As per case facts, the petitioner, after an accident, resumed duty but subsequently absented himself frequently, claiming he was forced to do heavy work despite medical advice. He alleged that ...
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Constitutional Writ Jurisdiction
APPELLATE SIDE
Present:
The Hon’ble Justice ShampaDutt (Paul)
WPA 25066 of 2022
Sri Debasish Guha
vs.
The State of West Bengal & Ors.
For the Petitioner : Mr. Balai Chandra Paul,
Ms. Tithi Roy.
For the Respondent No.3 : Mr. Soumya Majumder, ld. Sr. Adv.
Mr. Sandip Kundu,
Mr. Malay Kr. Seal.
Judgment reserved on : 01.07.2026
Judgment delivered on : 27.07.2026
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ShampaDutt (Paul), J.:
1. The writ application has been preferred praying for quashing of the
impugned award dated 17.06.2022 passed in case No. 03/2018 by the
Second Industrial Tribunal, Kolkata.
2. The petitioner’s case is that he was appointed by the respondent No. 3 on
01.08.1993 and he was made permanent on and from 0 1.02.1994.
3. On 19.06.2012, the petitioner met with a severe accident resulting in
severe injuries on head, eyes and also other parts of the body for which he
had to undergo an operation for the same. After long treatment he was
advised to take full rest and after recovery, the petitioner was advised to
join his duty with light job.
4. The petitioner states that in spite of the advice of the Doctor, he had to do
his duty as usual as per the order of the management of the company and
as a result, after completion of his duty he felt various problems, resulting
in absenteeism in his duty.
5. It is further stated that when he demanded for light job and/or changing
his duty as per advice of the Doctors, he was not allowed to enter the
factory premises on and from 05.09.2014, which was fully illegal and/or
unjustified.
6. It is further stated that due to his frequent absence, the company referred
his case to the Medical Board, wherein 6(six) Doctors examined and
submitted a report to the company, which was produced by the company
before the respondent Tribunal and marked as exhibit H2/1.
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7. The petitioner further states that in spite of his regular visit to the
company to join his job, neither was he allowed to join his duty nor was
any show cause/charge sheet issued to the petitioner in accordance with
the provisions of the standing order of the company for his alleged
absenteeism.
8. Having no other alternative, he raised an industrial dispute on 18.12.2017
before the Labour Department, wherein due to the adamant attitude of the
management, the matter was not settled and as such the petitioner filed
an application on 26.02.2017 under S ection 2A(2) of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947, before the respondent tribunal, being No. 3/ 2018.
9. After hearing both the parties, the impugned award was passed. Vide the
impugned order, the learned Tribunal held as follows:-
“So considering the entire materials on record as
discussed above, I hold that the petitioner has
failed to prove his allegation that by way of
refusal of employment w.e.f. 05.09.14, the O.P.
company has terminated his service and it has
also been proved that as per the standing orders
of the O.P. company, the O.P. company has not
terminated the service of the petitioner and the
O.P. company has submitted that it has not
terminated the service of the petitioner in any
way, and the petitioner intentionally left the said
service by remaining absent for a long time
unauthorisedly without prior sanction of leave
and the record also shows that the petitioner did
4
not submit proper leave applications to regularise
his long unauthorised absence to the O.P.
company.
Accordingly, I hold that the petitioner himself has
left the said service and he is not entitled to get
any relief in this case as prayed for and he is
also not entitled to get any back wages as he has
not regularised his unauthorised long absence in
the OP company.”
10. The learned Tribunal then dismissed the said case No. 03 of 2018.
11. Being aggrieved the present writ application has been preferred challenging
the said award.
12. Both parties have filed their respective written notes.
13. The petitioner herein has argued that after joining his duty, the
management of the company without considering the medical certificates,
forced the workman to do the heavy work including night duty and as a
result, he faced various problems, resulting in his absence to report for
duty.
14. As the petitioner demanded for avoiding the night duty, he was not allowed
and/or refused to join in his duty on and from 05.09.2014.
15. The termination of service by the way of refusal was made without issuing
any show cause/charge sheet and/or holding any enquiry as per the
service Rules of the Company.
