1 ( 2026:HHC:11550 )

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

RSA No. : 97 of 2025

Decided on : 10.04.2026

State of H.P. & anr. ….Appellant.

Versus

Piar Singh & another. ...Respondents

_________________________________

Coram:

The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Romesh Verma. Judge.

Whether approved for reporting?

1

For the appellants Mr. Baldev Singh Negi, Additional

Advocate General

For the respondents Mr. Devender K. Sharma, Advocate

__________________________________________

Romesh Verma, Judge(oral)

The present Regular Second Appeal arises out of

the judgment and decree as passed by the learned

Additional District Judge, Sarkaghat, District Mandi, H.P.

dated 29.07.2024, whereby the appeal as preferred by the

defendants/appellants has been ordered to be dismissed and

the judgment and decree as passed by the learned Civil

Judge, Sarkaghat, District Mandi, H.P. dated 31.10.2023 was

affirmed

2. Brief facts of the case are that the plaintiff-

respondent filed a suit for declaration with consequential

1

Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment?

2 ( 2026:HHC:11550 )

relief for injunction in the Court of learned Civil Judge,

Sarkaghat, District Mandi on 18.05.2015. As per the

averments as made in the plaint, the plaintiff is owner of

the land comprised in Khewat No. 203 min, Khatoni No. 234

bearing Khsra No. 620, Kita 3, land measuring 00-02-90

hectares, situated in Mohal Nabahi bearing Hadbast No.

368, Illaqua Suranga, Tehsil Sarkaghat, District Mandi, H.P.

as per jamabandi for the year 2010-2011. It was averred that

before the settlement operation in the area, the suit land

was comprised in khata Khatauni No. 66 min/159 bearing

Khasra No. 564 min (old) corresponding to Khasra No. 614

(new) land measuring 00-02-90 hectares and after

settlement operation, in measuring 00-00-77 hectares and

Khasra No. 871 min (old) corresponding to Khasra No. 1559

(new),

3. That after settlement operation the suit land in

consolidation operation which was affected in area

concerned in year 1990-91, the suit land carved in Khata,

Khatani No. 172 min/206 bearing Khasra No. 614(old)

corresponding to Khasra No.620 (new) land measuring 00-

02-90 hectare as per naklal Missal Hakiyat Bandobast Jadid,

and Nakal Missal Hakiyat consolidation of the year 1993-

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1994 of Mouza Nabahi Tehsil Sarkaghat, District Mandi,

H.P. It was averred that prior to settlement operation, the

suit land was jointly owned and possessed by predecessor-

in-interest of plaintiffs as well as of proforma defendants

and after their death, plaintiff and proforma defendants are

in joint ownership. It was further averred that that HPPWD

had constructed the road namely “Ghumarwin to

Sarkaghat” through the suit land and when the

respondents/plaintiffs objected to the same, assurance was

given to the plaintiffs that they shall be duly compensated

on account of utilization of the suit land and it is only on

their assurance that the plaintiffs permitted the officials of

the State to raise the construction of the road over the suit

land. In the revenue record, classification of the land has

been depicted as “gair mumkin road”. Since the defendants

have utilized the land of the plaintiffs without adopting due

process of law including payment of amount, therefore, the

plaintiffs filed a suit to declare their rights of due

compensation qua the suit land.

4. As per the averments as made in the plaint the

cause of action arose to the plaintiffs to file suit firstly on

29.04.2008 and thereafter on 07.12.2011 when the suit land

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was not found to have been mentioned in the Notification as

issued by the State under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition

Act. The plaintiffs were under impression that on account of

the promises as made by the officials of the defendants, the

suit land shall be acquired and compensation shall be duly

paid to the affected parties. Therefore, the suit for

declaration and injunction was filed by the plaintiffs against

the defendants.

5. The suit was contested by the defendants by

raising preliminary objections with regard to

maintainability, cause of action, mis-joinder and non-

joinder of necessary parties, suppression of facts etc. It was

admitted that road namely Ghumarwin-Sarkaghat was

constructed in the year 1955-1960. It was averred that the

road was constructed by the Public Works Department after

complying with the codal formalities which were required

for the construction of the road. It was averred that at the

time of raising of construction of the road, no objection of

any kind was raised by affected parties including the

plaintiff. Further it was averred that the suit is barred by

period of limitation and that the plaintiff is estopped from

filing the suit on account of his conduct since no objection

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was raised by him with respect to the construction of the

road at the relevant time. It was further averred that the

defendants paid compensation to the land owners with

respect to the construction and since the record is about

more than 63 years old and though every efforts were made

to trace the record but the same could not be done.

