1

2026:CGHC:15695-DB

NAFR

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

FAM No. 44 of 2025

Reserved on 24/03/2026

Pronounced on 07/04/2026

1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Collector, Korba, District- Korba

(C.G.)

2 - The Land Acquisition Officer Cum Sub Divisional Officer (Revenue),

Podiuproda, District- Korba (C.G.)

3 - The Executive Engineer, Water Resources Division, Korba, District-

Korba (C.G.)

--- Appellants

versus

1 – Manohar, S/o Punaram, R/o Village Jurali, Tahsil Pondiuproda,

District- Korba (C.G.)

2 – Dhanharan, S/o Punaram, R/o Village Jurali, Tahsil Pondiuproda,

District- Korba (C.G.)

3 – Marharan, S/o Punaram, R/o Village Jurali, Tahsil Pondiuproda,

District- Korba (C.G.)

4 – Dilharan, S/o Punaram, R/o Village Jurali, Tahsil Pondiuproda, District-

Korba (C.G.)

5 – Dileshwar, S/o Punaram, R/o Village Jurali, Tahsil Pondiuproda,

District- Korba (C.G.)

2

6 – Kaleshwar, S/o Punaram, R/o Village Jurali, Tahsil Pondiuproda,

District- Korba (C.G.)

--- Respondents

For Appellants/State:Mr. Dilman Rati Minj, Dy. A.G.

For Respondents :Mr. Sunil Otwani, Sr. Advocate appears

alongwith Mr. Vikas Pandey, Advocate and Mr.

Amit Soni, Advocate

D.B:-Hon’ble Shri Justice Sanjay S. Agrawal &

Hon’ble Shri Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad

CAV ORDER

Per: Sanjay S. Agrawal, J.

1.Heard on I.A. No.02/2025 and I.A. No.03/2025, applications

seeking condonation of delay of 616 days’ in preferring of this

appeal.

2.Learned counsel appearing for the appellants/State submits

that the order impugned passed on 22/12/2023 by the Land

Acquisition and Rehabilitation and Resettlement Authority

(hereinafter referred to as “Authority”) constituted under Section 51

of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land

Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter

referred to as “the Act, 2013”), was forwarded by the Government

Advocate appearing before the said Authority to the Executive

Engineer, Water Resources Department, Division- Korba (C.G.),

who in turn, has sought for an opinion from him on 02/02/2024 and

in response to it, the said Government Advocate vide letter dated

14/02/2024 has opined for assailing the same. It is contended

3

further that in the meantime, an opinion was also sought from the

Office of Advocate General on 08/02/2024, where, an opinion was

given vide letter dated 19/03/2024 for challenging the same. Further

of his contention is that, on 09/07/2024, a permission was sought by

the Water Resources Department from the Department of Law and

Legislative Affairs for filing an appeal against the said impugned

order, where, permission was accorded on 19/11/2024 and, in

pursuance thereof, the Officer-in-Charge, appointed on 10/05/2024

has contacted the Officer of the Office of Advocate General on

20/11/2024. It is contended further that the said Officer-in-Charge

was directed to bring all the necessary and relevant documents, as

well as, the certified copy of the order impugned and, in pursuance

to the said direction, he contacted the said office and supplied the

relevant documents and, based upon which, an appeal, being F.A.

(M) No.01/2025, was filed without any further delay. It is contended

further that, since there was some default(s) in preferring the same,

therefore, after its withdrawal on 14/11/2025, the instant appeal has

been preferred. While furnishing these materials, it is contended

that the alleged delay in preferring this appeal has been occurred

bonafidely and may be condoned in order to provide substantial

justice to the parties.

3.In response to the aforesaid contention, it is contended by the

counsel appearing for the respondents that, after passing of the

order impugned, the Land Acquisition Officer vide its letter dated

24/01/2024, had directed the Executive Engineer, Water Resources

Department to deposit the amount of compensation, but the same

4

was not deposited even though the direction was issued by this

Court vide order dated 01/08/2024 in WP(C) No.3906/2024. It is

contended further that the Contempt Case (C) No.3906/2024 was,

therefore, filed where a notice was directed to be issued on

10/12/2024, however, in order to get rid of it, the State Authorities

have filed the appeal on 09/12/2024, registered as FA(M)

