1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 1452 OF 2023

(@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NO.2480 OF 2021 )

SRI GULAM MUSTAFA … APPELLANT

VERSUS

THE STATE OF KARNATAKA & ANR. … RESPONDENTS

R1: THE STATE OF KARNATAKA

R2: SMT. JAYAMMA

J U D G M E N T

AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, J.

Heard learned counsel for the appellant,

respondent no.1 and respondent no.2.

2. Leave granted.

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3. The present criminal appeal is directed against

the Final Judgment and Order dated 23.02.2021 (herei n-

after referred to as the “Impugned Judgment”) rendered

by the High Court of Karnataka (hereinafter referred to

as the “High Court”) at Bengaluru, whereby the High

Court was pleased to reject Criminal Petition No. 3788

of 2019 preferred by the appellant.

FACTUAL PRISM:

4. The Appellant is the Managing Director of GM

Infinite Dwelling (India) Private Limited (hereinafter

referred to as “GMID”). The company is said to be

engaged in developing residential properties. The said

company and the owners (heirs of one Mr A. Hafeez Khan)

of land bearing Survey Number 83 in Jodi Mallasandra

Village, District Bengaluru e ntered into a Joint

Development Agreement (hereinafter referred to as the

“JDA”) on 17.08.2009. In the year 2017, the apartment

project, as contemplated under the JDA, was completed

and sale deeds were executed in favour of the

allottees.

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5. The original owners of the land claimed title on

the basis of possessing the sale deed with regard to

the said land; order of the Special Deputy

Commissioner, Inams Abolition, Bangalore in Case No.

86/1959-60 dated 09.07.1961; Revenue records recording

the property mutated in the names of the heirs of Mr.

A. Hafeez Khan and given Survey Numbers 83/1 and 83/2

[(old Survey Number 8) new Survey Number 83]. Pursuant

to the JDA, the land-owners got the land-use changed

from agriculture to non- agriculture and after getting

the necessary No- Objection Certificate from various

departments involved, obtained the sanctioned map and

Building License from the Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagar

Palike (hereinafter referred to as the “BBMP”), before

construction commenced.

6. It transpires that one Venkatesh, son of Late

Bylappa, was the owner of old Survey Number 83 and his

property had been assigned new Survey Numbers 80/1 and

80/3, and due to such change, with the new survey

numbers with regard to the land in question being

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Survey Number 83, the said Venkatesh claimed title over

land under the new Survey Number 83. This resulted in

prolonged civil litigation which included an

application before the Special Tehsildar; appeal before

the Assistant Commissioner, Bangalore, North Sub-

Division, and; Appeal before the Special Deputy

Commissioner – all of which went against Venkatesh.

7. But that is not all. There were also two suits –

one filed by the legitimate land- owners, which was a

suit for injunction, and one (which we have no

hesitation in terming so) a frivolous suit filed by

Venkatesh. Since Venkatesh ’s suit did not yield any

relief, he, along with others, approached the High

Court with an appeal, which was also dismissed. In

addition to this, Venkatesh also made an application

before the Additional Director, Town Planning, BBMP and

got the sanctioned plan cancelled. GMID impugned the

cancellation before the High Court by way of a writ

petition, which was disposed of directing GMID and the

owners to approach the BBMP ’s Appeal Committee. Upon so

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doing, BBMP’s Appeal Committee set aside the order of

the Commissioner and restored the sanctioned plan.

8. The construction commenced and after GMID having

entered into sale agreement(s) with prospective

purchasers of the apartments, Venkatesh initiated

criminal proceedings against the appellants and others

and through his proxies, one of whom, namely, Parvathy

Reddy had even been impleaded in the civil suit filed

by Venkatesh. Another civil suit being O.S. No.

8163/2016 has also been filed against the land-owners

and the builders by other person(s), which, as on date,

is still pending. While these civil litigations were

being defended by GMID and the original landlords in

various courts, a criminal complaint was lodged by the

mother of the plaintiff in O.S. No. 8163/2016, under

Sections 120B, 406, 419, 468, 471, 420, 448, 427 read

with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860

(hereinafter referred to as the “IPC”). The same

metamorphosed into First Information Report in Crime

No. 317/2017 at Bagalgunte Police Station, Bangalore

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City (hereinafter referred to as the “FIR”) under

Section 3(1)(15) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled

Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989

(hereinafter referred to as the “SC/ST Act”) and

Sections 427, 420, 419, 406 , 471, 468, 448 and 120B of

the IPC. The Managing Director of GMID, namely Gulam

Mustafa, the appellant before us is arrayed as Accused

No. 18 in the FIR.

