1

Reserved on : 25.04.2026

Pronounced on : 29.07.2026

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA DHARWAD BENCH

DATED THIS THE 29

TH

DAY OF JULY, 2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M. NAGAPRASANNA

WRIT PETITION No.101332 OF 2025 (S - RES)

BETWEEN:

1 . SRI VIJAY SHANKAR DESHINGE

AGED ABOUT 39 YEARS,

OCC. AEE,

R/O. C/O. KHB DISTRICT PROJECT OFFICE,

BAGALKOT – 587 101.

2 . PRAMODA B. P.,

AGED ABOUT 38 YEARS,

OCC. AEE,

R/O. BEHIND IJOOR POLICE STATION,

KHB DISTRICT PROJECT OFFICE,

RAMANAGARA – 562 159.

3 . SAHANA M.,

AGED ABOUT 37 YEARS,

OCC. AEE,

R/O. KHB DISTRICT PROJECT OFFICE,

UDUPI DISTRICT

DAKSHINA KANNADA – 574 118.

4 . IRFAN AHMED,

AGED ABOUT 39 YEARS,

R

2

OCC. AEE,

TECHNICAL SECTION,

KARNATAKA HOUSING BOARD,

CAUVERY BHAVAN, 3

RD

FLOOR,

K.G. ROAD, BENGALURU – 560 001.

... PETITIONERS

(BY SRI GURUDAS KHANNUR, SR.ADVOCATE A/W

SRI JAGADISH PATIL, ADVOCATE)

AND:

1 . THE STATE OF KARNATAKA

REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY,

DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING,

M. S. BUILDING, VIKAS SOUDHA,

BENGALURU – 560 001.

2 . KARNATAKA HOUSING BOARD,

REPRESENTED BY ITS COMMISSIONER,

III AND IV FLOOR, CAUVERY BHAVAN,

K. G. ROAD, BENGALURU – 560 009.

3 . KARNATAKA HOUSING BOARD,

REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY,

III AND IV FLOOR, CAUVERY BHAVAN,

K. G. ROAD, BENGALURU – 560 009.

4. GANESH H.N.,

S/O NATARAJ H.N.,

AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS

OCC.: ASSISTANT ENGINEER

KHB HEAD OFFICE

BENGALURU.

5. ANITA S.,

W/O VENUGOPAL C.N.,

AGED ABOUT 35 YEARS

3

ASSISTANT ENGINEER

KHB HEAD OFFICE

BENGALURU.

6. ASHA K.M.,

W/O ASHWIN M.,

AGED ABOUT 37 YEARS

ASSISTANT ENGINEER

KHB, SURYA NAGAR, 4

TH

PHASE

BENGALURU.

7. BASAVARAJU

S/O HANAMANTHA

AGED ABOUT 36 YEARS

ASSISTANT ENGINEER

KHB, SURYA NAGAR

4

TH

PHASE, BENGALURU.

8. RAKSHITH GOUDA H.S.,

S/O SOMEGOUDA

AGED ABOUT 35 YEARS

ASSISTANT ENGINEER

KHB, DISTRICT PROJECT OFFICE

CHIKKAMAGALUR.

9. PRADEEP RAO S.,

S/O K.V.SATTANARAYANA RAO

AGED ABOUT 37 YEARS

ASSISTANT ENGINEER

KHB, DISTRICT PROJECT OFFICE

MANGALURU.

10. SUNIL KUMAR B.R.,

S/O RAMASWAMY

AGED ABOUT 36 YEARS

ASSISTANT ENGINEER

KHB, DISTRICT PROJECT OFFICE

CHITRADURGA.

4

11. AYASH BANU

W/O ASKAR AHMED

AGED ABOUT 39 YEARS

ASSISTANT ENGINEER

KHB OFFICE, MANDYA.

12. C.N.VENUGOPAL

S/O NAGEGOWDA

AGED ABOUT 37 YEARS

ASSISTANT ENGINEER

KHB, DISTRICT PROJECT OFFICE,

MANDYA.

13. ASHA K.S.,

W/O MOHAN S.S.

AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS

ASSISTNAT ENGINEER

KHB, HEAD OFFICE

BENGALURU.

14. ROOPA N.,

W/O VINOD KUMAR T.,

AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS

ASSISTANT ENGINEER

KHB, DISTRICT PROJECT OFFICE

BENGALURU.

15. HARISH H.,

S/O HANUMANTHARAYAPPA

AGED ABOUT 36 YEARS

ASSISTANT ENGINEER

KHB, DISTRICT PROJECT OFFICE

UDUPI.

16. SITARA Y.N.,

W/O L.LAXMAN RAO

AGED ABOUT 38 YEARS

ASSISTANT ENGINEER

5

KHB, DISTRICT PROJECT OFFICE

HUBBALLI.

17. HAREESHA K.,

S/O KENCHAPPA H.,

AGED ABOUT 36 YEARS

ASSISTANT ENGINEER

KHB, DISTRICT PROJECT OFFICE

SHIVAMOGGA.