No.01/2025, which shows the lack of bonafide on part of the

appellants/State Authorities. It is contended further that since the

appeal was filed on 09/12/2024, therefore, the said Contempt

Petition was disposed of vide order dated 21/01/2025 (Annexure

R/2). It is contended further that the order impugned was passed on

22/12/2023, where as the opinion was sought from the Government

Pleader only, on 02/02/2024 and, no explanation was given why it

was not obtained immediately thereafter and, contended further

that, though the legal opinion was given on 19/03/2024 by the Office

of Advocate General to this effect, but the Officer-in-Charge was

appointed only on 10/05/2024 and, no explanation to this effect has

also been offered, and permission for filing an appeal was sought

again from the Law Department on 09/07/2024, i.e. after passing of

a considerable period of two months and, despite the permission

was accorded by the said Department on 19/11/2024, the appeal

was filed earlier on 09/12/2024 with default(s) and after its

withdrawal on 14/11/2025, the instant appeal has been preferred on

04/12/2025 with a delay of 616 days’ without offering any proper

explanation. Therefore, the application as filed in absence of

offering proper explanation of the huge delays deserves to be

5

rejected.

4.From perusal of the record, it appears that the land owned by

the respondents situated at Village-Jurali, Tahsil- Pondiuproda of

District- Korba (C.G.) was acquired by the State Authorities for the

construction of Canal as per the award, dated 06/02/2019 passed

by the Land Acquisition Officer in Land Acquisition Case No.04/A-

82/2014-15. Since, the amount of compensation was inadequate, a

Reference Petition under Section 64 of the Act, 2013 was made

before the Authority constituted under Section 51 of the Act, 2013,

who in turn has allowed the same vide its order impugned, dated

22/12/2023 passed in Reference Case No.45/2022 “Manohar and

Others v. State of C.G. and Others” enhancing the amount of

compensation payable to the respondents by the State Authorities.

5.Being aggrieved with the aforesaid order impugned passed by

the Authority, the instant appeal has been preferred by the State

Government on 04/12/2025 under Section 74 of the Act, 2013,

along with the said applications for condonation of delay in

preferring the same while mentioning the reasons as contended

herein-above by the counsel appearing for the appellants in

precedent paragraph.

6.It is, however, to be seen that, after passing of more than

three months from the date of the opinion given by the Office of

Advocate General on 19/03/2024, the Department of Water

Resources vide its letter dated 09/07/2024 sought an opinion again

from the Department of Law and Legislative Affairs, where sanction

6

to prefer an appeal was accorded on 19/11/2024 and, an appeal,

being FA(M) No.01/2025, was initially filed on 09/12/2024 under

Section 74 of the Act, 2013 with a delay of 292 days’. The said

appeal was listed in default(s) on 08/01/2025, but the same was not

cured and instate, the appeal so preferred, was withdrawn on

14/11/2025 without offering any explanation as to why the default(s)

was not cured for such a considerable time, commencing with effect

from 08/01/2025 up to 14/11/2025. No explanation, whatsoever has,

infact, been assigned from the date of filing of earlier appeal to the

date of its withdrawal and, instate, the instant appeal has been

preferred with a huge delay of 616 days’.

7.Pertinently to be noted here further that, the Land Acquisition

Officer after passing the order impugned has directed the Executive

Engineer, Water Resources Department vide its letter dated

24/01/2024 to deposit the enhanced amount of compensation

payable to the respondents, however, the same was not deposited

and, when it was not deposited, a petition, being WP(C)

No.3906/2024, was filed by the respondents seeking an appropriate

directions to this effect. In the said petition, three months time was

granted to the appellants/State Authorities to deposit the same while

disposing the said petition, as revealed from the order dated

01/08/2024 (Annexure R/1) passed by this Court. It is to be seen

further that, though three months time was granted to deposit the

enhanced amount of compensation, but the same was not

deposited which led to filing of a Contempt Petition, being Contempt

Case (C) No.1433/2024, where a notice was directed to be issued

7

on 10/12/2024. However, in order to get rid of it, the said sanctioned

appears to have been obtained on 19/11/2024 and, based upon

which, the earlier appeal, being FA(M) No.01/2025, was preferred

on 09/12/2024 and, the appellants/State Authorities have

succeeded to get rid of the said contempt proceedings, as owing to

filing of the said appeal, the said Contempt Petition was disposed of

vide order dated 21/01/2025 (Annexure R/2) with the directions,

made at para 7, as under:-

“7. Having considered aforesaid contentions of learned

counsel for both the parties, though it is found that the

order under contempt has not been complied with by

respondents well within a time, but by filing FA No.2/2025

against the order dated 22.12.2023 passed by the

Tribunal, they have taken recourse to law, as such, no

case of contempt is made out at this stage.”