9. Insofar as the development on the land is

concerned, learned counsel for the appellant has stated

that in 2017, the construction of the apartments was

completed, sale deeds executed in favour of the

respective allottees, and these allottees are residing

in their apartments thereafter.

10. The appellant moved a petition under Section 482

of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter

referred to as the “Code”) on 28.05.2019 before the

High Court for quashing the FIR. The said petition was

numbered Criminal Petition No. 3788 of 2019, and the

High Court, by order dated 07.08.2019, while issuing

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notice, granted ad-interim direction staying further

proceedings in the FIR as far as the appellant was

concerned. However, Criminal Petition No. 3788 of 2019

was ultimately dismissed on 23.02.2021, leading to the

institution of the instant appeal.

SUBMISSIONS BY THE APPELLANT :

11. Learned senior counsel for the appellant submitted

that firstly, the matter is purely civil in nature as

it raises questions relating to title of the land on

which GMID had entered into a JDA and constructed

apartments after following the due procedure in law.

12. It was submitted that not one but multiple

authorities, including revenue authorities, the BBMP,

etc. had given requisite permission/s for construction.

Moreover, it was submitted that initial civil

litigation was also decided in favour of the original

land-owners, with whom GMID had signed the JDA.

13. The complaint resulting into the FIR, submitted

learned counsel, was at the behest of Venkatesh, who,

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mischievously, taking advantage of the similarity in

the old survey number of his land with the new survey

number of the land involved herein, had blatantly

abused the process of the court. It was submitted that

even when the initial written complaint was filed

before the police, GMID was arrayed as Accused No. 19,

but in the consequent FIR, the appellant was made party

thereto, by naming him as the Accused No.18.

14. It was submitted that the FIR is a complete abuse

of process as it has been filed by a family member of

the person, who was unsuccessful in various proceedings

against the original land -owners and the builder

(GMID), where they could not succeed and that is the

reason why Venkatesh had put up his illiterate mother

to file a false and frivolous complaint levelling false

allegations. It was submitted that the i ssue of title

of the property has attained finality in terms of the

decree passed by the Civil Court and no appeal has been

filed against the same. It was submitted that even the

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allegations to bring in the SC/ST Act were deliberate,

and with malafide intention.

15. Learned counsel submitted that this Court has

repeatedly deprecated the practice of filing false

criminal cases in order to apply pressure and settle

civil disputes. By way of illustration, he relied upon

Govind Prasad Kejriwal v State of Bihar , (2020) 16 SCC

714; Commissioner of Police v Devender Anand, 2019 SCC

OnLine SC 966; Binod Kumar v State of Bihar, (2014) 10

SCC 663; Indian Oil Corporation v NEPC India Ltd. ,

(2006) 6 SCC 736 and G Sagar Suri v State of Uttar

Pradesh, (2000) 2 SCC 636.

16. It was submitted that till date chargesheet has

not been filed. It was further submitted that GMID had

developed residential apartment complexes of more than

400 units on the self-same land, whereon the

complainant’s family unsuccessfully attempted to claim

title on multiple occasions, and the FIR is nothing but

a vexatious proceeding employed as a tool by the

complainant to coerce the appellant to agree to

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unjustified attempts. It was canvassed that in 2010,

the relatives of the complainant had instituted a civil

suit seeking declaration of the title of the suit

property, which was dismissed in 2016. Subsequently,

the sons of the complainant instituted a fresh suit in

2016 and also sought an order to, inter alia, restrain

the appellant from entering upon the land in question.

The said suit, it is stated, is pending without any

interim order in operation.

17. Learned counsel also drew the attention of the

Court to the fact that the complainant ’s relatives

initially tried to interfere with the suit prope rty in

2006 due to which the original land-owners had

initiated a civil suit in 2008, which was, in fact,

decreed against the complainant ’s family members.

