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601

ST ATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH

v.

RAYAVARAPU PUNNAYYA & ANOTHER

September 15. 1976

[R. S. SARKARIA AND S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, .IJ.J

Penal Code--Ss. 299 an4 300-Cu/pable homicide not amo1111ti11g to murder

and Murder-Disti11ctio11-Tests to be applied in each case-s. 300, Thirdly

i.P.C.-Scope of

Jn the scheme of the Penal Code, 'culpable homicide' is genus and 'murder'

1'.ts specie. All 'murder' is 'culpable homicide' but not vice-versa. Speakinr

.ienerally, 'culpable homicide' sans 'special characteristics of murder', is 'culpable

A

B

.homicide not amounting to murder'. For the purpose of fixing punishment, pro- C

portionate to the gravity of this generic offence, the Code practically recognises

three degrees of culpable homicide. The

first is, what may be called,

culpable

·homicide of the first degree. This is the gravest form of culpable homicide,

·which is defined in s_. 300 as 'murder'. The second may be termed as 'culpable

.homicide of the second degree'. This is punishable under the Ist part of s. 304.

Then there

is 'culpable homicide of the third degree'. This is the lowest type

.of culpable homicide and the punishment provided for

it is, also, the

lowest

_among the punishments provided for the three grades. Culpable homicide of

•his degree is punishable under the second Part of s. 304. [606B-D] D

Clause (b) of s. 299 corresponds with ell. (2) and (3) of s. 300. The

distinguishing feature of the mens rea requisite under clause (2) is the know­

ledge possessed by the offender regarding the particular victim being in such a

peculiar condition or state of health that the intentional harm caused to him is

)ikely to be fatal, notwithstanding the fact that such harm would not m the

ordinary way

of

p.ature be sufficient to cause death of a person in normal health

-0r condition. The 'intention to cause death' is not an essential requirement of E

~lause (2). Only the intention of causing the bodily injury coupled with the

.offender's knowledge of the likelihood of such injury causing the death of the

particular victim,

is sufficient to bring the killing within the ambit of this clause

This aspect

of clause (2) is borne out by illustration (b) appended to s.

300.

[607C-DJ

Instances of cases falling under clause (2) of s. 300 can be where the·

assailant causes death by a first blow intentionally given knowing that the

victim

is suffering from an enlarged liver, or enlarged spleen or

diseased heart

and such blow is likely to cause death of that particular person oo a result

<1f the rupture of the liver, or spleen or the failure of the heart, as the case

may

be. If the assailant had no such knowledge about the disease or special frnilty of the victim, nor an intention to cause death or bodily injury suffi-

cient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the offence will not be

murder, even if the injury which caused the death, was intentionally given.

Clause

(b) of s. 299 does not postulate any such knowledge on the part of the

offender.

(607£-F]

In Clause (3) of s. 300, instead of the words 'likely to cause death' occur­

ring tn the corresponding clause (b) of s. 299, the words "sufficient

ia the ordinary course of nature" have been used. The distinction

between a bodily injury

likely to cause death and a bodily injury .sufficient in the. ordinary course of nature to cause death, is fine

but real, &nd, if overlooked, may result in miscarriage of justice. The diffe­

rence is one of the degree of probability of death resulting from the intend­

ed bodily injury. The word "likely" in s. 299(b) conveys the sense of

of 'probable' as distinguished from a mere possibility. The words bodily injury

...... sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death' mean th:it

dcatb will be the 'most probable' result of the injury, having regard to the

prdinary course of nature. [607G-HJ

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602 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1977) 1 S.C.R.

. For cases to fall within clause (3 ), it is not necessary that the offender"

!n!ended

t? .ca~se deat~,

so long as death ensues from the intentional bodily

m1ury or m1unes sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of

nature. [608B]

Clause (c) of

s. 299 and clause (4) of s.

300 both require knowledge of

the probability of the act causing death. Clause (

4) of s.

300 would be

applica·ble where the knowledge of the offender as to the probability of death

of a person

or persons in general-as distinguished from a particular person

or persons-being caused from his imminently dangerous act, approximates to

a practical certainity. Such knowledge on the part of .the offender must be

of the highest degree of probability, the act having been committed by the

offender without any excuse for incurring the

risk of causing death or such

injury as aforesaid. [608F-Gl

Whenever a court

is confronted with the question whether the

vlfencc is

'murder' or 'culpable homicide not amounting to murder', on the facts of a

case, it will be convenient for it to approach the problem in three stages.

The question to be considered at the first stage would be, whether the ~ccuscd

has done an a-ct by doing which he has caused the death of another. Proof

of such casual connection between the act of the accused and the death.

leads

to the second stage for considering whether that act of the

::iccused

amounts to 'culpable homicide' as defined in s. 299. lf the answer to this

question

is prtma facie found in the affirmative, the stage for considering the

operation of

s.

300, Penal Code. is reached. This is the stage at which the

Court should determine whether the fa-cts proved by the prosecution bring

the case within the ambit of any of the four clauses of the Jefinition of

'murder' containd in s. 300. If the answer to this question is in the negative

the offence would

be 'culpable homicide not amounting to murder', punish-

able under the

first or the second part of s. 304, depending. respectively,

011

whether the second or the third clause of s. 299 is applicable. If this ques-

tion is found in the positive, but the case comes within any of the Excep-

tions enumerated in

s.

