As per case facts, the petitioner, initially appointed as Assistant Grade-III, sought promotion to Assistant Public Prosecution Officer. His promotion was denied in earlier DPCs for lacking service or being ...
No Acts & Articles mentioned in this case
1
CGHC010250922026 2026:CGHC:35175-DB
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WA No. 663 of 2026
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Department Of Home,
Mahandi Bhawan, Mantralaya, Nava Raipur Atal Nagar, District Raipur
Chhattisgarh.......... (Respondent No. 1)
2 - The Secretary, General Administration Department, Mahanadi
Bhawan, Atal Nagar Nava Raipur, District Raipur Chhattisgarh .........
( Respondent No. 2)
3 - Director, Directorate Of Public Prosecution, Indrawati Bhawan, Atal
Nagar Nawa Raipur Chhattisgarh ....... ( Respondent No. 4)
... Appellants
versus
1 - Aalok Ghosh, S/o Late Shri Kamal Krishna Ghosh, Aged About 46
Years Currently Working As Assistant Grade 03, Office Of Deputy
Director, Public Prosecution, Surajpur, District Surajpur Chhattisgarh......
( Writ Petitioner)
2 - The Secretary Chhattisgarh Public Service Commission, North
Block, Sector 19, Atal Nagar Nava Raipur, District Raipur,
Chhattisgarh ........ ( Respondent No. 3)
... Respondents
(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)
For Appellants/State:Mr. Shashank Thakur, Additional Advocate
General
For Respondent No.1 :Mr. Harshmander Rastogi, Advocate
2
Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal , Judge
Judgment on Board
Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice
11.08.2026
1.Heard Mr. Shashank Thakur, learned Additional Advocate
General, appearing for the State/appellants and Mr. Harshmander
Rastogi, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.1 on I.A.
No.02, which is an application for condonation of delay of 35 days
in preferring the appeal.
2.For the grounds assigned in the application (I.A. No.02), the same
is allowed. Delay of 35 days in filing the writ appeal is hereby
condoned.
3.The present intra Court appeal has been filed against the order
dated 06.04.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ
Petition (S) No.10635/2025 (Aalok Ghosh v. State of Chhattisgarh
and others) whereby the writ petition filed by the writ petitioner-
respondent No.1 herein before the learned Single Judge has been
allowed.
4.Brief facts of the case projected before the learned Single Judge
were that the writ petition was filed by the petitioner/respondent
No.1 seeking, inter alia, a direction to the respondent authorities
to consider and decide his representations dated 15.07.2025 and
to grant him promotion to the post of Assistant District Public
3
Prosecutor/Assistant Public Prosecution Officer from the year
2018 with all consequential benefits. The petitioner had initially
been appointed as Assistant Grade-III pursuant to the
appointment order dated 15.10.2012 and had joined service on
25.10.2012. His service was governed by the Chhattisgarh Public
Prosecution (Gazetted) Services Recruitment and Promotion
Rules, 2008, under which 10% of the posts of Assistant Public
Prosecution Officer were to be filled by promotion from amongst
eligible Class-III employees possessing a degree in Law.
5.The petitioner’s candidature had been considered by the
Departmental Promotion Committee (DPC) in the years 2018 and
2019, but he was not recommended on the ground that he had
not completed the requisite seven years of service and, in the
subsequent DPC, that he was still on probation and had not been
confirmed in service. The petitioner was thereafter confirmed in
service by order dated 10.06.2024/18.06.2025. When the DPC
met on 07.01.2026, the petitioner, having completed more than
thirteen years of service from the date of his initial appointment,
was again considered along with other Class-III employees;
however, against his name, he was simply recorded as “non-
suitable” without assigning any reason. Aggrieved thereby, the
petitioner approached the learned Single Judge contending that
his period of service was liable to be reckoned from the date of his
initial appointment and that the DPC had erred in declaring him
non-suitable without assigning reasons.
4
6.The learned Single Judge, by order dated 06.04.2026 passed in
WPS No.10635/2025, allowed the writ petition and directed the
respondents to convene a review DPC and reconsider the
petitioner’s candidature by counting his service from 25.10.2012,
with a further direction to assign reasons if he was again found
unsuitable.