Therefore, the defendants sought the dismissal of the suit

on the ground of limitation and on the principle of estoppel.

6. The plaintiffs filed the replication reiterating

the contents of the plaint.

Learned trial Court framed the following issues

on 02.09.2023.

1. Whether suit land had been owned and

possessed by the plaintiff/proforma defendants

or their predecessor-in-interest? OPP

2. Whether State of H.P. without acquiring the

suit land, constructed roads etc. on assurance to

the plaintiff/proforma defendants for giving

compensation? OPP

3. Whether State of H.P. could not have used the

suit land and possessed the same without,

acquisition?OPP

4. Whether plaintiff is entitled for declaration to

the effect declaring the right of compensation

by way of acquisition of the suit land, as prayed

for?OPP

5. Whether plaintiff/proforma defendants are

entitled for consequential relief of injunction,

as prayed for? OPP

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6. Whether suit is not maintainable in the

present form, as alleged?OPD

7. Whether plaintiff has no cause of action, as

alleged?OPD

8. Whether suit is bad for non-joinder of the

necessary parties, as alleged ? OPD

9. Whether suit has not been properly valued for

the purposes of Court fee & jurisdiction, as

alleged ?OPD

10.Whether suit is barred by limitation as

alleged? OPD

11. Whether plaintiff is estopped to file present

suit by his own acts, conduct, omissions and

commissions, as alleged? OPD

12. Relief.

7. The learned trial Court directed the respective

parties to adduce evidence in support of contention and

vide its judgment and decree dated 31.10.2023, the suit filed

by the plaintiff was decreed and the defendants were

directed that plaintiff and proforma defendants have right

to compensation of the suit land which was used by the

defendants for the construction of the road. Further the

plaintiffs were held entitled for the relief of injunction and

defendants were directed to acquire the land in the suit

under the road under the ambit of law to use the same as

road by giving adequate compensation to the plaintiffs.

Further the defendants were also directed not to cause

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further interference over the suit land until they acquired it

in accordance with law.

8. Feeling dissatisfied, defendants/appellants

preferred an appeal in the Court of Additional District Judge,

Sarkaghat, Mandi on 01.03.2024 The First Appellate Court

vide its judgment and decree dated 29.07.2024 dismissed

the appeal preferred by the present appellants-State.

9. Still feeling aggrieved, the State/appellants

have preferred the present Regular Second Appeal

challenging the impugned judgment and decree as passed

by the Courts below.

10. It is contended by the learned Additional

Advocate General that the judgments and decrees as passed

by the learned Courts below are erroneous and are liable to

be quashed and set-aside. He further submits that the

Courts below have not decided the case in hand in

accordance with law and the decree as passed by the learned

trial Court could not have been passed by directing the

defendants/appellants to acquire the land which was

utilized for the construction of the road and by ordering the

payment of amount of compensation.

8 ( 2026:HHC:11550 )

11 On the other hand, learned counsel for the

respondents /plaintiffs have defended the judgments and

decrees as passed by the Courts below. He has contended

that as per the mandate of the Hon’ble Apex Court, no

person can be deprived of his properties without process of

law. He submits that there are concurrent findings of fact of

the Courts below and the same do not call of any

interference.

12. I have heard the learned counsel for both the

parties and have gone through the record of the case

carefully.

13. With the consent of the parties, the present

appeal is finally heard at the admission stage.

14. The Court of the first instance as also the First

Appellate Court have concurrently held that the land of the

plaintiffs/respondents was utilized for construction of

Ghumarwin-Sarkaghat link road without payment of

compensation to them. No dispute has been raised as to

such findings of fact. It has only been contended on behalf

of the defendants/State that the suit was filed by the

plaintiffs after almost 35 years and the same was time

barred. In alternative, it was contended that since the

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plaintiffs/respondents remained silent for such a long

period, they were estopped from raising the stale claim.

Principle of acquiescence has also been sought to be applied

against the plaintiffs/respondents on the premise that the

plaintiffs/respondents were aware about the construction of

road and the road was constructed with their implied

consent and now they cannot, turn around to raise

objections against the construction of road.

15. The defendants/appellants are constituents of a

welfare State. It is well settled that the welfare State cannot

claim adverse possession against its citizens. Thus, the suit

on the basis of title cannot be said to be time barred, which

right could only be defeated by proof of perfection of title by

way of adverse possession by the other.

