0  20 Dec, 1950
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State of Bombay Vs. Narothamdas Jethabai and Another

  Supreme Court Of India Civil Appeal/10/1950
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!9SO

State of Bombay

y.

Narothamdas

Jethabai and

Anothtf.

Patanfali

Sastri J.

68 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1951]

value and w dS not cognisable by the City Court apart

from the impeached notification,

was held to have

been properly laid in the High Court. Both these

findings

hav~ been challenged before us as erroneous,

tbe first

by the first respondent and the second by the

appellant.

On the first point, learned counsel for the first res­

pondent urged that section 100 of the Government of

India Act, 1935, read with entries 53 of List I, 2 of

List II and 15 of List III, the relevant parts of which

are in identical terms, namely, "jurisdiction and

powers

of all courts except the Federal Court with

res­

pect to any of the matters in this List", conferred

power on Legislatures in British India to make

laws

with respect to jurisdiction of courts only in relation

to matters falling within their

respective legislative

fields, and that, therefore,

the. expressions "adminis­

tration of justice" and "constitution and organisation

of courts" in entry 1 of List II, although -they might

be wide enough, if that entry

stood alone, to include

the topic

of

"jurisdiction and powers of courts",

should not be construed in that comprehensive sense as

such construction would give no effect to the limiting

words in entry 2 which would then

become meaningless.

Indeed

if those expressions in entry 1 included the

power to legislate with respect to jurisdiction

also,

there would

be no need for entry 2, while, on the other

hand, without including such power, they would still

have ample content,

as various other matters relating

to administration

of justice and constitution of courts

would

have to be provided for. The scheme disclosed

by the three separate entries in identical terms in the

three

list• was said to be this: The Provincial Legis­

latures were to have the power of constituting courts

and providing for administration

of justice, but the

power to invest the courts with jurisdiction was to

rest with the Federal

Lej!islature in respect of the

matters mentioned in List I and with the Provincial

Legislature in respect

of the matters mentioned in

List II, while

both the Federal and the Provincial

Legislatures were to

have such power with respect to

·-

•.

>

S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 69

the matters mentioned in List III subject to the pro­

visions of section 107. It was, therefore, submitted

that the Act, in

so far as it purported to provide by

section 3 that the City Civil Court established there-

·

under "shall have jurisdiction to receive, try and dis­

pose of all suits and other proceedings of a civil nature

not exceeding

Rs.

10,000 in value and · arising within

Greater Bombay" (with certain exceptions not mate­

rial here)

was ultra vires the Provincial Legislature,

constituting

as it did a direct invasi@n of the Federal

field marked out

by entry 53 Qf List I. As all the three

entries dealt with the same topic of jurisdiction and

powers of courts, there

was no room, it was said, for

the application of the doctrine of incidental encroach­

ment.

-The argument is ~ot without force. The Bombay

High Court in Mulchand v. Raman(1}, which was fol­

lowed by the learned Judges in .the present case, and

the Attorney-General who adopted the

same line be­

fore us, invoked the doctrine of pith and substance in

answer to the argument on behalf of. the respondent.

But that doctrine, while it often furnishes the

key to

the solution of problems arising out of the distribution

of overlapping legislative powers in a Federal

system,

is not of much assistance in meeting the difficulty in

finding any usefulness in entry 2 if under entry 1 the

Provincial Legislature were intended

to have the power

to legislate generally with respect to the jurisdiction

and powers of courts. The greater power must include

the

less. A similar difficulty in construing entry 4 of

List III and entry 2 of List II

arose in Stewart v.

Brojendra

Ki'shore(

2

} and led a Division Bench of the

Calcutta High" Court to construe the expression, "civil

procedure" occurring in the former entry in a "limited

sense" as excluding jurisdiction and powers of courts.

After referring to the decision of the Judicial Com­

mittee in In re Marriage Reference(

3

}

where

"marriage

and divorce" in the Dominion List was construed as

excluding matters relating to the "solemnisation of

(

1

) Sl B.L.R. 86. (') [1912] A.C. 880.

(') A.l.R. l 939 Cal. 628.

1950

State of BombQJ'

v.

Narothamdas

Jethabai and

Another.

Patanjall

Sami J.

1950

State of Bombay

v.

Narothamda5

Jethahai and

Another.

Patanjali SaJtri J.

70 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1951]

marriage in the province" because the latter topic was

specifically included in the Provincial List, the learned

Judges observed : "The position is similar here. 'Civil

procedure' in the Concurrent Legislative List must

be

held to exclude matters relating to jurisdiction and

powers of courts since special provision

is made for

those matters elsewhere in the

lists." "To hold other­

wise", they pointed out, "would be completely to wipe

out the second entry in the Provincial Legislative

List." Learned counsel for the first respondent strong­

ly relied on that decision and suggested that, if it had

been brought to the notice of the learned Judges in

Mulchand v. Raman('), their decision might well have

been the other

way. On the other hand, the Attorney-General submitted

that there · could

be no question of conflict between

two entries in the

same list and that the natural

meaning of one should not

be restricted simply

be­

cause of the presence of the other. He placed reliance

on the following observations of Gwyer

C. J. in

Atiqua Begum's case(').

"It would be practically

impossible for example tp define each item in the Pro­

vincial List in such a way as to make it exclusive of

every item in that List and Parliament seems to have •

been content to take a number of comprehensive cate-

gories and to describe each of them

by words of broad

and general import. .

............ : .... I think, however,

that none of the items in the Lists

is to · be read in a

narrow or restricted

sense and that each general word

should

be held to extend to all ancillary or subsidiary

matters which

can fairly and reasonably be said to be

comprehended in

it." These observations were, how­

ever, made to support the conclusion that the power to

legislate with respect

to

"collection of rents" under

entry

21 of List II includes the power to legislate with

respect to any limitation on the power of a landlord to

collect rents, that

is to say, with respect to the

remis­

sion of rents· as well, and that, therefore, the United

Provinces Regularisation of Remissions Act, 1938,

was intra vires. General observations made in such

(') (1940] F.C.R. 110, 134.

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1950

State of Bombay

v.

Narothamda$

Jelhahai and

Another

Mahajan J.

78 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1951]

intestate jurisdiction or for the relief of insolvent

debtors.

4. Subject to the exceptions specified in section 3

the State Government may

by notification in the

Official Gazette, invest the City Court with jurisdic­

tion to receive, try and dispose of all suits and other

proceedings of a civil nature arising within the Grea­

ter Bombay and of such value not exceeding twenty-five

thousand rupees

as may be specified in the notification.

12. Notwithstanding anything contained in any law,

the High Court shall not have jurisdiction to try suits

and proceedings

cognisable by the City Court :

Provided that the High Court may, for any special

reason, and at any

stage remove for trial by itself an

suit or proceeding from the City

Court."

On the second question the High 0 .urr held that

section 4 of the Act

was inoperative as it purported to

delegate the law-making powers

of the legislature to

~n

outside authority and lience the notification issued in

pursuance

of it had no effect whatsoever and did not

take away the jurisdiction

of the High Court to try

the present suit.

On the first question the High Court

placed reliance on

its own earlier decision in M ulchand

Kundanmal Jagtiani

v. Raman Hiralal

Shah('), and

held that the Act

was intra vires the Bombay

· Legis­

lature. The appellant assails the correctness of the

decision of the High Court on the second point and

supports the decision on the first point. The first re<­

pondent, on the other hand, while supporting the

decision of the High Court on the second question,

:hallenges its correctness in regard to the first ques­

tion. The learned Attorney-General contends that the

High Court placed an erroneous construction on sec­

tions 3 and 4 of the Act; that reading the two sections

together the effect

is that the legislature has set up the

City Civil Court with an mitial

jurisdiction of

Rs. 10,000 and has placed an outside limit of

Rs. 25,000 on its pecuniary jurisdiction and that it

(I) 51 Born. L.R. 86.

..

'

..,

)-

S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 79

has left to the discretion of the Provincial Govern­

ment the determination of the circumstances under

which this extension

of the pecuniary jurisdiction

between

Rs.

10,000 and Rs. 25,000 is to take place. It

was said that section 4 is in th~ nature of a conditional

kgislation and that under it no legislative function has

l!>een delegated to the Provincial Government. The

learned Chief Justice in the court below disposed of

this contention with the following observations :-

"I am also conscious of the fact that an Act

must

be construed in a manner which would

reconcile

its different sections but with the best

of intention in the world I <lo not see how it is

pos.sible to read sections 3 and 4 together so as

to come to the conclusion for which the Advocate­

General contends. To my mind it is patent that the

Legislature never applied its mind to the question

as to

whether the new court which it was setting up should

have a jurisdiction higher than that of

Rs.

10,000~

It never passed any judgment on that question. It

never laid down any policy with regard to that ques­

tion and section 4 is not a _ section which merely

directs the Provincial Government r.o carry out the

policy laid down

by the legislature ...... but it is a sec-

tion which confers upon the Provincial Government

the power

to confer jurisdiction upon the Court, or in

other words, it

is a

section which entitled the Pro­

vincial Government to lay down its policy as to whether

the new Court should have the increased jurisdiction

up to twenty-five thousand rupees."

I find it difficult to accept -this view. Without

applying its mind to the question

as to whether the

new Court which it was setting up should have a

jurisdiction higher than

Rs.

10,000, how could the

legislature possibly enact in section 4 that the pecuni­

ary jurisdiction of the new court would not exceed

Rs. 25,000. The fixation of the maximum limit of the

court's pecuniary jurisdiction

is the result of exercise

of legislative will,

as without arriving at this

judg­

ment it would not have been able to determine the

outside limit of the pecuniary jurisdiction of the new

1950

State of Bombay

v.

NarothamdaJ

Jethabai and

Another

Mahajan J.

1950

tale of Bombay

v.

Narothamdas

Jethabai and

Another

Mahajan I.

80 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1951]

court. The policy of the legislature in regard to the

pecuniary jurisdiction

of the court that was being set

up was settled by sections 3 and 4 of the Act and it

was to the effect that initially its pecuniary

jurisdic­

tion will be limited to Rs. 10,000 and that in future if

circumstances make it desirable-and this

was left to

the determination of the Provincial Government-it

could

be given jurisdiction to hear cases up to the

value of Rs. 25,000. It was also determined that the

extension of the pecuniary jurisdiction of the new

court will

be

subject to the provisions contained in the

exceptions

to section 3. I am therefore of the opinion

that the learned

Chief Justice was not right in saying

that the legislative mind

was never applied as to the

conditions subject

to which and as to the amount up

to which the new court could have pecuniary

jurisdic­

tion. All that was left to the discretion of the Pro­

vincial Government was the determination of the

circumstances under which the new court would be

clothed with enhanced pecuniary jurisdiction. The

vital matters

of policy having been determined, the

actual execution

of that policy was left to the

Pro­

vincial Government and to such conditional legislation

no exception could

be taken. The section does not

empower

the Provincial Government to enact a law as

regards the pecuniary jurisdiction of the new court and

it

can in no sense be held to be legislation conferring

legislative power on the Provincial Government.

In

Queen v. Burah('), section 9 of Act XXII of 1869,

which was a piece of legislation analogous to section 4

of the City Civil Court Act, was held intra vires by

their Lordships of the Privy Council. By the 9th

section power was conferred on the Lieutenant Gover­

nor of Bengal to determine whether the Act or any

part of it should be applied to certain districts. In

other words, authority

to extend the territorial limits

of the operation of the statute

was conferred on the

Lieutenant Governor and such extension had the result

of depriving the High Court of its jurisdiction in those

areas and of conferring jurisdiction in respect to them

(11 51.A. 178.

'

....

j

S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 81

on the commissioner. Objection was taken as to the

valiqity of section 9 on the ground that it was legisla­

tion delegating legislative power and was therefore

void. Their Lordships negatived this contention and

held that se.ction 9 was intra vires the Governor­

General's power to make laws and was a piece of con­

ditional legislation. That was a case of an extension

of territorial limits within which an Act of the Legis­

lature was to be in force, whereas the present is a case

of extension' of pecuniary limits of a court's jurisdic­

tion. In principle, there seems no difference between

the two

cases and the present case is therefore within

the rule

of the decision in Queen v.