7.Aggrieved thereby, the appellants/State has preferred the present
writ appeal under Section 2(1) of the Chhattisgarh High Court
(Appeal to Division Bench) Act, 2006, questioning the legality,
validity and correctness of the judgment and order passed by the
learned Single Judge.
8.Learned counsel appearing for the appellants/State submits that
the learned Single Judge has erred in law and on facts in directing
the appellants to reckon the period of service of respondent No.1
from the date of his initial appointment for the purpose of
determining his eligibility for promotion. It is contended that the
respondent No.1 was appointed on probation and was confirmed
only subsequently, and therefore, in terms of the applicable
service conditions/rules, the requisite qualifying service for
promotion was liable to be computed from the date on which he
acquired the status of a confirmed employee in the feeder cadre.
According to learned counsel, the learned Single Judge has
proceeded on an erroneous assumption that confirmation
automatically relates back to the date of initial appointment,
5
without examining the specific requirements governing promotion
under the Chhattisgarh Public Prosecution (Gazetted) Services
Recruitment and Promotion Rules, 2008.
9.Learned counsel further submits that the learned Single Judge
has also erred in interfering with the assessment made by the
DPC, which, after considering the candidature of respondent No.1
along with other eligible employees, found him to be “non-
suitable” for promotion. It is contended that the DPC is the
competent body to assess the suitability of an employee for
promotion and the Court, in exercise of its writ jurisdiction, ought
not to substitute its own assessment for that of the DPC. It is
further submitted that mere completion of the requisite period of
service does not confer an indefeasible right to promotion, as
promotion is subject to suitability and assessment by the
competent DPC. The direction to convene a review DPC,
therefore, amounts to interference with the administrative
decision-making process. Accordingly, learned counsel prays that
the order dated 06.04.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge in
WPS No.10635/2025 be set aside and the writ petition filed by
respondent No.1 be dismissed.
10.Per contra, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.1
opposes the submissions advanced on behalf of the
appellants/State and submits that the learned Single Judge has
rightly appreciated the facts and the applicable legal position. It is
contended that respondent No.1 was appointed against a
6
sanctioned vacant post of Assistant Grade-III pursuant to the
regular appointment order dated 15.10.2012 and joined on
25.10.2012. His subsequent placement on probation and eventual
confirmation in service cannot have the effect of obliterating the
period during which he continuously rendered service in the
feeder cadre. In the absence of any specific statutory rule
providing that the qualifying service for promotion is to be
reckoned only from the date of confirmation, the entire period of
service from the date of initial appointment is liable to be taken
into consideration. Learned counsel submits that the judgment of
the learned Single Judge is fully supported by the decisions of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in G.P. Doval & Others v. Chief
Secretary, Government of U.P. & Others, (1984) 4 SCC 329
and L. Chandrakishore Singh v. State of Manipur, (1999) 8
SCC 287.
11.Learned counsel further submits that the DPC convened on
07.01.2026, despite considering the candidature of respondent
No.1, merely recorded him as “non-suitable” without assigning
any reason, whereas specific reasons were recorded in respect of
several other candidates. It is submitted that once respondent
No.1 had completed the requisite period of service and there was
admittedly no departmental enquiry or adverse material
communicated to him, the cryptic recording of “non-suitable” could
not constitute a lawful or meaningful assessment of his
candidature. The learned Single Judge has not directed his
7
automatic promotion, but has only directed the appellants to
convene a review DPC and reconsider his candidature in
accordance with law, while requiring reasons to be assigned if he
is again found unsuitable. Such a direction, according to learned
counsel, is just, equitable and legally sustainable, and calls for no
interference in the present intra-court appeal.
12.We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties at length
and carefully considered their rival submissions. We have also
perused the record of the case, including the impugned order
dated 06.04.2026 passed in Writ Petition (S) No.10635/2025.