16. Admittedly, the defendants/appellants were not

in possession of any document to show that the plaintiffs

had consented for construction of road through the suit

land.

17. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Vidya Devi vs. State of

Himachal Pradesh & others (2020) 2 SCC 569 has held that no

person can be forcibly dispossess of his property without

any legal sanction and without following the due process of

10 ( 2026:HHC:11550 )

law and depriving her payment of just and fair

compensation. The State being a welfare State governed by

the rule of law cannot arrogate to itself a status beyond

what is provided by the Constitution. The Court has held as

follows:

“12. We have heard learned Counsel for the parties

and perused the record. 12.1. The Appellant was

forcibly expropriated of her property in 1967, when

the right to property was a fundamental right

guaranteed by Article 31 in Part III of the

Constitution. Vidaya Devi vs The State Of Himachal

Pradesh on 8 January, 2020 Article 31 guaranteed

the right to private property 1, which could not be

deprived without due process of law and upon just

and fair compensation.

12.2. The right to property ceased to be a

fundamental right by the Constitution (Forty

Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, however, it

continued to be a human right 2 in a welfare State,

and a Constitutional right under Article 300 A of

the Constitution. Article 300 A provides that no

person shall be deprived of his property save by

authority of law. The State cannot dispossess a

citizen of his property except in accordance with

the procedure established by law. The obligation to

pay compensation, though not expressly included

in Article 300 A, can be inferred in that Article The

State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose and Ors.

11 ( 2026:HHC:11550 )

AIR 1954 SC 92. 2 Tukaram Kana Joshi & Ors. v.

M.I.D.C. & Ors. (2013) 1 SCC 353.

12.3. To forcibly dispossess a person of his private

property, without following due process of law,

would be violative of a human right, as also the

constitutional right under Article 300 A of the

Constitution. Reliance is placed on the judgment in

Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Darius

Shapur Chenai4, wherein this Court held that:

“ 6. … Having regard to the provisions

contained in Article 300A of the

Constitution, the State in exercise of its

power of "eminent domain" may interfere

with the right of property of a person by

acquiring the same but the same must be for

a public purpose and reasonable

compensation therefor must be paid.”

(emphasis supplied)

12.4 In N. Padmamma v. S. Ramakrishna Reddy5,

this Court held that:

“21. If the right of property is a human right

as also a constitutional right, the same

cannot be taken away except in accordance

with law. Article 300A of the Constitution

protects such right. The provisions of the Act

seeking to divest such right, keeping in view

of the provisions of Article 300A of the

Constitution of India, must be strictly

construed.” (emphasis supplied) 4 (2005) 7

SCC 627.

12 ( 2026:HHC:11550 )

12.5 In Delhi Airtech Services Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v.

State of U.P. & Ors., this Court recognized the right

to property as a basic human right in the following

words:

“30. It is accepted in every jurisprudence and

by different political thinkers that some

amount of property right is an indispensable

safeguard against tyranny and economic

oppression of the Government. Jefferson was

of the view that liberty cannot long subsist

without the support of property.

"Property must be secured, else liberty cannot

subsist" was the opinion of John Adams. Indeed the

view that property itself is the seed bed which must

be conserved if other constitutional values are to

flourish is the consensus among political thinkers

and jurists.” (emphasis supplied)

12.6 In Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of

Gujarat,7 this Court held as follows :

“48. …In other words, Article 300A only

limits the powers of the State that no person

shall be deprived of his property save by

authority of law. There has to be no

deprivation without any sanction of law.

Deprivation by any other mode is not

acquisition or taking possession under

Article 300A. In other words, if there is no

law, there is no deprivation.” (emphasis

supplied) 10.3. In this case, the Appellant

could not have been forcibly dispossessed of

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her property without any legal sanction, and

without following due process of law, there

is no deprivation.”

12.6 In this case, the Appellant could not have

been forcibly dispossessed of her property without

any legal sanction, and without following due

process of law, and depriving her 6 (2011) 9 SCC

354. 7 (1995) Supp. 1 SCC 596. payment of just

compensation, being a fundamental right on the

date of forcible dispossession in 1967.

12.8. The contention of the State that the Appellant

or her predecessors had “orally” consented to the

acquisition is completely baseless. We find

complete lack of authority and legal sanction in

compulsorily divesting the Appellant of her

property by the State.

12.9. In a democratic polity governed by the rule of

law, the State could not have deprived a citizen of

their property without the sanction of law.