Burah(1). Their

Lordships

in holding section 9 intra vires made the

fol­

lowing observations :-

"Their Lordships think that it is a fallacy to speak

of the powers thus conferred upon the Lieutenant­

Governor (large as they undoubtedly are) as if, when

they were exercised, the

efficacy

of the acts done under

them would

be due to any other legislative authority

than that

of the Governor-General in Council. Their

whole operation

is, directly and immediately, under

and by virtue of this Act (XXII of 1869) itself. The

proper Legislature has exercised its judgment

as to

place, person, laws, powers, and the result

of that

judgment

has been to legislate conditionally as to all

these things.

The conditions haTing been fulfilled, the

legislation

is now absolute. Where plenary powers of

legislation exist

as to particular subjects, whether in

an Imperial or in a Provincial Legislature, they may

(in their Lordships' judgment)

be well exercised, either

absolutely or conditionally. Legislation, conditional

on the

use of

· particular powers, or on the exercise of a

limited discretion, entrusted

by the Legislature to

persons in whom it places confidence, is no uncommon

thing ; and, in many circumstances,

it may be highly

convenient. The British Statute Book abounds with

examples

of it ; and it cannot be supposed that the

Imperial Parliament did not, when constituting the

(1)

SI I.A.178.

1950

State of Bombay

.. v.

Narothamda$

J e thabai and

Another

Mahajan

J.

1950

State of Bombay

v.

Narothamda.J

Jethahai and

Another

Mahajan J.

82 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19511

Indian Legislature, contemplate this kind of condi­

tional legislation as within the scope of the legislative

powers which it from time

to time conferred. It cert.-Unly used no words to exclude it."

These observations appositely apply to the legislative

provision contained in section 4 of the impugned Act.

The true distinction is between the delegation of power

to make the law which necessarily involves a

discre­

tion as to what it shall be and conferring authority or

discretion

as

·to itSI execution, to be exercised under

and in pursuance

of the law. Objection may be taken

to the former but not to the latter. Reference in this

connection may

also be made to

tli.e decision of the

Supreme Court of America in Field v. Clark(') wherein

reterring to

Locke's case(

2

)

the following observations

were

made:-

"To assert that a law is less than a law, because it

is made to depend on a future event or act, is to rob

the legislature of the power to act wisely for the pub­

lic welfare whenever a law is passed relating to a state

of affairs not

yet developed, or to things future and

impossible

to fully

know." The proper distinction

the court said

was this :

"The Legislature cannot

delegate

its power to make a law, but it can make a

law to delegate a power

to determine some fact or state

of things upon which the law makes, or intends to

make,

its own action depend. To deny this would be

to

stop the wheels of government. There are many

things upon which

wise and usefull legislation must

depend which cannot be known to the law-making

power; and, must therefore,

be a subject of inquiry

and determination outside of the halls of legislation."

The High Court in support of its view placed

con­

siderable reliance on the decision of the Federal Court

in /i:itindra Nath Gupta v. The Province of Bihar(")

and it was considered that the present case fell within

the ambit of the rule therein laid down. It

seems to me

that the decision in the Bihar

case has no application

to the

case in hand. The Federal Court

there· was

en 143 u'.s. 649.

(2)

72

Pa. 491.

(3) [1949] F.C.R. 595.

...

'

...

>

S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 83

dealing with an Act which contained the following

provisions in section I, sub-~ection (3) :-

"The Act shall remain in force for a period of 0ne

year from the date of its commencement :

Provided that the Provincial Government may,i by

notification, on a resolution passed

by the Bihar

Legislative Assembly and agreed to

by the Bihar

Legislative Council, direct that this Act shall remain

in force for a further period of one year with such

modifications, if any,

as· nuy be specified in the

notification."

ln connection with this proviso I said in my judg­

ment in that

case that the power

conferred therein was

much larger than ' was conferred on the Lieutenant­

Governor in

Queen v:

Burah(1) inasmuch as it author­

ised the Provincial Governrnent to modify the Act and

also to recenact it. It was pointed out that "distinction

between delegation of power to make the law which

necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be,

and conferring discretion or authority

as to its execu­

tion to be exercised

un~tr. and in pursuance of the law

is a true one and has to be made in all cases where

such a question

is

raised." The follow:ng observations

made

by me there

pointedly bring out the distinction

between the two

cases

;......,. •

"The proviso which has been assailed in this case,

judged on the .above test, comes within the ambit of

delegated legislation, and is thus an .improper piece of

legislation and is void. . To my mind, it not only

amounts to abdicati0n· of legislative authority by the

Provincial Legislature, it goes further and amounts to

setting up a . parallel Legislature for enacting a modi­

fied Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act and for

enacting a

prov151on in it that that Act has to be

enacted for a further period of one year. A careful ana­

lysis of the proviso bears out the above conclusion. It

may be asked what does the proviso purport to do in

terms and in substance? The answer

is that it empowers

the

Provincial Goyernment to issue a notification say-

ll) S I.A. 178.

1950

State of Bombay

v.

Narothamdas

Jethabai and

Another

ahajan J.

1950

State of Bombay

v.

Narotha171tlM

Jethabai and

Another

Mahajan J.

84 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1951]

ing that the Provincial Act shall remain in force for a

further period of

one year with such modifications, if

any,

as may be specified in the notification ........ Modi-

fication

of statute amounts to re-enacting it partially.

It involves the power to say that certain parts of it

are· no longer parts of the statute and that a statute

with X sections

is now enacted with

Y sections. In the

act of modification

is involved a legislative power as a

discretion

has to be exercised whether certain parts of

the statute are to remain law in future or not or have

to

be deleted . from it. The power to modify may even

involve a power to repeal parts

of it. A modified

statute

is not the same original statute. It is a new

Act and logically speaking, it amounts to enacting a

new

law." ,

I have not been able to follow how these observations

concerning the Bihar statute could

be relied upon by

the High Court in support of its decision in respect to

the invalidity of section 4 of the

Bombay

City Civil

Court Act. The two provisions are not anaiogous

jn any mai:rner whatsoever and that being so, no

support

can be derived by the respondent from this

decision.

In the concluding portion of his judgment under

appeal the learned

Chief Justice observed as follows :-

"Now applying once more these tests to the City

Civil Court Act, we find that the Legislature in the

exercise of its legislative power has set up a Civil Court

with a limited jurisdiction under section 5 of the Act.

It has not set up a court with jurisdiction higher than

ten thousand rupees. Having

set up a court of limited

jurisdiction it

has given to the Provincial Government

under section 4 the power

to confer upon that court a

higher jurisdiction up to twenty-five thousand rupees.

Now this power which is conferred upon the

Provin­

cial Government is a power which could only have i>een

-exercised by the Legislature itself."

It seems to me that the above observations are based

on a construction

of sections 3 and 4 of the Act which

these sections cannot legitimately bear.

As already

-~b­

served, the Legislature set up a Civil Court for Greater

._

)

S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 85

Bombay and decided that to start with, it will have

pecuniary jurisdiction up

to Rs.

10,000. It also

decided at the same time that it would

also have

jurisdiction up to

Rs.

25,000 as soon as circumstances

necessitate it. The Provincial Government

was consti­

tuted

the judge of those circumstances. What thr. limit

.

of that jurisdiction was to be was in unmistakeable

terms enacted in section 4 of the Act. It was not left

to the will of the Provincial Government to confer on

that court any pecuniary jurisdiction that it liked

to

confer upon it. It would be by force of the legislative

power of section 4 that the City Civil Court will

be

vested with enhanced jurisdiction but that vesting

cannot take place till a notification

is issued by the

Provincial Government.

It is conditional on that

event only.

For the reasons given

above, in my judgment, the

High Court was in error in holding that section 4 of

the City Civil Court Act

was void and ul'tra

vires the

Provincial Legislature. In this

view the notification

issued under section 4 must

be held to be effective.

That being

so, it is unnecessary to go into the qu_estion

raised by the learned Attorney-General that assuming

that section 4

of the Act was delegation of legislative

power, it

was still valid.

The next question to decide

is whether the Act is

ultra

vires the Bombay Legislature. In order to

appreciate Mr. Seervai's contention on this point it

is

necessary to set out some

cf the provisions of the

Government ()f India Act, 1935, relev:ui.t to the

enqujry. These are contained in section 100, and in

the Seventh Schedule in entries 28 and 53 of List I,

entries 1 and 2

of List II, and entries 4 and 15 of

List III. They are in these terms

:-

Sec. 100 (1) Notwithstanding anything in the two

next succeeding sub-sections, the Federal Legislature,

has, and a Provincial Legislature has not, power to

make

laws

with respect to anv of the matters enume­

rated in List I in the Seventh Schedule to this Act

(hereinafter called the "Federal Legislative List").

1950

State of Bombay

v.

Narothamda$

Jethabai and

Another

Mahajan J .

1950

State of Bombay

v.

Narothamdas

Jethabai and

Another

Mahajan

J.

86

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1951]

(2) Notwithstanding anything in the next succeed­

ing sub-section, the Federal Legislature, and, subject

to the preceding sub-section, a Provincial Legislature

also, have power to make laws with respect to any of

the matters enumerated in List III in the said

Schedule (hereinafter called the "Concurrent Legisla­

tive List").

(3) Subject to the two preceding sub-sections, the

Provincial Legislature has, and the Federal Legislature

has not, power to make laws for a Province or any

part thereof with respect to any of

the matters

enumerated in List II in the said Schedule (herein­

after called the 'Provincial Legislative

List").

( 4) The Federal Legislature has power to make

laws with respect to matters enumerated in the Provin­

cial Legislative List except for a Province or any part

thereof.

List I. 23. Cheques,

bjlls of exchange, promissory

notes and other like instru~nts.

55. Jurisdiction and powers of all courts, except

the Federal Court, with respect to any of the matters

in this list and,

to such extent as is expressly authoriz­

ed by

Part IX of this Act, the ~nl;i,rgement of the

appelbte jurisdiction of the Federal Court, and the

conferring thereon

of supplemental powers.

List II. 1.

Public order . (but not including the

use of His Majesty's naval, military or air forces in aid

of the civil power) ; the administration of justice ;

rnn.;titution and organization of all courts, except the

..

Federal Court, and fees taken therein ; preventive •.

dete'1tion for reasons connected with the maintenance

of public order ; persons subject to such detention.

2. Jurisdiction and powers of all courts except the

Federal Court, with respect to any of the matters in

this list; procedure in Rent and Revenue Courts.

List Ill. 4. Civil Procedure, including the Law of

Limitation and all matters included in the Code of

"'

Civil Procedu~e at the date of the passing of this Act :

the recovery

in

a Govern~'s Province or a Chief

}

S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 87

Commissioner's Province of claims in respect of taxes

and other public demands, including arrears of land

revenue and sums recoverable

as such, arising outside

that Province.

15 .. Jurisdiction and powers of all courts except

the Federal Court, with respect to any of the matters

in this list.

Mr. Seervai contends that section 3 of the

impugn­

ed Act is void because it directly trenches on the exclu­

sive legislative powers of the Centre conferred on it by

List I of the Seventh Schedule inasmuch as it confers

jur~sdiction on the new court in respect to all cases of

a civil nature.

The expression

"all cases of · a civil

nature" presumably brings within the ambit of the

Act suits in respect to subjects contained in List

I.

He urged that the three similar entries in the three

lists. namely, entry 53 in List I, entry 2 in

List II and

entry

15 in List III indicated that in respect to the

subjects covered

by the three fields of legislation

demarcated for the two Legislatures the

· Parliament

empowered each of them respectively to make laws

in respect to jurisdiction and power of courts and that

in view of the provisions of section 100 of the Consti­

tution Act the Provincial Legislature had no power

to make any law conferring jurisdiction on courts in

respect to subjects covere<l by List I. In other words,

the Federal Legislature alone could legislate on the

jurisdiction and powers of a court in regard to the

subjects in List

I. Similarly in respect of subjects

con­

tained in the Provincial List, jurisdiction and power

of courts could only

be determined by a law enacted by

the Provincial Legislature and that in respect of items

contained in List III, both Legislatures could make

laws on the subject

of jurisdiction and powers of courts.

It was said that the exceptions and the proviso to

section 3 of the City Civil Court Act in clear terms

disclosed that jurisdiction in respect to the subjects

on which the Provincial Legislature

ha<l no

com­

petence to legislate, was also conferred on the new

court. Section 12 of the Act by which the Hi'gh Court

was deprived of ·all jurisdiction on matters that fell

1950

State of Bombay

v.

Narothamda5

lethabai and

Another

Mahajan

J.

1950

State of Bombay

v.

Narothamda:J

Jetbabai and

Another

Mahajan J.