300, the offence would still be 'culpable homicide not

a-mounting to murder', punishable under the First Part of s. 304. Penal

Code. [608H; 609A-C]

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Rajwant and anr. v. Slate of Kera/a AlR 1966 SC 1874. Virsa Si111;/1. v. r·

The State of Punjab [1958] SCR 1495 and Anda v. State of Raja.11/ian AIR •

1966 S.C. 148 followed.

In the instant case the prosecution i:·lleged that in furtherance of political

feuds

of the village the accused followed the deceased in the bus when he

went tn a neighbouring place, chased him when

he got

off the bus, an<l indis­

criminately nnunded the legs and arms of the deceased, who was

55 years

ol<l, with heavy

sticks. The deceased succumbed to his injuries on the follow­

ing n1orning.

The trial court held that the ca>e was covered by clause 'thirdly' of '· 300

and convicted them under s. 302 and s. 302 read with s. 34. Indian Pcm1l

Code. In appeal, the High Court altered the conviction. to. one. under s. 304

Pait II, on the grounds that (i) there was no premedttnl!'?n m the attack;

(ii) injuries were not on any vital part of the body; (111) there WZ.'3 no

compound fracture resulting in heavy haemorrhage; (iv) death occurred due

to shock

and

not due to haemorrhage and (v) though the accused had kf'.ow-

ledge while inflicting injuries that they were likely to cause death, they might

not have had the knowledge that they were so imminently d~n~erous that in

all probability their acts would result in such injuries

as are

likely to cause

the death.

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In appeal to this Court the appellant-State contended that t~e case fell unde; 1,__

s. 300(3) I.P.C., while the accused sought to support the 1udgmcnt of the

High Court.

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ANDHRA PRAD'SH V, RAYAVARAPU PUNNAYYA 603

Allowing the apper..f.

HELD : ( l) It. is not corre~t to say that the attack was not premeditated

or pre-planned. The High Court itself .found that the injuries were caused

in furtherance of the common intention of the respondents, and that there­

fore section 34 was applicable. [61 !B]

(2) The High Court may be right in its finding that since the injuries

ware not on vital p<:.·rts, the accused had no intention to cause death but

that finding-assuming it to be correct---Ooes not necessarily take the case

out of the definition of 'murder'. The crux

of the matter is whether the

facts established bring the case within clause 'thirdly' of

s.

300. This ques­

tion further narrows down into a consideration of the two-fold issue; (i)

whether the bodily injuries found on the deceased were intentionally inflicted

by the accused ? and (ii) If so, were they sufficient to cause death in the

ordinary course of nature ? If both these elements are satisfactorily estab­

.Jished, the offence will be 'murder', irrespective of the fact whether an mten­

tion on the part of the accused to cause death, had or had not been

proved. [612 C-E]

Jn the instant case, the formidable weapons used by the accused in the

beating the savage ma-nner of its execution, the helpless state of the unarmed

victim, the intensity

of the violence caused, the callous conduct of the accused

in persisting in

th() assault even against the protest of feeling bystanders­

all, viewed against the background of previous animosity between the parties,

irresistibly lead to the conclusion tha.t the injuries caused by the accused to

the deceased were intentionally inflicted, and were not accidental. Thus the

presence of the first element

of clause 'thirdly' of s.

300 had been cogently

aMd convincingly established. [613 B-C]

I· (3) The medical evidence shows that there were compound fractures and

that there

was heavy

haemorrha-ge requiring blood transfusion. Such injuries

a•e ordinarily danl!erous. f613Dl

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(4) The medical evidence clearly establishes that the c3use of death was E

shock and haemorrhage due to multiple injuries which were cumulatviely

sufficient to c&use d""th in the ordinary course of nature. [612B-Cj

(5) The mere fact that the beating was designedly confined by the assail­

ants to the legs and arms or that none of the multiple injuries inflicted was

individually sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, will

not exclude the applica.tion of clause 'thirdly' of s. 300. The expression

'bodily injury'

in clause 'thirdly' includes also its plural, so that the clause

would cover a case where all the injuries intentionally caused by the accused are

F

c11mulatively sufficient to cause the death in the ordinary course of

na.ture,

even if no"e of those injuries individually measures upto such sufficiency.

The sufficiency spoken

of in this clause, is the high probability of death in

the ordinary course of nature, and if such sufficiency exists and death

is caused

and the injury causing it is intentional, the case would fall under clause 'thirdly'

ef s. 300. All the conditions which are a pre-requisite for the applicability

ef this clause have been established a.nd the offence committed by accused in

the instant case was 'murder'. [614G-HJ ~

There is no escape from the conclusion that the offence committed by the

acc>1sed was murder notwithstanding the fact that the intention of the accused

to cause death has not been shown beyond doubt. [613F]

CRIMINAL

APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 214

of 1971.

(Appeal

by Special Leave from the judgment and

Order dated

27-7· 1970 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Criminal Appeals

Nos. 26 and 27

/69).

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604 ·SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1977] 1 S.C.R.