Reliance is placed on the judgment of this Court in

Tukaram Kana Joshi & Ors. v. M.I.D.C. & Ors.

wherein it was held that the State must comply

with the procedure for acquisition, requisition, or

any other permissible statutory mode. The State

being a welfare State governed by the rule of law

cannot arrogate to itself a status beyond what is

provided by the Constitution.

12.10. This Court in State of Haryana v. Mukesh

Kumar held that the right to property is now

considered to be not only a constitutional or

14 ( 2026:HHC:11550 )

statutory right, but also a human right. 8 (2013) 1

SCC 353. Human rights have been considered in the

realm of individual rights such as right to shelter,

livelihood, health, employment, etc. Human rights

have gained a multi− faceted dimension.

12.11. We are surprised by the plea taken by the

State before the High Court, that since it has been

in continuous possession of the land for over 42

years, it would tantamount to “adverse”

possession. The State being a welfare State, cannot

be permitted to take the plea of adverse possession,

which allows a trespasser i.e. a person guilty of a

tort, or even a crime, to gain legal title over such

property for over 12 years. The State cannot be

permitted to perfect its title over the land by

invoking the doctrine of adverse possession to grab

the property of its own citizens, as has been done

in the present case. 12.12. The contention advanced

by the State of delay and laches of the Appellant in

moving the Court is also liable to be rejected. Delay

and laches cannot be raised in a case of a

continuing cause of action, or if the circumstances

shock the judicial conscience of the Court.

Condonation of delay is a matter of judicial

discretion, which must be exercised judiciously and

reasonably in the facts and circumstances of a case.

It will depend upon the breach of fundamental

rights, and the remedy claimed, and when and

how the delay arose. There is no period of

limitation prescribed for the courts to exercise their

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constitutional jurisdiction to do substantial justice.

12.13. In a case where the demand for justice is so

compelling, a constitutional Court would exercise

its jurisdiction with a view to promote justice, and

not defeat it.

12.14. In Tukaram Kana Joshi & Ors. v. M.I.D.C. &

Ors.,10 this Court while dealing with a similar fact

situation, held as follows : “There are authorities

which state that delay and laches extinguish the

right to put forth a claim. Most of these authorities

pertain to service jurisprudence, grant of

compensation for a wrong done to them decades

ago, recovery of statutory dues, claim for

educational facilities and other categories of

similar cases, etc. Though, it is true that there are a

few authorities that lay down that delay and laches

debar a citizen from seeking remedy, even if his

fundamental right has been violated, under Article

9 P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of T.N. (1975) 1 SCC

152. 10 (2013) 1 SCC 353. 32 or 226 of the

Constitution, the case at hand deals with a

different scenario altogether. Functionaries of the

State took over possession of the land belonging to

the Appellants without any sanction of law. The

Appellants had asked repeatedly for grant of the

benefit of compensation. The State must either

comply with the procedure laid down for

acquisition, or requisition, or any other permissible

statutory mode.” (emphasis supplied)

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13. In the present case, the Appellant being an

illiterate person, who is a widow coming from a

rural area has been deprived of her private

property by the State without resorting to the

procedure prescribed by law. The Appellant has

been divested of her right to property without

being paid any compensation whatsoever for over

half a century. The cause of action in the present

case is a continuing one, since the Appellant was

compulsorily expropriated of her property in 1967

without legal sanction or following due process of

law. The present case is one where the demand for

justice is so compelling since the State has

admitted that the land was taken over without

initiating acquisition proceedings, or any

procedure known to law. We exercise our

extraordinary jurisdiction under Articles 136 and

142 of the Constitution, and direct the State to pay

compensation to the appellant.

18. To the similar effect, the Hon’ble Apex Court in

(2022) 7 SCC 508 titled as Sukh Dutt Ratra and another vs.

State of H.P. and others has held as under:

“14. It is the cardinal principle of the rule of law,

that nobody can be deprived of liberty or property

without due process, or authorization of law. The

recognition of this dates back to the 1700s to the

decision of the King’s Bench in Entick v.

Carrington17 and by this court in Wazir Chand v.

17 ( 2026:HHC:11550 )

The State of Himachal Pradesh18. Further, in

several judgments, this court has repeatedly held

that rather than enjoying a wider bandwidth of

lenience, the State often has a higher responsibility

in demonstrating that it has acted within the

confines of legality, and therefore, not tarnished

the basic principle of the rule of law.