8.Be that as it may, the appeal, being FA(M) No.01/2025, so

preferred, was delayed by 292 days’ and was listed in default(s) on

08/01/2025. But, instead of removing the default(s), it was

withdrawn, much after that, i.e. only on 14/11/2025 though, sufficient

time for more than ten months’, was available to cure the same.

9.What is, therefore, reflected from the above facts that, despite

the legal opinion given by the Office of Advocate General on

19/03/2024 for assailing the order impugned, no sanction was

obtained immediately thereafter, i.e. within the prescribed period of

limitation of 60 days’ as provided under Section 74 of the Act, 2013

and, instate much after passing of a considerable period of more

8

than three and half months, a letter dated 09/07/2024 was written

by the Office of Water Resources Department to the Department of

Law and Legislative Affairs seeking sanctioned for preferring an

appeal and, even upon the sanction was accorded by the said

Department on 19/11/2024, the appeal, being FA(M) No.01/2025

was preferred only on 09/12/2024 and, that too with an ulterior

motive to get rid of the said contempt proceedings, with a delay of

292 days’, and despite of its listing in default(s) on 08/01/2025, it

was not cured and withdrawn on 14/11/2025 and thereafter, the

instant appeal has been preferred on 04/12/2025.

10.It is, however, the settled legal position that, where the case

has been presented in the court beyond limitation, it is, then

required to be explained with proper reasons as to why, it was not

preferred in time and, unless and until the sufficient reasons are

assigned, the same cannot be condoned.

11.At this juncture, the principles laid down by Hon’ble the

Supreme Court in the matter of “State of Madhya Pradesh v.

Ramkumar Choudhary” reported in 2024 SCC Online SC 3612,

as relied upon by the counsel appearing for the respondents, is to

be seen, wherein at paragraphs 5, 5.1 and 7, it has been held as

under:-

“5.The legal position is that where a case has been

presented in the Court beyond limitation, the petitioner has

to explain the Court as to what was the "sufficient cause"

which means an adequate and enough reason which

9

prevented him to approach the Court within limitation. In

Majji Sannemma v. Reddy Sridevi, reported in SCC Online

SC 1260, it was held by this Court that even though

limitation may harshly affect the rights of a party, it has to

be applied with all its rigour when prescribed by statute. A

reference was also made to the decision of this Court in

Ajay Dabra v. Pyare Rams, reported in 2023 SCC Online

SC 92, wherein, it was held as follows:

"13. This Court in the case of Basawaraj v. Special

Land Acquisition Officer [(2013) 14 SCC 81] while

rejecting an application for condonation of delay for

lack of sufficient cause has concluded in Paragraph

15 as follows:

"15. The law on the issue can be summarised

to the effect that where a case has been

presented in the court beyond limitation, the

applicant has to explain the court as to what

was the "sufficient cause" which means an

adequate and enough reason which prevented

him to approach the court within limitation. In

case a party is found to be negligent, or for

want of bona fide on his part in the facts and

circumstances of the case, or found to have not

acted diligently or remained inactive, there

cannot be a justified ground to condone the

delay. No court could be justified in condoning

such an inordinate delay by imposing any

condition whatsoever. The application is to be

10

decided only within the parameters laid down

by this Court in regard to the condonation of

delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to

prevent a litigant to approach the court on time

condoning the delay without any justification,

putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to

passing order in violation of the statutory

provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter

disregard to the legislature."

14. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that

the High Court did not commit any mistake in

dismissing the delay condonation application of the

present appellant."

Thus, it is crystal clear that the discretion to condone

the delay has to be exercised judiciously based on facts

and circumstances of each case and that, the expression

'sufficient cause' cannot be liberally interpreted, if

negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is attributed to

the party.

5.1. In Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D)

through his legal heir (2024 SCC Online SC 489),

wherein, one of us (J.B. Pardiwala, J) was a member, after

referring to various decisions on the issue, it was in

unequivocal terms observed by this Court that delay

should not be excused as a matter of generosity and

rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to

the opposite party. The relevant passage of the same is

profitably extracted below:

11

"24. In the aforesaid circumstances, we made it very

clear that we are not going to look into the merits of

the matter as long as we are not convinced that

sufficient cause has been made out for condonation

of such a long and inordinate delay.

