2026:HHC:42849

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

Cr. Appeal No. 208 of 2015

Reserved on: 16.09.2026

Date of Decision: 01.10.2026

State of H.P. ...Appellant.

Versus

Narinder Singh ...Respondent.

Coram

Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.

Whether approved for reporting?

1

No.

For the Appellant/State : Mr Tarun Pathak, Deputy

Advocate General

For the respondent : Ms Sheetal Vyas, Advocate.

Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

The present appeal is directed against the judgment

dated 11.11.2014, passed by learned Special Judge, Bilaspur, H.P.,

District Bilaspur, H.P. (learned trial Court), vide which the

respondent (accused before learned trial Court) was acquitted of

charges framed against him. (The parties shall hereinafter be

referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the

learned Trial Court for convenience).

1

Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

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2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present

appeal are that the police presented a challan before the learned

Trial Court for the commission of offences punishable under

Sections 7 and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (PC Act).

It was asserted that the informant Sunil Kumar (PW-1) had taken

a contract for constructing the wall of Koldam–Nalagarh Tower

Line in the year 2005. He constructed the walls in Tower Line No.

20 and 22, and submitted the bills to Jyoti Company, which

submitted them to the office of Power Grid at Sundernagar.

Accused Narender Singh was posted as Executive Engineer

(EXEN), who used to pass the bills. The accused did not pass the

informant’s bills, and the informant met the accused many times

to get his bill passed. The accused demanded a bribe of

₹20,000/- for passing the bill. He asked the informant to visit

Swagat Hotel on 12.06.2010 with ₹20,000/-. The informant was

against the payment of the bribe. Hence, he filed a complaint

(Ext.PW1/A) before the police. The police registered the FIR

(Ext.PW-16/A). Dy.SP, Vinod Kumar (PW-16) constituted a trap

party consisting of the informant, Sunil Kumar (PW-1), Ram

Nath (PW-13), SI Lachman Dass, and Constable Dharam Singh

(PW-11). He took out phenolphthalein and sodium powders from

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the investigation kit. He procured the water in two clean glass

tumblers and added phenolphthalein powder in one tumbler and

sodium carbonate in another. The wate r did not change its

colour. When the mixtures were added, the colour changed to

pink. Vinod Kumar explained to the witnesses that if the

solutions of sodium carbonate and phenolphthalein are mixed,

the water changes its colour to pink. He retained the pink

solution in a nip/bottle, sealed it with seal impression ‘T’, and

seized it vide Memo (Ext.PW-1/B). He prepared a memorandum

of demonstration (Ext.PA). Sample seal (Ext.W1/C) was taken on

a separate piece of cloth. Informant Sunil Kumar produced

twenty currency notes of ₹1000/- each. These were treated with

phenolphthalein powder, and their serial numbers were noted in

the memo (Ext.PW-1/D). The currency notes were handed over to

the informant with a direction to give these notes on demand to

the accused and not to unnecessarily fiddle with the currency

notes. Witness Ram Nath (PW-13) was instructed to be a shadow

witness and signal the police party by moving his right hand

above his head after the money was paid to the accused .

Informant Sunil Kumar (PW-1) and Ram Nath (PW-13) went to

Sawagat Hotel Beri, where the money was to be paid. The police

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officials concealed themselves and waited for the signal. The

informant paid ₹20,000/- to the accused on his demand. The

shadow witness signalled the police. The police party went to the

Hotel. Constable Dharam Singh and HC Nishan t caught hold of

the wrists of the accused. Vinod Kumar introduced himself. He

associated Anoop Kumar (PW-2) as a witness. The hands of the

accused were washed in a Thali. The water remained colourless,

and when the solution of sodium carbonate was added to the

water, the water turned pink. The accused produced currency

notes of ₹20,000/-. Their serial numbers were tallied with the

serial numbers noted in the memo and were found to be the

same. These were put in a parcel, and the parcel was sealed with

seal ‘T’. The hand wash was preserved in a nip, and the nip was

also sealed with seal ‘T’. The purse of the accused and currency

notes were seized vide memo (Ext. PW1/E). The seal was handed

over to Ram Nath after use. Vinod Kumar (PW-16) investigated

the matter. He prepared the site plan (Ext.PW-16/B) and

deposited the case property with MHC. The informant produced

one memory card of a mobile phone on 29.06.2010, in which he

had recorded the conversation with the accused regarding the

demand of ₹20,000/- to pass the bill. The contents of the

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memory card were copied to a CD. The CD and memory card were

seized vide memo (Ext.PW -1/F). Vinod Kumar seized the

certificate (Ext.PW-3/A), bills regarding the payment of Sunil

Kumar (Ext.PW-3/B to Ext.PW-3/D), and the work order

(Ext.PW-3/E) issued to the informant vide memo (Ext.PW-3/F).