18. HARISH N.S.,

S/O K.N.SRINIVAS RAO

AGED ABOUT 38 YEARS

ASSISTANT EXECUTIVE ENGINEER

KARNATAKA HOUSING BOARD

3

RD

FLOOR, E-BLOCK

CAUVERY BHAVAN

BENGALURU – 560 009.

19.

SOWMYA V.N.

D/O NINGAPPA V.H.,

AGED ABOUT 38 YEARS

ASSISTANT EXECUTIVE ENGINEER

KARNATAKA HOUSING BOARD

BENGALURU – 560 009.

20. SMT.VASANTH KUMARI C.P.,

AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS

OCC.:AEE, KHB, BALLARY

R/O: C/O:KBB DISTRICT PROJECT OFFICE

S.N.PETE, BELLARY

DISTRICT BELLARY – 583 101.

21. SHRI SUDHEER P.BANARE

S/O PADMANABH N.SHETTI

AGED ABOUT 58 YEARS

OCC.:EXECUTIVE ENGINEER

KARNATAKA HOUSING BOARD

6

SURYANAGAR, 4

TH

PHASE

SWAMY VIVEKANAND YOGA

UNIVERSITY ROAD

KONASANDRA, JIGANI

BENGALURU – 560 105.

... RESPONDENTS

(BY SRI T.HANUMAREDDY, AGA FOR R-1;

SRI H.R.GUNDAPPA, ADVOCATE FOR R2 AND R3;

SRI RAJASHEKHAR BURJI, ADVOCATE FOR R4 TO R17 ;

SRI NEELENDRA D.GUNDE, ADVOCATE FOR R-18;

SRI KRISHNA MOHANA REDDY C., AND

SRI VIJAYKUMAR KOTIN, ADVOCATES FOR R19;

SRI M.S.BHAGWAT, SR.COUNSEL A/W

SRI A.D.KULKARNI, ADVOCATE FOR R-20;

SRI VIJAYKUMAR AND SRI OMKAR L.DESAI,

ADVOCATES FOR R-21)

THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND

227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO A) ISSU E A

WRIT IN NATURE OF CERTIORARI QUASHING THE IMPUGNED

GRADIENT LIST IN OFFICIAL MEMO DATED. 22/01/2025 BE ARING

NO. KaGruMo/AaSha/01/2025 PASSED BY R2 VIDE ANNEXUR E-G

AND DIRECT THE 3

RD

RESPONDENT TO PREPARE FRESH GRADIENT

LIST WITH RESPECT TO PETITIONERS IN THE INTEREST OF

JUSTICE AND EQUITY; B) ISSUE A WRIT IN NATURE OF

CERTIORARI QUASHING THE NOTIFICATION DATED. 01/06/2 022

BEARING NO. DOH 59 KHB 2020 ISSUED BY 1

ST

RESPONDENT VIDE

ANNEXURE-B WITH RESPECT TO PETITIONERS IN THE INTER EST

OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY.

7

THIS WRIT PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED

FOR ORDERS ON 25.04.2026, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEME NT

THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:-

CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA

CAV ORDER

The petitioners, graduate Engineers, in the servic e of the

Karnataka Housing Board (hereinafter referred to as 'the Board'),

stand, at the portals of this Court calling in question the legality of

the Notification dated 01-06-2022, whereby the Karnataka

Housing Board (Recruitment and Conditions of Servic e)

(Amendment) Rules, 2022 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules')

came to be promulgated. The impugned amendment hera lds a

significant departure from the existing service structure by carving

out, for the first time, a promotional avenue enabl ing diploma-

holder Engineers to ascend, to the cadre of Executive Engineer. It is

this legislative exercise, perceived by the petitio ners as an

impermissible obliteration, of a long-recognised distinction between

graduate and diploma Engineers, that has propelled them to invoke

the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court.

8

2. Heard Sri Gurudas Khannur, learned senior couns el

appearing for the petitioners; Sri T. Hanumareddy, learned

Additional Government Advocate appearing for respon dent No.1;

Sri H.R. Gundappa, learned counsel appearing for re spondents 2

and 3, Sri Rajashekhar Burji, learned counsel appea ring for

respondent Nos. 4 to 17; Sri Neelendra D Gunde, lea rned counsel

appearing for respondent No.18; Sri Krishna Mohan R eddy, learned

counsel appearing for respondent No.19; Sri M.S.Bha gwat, learned

senior counsel appearing for respondent No.20 and S ri Vijaykumar

and Sri Omkar L. Desai, learned counsel appearing for respondent

No.21.

3. Facts adumbrated, are as follows: -

3.1. The petitioners entered the service of the Bo ard as

Assistant Engineers on 29-06-2010. By dint of merit and

experience, they earned promotion to the cadre of A ssistant

Executive Engineer with effect from 01-07-2021, thereby

becoming eligible, in due course, for consideration to the higher

cadre of Executive Engineer. Hardly had they entere d the

promotional stream when the landscape of the servic e Rules

9

underwent a fundamental transformation. The amendme nt of 2022

dismantled the hitherto prevailing scheme by creating an altogether

new promotional channel, permitting diploma-holder Assistant

Executive Engineers also to compete for elevation to the cadre of

Executive Engineer.