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16. It is submitted that in spite of Doctor’s advice, the petitioner was given
night duty and that from the cross examination of the Company’s
evidence, the workman’s duty was not changed, as the union did not give
consent.
17. It is further stated that the findings of the learned Tribunal is thus not in
accordance with law and the same is liable to be set aside on the ground
that the petitioner’s termination of service by way of refusal was made:-
i) Without giving any opportunity to detend.
ii) No show cause/charge sheet as well as enquiry was held
in terms of the service rules of the Company.
iii) No notice was served in terms of Section 25(F) of the I.D.
Act, 1947.
iv) Non consideration of the medical reports as well as
service Rules by the company and also by the Tribunal.
18. The petitioner superannuated on 31.01.2026.
19. The contesting responden t herein, being the respondent n o.
3/company/establishment has argued that the writ petitioner joined as a
workman in the factory of the company at Belur on 01.02.1994, in the
capacity of 12’ Shear Helper. The said duty was a shifting duty. The
factory is a round the clock factory.
20. The petitioner met with an accident on 19
th
June, 2012 far away from
the factory premises, and suffered severe injuries.
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21. The company disbursed the medical expenses to the workman. The
petitioner was insured under the Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948,
yet the company had borne the medical treatment expense of the writ
petitioner at the material point of time. The petitioner did not produce any
documentary evidence of being treated at the ESI Hospital.
22. It is further stated that the petitioner resumed service on 11
th
February,
2013. It is the evidence of the petitioner before the learned Tribunal that
he was suffering from drowsiness because of the effect of medicine, even
after resuming duties on 11
th
February, 2013. It is also admitted that even
after resuming duties, he continued to remain absent because of his
incapability to perform duties due to the effect of medicines.
23. It is stated that the petitioner was admitted on 5
th
September, 2014, when
he again became ill. Thereafter the doctors advised him bed rest for one
month.
24. The petitioner admits to have been suffering also from morbidities of high
blood pressure and high sugar as well.
25. It is submitted that the petitioner had requested the management of the
company for a lighter job thereby exhibiting his complete lack of interest
to continue his service in the post which he was holding at the time
of resumption of duty on 11
th
February, 2013.
26. The company had written a letter dated 15
th
September, 2014, intimating
the writ petitioner that he was absenting without permission or sanction,
with effect from 5
th
September, 2014. To this, the petitioner had replied on
7
18
th
September, 2014 stating that his health condition was not good and
doctor had prescribed him to take bed rest for four weeks. The company by
a letter dated 20
th
September, 2014 advised the petitioner to report in
person to justify the severity of his illness.
27. It is further argued by Mr. Majumder, learned senior counsel appearing
for the respondent/establishment that the writ petitioner had been
examined at the Howrah District Hospital on 26
th
November, 2014 and had
been issued a certificate of fitness dated 27
th
November, 2014
recommending light job and to avoid night duty. The said certificate
cannot therefore be treated as a certificate of fitness for the nature of
job required to be performed by the writ petitioner. The writ
petitioner’s claim for being able to resume duties is thus contrary to
records.
28. Mr. Majumder, further argues that the company had a subsisting
settlement with the trade unions representing the workers of the factory
with regard to placement of the workers in various departments and
shifting them from one duty to another. The petitioner was a member of
M/s. Aditya Birla and Hindalco Industries Limited , Belur Works
Employees' Union, which had entered into an agreement with the
management on 28th November, 2014 , regarding such placement and
shifting of duties of workmen. The union however did not communicate
any request or probability of the petitioner's placement/deployment or
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non-allotment of night shift duty to him, in spite of the management
referring the issue to the union by honouring the Industrial settlement.
29. It is the further case of the respondent/establishment that the petitioner
continued to remain absent. Only on 9th February, 2015, he submitted a
letter to the company, which he contradicted as a matter of fact in his
cross examination before the learned Tribunal. The writ petitioner had
evidently involved himself in a family business having a trade license along
with his mother; which will reveal from his cross examination before the
learned Tribunal.