18. It was also submitted that the person(s), with

whom the appellant had inked the JDA, had purchased the

subject-property in 1954-1955 and thereafter, they got

occupancy rights of the land on 09.07.1961, and only in

2017, the present criminal dispute had been engineered

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by the complainant and/or her family members, noted

hereinabove.

SUBMISSIONS OF RESPONDENT NO. 2/COMPLAINANT:

19. Learned counsel for the complainant/respondent no.

2 submitted that the appeal is misconceived as the

police was in the midst of investigation which should

be allowed to be completed. It was submitted that the

complainant belongs to the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled

Tribes category and is protected thereunder. Learned

counsel supported the invocation of the provisions of

the SC/ST Act in the FIR. It was submitted that the

additional documents, sought to be made part of the

present record, were not part of the pleadings before

the High Court and thus, may not be looked into. It was

contended that it would amount to introduction of new

fact(s) in this case. It was contended that Section 482

of the Code requires the court only to see, whether

from the complaint, any cognizable offence is made out,

which in the present case is made out.

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20. It was submitted that as the specific allegations

pertain to cheating, criminal conspiracy and trespass,

being cognizable offences under the IPC, and the same

relating to the property belonging to the Scheduled

Castes/Scheduled Tribes community would attract

provisions of the SC/ST Act. It was reiterated that the

property in question belongs to the respondent no. 2

and her family members, and any construction raised on

the subject-land is by creating forged documents.

21. It was then contended that the Court is to be

highly circumspect in interfering with investigation

and quashing of FIRs. In support of his contentions,

learned counsel reli ed upon the following judgments,

and the paragraphs indicated alongside:

i. State of Madhya Pradesh v Surendra Kori ,

(2012) 10 SCC 155 @ Paras 14 and 16.

ii. Dineshbhai Chandubhai Patel v State of

Gujarat, (2018) 3 SCC 104 @ Paras 30-31

iii. Satvinder Kaur v State (Govt. of NCT of

Delhi), (1999) 8 SCC 728 @ Para 16

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iv. P Chidambaram v Directorate of

Enforcement, (2019) 9 SCC 24 @ Paras 61,

64-67

v. Skoda Auto Volkswagen India Private

Limited v State of Uttar Pradesh, (2021) 5

SCC 795 @ Para 41

vi. Union of India v Prakash P Hi nduja, (2003)

6 SCC 195 @ Para 20

22. Further, advancing that the FIR was not required

to be an encyclopaedia, which must disclose all facts

and details of the offence(s) alleged or complained of,

learned counsel relied upon Superintendent of Police,

CBI v Tapan Kumar Singh , (2003) 6 SCC 175 (at Para 20)

and State of Uttar Pradesh v Naresh , (2011) 4 SCC 324

(at Para 32).

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT NO.1/THE STATE:

23. Learned counsel for the State submitted that the

matter involves disputed questions of fact which this

Court would not go into. It was the submission that the

case be left to be investigated into by the police.

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Further, it was submitted that Dineshbhai Chandubhai

Patel (supra) has held that it is the duty of the

Investigating Officer to probe the crime, and that the

High Court is not to act as an Investigating Officer.

ANALYSIS, REASONING AND CONCLUSION:

24. Having considered the matter, this Court finds

that a case for interference is made out. The basic

facts to be noticed are: (a) that the land-owners with

whom GMID had entered into the JDA, had purchased the

land in 1954-1955, and; (b) the occupancy rights were

also created in the original land- owners’ favour on

09.07.1961. From then onwards, no dispute was raised by

any person before any authority and only after the GMID

entered into the JDA with the original land -owners in

the year 2009, obtained all clearances from the

authorities in their favour, started the construction

work and built apartments numbering more than 400, sold

them to the buyers/allottees in the year 2017, did the

present dispute arise. This itself indicates a lack of

bonafide. We have mused as to why the complainant and

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her family members, if the land was theirs, would sit

by and watch on as fence- sitters for a long period of

time.

25. Moreover, when one civil litigation had attained

finality with no relief granted to the relatives of the

complainant, another civil suit was filed in the year

2016 and therein as well, when no interim order could

be secured by the complainant/her family members, the

present complaint has been registered, resulting in the

FIR. We are constrained to state that the malafide

appears writ large from the aforenoted sequence of

events.