3.2. The petitioners, perceiving the amendment to b e

destructive of the long-standing distinction maintained between

graduate and diploma Engineers, did not remain mute spectators.

They addressed a series of representations to the a uthorities,

asserting that the creation of such a promotional a venue was

contrary to the settled service structure governing engineering

establishments. Those representations, however, rem ained

unanswered.

3.3. While matters stood thus, the Board proceeded to notify

a gradation list dated 22-01-2025 , wherein diploma-holder

Assistant Executive Engineers and graduate Assistan t Executive

Engineers came to be arranged in a common seniority list for the

purpose of promotion to the cadre of Executive Engi neer. The

publication of the common gradation list, coupled w ith the

10

impugned amendment to the Rules, constitutes the ge nesis of the

present lis. Feeling aggrieved by what they perceive to be an

erosion of the distinction between unequals and a dilution of their

promotional prospects, the petitioners have approached this Court

invoking its writ jurisdiction.

SUBMISSIONS

:

PETITIONERS:

4. Learned senior counsel Sri Gurudas Khannur repre senting

the petitioners would vehemently contend that nowhe re in any of

the services of any statutory organization or the Government even

a diploma holder is entitled to get promotion beyond the cadre of

Assistant Executive Engineer. There is a reason beh ind the

restriction of diploma holders up to the cadre of Assistant Executive

Engineer, as they are not qualified to perform complicated manifold

engineering functions in the Department. Therefore, the Rules run

foul of the hitherto settled practice. He would sub mit that the

petitioners who are degree holders since 2010 are now placed along

with the degree holders who began as diploma holder s and

11

completed their degree on 01-07-2021. There is gros s disparity in

the amendment to the Rules, as unequals are treated as equals. It

is not that the petitioners have kept quiet but are agitating when

the amendment to the Rules were notified. The Board has not

considered those representations. Therefore, this C ourt must

intervene and obliterate the amendment to protect the classification

between graduate Engineers and diploma holders as, a practice that

has prevailed over five decades is now changed by the Board.

RESPONDENTS IN UNISON:

5. Contrariwise, the learned counsel appearing for several

respondents in unison contend that it is not that t he private

respondents who are now beneficiaries of the amende d Rules are

treated on par with graduate Engineers. In terms of the Rules, an

Assistant Executive Engineer would become entitled to

consideration for promotion to the cadre of Executive Engineer if he

is a graduate with three years of experience and if he is a diploma

holder with five years of experience. Therefore, on the experience

criteria graduate Engineers will always have a march over diploma

holder Engineers. The Rule carves out 25% quota in promotion to

12

the cadre of Executive Engineer for diploma holder and seventy-five

percent quota to graduate Engineers. Therefore, the rule dividing

entry to the cadre of Executive Engineer, in the aforesaid manner,

cannot be held to be arbitrary. It is a policy of the Government and

the wisdom and who should be promoted where cannot be

justiciable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. They would

seek dismissal of the petition.

6. I have given my anxious consideration to the su bmissions

made by the respective learned counsel and have per used the

material on record.

CONSIDERATION :

7. The factual matrix, though uncomplicated, requi res a closer

scrutiny to appreciate the controversy in its proper perspective. The

chronology of entry into service of the petitioners and the private

respondents assumes considerable significance. For the sake of

convenience, the career progression of the 21

st

respondent may

be taken as illustrative of the class of diploma-holder Engineers.

13

8. The 21

st

respondent, possessing a Diploma in Civil

Engineering, entered the service of the Board as a Junior

Engineer on 23-03-1989. By successive promotions, he reached

the cadre of Assistant Engineer in the year 2003, and thereafter

ascended to the post of Assistant Executive Engineer on

25-07-2007 in terms of the Recruitment Rules then holding the

field. Like all similarly situated diploma-holder E ngineers, his

promotional journey culminated at the post of Assistant Executive

Engineer, for the Rules then in force contemplated no further

promotional avenue.

9. The petitioners stand on an entirely different footing. They

entered service nearly two decades later, in the year 2010, not as

Junior Engineers, but by direct recruitment as Assistant

Engineers, armed with Bachelor's Degrees in Engineering. By the

time they commenced service, the 21

st

respondent and others

similarly situated had already occupied the higher post of Assistant

Executive Engineer. Consequently, the diploma-holde r Engineers

had, by then, accumulated substantial experience in the feeder

cadre, having discharged the duties of Assistant Ex ecutive

14

Engineers for well over a decade, before the impugned amendment

came into existence.

10. It thus becomes imperative to notice the statut ory

framework governing the service conditions. Recruit ment,

promotion and other incidents of service within the Board are

regulated by the Karnataka Housing Board (Recruitment and

Conditions of Service) Rules , framed in exercise of the powers

conferred under Section 74 of the Karnataka Housing Board

Act, 1962. These Rules underwent amendment on 10-08-2005,

marking the first occasion on which diploma-holder Assistant

Engineers were permitted to earn promotion to the c adre of

Assistant Executive Engineer. It was under the aegi s of this

amendment that the 21

st

respondent and several others entered the

cadre of Assistant Executive Engineer in the year 2007.

