criminal law, Andhra Pradesh case, conviction appeal, Supreme Court India
0  07 Apr, 1998
Listen in 01:03 mins | Read in 24:00 mins
EN
HI

State of andhra Pradesh Vs. N. Radhakishan

  Supreme Court Of India Civil Appeal /3503/1997
Link copied!

Case Background

As per case facts, the State of Andhra Pradesh challenged an Administrative Tribunal's order promoting N. Radhakishan to Director of Town and Country Planning. The Tribunal had overlooked multiple charge ...

Bench

Applied Acts & Sections

No Acts & Articles mentioned in this case

Hello! How can I help you? 😊
Disclaimer: We do not store your data.
Document Text Version

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 11

PETITIONER:

STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH

Vs.

RESPONDENT:

N. RADHAKISHAN

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 07/04/1998

BENCH:

SUJATA V. MANOHAR, D.P. WADHWA

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:

THE 7TH DAY OF APRIL, 1998

Present:

Hon'ble Mrs. Justice Sujata V. Manohar

Hon'ble Mr. Justice D.P. Wadhwa

Ms.K. Amareshwari, Sr. Adv., V.R. Anumolu, T.Anil Kumar,

Advs. with her for the appellant

H.s. Gururaja Rao, Sr. Adv., T.V. Ratnam, Adv. with him for

the Respondent

J U D G M E N T

The following Judgment of the Court was delivered:

WADHWA,J.

Against the judgment dated December 12, 1996 of the

Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad, in O.A.

No. 2239/96 filed by the respondent, the State of Andhra

pradesh has come up in appeal. By the impugned judgment the

Tribunal allowed the petition of the respondent and directed

that the respondent be promoted to the category of Director

of Town and Country Planning, in the existing vacancy,

ignoring the charge memos -- (1) Memo No. 2732/FL/87/27/MA,

dated July 31, 1995; (2) memo no. 145/B2/93-19/MA, dated

October 27, 1995; and (3) Memo No. 898/B.2/94/M.A dated June

1, 1996, if the respondent is otherwise eligible. The

Tribunal found that the Departmental Promotion committee

met on August 16, 1995 and prepared the panel for the panel

year 1994-95, which was approved by the State Government in

October, 1995. One of the persons included in the panel was

promoted to the category of Director of Town and Country

Planning by G.O.M. dated November 14, 1995. The Tribunal

observed that the panel itself having been prepared on

August 16, 1995 should lapse only on December 31, 1996 and

not on December 31, 1995 as was contended by the State. The

name of the respondent was included in the panel. The

Tribunal, therefore, held that since the panel would lapse

only on December 31, 1996 the respondent was entitled for

promotion before that date. The Tribunal also noticed that

the objection of the State that the panel lapsed on December

31, 1995 was never raised either before it or in the State

against an interim order earlier made by the Tribunal.

Tribunal was concerned with the question if promotion

of the respondent could be denied to him after his name had

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 11

been included in the panel prepared by the DPC on the ground

that the disciplinary inquiry initiated against him had not

yet been terminated. The respondent had submitted before the

Tribunal that the charge memo dated July 31, 1995 was served

upon him just before the meeting of the DPC only to deprive

him his claim of promotion and further that the charge memos

dated October 27, 1995 and June 1, 1996 being subsequent to

the date of meeting of DPC could not be taken into

consideration for promoting him to the post of Director,

Town and Country Planning. Tribunal noticed that the memo

dated July 31, 1995 related to the incidents that happened

in the years 1978, 1979 and 1984, which were also the

subject-matter of the memo No. 1412 dated December 22, 1987.

While the memo No. 1412 had been issued under Rule 19 of the

Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (CCA) Rules, 1963 (for short

"1963 Rules") that dated July 31, 1995 was issued under Rule

20 of the Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (CCA) Rules, 1991

(for short "1991 Rules"). Earlier memo No. 1412 was neither

cancelled nor annulled before issuance of memo dated July

31, 1995 and the Tribunal was of the view that because of

this circumstance memo dated July 31, 1995 could not have

been issued and inquiry should have proceeded under the old

Rules after the Inquiry Officer had been appointed.

