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HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA

_A_G_A_R_T_A_L_A_

Crl. Rev. P. No. 58 of 2025

Sri. Gopi Nath Saha,

S/o. Sri Kanai Lal Saha,

of Town Pratapgarh, near Ram Thakur Sangha,

P.O. Agartala, P.S. East Agartala,

District- West Tripura, PIN-799001.

……....Revision Petitioner

VERSUS

Smt. Bina Roy,

D/O. Sri B. L. Roy,

C/O. late Sahicharan Saha,

Of Gagail Road, master Para,

P.O. Agartala, P.S. West Agartala,

District-West Tripura, PIN-799001.

...........Respondents

For Petitioner(s) :Mr. Subrata Sarkar, Sr. Adv.

Mr. Kabrabam Dhirendra Singha, Adv.

Ms. Megha Sarkar, Adv.

For Respondent(s) :Mr. Purusuttam Roy Barman, Sr. Adv.

Mr. Samarjit Bhattacharjee, Adv.

Mr. Kawsik Nath, Adv.

Date of hearing :03.08.2026

Date of Delivery of judgment :10.09.2026

Whether fit for reporting : YES

HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE BISWAJIT PALIT

JUDGMENT & ORDER

This petition is filed under Section 438 read with Section 442

of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023 is filed

challenging the order dated 24.07.2025 passed by the Learned

Additional Judge, Family Court, Agartala, West Tripura, in connection

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with Case No. Crl. Misc. (Int). 231/2024 (arising out of Crl. Misc. No.

230/2024). By the impugned order, the Learned Addl. Judge has

awarded interim maintenance of Rs. 15,000/ - (Rupees Fifteen

Thousand) per month to the petitioners is the respondent herein.

2. Heard Learned Sr. Counsel Mr. Subrata Sarkar, assisted by

Learned Counsel Mr. Kabrabam Dhirendra Singha and Learned Counsel

Ms. Megha Sarkar, appearing on behalf of the petitioner husband-OP

also heard Learned Sr. Counsel Mr. Purusuttam Roy Barman, assisted

by Learned Counsel Mr. Samarjit Bhattacharjee and Learned Counsel

Mr. Kawsik Nath, appearing on behalf of the respondent-wife petitioner.

3. At the time of hearing, Learned Sr. Counsel Mr. S. Sarkar,

appearing on behalf of the petitioner-husband, submitted that the

respondent, as petitioner, had filed a petition for maintenance against

the respondent-OP is the petitioner herein under Section 125 of CR.P.C.

In the said proceeding, a separate petition was filed for granting interim

maintenance till disposal of the main petition, which was registered as

Crl. Misc. (Int). No.231 of 2024. After hearing both the sides, Learned

Addl. Judge, Family Court, Agartala, West Tripura , passed the

impugned order. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the said order,

the alleged husband, as petitioner, has preferred the present petition

challenging the legality and maintainability of the said order.

4. After that, Learned Counsel for the petitioner-husband, first

of all, drawn the attention of the Court to the fact that, in a proceeding

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under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C., the wife is required to establish that

she is the legally married wife of the petitioner. However, in the present

case, the alleged petitioner, claiming to be the wife of the petitioner-

husband, could not produce any document to establish that her

marriage had taken place with the present petitioner-husband. Learned

Senior Counsel further submitted that the petitioner -husband had a

legally wedded wife, who had been suffering from illness and ultimately

expired on 09.01.2020.

5. Learned Counsel further submitted that, surprisingly,

according to the respondent -wife, the alleged marriage with the

petitioner-husband took place in the year 2012. However, during the

lifetime of the wife of the petitioner-husband, the respondent-wife

never raised any claim that she was the legally wedded wife of the

petitioner-husband, nor did she claim any maintenance or other benefit

from him. It was only after about four years from the death of the wife

that the respondent-wife, claiming herself to be the wife of the

petitioner-husband, filed the application for ma intenance, which,

according to Learned Counsel, has got no legal basis.

6. Learned Counsel further submitted that, even if it is proved

that the petitioner-husband had married the respondent-wife during the

subsistence of his marriage with another woman, who subsequently

expired in the year 2020. So, as per law, the respondent-wife would not

be entitled to claim maintenance from the petitioner-husband.

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7. It was further submitted that, till date, the respondent-wife

could neither produce nor prove d any document or evidence to

establish that the petitioner-husband had divorced his first wife, so as

to substantiate her claim. Therefore, in such a situation, during the

subsistence of the marriage between the petitioner -husband and his

wife, there was no scope for the respondent-wife to claim maintenance

from the petitioner-husband.