11. Three years thereafter, the petitioners entered the service

of the Board, not into the cadre of Assistant Executive Engineer but

into the lower cadre of Assistant Engineer through direct

15

recruitment. Matters remained undisturbed until the year 2022,

when the Government introduced yet another amendmen t to the

Rules. This amendment, unlike its predecessor, trav elled a step

further. It extended to diploma-holder Assistant Ex ecutive

Engineers a limited promotional avenue to the cadre of Executive

Engineer, thereby altering the service structure that had hitherto

prevailed. It is this amendment that has become the epicentre of

the present controversy. The Rules that have becom e the bone of

contention read as follows:

“

SCHEDULE-III

(see rule 5)

Sl.

No

Category of

Post

Method of recruitment Minimum qualification

xx xx xx Xx

9. Executive

Engineer

(1)Seventy five percent by

promotion from the cadre

of Assistant Executive

Engineer (Civil) with

BE/B.Tech degree in Civil

Engineering and

(2)Twenty five percent by

promotion from the cadre

of Assistant Executive

Engineer (Civil) with

Diploma in Civil

Engineering.

For promotion Assistant

Executive Engineer (Civil)

with Engineering Degree. –

(1) Must be a holder of B.E

/B.Tech Degree in Civil

Engineering from a University

established by Law; and

(2) Must have put in a service of

not less than three years in the

cadre of Assistant Executive

Engineer (Civil)

For Promotion of Assistant

Executive Engineer (Civil)

with Diploma. – (1) Must be a

holder of Diploma in Civil

Engineering from a Institute

16

recognized by the

Government; and

(2) Must have put in a service

of not less than five years in

the cadre of Assistant

Executive Engineer (Civil)”

The afore-quoted rules create two distinct channels of

promotion to the cadre of Executive Engineer. The first,

constituting seventy-five per cent of the promotional vacancies,

is reserved for Assistant Executive Engineers posse ssing a

Bachelor's Degree in Civil Engineering , who become eligible

upon completion of three years' service in the feeder cadre. The

remaining twenty-five per cent is earmarked exclusively for

Assistant Executive Engineers holding a Diploma in Civil

Engineering, who become eligible only after rendering five years'

service in that very cadre.

12. A careful reading of the amended Rules dispels any

notion that graduate and diploma-holder Engineers h ave

been indiscriminately merged into a single stream. The

distinction is consciously preserved. Educational

qualifications continue to operate as the basis of

17

classification. The period of qualifying service is separately

prescribed. The quota itself is distinctly apportio ned. The

Rule merely recognises that both streams, though en tering

the promotional avenue through different gateways a nd on

different conditions, ultimately converge upon the common

destination of the cadre of Executive Engineer .

13. The question that, therefore, falls for considerati on

is, not whether the distinction between degree and diploma

holders has disappeared—it plainly has not. The rea l issue is,

whether the limited extension of a promotional aven ue to

diploma-holder Assistant Executive Engineers, by re serving

for them a modest twenty-five percent quota, render s the

Rule arbitrary, discriminatory or violative of the

constitutional guarantee of equality under Article 14. It is

this constitutional issue that now engages the atte ntion of

the Court.

18

14. The avowed object behind the amendment is

neither obscure nor elusive. It is to alleviate the stagnation

that had overtaken diploma-holder Assistant Executi ve

Engineers who, notwithstanding decades of blemishle ss

service, found the doors of further advancement

permanently closed. Stagnation in public service has never been

viewed by constitutional Courts as a desirable inci dent of

administration. Promotion is not merely an enhancement of

rank or emoluments; it is a legitimate instrument f or

sustaining morale, recognising experience and prese rving

institutional efficiency. A service, bereft of prom otional

prospects, inevitably breeds frustration; frustrati on, if

allowed to fester, gradually corrodes administrativ e vitality.

It is for this reason that service jurisprudence ha s

consistently recognised the obligation of the State to

endeavour, wherever administratively feasible, to c reate

promotional avenues, so that an employee's career d oes not

culminate in perpetual stagnation .

19

15. It is no doubt true that diploma-holder Enginee rs had

already earned two promotions—from Junior Engineer to Assistant

Engineer and thereafter to Assistant Executive Engineer. Equally

true, however, is the fact that their journey there after

reached a constitutional cul-de-sac, with no possibility of

advancement, irrespective of the length or quality of service

rendered. The Government, perceiving such stagnation,

consciously chose to carve out a limited promotiona l channel by

reserving twenty-five per cent of the promotional vacancies in

the cadre of Executive Engineer for diploma-holder Assistant

Executive Engineers possessing longer experience. Such an exercise

is quintessentially one of policy.