State has contended before us that the Tribunal wrongly

assumed that the charges communicated to the respondent on

July 31, 1995 were belated and not only that it quashed that

charge memo but also other charge memos when there was no

challenge to that. Merely on the ground of delay the

Tribunal should not have conferred unwanted benefits on the

respondent. It was submitted that the whole approach of the

Tribunal in giving relief to the respondent has been the the

delay in not concluding the inquiry in furtherance to the

charge memo. It may, however, be noticed that the respondent

did seek setting aside of the memo dated July 31, 1995 and

that dated October 27, 1995. The Tribunal only quashed memo

dated July 31, 1995 and as regards memos dated October 27,

1995 and June 1, 1996, it said that the State might proceed

against the respondent for taking action as per law but the

only rider which the Tribunal put was that these two memos

could not be taken into consideration in implementing the

recommendation of the DPC.

Whether the delay did vitiate the disciplinary

proceedings and if the Tribunal was justified in giving the

directions aforesaid we may refer to the sequence of the

events.

The respondent was appointed as Asstt. Director of Town

Planning in the year 1976. He worked in the Municipal

Corporation of Hyderabad (hereinafter referred to as

`Corporation') in 1979. He was posted as City Planner,

Municipal Corporation of Visakhapatnam in 1981. A report

dated November 7, 1987 was sent by the Director General,

Anti-Corruption Bureau, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad, to the

Secretary to the Government, Housing, Municipal

Administration & Urban Development Department, Andhra

Pradesh, Hyderabad, about the irregularities in deviations

and unauthorised constructions in multi-storied complexes in

twin cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad in collusion with

Municipal authorities.

In this report four multi-storied buildings were

mentioned, viz., chandralok Complex, chenoy market

Commercial Complex, Shajahan Apartments and Progressive

Towers. It was stated that in September, 1987 these premises

were inspected and irregularities in deviations and

unauthorised construction were noticed and the relevant

files of the Corporation were also perused. Town planning

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 11

staff of the Corporation in collusion with the builders

permitted them to flout building bye-laws and the staff

abused their official position or obtaining pecuniary

advantage for themselves and the builders causing loss of

revenue to the Corporation in the shape of house-taxes.

Eleven officers were named including the respondent, who

were said to be responsible for the abnormal deviations and

unauthorised constructions.