88 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1951]

within the jurisdiction of the City Civil Court was

assailed on similar grounds. In regard to the legis­

lative power conferred under entry I of List II on the

Provincial Legislature it

was contended that this wide

power

"stood limited by the three entries above mention­

ed and that under it legislation could only be made to

the extent

of establishing and organizing courts but no

legislation under it was permissible in respect to the

powers

of those courts.

The learned Attorney-General, on the other hand,

contends that the Act

is intra

vires the Bombay Legis­

lature under entry

1 of List II and under entries -4

and 15 of List III, it having received the assent of the

Governor-General.

It was

urged that the Provincial

Legislature had exclusive legislative power on the sub­

ject of administration of justice and constitution and

organization

of all courts and that

this power neces­

sarily included the power to make a law in respect to.

the jurisdiction of courts established

an.d constituted

by it and that the impugned legislation in pith and

substance being on the subject of administration

cf

justice, it could not be held ultra vires even if it

trenched on the field of legislation of tbe Federal

Legislature. In regard to entry

53 of List I, entry 2

of List II and entry 15 of List III of the Schedule, it

was said that

these conferred legislative power on the

respective Legislatures to confer special jurisdiction on

established

courts· in respect of particular ~ubjects

only if it was considered necessary to do SIC). In other

words, the argument was that the Provincial Govern­

ment could create a court of general jurisdiction legis­

lating under e!1try 1 of List II and that it was then

open to both the Central and the Provincial Legis­

latures to confer special jurisdiction on courts in res­

pect to particular matters that were c<lftred by the res­

pective lists. In my opinion, the contention of the learn­

ed Attorney-General that the Act is intra vires the

Bombay Legislature under entry 1 of List

II is sound

and I am in respectful agreement with the

view ex­

pressed by the

Chief Justice of Bombay on this point

in Mulchand Kundanmal /agtiani v. Raman Hiralal

'

·~ I

•'

S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 89

Shah (1). The learned Chief Justice when dealing

with this point said

as follows :-

"If, therefore, the Act deals with administration of

justice and constitutes a court for that purpose and

confers ordinary civil jurisdiction upon it,

in my

opmion, the legislation clearly falls within the

legis­

lative competence of the Provincial Legislature and is

covered by item 1 of List II of Schedule 7. That item

expressly confers upon the Provincial Legislature the

power to legislate with regard

to the administration of

justice and the constitution and organization of all

courts except the Federal Court. It

is difficult to

imagine how a court can

be constituted without any

jurisdiction, and if Parliament has made the adminis­

tration of justice exclusively upon the Provincial

Legislature the power

to constitute and organize all

courts, it must follow, that the power

is given to the

Provincial Legislature

to confer the ordmary civil

jurisdiction upon the courts

to carry on with their

work. Item

4. of List II deals with jurisdiction and

power of

all courts except the Federal Court with res­

pect to any of the matters in this list and Mr. Mistree's

argument

is that item 1 is limited and conditioned by

'

item 2 and what he contends is that the only power

that the Provincial Legislature has is undoubtedly to

create courts, but

to confer upon them only such

jurisdiction

as relates to items comprised in List II.

I am unable

to accept that contention or that inter­

pretation

of List II in Schedule 7. Each item in List II

is an independent item, supplementary of each other,

and not limited

by each other in any way. Item 1

having given the general power

to the Provincial

Legislature with regard

to all matters of administra­

tion of justice and with regard to the constitu­

tion and organization of all courts, further

gives the

power to the Legislature

to confer special jurisdic­

tion, if

needs be,

and special power, if needs be, to

these courts with regard

to any of the items mentioned

in List II. It is impossible to read item 2 as curtailing

(1) 51 Born. L.R. 86.

1950

State of Bombay·

v.

Narothamdal

lethabai and

Another

Mahajan

J.

1950

State of Bombay

v.

NarothamdaJ

lethabai and

Another

Mahajan J.

90 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1951]

and restricting the very wide power with regard to

administration

of justice given to the Provincial

Legislature under item

1. Similarly in List I tbe

Federal Legislature has been given the power under

item

53 to confer jurisdiction and power upon any

court with regard to matters, falling under any of the

items in that list, and, therefore, it would

be

compe­

tent to die Federal Legislature to confer any special

jurisdiction or power which it thought proper upon

any court with regard to suits on promissory notes or

matters arising under the Negotiable Instruments

Act. , , , .. ". It seems to me that the legislative power

conferred on the Provincial legislature

by item 1 of

List II has been conferred by use of

languag~ which is

of the widest amplitude (administration of justice and

constitution and organization of all courts). It was

not denied that the phrase employed would include

within

its ambit legislative power in respect to

juris­

diction and power of courts established for the purpose

of administration of justice. Moreover, the words

appear to

be sufficient to confer upon the Provincial

Legislature the right to regulate and provide for the

whole machinery connected with the administration

of justice in the Province. Legislation on the subject

of administration of justice and constitution

of courts

of justice would be ineffective and incomplete unless

and until the courts established under it were clothed

with the jurisdiction and power to hear and decide

causes.

It is difficult to visualise a statute dealing with

administration of justice and the subject of

constitu­

tion and organization of courts without a definition of

the jurisdiction and powers of those courts,

as without

such definition such a statute would

be like a body

without a soul.

To enact it would be an idle formality.

By its own force it would not have power to clothe a

court with any power or jurisdiction whatsoever. It

would have to look to an outside authority and to

another statute to become effective.

Such an enact­

ment is, so far as I know, unknown to legislative

practice and history.

The Parliament by making

administration of justice a provincial subject could

'

f

>

I

S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 91

not be considered to have conferred power of legis­

lation on the Provincial Legislature of an inef!cc­

tive and useless nature. Following the line of

argument taken

by Mr. Mistree before the High Court

.of Bombay, Mr.

Seervai strenuously contended that

the only legislative power conf~rred on the Provincial

Legislature

by entry

I of List II was in respect to the

establishment of a court and its constitution and

that no legislative power was given to

it to make a law

in

respect to jurisdiction and power of the court esta­

blished

by it.

The argument, logically analysed, comes to this :

that

such a statute will contain the name of the court,

the number of its. judges, the method of their appoint­

ment, the salaries

to be drawn by them and it will

then stop short at that stage and will not include any

provision defining the powers of the tribunal or its

other jurisdiction and that the court

so constituted

could acquire jurisdiction only when a law was made

relating to its jurisdiction and powers

by the Federal

Legislature under entry

53 of List T, by the Prc'.'incial

Legislature under entry 2 of List

11 and by either Le­

gislature under entry

15 of List III. The learned

counsel contended that this peculiar result was the na­

tural consequence of a federal constitution with divid­

ed powers, and that entries

53. 2 and 15 of. the

three

respective· lists limit and curtail the wide power con­

ferred on tile Provincial Legislature by item 1 of List

II.

It is difficult to accede to this contention because it wou'd amount to holding that though the Provincial

Legislature under item 2 of List II has been given the

widest power of legislation in the matter of adminis­

tration of justice and constitution and organization of

courts and though that field has been demarcated for it

as its exclusive field of legislation, yet all that it can

do, acting within that field,

is merely to establish a

court without any competency to function and that

it can only become an effective instrument for adminis­

tering justice

by laws enacted

elsewhere or under

powers conferred under other items . of the different

lists. I am unable to read items 53, 2 and 15 of the three

1950

State of Bombay

y.

Narothamdas

Jethabai and

Ariother

Mahajan J.

1950

State of Bombay

v.

Narothamda1

Jethabai and

A.nother

Mahajan J.

92 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1951]

respective lists as imposing limitations on legislative

power conferred

on the

Province by item 1 of List II.

Such a construction of the Act would not only do vio­

lence to the plain language of item 1 of List II but

would.

be contray to its scheme under which

adminis­

tration of justice was tp.ade a provincial subject. It is

significant that no other Legislaure has been given the

power

to bring into existence a court. A court without

powers and jurisdiction would

be an anomaly as it

would not

be able to discharge the function of admin­

istration of justice and the statute establishing such a

court could not

be said

t:o be a law on the subject of ad­

ministration

of justice. It is a fundamental principle

of the construction of a constitution that everything

necessary for the exercise of powers is included in the

grant

of power. Everything necessary for the effective

execution of power of legislation must therefore be

taken to be conferred by the constitution with that

power. It

may be observed that in exercise of legislative

power under item 1

of List II a

Provincial Legislature

can alter the constitution of the existing courts, can

abolish them, reorganize them and can establish new

courts. If the construction contended for bv Mr. Seervai

is accepted, then the existing courts re:established or

re-organised

by the

Provincial Legislature would not

be able to function till legislation under item 53 of List

I, under item 2

of List II or item 15 of List III

also

simultaneously was made. I do not think that such a

result

was in the contemplation of

Parliament.

Mr. Seervai with some force argued that if full effect

is given to the comprehensive phraseology employed in

item 1 of List II. then it would result in making the

provisions of item 2 of List II, of item 53 of List I and

item

15 of List III nugatory, in other words, if the Provincial Legislature could bring into existence a

court

of

gc:neral jurisdiction which could hear all

causes on subjects concerning which legislative power

was divided in the three lists, then the conferment of

legislative power on the Federal Legislature under

item

53 of List I, on the

Provincial Legislature under

item 2

of List II and on both the Legislatures under

S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 93

item 15 of List III was purposeless. In my opinion,

this argument

is not a valid one and the premises on

which it

is based are not sound. The three lists of

subjects contained in Schedule 7 have not been drawn

up with any scientific precision and the various items

in them overlap. The point kept in view in drawing

up the lists

was to see that all possible power of

legis­

lation was included within their ambit. By making

administration

of justice a provincial subject and by

coriferring on the

· Provincial Legislature power to

legislate on this subject and also on the subject of con­

stitution and organization of courts, Parliament con­

ferred on that Legislature an effective power which

included within its ambit the law-making power on

the subject of jurisdiction

of courts. The Provincial

Legislature could therefore bring into existence a court

with general jurisdiction to administer justice on all

matters coming before it within certain territorial and

pecuniary limits, subject of course

to the condition

that such general jurisdiction may

be expressly or

impliedly taken away by the provisions of other laws.

The Parliament having divided the field of legislation

between the two Legislatures, naturally thought that

as a corollary or a necessary consequence of this

divi­

sion of legislative power it was necessary to provide

by way of a complementary provision a legislative

power specifically on the two Legislatures in respect to

the jurisdiction and powers of courts on subjects which

were within their exclusive legislative field.

If a

Legislature could exclusively legislate in respect to

particular subjects,

as a necessary consequence it

should also have the power to legislate

in

· respect to

jurisdiction and power of the court dealing with that

subject.

It is this power that has been conferred by

entries

53, 2 and 15 above mentioned on the two

Legis­

latures. Entries 42 and 99 of List I, entries 37

and 42 of List II and entries 25 and 36 of List III

are

of a similar consequential

character· The res­

pective Legislatures are therefore competent to

confer special powers on courts and can create special

jurisdictions acting under those powers in respect to

7 -8

S C. Tndia/67

1950

State of Bombay

v.

Narothamdas

Jethabai and

Anothet

-, -

Mahajan J.

1950

State of Bombay

v.

Narothamd!ls

Jethohai and

Another

Mahajan J.

94 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1951]

their divided fields of legislation. Instances of con­

ferment of powers and jurisdiction on courts to hear

cases on particular subjects were well known to Parlia­

ment. Such powers had been conferred on different

courts in respect of testamentary and intestate juris­

diction, admiralty jurisdiction, under the Indian Com­

panies Act, under the Succession Act, Guardians and

Wards Act and under the various Rent

Acts and Acts

dealing with relief of indebtedness. In

view of the

division

of powers in respect to different subjects,

power was given under item

53 of List I, item 2 of List

II and item 15 of List III to the different Legislatures

when dealing with those subjects

also to legislate on

the question of jurisdiction and powers of

tl•e courts.