JUDICAL LANDSCAPE

:

16. The question, therefore, is not whether another view was

possible or even preferable. The question is whether the policy is so

manifestly arbitrary, capricious or constitutionally offensive as to

warrant judicial invalidation. It is here that the settled contours of

judicial review assume significance. Courts exercising jurisdiction

20

under Article 226 of the Constitution of India do n ot sit in

constitutional appeal over legislative wisdom. The power of judicial

review is directed against illegality, irrationality and procedural

impropriety - not against policy merely because ano ther policy

appears more attractive.

17. Jurisprudence is replete with judgments of the Apex Court

or of this Court with regard to such interference.

17.1. The Apex Court, in P.U. JOSHI v. ACCOUNTANT

GENERAL

1

, has held as follows:

“…. …. ….

10. We have carefully considered the submissions made

on behalf of both parties. Questions relating to the constitution,

pattern, nomenclature of posts, cadres, categories, their

creation/abolition, prescription of qualifications and other

conditions of service including avenues of promotio ns and

criteria to be fulfilled for such promotions pertain to the field of

policy is within the exclusive discretion and jurisdiction of the

State, subject, of course, to the limitations or re strictions

envisaged in the Constitution of India and it is no t for the

statutory tribunals, at any rate, to direct the Government to

have a particular method of recruitment or eligibility criteria or

avenues of promotion or impose itself by substituting its views

for that of the State. Similarly, it is well open and within the

competency of the State to change the rules relatin g to a

service and alter or amend and vary by addition/sub straction

the qualifications, eligibility criteria and other conditions of

service including avenues of promotion, from time to time, as

1

(2003) 2 SCC 632

21

the administrative exigencies may need or necessita te.

Likewise, the State by appropriate rules is entitle d to

amalgamate departments or bifurcate departments int o more

and constitute different categories of posts or cad res by

undertaking further classification, bifurcation or amalgamation

as well as reconstitute and restructure the pattern and

cadres/categories of service, as may be required from time to

time by abolishing the existing cadres/posts and creating new

cadres/posts. There is no right in any employee of the State to

claim that rules governing conditions of his service should be

forever the same as the one when he entered service for all

purposes and except for ensuring or safeguarding ri ghts or

benefits already earned, acquired or accrued at a p articular

point of time, a government servant has no right to challenge

the authority of the State to amend, alter and bring into force

new rules relating to even an existing service.”

The Apex Court in P.U. JOSHI v. ACCOUNTANT GENERAL , while

delineating the limits of judicial review in matter s of service

conditions, has unequivocally held that questions c oncerning

the formation of services, restructuring of cadres,

prescription of qualifications, eligibility criteria, promotional

avenues and conditions of service lie within the ex clusive

domain of the rule-making authority. Such matters

constitute policy choices entrusted to the executiv e, and

constitutional Courts cannot substitute their own

perceptions of administrative desirability for thos e of the

employer. The State remains at liberty to amend service Rul es,

restructure cadres, alter eligibility conditions and create or modify

22

promotional avenues to meet changing administrative exigencies,

subject only to constitutional limitations.

17.2. The Apex Court, later, in the case of UNION OF

INDIA v. PUSHPA RANI

2

has held as follows:

“…. …. ….

37. Before parting with this aspect of the case, we

consider it necessary to reiterate the settled legal position that

matters relating to creation and abolition of posts, formation

and structuring/restructuring of cadres, prescribin g the

source/mode of recruitment and qualifications, crit eria of

selection, evaluation of service records of the employees fall

within the exclusive domain of the employer. What steps should

be taken for improving efficiency of the administration is also

the preserve of the employer. The power of judicial review can

be exercised in such matters only if it is shown that the action of

the employer is contrary to any constitutional or s tatutory

provision or is patently arbitrary or is vitiated due to mala fides.

The court cannot sit in appeal over the judgment of the

employer and ordain that a particular post be filled by direct

recruitment or promotion or by transfer. The court has no role in

determining the methodology of recruitment or laying down the

criteria of selection. It is also not open to the court to make

comparative evaluation of the merit of the candidates. The court

cannot suggest the manner in which the employer sho uld

structure or restructure the cadres for the purpose of improving

efficiency of administration.”

The same principle reverberates through the decision of the Apex

Court in UNION OF INDIA v. PUSHPA RANI , wherein it is

2

(2008) 9 SCC 242

23

authoritatively declared that matters relating to creation or abolition

of posts, restructuring of cadres, prescription of qualifications,

sources of recruitment and promotional criteria lie within the

exclusive preserve of the employer. Judicial review , in such

matters, is an exception, not the rule. Unless the policy is

demonstrated to be contrary to a constitutional or statutory

mandate, patently arbitrary or tainted by mala fides, Courts cannot

assume unto themselves the role of administrators. The

constitutional function of judicial review is to ex amine

legality - not to redesign service structures or re calibrate

promotional schemes according to judicial notions o f

fairness.

17.3. The principle finds further reaffirmation in SATYA DEV

BHAGAUR v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN

3

, wherein the Apex Court

holds as follows:

“…. …. ….

