1) and Zonunmawii

(A-2) came to her residence and informed her that the victim

would stay with them and that they would look after her and

ensure continuation of her education. She further stated that

after some time, the victim disclosed to her that accused A-1

and A-2 had sexually exploited her by sending her to various

men.

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20] In her cross-examination, PW-3 admitted that she did

not know the present appellant personally. Her evidence,

therefore, does not directly implicate the appellant but is

relevant in relation to the circumstances under which the

victim came to reside with accused A-1 and A-2 and the issue

relating to her age.

21] PW-4, namely, Lalchhanhimi, deposed that she had

learnt from the victim that accused Lalrinchhana and

Zonunmawii compelled her to engage in prostitution and

assaulted her whenever she refused. She further stated that

the victim had stayed at her house for two nights after fleeing

from the accused persons and that when accused A-1 and A-2

came to take her back, the victim refused to accompany

them.

22] In her cross-examination, PW-4 admitted that she had

not personally witnessed any sexual act involving the victim.

She further clarified that the victim had not disclosed anything

specifically concerning the present appellant. Her testimony,

therefore, lends contextual support to the prosecution case

concerning the larger exploitation alleged against accused A-1

and A-2, but does not directly bear upon the culpability of the

present appellant.

23] PW-5, namely, Ms. Lalbiakdiki, deposed that she was

working as a Home Mother at the Centre for Peace and

Development, Aizawl, where minor victims of abuse were

accommodated. She stated that she accompanied the victim

to the police station, where the birth certificate of the victim

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was seized. However, in her cross-examination, she admitted

that she had not actually witnessed the seizure in the manner

suggested by the prosecution.

24] PW-6 and PW-7 deposed as seizure witnesses in relation

to the mobile handset allegedly seized from the possession of

the present appellant. Though both admitted in cross-

examination that they were police personnel, they denied the

suggestion that no such seizure had taken place.

25] PW-8 deposed as a seizure witness concerning the

vehicle allegedly seized from the possession of the appellant.

26] PW-9 did not materially support the prosecution case.

27] PW-10 and PW-11 were examined as seizure witnesses

in relation to the mobile handset seized from accused Andrew

Lalrintluanga (A-4). Their evidence is formal in nature.

28] PW-12, Dr. Zosangpuii, the medical officer who

examined the victim, deposed that upon examination, no

fresh signs of violence or seminal traces were detected.

However, an old rupture of the hymen was noticed. She

further stated that the victim had disclosed a history of

repeated sexual exploitation and multiple sexual encounters.

The medical examination report was exhibited as Exhibit P-37.

29] In her cross-examination, PW-12 clarified that the

hymenal rupture could have resulted from sexual intercourse

with persons other than the accused persons. Thus, while the

medical evidence is consistent with prior sexual activity, it

does not specifically identify the perpetrator.

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30] PW-13 to PW-15 are medical witnesses who examined

the accused persons. Their evidence is formal in nature and

does not materially advance the case against the present

appellant.

31] PW-19, Ms. Sarah Lalrinkimi, one of the Investigating

Officers, deposed regarding registration of the FIR, arrest of

the accused persons, seizure of mobile devices, recording of

statements, and extraction of electronic communications. She

stated that the victim’s statement was recorded during

investigation and that the victim was also produced before the

jurisdictional Magistrate for recording of her statement.

Significantly, this witness was not cross-examined on behalf

of the present appellant.

32] PW-20, the succeeding Investigating Officer, deposed

regarding continuation of the investigation, examination of

electronic materials, seizure of devices, interrogation of

accused persons, and submission of the charge-sheet.

33] In cross-examination, he admitted that the medical

evidence did not directly connect any specific accused person

with the alleged sexual assault.

34] Upon closure of the prosecution evidence, the present

appellant was examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C. While

generally denying the incriminating circumstances, he

admitted that he had taken the victim in his vehicle, though

he denied having had sexual intercourse with her and claimed

that he had instead advised her not to engage in prostitution.

The appellant did not adduce any defence evidence.

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35] It is pertinent to note that co-accused Zonunmawii (A-2)

had also preferred an appeal before this Court by way of Crl.

A. No. 9 of 2025 (Smt. Zonunmawii v. State of Mizoram) ,

wherein a coordinate Bench of this Court, upon a re-

appreciation of the evidence on record, affirmed the judgment

of conviction and sentence rendered by the learned trial

court. While upholding the conviction of the said accused, the

coordinate Bench affirmed the findings regarding the minority

of the victim as well as the fact that accused Lalrinchhana (A-

1) and Zonunmawii (A-2) had procured and exploited the

victim for commercial sexual purposes.

36] In view of the aforesaid adjudication, and having

independently examined the materials placed on record, we

find no reason to take a different view insofar as the age of

the victim is concerned. The birth certificate brought on

record, coupled with the testimonies of PW-2 and PW-3,

clearly establishes that the victim was born on 12.01.2009

and was, therefore, a minor at the time of the alleged

occurrence.