On the basis of the report the State issued two both

dated December 12, 1987 (1) in respect of three officials,

viz., Radha Krishna, the then Asstt. City Planner, the

respondent, (2) P.V. Janaki Raman, the then City Planner and

(3) A. Ram Reddy, the then Asstt. City Planner. In the

second memo seven other officers of the rank of Section

Officers and one Assistant City Planner were named. The memo

respecting the respondent and two others said that under

Rule 19(2) of 1963 Rules one sri N. Venugopal Reddy,

Director of Town and country Planning, Andhra Pradesh,

Hyderabad, was appointed as Inquiry Officer to conduct a

detailed inquiry against them, who were allegedly involved

and found responsible for the irregularities. The Inquiry

Officer was directed to complete his inquiry within a period

of two months and to submit his report to the Government

with specific findings. As we see this memo is entirely

based on the report of the director General, Anti-Corruption

Bureau. In one of the letters dated January 7,1988 of the

Director General Anti-Corruption Bureau, it is mentioned

that during the course of the checking of the buildings

witnesses were neither examined nor their statements were

recorded and as such there was no part-B file. It was

suggested that action be taken on the basis of the report

already sent to the Government. Rule 19(2) of the 1963 Rules

requires that when it is proposed to impose on a member of a

service any of the penalties specified therein the authority

competent to impose the penalty shall appoint an inquiry

officer or itself hold an inquiry. In every such case the

ground on which it is proposed to take action shall be

reduced to the form of definite charges, which shall be

communicated to the person charged together with a statement

of the allegations on which each charge is based and any of

other circumstance which it is proposed to take into

consideration in passing orders in the case. the charged

employee shall be required within a reasonable time to file

a written statement of his defence and to state whether he

desires an oral inquiry or to be heard in person or both. It

is not necessary to refer to further steps whether he

desires an oral inquiry or to be heard in person or both. It

is not necessary to refer to further steps in the inquiry

proceedings as in the present case we find that till July

31, 1995 article of charges had not been served on the

respondent by which time 1991 Rules had come into force in

supersession of the earlier 1963 Rules. Rule 45 of 1991

Rules provided that repeal shall not affect the previous

operation of 1963 Rules, or any notification or order made,

or anything done, or any action taken thereunder, in any

proceeding under those Rules pending at the commencement of

1991 Rules and shall be continued and disposed of as far as

may be in accordance with the provisions of 1991 Rules. In

1991 Rules procedure for imposing penalties had been changed

by Rules 20 and 21. Now, the Inquiry Officer is top be

appointed after written statement of the defence of the

charged employee has been received. When it is proposed to

hold inquiry against a Government servant, the disciplinary

authority is required to draw up the substance of the

imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour into definite and

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 11

distinct article of charge; a statement of the imputations

of misconduct or misbehaviour in support of each article of

charge containing (a) a statement of all relevant facts (b)

list of documents and (c) list of witnesses. These shall be

served upon the Government Servant, who shall be required to

submit written statement in defence and to state whether he

desires to be heard in person. If on receipt of the written

statement of the defence the disciplinary authority finds

that it is necessary to inquire into the charges, it hall

appoint an Inquiry officer of the purpose , Of course, the

disciplinary authority can itself inquire into the article

of charges, if it so chooses or thinks to do so. Again, we

are not concerned as to how the inquiry officer is to

proceed further in the matter as per 1991 Rules as after the

article of charge was served upon the respondent and his

statement of defence was received there was no progress and

he moved the Tribunal.

Coming back to the state when Shri N. Venugopal Reddy

was appointed as Inquiry Officer we find from the official

file produce before us that he sent various communications

to the Secretary to the Government, Housing, Municipal

Administration & Urban Development Department, to send him

the relevant files. This he went on writing but without any

response from the State Government till Shri N. Venugopal

Reddy retired on attaining the age of superannuation on

September 30, 1991. As to why there was no response to

various letters of the Inquiry Officer from the State

Government the file does not reveal anything. Meanwhile

respondent was promoted as Joint Director of Town and

Country Planning on September 10, 1991. Thereafter, the

State Government appointed Sri P.B. Chowdhary, O.S.D. (legal

cases), Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad, as Inquiry

Officer by order dated September 7, 1992. Shri Chowdhary did

not submit the inquiry report and his term of office as

O.S.D. (legal cases) expired on November 20, 1992. Again,

orders were issued on March 6, 1993 appointing Shri A.

Vidyasagar, I.A.S., Additional Commissioner of the

Corporation as Inquiry Officer. He was transferred from his

post on May 25, 1993. Yet again orders mere issued on June

17, 1993 appointing Shri Adityanath Dass, IAS, Additional

Commissioner (Genl.) of the Corporation, as Inquiry Officer.

On August 16, 1994 Shri Dass informed the authorities

concerned that connected files and records have been

received from the appropriate authority "recently" and

promised that he would submit his report as early as

possible. No report was submitted and Shri DAss was

transferred from the post. Thereafter, orders were issued

on march 20, 1995 appointing Shri M.Veerahhadraiah, IAS,

O.S.D. of the Corporation, as Inquiry Officer. At this stage

it was observed that procedure as contained i 1991 Rules

had not been followed. therefore, the order dated March 20,

1995 appointing Shri M. Veerahhadraiah as Inquiry Officer

was cancelled by order dated June 16, 1995. It was at this

stage that articles of charges dated July 31, 1995 were

issued to the respondent.

The Tribunal did not go into the culpability of the

respondent with respect to the charges as contained in memo

dated July 31, 1995 and did not record any finding of guilt

or otherwise on those charges. The Tribunal, however, said

that the memo dated July 31, 1995 related to the incidents

that happened ten years or more prior to the date of the

memo and that there was absolutely no explanation by the

Government for this inordinate delay in framing the charges

and conducting the inquiry against the respondent. The

explanation given by the State that for some reason or the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 11