8. In course of hearing, Learned Counsel also referred to the

interim petition filed by the respondent, as well as the written objection

submitted by the present petitioner before the Learned Trial Court. He

submitted that, admittedly, the respondent had, for a certain period,

been employed in the shop of the petitioner-husband as a staff

member. At one point of time, the respondent became close to the wife

of the petitioner-husband, as because his wife suffering from severe

illness and the respondent was requested to assist the ailing wife of the

petitioner-husband. Learned Counsel further submitted that, during the

said period, the petitioner-husband had extended certain financial

assistance to the son of the respondent, out of which he was admitted

to an institution outside the State and pursued his studies.

9. It was also submitted that, although certain photographs

were produced showing that both the parties had visited and moved

around at different places together, surprisingly, with regard to the

alleged marriage said to have taken place in the year 2012, the

respondent could neither produce any photograph nor any documentary

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evidence before the Learned Trial Court to establish that the petitioner-

husband had married her.

10. In support of his contention, Learned Counsel relied upon a

judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, reported in (1988) 1

SCC 530, in Yamunabai Anantrao Adhav v. Anantrao Shivram

Adhav & Anr., wherein, in para No. 8, the Hon’ble Apex Court has

observed as under:-

“8. We, therefore, hold that the marriage of a

woman in accordance with the Hindu rites with a ma n

having a living spouse is a complete nullity in the eye

of law and she is not entitled to the benefit of Section

125 of the Code. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.

There will be no order as to costs. During the

pendency of the appeal in this Court som e money was

paid to the appellant in pursuance of an interim order.

The respondent shall not be permitted to claim for its

refund.”

11. Learned Sr. Counsel thereafter referred another judgment of

the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, reported in (2005) 3 SCC 636, in

Savitaben Somabhai Bhatiya v. State of Gujarat & Ors. , wherein,

in para Nos. 8, 5, 15 and 21, the Hon’ble the Apex Court has observed

as under:-

“5. Criminal Revision Application No. 65 of

1995 was filed by Respondent 2 against the order

dated 31-7-1999. By order dated 12 -7-2001, learned

Additional District Judge, Sabarkatha dismissed the

application. Respondent 2 filed Special Criminal

Application No. 568 of 2001 before the Gujarat High

Court which by the impugned order held that the

appellant was not the legally wedded wife of

Respondent 2. Reliance was placed on documents filed

by Respondent 2 to conclude that before the alleged

date of marriage between the appellant and

Respondent 2, the latter was already married to

Veenaben with referenc e to the documents produced.

However, maintenance granted to the child

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(Respondent 3) was maintained and amount as

awarded to him i.e. Rs 350 was enhanced to Rs 500. A

direction was also given to pay the enhanced amount

from the date of order of the learne d JMFC i.e. 31-7-

1999.

8. There may be substance in the plea of

learned counsel for the appellant that law operates

harshly against the woman who unwittingly gets into

relationship with a married man and Section 125 of

the Code does not give protection to such woman. This

may be an inadequacy in law, which only the

legislature can undo. But as the position in law stands

presently there is no escape from the conclusion that

the expression “wife” as per Section 125 of the Code

refers to only legally married wife.

15. In Yamunabai case [(1988) 1 SCC 530 :

1988 SCC (Cri) 182 : AIR 1988 SC 644] it was held

that the expression “wife” used in Section 125 of the

Code should be interpreted to mean only a legally

wedded wife. The word “wife” is not defined in t he

Code except indicating in the Explanation to Section

125 its inclusive character so as to cover a divorcee. A

woman cannot be a divorcee unless there was a

marriage in the eye of the law preceding that status.

The expression must therefore be given the meaning

in which it is understood in law applicable to the

parties. The marriage of a woman in accordance with

Hindu rites with a man having a living spouse is a

complete nullity in the eye of the law and she is

therefore not entitled to the benefit of Sec tion 125 of

the Code or the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (in short

“the Marriage Act”). Marriage with a person having a

living spouse is null and void and not voidable.

However, the attempt to exclude altogether the

personal law applicable to the parties from

consideration is improper. Section 125 of the Code has

been enacted in the interest of a wife and one who

intends to take benefit under sub -section (1)(a) has

to establish the necessary condition, namely, that she

is the wife of the person concerned. The i ssue can be

decided only by a reference to the law applicable to

the parties. It is only where an applicant establishes

such status or relationship with reference to the

personal law that an application for maintenance can

be maintained. Once the right und er the provision in

Section 125 of the Code is established by proof of

necessary conditions mentioned therein, it cannot be

defeated by further reference to the personal law. The

issue whether the section is attracted or not cannot be

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answered except by re ference to the appropriate law

governing the parties.

21. In that view of the matter, the application

so far as claim of maintenance of the wife is

concerned stands dismissed .”