P. Plirmeswara Rao and G. Narayana Rao for the Appel'lant.

A. Subba Rao for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

SARKARIA, J. This appeal by special leave is directed against a

judgment of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh. It arises out of these

facts.

l n Rompicherla village, there were factions belonging to three

major communities viz., Reddys, Kammas and Bhatrajus. Rayavarapu

(Respondent No. 1 herein)

was the leader of Karnma faction,

w~ile

Chopparapu Subbareddi was the leader of the Reddys. In politics, the

Reddys were supporting the Congress Party, while Kammas were sup­

porters of Swataatra Party. There was bad blood between the two

factions which were proceeded against under

s.

107, Cr. P. C. In the

Panchyat elections of 1954, a clash took place between the two parties.

A member of the Kamma faction

was murdered. Consequently, nine

persons belonging to the Reddy faction were prosecuted for that

mur­

der. Other incidents also took place in which these warring factions

were involved. So much so, a punitive police force was stationed in

this village to keep the peace during the period from March 1966 to

September 1967. Sarikonda Kotamrajn, the deceased person

in the

instant case,

was the leader of Bhatrajus. In order to devise

protec­

tive measures against the onslaughts of their opponents, the Bhatrajus

held a meeting at the house of the deceased, wherein they resolved to

defend themselves against the aggressive actions of the respondents· and

their party-men. PW 1, a ·member of Bhatrajus faction has a cattle

shed. · The passage to this cattle-shed was blocked by the other party.

The deceased took PW 1 to Police Station Nekarikal and got a report

lodged there. On July 22, 1968, the Sub-Inspector of Police came

to the village and inspected the disputed wall

in the presence of the

parties. The Sub-Inspector went away directing both the parties to

come to the

Police Station on the following morning so that a com­

promise might be effected ..

Another case arising out of a report made to the police by one

Kallam Kotireddi against Accused 2 and 3 and another in respect of

offences under

ss. 324, 323 and 325,

Penal Code was pending before

a Magistrate at Narasaraopet and the neJ(t date for hearing fixed in that

case was July 23, 1968.

On the morning of July 23, 1968, at about 6-30 a.m., PWs 1, 2

and the dece•ased boarded Bus No. AP 22607 at Rompicherla for

going to Nekarikal. Some minutes later, Accused 1 to 5 (hereinafter

referred to

as A-1, A2, A3, A4 and AS)

also got into the same bus.

The accused had obtained tickets for proceeding

to Narasaraopet.

When the bus stopped at Nekarikal Cross Roads, at about

7-30 a.m.,

the deceased and his companions al\ghted for going to the Police

Station. The

five accused also got down. The deceased and PW 1 went towards a Choultry run by PW 4, While PW 2 went to the road­

side to ease himself. A-1 and A2 went towards the Coffee Hotel

situate near the Choultry. From there, they picked up heavy sticks

and went after the deceased into the Choultrv. On seeing the accus­

ed, PW 1 ran away towards a hut nearby. -The deceased stood up.

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_ANVHRA il'RADESH v. RAYAVARAPU PUNNAYYA (Sarkaria, J.) 60 5

}fe was an old man of 55 years. He was not allowed to run. Des­

pite the entreaties made

by the deceased with folded hands, A-1 and

A

-2 indiscriminately pounded the legs and arms of the deceased .

. One of the by-standers, PW 6, asked the assailants as to why they were

mercilessly beating a

human being, as if he were a buffalo. The assai-·1ants angrily retorted that the witness was nobody to question them

and continued the beating till the deceased became unconscious. Tho

accused then threw their sticks at the spot, boarded another vehicle,

and went away. The occurrence was witnessed by PWs 1 to 7. The

victim was removed by PW 8 to Narasaraopet Hospital in a tempo­

rar. There, at about 8.45 a.m., Doctor Konda Reddy examined him

.;md found 19 injuries, out of which, no less than 9 were (internally)

.found to be grievous. They were :

1. Dislocation of distal end of proximal phalanx of left

middle finger.

2.

Fracture of right radius in its middle.

3. Dislocation of lower end of right ulna.

4.

Fracture of lower end of right femur.

5.

Fracture of medial malleolus of right tibia.

6.

Fracturn of lower 1/3 of right fibula.

7. Dislocation of lower end of left ulna.

:8. Fracture of upper end of left tibia.

· 9. Fracture of right patella.

Finding the condition of

the injured serious, the Doctor sent

information to the Judicial Magistrate for getting his dying declaration

-recorded. On Dr. K. Reddy's advice, the deceased was immediately

:-removed to the Guntur Hospital where he was examined and given

medical aid

by Dr.

Sastri. His dying declaration, Ex. P-5, was also

recorded there by a Magistrate (PW 10) at about 8.05 p.m. The

.deceased, however, succumbed to his injuries at about 4.40 a.m. on

July 24, 1968, despite medical aid.

The autopsy was conducted by Dr. P. S. Sarojini (PW 12) in

-whose opinion, the injuries found on the deceased were cummulatively

sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. The cause

.of death, according to the Doctor, was· shock and haemorrhage result-

.jng from multiple injuries.

The trial iudge convicted A-1 and A-2 under s.