13.the principal issue that arises for consideration is whether the
learned Single Judge was justified in allowing the writ petition filed
by respondent No.1 and directing the appellants to convene a
review Departmental Promotion Committee and reconsider his
candidature for promotion to the post of Assistant Public
Prosecution Officer by reckoning his qualifying service from the
date of his initial appointment as Assistant Grade-III on
25.10.2012. The ancillary issue is whether, upon his subsequent
confirmation in service, the period of service rendered by
respondent No.1 during probation could be counted for
determining the requisite qualifying service in the feeder cadre, in
the absence of any specific rule providing otherwise, and whether
the learned Single Judge was justified in interfering with the
decision of the DPC dated 07.01.2026, which had recorded
8
respondent No.1 as “non-suitable” for promotion without assigning
any reason. The further question is whether the directions issued
by the learned Single Judge, in the light of the applicable
Chhattisgarh Public Prosecution (Gazetted) Services Recruitment
and Promotion Rules, 2008 and the judgments relied upon in G.P.
Doval (supra) and L. Chandrakishore Singh (supra), call for
interference in the present intra-court appeal.
14.After appreciating the submissions of learned counsel for the
parties therein as also the materials on record, the learned Single
Judge has passed the impugned order in following terms:-
“5. Claim of petitioner is that petitioner has been
appointed on the regular post vide order dated
15.10.2012 on probation. Annexure P-19 filed
along with writ petition, which is the proceedings
recorded by the competent authority for
considering name of Class-III employee for their
promotion on the post of Assistant Public
Prosecution Officer, wherein name of petitioner
could not be considered mentioning that on
01.01.2018, petitioner has not completed 7 years
of service. The relaxation is sought for his posting
in the schedule area and further observed that
probation period has not been completed and
petitioner has not been confirmed in service. The
documents enclosed at Page No.86 which is part
of Annexure P-19 is the proceedings of promotion
initiated by DPC on 30.01.2019. Name of
petitioner though considered in this DPC
proceedings also, however, it is mentioned that on
9
01.01.2019, though petitioner has completed
requisite period of service in feeder cadre of 7
years, however, petitioner has not been confirmed
and still working as probationer. The documents
filed along with writ petition Annexure P-16 would
show that Directorate have passed an order on
10.06.2024 confirming petitioner on the post of
Assistant Grade-III and directed the end of
probation period. From the aforementioned facts
of the case, it is appearing that petitioner is
permanent employee appointed on probation on
vacant post of Assistant Grade-III. Once petitioner
has been confirmed in service, his period of
service is to be reckoned for the purpose of
computing the length of service in the feeder
cadre from the date of his initial appointment i.e.
Class-III post. The next DPC was initiated on
07.01.2026 on the said date petitioner has
completed more than 13 years of service as
Assistant Grade-III employee. DPC in its meeting
dated 07.01.2026 has considered the name of 13
Class-III employees including petitioner, who has
been named at Sr.No.8. In front of his name, it is
only mentioned that petitioner was found to be
non-suitable for promotion, no reason has been
assigned as to why he has been found to be non-
suitable. Though specific reasons has been
assigned for the most of the candidates
considered for their promotion by DPC.
6. Order of confirmation of petitioner after
completion of probation period passed by the
competent authority dated 18.06.2025 is filed by
respondents along with reply as Annexure R-1. In
10
the said order of confirmation, there is no mention
that what will be the status of period of service,
which petitioner rendered pursuant to his
appointment on 15.10.2012 and joining of service
on 25.10.2012 till 18.06.2025, which is an order of
competent authority confirming the petitioner in
service after completion of probation.
7. Respondents in their reply have also not
mentioned any provision of law or referred any
rule or regulation in support of their contention to
state that in view of such rule or provision under
the law, length of service of employee is to be
counted from date of his confirmation in service
and not from the date of initial appointment. In
absence of any specific rule, provision or
regulation, upon confirmation of employee it shall
relate back to the date on which the petitioner
was appointed.
8. Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of G.P. Doval &
Others. Vs. Chief Secretary, Government of U.P.