12. Referring to both the aforesaid judgments, Learned Senior

Counsel submitted that marriage of a woman, solemnized in accordance

with Hindu rites with a man having a living spouse, is a complete nullity

in the eye of law, and, as such, she is not entitled to claim the benefit

of Section 125 of the Cr.P.C.

13. Further, he submitted that the expression “wife” used in

Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. should be interpreted to mean only a legally

wedded wife. In the present case, the respondent has failed to prove

that she is the legally wedded wife of the petitioner. Moreover, even if it

is proved that the petitioner had married the respondent, she would still

not be entitled to claim maintenance from the petitioner, in view of the

fact that the petitioner already has got his legally wedded wife residing

at his matrimonial home.

14. Referring to the aforesaid citations, Learned Senior Counsel

further submitted that the order passed by the L earned Trial Court

suffers from infirmity and, therefore, warrants interference by this

Court and is liable to be quashed and set aside.

15. Thereafter, with regard to the maintainability of the petition,

Learned Senior Counsel drawn the attention of this Court to the

judgment delivered in Rajendra Kumar v. Rukhmai Bisen , reported

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in 2023 SCC OnLine MP 2822 , wherein, in paragraph No. 17, the

Madhya Pradesh High Court observed as under:

“17. In the case of Aakansha Shrivastava,

(Supra) the Division Bench of this Court further held

that any order which affects right of a person

drastically and substantially, cannot be treated as

interlocutory order an d criminal revision can be

preferred under Section 19(4) of the Family Courts Act

against the order passed on the application for interim

maintenance by the Family Court . Further more in the

Case of Rajesh Shukla v. Meena Shukla, (2005) 2 MP

LJ 483, it has been held by Full Bench of this Court

while passing of maintenance under Section 125 of Cr.

P.C. in exercise of powers, against such order under

Section 19(4) of Cr. P.C. criminal revision should be

registered. In another case Nasreen Begum v. State of

Jharkhand, 2006 Cri LJ 326 has held the Section 19(4)

of the said Act make special provision of revision with

regard to orders passed under Section 125 of Cr. P.C.

and thus revisions would lie.”

16. Further, he also referred another judgment of the Hon’ble

Supreme Court of India in Akanksha Arora v s. Tanay Maben

reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3688 , wherein, in para Nos. 5, 9 &

11, Hon’ble the Apex Court has observed as under:-

“5. It appears that the Principal Judge, Family

Court vide order dated 08.03.2 022 in exercise of

powers under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure

Code, 1973 (for short „the CrPC‟) had fixed interim

maintenance in favour of the appellant.

9. In Prabhu Chawla v. State of Rajasthan

(1977) 4 SCC 551, this Court examined the relevan t

scope of Section 482 CrPC and Section 397 CrPC and

held that nothing in CrPC, not even Section 397, can

affect the amplitude of the inherent powers preserved

in so many terms by the language of Section 482 CrPC.

The inherent powers should not invade area s set apart

for specific powers conferred under CrPC but there is

no total ban on the exercise of inherent powers where

abuse of process of Court or other extraordinary

situation warrants exercise of inherent jurisdiction.

The limitation is self -restraint, nothing more.

Availability of alternative remedy of criminal revision

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under Section 397 CrPC, by itself, cannot be a good

ground to dismiss an application under Section 482

CrPC.

11. In view of the above, we dispose of the

appeal by setting aside the i mpugned order of the

High Court dated 21.09.2023 and remand the matter

to the High Court with further direction to convert the

petition under Section 482 CrPC as a criminal revision

under Section 397 CrPC and decide it in accordance

with law after affording opportunity of hearing to the

parties.”

17. Referring to the aforesaid citations, Learned Senior Counsel

submitted that, in view of the observations made th erein, there is no

bar to file a revision petition before this Court challenging the order

granting interim maintenance, and that the bar contemplated under

Section 19(4) of the Family Courts Act, 1984, would not operate in the

present matter.

Finally, Learned Senior Counsel submitted that, since the

order passed by the Learned Trial Court suffers from infirmities and is

otherwise unsustainable in law, the same warrants interference by this

Court and is liable to be set aside.

18. On the other hand, Learned Senior Counsel appearing for

the respondent, who was the petitioner in the original maintenanc e

proceeding, submitted that it is an admitted position that the

respondent was employed at the shop of the present petitioner. After

the petitioner’s divorce from his first wife, the respondent, being

helpless, got employment at his shop. During the said period, the

present petitioner developed an acquaintance with her and proposed to

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marry her. He represented her that his wife was suffering and that he

would divorce her. Subsequently, he informed the respondent that he

had divorced his wife.

19. Relying upon such representation and believing the same to

be true, the respondent married the present petitioner in the year

2012, i.e. on 20.11.2012, at the Kalighat Temple, Kolkata, in the

presence of a priest. It was submitted that the petitioner performed the

marriage rituals by applying vermilion and, thereafter, accepted the

respondent as his wife, took responsibility for her and they started

living together as husband and wife. The petitioner also introduced and

represented the respondent before members of the society as his wife.