30. It is further stated that learned Tribunal on proper appraisal of the
evidence and on proper reasoning rightly dismissed the case on coming to
the conclusion that the management of the company had not terminated
the petitioner from service with effect from 5
th
September, 2014.
31. On hearing learned counsels for the parties and on perusal from the record
including the impugned award, this Court finds that the learned Tribunal
made relevant observations, which are extracted and reproduced herein
below for convenience:-
“(i) After the petitioner was declared medically fit after the said
accident, the O.P. company allowed him to join on 11.02.13 in
the O.P. company, and though the O.P. company has not
admitted in its written statement and evidence of the OPW-I in
chief regarding allowing the petitioner to work light job after
the said accident in 2012, the OPW-1 has admitted in his
cross examination that after the accident in question,
the workman was posted by giving light assignment by
adjusting his times and the workman joined and worked
there.
9
So it is proved through the above admitted facts that when after
the said accident in 2012, the O.P. company allowed the
petitioner to join on 11.02.13 in the O.P. company after he was
medically declared fit, the O.P. company gave him light job by
adjusting his times and then the workman joined and worked
there.
(ii) After the said accident in 2012, the O.P. company allowed him
to join the duty on 11.02.13 when he was declared medically
fit but thereafter he started absenting himself frequently
from duty in an unauthorised manner and since
05.09.14 he started absenting continuously as per
allegations of the O.P. company.
The O.P. company has proved on letter dt. 15.09.14 as the
Exbt.B and the petitioner also has proved this letter as the
Exbt.I and this letter dt. 15.09.14 mentions that since
05.09.14 the petitioner would not attend his duty in an
unauthorised manner and without prior sanction of
leave and sufficient cause and for this reason the
petitioner was directed by the O.P. company to report to
the Head-HR immediately and explain the reason of the
said absence. So this letter dt. 15.09.14 ment ions that
the petitioner was directed to show cause or explain the
reason of his unauthorised absence from 05.09.14.
The petitioner has mentioned in his written statement that the
O.P. company never issued any show cause notice to him to
explain his conduct during the period of his service but this
allegation of the petitioner is not correct in view of this
Exhibit B and I and by this letter the petitioner was directed
to explain the reason of his continuous absence from 05.09.14.
(iii) The Exbt. 7 shows that the O.P. company by this order
informed the petitioner w.e.f 05.09.14 he had been absenting
himself in an unauthorised manner for whom the company
issued one letter dt. 15.09.14 advising him to report and
submit explanation and in response to the letter, the
petitioner sent one e-mail on 18.09.14 stating about his
ill health and advice of doctor to take bed rest for four
weeks and he already reported about his sickness to the
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Medical Department and the Mechanical Department and
by this letter the O.P. company informed the petitioner that as
he had been working in this factory for last 22 years, he must
be aware that as per the standing orders of the company, no
worker is allowed to absent himself from work unless he has
the previous sanction from his Manager and in case of the
sudden illness, a definite message to that respect in
writing must be sent to the Time Office but h e failed to
comply the above standing orders and information to the
Medical Department and the Mechanical Department are
not required as per the standing orders and he did not
submit the sick certificate of a doctor within 48 hours.
(iv) The petitioner has proved his letter dt. 26.02.15 sent to
the O.P. company as the Exbt 8 and in this letter he has
mentioned that after recovery from accident he joined
his duty but became sick and then he was treated by the
medical board and the medical board suggested for light job
and avoiding night duty and then he addressed the O.P.
company for light job but the O.P. company told him to wait till
the reply from the unions was received, and the petitioner has
mentioned in this letter that the O.P. company has not been
allowing him to enter the factory and by hand delivery the O.P.
company has not been receiving any letter from him. But this
Exbt.8 issued by the petitioner to the O.P. company
mentions that it was given by him by hand delivery to
the O.P. company. So the allegation of the petitioner that by
hand delivery the O.P. company has not been receiving any
letter from him is not correct.