37] Likewise, the evidence on record unmistakably

establishes that the victim had been subjected to repeated

sexual exploitation after being placed in the custody of

accused A-1 and A-2. The findings recorded by the coordinate

Bench on that aspect reinforce the broader factual backdrop

against which the present appeal falls for consideration.

However, the issue arising in the present appeal is

considerably narrower in scope. The question requiring

determination is whether the prosecution has succeeded in

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establishing, beyond reasonable doubt, that the present

appellant was one of the persons who committed penetrative

sexual assault upon the victim.

38] At the outset, it must be acknowledged that, insofar as

the present appellant is concerned, the prosecution case rests

substantially upon the direct testimony of the victim. There is

no independent eyewitness account of the alleged sexual

assault involving the appellant. The medical evidence does

not specifically identify him as the perpetrator, nor is there

forensic evidence directly linking him to the offence. That,

however, does not by itself render the prosecution case

infirm.

39] It is by now well settled that in cases involving sexual

offences, particularly offences under the POCSO Act,

conviction can lawfully be founded upon the sole testimony of

the prosecutrix, provided such testimony is found to be

trustworthy, credible, and of such quality as to inspire judicial

confidence. Corroboration is not a rule of law.

40] In Ganesan v. State, reported in (2020) 10 SCC 573,

the Apex Court reiterated that the testimony of a child victim

of sexual assault, if cogent and confidence-inspiring, can form

the sole basis of conviction and need not be corroborated

merely because of the nature of the allegation.

41] Similarly, in Rai Sandeep v. State (NCT of Delhi) ,

reported in (2012) 8 SCC 21, the Apex Court explained the

concept of a “sterling witness” and observed that where the

testimony of a witness remains materially consistent, natural,

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and unshaken on the substantive aspects of the occurrence,

the Court may safely act upon such testimony without

insisting upon independent corroboration.

42] Likewise, in Santhosh Moolya v. State of

Karnataka, reported in 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1243 , it was

held that minor inconsistencies, trivial discrepancies, or

omissions touching peripheral aspects do not justify rejection

of otherwise reliable testimony.

43] The principle that emerges from the aforesaid decisions

is that what the Court must scrutinize is not the existence of

corroboration as a condition precedent, but the intrinsic worth

of the testimony itself. The question, therefore, is whether the

testimony of PW-2, insofar as it implicates the present

appellant, satisfies the test of reliability.

44] Upon careful examination of the testimony of PW-2, we

find that she has categorically identified the present appellant

before the learned trial court and has specifically deposed

that he had taken her out in his vehicle and subjected her to

sexual intercourse on three separate occasions. Her evidence

is not vague on the core allegation. Though she may not have

been able to furnish exact dates or precise locations with

mathematical certainty, her account remains consistent on the

material particulars, namely, the identity of the appellant, the

nature of the acts attributed to him, and the repeated nature

of the assaults.

45] Significantly, during her cross-examination, the victim

remained steadfast on the central accusation against the

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appellant. Though she admitted that she had been sexually

exploited by multiple men and could not recollect every

specific detail concerning each occurrence, she consistently

maintained that the present appellant was one of the persons

who had sexually assaulted her and that he had done so on

more than one occasion. The inability of a child victim of

sustained exploitation to furnish exact chronological

particulars cannot, in the facts of such a case, be elevated

into a circumstance destroying the core credibility of her

testimony.

46] Learned counsel for the appellant, however, has

strenuously contended that the testimony of the victim is

rendered unreliable because, in her statement recorded under

Section 164 Cr.P.C., she did not specifically mention the name

of the present appellant. The submission, though attractive at

first blush, does not withstand closer scrutiny.

47] A statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. is not

substantive evidence. Its utility lies in corroboration or

contradiction in accordance with settled principles of

evidence. The mere fact that every factual detail subsequently

deposed to at trial does not find place in such statement does

not automatically render the witness unreliable. The crucial

inquiry is whether the omission is of such nature as to

amount to a material contradiction striking at the root of the

prosecution case.

48] In the present case, though the victim did not

specifically mention the appellant by name in her statement

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under Section 164 Cr.P.C., she clearly stated that accused A-1

and A-2 had repeatedly sent her with different men who took

her to various places and had sexual intercourse with her.

Thus, the substratum of the prosecution case remained

consistent. The omission pertains to the non-disclosure of a

specific name, not to a denial or contradiction of the

underlying occurrence.

49] More importantly, the statement recorded under Section

161 Cr.P.C. reveals that the victim had specifically disclosed

the role of the present appellant during investigation and had

stated that he had sexual intercourse with her on three

occasions after taking her out in his vehicle. Thus, the

allegation against the appellant was not an embellishment

introduced for the first time during trial. Rather, it formed part

of the prosecution narrative from the early stage of

investigation itself.