20. It was further submitted that the present petitioner not only

recognized the respondent as his wife but also spent a considerable

amount of money towards the education of her son. Apart from the

aforesaid facts, the petitioner and the respondent travelled to various

places together as husband and wife and took several photographs

during such visits, which, according to the respondent, further

demonstrates their relationship and the manner in which the petitioner

represented her as his wife.

Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the present

petitioner has suppressed the material facts that, after obtaining a

divorce from his wife, he married the respondent and thereafter lived

with her as husband and wife.

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21. Accordingly, Learned Senior Counsel submitted that there is

no infirmity in the order passed by the Learned Judge, Family Court,

and urged that the present petition be dismissed. In support of his

contention, Learned Sr. Counsel relied upon a judgment of the Hon’ble

Supreme Court reported in (2014) 1 SCC 188, in Badshah vs.

Urmila Badshah Godse & Anr. , wherein in para .Nos. 11, 13, 13-1,

13-2, 13-3, 15, 16, 18 & 20 Hon’ble the Apex Court has observed as

under:-

“11. The second case which we would like to

refer to is Chanmuniya v. Virendra Kumar Singh

Kushwaha [Chanmuniya v. Virendra Kumar Singh

Kushwaha, (2011) 1 SCC 141 : (2011) 1 SCC (Civ) 53 :

(2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 666] . The Court has held that the

term “wife” occurring in Section 125 CrPC is to be

given very wide interpretation. This is so stated in the

following manner:

“42. … a broad and expansive interpretation

should be given to the term „wife‟ to include even

those cases where a man and woman have been living

together as husband and wife for a reasonably long

period of time, and strict proof of marriage should not

be a precondition for maintenance under Section 125

CrPC, so as to fulfil the true spirit and essence of the

beneficial provision of maintenance under Section

125.”

13. On this basis, it was p leaded before us

that this matter be also tagged along with the

aforesaid case. However, in the facts of the present

case, we do not deem it proper to do so as we find

that the view taken by the courts below is perfectly

justified. We are dealing with a si tuation where the

marriage between the parties has been proved.

However, the petitioner was already married. But he

duped the respondent by suppressing the factum of

alleged first marriage. On these facts, in our opinion,

he cannot be permitted to deny the benefit of

maintenance to the respondent, taking advantage of

his own wrong. Our reasons for this course of action

are stated hereinafter:

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13.1. Firstly, in Chanmuniya case [Chanmuniya

v. Virendra Kumar Singh Kushwaha, (2011) 1 SCC 141

: (2011) 1 SCC (Civ) 53 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 666] , the

parties had been living together for a long time and on

that basis question arose as to whether there would

be a presumption of marriage between the two

because of the said reason, thus, giving rise to claim

of maintenance under Section 125 CrPC by

interpreting the term “wife” widely. The Court has

impressed that if man and woman have been living

together for a long time even without a valid

marriage, as in that case, term of valid marriage

entitling such a woman to ma intenance should be

drawn and a woman in such a case should be entitled

to maintain application under Section 125 CrPC . On

the other hand, in the present case, Respondent 1 has

been able to prove, by cogent and strong evidence,

that the petitioner and Resp ondent 1 had been

married to each other.

13.2. Secondly, as already discussed above,

when the marriage between Respondent 1 and the

petitioner was solemnised, the petitioner had kept

Respondent 1 in dark about his first marriage. A false

representation was given to Respondent 1 that he was

single and was competent to enter into marital tie

with Respondent 1. In such circumstances, can the

petitioner be allowed to take advantage of his own

wrong and turn around to say that the respondents

are not entitled to maintenance by filing the petition

under Section 125 CrPC as Respondent 1 is not

“legally wedded wife” of the petitioner? Our answer is

in the negative. We are of the view that at least for

the purpose of Section 125 CrPC, Respondent 1 would

be treated as the wife of the petitioner, going by the

spirit of the two judgments we have reproduced

above. For this reason, we are of the opinion that the

judgments of this Court in Adhav [Yamunabai

Anantrao Adhav v. Anantrao Shivram Adhav, (1988) 1

SCC 530 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 182] and Savitaben

[Savitaben Somabhai Bhatiya v. State of Gujarat,

(2005) 3 SCC 636 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 787] cases would

apply only in those circumstances where a woman

married a man with full knowledge of the first

subsisting marriage. In such cas es, she should know

that second marriage with such a person is

impermissible and there is an embargo under the

Hindu Marriage Act and therefore she has to suffer the

consequences thereof. The said judgment would not

apply to those cases where a man marries a second

time by keeping that lady in dark about the first

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surviving marriage. That is the only way two sets of

judgments can be reconciled and harmonised.