15. When it comes to the subject of private property,

this court has upheld the high threshold of legality

that must be met, to dispossess an individual of

their property, and even more so when done by the

State. In Bishandas v. State of Punjab19 this court

rejected the contention that the petitioners in the

case were trespassers and could be removed by an

executive order, and instead concluded that the

executive action taken by the State and its officers,

was destructive of the basic principle of the rule of

law. This court, in another case - State of Uttar

Pradesh and Ors. v. Dharmander Prasad Singh and

Ors. 20, held: “A lessor, with the best of title, has no

right to resume possession extra-judicially by use

of force, from a lessee, even after the expiry or

earlier termination of the lease by forfeiture or

otherwise. The use of the expression 're-entry' in

the lease-deed does not authorise extrajudicial

methods to resume possession. Under law, the

possession of a lessee, even after the expiry or its

earlier termination is juridical possession and

forcible dispossession is prohibited; a lessee cannot

be dispossessed otherwise than in due course of

18 ( 2026:HHC:11550 )

law. In the present case, the fact that the lessor is

the State does not place it in any higher or better

position. On the contrary, it is under an additional

inhibition stemming from the requirement that all

actions of Government and Governmental

authorities should have a 'legal pedigree'”.

16. Given the important protection extended to an

individual vis-a-vis their private property

(embodied earlier in Article 31, and now as a

constitutional right in Article 300-A), and the high

threshold the State must meet while acquiring

land, the question remains – can the State, merely

on the ground of delay and laches, evade its legal

responsibility towards those from whom private

property has been expropriated? In these facts and

circumstances, we find this conclusion to be

unacceptable, and warranting intervention on the

grounds of equity and fairness.

17. When seen holistically, it is apparent that the

State’s actions, or lack thereof, have in fact

compounded the injustice meted out to the

appellants and compelled them to approach this

court, albeit belatedly. The initiation of acquisition

proceedings initially in the 1990s occurred only at

the behest of the High Court. Even after such

judicial intervention, the State continued to only

extend the benefit of the court’s directions to those

who specifically approached the courts. The State’s

lackadaisical conduct is discernible from this

action of initiating acquisition proceedings

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selectively, only in respect to the lands of those writ

petitioners who had approached the court in

earlier proceedings, and not other land owners,

pursuant to the orders dated 23.04.2007 (in CWP

No. 1192/2004) and 20.12.2013 (in CWP No.

1356/2010) respectively. In this manner, at every

stage, the State sought to shirk its responsibility of

acquiring land required for public use in the

manner prescribed by law.

18. There is a welter of precedents on delay and

laches which conclude either way – as contended

by both sides in the present dispute – however, the

specific factual matrix compels this court to weigh

in favour of the appellant-land owners. The State

cannot shield itself behind the ground of delay and

laches in such a situation; there cannot be a

‘limitation’ to doing justice. This court in a much

earlier case - Maharashtra State Road Transport

Corporation v. Balwant Regular Motor Service,

held:

‘11…..."Now the doctrine of laches in Courts

of Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical

doctrine. Where it would be practically

unjust to give a remedy, either because the

party has, by his conduct, done that which

might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a

waiver of it, or where by his conduct and

neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving

that remedy, yet put the other party in a

situation in which it would not be

20 ( 2026:HHC:11550 )

reasonable to place him if the remedy were

afterwards to be asserted in either of these

cases, lapse of time and delay are most

material.

But in every case, if an argument

against relief, which otherwise would be

just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay

of course not amounting to a bar by any

statute of limitations, the validity of that

defence must be tried upon principles

substantially equitable. Two circumstances,

always important in such cases, are, the

length of the delay and the nature of the acts

done during the interval, which might affect

either party and cause a balance of justice or

injustice in taking the one course or the

other, so far as relates to the remedy."

19. The facts of the present case reveal that

the State has, in a clandestine and arbitrary

manner, actively tried to limit disbursal of

compensation as required by law, only to

those for which it was specifically prodded

by the courts, rather than to all those who

are entitled. This arbitrary action, which is

also violative of the appellants’ prevailing

Article 31 right (at the time of cause of

action), undoubtedly warranted

consideration, and intervention by the High

Court, under its Article 226 jurisdiction. This

court, in Manohar (supra) - a similar case

21 ( 2026:HHC:11550 )

where the name of the aggrieved had been

deleted from revenue records leading to his

dispossession from the land without

payment of compensation – held: 6“Having

heard the learned counsel for the appellants,

we are satisfied that the case projected

before the court by the appellants is utterly

untenable and not worthy of emanating

from any State which professes the least

regard to being a welfare State. When we

pointed out to the learned counsel that, at

this stage at least, the State should be

gracious enough to accept its mistake and

promptly pay the compensation to the

respondent, the State has taken an

intractable attitude and persisted in

opposing what appears to be a just and

reasonable claim of the respondent.