He also seized the call detail record (Ext.PW-5/A). He obtained

the appointment order (Ext.PW-7/A) of the accused, Narender

Kumar and his posting or der (Ext.PW-7/B) and terms and

conditions (Ext.PW-7/C). He recorded the statements of

witnesses as per their version. The memory card was sent to FSL,

where Dr Minakshi Mahajan (PW-14) examined it and issued a

report (Ext.PW-14/A). As per her opinion, the contents of the

memory card and CD were the same. The prosecution sanction

(Ext. PW-15/A) was obtained, and the challan was prepared and

presented before the learned trial Court after the completion of

the investigation.

3. The learned trial Court charged the accused with the

commission of offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13 (2) of

the PC Act, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.

4. The prosecution examined 16 witnesses to prove its

case. Informant Sunil Kumar (PW-1), Manager Anoop Kumar

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(PW-2), shadow witness Ram Nath (PW-13), Tara Chand (PW-

6), and Rohit (PW-12) did not support the prosecution case.

Rakesh Roshan (PW-3) produced the record. Varun Sharma (PW-

4) and HHC Dharam Singh (PW-11) witnessed the recoveries. SI

Sardar Singh (PW-5) collected the records. Pritam Singh (PW-7)

proved the service record of the accused. Nishant Dabra (PW-8)

is the witness to the recovery of the memory card and its transfer

to the CD. HHC Sohan Lal (PW-9) carried the case property to

RFSL, Gutkar. Sita Ram (PW-10) carried the CD and the memory

card to the FSL, Junga. Dr Minakshi Mahajan (PW-14) analysed

the memory card and CD. V. M. kaul (PW-15) accorded the

prosecution sanction. Vinod Kumar (PW-16) investigated the

matter.

5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section

313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure ( CrPC), denied the

prosecution case in its entirety. He stated that he was alone and

the police officials had introduced themselves. The witnesses had

vested interests. He is innocent. He did not produce any evidence

in his defence.

6. The learned trial Court held that the prosecution is

required to prove the demand and the acceptance; mere recovery

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of money without any demand or acceptance is not sufficient to

prove the prosecution case. All the witnesses, except the official

witnesses, have not supported the prosecution case. The

statements of the informant and shadow witness are not

sufficient to prove the demand and the acceptance of the money.

The informant has no t stated that he had recorded the

conversation between him and the accused , and there is no

evidence to establish that the voice in the recording was that of

the accused and the informant. The payment for the construction

work of Tower Nos. 20 and 22 had already been received by Jyoti

Structures before 2010, and the whole of the prosecution case

that the accused had demanded the money for passing the bills

became suspicious. Hence, the learned trial Court acquitted the

accused of the charged offences.

7. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the

learned trial Court, the State has filed the present appeal

asserting that the learned trial Court had failed to appreciate the

evidence in its proper perspective. The statements of prosecution

witnesses were discarded without an y sufficient reason. The

informant admitted his signatures on the complaint and the

various steps of the trap. The official witnesses proved the

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prosecution version. Therefore, it was prayed that the present

appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned trial

Court be set aside.

8. I have heard Mr Tarun Pathak, learned Deputy

Advocate General, for the appellant/State and Ms Sheetal Vyas.

learned counsel for the respondent/ accused.

9. Mr Tarun Pathak, learned Deputy Advocate General,

for the appellant/State, submitted that the learned trial Court

erred in acquitting the accused. The statements of official

witnesses corroborated each other, and the learned trial Court

erred in acquitting the accused on the ground that the informant

and the shadow witness had not supported the prosecution

version. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed

and the judgment passed by the learned trial court be set aside.

10. Ms Sheetal Vyas, l earned counsel for the

respondent/accused, submitted that the prosecution is required

to prove the demand and the acceptance. The informant and the

shadow witness have not supported the prosecution version. The

learned trial Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting

the accused, and this Court should not interfere with the

reasonable view of the learned trial Court even if another view is

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possible. Therefore, she prayed that the present appeal be

dismissed.