302 as well as

under s. 302 read with s .. 34, Penal Code arid sentenced each of them

·to imprisonment for life.

On appeal by the convicts, the High Court altered their conviction

--to one under s. 304, Pt. II, Penal Code and reduced their sentence to

'five years rigorous imprisonment, each.

Aggrieved

by the judgment of the High Court, the

State has come

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in appeal to this. Court after obtaining special leave. H

J A-1, Rayavarappu Punnayya (Respondent 1) has, as reported by

·his Counsel, died during the pendency of this appeal. This informa­

-tion is not contradicted by the Counsel appearing for the State. This

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606 SUPREME COURT REPORTS L 1977) I S.C.IL

appeal therefore, in so far as it relates to A-1, abates. The appeal

against A-2 (Respondent 2), however, survives for decision.

The principal question that falls to be considered in this appeal is,

whether the offence disclosed by the facts and circumstances establish­

ed by the prosecution against the respondent, is 'murder' or 'culpable

homicide not amounting to murder'.

In the scheme of the Penal Code, 'culpable homicide' is genus and

'murder' its specie. All 'murder'

is 'culpable homicide' but not vice­

vcrsa. Speaking generally, 'culpable homicide'

sans 'special charac­

teristics of murder',

is 'culpable homicide not amounting to murder'.

For the purpose of fixing punishment, proportionate to the gravity of

this generic offence, the Code practically recognises three degress of cul­

pable homicide. The

first is, what may be called, culpable homicide of

the first degree. This

is the gravest form of culpable homicide which is

defined ins.

300 as 'murder'. The second may be termed as 'culpable

homicide

of the second degree'. This is punishable under the

1 gt

part of s. 304. Then, there is 'culpable homicide of the third .degree.'

This is the lowest type of culpable homicide and the punishment pro­

vided for it is, also, the lowest among the punishme;its provided for

the three grades. Culpable homicide of this degree

is punishable

under the second Part of

s.

304.

The academic distinction between 'murder' and 'culpable homicide

not amounting to murder' has vexed the courts for more than a cen­

tury. The confusion

is caused, if courts losing sight of the true scope

and meaning

of the terms used by the legislature in these sections,

allow themselves to be drawn into minutae abstractions.

The

safest

way of approach to the interpretation and application of these provi­

sions seems to

be to keep in focus the key words used in the various

clauses of

ss. 299 and

300. The following comparative table will be

helpful in appreciating the points of distinction between the two

offences.

Section 299 Section

300

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{

.,,

I

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A person commits culpable homici~e if the Sub1ect. lo . certain e;rceptions culpa(>/~ ,__

act by which the death IS caused IS done homicde Is murdenf the act by wh1c\i

the death ce.used is done-

INTENTION

(a) with the intention of causing dec,th;

or

(b) with the intention of causing such

bodily injury as

is likely to

cause

death; or

(I) with the intention of causing death;

or

(2) wiih to<:. intention of causing such

bodily injury as the ojjender knows

to be likely to cause the death

of the person to whom the harm

is caused; or

(3) with the intention of causing

bodily injury

to

any person and

the bodily injury intended

to be

inflicted

is su}jicient in the ordinary

course

of nature to

cause death;

Or

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ANDHRA PRADESH v. RAYAVARAPU PUNNAYYA (Sarkc.ria, J.) 60 7

A

KNOWLEDGE

(c) with the knowledge th1t the act is (4) with the knowledge that the act

likely to cause death. is so imminently dangerous that

it must in all probability cause

death or such bodily injury as is

'likely to cause death, and without B

any excuse for incurring the risk

of c1using death

or such injury as

is mentioned above.

Clause (b) of s. 299 corresponds with els. (2) and (3) of s.

300.

The distinguishing feature of the mens rea requisite under cl. (2) is the

knowledge possessed by the offender regarding

the particular victim c

being in such a peculiar condition or state of

health that the intentional

!harm caused to him

is likely to be fatal, notwithstanding the fact that

such harm would not in the ordinary way of nature be sufficient to

.cause death of a person

jn normal

health or condition. It is noteworthy

that the 'intention

to cause death' is not an essential requirement of

cl. (2).

Only the intention of causing the bodily injury coupled with

the offender's

knowledge of the likelihood of such injury causing the D

death of the particular victim,

is sufficient to bring the killing within

·the ambit of this clause. This aspect of cl. (2) is b01•11e out by illustra-

tion

(b) appended to s.

300.

Clause (b) of s. 299 does not postulate any such knowledge on

the part of the offender. Instances of cases falling under cl. (2) of

·s. 300 can be where the assailant causes death by a fist blow inten­

tionally given knowing that the victim is suffering from an enlarged

liver,

or enlarged spleen or diseased heart and such blow is

likely to

cause death of that

particular person as a result of the rupture

of the

liver, or spleen or the failure of the he•art, as the case may be. If the

assailant had

no such knowledge about the disease or special frailty. of

the victim, nor an intention to cause death or bodily injury sufficient "in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the offence wilJ not be

murder, even if the injury which caused the death, was intentionally

:given.

In clause

(3) of s.