13.3. Thirdly, in such cases, purposive

interpretation needs to be given to the provisions of

Section 125 CrPC. While dealing with the application

of a destitute wife or hapless children or parents

under this provision, the Court is dealing with the

marginalised sections of the society. The purpose is to

achieve “social justice” which is the constitut ional

vision, enshrined in the Preamble of the Constitution

of India. The Preamble to the Constitution of India

clearly signals that we have chosen the democratic

path under the rule of law to achieve the goal of

securing for all its citizens, justice, liberty, equality

and fraternity. It specifically highlights achieving their

social justice. Therefore, it becomes the bounden duty

of the courts to advance the cause of the social

justice. While giving interpretation to a particular

provision, the court is s upposed to bridge the gap

between the law and society .

15. The provision of maintenance would

definitely fall in this category which aims at

empowering the destitute and achieving social justice

or equality and dignity of the individual. While dealing

with cases under this provision, drift in the approach

from “adversarial” litigation to social context

adjudication is the need of the hour .

16. The law regulates relationships between

people. It prescribes patterns of behaviour. It reflects

the values of society. The role of the court is to

understand the purpose of law in society and to help

the law achieve its purpose. But the law of a society is

a living organism. It is based on a given factual and

social reality that is constantly changing. Sometimes

change in law precedes societal change and is even

intended to stimulate it. In most cases, however, a

change in law is the result of a change in social

reality. Indeed, when social reality changes, the law

must change too. Just as change in social realit y is the

law of life, responsiveness to change in social reality

is the life of the law. It can be said that the history of

law is the history of adapting the law to society's

changing needs. In both constitutional and statutory

interpretation, the court i s supposed to exercise

discretion in determining the proper relationship

between the subjective and objective purposes of the

law.

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18. The court as the interpreter of law is

supposed to supply omissions, correct uncertainties,

and harmonise results with justice through a method

of free decision — libre recherché scientifique i.e.

“free scientific research”. We are of the opinion that

there is a non -rebuttable presumption that the

legislature while making a provision like Section 125

CrPC, to fulfil its constitutional duty in good faith, had

always intended to give relief to the woman becoming

“wife” under such circumstances. This approach is

particularly needed while deciding the issues relating

to gender justice. We already have examples of

exemplary efforts in this regard. Journey from Shah

Bano [Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum,

(1985) 2 SCC 556 : 1985 SCC (Cri) 245 : AIR 1985 SC

945] to Shabana Bano [Shabana Bano v. Imran Khan,

(2010) 1 SCC 666 : (2010) 1 SCC (Civ) 216 : (2010) 1

SCC (Cri) 873 : AIR 2010 SC 305] guaranteeing

maintenance rights to Muslim women is a classical

example.

20. Thus, while interpreting a statute the

court may not only take into consideration the

purpose for which the statute was enacted, but also

the mischief it seeks to suppress. It is this mischief

rule, first propounded in Heydon case [(1584) 3 Co

Rep 7a : 76 ER 637] which became the historical

source of purposive interpretation. The court would

also invoke the legal maxim construction of ut res

magis valeat quam pereat in such cases i.e. where

alternative constructions are possible the court must

give effect to that which will be responsible for the

smooth working of the system for which the statute

has been enacted rather than one which will put a

road block in its way . If the choice is between two

interpretations, the narrower of which would fail to

achieve the manifest purpose of the legislation should

be avoided. We should avoid a construction which

would reduce the legislation to futility and should

accept the bolder construction based on the view that

Parliament would legislate only for the purpose of

bringing about an effective result. If this

interpretation is not accepted, it would amount to

giving a premium to the husband for defrauding the

wife. Therefore, at least for the purpose of claiming

maintenance under Section 125 CrPC, such a woman is

to be treated as the legally wedded wife.”

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22. Relying upon the said judgment, L earned Senior Counsel

submitted that, in view of the observations made by the Hon’ble Apex

Court in the aforesaid case, and considering the facts and

circumstances of the present matter, the respondent -O.P. was legally

entitled to receive maintenance fr om the present petitioner. The

Learned Trial Court, having considered all the relevant aspects of the

matter, rightly granted interim maintenance in favour of the

respondent, and there was no infirmity in the said order.