This conferment of legislative power

to create special

jurisdiction in respect to particular subjects

does not

in any

way curtail the legislative power conferred on

the

Provincial Legislature under item 1 of List II. As

soon as special legislative power under item 53 of

List I, under item 2

of List II and item 15

of· List III

is exercised, the causes that arise in respect· to those

subjects would then only

be heard in jurisdictions

created

by those statutes and not in the courts of . gene­

ral jurisdiction entrusted with the normal administra­

tion of justice. In the language of section 9

of the

Code

of

Civil Procedure, jurisdietion of the general

courts will then

become barred by those

statutes.·

I am therefore of the opinion that under item l of

List II the Provincial Legislature has complete com­

petence not only to establish courts for the adminis­

tration of justice but to confer on them jurisdiction to

hear all

causes of a civil nature, and that this power

is not curtailed or limited by power of legislation .con-

ferred on the two Legislatures under items 53, 2 and

,

IS of the three lists. On the other hand, these three

items confer on the respective Legislatures power to

legislate when dealing with particular su\ljects within

their exclusive legislative field to make

laws in res-

pect of jurisdiction and powers of courts that will be

competent to hear causes relating to those subjects; in

other words,

this is a power of creating special

i I

)

}

S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 95

jurisdictions only. This interpretation of the entries in

tbe lists is not only in accordance with the scheme of

the statute but it harmonizes the different entries in

the

lists and does not make any of them nugatory and

ineffective. The interpretation contended for

by Mr.

Seervai would reduce the power of the Provincial

Legislature under item 1 to almost nothingness.

The crux of the

case is whether item 1 of List II

should

be given a limited construction which makes it

nugatory or whether a limited construction

is to be

placed on items 53, 2 and 15 of the three lists. I have

no hesitation in holding that both

in the light of

principles of construction

of statutes and principles of

legislation, the course to adopt

is the one that I have

indicated

above.

Finally, it was contended that section 12 of the Act

in

any case was a void piece of legislation as it

de­

prived the High Court of its jurisdiction even in res­

pect to subjects contained in List I of the Seventh

Schedule. In

view of the construction that I have

placed on item 1 of List II this argument has no force.

If the Legislature has power to bring into existence a

court and confer jurisdiction and power on it, a fortiori

it has power to take away the jurisdiction and power

that already exist in other courts. Moreover, the

Bombay City Civil Court Act in section 3 has excepted

from the jurisdiction of the new court all cases which

the

High Court can hear under any special law. Special law has been defined as a law applicable to a

particular subject.

If under List 1 of the Seventh

Schedule the Federal Legislature

by any law

deter­

mines that a case has to be heard by the High Court,

section 5 will not affect the jurisdiction of that court

in any manner whatsoever.

The result, therefore,

is that the Bombay City Civil

Court Act

is a statute which is wholly within the

legislative field of the Province under item 1 of List II

and its validity cannot

be affected even if it

inci­

dentally trenches on other fields of legislation. It is

not a statute dealing with any of the subjects mention­

ed in List I and therefore it cannot be said that the

1950

State of Bomba)'

v.

Narothamdaa

.Te thabai Ofld

Another.

Mahajan

J.

1950

State of Bombay

v.

Narothamda5

htlrabai and

Another

MMk/iet'jea I.

96 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1951]

Provincial Legislature has in any way usurped the

power demarcated

for the Centre. In view of this

conclusion I think it

unnecessary to pronounce any

opinion on the other points raised by the learned

Attorney-General.

For the

reasons given above I allow the appeal

preferred

by the Government of Bombay and set aside

the decision of the High Court holding that section 4

of the

City Civil Court Act (XL of 1948) is void. In

the circumstances of the case I leave the parties to

bear their own costs of the appeal.

MuK.HERJEA J.-In my opinion this appeal. should

be allowed and I concur substantially in the line of

reasoning adopted by my learned brother Mahajan J.

in his judgment. Having regard to the constitutional

importance of the questions

raised in this case, I

would

desire to add some observations of mine own.

There are really two questions which require

con­

sideration in this appeal. The first is whether sec­

tion 4 of the Bombay City Civil Court Act, 1948, is

void and inoperative by reason of its amounting to a

delegation

of legislative powers by the Provincial

Legislature

to the Provincial Government of Bombay.

The Bombay High Court has answered this question

in

the affirmative and it is entirely upon this ground

that the judgment appealed against

is based. The

propriety

of this decision has been challenged by the

learned Attorney-General who appeared on behalf

of the

State of Bombay in support of this appeal.

On the other hand, Mr. Seervai, appearing on behalf

of the respondents, has not only attempted to repel

the contention advanced

by the learned

Attorney­

General, but has sought to support the judgment

appealed against on another

and a more

compre­

hensive ground which, if accepted, would make

the entire

Bombay

City Civil Court Act a void piece

of legislation, as being an encroachment by the Pro-

'

vincial Legislature upon the field of legislation reserved •

for the Centre under List I of Schedule 7 to the

Government of India Act,

1935.

~-

)

S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS · 97

As regards the first point, I agree that the contention

of the appellant

is sound and must prevail. I have no

hesitation in holding that the Legislature in

empower­

ing the Provincial Government · to invest the City Court,

by rwtification, with jurisdiction of such value not

exceeding

Rs.

25,000 as may be specified in the

Notification, has not delegated its legislative authority

to the Provincial Government. The provision relates

only to the enforcement -of the policy which the

Legislature itself

has laid down. The law was full and

complete when it left the legislative chamber permitting

the Provincial Government to increase the pecuniary

jurisdiction of the City Court up to a certain amount

which was specified in the

Statute ·itself. What the

Provincial Government

is to do is not to make any

law; it has to execute the will of the Legislature by

determining the time at which and the extent to which,

within the limits fixed

by the Legislature, the

juris­

diction of the court, should be extended. · This is a

species of conditional legislation which

comes directly

within the principle enunciated

by the Judicial

Com­

mittee in The Queen v. Burah(1), where the taking

effect of a particular provfr.ion of law is made to depend

upon determination of certain facts and conditions by

an outside authority.

The learned Judges of the Bombay High Court in

coming

to their decision on the point seem to have

been influenced to some extent by the pronouncement

of the Federal Court in

/atindranath Gupta v.

Pro­

t1ince of Bihar (2), and the learned Counsel for the

respondents naturally placed reliance upon it. I was

myself a party to the majority decision in that

case

and expressed my views

in a separate judgment. I do

not think that there

is anything in my judgment which

lends support

td the contention which the respondents

have

put forward. I stated expressly in course of my

judgment on the authority of the well known American • I decision in Locke's appeal(3) that a legislature may not

(1) SI. A. 178. (3) 13 American Reports, 716.

(2) [1949] F.C.R_ 596.

19.50

State of Bombap

V•

Na1othamda1

Jt tltabai and

Ano titer

Mukherjea J.

1950

State of Bombay

v.

Narothamdas

Jethabai and

Another

Mukherfea J.

98 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19511

delegate its powers to make law but "it can make a

law to delegate a power to determine some fact or state

of things

upon_ which the law makes or intends to

make its own action

depend"; and that the Inhibition

against delegation

does not extend to legislation which

is complete in itself, though its operation is made to

depend upon contingencies the ascertainment of which

is left to an external body.

The subject matter of dispute in the Bihar case was

the validity of a proviso engrafted upon section

1,

sub­

section (3) of the Bihar Maintenance of Public Order

Act. The sub-section laid down that the Act would

remain in force for a period

of one year from the date

of

its commencement. The proviso then added

"that

the Provincial Government may, by notification on a

resolution

passed by the Bihar Legislative Assembly

and agreed to

by the Bihar Legislative Council direct

that this Act shall remain in

force for a further period

of

one year with such modifications, if any, as may be

specified in the notification." Mr. Seervai would have

been probably right in invoking the decision in that case

as an authority in his favour if the proviso simply

empowered the Provincial Government, upon

com­

pliance with the conditions prescribed therein, to ex­

tend the duration of the Act for a further period of one

year, the maximum period being

fixed by the

Legisla­

ture itself. The proviso, however, went further and

authorised · the Provincial Government to decide at the

end of the year not merely whether the Act should

be

continued for another year but whether the Act itself

was to be modified in any way or not. It was conceded

by the learned Counsel appearing for the Province of

Bihar that to authorise another body to modify a

sta­

tute amounts to investing that body with legislative

powers. What the learned Counsel contended for,

was

that the power of modification was severable from the

power of extending the duration of the statute and the

invalidity of

Ol)e part of the proviso should not affect

its other part.

To this contention my answer was that

the two provisions were inter-related in such a manner

in the statute that one could not

be

s~vered from the

'

',.

)

t

>

S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 99

other. Obviously, the facts of this case are quite diffe­

rent, and all that I need say with regard to my pro­

nouncement in /atindranath Gupta's case is that the

principle upon which that

case was decided

. is not ap­

plicable ·and cannot be attracted, to the present case.

I may state here that a question in the broad form

as to whether a Provincial Legislature exercising its

legislative powers within the limits prescribed

by the

Imperial Parliament in the Government of India

Act,

1935, could delegate its legislative functions in

eny manner to an outside authority

as it thought

proper, was neither raised nor decided in Jatindranath

Gupta's

case. The learned Attorney-General has not

very properly invited any final decision on that point

in the present

case and I would refrain from

expres­

sing any opinion upon it.

The second point appears

to be of some complexity

and it

was decided by the Bombay High

Court adversely

to the respondents on the basis of an earlier pronounce­

ment of the same Court in Mulchand v. Raman(

1

). The

arguments of Mr.

Seervai are really directed as

assail­

ing the correctness of this earlier decision which the

learned Judges held to

be binding on them in the

pre­

sent case. The contention of Mr. Seervai, in substance,

· is, that the Bombay City Civil Court Act, which is a

piece of provincial legislation,

is ultra

vires the legisla­

ture inasmuch· as it purports to endow the City Court,

which it brings into existence, with jurisdiction to re­

ceive, try and dispose of "all suits and other proceed­

ings of a civil nature" with certain exceptions that are

specified in the different

sub-sections of section 3. What

is said is that the expression

"all suits of a civil na­

ture" is wide enough ·to include suits in respect to mat­

ters specified in List I of the Seventh Schedule t)f the

Constitution Act with regard to which the Cen~ral

Legislature alone is competent to confer jurisdiction art

courts under entry 53 of the said List. It is argued that

so far as the Provincial Legislature is concerned, it may

empower all courts (except the Federal Court) with

jurisdiction in respect to any

of the matters in .the

Pro-

(!)SI Bom. L.R. 86.

1950

Stale of Bo '11b4f

v.

Nruotlrcmdiu

Jell.Adi 111111(

A•oll1er

Mukhuit.o. J •.

1950

State of Bon1hay

v.

NarOthamdas

kthabai and

Anoth~r.

Mukherjea J.

100 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1951]

vincial List. And it m:iy also be capable of exerc1smg

like powers in regard .'to subjects enumerated in the

Concurrent List as provided for

in article 15 of List

III, subject to the conditions laid down in section

107

of the Act. But as the scope of section 3 of the Bombay

City Civil Court Act

is not

-limited to matters in Lists

II and III only and

its language can embrace subjects

coming under List I

as well, and furthermore as the

JiJierent subjects both within and outside the provin­

cial and concurrent fields dealt with by section 3 are m­

extricably intertwined and not capable of severance _or

demarcation, the whole Act must be held to be ultra

mres.

In answer to this, it has been urged by the learned

Attorney-General that amongst the subjects included

in Item

1 of the Provincial List are

"the administra­

tion of justice and constitution and organization of all

courts except the Federal Court", and these expressions

obviously include within their ambit the conferring of

general jurisdiction to hear and decide

cases upon

courts which are

set up by the Provincial Legislature,

and without which they cannot function as courts at

all.

It is said that Item 2 of the Provincial List

which mentions

"jurisdiction and powers of all courts

except the Federal Court with respect to any of the

matters in this List" does not in any way limit or

curtail the ordinary connotation

of the expressions "administration of justice and constitution of courts"

as used in Item I of the said List referred to above.

It cannot be disputed that the words "administra­

tion of justice" occurring in Item l of the Provincial

List, unless they are limited in-any

way,

a!e of suffi­

cient amplitude to confer upon the Provincial Legisla­

ture the right to regulate and provide for the whole

machinery connected with the administration of jus­

tice. Section 92 of the North America Act deals with

the exclusive powers of the Provincial Legislatures and

dause (14) of the section speaks of "the administration

of justice in the Provinces" as including "the consti­

tt!lion, maintenance and organization of Provincial

Courts." In interpreting this provision of the constitu­

tion it has been held in North America that the words

)

I

S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 101

"constitution, maintenance and organization of

courts" plainly indude the power to define the juris­

diction of such courts territorially as well as in other

respects(1 ). Mr. Seervai argues that' this might be the

normal meaning of the words if they stood alone.

But

if Items 1 and 2 of the Provincial List are read to­

gether, the conclusion cannot be . avoided that the

ex­

pressions "administration of justice and constitution

of courts" do not include "jurisdiction and powers of

court~" which are separately dealt with under Item 2.