other the Inquiry Officer was being changed from time to

time and on that account inquiry could not be conducted, did

not find favour by the Tribunal. it said that there was no

justification on the part of the State now conducting the

inquiry against the respondent in respect of the incidents

at this late stage. The Tribunal noticed that in the

meanwhile respondent had been promoted as Senior Joint

Director of Town and Country Planning notwithstanding the

appointment of Inquiry Officer one after the other after

memo No. 1412 dated December 22, 1987 and plea of the State

the when respondent was promoted as Senior Joint Director of

Town and Country Planning his file relating to inquiry

against him was not brought to the notice of the

administrative section in the year 1991 at the time of

convening the DPC and which resulted in promoting the

respondent, also did not find favour with the Tribunal. The

Tribunal said that both the sections were within the

Municipal Administration and this explanation, now offered,

was without any any merit. The Tribunal while quashing memo

dated July 31, 1995 did not quash the memos dated October

27, 1995 and June 1, 1996 and said that the State, if so

advised, might proceed against the respondent according to

law for taking action against him. What the Tribunal said

about the later two memos was that they should not be taken

into consideration while promoting the respondent in

pursuance to the recommendations of DPC which was held on

August 16, 1995.

A letter dated March 27, 1995 from the Vigilance

Commissioner to the Principal Secretary to Government,

Municipal Administration and Urban Development Department

has been brought to our notice. In this letter the Vigilance

Commissioner writes that after consideration of the facts it

is observed that there was abnormal and avoidable delay in

taking disciplinary action against various categories of

officers, who are alleged to have committed several

irregularities in the matter of permission given for

construction of multi-storied complexes in the Twin Cities

of Hyderabad and Secunderabad. The letter says that the

Inquiry Officer has now been appointed without following the

procedure under Rule 20 of 1991 Rules. The Department was

asked to verify if the earlier Inquiry Officers and if not

to take immediate action to frame the charges, first as

provided under Rule 20 of 1991 Rules. The Vigilance

Commissioner advised that the draft charges may be shown to

him before issuance. A reminder was sent by the Vigilance

Commissioner on April 26, 1995. It was thereafter that

charges dated July 31, 1995 were framed ad served upon the

respondent and others.

Four articles of charges have been set out against the

respondent, now working as Joint Director, Office of the

Director of Town and Country Planning, which are as under:-

"ARTICLES OF CHARGES

1) That Sri N. Radha Krishna,

formerly Assistant Town Planner,

Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad,

Secunderabad, and presently working

as Joint Director, Directorate of

Town Planning, Hyderabad,. While

working as Assistant Town Planner

during the year 1978 committed

misconduct in as much as he has put

up misleading note with certain

omissions and commissions to the

City Planer recommending permission

for construction of 4th floor, 5th

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 11

floors and pa subject to certain

conditions at Chandralok Complex,

Secunderabad in favour of M/s.

Swastik Builders in File No.

234/241/7/1/B4/78 in violation of

Building Bye-laws and Zoning

Regulations. He thereby exhibited

his conduct which is unbecoming on

the part of a Government servant

and failed to maintain absolute

integrity and devotion to duty.

Thereby the said Sri N. Radha

Krishna, contravened rule 3 of the

Andhra Pradesh Civil Services

(Conduct) Rules, 1964.

2) Sri N. Radha Krishna while

working as such has also committed

misconduct in allowing the Cellar

of Chenoy Market Commercial

complex, Secunderabad for using as

godowns by various concerns such as

ELCOM ENGINEERING COMPANY,

HYDERABAD PUMPS LIMITED, E.T. & T.

LIMITED by converting the Cellar

portion as Garrages when the Cellar

was actually meant for parking and

he has also allowed the North-East

Corner of Cellar to convert as

Strong Room for Lockers occupied by

Suman Safe Deposit Lockers Private

Limited. he has further committed

misconduct in allowing to raise the

height of the building to 130' - 8"

instead of the permitted average

height of the building 92' wide

whereas permit No. 92/84 dated

11.7.1985 and the sanctioned plan

permitted the average height of the

building is only 92' i.e., Ground +

7 floors. He thereby exhibited his

conduct which is unbecoming on the

part of a Government servant and

failed to maintain absolute

integrity and devotion to duty.

Thereby the said Sri N. Radha

Krishna contravened rule 3 of the

Andhra Pradesh Civil services

(Conduct) Rules, 1964.

3) Sri N Radha Krishna has also

committed mis-conduct in allowing

the Cellar of Shahjahan Apartments

bearing premises No. 6-2-94,

Khairatabad for being used as shops

and office godowns when it was

supposed to be used as Car Parking

as per Permit No. 24/15 of 1979 dt.