23. Learned Sr. Counsel further relied upon another judgment of

this High Court, reported in Nityagopal Sukladas v. Anjali Nag Nath

@ Sukladas passed by this Court in Crl.Rev.P Nos.53 and 69 of 2007

decided on 05.02.2014, wherein, in para No. 8, 19 & 20 this High Court

has observed as under:-

“8. Mr. R. Datta, learned counsel appearing for

the petitioner has submitted that the impugned

judgment and order in Criminal Revision Petition

No.53 of 2007 has been passed in contrast to the

settled proposition of law as to whether the person

who is not legally married can claim maintenance

under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. In support of h is

contention, Mr. R. Datta, learned counsel has relied on

a decision of the apex Court in Smt. Yamunabai

Anantrao Adhav vs. Anantrao Shivram Adhav and

another, reported in AIR 1988 SC 644 where it has

been held that:

“4. The question, then arises as to

whether the expression 'wife' used in

Section 125 of the Code should be

interpreted to mean only a legally wedded

wife not covered by Section 11 of the Act.

The word is not defined in the Code except

indicating in the Explanation its inclusive

character so as to cover a divorcee. A

woman cannot be a divorcee unless there

was a marriage in the eye of law preceding

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that status. The expression must,

therefore, be given the meaning in which

it is understood in law applicable to the

parties, subject to the Ex planation (b),

which is not relevant in the present

context. 5. It has been contended on

behalf of the appellant that the term 'wife

' in Section 125 of the Code should be

given a wider and extended meaning so as

to include therein not only a lawfully

wedded wife but also a woman married in

fact by performance of necessary rites or

following the procedure laid down under

the law. Relying upon the decision of this

Court in Mohd. Ahmed khan v. Shah Bano

Beghum (1985) 3 SCR 844 : (AIR 1985 SC

945), it was argued that the personal law

of the parties to a proceeding under

Section 125 of the Code should be

completely excluded from consideration.

The relationship of husband and wife

comes to an end on divorce, but a divorcee

has been held to be entitled to the bene fits

of the section, it was urged, and therefore

applying this approach a woman in the

same position as the present appellant

should be brought within the sweep of the

section. We are afraid, the argument is not

well founded. A divorcee is included within

the section on account of Clause (b) of the

Explanation. The position under the

corresponding Section 488 of the code of

1898 was different. A divorcee could not

avail of the summary remedy. The wife's

right to maintenance depended upon the

continuance of her married status. It was

pointed out in Shah Bano's case that since

that right could be defeated by the

husband by divorcing her unilaterally

under the Muslim Personal Law or by

obtaining a decree of divorce under any

other system of law, it was consider ed

desirable to remove the hardship by

extending the benefit of the provisions of

the section to a divorced woman so long

as she did not remarry, and that was

achieved by including Clause (b) of the

Explanation. Unfortunately for the

appellant no correspon ding provision was

brought in so as to apply to her. The

legislature decided to bestow the benefit

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of the Section even on an illegitimate child

by express words but none are found to

apply to a de facto wife where the

marriage is void ab initio.”

[Emphasis added]

19. Badshah (supra) being the latest decision

of the apex court binds this Court to follow the law as

laid down therein. It has been admitted by the

petitioner that he has lived together with the

respondent as husband and wife and procreated two

children. Hence, de facto marriage cannot be denied

by him nor would it fit in his mouth to deny that

relation. Such long living together itself provides the

basis to presume that there has been a de facto

marriage with or without concealme nt of the former

marriage. Thus even if the respondent is not the wife

dejure, for that de facto marriage, in terms of Badsha

(supra), she is entitled to be treated as the legally

married wife within the meaning of Section 125 of the

Cr.P.C. As corollary thereof, she is entitled to the

maintenance allowance. Having held so, this court is

not inclined to interfere with the impugned judgments

and orders.

20. The petitioner has introduced one

affidavit in the evidence showing that the respondent

had married one Bibhash Nath and the Notary Public

who verified the affirmation has also been examined.

However, the Sub -Divisional Judicial Magistrate,

Dharmanagar did not give any finding on that aspect

of the matter. As such, if the petitioner so desires, he

can approach the appropriate court for getting out of

the liability of the payment of maintenance to the

respondent on alteration of the order of maintenance

for the change in the circumstances. For now, the

petitioner has to oblige the order of maintenance

granted by the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate and

the Additional Sessions Judge, North Tripura,

Dharmanagar. For non -payment, he is liable to be

subjected to the enforcement proceeding. ”

24. Relying upon the said judgment, he further submitted that

the facts and circumstances of the present case are squarely covered

by the aforesaid judgment. Finally, he submitted that there is no merit

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in the petition filed by the present petitioner-husband and, as such, the

same is liable to be dismissed with costs.

25. Heard Learned counsel for both the parties at length.

Perused the petition filed by the respondent, the objection filed by the

petitioner, and also perused the order dated 24.07.2025 passed by the

Learned Additional Judge, Family Court, Agartala, West Tripura.

26. Now, before arriving at a conclusion, let us narrate

hereinbelow the subject matter of the petition filed by the respondent

before the Learned Family Court as the petitioner therein.