(v) The most interesting exhibited document of this case is the
certificate of fitness on medical ground issued by the medical
board of the Howrah District Hospital and as per this
certificate (Exbt.H/1), on 26.11.14 the petitioner was examined
by the said medical board and according to their opinions, the
petitioner was found to be medically fit and they also
opined that no loco motor disability was found at
present and prescribed for light job and avoiding night
duty. This medical certificate is confusing and
contradictory because once the medical board has found
the petitioner as medically fit and again they have
opined for light job and avoiding night duty.
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(vi) A completely medically fit person can be allowed only to
work before any place of employment. So if th e
petitioner was found completely medically fit, then why
the said doctors opined for his light job of the petitioner
and advised for his night duty! Naturally the question
arises as to whether on 26.11.14 after examination by the
medical board the petitioner was found completely medically fit
or not and if he was found completely medically fit then
the doctors would not opine for light job and avoid night
duty, and a completely medically fit person will have no
problem to perform any kind of job like befor e and he
will have no problem also to work in night shift . But the
said doctors have opined for light job for the petitioner with a
direction to avoid the night duty, and such type of opinion
means scientifically that after examination on 26.11.14
the petitioner was confirmly not found completely
medically fit for which the opinion of light job with a
direction to avoid night duty was given by the said
doctors.)
So considering the above contradictory, opinions of the
doctors of the said medical board, I have no hesitation to hold
that the said opinions of the doctors are not correct and
genuine scientifically and the same are biased and on the
basis of this report it cannot be confirmly held as to whether
the petitioner was found complet ely medical fit after
examination on 26.11.14 or whether he was unfit or half fit for
which light job with a direction to avoid night duty was
prescribed by the said doctors.”
32. The learned Tribunal also held that the petitioner violated point No. 23 of
the Standing Orders of the respondent/company, as he remained absent
without prior intimation.
33. Finally the Tribunal considering the entire materials on record as
discussed above, held that the petitioner has failed to prove his allegation
that by way of refusal of employment w.e.f. 05.09.14, the respondent/
12
company has terminated his service and it has also been proved that as
per the standing orders of the O.P. company, the O.P. company has not
terminated the service of the petitioner in any way, and that the
petitioner intentionally (voluntarily) left the said service by remaining
absent for a long time unauthorisedly without prior sanction of leave
and the record also shows that the petitioner did not submit proper leave
applications to regularise his long unauthorised absence to the O.P.
company.
34. Accordingly, the tribunal held that the petitioner himself has left the said
service and he is not entitled to get any relief in this case as prayed for and
he is also not entitled to get any back wages, as he has not regularised his
unauthorised long absence in the OP company.
35. In the written notes filed on behalf of the petitioner herein the case of the
petitioner has been reiterated, as made out in the writ petition.
36. The respondent no. 3/company on filing their written notes has argued as
noted above, relying upon the following judgments:-
i. West Bengal Central School Service Commission and Ors. Vs
Abdul Halim & Ors. (2019) 18 SCC 39, Para 29,30,31,32,33.
“29. The High Court in exercise of its power to issue
writs, directions or orders to any person or authority
to correct quasi-judicial or even administrative
decisions for enforcement of a fundamental or legal
right is obliged to prevent abuse of power and
neglect of duty by public authorities.
13
30. In exercise of its power of judicial review, the
Court is to see whether the decision impugned is
vitiated by an apparent error of law. The test to
determine whether a decision is vitiated by error
apparent on the face of the record is whether the
error is self-evident on the face of the record or
whether the error requires examination or argument
to establish it. If an error has to be established by a
process of reasoning, on points where there may
reasonably be two opinions, it cannot be said to be
an error on the face of the record, as held by this
Court in Satyanarayan Laxminarayan
Hegde v. Millikarjun Bhavanappa
Tirumale [Satyanarayan Laxminarayan
Hegde v. Millikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale , AIR
1960 SC 137] . If the provision of a statutory rule is
reasonably capable of two or more constructions and
one construction has been adopted, the decision
would not be open to interference by the writ court. It
is only an obvious misinterpretation of a relevant
statutory provision, or ignorance or disregard
thereof, or a decision founded on reasons which are
clearly wrong in law, which can be corrected by the
writ court by issuance of writ of certiorari.