Ours is a constitutional democracy

and the rights available to the citizens are

declared by the Constitution. Although

Article 19(1)(f) was deleted by the Forty-

fourth Amendment to the Constitution,

Article 300-A has been placed in the

Constitution, which reads as follows: “300-

A. Persons not to be deprived of property

save by authority of law.—No person shall

be deprived of his property save by authority

of law.” 8.This is a case where we find utter

lack of legal authority for deprivation of the

22 ( 2026:HHC:11550 )

respondent's property by the appellants who

are State authorities. In our view, this case

was an eminently fit one for exercising the

writ jurisdiction of the High Court under

Article 226 of the Constitution…

20. Again, in Tukaram Kana Joshi (supra)

while dealing with a similar fact situation,

this court held as follows: (SCC p. 359

para11)

“11“There are authorities which state that

delay and laches extinguish the right to put

forth a claim. Most of these authorities

pertain to service jurisprudence, grant of

compensation for a wrong done to them

decades ago, recovery of statutory dues,

claim for educational facilities and other

categories of similar cases, etc. Though, it is

true that there are a few authorities that lay

down that delay and laches debar a citizen

from seeking remedy, even if his

fundamental right has been violated, under

Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution, the case

at hand deals with a different scenario

altogether. The functionaries of the State

took over possession of the land belonging

to the appellants without any sanction of

law. The appellants had asked repeatedly for

grant of the benefit of compensation. The

State must either comply with the procedure

23 ( 2026:HHC:11550 )

laid down for acquisition, or requisition, or

any other permissible statutory mode.”

21. Having considered the pleadings filed,

this court finds that the contentions raised

by the State, do not inspire confidence and

deserve to be rejected. The State has merely

averred to the appellants’ alleged verbal

consent or the lack of objection, but has not

placed any material on record to

substantiate this plea. Further, the State was

unable to produce any evidence indicating

that the land of the appellants had been

taken over or acquired in the manner known

to law, or that they had ever paid any

compensation. It is pertinent to note that

this was the State’s position, and subsequent

findings of the High Court in 2007 as well, in

the other writ proceedings.”

19. The similar position has been reiterated and

relied upon in the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court by

the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court in CWP No. 491 of

2022, titled as Sakuntla Devi and another vs. State of

Himachal Pradesh & another dated 20.10.2023. After relying

upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Vidya Devi &

SukhDutt Ratra’s case, the Court held as follows:

24 ( 2026:HHC:11550 )

“7. In the aforesaid judgments, Hon’ble Apex Court

has categorically held that contention advanced by

the State of delay and laches of the appellant in

moving the Court is liable to be rejected especially

when it is not in dispute that petitioner are

suffering continuous loss coupled with the fact that

they repeatedly requested the authorities to

initiate acquisition proceedings.

8. If the aforesaid judgments are read in their

entirety, it clearly emerges that land owners

cannot be deprived of their land, without following

due process of law. If it is so, ground raised by the

respondents that petitioners have made their land

available with consent, is of no consequence

rather, this court, having taken note of the fact that

the land of petitioners stands utilized for the

construction of road in question, is compelled to

agree with the submission of learned counsel for

the petitioners that her clients are entitled for

compensation qua the land utilized by respondents

for construction of road in question.

10. Admittedly, land of the petitioners stands

utilized for construction of road but till date, they

have not been paid any amount, which action of

the respondent-State certainly amounts to forcible

dispossession of the petitioners from their land,

which is violative of provision contained under Art.

300-A of the Constitution of India.

14. In case titled, State of Himachal Pradesh v.

Umed Ram Sharma (1986) 2 SCC 68, Hon’ble Apex

25 ( 2026:HHC:11550 )

Court has held that entire State of Himachal

Pradesh is a hilly area and without workable

roads, no communication is possible; every person

is entitled to life as enjoined in Article 21 of the

Constitution of India; every person has right under

Article 19 (1) (b) of the Constitution of India to

move freely, throughout the territory of India; for

the residents of hilly areas, access to road is access

to life itself. Stand taken by the respondents that

there was a policy for providing roads on demand

of residents as a favour to them on conditions that

they would not claim compensation, cannot be

sustained because such stand is violative of Article

300A of the Constitution of India.