30.3.1979. He thereby exhibited his

conduct which is unbecoming on the

part of a Government Servant and

failed to maintain absolute

integrity and devotion to duty.

Thereby the said Sri N. Radha

Krishna, contravened rule 3 of the

Andhra Pradesh Civil Services

(Conduct) Rules, 1964.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 11

4) Sri N. Radha Krishna has also

committed misconduct in not

insisting to erect railings on the

eastern side of Progressive Towers

abutting the Rajbhavan Road even

though the condition was stipulated

that no opening should be provided

towards Rajbhavan road as per

permit No. 145/42, dt. 19.3.1981

read with G.O. MS. No. 1065, M.A.

dated 16.9.1981, thus he failed to

maintain absolute integrity and

devotion to duty and thereby

contravened Rules 3(1) of Andhra

Pradesh Civil Services (Conduct)

Rules, 1964."

It is interesting to note that same Articles of Charges in

verbatim have been served upon Sri A. Sree Rami Reddy also,

now working as Joint Director, office of Director Town and

Country Planning and also 8 other named in the report dated

November 7, 1987 of the Director General, anti corruption

Bureau.

By letter dated August 3, 1995 respondent informed the

disciplinary authority, who issued the Articles of charges,

that he worked as Assistant City Planner in she corporation

from December 6, 1977 to February 16, 1979 in different

circles and that from that it could be seen that only charge

No. 1 related to his period when he was working as Assistant

City Planner in that circle. The respondent wanted copies of

the relevant records in respect of charges contained in the

memo to facilitate him to submit detailed written statement.

In his written statement dated September 25, 1995 the

respondent explained as to how charges 2, 3 and 4 could not

relate to him and subsequently also in his letter to the

Chief Secretary to the government of Andhra Pradesh he said

that charges 2 and 4 related to the period when he was

working in Andhra Pradesh State Scheduled Castes and Tribes

CO- operative Housing Society Federation from February 9,

1979 to September 30, 1981. During the period charge No. 3

related to, the respondent said that he was on deputation at

oxford Polytechnic in United Kingdom from October 11, 1984

to September 26, 1985 for his post-graduation course. On the

first charge his statement of defence was as under :-

"1. With reference to the Charge

No. 1, I submit that I have perused

the file bearing No

234/241/7/1/B4/78 belonging to M/s.

Swastik Constructions in the

Chambers of Deputy Secretary to

Government, M.A. & U.D. Department

on 20.9.1995. As seen from the file

that M/s. Swastik Constructions

have applied for the construction

of 4th 5th and 6th floors over the

existing ground, 1st, 2nd, and 3rd

floors vide their application dt.

18.9. 1978. The proposals have been

examined in detail in pages 6 and 7

of note file at paras 1 to 27

giving clear statement of the F.S.I

permissible and also other Rules

and Regulations for the proposed

construction in the light of the

material available in the file. At

para 23rd the proposals were

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 11

submitted for consideration to the

Higher Authorities as per corrected

plan subject to certain

conditions. As it can be seen from

the endorsement of the then City

Planner sri P.V. Janakiraman on the

right hand side margin "This may be

restricted to 4th and 5th floors

only, let us delete part of 6th

floor. The Then City Planner has

approved the proposed construction

of 4th and 5th floors and part of

6th floor regularising the

deviation imposing the compound

fee of Rs. 1000/- on 1.1.79 and

marked the file to the Deputy

Commissioner. The Deputy

Commissioner in burn approved the

proposal on 10.1.1979. It is clear

from the above note that I did not

put up any misleading note and did

not recommend the proposals

irregularly against any rule and

regulation as alleged in the

charge. The Higher Officers have

also not pointed out any lapses in

the submitted note before approval

of the said proposals and also

regularised the offence by levy of

compounding fee.

Hence, I submit that since I have

not recommended the proposals

irregularly, the charge may kindly

be dropped."

As a matter of fact the disciplinary authority got verified

the facts that what the respondent had said about the

article of charges 2, 3 and 4 was correct and that he could

not be concerned with any deviations or unauthorised

constructions in respect of the buildings mentioned in those

charges. This is by letter dated October 10, 1995 from the

Director of Town and Country Planning to the Principal

Secretary to the Government, Municipal Administration and

Urban Development Department, and was in answer to a query

raised by the disciplinary authority from the Director of

Town and Country Planning. On March 15, 1996 Vigilance

Commissioner advised the disciplinary authority "to Process

the explanations of the Accused Officers with reference to

the connected files returned by the A.C.B. vide its report

dated 7.11.1987 and then refer the file to Vigilance

commissioner for further advice". Nothing happened

Everything was at standstill.