& Ors., reported in (1984) 4 SCC 329, while
considering the issue of seniority and promotion
raised by petitioner therein observed thus :-
“15. Now if there was no binding rule of
seniority it is well-settled that length of
continuous officiation prescribes a valid
principle of seniority. The question is: from
what date the service is to be reckoned? It
was urged that any appointment of a stopgap
nature or pending the selection by Public
Service Commission cannot be taken into
account for reckoning seniority. In other
11
words, it was urged that to be in the cadre and
to enjoy place in the seniority list, the service
rendered in a substantive capacity can alone
be taken into consideration. We find it difficult
to accept this bald and wide submission. Each
case will defend upon its facts and
circumstances. If a stopgap appointment is
made and the appointee appears before the
Public Service Commission when the latter
proceeds to select the candidates and is
selected, we see no justification for ignoring
his past service. At any rate, there is no
justification for two persons selected in the
same manner being differently treated. That
becomes crystal clear from the place assigned
in the seniority list to Petitioner 1 in relation to
Respondent 7. In fact if once a person
appointed in a stopgap arrangement is
confirmed in his post by proper selection, his
past service has to be given credit and he has
to be assigned seniority accordingly unless a
rule to the contrary is made. That has not
been done in the case of all the petitioners.
The error is apparent in the case of Petitioner
1 and Respondent 7. These errors can be
multiplied but we consider it unnecessary to
do so. In fact a fair rule of seniority should
ordinarily take into account the past service if
the stopgap arrangement is followed by
confirmation. This view which we are taking is
borne out by the decision of this Court in
Baleshwar Dass v. State of U.P. [(1980) 4
SCC 226 : 1980 SCC (L&S) 531 : (1981) 1
12
SCR 449 : 1981 UPSC 15 : (1981) 1 LLJ 140]
wherein this Court observed that the principle
which has received the sanction of this Court's
pronouncement is that “officiating service in a
post for all practical purposes of seniority is as
good as service on a regular basis. It may be
permissible, within limits for Government to
ignore officiating service and count only
regular service when claims of seniority come
before it, provided the rules in that regard are
clear and categorical and do not admit of any
ambiguity and cruelly arbitrary cut-off of long
years of service does not take place or there
is functionally and qualitatively, substantial
difference in the service rendered in the two
types of posts'. It was said that service rules
will have to be reasonable, fair and not grossly
unjust if they are to survive the test of Articles
14 and 16. It is thus well-settled that where
officiating appointment is followed by
confirmation unless a contrary rule is shown,
the service rendered as officiating
appointment cannot be ignored for reckoning
length of continuous officiation for determining
the place in the seniority list. Admittedly, that
has not been done and the seniority list is
drawn up from the date on which the
approval/selection was made by the Public
Service Commission in respect of each
member of the service, which is clearly
violative of Article 16, and any seniority list
drawn up on this invalid basis must be
quashed.”
13
9. Further Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of L.
Chandrakishore Singh v. State of Manipur,
reported in (1999) 8 SCC 287 observed thus :-
“15. It is now well settled that even in cases of
probation or officiating appointments which
are followed by a confirmation unless a
contrary rule is shown, the service rendered
as officiating appointment or on probation
cannot be ignored for reckoning the length of
continuous officiating service for determining
the place in the seniority list. Where the first
appointment is made by not following the
prescribed procedure and such appointee is
approved later on, the approval would mean
his confirmation by the authority and shall
relate back to the date on which his
appointment was made and the entire service
will have to be computed in reckoning the
seniority according to the length of continuous
officiation. In this regard we fortify our view by
the judgment of this Court in G.P. Doval v.
Chief Secy., Govt. of U.P. [(1984) 4 SCC 329 :
1984 SCC (L&S) 767].”
10. In the aforementioned facts of the case, when
petitioner is appointed on sanctioned vacant post
in regular recruitment proceedings on 15.10.2012
on probation, as soon as probation period is
completed and employee is confirmed in service
by passing order in this regard, for the purpose of
considering the requisite period of service in
feeder cadre it is to be considered from the first
date of appointment and joining on the post in the
14
feeder cadre. Petitioner have joined the service
on 25.10.2012, therefore, on the date of holding
of DPC petitioner has completed more than 7
years of service. Observation made by the DPC
so far as it relates to petitioner holding him to be
non-suitable for promotion without assigning any
reason in the opinion of this court is not
sustainable and is erroneous.