To find out, therefore, the extent of powers of the Pro­

vincial Legislature in · respect o! conferring jurisdiction

upon courts, the . relevant item • to be looked to is not

Item I but Item 2 of the Provincial List.

The contention in this form

seems to me to be

plainly unacceptable. I agree with Mr. Setalvad that

the different topics in the

same Legislative List should

not be read

as exclusive of one another. As was

observed by Sir Maurice Gwyer in The

United Provin-

ces v. Atiqua Begum(

2

), "the subjects dealt with in the

three Legislative . Lists are not always

set out with

scientific definition. It

would be practically impossible

for example to define each item in the Provincial List

in such a

way as to make it exclusive of every other itrm in that List, and Parliament seems to have been

content to take a number of comprehensive categories

.and to describe each of them

by a word of broad and

general import

..... I think that none of the items in

the List is to be read in a

narrow or restricted sense,

and that each general . word' should be held to extend to

all ancillary or subsidiary matters which can fairly

and reasonably

be said to be comprehended in

it." As

there can be no question of conflict between two items

in the

same List, there is no warrant for restricting

the natural meaning of one for the simple reason that

the same subject might in

some aspect come within

the purview

of the other.

The difficulty, however,

arises when we come to

} entry 53 of List I. Under this entry, it is the Central

\I) R, CountY Courts 'Of British Columbia-21 S.C.R. 446.

(2) [I 940]F.C.R. 110 at p. l 34.

19SO

State of Bombay

v.

Narothamda:t

Jethabai and

Another.

Mukherjea

J.

1950

State of Bombay

v.

Narolhamdas

Jethabal and

Another.

Mukherjra J.

102 SUPREME COURT REPORTS r 19511

Legislature that has been given the· power of legisla­

ting in regard to jurisdiction and powers of all courts

except the Federal Court in respect to any of the

matters in List. L The difficulty that one

is confronted

with,

is that if Item 1 of the Provincial List is taken

to empower the Provincial Legislature to invest a

court with jurisdiction with respect to all subjects

no

matter in whichever List it might occur, a

clear

conflict is hound. to anse between Item 1 of the

Provincial List and Item

53 of the

Central List;

and a Provincial legislation tresp;u;sing upon the

exclusive field of the Centre would be void and

inoperative under section 100 of the Constitution

Act. This being the position, a way would have

to be found out to avoid the conflict. As the

Privy Council observed in the case of the Citizens

lnst1rance Company of Canada v. Parsons(') "it could

not

ha\-e been the intention that a conflict should

exi~t

and in order to prevent such a result the two sections

must

be read together and the language of the one

in­

terpreted and where necessary modified by the

other."

Mr. Seervai suggests that the proper way of recon­

ciling this apparent conflict would be to read the

words "administration of justice and constitution cf

courts" occurring in entry 1 of the Provincial List

as exclusive of any matter relating to jurisdiction of

courts. The Provincial Legislature can only set up

or constitute courts but their jurisdiction or power of

deciding

cases must be derived from the Central or the

Provincial Legislature or from either of them in

accord­

ance with the subjects to which such jurisdiction

relates. The Provincial Legislature can endow the

court with jurisdiction in respect

to any matter in

List II and the

Central Legislature can do the same

with regard to s11bjects specified in , List I. So far as

matters in the Concurrent List are concerned, either of

the Legislatures can make prov1S1ons in respect of

them subject to the conditions laid down in section 107

of the Constitution Act.

(1) 7 A.C. 96 at p. 109.

S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 103

This argument, though apparently plausible, cannot,

in my opinion,

be accepted as sound. It is to be

noted that the right to set up courts and to provide for

the whole machinery of administration of justice has

been given exclusively to the Provincial Legislature.

Under section

101 of the North America Act, the

Parliament of Canada has a reserve of power

to create

additidnal courts for better administration of the laws

of Canada but the Indian Constitution Act of

1935

does not give any such power to the Central

Legis­

·Jature. Courts are to be established by the Provincial

Legislature alone.

The word 'court' certainly means

a place where justice

is judicially administered, The

appointment of Judges and

officers or the mere setting

apart of a place

·where the Judges are to meet,

are not sufficient to constitute a court. A court

cannot administer justice unless it

is

'vestt'd with

jurisdiction to decide

cases and

"the constitution of a

court necessarily includes its jurisdiction." (1) If

Mr. Seervai's contention is accepted, the result will be

that _when a Provincial Legislature establishes a civil

court, it can only be invested with jurisdiction to

decide

cases in respect to matters coming within the

Provincial List. Such court can have

no power to

decide

cases relating to any matter which is

enumerated·

in List I so long as the appropriate Legislature does

not confer upon it the requisite authority. Thus an

ordinary Provincial Court established to decide civil

suits would

be entitled to entertain all monev claims

but -not a claim on a promissory note; nor

·could it

'entertain a suit for recovery of corporation tax, for

Negotiable Instruments and corporation tax are sub­

jects of the Central List. This certainly was not the

scheme of the Constitution Act. In my opinion, the pro­

per way to avoid a conflict would be to read entry 1

of the Provincial List, which contains the only provi­

sion relating to constitution of courts and adminis­

tration of justice, along with the group of three entries,

viz., entry 53 of List I, entry 2 of List II and entry

15 of List III with which it is supposed to be in conflict,

(I) Vide Clemen's Canadian Constitution, 3rd Edn., p. 527.

1950

State of Bombay

v.

Narothamda~

Jethabai and

Another.

1950

State of Bombay

v.

Narothamdas

Jethabai and

Anolhet.

Mukherjea J.

104 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1951]

and to interpret the · language of one by that of the

other. Entry 1 of List II uses the expressions "ad.

ministration of justice and constitution of all courts"'

i.n a perfectly general manner. No particular subject

is specified to which the administration of justice

might relate or for which a court might

be comtituted.

It can, therefore,

be legitimately interpreted to refer

to a general jurisdiction

to decide cases not limited

to any particular subject. The other three items

on

the other hand relate to particular matters

appearing in the three Lists and what

they

con­

template is the vesting of jurisdiction in courts

with regard to such

specific items only. In one case

the jurisdiction is 'general' as is implied in the

expres­

sion "administration of justice", while in the other

three the jurisdiction

is 'particular' as limited to

parti­

cular matters and hence exclusive. I agree with my

learned brother Patanjali Sastri J. that one approved

way of determining the

scope of a legislative topic is

to have regard to what has been ordinarily treated as

embraced within that topic in the legislative practice

of the country('); and if that test

is applied, the

inter­

pretation suggested above would . appear to be per­

fectly legitimate.· The distinction between general and

particular jurisdiction has always

been recognised

in the legislative practice of this country prior

to

the passing of the Constitution Act of 1935 and

also after that. There have been always in this

country civil courts of certain

classes and categories

graded in

a certain manner according to their

pecuniary jurisdiction and empowered to entertain

and decide all suits of a

civil nature within

particular localities. Particular jurisdiction again

have

been conferred on some one or the other of these

. courts to try cases relating to certain specified matters.

Thus there have been

special jurisdictions created for

insolvency, probate or guardianship proceedings, for

deciding disputes relating

to compulsory acquisition of

land and for dealing with cases arising under the Rent

Acts or the different legislations passed in recent

years

(I) Vide c,oft v. Dunphy, [1933] A.C. 156.

'

..

I

~

t l

S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 105

for scaling down exorbitant rates of interest or giving

relief to rural debtors. Similar instances may be cited

with regard to conferring

of special jurisdiction in

criminal

cases.

There will be no difficulty in interpreting in a proper

manner the different entries in the Legislative Lists

referred to

above if this distinction between general

and

special jurisdiction is kept in view. The "entire

scheme of the Constitution Act of 1935 is to vest the

power

of .establishing courts upon the Provincial

Legislature. The Provincial Legislature can endow

the courts which it

sets up with general jurisdiction to

decide all

cases which, according to the law of the

land, are triable in

. a court of law, and all these

powers can

be exercised under entry 1 of List II. If

the Central Legislature or the Provincial Legislature

chooses to confer special jurisdiction on certain courts

in respect

to matters enumerated in their appropriate

legislative

lists, they can exercise such powers under

the three entries

specified above. But the exercise of

any such powers by the Central Government would not

in any way conflict with the powers exercisable

by the

Provincial Legislature under entry 1 of List II. The

ex­

pression 'general' must always be understood as being

opposed to what is 'special' or

exclusive. If the Central

Legislature

vests any particular jurisdiction upon a

court in respect to a Central matter, that matter would

cease to be a general matter and consequently the court

having general jurisdiction would no longer deal

with

that, but the general jurisdiction of such courts would

not

be affected thereby. The contents of general

jurisdiction are

always indeterminate and are not

susceptible of any

specific

enumeration. In this view,

I do not think that it would be at all necessary to

invoke 'the pith and substance' doctrine in avoiding

the possibility of incidental encroachment

by the

Pro­

vincial Legislature upon Central subjects in regard to

conferring jurisdiction upon courts. If the expression

'jurisdiction' in entry

53 of List I means and refers to

special jurisdiction only, there cannot be

even an

incidental encroachment upon such

special jurisdiction

19SO

State of Bombay

v

Narothamdas

Jethabai and

Another.

Mukherjea J..

1950

State of Bombay

v.

Narothamdas

Jethabai and

Another

Mukherjea J.

DasJ.

106 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1951]

by reason of the conferring of general jurisdiction

upon courts

by the Provincial Legislature under

entry 1

of List II. As I have said already what is

'special' or made so, will automatically cease to be in

the category of what

is 'general' and no question of a

conflict would at all arise.

It may

be pointed out in this connection that in the

Canadian Constitution

also, the general scheme is to

carry on administration of justice throughout

Canada

through the medium of provincial courts. Subject to

the residuary power reserved to the Dominion Parlia­

ment under section 101 of the North America Act, the

Constitution

has assigned to the provinces the exclusive power in relation to administration of justice includ­

ing the maintenance, constitution and organization of

courts. There is no limitation in any provincial

court along the line of division that

exists between

matters within the legislative competence of the

Dominion Parliament and

of the Provincial

Legis­

lative Assemblies('). There is indeed no such thing

<is entry 53 in List I of the Indian Act in the

Canadian Constitution, but there are judicial pro­

nouncements to the effect that the Dominion Parlia­

ment can impose jurisdiction on provincial courts over

Dominion subjects('). It may

be that the British

Parliament in framing the legislative topics in the

Government

of India Act of 1935 in regard to

admin­

istration of justice and jurisdiction of courts wanted

to adopt the Canadian model with such modifications JS

they considered necessary. It is, however, immaterial

to speculate on these matters. For the reasons given

above, I am

of

the ppinion that the decision of the

Bombay

High

Court in Mulchand v. Raman(

3

)

is

correct, and the contention of Mr.

Seervai should fail.

In the result, the appeal

is allowed and the

judg­

ment of the High Court is set aside.

DAs J.-I agree that this appeal should be allowed.

In view

of the importance of the questions raised in (I) Vide Clements Canadian Constitution p. 526.

\2) Vide Lefroy's

Canada's Federal System p. 541.

(3)

SI Born. L.R. 86.

S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 107

this appeal, I consider it right to state my reasons for

coming to that conclusion.

The salient facts, as to which there is no dispute, arc

as follows: On May 10, 1948, the Provincial Legisla­

ture of Bombay passed Act No. XL of 1948, called the

Bombay City Civil Court Act, 1948. · It was passed

with a view "to establish an additional Civil Court for

Greater Bombay." The provisions of that Act which

will

be relevant for the purposes of the present appeal

may now

be set

out :

"l. (2) It shall come into force on such date as the

Provincial Government may,

by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint in this behalf.

3. The Provincial Government may, by notification

in the Official Gazette, establish for the Greater

" ' Bombay a Court, to be called the Bombay City Civil

Court. Notwithstanding anything contained in

any

law, such Court shall have jurisdiction to receive, try

and

dispose of all suits and other proceedings of a civil

nature not exceeding ten thousand rupees in value, and

arising within the Greater

Bombay, except suits or

proceedings which are cognizable-

( a)

by the High

Coun as a Coun of Admiralty or

Vice-Admiralty or

as a Colonial Coun of Admiralty,

or as a Court having testamentary, intestate or

matri­

monial jurisdiction, or

(b)

by the High Court for the relief of insolvent

debtors, or

( c)

by the High Court under any

special" law

other than the Letters Patent, or

(

d) by the

Small Cause Court :

Provided that the Provincial Government may,

from time to time, after consultation with the High

Court,

by a like notification extend the jurisdiction of

the City Court to any suits or proceedings of the nature

specified in Clauses (a) and (b).