It is in April, 1996 that respondent moved the Andhra

Pradesh Appellate Tribunal for relief.

It would, therefore, appear that charges have been

farmed against the respondent merely on the basis of the

report dated November 7, 1987 from the director General,

Anti-Corruption Bureau, which is of general in nature

raising accusing finger on the various officers of the

corporation, but without any reference to the relevant files

and pin pointing if respondent or any other official charged

was at all concerned with the alleged deviations and

unauthorised construction in multi-storied complexes.

It would not be necessary for us to refer to the

charges issued by the memos dated October 27, 1995 and June

1, 1996 as that was not the subject-matter for quashing

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 11

either in the Tribunal or before us.

One of the grounds on which the Tribunal quashed memo

dated July 31, 1995, issued under 1991 Rules, was that

without cancelling the earlier memo No. 1412 dated December

22, 1987, issued under 1963 Rules, the latter memo could not

be issued. We have seen that under rule 45 of 1991 Rules the

inquiry proceedings initiated under 1963 Rules could be

continued even after coming into force of 1991 Rules. it is

correct that inquiry proceedings did progress after issuance

of memo No. 1412 dated December 22, 1987 to the extent that

n inquiry officer was appointed and should have been

concluded under 1963 Rules. If memo of charge has been

served for the first time before 1991 there would have been

no difficulty. However, in the present case it could be only

an irregularity and not an illegality vitiating the inquiry

proceedings inasmuch as after the Inquiry Officer was

appointed under memo No. 1412 dated December 22, 1987, there

had not been any progress. If a fresh memo is issued on the

same charges against the delinquent officer it cannot be

said that any prejudice.

In State of Punjab and others vs. Chaman Lal Goyal

(1995 (2) SCC 570), state of Punjab was aggrieved by the

order of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana quashing memo

of charges against Goyal and also the order appointing

Inquiry Officer to inquire into those charges. In this case

the incident, which was the subject-matter of charge,

happened in December, 1986 and in early January, 1987, when

Goyal was working as supdt. of Nabha High Security Jail. It

was only on July 9, 1992 that memo of charges was issued to

Goyal. He submitted his explanation of January 4, 1993

denying the charges. Inquiry Officer was appointed on July

20, 1993 and soon thereafter Goyal filed writ petition in

the High Court on august 24, 1993. The High Court quashed

the memo of charges on the principal ground of delay of five

and a half years in serving the memo of charges, for which

there was no acceptable explanation. This Court examined the

factual position as to how the delay occurred and if Goyal

had been prejudiced in any way on account of delay. This

Court relied on the Principles laid down in A.r. Antulay vs.

R.S. Nayak (1992 (1) SCC 225), and said, that though that

case pertained to criminal prosecution the principles

enunciated therein were broadly applicable to the pleas of

delay in taking the disciplinary proceedings as well.

Referring to decision in a.r. Antulay case this Court said:-

"In paragraph 86 of the judgment,

this Court mentioned the

propositions emerging from the

several decisions considered

therein and observed that

"ultimately the court has to

balance and weigh the several

relevant factors - balancing test

or balancing process - and

determine in each case whether the

right to speedy trial has been

denied in a given case." It has

also been held that, ordinarily

speaking, where the court comes to

the conclusion that right to speedy

trial of the accused has been

infringed, the charges, or the

conviction, as the case may be,

will be quashed. At the same time,

it has been observed that that is

not the only course open to the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 10 of 11

court and that in a given case, the

nature of the offence and other

circumstances may be such that

quashing the proceedings may not be

in the interest of justice. In such

a case, it has been observed, it is

open to the court to make such

other appropriate order as it finds

just and equitable in the

circumstance of the case."

In that case this Court said that it was more appropriate

and in interest of justice as well as in the interest of

administration that inquiry which has proceeded to a large

extent be allowed to be completed. At the same time the

Court directed that Goyal should be considered forthwith for

promotion without reference to and without taking into

consideration the charges or the pendency of the inquiry, if

he is found fit for promotion.