According to the respondent -petitioner, she had been

working as an employee at the garment shop of the O.P., i.e. the

present petitioner, namely “Kanai Textiles”, situated at Central Road,

Agartala, since 3rd December, 2008. Her first marriage was dissolved

by a decree of divorce dated 26.11.2020, and out of the said wedlock,

she has a son.

27. During the initial period of her employment at the said

garment shop, the present petitioner allegedly approached the

respondent-petitioner to establish a relationship with her, which she

was initially not agreed. However, subsequently, owing to his

assurances and good behaviour, and as the present petitioner

expressed his love for the respondent-petitioner and assured her that

he would lead a peaceful married life with her during the rest part of his

life, she gradually became closer to him.

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28. It was further stated that the present petitioner, as O.P.,

frequently called her to his room and proposed to marry, stating that he

would soon divorce his wife, alleging that his wife had developed an

extra-marital relationship with another man and that their matrimonial

relationship had consequently deteriorated. On the basis of such

representations and assurances, the respondent -petitioner became

closer to the present petitioner. Subsequently, on 10.12.2010, the

present petitioner, as O.P., allegedly represented to her that he had

already divorced his wife and was, therefore, free to marry her.

29. The respondent-petitioner, believing the representation

made by the O.P., i.e. the present petitioner herein, regarding his

divorce, started living with him in good faith as his wife at his flat

situated at Gurkhabasti and, sometimes, at his flat in Kolkata.

Thereafter, when the father of the respondent-petitioner fell seriously ill

and required an operation in Kolkata, the present petitio ner-O.P.

assured her that he would accompany her to Kolkata for the treatment

of her father. Accordingly, they went to Kolkata, where the present

petitioner stood by the respondent-petitioner and took care of her and

her son during the treatment of her father. Thereafter, on 20.11.2012,

the marriage between the parties was solemnized at the Kalighat

Temple in the presence of a priest and the minor son of the

respondent-petitioner. It was alleged that the present petitioner-O.P.

applied vermilion on her forehead, accepted her as his wife, and

undertook all responsibilities towards her.

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30. Thereafter, they started living together as husband and wife

and continued their conjugal life. During the course of their

cohabitation, the respondent-petitioner became pregnant; however,

due to alleged tremendous pressure and coercion, she was compelled to

undergo an forceful abortion in the second week of September, 2014,

at Kolkata.

31. It was further alleged that the present petitioner -O.P.

introduced the respondent-petitioner to the other staff members of his

shop as his wife. However, on 14.06.2022, the present petitioner

suddenly changed his behaviour and informed the respondent -petitioner

that he was no longer interested in living with her. He thereafter

blocked her telephone number. Subsequently, on 23.08.2022, the

petitioner-O.P. allegedly deserted the respondent -petitioner after

subjecting her to mental and emotional torture, as a result of which she

was compelled to take shelter at her father's residence.

Thereafter, the respondent-petitioner instituted a proceeding

under the Domestic Violence Act, which is stated to be pending. She

also filed a petition seeking maintenance against the present petitioner.

32. The present petitioner, as the opposite party, contested the

proceeding by filing a written objection, wherein he denied all the

assertions and allegations made by the respondent -petitioner in her

application. He also took the plea that he had been married to one

Shipra Saha for long back and that, out of their wedlock, a daughter,

namely, Sri Bijoyeta Saha, and a son, namely, Rupsankar Saha, were

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born. He further stated that both of his children had already got

married in the years 2011 and 2016, respectively, and that they have

children of their own.

33. According to the petitioner, following the termination of the

employment of one Suman Saha, he alleged that said Suman Saha,

along with other employees, including the respondent -petitioner, had

conspired against him and instituted the present proceeding wit h a

mala fide intention. He further denied having shared any household

with the respondent-petitioner or having led any conjugal life with her.

He also denied that they had ever resided together at any place as

husband and wife.

34. It was further submitt ed that, after the respondent -

petitioner obtained a divorce from her first husband in the year 2010,

she and her son became close to the wife of the present petitioner-O.P.

and, owing to their financial difficulties, gained her sympathy. The wife

of the petitioner-O.P., considering the respondent-petitioner to be a

helpless woman, provided her financial assistance from time to time. It

was further stated that the wife of the petitioner-O.P. subsequently died

on 09.01.2020.

35. It was further submitted that, since the marriage of the

petitioner-O.P. with the said Shipra Saha subsisted until her death, the

question of solemnizing a second marriage during the subsistence of

the said marriage did not arise. Accordingly, by filing the written

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objection, the petitioner-O.P. prayed for dismissal of the application for

interim maintenance.

36. However, after hearing both sides, the Learned Trial Court

was pleased to grant ad-interim maintenance at the rate of Rs.15,000/-

per month in favour of the respondent -petitioner, till disposal of the

maintenance petition by the said Court.