300, instead of the words 'likely to cause

death' occurring in the corresponding cl. (b) of s. 299, the words

"sufficient in the ordinary course of nature" have been used. Obvious­

ly, the distinction lies between a bodily injury likely to cause death

:and a bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause

death.

The distinction is fine but real, and, if overlooked, may result

in miscarriage

of1 justice. The difference between cl. (b) of s. 299

and cl.

(3) of s.

300 is one of the degree of probability of death

resulting from the intended bodily injury.

To put it more broadly, it \s the degree of probability of death which determines whether a culpa­

ble homicide is of the gravest, medium or the lowest degree. The

word "likely" in cl. (b) of s. 299 conveys the sense of 'probable' as

,distinguished from a mere possibility. The words "bodily injury ...

sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death" mean that

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608 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1977] 1 S.C.it

A death w!ll be the "most probable" result of the injury having regard to·

the ordmary course of nature.

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.

For cases to fall within cl. ( 3), it is not necessary that the

offender­

mtended to cause death, so long as death ensues from the intentional..

bodily injury or injurie's sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course.

of nature. Rajwant and anr. v. State of Kera/a(') is an apt illustra-·

tion of this point.

In Virsa Singh v. The State of Punjab, (2) Vivian Bose J. speaking

for this Court, explained the meaning· and scope of Clause (3), thus

(at p. 1500) :

'

"The prosecution must prove the following facts before·

it can bring a case under s. 300, 3rdly'. First, it must esta­

blish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury

1s present;.

secondly the nature of the injury must

be proved. These

are purely objective investigations.

It must be proved that

there was

an intention to inflict that particular injury, that

is

to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional or that

some other kind

of injury was intended. Once these three

elements are proved

to

be> present, the enquiry proceeds fur­

ther, and, fourthly it must be ,proved that the injury of the

type just described made

up of

the three elements set out

above was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of

nature. This

part of

the enquiry is purely objective and

inferential and has nothing

to do with thd intention of the offender."

Thus according to the rule laid down in Virsa Sing Ii' s case (supra)

even if the intention of accused was limited to the infliction of a bodily

injury sufficient

to cau'se death in the ordinary course of nature and

did not extend

to the intention of causing death, the offence would be

murder. Illustration ( c) appended to

s.

300 clearly brings out this

point.

Clause ( c) of

s. 299 and cl. ( 4) of s.

300 both require knowledge

of the probability of the causing death. It is not necessary for the

purpose of this case

to dilate much on the

distinction between these

corresponding clauses.

It will be sufficient to say that cl. ( 4) of s.

300

would be applicable where the knowledge of the offender as to the

probability of death of a person or persons in general-as distinguished

from a particular person

or persons-being caused from his imminently daflgerous act, approximates to a practical certainty. Such lmow­

ledge

on the part of the offender must be of the highest degree of proba.

bility, the act having been committed by the offender without any

excuse for incurring the risk of causing death

or such injury

as

aforesaid.

From the above conspectus, it emerges that whenever a court is

confronted with the question whether the offence

is 'murder' or 'culpa­

ble homicide

not amounting to murder,' on 1the facts of a case, it will'

(I) A.l.R. 1966 S.C. 1874. (2) [1958) S.C.R. 1495.

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ANDHRA PRADESH v. RAYAVARAPU PUNNAYYA (Sarkaria, J.) 609

be convenient for it to approach the problem in three stages. The A

question to

be considered at the first stage would be, whether the

accused

has done

an act by doing which he has caused the death of

another. Proof of such causal connection between the act of the

accused and the death, leads

to the second stage for considering

whether that act of the accused amounts to

"culpable homicide" as B

9efined in s. 299. If the answer to thi~ question is prim a f acie found

111 the affinnative, the stage for considering the operation of s. 300,

Penal Code is reached. This is ~he stage at which the Court should

d}!t$'.rrnip£ wh~th~r the facts proved by the prosecution bring the case

within the ambit of any of the four Clauses of the definition of

murder' contained in

s.

300. If the answer to this question is in the

negative the offence would be 'culpab:e homiCide not amounting to C

murder', punishable under the

first or the second part of

.s .. 304, depen-

ding, respectively, on whether

the second or the third Clause of s. 299

is applicable. If this

question is found in the positive, but the case

comes, within any of the Exceptions enumerated in s. 300, the offence

would still be 'culpable homicide not amounting to murder', punishable

under the First Part of s. 304, Penal Code. .

The. above are only broad guidelines and hot cast-iron imperatives.

In

m.ost

, cases, their observance will facilitate the task of the court.

But sometimes the facts are

so inter-twined and the second and the

third stages

i;o telescoped into each other, that it may not be conve­

nient ·to give a separate treatment to the matters involved in the

second and third stages.

Now

let us consider the problem before

us in the light of the above

enunciation.

It is not disputed that the death of the deceased was caused by the

accused, there being a direct causal connection between the beating

administered by

Ac 1 and A-2 to the deceased and his death. The

accused confined the beating

to the legs and arms of the deceased, and

therefore, it can be said that they perhaps had no

"intention to cause

death" within the contemplation clause (a) of s. 299 or cl. ( 1) of

s. 300. It is nobody's case that the instant case falls within cl. ( 4)

of s. 300. This clause, as already noticed, is designed for that class of

cases where the act of the offender

is not directed against any particu­

lar individual but there is in his act that recklessness and risk of immi­

nent danger, knowingly and unjustifiably incurred, which

is directed

against the man in general, and places the lives of many in jeopardy.