It is not possible to lay down any pre-determined

principles applicable to all cases and in all situations

where there is delay in concluding the disciplinary

proceedings. Whether on that ground the disciplinary

proceedings are to be terminated each case has to be

examined on the facts and circumstances in that case. the

essence of the matter is that the court has to take into

consideration all relevant factors and to balance and weight

them to determine if it is in the interest of clean and

honest administration that the disciplinary proceedings

should be allowed to terminate after delay particularly when

delay is abnormal and there is no explanation for the delay.

The delinquent employee has a right that disciplinary

proceedings against him are concluded expeditiously and he s

not made to undergo mental agony and also monetary loss when

these are unnecessarily prolonged without any fault on his

part in delaying the proceedings. In considering whether

delay has vitiated the disciplinary proceedings the Court

has to consider the nature of charge, its complexity and on

what account the delay has occurred. if the delay is

unexplained prejudice to the delinquent employee is writ

large on the face of it. It could also be seen as to how

much disciplinary authority is serious in pursuing the

charges against its employee. It is the basic principle of

administrative justice that an officer enterusted with a

particular job has to perform his duties honestly,

efficiently and in accordance with the rules. If he deviates

from this path he is to suffer a penalty prescribed.

Normally, disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to take

its course as per relevant rules but then delay defeats

justice. Delay causes prejudice to the charged officer

unless it can be shown that he is to or when there is

proper explanation for the delay in conducting the

disciplinary proceedings. Ultimately, the court is to

balance these two diverse consideration.

In the present case we find that without any reference

to records merely on the report of the Director General,

Anti-Corruption Bureau, charges were framed against the

respondent and ten others, all in verbatim and without

particularizing the role played by each of the officers

charged. There were four charges against the respondent.

With three of them he was not concerned. He offered

explanation regarding the fourth charge but the disciplinary

authority did not examine the same nor did it choose to

appoint any inquiry officer even assuming that action was

validly being initiated under 1991 Rules. There is no

explanation whatsoever for delay in concluding the inquiry

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 11 of 11

proceedings all these years. The case depended on records

of the Department only and Director General, Anti Corruption

bureau had pointed out that no witnesses ad been examined

before he gave his report. The Inquiry Officers, who had

been appointed on after the other, had just to examine the

records to see if the alleged deviations and constructions

were illegal and unauthorised and then as to who was

responsible for condoning or approving the same against the

bye-laws. It is nobody's case that respondent at any stage

tried to obstruct or delay the inquiry proceedings. The

Tribunal rightly did not accept the explanations of the

state as to why delay occurred. In fact there was hardly any

explanation worth consideration. In the circumstances the

Tribunal was justified in quashing the charge memo dated

July 31, 1995 and directing the state to promote the

respondent as per recommendation of the DPC ignoring memos

dated October 27, 1995 and June 1, 1996. the Tribunal

rightly did not quash these two later memos.

Accordingly we do not find any merit in the appeal. It

is dismissed with costs.

Reference cases

Description

State of Andhra Pradesh v. N. Radhakishan: Supreme Court on Quashing Charge Memos for Inordinate Delay

The landmark Supreme Court judgment in State of Andhra Pradesh v. N. Radhakishan serves as a critical authority on the consequences of an unreasonable delay in disciplinary proceedings and the grounds for the quashing of charge memo. This pivotal ruling, now comprehensively documented on CaseOn, establishes that an inordinate and unexplained delay in initiating and concluding departmental inquiries can be a valid reason for judicial intervention to prevent prejudice and harassment to an employee.

Background of the Case

The respondent, Mr. N. Radhakishan, was an officer in the Town and Country Planning department of Andhra Pradesh. His promotion to the post of Director was stalled due to disciplinary proceedings initiated against him. The timeline of events is crucial to understanding the court's final decision:

  • 1978-1984: The alleged irregularities in construction permits, which formed the basis of the charges, took place during this period.
  • December 1987: A charge memo was first issued against the respondent under the 1963 Rules, and an Inquiry Officer was appointed. However, the inquiry made no progress for years.
  • August 1995: The Departmental Promotion Committee (DPC) prepared a panel for the year 1994-95, which included the respondent's name for promotion.
  • July 1995: Just before the DPC meeting, a fresh charge memo was served on the respondent under the new 1991 Rules, based on the same old allegations from over a decade ago. Two more memos followed in October 1995 and June 1996.