;. 4. Subject to the exceptions specified m sec-

• tion 3, the Provincial Government may, by notifica­

tion in the Official Gazette, invest the City Court with

jurisdiction

to receive, try and dispose of all suits and

19SO

State of Bombay

v.

Narothamda!

Jethabai and

Another.

Da& J,



 









   

 





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195.0

State of Bombay

v.

Narothamdas

Jethabai and

Another

DasJ.

112 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1951]

that, having set up a Court of limited jurisdiction, it

had given

to the Provincial Government under section

4 the power to confer upon that Court a higher jurisdic­

tion up

to twenty-five thousand rupees. This power,

which

was conferred upon the Provincial Government

was according to the

Chief Justice, a power which

could

only have been exercised by the Legislature

itself. I am unable to accept the afore-mentioned con­

struction of sections 3 and 4 of the Act.

As I have already said, the High

Court founded their

conclusions principally on the observations of their

Lordships

of the

Privy Council in R. v. Burah(') and

certain other Privy Council cases. It will be useful,

therefore,

to analyse the

Privy Council decision in R. v.

Burah(' ). In 1869 the Indian Legislature passed an Act

(No. XXII of 1869) purporting, first, to remove a

district called Garo Hills from the jurisdiction

of the

Courts

of civil and criminal jurisdiction and from the

law prescribed for such Courts

by Regulations and Acts

and, secondly, to. vest the administration of civil and

criminal justice, within the

same territory, in such

officers as the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal might,

for the purpose of tribunals

of first instance,

or of

reference and appeal, from time

to time appoint. The

Act was to come into operation on such day as the

Lieutenant-Governor of

Bengal should, by notification

in the Calcutta Gazette, direct. The 8th

section

authorised the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal by noti­

fication in the Calcutta Gazette

to extend to the said

territory,

any law or any portion of any

law then in

force in other territories subject to his government or

which

may thereafter be enacted by the Council of the

Governor-General or of himself. The

9th section of

that Act provided :

"The said Lieutenant-Governor may from time to

time, by notification in the Calcutta Gazette, extend

mutatis mutandis all or any of the provisions contain-

ed in the other sections of this Act to the J aintia Hills, • ..

the Naga Hills, and to such portion of the Khasi Hills,

as for the time being forms part of British India.

{I) L.R. SI.A. I 78.

-•

-

S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 113

Every such notification shall specify the bound­

aries of the territories to which it applies."

On October 14, 1871, the Lieutenant-Governor of

Bengal issued a notification in exercise of the powers

conferred

on him by section 9 extending the provisions

of that

Act to

· the territory known as the Khasi and

Jaintia Hills and

excluded therefrom the jurisdiction

of the Courts of

civil and criminal justice. The

respondent Burah and another person having

been

convicted by the Deputy Commissioner of the Khasi

and Jaintia Hills of murder and sentenced to death,

which

was later on commuted to transportation for

life, they from jail sent a

petition of appeal against

their conviction. The provisions of Act XXII

of 1869

having been extended, by notification under section 9,

to the Khasi and Jaintia Hills, the High Court would

have no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal, unless

section

9 and the notification were ultra

vires and void.

The majority of the Judges of the Full Bench con­

stituted for considering the question took the view

that section 9 was really not legislation but was an

instance of delegation of legislative power. The Crown

obtained

special leave to appeal to the

Privy Council.

In summarising the effect of the provisions of sections

1 to 8 of that Act on Garo Hills Lord Selborne who deli­

vered the judgment of the Privy Council observed at

page

194 that the Governor-General in Council had de­

termined, in the due and ordinary course of legislation,

to remove a particular district from the jurisdiction

of

the ordinary Courts and offices, and to place it under

new Courts and

offices, to be appointed by and responsi­

ble to the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal leaving it to

the Lieutenant-Governor to say at what time that

change should take

place, that the Legislature had

determined that,

so far, a certain change should take

place, but that

it was expedient to leave the time,

and the

manner, of carrying it into effect to the dis­

cretion of the Lieutenant-Governor and also, that

the laws which were or might

be in force in the other

territories subject to the

same Government were

such as it might be fit and proper to apply to

this

9-8 S. c. India/67

1950

State of Bombay

v.

Narothamdas

Jethabai

and

Another

Das/.

19SO

State of Bombay

v.

Narothamdm

Jethabai and

Another

Dal J.

114 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1951]

district also, but that, >(IS it was not certain that all

those laws, and every part of them, could with equal

convenience be so applied, it was expedient, on that

point

also, to entrust a discretion to the

Lieutenant­

Governor. His Lordship then proceeded to state the

true meaning and

effect of the provisions

·Of section 9:

"This having been done as to the Garo Hills, what

was done as to the Khasi and Jaintia Hills ? The

Legislature

decided that it, was fit and proper that the

adjoining district

of the ' Khasi and Jaintia Hills

should

also be removed from the jurisdiction of the

existing Courts, and brought under the

same

pro­

visions with the Garo Hills, not necessarily and at all

events, but if and when the Lieutenant-Governor

should think it desirable

to do so; and that it was

also possible that it might be expedient that not all

but

some only, of those provisions should be applied

to that adjoining district. And accordingly the

Legis­

lature entrusted for these purposes also, a discretionary

power

to the Lieutenant-Governor."

Finally,

his Lordship concluded at p. 195 :

"Their

Lordships think that it is a fallacy to speak

of the powers thus conferred upon the Lieutenant­

Governor (large as they undoubted! y are) as if, when

they were exercised, the efficacy of the acts done under

them would

be due to any other legislative authority

than that of the Governor-General in Council

Thcir

whole operation is, directly and immediately, under

and by virtue of this Act XXII of 1869 itself. The

proper Legislature

has exercised its judgment as to

place, person,

laws, powers; and the result of that

judgment

has been to legislate conditionally as to all

these things. The

conditions having been fulfilled,

the legislation is now absolute. Where plenary powers

of legislation exist as to particular subjects, whether

in any imperial or in a Provincial Legislature they

may, in their LordsMps' judgment, be well exercised,

either absolutely or conditionally. Legislation, con­

ditional on the use of particular powers, or on the

exercise of a limited discretion, entrusted by the

Legislature

to persons

In whom it places confidence,

'

S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 115

is no uncommon thing ; and in many circumstances,

it

may be highly convenient."

If the reasonings underlying the observations of the

Bombay High Court were correct then on those

very

reasonings it could be held in Burah's case(1) that while

in enacting

sections 1 to 8 the Legislature had applied

its mind and laid down its policy as to the exclusion

of the Garo Hills from the jurisdiction of the

Courts

the Legislature did not apply its. mind and .. did not

lay down any policy as to the exclusion of the Khasi

and Jaintia Hills from the jurisdiction of the Courts

hue had left it to the Lieutenant-Governor to do what

it alone could

do. This construction quite clearly did

not find favour with the

Privy Council. The Privy

Council by construction spelt out of . the very language

of section 9 that the Legislature itself had decided

that it

was fit and proper that the Khasi and Jaintia

Hills should

also be removed from the jurisdiction of

the existing Courts and brought under the

same

pro­

visions as applied to the Garo Hills, not necessarily

and at. all events but if and when the Lieutenant­

Governor should think it desirable

to do so and

ac­

cordingly entrusted a discretionary power to the

Lieutenant-Governor. Adopting the

same method of

construction and adopting the language

of Lord Sel­

borne it may well be said that in enacting section 3 the

Legislature itself

has determined, in the due and

ordinary

course of legislation, to establish an addi­

tional Court

of civil jurisdiction with jurisdiction to

entertain suits and other proceedings arising within

the Greater

Bombay of the value

up to Rs. 10,000 leav­

ing it, by section 1 (2), to the Provincial Government

to say at what time that .change should take place.

Likewise, it may

be said that in enacting section 4

the Legislature itself

has decided that it is fit and

proper to extend the pecuniary jurisdiction of the

new Court, not

necessarily and at all events or all at

once but, if and when the Provincial Government

should think it desirable to do

so and accordingly

entrusted a discretionary power to the Provincial

Government.

It is entirely wrong to say that the

(1)

LR.SI.A. 178.

1950

State of Bombay

v,

Narothamdas

Jethabai and

Another

Das

J.

1950

State of Bombay

v.

Narothamdos

Jethahai and

Another

Das J.

116 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1951]

Legislature has not applied its mind or laid down any

policy. Indeed, the very fact that the extension of

pecuniary jurisdiction should not

exceed twenty-five

thousand rupees, that the extension should

be ·subject

to the exceptions

specified in section 3 clearly indicate

that the Legislature itself

has decided that the

ex­

tension of the pecuniary jurisdiction of the new

Court should

be made, not necessarily or at all

events or all at

any one time but when the

Pro­

vincial Government may consider it desirable to do so

and while entrusting a discretionary power with the

Provincial Government

to determine the time for

investing

such extended jurisdiction on the new

Court, the Legislature itself

has also prescribed the

limits

of such extension. The efficacy of the Act of

ex­

tension of jurisdiction is, therefore, not due to any

other legislative authority than that of the Legis­

lature itself. The expression "invest" does not appear

to me to have any special significance. It only implies

or indicates the result

of the fulfilment of the

condition which the Legislature itself laid down. To

use the language of Lord Selborne the extension of

jurisdiction

is directly and immediately under and

by virtue of this very Act itself. Here

tMre is no

effacement of the Legislature, no abdication of the

legislative power. On the contrary, the proper Legis­

lature has exercised its judgment as to the possible

necessity for the extension of the pecuniary jurisdic­

tion of the new Court and the result of that judgment

has been to legislate conditionally as to such extension

and that the condition having

been fulfilled by the

issue of the notification by the Provincial Government

the legislation

has now become absolute. In my

judg­

ment the construction put upon sections 3 and 4 by

the High Court was erroneous and cannot be support­

ed either on principle or on authority. When pro­

perly construed in the light of the observation and

decision

of the

Privy Coundl in R. v. Burah(') as

indicated above section 4 does not amount to a delega­

tion of legislative power at all but constitutes what is

known as conditional legislation.

(l) L.R. SI.A. 178.

'

'

S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 117

Reliance was placed by the High Court on the

decision of the Federal Court of India in fatindra Nath

Gupta

v.

Province of Bihar(1) in support of their con­

clusions. That case was concerned with the questio1i

of the validity of the proviso to section 1 (3) of the

Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act (V of 1947).

Section 1 (3) provided the Act should remain in

force for a period of one year from the date

of its

commencement. The relevant part

of the proviso was

in the following terms :

"Provided that the Provincial Government may,

by notification, on a resolution passed by the Bihar

Legislative Assembly and agreed

to by the Bihar

Legislative Council, direct that this Act shall remain

in force for a further period of

one year with such

modifications if any,

as may be specified in the

notification."

Three of the learned Judges held that the proviso

and the notification thereunder were ultra

vires and

void. They laid particular emphasis on the power

given

to the Provincial Government to make

any

modification in the Act when extending its life as

indicating that it

was a delegation of legislative power.

Another learned Judge did not decide this point -but

agreed

to set aside the order of detention on another

ground not material for our present purpose and

th<!

remaining learned Judge took a different view of the

effect of the proviso and held that it

was a conditional

legislation within the meaning

of the decision in

'R.

v.

Burah(2). I do not find it necessary, for the

purposes

of. the present appeal, to express any view

as to the correctness of the decision of the Federal

Court in that

case. Assuming, but without deciding,

that the eutrustment with the Provincial Government

of the power to extend the life of an Act with such

modifications

as the Provincial Government in its

unfettered

discretion thought fit to make was nothing

but a delegation of legislative

power.s, there is no such -.4 power of modification given to the Provincial Govern­

ment by section 4 of the Bombay City Civil Court

\1) A.I.R.1949 F.C. 115 (2) LR.SI.A. 178.

1950

State of Bombay

v.

Narothamdas

Ji thabai and

Another

DasJ.

1950

State of Bombay

v.

Narotharndeu

Jethabai and

Another

·­

DaJ J.

118 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1951]

Act, 1948, and, therefore, that decision of the Federal

Court can

have no application to the case before us.