31. The sweep of power under Article 226 may be
wide enough to quash unreasonable orders. If a
decision is so arbitrary and capricious that no
reasonable person could have ever arrived at it, the
same is liable to be struck down by a writ court. If
the decision cannot rationally be supported by the
materials on record, the same may be regarded as
perverse.
32. However, the power of the Court to examine the
reasonableness of an order of the authorities does
not enable the Court to look into the sufficiency of
the grounds in support of a decision to examine the
14
merits of the decision, sitting as if in appeal over the
decision. The test is not what the Court considers
reasonable or unreasonable but a decision which the
Court thinks that no reasonable person could have
taken, which has led to manifest injustice. The writ
court does not interfere, because a decision is not
perfect.
33. In entertaining and allowing the writ petition,
the High Court has lost sight of the limits of its
extraordinary power of judicial review and has in
fact sat in appeal over the decision of Respondent
2.”
ii. Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde and Ors. Vs Millikarjun
Bhavanappa Tirumale, 1959 SCC OnLine SC10.
37. On hearing the parties and on perusal of the materials on record including
the impugned award, it is evident that:-
(i) On 01.08.1993, the petitioner was appointed as 12’ sheer helper and
confirmed in service on 01.02.1994.
(ii) On 19.06.2012, he met with a serious accident.
(iii) He joined after the accident on 11.02.2013 on being declared
medically fit.
(iv) Thereafter the petitioner was absent for a long period without any
proper application or following the official procedures, for 27 days in
2013 and 59 days in 2014.
(v) Since 15.09.2014 he stopped attending /reporting for work, in
spite of being asked to do so/report, on plea of illness.
15
(vi) As such, the respondent/company sent him before a medical board,
constituted by the District Medical Officer, Howrah, which declared
him fit but advised light job and to avoid night duty.
(vii) The tribunal refused to consider such a medical (fitness) certificate,
wherein contradictory facts were stated.
(viii) The tribunal’s view was that if could not do the job he was appointed
for, the fitness certificate was not a proper one, and rightly so.
38. Finally the tribunal held that in this case there was no illegal
termination, but voluntary abandonment of service by the petitioner.
39. It is thus clear that the petitioner refused to join his job, if he was not
given light job and was not given night duty.
40. The fitness certificate is not a proper medical certificate considering that
the medical board/Doctors did not find him fit for normal work/job for
which he was appointed.
41. The fact that the petitioner was permitted to join after his accident
on 11.02.2013, proves that the respondent/company did not refuse
employment.
42. Subsequently the petitioner on and from 05.09.2014 refused to work
if not given light job and was not given night duty, without even any
sanctioned leave for his continued absence.
43. The respondent company’s letter dated 15.09.2014 (Exhibit B) and the
petitioner’s Exhibit 1, show that respondent/company asked the petitioner
to report to the Head HR immediately and explain (show cause) for his
16
absence. The letter was admittedly received by the petitioner but he
refused to work if not given light job and no night duty.
44. This letter (Ext. B) too proves that the respondent/company was all
along ready and willing to let the petitioner to join.
45. But as the petitioner refused to join, his conduct could be treated as
voluntary resignation and the company is then only obligated to clear the
final dues to which the petitioner/workman is entitled under the law on
voluntary abandonment of service.
46. As there was no termination of service, there was no show cause, charge
and/or any enquiry/disciplinary proceedings initiated.
47. The order/award dated 17.06.2022 passed by the Second Industrial
Tribunal, Kolkata, thus being in accordance with law requires no
interference.
48. WPA 25066 of 2022 is dismissed.
49. Applications, if any, connected thereto stand disposed of consequently.
50. Interim order, if any, stands vacated.
51. Photostat certified copy of this Judgment, if applied for, be given to the
parties on priority basis upon compliance of all formalities.
[Shampa Dutt (Paul), J.]