11. For the foregoing discussions, this writ petition
is allowed. Respondents are directed to convene
review DPC within a period of two months from
today and thereafter to reconsider the candidature
of petitioner for his promotion on the post of
Assistant Public Prosecution Officer considering
the period of service of petitioner from 25.10.2012
till 07.01.2026 as a Class-III employee and to
grant promotion if he is otherwise found suitable.
If for any reason DPC concludes that the
candidature of petitioner is not suitable for
promotion, than reasons in this regard is to be
assigned.”
15.Having bestowed our anxious consideration to the rival
submissions advanced on behalf of the appellants/State as well
as respondent No.1, and having carefully scrutinized the entire
material available on record, we are of the considered opinion that
the learned Single Judge has proceeded on the basis of the
admitted factual position that respondent No.1 was appointed
against a sanctioned vacant post of Assistant Grade-III pursuant
to the order dated 15.10.2012 and joined his services on
25.10.2012. It is also not in dispute that his appointment was not a
15
mere stop-gap, ad hoc or fortuitous arrangement, but was an
appointment against a regular post, subject to completion of the
prescribed period of probation. His subsequent confirmation in
service by the competent authority, therefore, cannot, in the
absence of any specific statutory provision to the contrary, have
the effect of completely effacing the period during which he
continuously discharged his duties in the very same feeder cadre.
16.The principal contention of the appellants that the qualifying
service of respondent No.1 was liable to be reckoned only from
the date of his confirmation cannot be accepted in the absence of
any specific rule, regulation or statutory provision demonstrating
such a consequence. The appellants, despite filing their return
before the learned Single Judge, were unable to point out any
provision under the Chhattisgarh Public Prosecution (Gazetted)
Services Recruitment and Promotion Rules, 2008, or any other
applicable service rule, which expressly mandates that the
requisite period of service in the feeder cadre is to be counted
only from the date of confirmation and that the service rendered
during probation, where such probation is subsequently
successfully completed and followed by confirmation, is liable to
be excluded. In service jurisprudence, probation is ordinarily a
period of assessment of suitability of an employee appointed to a
post; it does not, by itself, convert a regular appointment against a
sanctioned post into an appointment having no continuity unless
the governing service rules expressly provide otherwise.
16
17.In the present case, respondent No.1 was appointed in the year
2012 and continued in service thereafter. He was not discharged
from service on account of failure to satisfactorily complete
probation; rather, upon completion of the probationary period, the
competent authority proceeded to confirm him in service. Such
subsequent confirmation assumes significance because it
establishes that the initial appointment was ultimately accepted
and continued by the employer. Once the appointment has
culminated in confirmation and there is no statutory provision
excluding the preceding period for the purpose of reckoning
qualifying service, the period during which respondent No.1
continuously served in the feeder cadre cannot be treated as non-
existent for determining his eligibility for consideration for
promotion.
18.The judgments relied upon by the learned Single Judge, namely,
G.P. Doval (supra) and L. Chandrakishore Singh (supra), lend
substantial support to the aforesaid conclusion. The principle
emerging from the said decisions is that where an appointment is
followed by confirmation, the service rendered prior to
confirmation cannot ordinarily be ignored for reckoning continuous
service, unless a contrary rule expressly provides for such
exclusion. The underlying rationale is that once the employee is
ultimately confirmed in the post and the appointment is found to
have been validly continued, the past service rendered in the
same post cannot be arbitrarily discarded, particularly when the
17
consequence would be to deprive the employee of accrued
consideration for promotion after several years of continuous
service. The appellants have not been able to demonstrate any
rule which would take the present case outside the principle laid
down in the aforesaid judgments.
19.It is equally significant that the candidature of respondent No.1
had earlier been considered by the DPC in the years 2018 and
2019. In the year 2018, his candidature was not recommended
principally on the ground that he had not completed the requisite
seven years of service, whereas in the year 2019, though he had
completed the requisite period of service in the feeder cadre, his
candidature was not recommended on the ground that he was still
undergoing probation and had not been confirmed. The
subsequent order of confirmation passed by the competent
authority removed the latter impediment. Consequently, when the
DPC met on 07.01.2026, the earlier grounds which had prevented
consideration of respondent No.1 in the previous years could no
longer operate against him. By then, reckoning his service from
25.10.2012, he had admittedly completed substantially more than
the requisite seven years of service in the feeder cadre.