Indeed, in all fairness, Counsel for the appellant has not contended

that the case would

f::ill under cl. ( 4) of s. 300. His sole contention

is that. even if the accused had no intention to cause death, the facts

established fully bring the case within the purview of

cl. (3) of

5. 300

and as such the offence committed is murder and nothing less.

Jn support of this contention reference has been made to

Anda v. State .of Rajasthan(') and Rajwani Singh v. State of Kera/a (supra).

As against this, Counsel for the respondent subJpits that since the

accused 'selected only non-vital parts of the body· of the deceased, for

0) A.J.R. 1966 S.C. 148.

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610 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1977] 1 S.C.R.

inflicting the injuries, they could not be attributed the mens rea requi­

site for bringing the case under clause (3) of s. 300; at the most, it

could be said· that they had knowledge that the injuries inflicted by

them were likely to cause death and as such the case falls within the

third clause of s. 299, and the offence committed was only "culpable

homicide not amounting to murder", punishable under s. 304, Part II.

Couns~I has thus tried to support the reasonin·g of the High Colll1.

The trial Court, 'JS already noticed, had convicted the respondent of

the offence of murder.

It applied the rule

in Virsa Singlt's ca'c

(supra). and the ratio of Anda v. State and held that the case was

clearly covered by clause Thirdly of

s.

300. The High Court has dis­

agreed with the trail Court and held that the offence was not murder

but one under

s.

304, Pt. IL

The High Co.mt reached this conclusion on the following reason­

.ing :

(a) "There was no premeditation in the attack. It was

almost an impulsive act".

( b) "Though there were 21 injuries, they were all on the

arms and legs and not on the head or other vital parts

of the body."

( c) "There was no compound fracture to result in heavy

haemorrhage; there must have been some bleeding".

(which) "according to PWI might have stoppl:d

with in about half an hour to one hour."

( d) "Death that had occurred 21 hours later, could have

been only due to shock and not due to haemorrhage

al3o, as stated by PW 12. . . who conducted the

autopsy. This reference

is strengthened by

the evi­

dence of PW 26 who says that the patient was under

shock and he was treating him for shock by sending

fluids through his vein. From the injuries inflicted

the accused therefore could not have intended to

cause death."

( e) "A I and A2 had beaten the deceased with heavy

sticks. These beatings had resulted in fracture of the

right radius, right femur, right tibia, right fibula, right

patalla and left tibia and dislocation of

.... , there­

fore considerable force must have been used white

inflicting the blows. Accused l and 2 should have

therefore inflicted these injuries with the

knowled.ge

that they are likely, by so beating, to cause the death

of the deceased, though they might not have had the

knowled11:e that they were so imminently dangerous

·that in all probability their acts would result in such

injuries as are likely to cause the death.

The offence

... is therefore culpable homicide falling under ....

s. 299,

I.P.C. punishable under s. 304 Part II and not

murder."

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ANDI-IRA PRADESH v. RAYAVARAPU PUNNAYYA (Sarkaria, 1.) 611

With respect, we are unable to appreciate and accept thi.s reas:m~ng.

Jt .appears to us to be inconsistent, erroneous and largely specuiatlve.

To say that the attack was not premeditated or preplann~d is ~ot

'°1ily factually incorrect but also at war with High Court's own findmg

:that the injuries were caused to the deceased in furtherance of the

,common intention of A-1 and A-2 and therefore, s. 34, I.P.C. was

.applicable. Further, the finding that there was no compound fractur~,

.no heavy haemorrhage and the cause of the death was shock, only, 1s

.not in accord with the evidence on the record. The best person to

speak about haemorrhage and the cause of the death was Dr. P. S .

. Sarojini (PW 12) who had conducted the autopsy. She testified that

:the cause of death of the deceased was "shock and haemorrhage due

to multiple injuries". This categorical opinion of the Doctor was not

assailed in cross-examination. In the post-mortem examination report

Ex. P-8, the Doctor noted that the heart of the deceased was found

full

of

dotted blood. Again in injury No. 6, which also was an internal

fracture,

the bone was visible through the wound. Dr. D. A. Sastri, PW 26, had testified that he was treating Kotamraju injured of shock,

not only by sending fluids through his vein, but also blood. This part

,of his statement wherein he spoke about the giving of blood transfusion

ito the deceased, appears to have been overlooked by the High Court.

Dr. Kondareddy, PW 11, who was the first Medical Officer to examine

the injuries_ of the deceased,

had noted that there was

bleedi11g and

swelling around injury No. 6 which was located on the left leg 3 inches

above the ankle. Dr. Sarojini, PW 12, found fracture of the left tibia

underneath this injury. There could therefore, be no doubt that this

was a compound fracture. P.W. 11 found bleeding from the other

.-abraded injuries, a.Jso. He however found the condition of the injured

grave and immediately sent an information to the Magistrate for

recording his dying declaration. PW l l also advised immediate re­

moval of the deceased to the bigger Hospital at Guntur. There, also,

Dr. Sastri finding that life in the patient was ebbing fast, took imme­

diate two-fold action. First, he put the patient on blood transfusion.