26. Although we are not for verbosity in our

judgments, a slightly detailed su rvey of the judicial

precedents is in order. In State of Haryana v Bhajan

Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 , this Court held:

“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of

the various relevant provisions of the Code under

Chapter XIV and of the principles of law

enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions

relating to the exercise of the extraordinary

power under Article 226 or the inherent powers

under Section 482 of the Code which we have

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extracted and reproduced above, we give the

following categories of cases by way of

illustration wherein such power could be exercised

either to prevent abuse of the process of any

court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice,

though it may not be possible to lay down any

precise, clearly defined and sufficiently

channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid

formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad

kinds of cases wherein such power should be

exercised.

(1) Where the allegations made in the first

information report or the complaint, even if they

are taken at their face value and accepted in

their entirety do not prima facie constitute any

offence or make out a case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first

information report and other materials, if any,

accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable

offence, justifying an investigation by police

officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except

under an order of a Magistrate within the purview

of Section 155(2) of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in

the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in

support of the same do not disclose the commission

of any offence and make out a case against the

accused.

(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not

constitute a cognizable offence but constitute

only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is

permitted by a police officer without an order of

a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2)

of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or

complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable

on the basis of which no prudent person can ever

reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient

ground for proceeding against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar

engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or

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the concerned Act (under which a criminal

proceeding is instituted) to the institution and

continuance of the proceedings and/or where there

is a specific provision in the Code or the

concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for

the grievance of the aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly

attended with mala fide and/or where the

proceeding is maliciously instituted with an

ulterior motive for wr eaking vengeance on the

accused and with a view to spite him due to

private and personal grudge .

103. We also give a note of caution to the

effect that the power of quashing a criminal

proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and

with circumspection and that too in the rarest of

rare cases; that the court will not be justified

in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability

or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations

made in the FIR or the complaint and that the

extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an

arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act

according to its whim or caprice .”

(emphasis supplied)

27. This Court, in S W Palanitkar v State of Bihar ,

(2002) 1 SCC 24, held:

“… whereas while exercising power under Section

482 CrPC the High Court has to look at the object

and purpose for which such power is conferred on

it under the said provision. Exercise of inherent

power is available to the High Court to give

effect to any order under CrPC, or to prevent

abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to

secure the ends of justice. This being the

position, exercise of power under Section 482 CrPC

should be consistent with the scope and ambit of

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the same in the light of the decisions

aforementioned. In appropriate cases, to prevent

judicial process from being an instrument of

oppression or harassment in the hands of

frustrated or vindictive litigants, exercise of

inherent power is not only desirable but necessary

also, so that the judicial forum of court may not

be allowed to be utilized for any oblique motive .

When a person approaches the High Court under

Section 482 CrPC to quash the very issue of

process, the High Court on the facts and

circumstances of a case has to exercise th e powers

with circumspection as stated above to really

serve the purpose and object for which they are

conferred.”

(emphasis supplied)

28. In State of Karnataka v M Devendrappa , (2002) 3

SCC 89, it was decided:

“6. Exercise of power under Section 482 of the

Code in a case of this nature is the exception and

not the rule. The section does not confer any new

powers on the High Court. It only saves the

inherent power which the Court possessed before

the enactment of the Code. It envisages three

circumstances under which the inherent

jurisdiction may be exercised , namely, (i) to give

effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent

abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to

otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is

neither possible nor desirable to lay down any

inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of

inherent jurisdiction . No legislative enactment

dealing with procedure can provide for all cases

that may possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have

inherent powers apart from express provisions of

law which are necessary for proper discharge of

functions and duties imposed upon them by law.

That is the doctrine which finds expression in the

section which merely recognizes and preserves

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inherent powers of the Hi gh Courts. All courts,

whether civil or criminal possess, in the absence

of any express provision, as inherent in their

constitution, all such powers as are necessary to

do the right and to undo a wrong in course of

administration of justice on the princip le quando

lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur et

id sine quo res ipsae esse non potest (when the

law gives a person anything it gives him that

without which it cannot exist). While exercising

powers under the section, the court does not

function as a court of appeal or revision.