15. In case titled Hari Krishna Mandir Trust v. State

of Maharashtra and others, 2020 9 SCC 356,

Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though right to

property is not a fundamental right, but it is still a

constitutional right under Article 300A of the

Constitution of India and also a human right; in

view of the mandate of Article 300A, no person can

be deprived of his property save by the authority of

law. No doubt, State possesses the power to take or

control the property of the owner of the land for

the benefit of public, but at the same time, it is

obliged to compensate the injury by making just

compensation.”

20. The Courts below, after appreciating the oral as

well as documentary evidence placed on record and on the

26 ( 2026:HHC:11550 )

basis of the title, decreed the suit as filed by the respondents

and have rightly came to the conclusion that they are

entitled for compensation with the direction to acquire the

portion of the suit land which has been utilized by the

present appellants for the construction of the road.

21. The Hon’ble Apex Court has repeatedly held

that no person can be deprived of his property without

adopting due process of law, therefore, under such

circumstances, the plea as set up by the appellants-State is

not tenable in the facts and circumstances of the case, once

they have utilized the land of the villagers without adopting

due process of law. Now the plea as raised by the present

appellants is not permissible that too at the stage of Regular

Second Appeal. There are concurrent findings of fact by the

Courts below.

22. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in catena of

judgments has held that the first appellate is the final court

of the fact. No doubt, second appellate court exercising the

power under Section 100 CPC can interference with the

findings of fact on limited grounds such as - (a) where the

finding is based on inadmissible evidence; (b) where it is in

ignorance of the relevant admissible evidence; (c) where it

27 ( 2026:HHC:11550 )

is based on misreading of evidence; (d) where it is perverse,

but that is not case in hand.

23. The Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with

scope of interference under Section 100 in Hero Vinoth

(minor) vs. Seshammal, (2006) 5 SCC 545 has held as under:

“18. It has been noted time and again that without

insisting for the statement of such a substantial

question of law in the memorandum of appeal and

formulating the same at the time of admission, the

High Courts have been issuing notices and

generally deciding the second appeals without

adhering to the procedure prescribed under Section

100 of the CPC. It has further been found in a

number of cases that no efforts are made to

distinguish between a question of law and a

substantial question of law. In exercise of the

powers under this section in several cases, the

findings of fact of the first appellate court are

found to have been disturbed. It has to be kept in

mind that the right of appeal is neither a natural

nor an inherent right attached to the litigation.

Being a substantive statutory right, it has to be

regulated in accordance with law in force at the

relevant time. The conditions mentioned in the

section must be strictly fulfilled before a second

appeal can be maintained and no court has the

power to add or to enlarge those grounds. The

second appeal cannot be decided on merely

28 ( 2026:HHC:11550 )

equitable grounds. The concurrent findings of facts

will not be disturbed by the High Court in exercise

of the powers under this section. Further, a

substantial question of law has to be distinguished

from a substantial question of fact. This Court in

Sir Chunilal V. Mehta and Sons Ltd. v. Century Spg.

& Mfg. Co. Ltd. (AIR 1962 SC 1314) held that : "The

proper test for determining whether a question of

law raised in the case is substantial would, in our

opinion, be whether it is of general public

importance or whether it directly and substantially

affects the rights of the parties and if so whether it

is either an open question in the sense that it is not

finally settled by this Court or by the Privy Council

or by the Federal Court or is not free from difficulty

or calls for discussion of alternative views. If the

question is settled by the highest court or the

general principles to be applied in determining the

question are well settled and there is a mere

question of applying those principles or that the

plea raised is palpably absurd the question would

not be a substantial question of law.

" 19. It is not within the domain of the High Court

to investigate the grounds on which the findings

were arrived at, by the last court of fact, being the

first appellate court. It is true that the lower

appellate court should not ordinarily reject

witnesses accepted by the trial court in respect of

credibility but even where it has rejected the

witnesses accepted by the trial court, the same is

29 ( 2026:HHC:11550 )