Second,

he sent an intimation for recording his dying declaration. A

Magistrate

(PW 10) came there and recorded the statement. These

are all tell-tale circumstances which unerring by show that there was

substantial haemorrhage from

some of the injuries involving compound

fractures. This being the case, there was absolutely no reason to

doubt the sworn word of the Doctor,

(PW 12) that the c:rnse of the

death was shock

and haemorrhage.

Although the learned Judges of the High

Court have not

specifi­

cally referred to the quotation from page 289, of Modi's book on

Medical ?.U!i~prudence an~ T<?xicology (1961 Edn.) which was put to

Dr. SaroJ!ru m cross-exammat10n, they appear

to have derived support

from

the

s•ame for the argument that fractures of such bones "are not

ordinarily dangerous"; therefore, the accused could not have intended

to cause

death but had only knowledge that they were likely by such

beating to cause the death of the deceased.

It wiJ!l be worthwhile to extract that quotation from Mody

a.s a

reference

to the same was made by Mr.

Subba Rao before us,' also.

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612 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1977] 1 S.C.R.

A According to Mody : "Fractures are not ordinarily dangerous unless. 't

they are compound, when death may occur from foss of blood, if a.

big vessel is wounded by the split end of a fractured bone."

It may be noted, in the first place, that this opinion of the learned·

author is couched in too general and wide language. Fractures of some

vital bones. such as those of the skull and the vertebral column are

B generally ki1own to be dangerous to life. Secondly, even this general

•

statement has been qualified by the learned author, by saying that

compound fractures involving haemorrhage, are ordinarily dangerous.

We have seen, that some of the fractures underneath the injuries oi the

deceased, were compound fractures accompanied by substantial

haemorrhage. In the face of this finding, Mady's opinion, far from

._

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advancing the contention of the defence, discounts it.

The High Court hus held that the accused had no intention to

cause death because they deliberately avoided

to hit any vital part of

the body, and confined the beating to the legs and arms of the deceas­

ed. There

is much that can be said in support of this particular

find-

ing. But that finding-assuming it to be correct--does not necessarily

take the case out of the definition of 'murder'.. The crux of the matter

D

is, whether the facts established bring the case within

Clans·e Thirdly

of

s.

300. This question further narrows down into a consideration

of the two-fold issue :

(i) Whether the bodily injuries found on the deceased were

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intentionally inflicted by the accused ? "'

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(ii) If so, were they sufficient !lO cause death in the ordinary

course of nature?

If both these elements are satisfactorily

established, the offence will be 'murder', irrespective of the

fact whether

an intention on the part of the accused

to

cause death, had or had not been proved.

In the instant case, the existence of both these elements was clearly

established by the prosecution. There was bitter hostility between the

warring factions to which the accused and the decea~ed belonged.

Criminal litigation was going on between these factions since long. Both

the factions had been proceeded against under

s.

107, Cr. P.C. The

accused had therefore a motive to beat the deceased. The attack was

premeditated and pre-planned, although the interval between the con­

ception and execution

of the plan was not very long; The

accused

had purchased tickets for going further to Narasaraopet, but on seeing

the deceased, their

bete noir, alighting at Nekarikal, they designedly

got down there and trailed him. They selected heavy sticks about

3·

inches in diameter, each, and with those lethal weapons, despite the

entreaties of the deceased, mercilessly pounded his legs and arms

causing no less than

19 or

20 injuries, smashing at least seven bones,.

mostly major bones, and dislocating two more. The beating was

administered in a brutal and reckless manner.

It was pressed home

with an unusually fierce, cruel and sadistic determination. When the

human conscience of one of the shocked bystanders spontaneously

cried out in protest as

to why the accused

were beating a human being

as if he were a buffalo, the only echo it could draw from the assailants,

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ANDHRA PRADESH v. RAYAVARAi'V PUNNAYYA (Sarkaria, ].) 613

was a 'rninacious retort, who callously continued their malevolent

action, and did not stop the beating till the deceased became uncons­

cious. May be, the intention of the accused was to cause death and

they stopped the beating under the impression th~t the _dece~sed was

dead. But this lone circumstance cannot take this poss1bl~ mference

to the plane of positive proof. Nevertheless, the formidable weaI>ons

' used by the accused in the beating, the savage manner of its execution,

the helpless state of the unarmed victim, the intensity of the violence

caused the

caHous conduct of the accused in persisting in the assault

even

ag;iinst the protest of feeling bystanders-all, viewed against the

background of previous animosity between the parties, irresistibly lead

to the conclusion that the injuries caused by the accused to the deceas­

ed were intentionally inflicted, and were not' accidental. Thus the

presence of the first element of Clause Thirdly of

s.

300 had been

cogently and convincingly established.