Inherent jurisdiction under the section though

wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and

with caution and only when such exercise is

justified by the tests specifically laid down in

the section itself. It is to be exercised ex

debito justitiae to do real and substantial

justice for the administration of which alone

courts exist. Authority of the court exists for

advancement of justice and if any attempt is made

to abuse that authority so as to produce

injustice, the court has power to prevent abuse.

It would be an abuse of process of the court to

allow any action which would result in injustice

and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of

the powers court would be justified to quash any

proceeding if it finds th at initiation/continuance

of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or

quashing of these proceedings would otherwise

serve the ends of justice. When no offence is

disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine

the question of fact. When a complaint is sought

to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the

materials to assess what the complainant has

alleged and whether any offence is made out even

if the allegations are accepted in toto .”

(emphasis supplied)

29. In Uma Shankar Gopalika v State of Bihar , (2005)

10 SCC 336, at Para 7 thereof, it was held that when

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the complaint fails to disclose any criminal offence,

the proceeding is liable to be quashed under Section

482 of the Code:

“In our view petition of complaint does not

disclose any criminal offence at all much less any

offence either under Section 420 or Section 120- B

IPC and the present case is a case of purely civil

dispute between the parties for which remedy lies

before a civil court by filing a properly

constituted suit. In our opinion, in view of these

facts allowing the police investigation to

continue would amount to an abuse of the process

of court and to prevent the same it was just and

expedient for the High Court to quash the same by

exercising the powers under Section 482 Code which

it has erroneously refused .”

(emphasis supplied)

30. The law on the subject was also examined in

Parbatbhai Aahir v State of Gujarat , (2017) 9 SCC 641 .

In Habib Abdullah Jeelani , (2017) 2 SCC 779 , it was

opined:

“inherent power in a matter of quashment of FIR

has to be exercised sparingly and with caution and

when and only when such exercise is justified by

the test specifically laid down in the provision

itself There is no denial of the fact that the

power under Section 482 CrPC is very wide but it

needs no special emphasis to state that conferment

of wide power requires the Court to be more

cautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent

duty on the Court.”

(emphasis supplied)

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31. In Vinod Natesan v State of Ker ala, (2019) 2 SCC

401, this Court took the position outlined hereunder:

“11. … Even otherwise, as observed

hereinabove, we are more than satisfied that there

was no criminality on part of the accused and a

civil dispute is tried to be converted into a

criminal dispute. Thus to continue the criminal

proceedings against the accused would be an abuse

of the process of law. Therefore, the High Court

has rightly exercised the powers under Section 482

CrPC and has rightly quashed the criminal

proceedings. In view of the aforesaid and for the

reasons stated above, the present appeal fails and

deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly

dismissed.”

(emphasis supplied)

32. The legal position was also considered in Kamal

Shivaji Pokarnekar v State of Maharashtra , (2019) 14

SCC 350. In Mahendra K C v State of Karnataka , 2021 SCC

OnLine SC 1021, this Court stated:

“23. … the High Court while exercising its power

under Section 482 of the CrPC to quash the FIR

instituted against the second respondent -accused

should have applied the following two tests : i)

whether the allegations made in the complaint,

prima facie constitute an offence; and ii) whether

the allegations are so improbable that a prudent

man would not arrive at the conclusion that there

is sufficient ground to proceed with the

complaint.”

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33. We are equally mindful of Arnab Manoranjan Goswami

v State of Maharashtra , (2021) 2 SCC 427 , where at

Paragraph 68, it was stated that “… The other end of

the spectrum is equally important: the recognition by

Section 482 of the power inhering in the High Court to

prevent the abuse of process or to secure the ends of

justice is a valuable safeguard for protecting

liberty.” We are at one with this comment. A detailed

exposition of the law is also forthcoming in Neeharika

Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v State of Maharashtra , 2021

SCC OnLine SC 315 , which we have factored into, while

adjudicating the instant lis.