no ground for interference in second appeal when

it is found that the appellate court has given

satisfactory reasons for doing so. In a case where

from a given set of circumstances two inferences of

fact are possible, one drawn by the lower appellate

court will not be interfered by the High Court in

second appeal. Adopting any other approach is not

permissible. The High Court will, however,

interfere where it is found that the conclusions

drawn by the lower appellate court were erroneous

being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law

applicable or its settled position on the basis of

pronouncements made by the Apex Court, or was

based upon inadmissible evidence or arrived at by

ignoring material evidence. 20. to 22 xx xx xx xx

23. To be "substantial" a question of law must be

debatable, not previously settled by law of the land

or a binding precedent, and must have a material

bearing on the decision of the case, if answered

either way, insofar as the rights of the parties

before it are concerned. To be a question of law

"involving in the case" there must be first a

foundation for it laid in the pleadings and the

question should emerge from the sustainable

findings of fact arrived at by court of facts and it

must be necessary to decide that question of law

for a just and proper decision of the case. An

entirely new point raised for the first time before

the High Court is not a question involved in the

case unless it goes to the root of the matter. It will,

30 ( 2026:HHC:11550 )

therefore, depend on the facts and circumstance of

each case whether a question of law is a

substantial one and involved in the case, or not; the

paramount overall consideration being the need

for striking a judicious balance between the

indispensable obligation to do justice at all stages

and impelling necessity of avoiding prolongation

in the life of any lis.”

24. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Annamalai vs.

Vasanthi, 2025 INSC 1267, has held as follows:-

“16. Whether D-1 and D-2 were able to discharge

the aforesaid burden is a question of fact which

had to be determined by a court of fact after

appreciating the evidence available on record.

Under CPC, a first appellate court is the final court

of fact. No doubt, a second appellate court

exercising power(s) under Section 100 CPC can

interfere with a finding of fact on limited grounds,

such as, (a) where the finding is based on

inadmissible evidence; (b) where it is in ignorance

of relevant admissible evidence; (c) where it is

based on misreading of evidence; and (d) where it

is perverse. But that is not the case here.

17. In the case on hand, the first appellate court, in

paragraph 29 of its judgment, accepted the

endorsement (Exb. A-2) made on the back of a

registered document (Exb. A-1) after considering

the oral evidence led by the plaintiff-appellant and

the circumstance that signature(s)/thumbmark of

31 ( 2026:HHC:11550 )

D-1 and D-2 were not disputed, though claimed as

one obtained on a blank paper. The reasoning of

the first appellate court in paragraph 29 of its

judgment was not addressed by the High Court. In

fact, the High Court, in one line, on a flimsy

defense of use of a signed blank paper, observed

that genuineness of Exb. A-2 is not proved. In our

view, the High Court fell in error here. While

exercising powers under Section 100 CPC, it ought

not to have interfered with the finding of fact

returned by the first appellate court on this aspect;

more so, when the first appellate court had drawn

its conclusion after appreciating the evidence

available on record as also the circumstance that

signature(s)/thumbmark(s) appearing on the

document (Exb.A2) were not disputed. Otherwise

also, while disturbing the finding of the first

appellate court, the High Court did not hold that

the finding returned by the first appellate court is

based on a misreading of evidence, or is in

ignorance of relevant evidence, or is perverse.

Thus, there existed no occasion for the High Court,

exercising power under Section 100 CPC, to

interfere with the finding of the first appellate

court regarding payment of additional Rs. 1,95,000

to D-1 and D-2 over and above the sale

consideration fixed for the transaction. 18. Once the

finding regarding payment of additional sum of

Rs.1,95,000 to D-1 and D-2 recorded by the first

appellate court is sustained, there appears no

32 ( 2026:HHC:11550 )

logical reason to hold that the plaintiff

(Annamalai) was not ready and willing to perform

its part under the contract particularly when Rs.

4,70,000, out of total consideration of Rs.

4,80,000, was already paid and, over and above

that, additional sum of Rs.1,95,000 was paid in

lieu of demand made by D-1 & D-2. This we say

so, because an opinion regarding plaintiff’s

readiness and willingness to perform its part under

the contract is to be formed on the entirety of

proven facts and circumstances of a case including

conduct of the parties. The test is that the person

claiming performance must satisfy conscience of

the court that he has treated the contract subsisting

with preparedness to fulfill his obligation and

accept performance when the time for

performance arrives.”

25. No other point was raised by the learned

counsel for the parties.

26. Both the Courts below have rightly appreciated

the Point in controversy after considering the oral as well as

documentary evidence placed on record. No question of law

much less substantial question of law arises in the present

case.

27. In view of above, the present appeal being

devoid of any merit deserves to be dismissed. Ordered

33 ( 2026:HHC:11550 )

accordingly. Pending application(s), if any, also stands

disposed of.

(Romesh Verma)

Judge

10

th

April, 2026.

(veena)