20.We are also unable to accept the submission of the appellants
that the learned Single Judge has substituted his own assessment
for that of the DPC. It is trite that the suitability of an employee for
promotion is primarily within the domain of the competent
18
Departmental Promotion Committee and ordinarily the
constitutional court does not sit as an appellate authority over the
assessment of suitability made by such committee. However, that
principle does not confer immunity upon the decision of a DPC
from judicial review altogether. Where the decision-making
process suffers from arbitrariness, non-application of mind, failure
to consider relevant material or absence of reasons in
circumstances where reasons are necessary to demonstrate a
genuine assessment, the constitutional court is competent to
examine the decision-making process and issue appropriate
directions.
21.In the present case, the learned Single Judge has not directed the
appellants to promote respondent No.1 as a matter of right.
Rather, the direction is expressly limited to convening a review
DPC and reconsidering his candidature in accordance with law.
Even the direction regarding recording of reasons operates only in
the event the DPC, upon such reconsideration, again arrives at
the conclusion that respondent No.1 is not suitable for promotion.
Thus, the learned Single Judge has consciously preserved the
jurisdiction and discretion of the DPC to undertake the
assessment of suitability. What has been interdicted is not the
assessment itself but an unexplained and cryptic recording of
“non-suitable”, particularly when the record indicates that in
respect of several other candidates considered in the same DPC,
reasons were recorded for arriving at the conclusion regarding
19
their suitability or otherwise.
22.The expression “non-suitable”, by itself, is merely a conclusion
and not a disclosure of the process by which such conclusion has
been reached. The purpose of requiring a competent authority to
undertake a consideration for promotion is not merely to
mechanically record a conclusion but to make an objective
assessment in accordance with the governing service rules and
the material relevant to such assessment. If a candidate otherwise
fulfils the prescribed eligibility conditions and his candidature is
considered by the DPC, the decision-making process must
demonstrate that his candidature has received meaningful and
bona fide consideration. This is particularly so where the
employee has already been denied promotion on earlier
occasions for specific reasons which have subsequently ceased
to exist. A bald recording of “non-suitable”, without anything more,
does not enable the Court to ascertain whether the relevant
eligibility criteria and service record were properly considered or
whether the candidate was rejected for some other undisclosed
reason.
23.The contention that respondent No.1 has no vested right to
promotion is undoubtedly correct as a general proposition. Mere
eligibility or completion of the qualifying service does not confer
an indefeasible right upon an employee to demand promotion,
and the employee remains subject to assessment of suitability by
20
the competent DPC. However, the aforesaid principle does not
mean that an eligible employee can be denied fair and meaningful
consideration. There is a distinction between a right to promotion
and a right to be considered for promotion in accordance with the
applicable rules and by following a fair, reasonable and non-
arbitrary procedure. The learned Single Judge has protected only
the latter right and has not conferred upon respondent No.1 any
automatic right to promotion.
24.The further submission of the appellants that the learned Single
Judge ought not to have interfered with the decision of the DPC
is, therefore, of no assistance to them. The impugned direction
does not amount to substitution of the Court's opinion for that of
the DPC. The learned Single Judge has merely required the
competent authority to reconsider the candidature of respondent
No.1 by taking into account the period of service actually rendered
by him in the feeder cadre from 25.10.2012 and to undertake a
fresh assessment of his suitability. Such a direction is consistent
with the limited scope of judicial review, particularly where the
original decision is found to have proceeded on an erroneous
understanding of the qualifying service and where the final
conclusion of “non-suitable” is unsupported by any disclosed
reason.
25.We are also mindful of the submission that the DPC is an expert
body and its assessment ordinarily deserves due deference.
21
There can be no quarrel with the said proposition. However,
deference to an expert body cannot mean abdication of judicial
review where the very eligibility of the employee has been
considered on an erroneous premise or where the decision-
making process is demonstrably deficient. The role of the Court is
not to determine whether respondent No.1 is suitable for
promotion, but only to ensure that his candidature is considered
by the competent authority in accordance with the governing
rules, upon taking into account the legally relevant period of
service and by adopting a fair and non-arbitrary procedure. The
learned Single Judge has remained well within these parameters.