25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a private

party or a State or Union of India when it comes to

condoning the gross delay of more than 12 years. If

the litigant chooses to approach the court long after

the lapse of the time prescribed under the relevant

provisions of the law, then he cannot turn around and

say that no prejudice would be caused to either side

by the delay being condoned. This litigation between

the parties started sometime in 1981. We are in

2024. Almost 43 years have elapsed. However, till

date the respondent has not been able to reap the

fruits of his decree. It would be a mockery of justice if

we condone the delay of 12 years and 158 days and

once again ask the respondent to undergo the

rigmarole of the legal proceedings.

26. The length of the delay is a relevant matter which

the court must take into consideration while

considering whether the delay should be condoned

or not. From the tenor of the approach of the

appellants, it appears that they want to fix their own

period of limitation for instituting the proceedings for

which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once

it is held that a party has lost his right to have the

12

matter considered on merits because of his own

inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-

deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the

case, he cannot be heard to plead that the

substantial justice deserves to be preferred as

against the technical considerations. While

considering the plea for condonation of delay, the

court must not start with the merits of the main

matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the

bona fides of the explanation offered by the party

seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause

assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the

other side is equally balanced that the court may

bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose

of condoning the delay.

27. We are of the view that the question of limitation

is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of

limitation are based on the principles of sound public

policy and principles of equity. We should not keep

the 'Sword of Damocles' hanging over the head of

the respondent for indefinite period of time to be

determined at the whims and fancies of the

appellants.

XXX XXX XXX

34. In view of the aforesaid, we have reached to the

conclusion that the High Court committed no error

much less any error of law in passing the impugned

order. Even otherwise, the High Court was exercising

13

its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the

Constitution of India.

35. In a plethora of decisions of this Court, it has

been said that delay should not be excused as a

matter of generosity. Rendering substantial justice is

not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The

appellants have failed to prove that they were

reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter and this

vital test for condoning the delay is not satisfied in

this case.

36. For all the foregoing reasons, this appeal fails

and is hereby dismissed. There shall be no order as

to costs."

Applying the above legal proposition to the facts of the

present case, we are of the opinion that the High Court

correctly refused to condone the delay and dismissed the

appeal by observing that such inordinate delay was not

explained satisfactorily, no sufficient cause was shown for

the same, and no plausible reason was put forth by the

State. Therefore, we are inclined to reject this petition at

the threshold.

7. There is one another aspect of the matter which we

must not ignore or overlook. Over a period of time, we

have noticed that whenever there is plea for condonation

of delay be it at the instance of a private litigant or State

the delay is sought to be explained right from the time, the

limitation starts and if there is a delay of say 2 years or 3

years or 4 years till the end of the same. For example if

14

the period of limitation is 90 days then the party seeking

condonation has to explain why it was unable to institute

the proceedings within that period of limitation. What

events occurred after the 91st day till the last is of no

consequence. The court is required to consider what

came in the way of the party that it was unable to file it

between the 1st day and the 90th day. It is true that a

party is entitled to wait until the last day of limitation for

filing an appeal. But when it allows the limitation to expire

and pleads sufficient cause for not filing the appeal earlier,

the sufficient cause must establish that because of some

event or circumstance arising before the limitation expired

it was not possible to file the appeal within time. No event

or circumstance arising after the expiry of limitation can

constitute such sufficient cause. There may be events or

circumstances subsequent to the expiry of limitation which

may further delay the filing of the appeal. But that the

limitation has been allowed to expire without the appeal

being filed must be traced to a cause arising within the

period of limitation. (See: Ajit Singh Thakur Singh v. State

of Gujarat, (1981) 1 SCC 495: AIR 1981 SC 733).”

12.Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, as

observed herein-above, in the light of the principles laid down by the

Supreme Court in the above referred matter, the explanation so

offered for the delay of 616 days’ in preferring of this appeal cannot

be held to be a sufficient one and, rather appears to have been

made with malafide intention. The applications are, thus, liable to be

and are hereby rejected with costs of Rs.15,000/- (Fifteen Thousand

15

Only), payable by the appellants/State to each of the respondents

within a period of 60 days’ from today, failing which, the same shall

carry interest @ 6% per annum from the date of passing of this

order till its realization and, the appellants/State may recover the

same from its erring officers. Consequently, the appeal is dismissed.

Sd/-

(Sanjay S. Agrawal)

JUDGE

Sd/-

(Amitendra Kishore Prasad)

JUDGE

Prashant