37. I have heard Learned counsel for both the parties at length.

The original petition is still pending for disposal. I have also perused the

order passed by the Learned Additional Judge, Family Court, Agartala,

West Tripura.

38. It is an admitted position that, after obtaining a divorce from

her first husband, the respondent-petitioner became helpless and took

up employment at the shop of the petitioner -O.P. During the said

period, both the parties came into contact with each other and

developed a relationship.

39. The issue regarding getting married by the petitioner to the

respondent is yet to be determined by the Learned Trial Court in the

main proceeding. The present petitioner, although, has taken the plea

that his marriage with Shipra Saha continued to subsist until her death

and, therefore, the question of his marriage with the respo ndent-

petitioner does not arise. At the same time, he has admitted that he

travelled to different places with the respondent-petitioner. He has also

admitted the photographs placed by the re spondent-petitioner before

the Learned Trial Court. Furthermore, he has admitted that he had

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spent a sum of Rs.20,00,000/- towards the education of the son of the

respondent-petitioner.

40. Although Learned Counsel appearing for the present

petitioner took the plea that the petitioner had never married the

respondent at Kalighat Temple in the year 2012, no marriage certificate

or independent evidence was produced to su bstantiate the said

contention. Rather, he sought to draw the attention of this Court to the

allegation that one Suman Saha and others had falsely implicated the

petitioner at the instance of the respondent-petitioner, as Suman Saha

had been terminated from the petitioner’s shop.

41. However, it is admitted that the petitioner had engaged the

respondent-petitioner as an employee in his shop in the year 2008-

2010, after her divorce from her first husband. The main proceeding is

still pending for adjudication. The allegations and counter allegations of

the parties are to be decided in the main proceeding by the Learned

Trial Court.

42. However, at the time of hearing, both the sides referred to

certain judgments. Learned Senior Counsel, Mr. Roy Barman, appearing

on behalf of the respondent, relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble

Supreme Court reported in (2014) 1 SCC 188 , Badshah v. Urmila

Badshah Godse & Anr. (supra), wherein, in paragraph 20, the Hon’ble

Apex Court observed that, while interpreting a statute the Court may

not only take into consideration the purpose for which the statute was

enacted, but also the mischief it seeks to suppress. It is the mischief

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rule, first propounded in Heydon case which became the historical

source of purposive of interpretation. The Court would also invoke the

legal maxim construction of ut res magis valeat quam pereat in such

cases i.e. where alternative constructions are possible the Court must

give effect to that which will be responsible for the smooth working of

the system for which the statute has been enacted rather than one

which will put a road block in its way. If the choice is between the two

interpretations, the narrower of which would fail to achieve the manifest

purpose of the legislation should be avoided.

43. Thus, the Hon’ble Apex Court observed that a construction

which would reduce the legislation to futility ought to be avoided, and a

broader construction should be adopted on the premise that Parliament

legislates with the object of achieving an effective and meaningful

result. If such an interpretation is not adopted, it would amount to

conferring a premium upon a husband for defrauding his wife.

Therefore, at least for the purpose of claiming maintenance under

Section 125 of the Cr.P.C., such a woman o ught to be treated as a

legally wedded wife. Accordingly, the Hon’ble Apex Court granted relief

in favour of the petitioner.

44. Viewed in the aforesaid perspective, in the case at hand,

prima facie, it appears that the parties maintained a relationship with

each other for a considerable period. They resided together as husband

and wife, travelled to different places, and took photographs together.

The present petitioner also spent money towards the care and well -

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being of the respondent-petitioner and her son and incurred expenses

towards the education of her son. Further more the petitioner disclosed

the respondent that his marriage with Shipra Saha was ended in

divorce which he disclosed on 10.12.2010 . Thus he duped the

respondent by suppressing the fact of his relationship with Shipra Saha

as husband and wife.

45. Thus, at this stage, considering the facts and circumstances

of the case, and since the original petition is still pending for disposal,

this Court, without making any further observation on the merits of the

main proceeding, is of the view that there is no infirmity in the order

passed by the Learned Additional Judge, Family Court, Agartala, West

Tripura, granting interim maintenance in favour of the respondent -

petitioner.

Accordingly, the present petition filed by the petitioner

stands rejected, being devoid of merit.

46. The Learned Trial Court is directed to dispose of the main

petition at the earliest convenience, without being influenced or

prejudiced by any of the observations made by this Court in the present

petition or in this order, after affording adequate opportunity to both

the parties to adduce their respective evidence.

With these aforesaid observations the present revision

petition is stands disposed of.

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Send down the copy of the judgment/order to the Learned

Trial Court immediately, for information and necessary action.

Also a copy of this order/judgment be circulated to all the

Family Court’s across the State.

Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of

accordingly.

JUDGE

Satabdi