This takes us to the second element of Clause (

3). Dr. Sarojini,

PW 12, testified that the injuries of the deceased were ctm1ulative1y

wfficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. In her

opinion-which we have found to be entirely trustworthy-the cause -

of the death was shock and haemorrhage due to the multiple injuries.

l)r. Sarojini had conducted the post-mortem examination of the dead­

Jody of the deceased. She had dissected the body and examined the

111juries to the internal organs. She was therefore the best informed

expert who could opine with authority as to the cause of the death and

as to the sufficiency or otherwise of the injuries from which the death

ensued. Dr. Sarojini's evidence on this point stood on a better footing

than that of the Doctors (PWs. 11 and 26) who had externally

examined the deceased in, his life-time. Despite this position, the High

Court has not specifically considered the evidence of Dr. Sarojini with

regard to the sufficiency of the injuries to cause death in the ordinary

course of nature. There

is no reason why Dr. Sarojini's evidence with

regard to the second element of Clause

(3) of s.

300 be not accepted.

Dr. Sarojini's evidence satisfactorily establishes the presence of the

, second element of this, clause.

There

is therefore, no escape from the conclusion, that the offence

committed by the accused was 'murder', notwithstanding the fact that

the intention of the accused to cause death has not been shown bevond

doubt.

·

In Anda v. State of Rajastlum (supra), this Court had to deal with

a very simifar situation. In that case, several accused beat the victim

with sticks after dragging him into a house and caused multiple injuries

including 16 lacerated wounds on the arms and legs, a hematoma on

the forhead and a bruise on the chest. Under these injuries to the

arms. and legs lay fractures of the right and left ulnas, second and third

metacarpal bones on the right hand and second metacarpal bone of

the left hand, compound fractures of the right tibia and right fibula.

There was loss of blood from the injuries. The Medical Officer who

conducted the autopsy opined that the cause of the death was shock

and syncope due to multiple .injuries; that all the injuries collectively

could be sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, but

individually none of them was

so sufficient.

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614 SUPREME COURT REPORTS fl 977] 1 S.C.R.

Question arose whether in such a case when no significant injury

had been inflicted on a vital art of the body, and the weapons used

were ordinary lathis, and the accused could not

be said to have the

intention of causing death, the offence would be 'murder'

or merely

'culpable homicide not amounting to murder'. This

Court speaking

through Hidayatullah

J. (as he then was), after explaining the com­

parative scope of and the distinction between ss. 299 and

300, answer­

ed the question in these terms :

"The injuries were not on a vital part of the body and no

weapon was used which can be described as specially dange­

rous. Only lathis were used. It cannot, therefore, be said

safely that there was

an intention to cause the death of

Bherun within the first clause of

s.

300. At the same time,

it is obvious

that his hands and legs were smashed and

numerous bruises and lacerated wounds were caused.

The

number of injuries shows that every one joined in beating

him.

Tt is also clear that the assailants aimed at breaking his

arms and legs. Looking

at the injuries caused to Bherun in

furtherance of the common intention of

all it is clear that the

injuries intended to be caused were sufficient to cause death

in the ordinary course of nature, even if it cannot be said that

his death was intended. This is sufficient to bring the case

within 3rdly of s. 300."

The ratio of Anda v. State of Rajasthan (supra) applies in full

force to the facts of the present case. Here, a direct causal connection

between the act of the accused and the death was established.

The

injuries were the direct cause of the death. No secondary factor such

as gangrene, tetanus etc., supervened. There. was no

doubt whatever

that the beating was premeditated and calculated. Just as in Anda's

case, here also, the aim of the asailants was to smash the arms and legs

·of the deceased, and they succeeded in that design. causing no less

than 19 injuries, including fractures of most of the bones of

the legs

and the arms. While in

Anda's case, the sticks used by the assailants

were not specially dangerous, in the instant case they were unusualJy

heavy, lethal weapons. All these acts of the accused

were pre-planned

and intentional, which, considered objectively in the light of the medical

evidence, were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause

death.

The mere fact that the beating was designedly confined by the

assailants to the legs and arms, or that none of the

multiple injuries

inflicted was individually sufficient in the ordinary course of nature tlil

cause death, will not exclude the application of Clause 3rdly of s. 300.

The expression "bodily injury" in Clause 3rdly includes also its plural,

so that the clause would cover a case where all the injuries intentionally

caused by the accused are cumulatively sufficient to cause the death in

the ordinary course of nature, even if none of those injuries i11divid1ully

measures upto such sufficiency. The sufficiency spoken of in this clause,

as already noticed,

is the high probability of death in the ordinary

course of nature, and if such sufficiency exists and death

is

caused and

the injury causing

it is intentional, the case would fall

1.t.lder Clause

3rdly of s. 300. All the conditions which are a pre-requisite for the

applicability of this clause have been established

and the offence com­

mitted by the accused in the instant

case was 'murder'.

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ANDERA PRADESH v. RAYAVARAPU PUNNAYYA (Sarkaria, J.) 615

For all the foregoing reasons, we are of opinion that the High Court A

was in error in altering the conviction of the accused-respondent from

one under

s. 302, 302/34, to that under s. 304,

Part II, Penal Code.

Accordingly

we allow this appeal and restore the order of the trial

Court convicting the accused (Respondent 2 herein) for the offence of

murder, with a sentence of imprisonment for life. Respondent 2,

if he

is not

already in jail shaJ.I · be arrested and committed to prison to

serve out the sentence inflicted on him. B

P.B.R. Appeal allowed.