15. It is trite that the Courts would be slow in interfering

in the policy matters, unless the policy is found to be palpably

discriminatory and arbitrary. This Court would not interfere with

the policy decision when a State is in a position to point out that

there is intelligible differentia in application of policy and that

3

(2022) 5 SCC 314

24

such intelligible differentia has a nexus with the object sought to

be achieved.

… … …

20. It could thus clearly be seen that the Division Bench

in Jagdish Prasad [Jagdish Prasad v. State of Rajasthan, 2016

SCC OnLine Raj 646] after considering the record, has come to

the finding that the Government of Rajasthan has co nducted

several training programmes for the persons working with it on

contractual basis, as well as under different schem es. The

training programmes mainly pertain to the peculiar working

pattern in the rural areas of the State of Rajasthan including

tribal and arid zones. The Division Bench has further come to a

finding that participation in such a training is mandatory and

non-joining of the same would result in non-renewal of service

contracts. It has been held that persons having spe cial

knowledge in working in the State of Rajasthan form a class

different than the persons not having such experien ce of

working in the State. It was found that the benefit extended by

the State policy was only that of giving a little more weightage

on the basis of experience and all the candidates were required

to undergo the rigor of selection process. The Division Bench

has clearly held that the experienced candidates in other States

cannot be compared with the candidates working in the State of

Rajasthan, as every State has its own problems and issues and

the persons trained to meet such circumstances, sta nd on a

different pedestal.”

The Apex Court cautions Constitutional Courts again st

entering the thicket of policy making. Judicial res traint, the

Court reminds, is the hallmark of constitutional ad judication

in matters involving executive policy. Interference becomes

permissible only when the policy is palpably discri minatory,

bereft of intelligible differentia or lacking any rational nexus

with the object sought to be achieved. So long as the

25

classification rests upon a discernible principle having a reasonable

connection with the purpose of the legislation, Article 14 does not

stand violated merely because another classification may also have

been conceivable.

18. It is in the light of these authoritative pronouncements

that the impugned amendment must be tested. The ame ndment

does not indiscriminately obliterate the distinctio n between

graduate and diploma-holder Engineers. Far from doi ng so, it

consciously preserves that distinction by maintaini ng separate

quotas, distinct qualifying service and independent eligibility

criteria. The object sought to be achieved is the r emoval of

stagnation amongst diploma-holder/Assistant Executi ve Engineers

without unsettling the predominant promotional advantage enjoyed

by graduate Engineers. The means adopted bear a dir ect and

rational nexus with that objective. Such a policy choice can scarcely

be characterised as arbitrary, merely because it introduces a limited

promotional opportunity where none existed before.

26

19. The submission that no other Department of the State

permits diploma-holder Engineers to rise to the cadre of Executive

Engineer is equally devoid of constitutional substa nce. Equality

under Article 14 does not operate by compelling uniformity across

all departments of Government. Service Rules are framed

having regard to the peculiar administrative needs of each

establishment. What may be appropriate for one

organisation need not necessarily govern another. T he

Constitution does not mandate mechanical uniformity ; it

insists only upon the absence of arbitrariness.

20. The challenge, therefore, cannot succeed merely because

the impugned Rules depart from what has historicall y prevailed

elsewhere. Constitutional adjudication is concerned with legality,

not with comparative administrative practices. The wisdom of the

policy belongs to the Government; its legality alon e falls

within the province of this Court.

27

JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF CLASSIFICATION:

21.1. The Apex Court in the case of CHANDRAVATHI P.K. v.

C.K. SAJI

4

recognizes this classification and puts its imprimatur in

the following paragraphs:

“…. …. ….

41. It is well settled that classification on the basis of

educational qualification is a reasonable one and satisfies the

doctrine of equality as adumbrated in Article 14 of the

Constitution of India.

… … …

43. The State as an employer is entitled to fix separate

quota of promotion for the degree-holders, diploma- holders

and certificate-holders separately in exercise of its rule-making

power under Article 309 of the Constitution of India. Such a

rule is not unconstitutional. The State therefore, in our

opinion, cannot be said to have acted arbitrarily by giving an

option to such diploma-holders, who acquired a high er

qualification, so as to enable them to either opt for promotion

in the category of degree-holder or diploma-holder. Such

option was to be exercised by the officer concerned only. He,

in a given situation, may feel that he would be promoted in

the diploma-holders' quota earlier than degree-holders' quota

and vice versa but once he opts to join the stream of the

degree-holders, he would be placed at the bottom of the

seniority list.”

21.2. Later, the Apex Court in the case of DILIP KUMAR

GARG v. STATE OF U.P .

5

, has held as follows:

“…. …. ….