34. Insofar and inasmuch as interference in cases

involving the SC/ST Act is concerned, we may only point

out that a 3-Judge Bench of this Court, in Ramawatar v

State of Madhya Pradesh , 2021 SCC OnLine SC 966 , has

held that the mere fact that the offence is covered

under a ‘special statute’ would not inhibit this Court

or the High Court from exercising their respective

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powers under Article 142 of the Constitution or Section

482 of the Code, in the terms below:

“15. Ordinarily, when dealing with offences

arising out of special statutes such as the SC/ST

Act, the Court will be extremely circumspect in

its approach. The SC/ST Act has been specifically

enacted to deter acts of indignity, humiliation

and harassment against members of Scheduled Castes

and Scheduled Tribes. The SC/ST Act is also a

recognition of the depressing reality that despite

undertaking several measures, the Scheduled

Castes/Scheduled Tribes continue to be subjected

to various atrocities at the hands of upper-

castes. The Courts have to be mindful of the fact

that the SC/ST Act has been enacted keeping in

view the express constitutional safeguards

enumerated in Articles 15, 17 and 21 of the

Constitution, with a twin -fold objective of

protecting the mem bers of these vulnerable

communities as well as to provide relief and

rehabilitation to the victims of caste -based

atrocities.

16. On the other hand, where it appears to

the Court that the offence in question, although

covered under the SC/ST Act, is primarily civil or

private where the alleged offence has not been

committed on account of the caste of the victim,

or where the continuation of the legal proceedings

would be an abuse of the process of law, the Court

can exercise its powers to quash the pr oceedings.

On similar lines, when considering a prayer for

quashing on the basis of a compromise/settlement,

if the Court is satisfied that the underlying

objective of the SC/ST Act would not be

contravened or diminished even if the felony in

question goes unpunished, the mere fact that the

offence is covered under a ‘special statute’ would

not refrain this Court or the High Court, from

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exercising their respective powers under Article

142 of the Constitution or Section 482 Cr.P.C .”

(emphasis supplied)

35. We have bestowed anxious consideration to the

precedents cited by learned counsel for the respondents

and are of the view that the same are inapposite to the

factual scenario herein. Suffice it would be to state

that while the propositions laid down therein are not

disputed, they do not prejudice the version of the

present appellant. Tapan Kumar Singh (supra) and Naresh

(supra) indicate that the FIR need not be a detailed

one, as it is only to initiate the investigative

process and the police should ordinarily be allowed to

investigate. This is the general rule, but not a fetter

on this Court or the High Court in an appropriate case.

36. What is evincible from the extant case-law is that

this Court has been consistent in interfering in such

matters where purely civil disputes, more often than

not, relating to land and/or money are given the colour

of criminality, only for the purposes of exerting

extra-judicial pressure on the party concerned, which,

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we reiterate, is nothing but abuse of the process o f

the court. In the present case, there is a huge, and

quite frankly, unexplained delay of over 60 years in

initiating dispute with regard to the ownership of the

land in question, and the criminal case has been lodged

only after failure to obtain relief in the civil suits,

coupled with denial of relief in the interim therein to

the respondent no.2/her family members. It is evident

that resort was now being had to criminal proceedings

which, in the considered opinion of this Court, is with

ulterior motives, for oblique reasons and is a clear

case of vengeance.

37. The Court would also note that even if the

allegations are taken to be true on their face value,

it is not discernible that any offence can be said to

have been made out under the SC/ST Act against the

appellant. The complaint and FIR are frivolous,

vexatious and oppressive.

38. This Court would indicate that the officers, who

institute an FIR, based on any complaint, are duty -

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bound to be vigilant before invoking any provision of a

very stringent statute, like the SC/ST Act, which

imposes serious penal consequences on the concerned

accused. The officer has to be satisfied that the

provisions he seeks to invoke prima facie apply to the

case at hand. We clarify that our remarks, in no

manner, are to dilute the applicability of

special/stringent statutes, but only to remind the

police not to mechanically apply the law, dehors

reference to the factual position.

39. For the reasons aforesaid, the Court finds that

the High Court fell in error in not invoking its

wholesome power under Section 482 of the Code to quash

the FIR. Accordingly, the Impugned Judgment, being

untenable in law, is set aside. Consequent thereupon,

the FIR, as also any proceedings emanating therefrom,

insofar as they relate to the appellant, are quashed

and set aside.

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40. Accordingly, this appeal stands allowed, without

any order towards costs. Pending applications are

consigned to records.

.......................J.

[DINESH MAHESHWARI]

.......................J.

[ AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH]

NEW DELHI

MAY 10, 2023