The learned Attorney-General wants to

_go further

and contend that under the Government

of India Acr,

1935, it was permissible for the Legislatures, Central

or

Provincial, while acting within their respective

legislative

fields, to delegate their legislative powers.

In the

view I have expressed above, namely, that

section 4

of the Bombay City Civil Court Act, 1948,

does not involve any delegation of legislative power,

I

do not consider it necessary, on this occasion, to go

into that question and I reserve my right to consider

and

decide that question including the question of the

correctness

of the decision of the Federal Court in

Jatindra Nath Gupta's case(') on that point as and

when

occasion may arise in future.

Learned Counsel for the first respondent then

raises

before us the larger question as to whether the Bombay

City Civil Court Act, 1948, as a whole was or was not

within the legislative competence

of the

Provincial

Legislature of Bombay. Legislative powers were by

section 100 of the Government of India Act, 1935,

distributed amongst the Federal and the Provincial

Legislatures. Under that section the Federal Legis­

lature had, and the Provincial Legislature had not,

power to make

laws with respect to any of the matters

enumerated in List 1 in the Seventh Schedule to thar

Act. Likewise, the

Provincial Legislature had, and the

Federal Legislature had not, power

to make laws for

the

Province with respect to any of the marrer.s enumer­

ated in List II in that Schedule. It will be noticed

that the section, while af!irmative giving legislative

power with respect

to certain matters to one

Legis­

lature, expressly excluded the legislative power of the

other Legislature with respect

to those matters. Lastly,

section

100 gave concurrent power of legislation to the

Federal

as well as to the

Provincial Legislature with

respect to matters enumerated in List Ill in that

Schedule. Section 107 of that Act made provision for

resolving the inconsistency, if any, between a Pro­

vincial law and a Federal law or the existing Indian

(1) AIR 1949 FC 175

'

-

S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 119

law with respect to any of the matters in the

Concurrent List

(i.e., List III). Turning now to the

three lists

we find several entries relating to

Courts,

the relevant portions of which are as follows :-

List I.

Entry

53 : Jurisdiction and powers of all

Courts,

except the Federal Court, with respect to any of the

matters in this list

....... .

List·Il.

Entry 1 : .......... the administration of justice,

constitution and organisation of all Courts, except the

Federal Court, and

fees taken therein ; ......... .

Entry· 2 : Jurisdiction and powers of all Courts,

except the Federal Court. with respect to any of the

matters in this list ; procedure in Rent and Revenue

+ Courts.

List III.

PART 1.

Entry 2 : Criminal Procedure, including all matters

included in the Code of the Criminal Procedure at

the date

of the passing of this Act.

Entry

4 :

Civil Procedure, including the law of

Limitation and all matters included in the Code of

Civil Procedure at the date of the passing of this

Act; ............. .

Entry

15 : Jurisdiction and powers of all

Courts,

except the Federal Court, with respect to any of the

matters in this list.

' Learned Attorney-General urges that entry 1 in

List II clearly indicates that administration of . justice

had been expressly made a provincial subject and

that it

was only the Provincial Legislature which

could make laws with respect to administration

of

justice. The next steps in the argument are that there

could

be no administration of justice unless

Courts

were constituted and organised~ that the constitution

and organisation

of

Courts would be meaningless

enterprises for the Provincial Legislatures to indulge

in, unless the Courts

so constituted and organised were

1950

State of Bombay

'· NarothamdaJ

Jethabai and

Another

Dal J.

1950

State of Bombay

v.

Narothamdas

lethabal a11d

Ano th.er

Das/.

120 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1951}

vitalised by being invested with jurisdiction and

powers

to receive, try and determine suits and other

proceedings. The argument, therefore,

is that entry 1

in List

II by itself gave power to the Provincial

Legis­

lature not only to constitute and organise Courts but al­

so to confer jurisdiction and powers on them. The learn­

ed Attorney-General relies on fagtianls case(') and

points out that under entry 1 administration

of justice

was entirely a provincial responsibility and the

Pro­

vincial Legislature was authorised to make laws with

respect to administration of justice. Administration

of justice, so the argument proceeds, is inseparable

from Courts and Courts without jurisdiction

is an in­

comprehensible notion. The conclusion sought

to be

es­

tablished, therefore, is that under entry 1 alone of List

II the Provincial Legislature had power to make a

law, not

merely constituting a new Court but, investing

such

new Court with general jurisdiction and powers

to receive, try and determine all suits and other

proceedings.

If entry 1 in List II stood alone and

entry

53 in List I, entry 2 in List II and entry 15 in

List III

were not

In the Seventh Schedule, the argu­

ment would have been unanswerable. In Section 92 of

the British North America Act,

1867, there was no se­

parate provision authorising the making of laws with · respect to jurisdiction and powers of Courts and, there­

fore, the authority to make laws with respect to the

jurisdiction and powers of Courts had of necessity to

be found in and spelt out of the words "administration

of justice" occurring in section 92 (14) of that Act.

There is, however, no such pressing or compelling

necessity for giving such wide and all embracing

meaning to the words "administration

of

justice" in

entry 1 of List II. The expression "administration of

justice" may be an expression of wide import and may

ordinarily, and in the

absence of anything indicating

any contrary intention,

cover and include within its

ambit several things

as component parts of it, namely,

the constitution and

·organisation of Courts, jurisdic­

tion and powers

of the Courts and the laws to be

administered

by the Courts. But the legislative

(I)

SI Bom. LR 86.

'

'

>

S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 121

practice in England as well as in India has been to

deal with

these topics separately in legislative

enact­

ments : sec for example Indian High Courts Act 1861

(24 and 25 Vic., c. 104) sections 2 and 19 ; Government

of India Act, 1935, sections 220 and 223, the Letters

Patent

of the Bombay High Court, 1865, and also the

different Civil Courts

Acts.

Of these, one topic,

namely, "constitution and organisation of Courts"

had · been expressly included in entry 1 of List II in

addition to "administration

of

justice", a fact of some

significance which must be noted although I do not say

that the inclusion of the words "constitution and

organisation

of all

Courts" in entry 1 of List II by

itself and in the absence of anything else cut down the

generality

of the meaning of the expression

"admini­

stration of justice" which preceded those words, for

such a construction may militate against the principle

laid down

by the

Privy Council in Mcghraj v. Allah

Rakhia(1). Further, entry 2 in List II would have been

wholly' unnecessary if the expression "administration

of justice" in entry 1 in List II were to be given the

wide meaning contended for

by the learned

Attorney­

General, for if under entry 1 in List II the Provincial

Legislature had plenary powers to make

laws

confer­

ring on, or taking away-from, Courts, existing or new­

ly constituted, jurisdiction and powers of the widest

description, such power would

also include the lesser

power of conferring jurisdiction and powers with

res­

pect to any of the . matters enumerated in List II, such

as is contemplated by entry 2 in List II. The greater

power would certainly

have included the lesser. I do

not

say that the presence of entry 2 in List II by itself

cut down the ambit

of the expression

"administration

of justice" in entry 1, for if there were only entries 1

and 2 in List II and there were no entries like entry

53

in

Li~ I and entry 15 in Lisf Ill, it might have been

argued with

some plausibility that in framing the two

entries in the

same list not much care was bestowed

by the draftsman to prevent overlapping and that as

(l) LR 74 IA 12, at p.

20.

' 1950

State of Bombay

v.

Narothamdas

Jethabai and

Another

Da3J.

19SO

.State of Bombay

••

Narotlwmdtu

Jethabal and

Another

DaJ J.

122 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1951]

both the entries in one and the same list gave legis­

lative power to the same Legislature the overlapping

caused no confusion or inconvenience and that it was

not necessary, therefore, to construe entry 1 of List II

as cut . down by entry 2 in the same List. The import­

ant thing

to notice is that the topic of

"jurisdiction

and powers of Courts" had not been included in entry

1 in List II along witb the

topic of

"constitution and

organization

of Courts'', but the legislative powers

with respect to the topic of

"jurisdiction and powers of

the Courts" had been distributed between the Federal

and the Provincial Legislatures in the manner

set forth

in entry

53 in List I, entry 2 in List II and entry 15

in List III. The inclusion of

"constitution and

organisation

of

Courts" as a separate item in entry 1

in List II, the

omission of the topic of

"jurisdiction

and powers of Courts" from entry 1 and the deliberate

distribution

of powers to make laws with respect to

jurisdiction and

powers of Courts with respect to

the several matters specified in the three lists clearly

indicate

to my mind that the intention of Parliament

was not, by entry 1 in List II by itself, to authorise

ihe Provincial Legislature

to make any law with

respect to the jurisdiction and powers

of Coum.

In my judgment, entry l in List II cannot be read

as at all giving any power to the Provincial Legisla­

ture to confer

any jurisdiction or power on any Court

it might constitute

or organise under that entry

and that the

expressions "administration of

justice"

and "constitution and organisation of Courts" occur­

ring in entry 1 in List II should be read as exclusive

of "the jurisdiction and powers of Courts" the powers

of legislation with

respect to which were distributed

under entry

53 in List I, entry 2 in List II and entry

15 in List III.

Such a construction will be consonant

with the principle of ·construction laid down by the

Privy Council in the case of In re Marriage Legisla­

tion in Canada(').

It is next said that entry 1 in List II gave general

powers

to the Provincial Legislature to make laws (I} (1912] AC 880.

'

. >

S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 123

conferring general jurisdiction and powers on Courts

constituted

by it under that entry while entry 53 in

List

I, entry 2 in List II and entry 15 in List III

conferred special powers on the Federal and Provincial

Legislatures to make

laws conferring special

jurisdic­

tion and powers with respect to matters specified in

their respective Lists.

As I have already pointed out,

if

entry 1 in List II conferred plenary powers on the

Provincial Legislature

to make laws with respect to

jurisdiction and powers of Courts in widest terms,

entry 2 in List II would

be wholly redundant, for the

wider power itself would include the

lesser power.

Further, the

very concession that entry 53 in List 1,

entry 2 in List II and entry 15 in List III gave special

powers

to the Legislature to confer special jurisdiction

and powers necessarily amounts

to an admission that

the powers conferred on the Provincial Legislature

by entry 1 in List II were exclusive of the powers con­

ferred under entry 53 in List I, entry 2 in List II and

entry

15 in List Ill, for if entry 1 in List II gave power

to the Provincial Legislature

to make laws conferring

general jurisdiction

of the widest kind which included

jurisdiction and powers with respect to all matters

spe­

cified in all the Lists, then the utility of entry 53 in List

I, entry 2 in List II and entry

15 in List III as giving

special powers

to make laws

conferring special jurisdic­

tion would vanish altogether. Special power to confer

special jurisdiction would

be meaningless if it were

included in the general power

also. This circumstance

by itself should be sufficient to induce the Court to

Qssign a limited scope and ambit to the power

con­

ferred on the Provincial Legislature under entry 1 in

List II. We, therefore,

come back to the same

conclu­

sion that entrv 1 in List II should be construed and

read

as

confeiring on the Provincial Legislature all

powers with respect

to administration of justice

and

constitution and organisation of Courts minus the

power to make

laws with respect to the jurisdiction

and powers of Courts.

It

is pointed out that under entry 1 in List II it

was only the

Provincial Legislature which alone could

1950

State of Bombay

v.

Narothamda3

Jethabai and

Another

DaJ J.

1950

State of Bombay

v.

Narothamdas

Jethabai and

Another

Dos J.

124 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1951]

constitute and organise a new Court and if that entry

did not empower the Provincial Legislature

to vest in such new Court the general juriscliction and power to

receive, try and dispose of all kinds of suits and other

proceedings, then no new Court

of general jurisdiction

could

be established at all. As will be seen hereafter,

the Provincial Legislature

has, under entry 2 in

List II, power

to make laws conferring wide general

jurisdiction and powers on a newly constituted Court

and consequently a

forced construction need not be

placed on entry 1 in List II. It is said that if the

Provincial Legislature could not, under entry 1 in

List II, confer jurisdiction on a new Court

set up by

it under that entry, the result would have been that

the Provincial Legislature would

have had to set up a

new Court

by one law made under entry 1 of List II

without conferring on it

any jurisdiction whatever and

would

have had to make another law with respect to

the jurisdiction and powers of such Court. I see no

force in this, for the Provincial Legislature could by

one and the same law have set up a Court under

entry 1 in List

II and vested in the Court jurisdiction

and powers with respect

to any of the matters specified

in List II and, subject to section

107 of the Act with

respect to

any of the matters enumerated in List III.