50] The legal position concerning omission vis-à-vis

contradiction is equally well settled. An omission in an earlier

statement does not ipso facto amount to a contradiction

unless what is subsequently stated is irreconcilable with the

earlier version. Only such omission as materially alters the

substance of the prosecution case or is fundamentally

inconsistent with the later testimony can be treated as a

contradiction of evidentiary significance.

51] In Jaswant Singh v. State of Haryana , reported in

(2004) 4 SCC 484, the Apex Court observed that whether an

omission amounts to a contradiction would depend upon the

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nature of the omission, the context in which it occurred, and

whether the witness had an occasion or was specifically called

upon to disclose the omitted fact. The explanation appended

to Section 162 Cr.P.C. makes it clear that every omission is

not necessarily a contradiction.

52] Tested on the aforesaid principles, the omission of the

appellant’s name from the victim’s statement under Section

164 Cr.P.C. does not, in our considered view, materially

undermine her testimony before the Court. What remains

significant is that the victim consistently maintained that she

had been repeatedly sent by accused A-1 and A-2 with

different men who subjected her to sexual intercourse. The

omission relates only to the non-disclosure of the appellant’s

specific identity in that statement; it does not amount to a

denial of the occurrence itself. Such omission, viewed in the

factual context of the present case, cannot be treated as

fatal.

53] We are also mindful of the fact that the victim in the

present case was a child subjected to repeated exploitation

over a period of time. Courts must remain sensitive to the

manner in which child victims recount traumatic experiences.

Such disclosures are not always linear, chronologically

precise, or exhaustive at the first available opportunity. Minor

gaps, hesitations, or partial disclosures cannot be

mechanically construed as indicators of falsehood. [Refer: -

Court on its Own Motion v. State, reported in 2018 SCC

OnLine Del 10301].

Page 21 of 23

54] Another circumstance which lends assurance to the

prosecution case is the explanation furnished by the appellant

in his examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. While generally

denying the allegations, the appellant admitted that he had

taken the victim in his vehicle. His explanation was that he

had not engaged in sexual intercourse with her and had

instead advised her against involvement in prostitution. The

admission regarding his association with the victim in the very

manner broadly alleged by the prosecution a ssumes

significance.

55] It is true that a statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. is

not substantive evidence for the prosecution in the strict

sense. However, where an accused admits a circumstance

otherwise relevant to the prosecution case, the Court is

entitled to take such explanation into account while

appreciating the totality of circumstances. In the present

case, the appellant’s admission that he had taken the victim in

his vehicle provides a measure of assurance to the

prosecution version regarding his contact with the victim.

56] Significantly, the defence suggestion now sought to be

projected through the appellant’s explanation that he merely

gave the victim a ride and attempted to dissuade her from

prostitution was never specifically put to the victim during her

cross-examination. No factual foundation was laid to

probabilise such a defence. Nor did the appellant choose to

adduce any evidence in support thereof.

Page 22 of 23

57] The law does not compel an accused to enter the

witness box or adduce evidence. However, where a specific

exculpatory version is advanced, its absence from the cross-

examination of material witnesses is a relevant circumstance

while assessing its credibility. The explanation furnished by

the appellant appears more in the nature of an afterthought

than a credible defence.

58] The medical evidence, though not directly connecting

the appellant with the offence, does not in any manner

discredit the prosecution case. Given the admitted lapse of

time between the alleged incidents and the medical

examination, absence of fresh physical injuries or forensic

traces cannot be treated as inconsistent with the prosecution

version. Indeed, the medical evidence broadly corroborates

the fact that the victim had been subjected to prior sexual

activity.

59] Upon an overall appreciation of the evidence, we find

that the testimony of the victim, insofar as it implicates the

present appellant, remains consistent on the material aspects.

Her account regarding the appellant was disclosed during

investigation, reiterated before the trial court, and remained

substantially unshaken in cross-examination. The omission in

the Section 164 Cr.P.C. statement does not, in the facts of the

case, rise to the level of a material contradiction sufficient to

discredit her testimony.

60] We are, therefore, satisfied that the prosecution has

succeeded in establishing the guilt of the present appellant

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beyond reasonable doubt. The findings recorded by the

learned trial court do not suffer from perversity, legal

infirmity, or misappreciation of evidence warranting

interference in appellate jurisdiction.

61] Consequently, the appeal, being devoid of merit, stands

dismissed. The judgment of conviction dated 17.02.2025 and

the order of sentence dated 27.02.2025 passed by the

learned Special Judge, POCSO Act, Aizawl Judicial District,

Aizawl, in Sessions Case No. 82/2022 corresponding to

Criminal Trial No. 974/2022 arising out of All Women P.S.

Case No. 14/2022, are hereby affirmed insofar as they relate

to the present appellant.

62] The appellant shall undergo the remaining part of the

sentence.

63] The learned Legal Aid Counsel shall be entitled to fees

in accordance with the prevailing rates prescribed by the

State Legal Services Authority, which shall process and

disburse the same in accordance with law.

64] Let the Trial Court Records be returned forthwith.

JUDGE JUDGE

Comparing Assistant