4

(2004) 3 SCC 734

5

(2009) 4 SCC 753

28

11. In P. Murugesan v. State of T.N. [(1993) 2 SCC 340:

1993 SCC (L&S) 445: (1993) 24 ATC 149] this Court h eld up

the validity of the rule prescribing the ratio of 3:1 between

graduates and diploma-holders in promotion as also the longer

qualifying period for service for diploma-holders. While noting

the earlier decisions a three-Judge Bench of this C ourt

observed: (SCC p. 350, para 14)

“14. This decision clearly supports the appellants'

contention and goes to sustain the validity of the

impugned amendment. If the diploma-holders can be

barred altogether from promotion, it is difficult to

appreciate how and why is the rule-making authority

precluded from restricting the promotion. The rule-

making authority may be of the opinion, having regar d

to the efficiency of the administration and other relevant

circumstances that while it is not necessary to bar the

diploma-holders from promotion altogether, their

chances of promotion should be restricted. On principle,

there is no basis for the contention that only two options

are open to a rule-making authority—either bar the

diploma-holders altogether or allow them unrestricted

promotion on par with the graduates.”

12. In J. Ranga Swamy v. Govt. of A.P. [(1990) 1 SCC

288 : 1990 SCC (L&S) 76 : AIR 1990 SC 535] and in State of

Rajasthan v. Lata Arun [(2002) 6 SCC 252 : 2002 SCC (L&S)

859 : AIR 2002 SC 2642] this Court observed that the eligibility

qualification for admission to a course or for recruitment or

promotion in service are matters to be considered b y the

appropriate authority, and not by the courts.

13. In the present case, what we find is that Rule 5(ii) of

the 2004 Rules has done away with the requirement o f passing

a qualifying examination for the diploma-holder Junior Engineers

for promotion as Assistant Engineers, and they have been

placed on a par with degree-holder Junior Engineers for this

purpose. We see no unconstitutionality or illegality in the same.

It is entirely for the authorities to decide whether the degree-

holders and diploma-holders should be treated on a par or not

for the purpose of promotion from the post of Junior Engineer to

the post of Assistant Engineer.

29

14. Shri Bobde, learned counsel for the appellants

submitted that degree-holder Junior Engineers have always

been treated differently from Junior Engineers who are only

diploma-holders for the purpose of promotion, and t hat the

latter have always been required either to get the requisite

qualification or pass the qualifying examination. In our opinion,

merely because in the past they have been treated d ifferently

does not mean that they cannot be treated identical ly

subsequently.

15. In our opinion Article 14 should not be stretched too

far, otherwise it will make the functioning of the administration

impossible. The administrative authorities are in t he best

position to decide the requisite qualifications for promotion from

Junior Engineer to Assistant Engineer, and it is not for this Court

to sit over their decision like a court of appeal. The

administrative authorities have experience in admin istration,

and the Court must respect this, and should not interfere readily

with administrative decisions. (See Union of India v. Pushpa

Rani [(2008) 9 SCC 242 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 851] and Official

Liquidator v. Dayanand [(2008) 10 SCC 1] .)

16. The decision to treat all Junior Engineers, whether

degree-holders or diploma-holders, as equals for the purpose of

promotion is a policy decision, and it is well settled that this

Court should not ordinarily interfere in policy decisions unless

there is clear violation of some constitutional provision or the

statute. We find no such violation in this case.

17. In Tata Cellular v. Union of India [(1994) 6 SCC 651:

AIR 1996 SC 11] it has been held that there should be judicial

restraint in administrative decision. This principle will apply all

the more to a rule under Article 309 of the Constitution.”

21.3. The Apex Court, again, in STATE OF UTTARAKHAND

v. S.K. SINGH

6

has held as follows:

6

(2019) 10 SCC 49

30

“…. …. ….

6. The diploma-holders in the post of JEs felt aggrieved

as it would result in some of their juniors, who had degrees,

being promoted earlier and, thus, on their ultimate promotion to

the post of AE, would rank senior to them. This was also stated

in the context of the fact that for further promotions from AE

upwards, the essential qualification was only a diploma, without

any quota or accelerated promotion being carved out for

degree-holders. These would be all promotion posts without any

direct recruitment.”

21.3.1. The Apex Court, in CHANDRAVATHI P.K. v. C.K.

SAJI, unequivocally recognized that classification founded upon

educational qualification is a reasonable classification satisfying the

mandate of Article 14. The Court further declared that the State, in

exercise of its rule-making power, is competent to prescribe distinct

promotional quotas for degree-holders, diploma-hold ers and

certificate-holders. Such differentiation is neithe r alien to

constitutional philosophy nor offensive to the equality clause. The

judgment thus affirms that educational qualificatio n remains

a constitutionally permissible basis for structurin g

promotional avenues.

31

21.3.2. The constitutional position is rendered eve n more

explicit in DILIP KUMAR GARG v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH .

The controversy before the Apex Court bore striking resemblance to

the issue that arises in the case at hand. There too, diploma-

holder Junior Engineers questioned the promotional

framework governing higher posts. Repelling the cha llenge,

the Apex Court held that the rule-making authority

possesses ample competence either to deny promotion

altogether, restrict promotional opportunities, or place

degree-holders and diploma-holders on an equal foot ing,

depending upon the administrative exigencies of the service.