It

is wrong to assume that the Provincial Legislature

could not make one

law under both entry 1 arid entry

2 in List II and entry

15 in List III at one and the

same time.

A

good deal of argument was advanced before us

as to the applicability of the doctrine of pith and

sub­

stance and, indeed, the decision of the Bombay High

Court in /agtiani's case was practically founded on

that doctrine. Shortly put, the argument, as advanced,

is that under entry 1 in List II the Provincial Legis­

lature had power

to make laws with respect to

administration of justice ; that, therefore, the

Pro­

vincial Legislature had power, under entry 1 itself,

to make laws conferring general jurisdiction and

powers on Courts constituted and organised

by it

under that entry ; that

if in making such law

'

'

S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 125

the Provincial Legislature incidentally encroached

upon the legislative field assigned to the Federal

Legislature under entry

53 in List I with respect

to the jurisdiction and powers of Court with respect

to any of the matters specified in List I, such

incidental encroachment did not invalidate the law, as

in pith and substance it was a law within the legisla­

tive powers. In my judgment, this argument really

begs the question. The doctrine of pith and substance

postulates, for its application, that the impugned law

is substantially within the legislative competence of

the particular

Lc;:gislature that made it, but only inci­

dentally encroached upon the legislative field of another

Legislature. The doctrine

saves this incidental

encroachment if only the law

is in pith and substance

within the legislative

field of the particular Legislature

which made it. Therefore, if the Provincial Legislature

under entry 1 had power to

vest general jurisdiction

on a newly constituted Court, then

if the law made by

it incidentally gave jurisdiction to the Court with

respect to matters specified in List I the question of

the applicability

of the doctrine of pith and substance

might have arisen. I

have already pointed out that

on a proper construction, entry 1 of List II did not

empower the Provincial Legislature

to confer any

jurisdiction or power

on the Court and the expression

"administration of

justice" had to be read as covering

matters relating

to administration of

justice other than

jurisdiction and powers of Court and, if that were

so,

the discussion of the doctrine of pith and substance

does not arise at all. I find it difficult to support the

reasonings adopted

by the Bombay High

Court in

/agtiani' s case.

The argument as to the applicability of the doctrine

of pith and substance

to the impugned Act can, how­

ever, be well

main~ained in the following modified

form. Under entry 2 in List TI the Provincial Legisla­

ture had power to make laws with respect to the

jurisdiction and powers of Courts with respect to any

of the matters enumerated in List II; that "administ­

ration of justice" in entry 1 is one of the matters in

1950

State of Bombay

v.

Narothamda3

Jethabai and

Another

Da5 J.

1950

State of Bombay

v.

Narothamdas

Jethabal and

Another

Da1J.

126 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1951]

List II ; that, therefore, the Provincial Legislature had

power

to confer the widest general jurisdiction on any

new Court or take away the entire jurisdiction from

any existing Court and there being this power, the

doctrine

of pith and substance applies. It is suggested

that this argument cannot

be formulated in view of the

language

used in entry 2 in List II. It is pointed out

that entry 2 treats

"any of the matters in this L:ist" as

subject-matter "with respect to" which, i.e., "over"

which the Court may be authorised to exercise jurisdic­

tion and power. This construction

of entry 2 is obvious­

ly fallacious, because jurisdiction and powers of the

Court

"over" administration of justice as a subject­

matter is meaningless and entry 2 can never be read

with entry

l. This circumstance alone shows that the

words

"with respect to" occurring in entry 2 in List II

when applied to entry 1 did not mean "over" but

really meant "relating to" or "touching" or "concern­

ing" or "for" administration of justice, and so read

and understood, entry

2, read with entry l in List II,

clearly authorised the

Provincial Legislature to make

law conferring on or taking

away from a Court general

jurisdiction and

powers rclatir.g to or touching or

concerning

or for administration of justice. This line of

reasoning

has been so very fully and lucidly dealt

with

by my brother

Sastri J. that I have nothing to

add thereto and I respectfully adopt

his reasonings

and conclusion on the point. This argument, in

my

opinion, resolves all difficulties by vesting power in

the

Provincial Legislature to confer general jurisdic­

tfon on Courts constituted and organised by it for

effective administration of justice which was made its

special responsibility. Any argument as to deliberate

encroachment tnat might have been founded on the

Proviso to section 3 of the Act which enabled the Pro­

vincial Government to give to the City Coun even

Admiralty jurisdiction which was a matter in List I

has been set at rest by the amendment of the Proviso

by Bombay Act XXVI of 1950. The impugned

Bombay Act may, in my judgment, be well supported

as a law made by the Provincial Legislature under

'

'

S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 127

entry 2 read with entry 1 in List II and I hold

accordingly. I, therefore, concur

in the order that this

appeal be. allowed.

In the

view I have taken, it is not necessary to dis­

cuss the contention of the learned Attorney-General

that .the

Bombay

City Civil Court Act may be sup­

ported as a piece of legislation made by the Pro­

vincial Legislature of Bombay under entry 4 read

with entry 15 in Part I of List III and I express no

opinion on that point.

Appeal allowed.

Agent for the appellant : P. A. Mehta.

Agent for the respondents: Ra;inder Nar:zin.

1950

State of Bombay

. v.

Narothallldru

lethabai

tl1ld

Another

Dasi.

Reference cases

Description

Legislative Power and Court Jurisdiction: A Deep Dive into State of Bombay v. Narothamdas Jethabai (1950)

The landmark 1950 Supreme Court ruling in State of Bombay v. Narothamdas Jethabai and Another stands as a cornerstone of Indian constitutional law, meticulously dissecting the intricate balance of legislative powers between the Centre and the Provinces. This seminal judgment, available for study on CaseOn, grapples with the constitutional validity of the Bombay City Civil Court Act, 1948, and clarifies the crucial distinction between permissible conditional legislation and the controversial Delegation of Legislative Powers. The case offers profound insights into the interpretation of legislative lists and the application of the doctrine of pith and substance, principles that continue to shape constitutional jurisprudence today.

Factual Matrix: The Heart of the Dispute

The controversy began when the Provincial Legislature of Bombay enacted the Bombay City Civil Court Act of 1948 to establish an additional civil court for Greater Bombay. Section 3 of the Act set the court's initial pecuniary jurisdiction at Rs. 10,000. Crucially, Section 4 empowered the Provincial Government to increase this limit to a maximum of Rs. 25,000 through a simple notification.

Following the Act's commencement, the government issued a notification under Section 4, enhancing the court's jurisdiction to Rs. 25,000. Subsequently, the first respondent filed a suit in the Bombay High Court to recover Rs. 11,704 based on a promissory note. This amount fell squarely within the enhanced jurisdiction of the new City Civil Court and outside the High Court's purview, according to the new law.

The respondent, however, challenged the Act's constitutional validity on two main grounds:

  1. The Provincial Legislature had no power to create a court with jurisdiction over matters like promissory notes, which fell under the Federal Legislative List (List I) of the Government of India Act, 1935.
  2. Section 4 was an invalid delegation of legislative power to the executive branch.

The Bombay High Court delivered a split verdict: it upheld the Act's overall validity but struck down Section 4 as an unconstitutional delegation of power. This led the State of Bombay to appeal to the Supreme Court.

The IRAC Analysis of the Supreme Court's Judgment

Issue

The Supreme Court was tasked with resolving two primary legal questions:

  1. Did the Provincial Legislature of Bombay possess the constitutional authority under the Government of India Act, 1935, to create a court with general jurisdiction over all civil suits, including those concerning subjects enumerated in the Federal Legislative List (List I)?
  2. Was Section 4 of the Act, which permitted the Provincial Government to enhance the court's pecuniary jurisdiction via notification, a valid form of conditional legislation, or did it constitute an unconstitutional delegation of essential legislative power?

Rule of Law

The Court's decision hinged on the interpretation of several key constitutional provisions and legal doctrines:

  • Government of India Act, 1935: Section 100 of this Act laid out the framework for the distribution of legislative powers.
  • The Seventh Schedule (Legislative Lists):
    • List I (Federal List): Item 53 granted the Federal Legislature power to make laws concerning the "Jurisdiction and powers of all courts... with respect to any of the matters in this list."
    • List II (Provincial List): Item 1 was the focal point, granting Provincial Legislatures power over the "Administration of justice; constitution and organisation of all courts, except the Federal Court." Item 2 covered jurisdiction with respect to matters in List II.
  • Doctrine of Pith and Substance: This doctrine directs courts to examine the true nature and character of legislation to determine which legislative list it falls under. A law that is substantially within a legislature's competence is not deemed invalid simply because it incidentally touches upon matters outside its legislative field.
  • Conditional Legislation vs. Delegated Legislation: Citing the foundational case of Queen v. Burah, the Court reiterated that conditional legislation occurs when a legislature enacts a complete law but leaves its enforcement or application to an external authority, contingent upon the fulfillment of certain conditions. This is permissible. In contrast, delegated legislation involves the legislature transferring its essential law-making function to another body, which is generally impermissible.

Analysis

The Supreme Court systematically addressed both issues, delivering a comprehensive analysis that harmonized the seemingly conflicting legislative entries.

1. The Validity of the Act and the Doctrine of Pith and Substance

The Court held that the power granted to the Provincial Legislature under List II, Item 1 ("Administration of justice" and "constitution and organisation of all courts") was a broad and general power. The majority opined that the power to constitute a court inherently includes the power to confer jurisdiction upon it; a court without jurisdiction is a meaningless entity. The power to administer justice cannot exist in a vacuum.

The specific entries concerning jurisdiction (like Item 53 of List I) were interpreted not as limitations on this general power but as special powers allowing the respective legislatures to create special jurisdictions for particular subjects. The Court then applied the doctrine of pith and substance. It concluded that the Bombay City Civil Court Act was, in its true nature, a law related to the "administration of justice"—a subject squarely within the provincial domain. The fact that this law incidentally affected suits on promissory notes (a federal subject) did not render it unconstitutional.

Analyzing complex rulings on legislative power can be demanding. For legal professionals seeking to quickly grasp the core arguments in this and other significant judgments, CaseOn.in provides 2-minute audio briefs that distill intricate legal reasoning into concise, accessible summaries, saving valuable time and effort.

2. Section 4 as a Valid Instance of Conditional Legislation

On the second issue, the Court was unanimous in its finding. It held that Section 4 was a classic example of conditional legislation, not an invalid delegation of power. The Court reasoned that the Legislature had already performed its essential function: it had debated the issue, formulated the policy, and set a definitive maximum limit (Rs. 25,000) for the court's jurisdiction. The law was complete in every respect.

The only task left to the Provincial Government was to determine the condition—that is, the appropriate time and circumstance—to bring the enhanced jurisdiction into effect. The government was not making the law; it was merely executing the will of the Legislature. The Court drew a clear line, distinguishing this from cases where the executive is given the power to modify or change the law itself, which would amount to a true and impermissible delegation.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal filed by the State of Bombay and set aside the High Court's decision. It conclusively held that:

  • The Bombay City Civil Court Act, 1948, was entirely intra vires (within the power of) the Provincial Legislature.
  • Section 4 of the Act was a valid exercise of conditional legislation and not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.
  • As a result, the Bombay High Court lacked the jurisdiction to entertain the suit, which now fell under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bombay City Civil Court.

Final Summary of the Judgment

In essence, the Supreme Court validated the Bombay City Civil Court Act by establishing that a provincial legislature's constitutional power to create courts for the "administration of justice" logically includes the authority to grant them general civil jurisdiction. It affirmed that this power is not nullified if it incidentally affects subjects in the federal domain, a conflict resolved by the doctrine of pith and substance. Furthermore, the judgment robustly reaffirmed the constitutional validity of conditional legislation, clarifying that empowering the executive to determine the timing of a law's application, within predefined legislative limits, does not constitute a delegation of the core law-making power.

Why is This Judgment an Important Read?

For Lawyers: This judgment is a foundational authority on the interpretation of legislative lists and the practical application of the pith and substance doctrine, both of which are critical in constitutional litigation. It also provides a clear and authoritative framework for distinguishing between valid conditional legislation and invalid delegation, a distinction vital for challenging or defending government notifications issued under various statutes.

For Law Students: As a textbook case, it offers a perfect illustration of Indian federalism and the judicial mechanisms used to resolve legislative conflicts between the central and state governments. It provides a clear, real-world example of how courts employ interpretative tools and established legal doctrines to uphold the constitutional structure.

Disclaimer: The information provided in this article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For legal inquiries, please consult with a qualified professional.

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