26.Another aspect which cannot be overlooked is that the appellants
have not placed before this Court any material to establish that
respondent No.1's service rendered from 25.10.2012 until his
confirmation was interrupted, invalid, ad hoc, stop-gap or
otherwise incapable of being counted for the purpose for which
consideration was sought. Nor has any rule been shown which
expressly excludes the probationary period after an employee is
ultimately confirmed in service. In the absence of such a
provision, acceptance of the appellants' interpretation would result
in depriving respondent No.1 of the benefit of several years of
continuous service solely because the formal order of
confirmation was issued at a later point of time, even though he
had continuously remained in the same feeder cadre. Such an
interpretation cannot be accepted merely on the basis of an
22
administrative assertion unsupported by the governing rules.
27.The chronology of events also supports the conclusion reached by
the learned Single Judge. Respondent No.1 was appointed in
2012; his candidature was considered in 2018 and was not
recommended for want of the requisite length of service; in 2019,
the requisite period of service had been completed but he was still
a probationer; thereafter he was confirmed in service; and when
the DPC again considered his candidature on 07.01.2026, he had
already rendered more than thirteen years of service from the
date of his joining. The very grounds which had earlier stood in
the way of his promotion were thus no longer available. In such
circumstances, the DPC was required to undertake a proper and
meaningful consideration of his candidature. Merely describing
him as “non-suitable”, without disclosing the basis of such
conclusion, cannot be regarded as sufficient compliance with the
obligation to consider his candidature fairly.
28.We may hasten to add that the present order shall not be
construed as an expression of opinion by this Court regarding the
ultimate suitability of respondent No.1 for promotion. Nor shall the
review DPC be understood as being bound to recommend
respondent No.1 for promotion. The DPC shall remain free to
assess his candidature in accordance with the applicable Rules,
the service record and all other relevant considerations. What is
required is only that the period of service directed to be reckoned
23
by the learned Single Judge be taken into consideration and that
the candidature be evaluated objectively and in accordance with
law. If, upon such consideration, the DPC finds respondent No.1
unsuitable, it shall be open to the competent authority to arrive at
such conclusion, provided the same is supported by relevant
material and the reasons are appropriately recorded.
29.The direction issued by the learned Single Judge, therefore,
strikes an appropriate balance between the rights of respondent
No.1 and the administrative domain of the appellants. It neither
commands automatic promotion nor interferes with the
substantive assessment of suitability. It merely corrects the basis
upon which the candidature is to be considered and ensures that
the decision is taken by the competent authority in a fair and
legally sustainable manner. We find no reason to hold that such a
direction amounts to impermissible judicial interference in the
functioning of the DPC.
30.On an overall consideration of the matter, we are satisfied that the
learned Single Judge has correctly appreciated the factual and
legal position. The conclusion that, upon subsequent confirmation,
the service rendered by respondent No.1 from the date of his
initial appointment in the feeder cadre could not be ignored in the
absence of any contrary statutory provision is consistent with the
principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in G.P. Doval
(supra) and L. Chandrakishore Singh (supra). The further
24
finding that the unexplained recording of “non-suitable” by the
DPC dated 07.01.2026 was insufficient to sustain the decision
against respondent No.1 is also founded upon a legitimate
exercise of judicial review and does not suffer from any perversity
or jurisdictional infirmity.
31.Consequently, we find no merit in the present writ appeal. The
order dated 06.04.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge in
Writ Petition (S) No.10635/2025 is hereby affirmed. The
appellants/respondent authorities shall comply with the directions
contained in the said order within the time stipulated therein,
subject, however, to the liberty of the competent DPC to
independently assess the suitability of respondent No.1 in
accordance with the applicable service rules and relevant material
on record. It is made clear that the respondent No.1 shall not be
entitled to claim automatic promotion merely by virtue of the order
passed by the learned Single Judge or this order, and his
promotion shall remain dependent upon his being found suitable
by the competent DPC.
32.Accordingly, the writ appeal, being devoid of merit, is dismissed.