The Court observed that if the authority is empowered to exclude

diploma-holders altogether from promotional conside ration, there

exists no constitutional impediment in conferring upon them only a

restricted promotional opportunity. The choice lies exclusively with

the rule-making authority and not with the constitutional Court.

21.3.2.1. The Apex Court proceeded to sound a note of

judicial restraint of enduring significance. It observed that eligibility

qualifications for recruitment or promotion are mat ters lying

32

squarely within the province of the employer. Merel y because

degree-holders and diploma-holders were treated differently in the

past, does not create an immutable constitutional m andate that

they must forever continue to be so treated. To stretch Article 14 to

such an extent, the Court cautioned, would render the functioning

of administration virtually impossible. Courts are not appellate

authorities over executive policy. They do not dete rmine

promotional methodology; they merely examine whethe r the policy

travels beyond constitutional boundaries.

21.3.3. The same jurisprudential thread continues in STATE

OF UTTARAKHAND v. S.K. SINGH . The Apex Court noticed the

grievance of diploma-holder Junior Engineers that, degree-holders,

though juniors in service, were obtaining accelerated promotions on

account of separate promotional quotas. Yet, the Court upheld the

legislative wisdom underlying such a scheme and reiterated that the

mere existence of differential promotional channels does not, by

itself, infringe Article 14. Service jurisprudence recognises that

promotional avenues may legitimately be designed to balance

educational qualifications, experience, efficiency and administrative

33

requirements. Absolute parity has never been the co nstitutional

command; reasonable classification alone is.

22. The cumulative effect of the aforesaid precedents leaves

little room for debate. They uniformly proclaim that the

architecture of a service, the structuring of promo tional

avenues and the balancing of competing interests be tween

different classes of employees are matters pre-emin ently

falling within executive wisdom. Judicial review in tervenes

only where constitutional boundaries are transgress ed. It

does not substitute administrative discretion with judicial

preference.

23. Much emphasis was laid by the learned senior counsel for

the petitioners upon judgments recognising the distinction between

graduate Engineers and diploma-holder Engineers. Th ere can

indeed be no quarrel with the propositions enunciated therein. The

distinction between educational qualifications has repeatedly

received judicial recognition. Equally, however, th ose very

authorities acknowledge the competence of the rule- making

34

authority to create separate promotional channels o r earmark

quotas for distinct classes of employees whenever a dministrative

necessity so demands.

24. The judgments relied upon by the petitioners ca nnot,

therefore, be read divorced from the factual and statutory contexts

in which they were rendered. Precedents are not sta tutes. They

illuminate principles; they do not fossilise service Rules for all time

to come. Every judgment speaks to the facts before it, and every

rule-making authority retains the constitutional freedom to remodel

service conditions so long as the resulting policy does not descend

into arbitrariness.

25. In the case at hand, the impugned amendment

preserves the distinction between degree-holders an d diploma-

holders. It does not obliterate it. Separate quotas continue to exist.

Distinct eligibility conditions continue to operate . Differential

qualifying service continues to be insisted upon. The amendment

merely introduces a carefully calibrated promotiona l avenue for

35

diploma-holder Assistant Executive Engineers with t he avowed

object of mitigating career stagnation. Such an exercise, far from

being arbitrary, reflects a conscious balancing of competing service

interests.

26. This Court searches in vain for any palpable

unreasonableness, hostile discrimination or constit utional

infirmity in the amended Rules. The policy neither treats

unequals as equals nor obliterates intelligible dif ferentia. On

the contrary, it harmonises the competing claims of

educational qualification and long administrative e xperience

by preserving a substantial seventy-five percent pr omotional

quota for graduate Engineers while carving out a li mited

twenty-five percent avenue for diploma-holder Engin eers.

Such legislative calibration cannot be branded as a rbitrary

merely because another arrangement may equally have been

possible.

36

EPILOGUE:

27. Before parting, it requires emphasis that

constitutional Courts exercise the power of judicia l review

with institutional restraint. Service Rules are not to be

tested on the anvil of individual hardship or compa rative

advantage, but on the touchstone of constitutional validity.

If every alteration in promotional policy were to b e

subjected to microscopic judicial re-evaluation mer ely

because one class of employees perceives itself to be

disadvantaged, the delicate balance between judicia l review

and executive governance would stand irretrievably

disturbed. The Constitution entrusts policy to the executive

and legality to the judiciary. Neither institution can usurp

the province of the other without unsettling the

constitutional equilibrium.

28. Tested on that touchstone, the impugned

amendment withstands scrutiny. It neither broods ov er

palpable arbitrariness nor transgresses the mandate of

37

Article 14. The petitioners have failed to demonstr ate that

the amendment is unconstitutional, irrational or ac tuated by

mala fides. Interference under Article 226 of the

Constitution would, therefore, amount not to judici al review

but to judicial substitution of policy - a course impermissible

in constitutional adjudication.

29. In the result, finding no merit in the challenge, this Court

declines to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226

of the Constitution. The Writ Petition, being devoid of merit, stands

dismissed.

No order as to costs.

Sd/-

(M.NAGAPRASANNA)

JUDGE

Bkp

CT:MJ