Aggrieved by the denial of his promotion due to these belated charges, the respondent approached the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal. The Tribunal quashed the charge memo of July 1995 due to the inordinate delay and directed the State to promote the respondent, ignoring the charges. The State of Andhra Pradesh then appealed this decision to the Supreme Court.

Issue Before the Supreme Court

The central legal question before the Supreme Court was:

Whether an inordinate and unexplained delay in concluding disciplinary proceedings can be a sufficient ground for quashing the charge memo against an employee?

Rule of Law

The Supreme Court's decision was anchored in fundamental principles of administrative law and natural justice. The core principles applied were:

  • Right to a Speedy Trial/Inquiry: Drawing parallels from the principles laid down in criminal law, particularly in A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, the Court affirmed that the right to a speedy resolution is an essential part of fairness. Prolonged proceedings can lead to mental anguish and prejudice for the accused employee.
  • The Balancing Test: The Court must balance the government's interest in maintaining administrative integrity and punishing misconduct against the employee's right to be free from oppressive and prolonged proceedings.
  • Prejudice to the Employee: Delay vitiates proceedings if it is shown to be unexplained and has caused prejudice to the employee. This prejudice isn't just about the inability to defend oneself due to fading memories or lost documents; it also includes the continuous anxiety and career stagnation caused by a pending inquiry.

Analysis by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court meticulously analyzed the facts and upheld the Tribunal's decision. Its reasoning was broken down into several key observations.

Inordinate and Unexplained Delay

The Court found the delay of over ten years between the alleged incidents and the framing of charges in 1995 to be grossly unreasonable. The State's explanation—that the delay occurred because various Inquiry Officers were appointed and transferred—was deemed unsatisfactory. The Court noted that it is the responsibility of the administration to ensure inquiries are concluded expeditiously, and bureaucratic inefficiency cannot be a valid excuse to harass an employee.

Mechanical Framing of Charges

A striking part of the analysis was the Court's finding that the charges were framed mechanically, without a proper application of mind. The respondent demonstrated that for three of the four charges against him, he was not even posted in the relevant capacity during the period of the alleged misconduct. This showed that the disciplinary authority had simply lifted allegations from a general report by the Anti-Corruption Bureau without verifying the individual role or responsibility of the respondent.

Understanding the nuances of judicial reasoning in such service matters is crucial for legal professionals. For a deeper dive into how courts weigh factors like delay and prejudice, the 2-minute audio briefs on CaseOn.in provide quick and insightful analyses of rulings like this one.

Prejudice is Writ Large

The Court concluded that in a case with such an abnormal delay and no plausible explanation, prejudice to the employee is self-evident ("writ large on the face of it"). An employee forced to live under the shadow of an inquiry for more than a decade suffers immense mental agony and professional harm. The Court held that allowing such a delayed inquiry to proceed would be a miscarriage of justice.

Conclusion of the Court

The Supreme Court dismissed the State's appeal, affirming the Tribunal's order to quash the charge memo dated July 31, 1995. The Court held that while every case depends on its own facts, in this instance, the balance was clearly in favor of the employee. The combination of inordinate delay, lack of a satisfactory explanation, and the mechanical framing of charges vitiated the entire disciplinary proceeding.


Final Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. N. Radhakishan held that disciplinary proceedings can be quashed on the ground of inordinate and unexplained delay. The court must perform a balancing act between the administrative need to curb misconduct and the prejudice caused to an employee by prolonged proceedings. When the delay is abnormal and the administration fails to provide a justifiable reason, the proceedings are liable to be set aside to prevent harassment and ensure fairness.

Why This Judgment is an Important Read

  • For Lawyers: This case is a powerful precedent in service law and administrative law. It provides a strong foundation for arguments against stale charges and administrative lethargy, emphasizing that the state cannot indefinitely keep a sword hanging over an employee's head.
  • For Law Students: It offers a practical illustration of the application of principles of natural justice, fairness, and reasonableness (Article 14) to administrative actions. It showcases how courts act as a crucial check on the arbitrary exercise of power by the executive.

Disclaimer: This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal issues, it is recommended to consult with a qualified legal professional.

Legal Notes

Add a Note....