All pending interlocutory applications, if any, shall stand disposed
of. There shall be no order as to costs.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha)
Judge Chief Justice
Anu
The recent Chhattisgarh High Court Judgment in WA No. 663 of 2026, a significant ruling concerning Service Law Promotion, has been meticulously analyzed and is now accessible on CaseOn. This insightful decision from the High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur addresses crucial aspects of an employee's right to be considered for promotion, particularly regarding the reckoning of probationary service and the necessity of reasoned decisions from Departmental Promotion Committees (DPCs).
At the heart of this appeal was a challenge against a Single Judge's order that directed the State authorities to reconsider an employee's promotion. The key questions before the Division Bench were:
The High Court relied on established precedents from the Hon'ble Supreme Court to frame its legal reasoning:
This landmark case affirmed that continuous officiating service, even if initially stop-gap or temporary but later followed by selection and confirmation, should generally be credited for seniority unless a clear rule states otherwise. It emphasized that service rules must be reasonable and fair, not arbitrary.
Reinforcing the Doval principle, this judgment clarified that probationary or officiating appointments, when followed by confirmation, cannot be ignored for reckoning continuous officiating service for seniority, unless a contrary rule exists. Confirmation, in such cases, relates back to the initial appointment date.
These rulings collectively establish that, in the absence of a specific statutory provision to the contrary, service rendered on probation followed by confirmation contributes to the overall length of service for promotion purposes.
The petitioner, Aalok Ghosh, was initially appointed as an Assistant Grade-III on a regular, sanctioned post in 2012, serving a probationary period before being confirmed. His candidature for promotion to Assistant Public Prosecution Officer was considered by the DPC in 2018 and 2019 but rejected for reasons like insufficient service or being on probation. By the time the DPC met again in 2026, he had completed over 13 years of service (reckoned from his initial appointment) and had been confirmed.
Crucially, the 2026 DPC merely recorded him as 'non-suitable' without any explanation, while providing reasons for other candidates. The appellants (State) failed to present any specific rule from the Chhattisgarh Public Prosecution (Gazetted) Services Recruitment and Promotion Rules, 2008, or any other applicable service rule, that mandated the exclusion of probationary service from the qualifying period for promotion, once followed by confirmation.
The Division Bench concurred with the Single Judge's finding that the probationary period, when successfully completed and followed by confirmation, could not be arbitrarily disregarded. Such an interpretation, if accepted, would unfairly deprive an employee of accrued consideration for promotion after years of continuous service.
For legal professionals and students seeking to quickly grasp the nuances of such complex rulings, CaseOn.in offers invaluable 2-minute audio briefs that condense the essential arguments and findings, providing a clear and concise understanding of Service Law Promotion cases like this one.
The Court also rejected the State's argument against judicial interference with DPC decisions. While acknowledging the DPC as an expert body, the High Court reiterated that its decisions are not immune to judicial review, especially when they suffer from arbitrariness, non-application of mind, or lack of necessary reasons. The Single Judge's direction was not for automatic promotion but for a fair reconsideration, requiring the DPC to take into account the full period of service and, if finding him unsuitable again, to provide clear reasons.
In conclusion, the High Court found no merit in the State's appeal and affirmed the Single Judge's order. The decision emphasizes that:
This judgment serves as a strong reminder to administrative bodies to adhere to principles of fairness and transparency in promotion processes.
This ruling is a crucial read for lawyers practicing service law and for law students studying administrative and constitutional law for several reasons:
It explicitly clarifies the principle of reckoning service for promotion, particularly the inclusion of probationary periods followed by confirmation. This is a recurring issue in public employment.
The judgment underscores the necessity for DPCs to provide reasoned decisions, preventing arbitrary rejections and promoting transparency in promotion procedures. This is vital for upholding employee rights against administrative opacity.
It illustrates the limited yet effective scope of judicial review in matters concerning expert bodies like DPCs, demonstrating when and how courts will intervene to ensure fairness and adherence to legal principles.
The case effectively applies and interprets significant Supreme Court precedents (G.P. Doval and L. Chandrakishore Singh), providing a practical example of how these principles guide High Court decisions.
Please note that all information provided in this analysis is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance, it is essential to consult with a qualified legal professional.
Login with google
Legal Notes
Add a Note....