In a significant ruling, the Calcutta High Court recently dismissed a writ petition in the case of Sri Debasish Guha vs. The State of West Bengal & Ors. (WPA 25066 of 2022), providing crucial clarity on Industrial Law Dispute Resolution and the interpretation of Voluntary Abandonment of Service. This judgment, like many other pivotal rulings, is readily accessible on CaseOn, offering legal professionals and students deep insights into complex legal matters. The Court upheld the findings of the Second Industrial Tribunal, Kolkata, affirming that the petitioner had voluntarily abandoned his service rather than being illegally terminated.
The petitioner, Sri Debasish Guha, was appointed by Respondent No. 3 (the company) on August 1, 1993, and became permanent on February 1, 1994, as a 12' Shear Helper in a round-the-clock factory at Belur, a role that involved shifting duties.
On June 19, 2012, the petitioner suffered a severe accident, resulting in significant head and eye injuries requiring an operation. After treatment, he was advised light duty. The petitioner claimed that despite medical advice, the management forced him to perform heavy work, including night shifts, leading to frequent absenteeism due to health issues. He alleged that when he requested light duty, he was denied entry to the factory premises from September 5, 2014, without any show cause notice or charge sheet, which he considered illegal termination.
Conversely, the respondent company maintained that after the petitioner was declared medically fit, he resumed service on February 11, 2013, with a light assignment. They contended that he subsequently started absenting himself frequently and continuously from September 5, 2014, without proper leave applications or following official procedures. The company sent a letter dated September 15, 2014 (Exhibit B), asking him to report to the HR Head and explain his absence. The petitioner responded, citing ill health and doctor's advice for bed rest, but his medical certificate was deemed contradictory by the Tribunal (stating he was 'medically fit' yet recommending 'light job' and 'avoid night duty'). The company also highlighted a subsisting settlement with trade unions regarding worker placements and shifts, which the petitioner's union did not act upon for his redeployment. Furthermore, it was noted during cross-examination that the petitioner was involved in a family business.
The central legal question before the Tribunal and subsequently the High Court was whether the petitioner's cessation of employment constituted an illegal termination by the company (due to refusal of employment) or a Voluntary Abandonment of Service by the petitioner himself.
The Tribunal and High Court examined principles governing employer-employee relationships, unauthorized absenteeism, and the requirement for due process in termination. Key to the High Court's review was the limited scope of judicial review under Article 226, as established in precedents like West Bengal Central School Service Commission and Ors. Vs Abdul Halim & Ors. (2019) 18 SCC 39 and Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde and Ors. Vs Millikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale, 1959 SCC OnLine SC10.
These judgments underscore that a High Court, in judicial review, primarily assesses whether a decision is vitiated by an apparent error of law, is arbitrary, or perverse—it does not re-evaluate the merits of the decision as an appellate authority. The Court must ensure that public authorities prevent abuse of power and neglect of duty, but it cannot substitute its opinion for that of the Tribunal if the decision is supported by reasonable grounds and evidence.
For legal professionals navigating such intricate rulings, CaseOn.in offers invaluable resources, including concise 2-minute audio briefs that help in quickly grasping the essence of judgments like this, making analysis efficient and accessible for understanding complex Industrial Law Dispute Resolution cases.
The Tribunal, after hearing both parties and reviewing the evidence, made several critical observations, which the High Court subsequently upheld:
Based on these findings, the Tribunal dismissed the petitioner's case, concluding there was no illegal termination but a Voluntary Abandonment of Service. The High Court, applying the principles of judicial review, found no apparent error of law, arbitrariness, or perversity in the Tribunal's award. The Tribunal's decision was well-reasoned, based on a proper appraisal of evidence, and therefore required no interference.
The Calcutta High Court dismissed WPA 25066 of 2022, affirming the Second Industrial Tribunal's award. The Court concluded that the petitioner had failed to prove illegal termination by the company and that the evidence strongly indicated a Voluntary Abandonment of Service due to prolonged unauthorized absence and refusal to join without specific conditions.
This judgment serves as a crucial reference for understanding:
For legal professionals and students, this case is an essential read for its practical implications in handling cases of absenteeism, alleged wrongful termination, and the nuances of proving Voluntary Abandonment of Service in industrial disputes.
All information provided in this article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Readers are encouraged to consult with a qualified legal professional for advice pertaining to their specific circumstances.
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