11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions

made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

12. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment

of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

Sanjay Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1373, that the

Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal only if it is

impossible, perverse, wholly unsustainable, or manifestly illegal.

It was observed:

Scope of interference with an acquittal:

26. At the outset, it is necessary to remind ourselves of

the settled principles governing interference with an order

of acquittal. An accused is presumed innocent until proven

guilty. When a court of competent jurisdiction acquits the

accused, the presumption of innocence is not weakened

but reinforced. Where such acquittal is affirmed by the

High Court, the caution to be exercised by this Court under

Article 136 is even greater.

27. In Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh (1973) 2 SCC

808: 1973 SCC (Cri) 1048, this Court explained the golden

thread running through criminal jurisprudence in the

following words:

“25. Another golden thread which runs through the web

of the administration of justice in criminal cases is that if

two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case,

one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his

innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused

should be adopted. This principle has a special relevance in

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cases wherein the guilt of the accused is sought to be

established by circumstantial evidence. The rule has

accordingly been laid down that unless the evidence

adduced in the case is consistent only with the hypothesis

of the guilt of the accused and is inconsistent with that of

his innocence, the Court should refrain from recording a

finding of guilt of the accused. It is also an accepted rule

that in case the Court entertains reasonable doubt

regarding the guilt of the accused, the accused must have

the benefit of that doubt. Of course, the doubt regarding the

guilt of the accused should be reasonable; it is not the

doubt of a mind which is either so vacillating that it is

incapable of reaching a firm conclusion or so timid that it is

hesitant and afraid to take things to their natural

consequences. The rule regarding the benefit of doubt also

does not warrant acquittal of the accused by resort to

surmises, conjectures or fanciful considerations. As

mentioned by us recently in the case of State of Punjab v.

Jagir Singh, a criminal trial is not like a fairy tale wherein

one is free to give flight to one's imagination and fantasy.

It concerns itself with the question as to whether the

accused arraigned at the trial is guilty of the offence with

which he is charged. Crime is an event in real life and is the

product of the interplay of different human emotions. In

arriving at the conclusion about the guilt of the accused

charged with the commission of a crime, the Court has to

judge the evidence by the yardstick of probabilities,

intrinsic worth and the animus of witnesses. Every case in

the final analysis would have to depend upon its own facts.

Although the benefit of every reasonable doubt should be

given to the accused, the Courts should not at the same

time reject evidence which is ex facie trustworthy on

grounds which are fanciful or in the nature of conjectures.”

28. The decision in Kali Ram (supra) further cautions

that wrongful acquittal and wrongful conviction do not

stand on the same footing, for conviction of an innocent

person causes grave injustice and shakes public

confidence in the administration of criminal justice. The

rule of benefit of doubt, therefore, is not a technical rule; it

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is a substantive safeguard flowing from the presumption

of innocence.

29. In Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2008) 10 SCC

450 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 60, this Court reiterated the limited

scope of interference with acquittals. This Court observed:

“75. The Trial Court has the advantage of watching

the demeanour of the witnesses who have given

evidence; therefore, the appellate court should be slow

to interfere with the decisions of the Trial Court. An

acquittal by the Trial Court should not be interfered

with unless it is totally perverse or wholly

unsustainable.”

30. The decision in Ghurey Lal (supra) also crystallised

certain propositions: first, there is a double presumption

of innocence in favour of an acquitted accused; secondly, if

two views are possible, the view favourable to the accused

must prevail; thirdly, though the appellate court has the

power to reappreciate evidence, it should interfere only

when the acquittal is manifestly illegal, perverse or results

in miscarriage of justice; and fourthly, due weight must be

given to the Trial Court's findings, particularly because

the trial judge had the advantage of observing the

demeanour of witnesses.

31. In Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415 :

(2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325, this Court held that though the

appellate court has full power to review and reappreciate

the evidence, the presumption of innocence is

strengthened by an order of acquittal. It was held that

when two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis

of evidence on record, the appellate court should not

disturb the finding of acquittal.

32. The same principle was restated in Mrinal Das v.

State of Tripura (2011) 9 SCC 479, wherein this Court held

that an order of acquittal is to be interfered with only

when there are compelling and substantial reasons for

doing so. If two reasonable views are possible on the basis

of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not

disturb the finding of acquittal.

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33. Therefore, the question before us is not whether

another view on the evidence is possible. The question is

whether the view taken by the Trial Court and affirmed by

the High Court is impossible, perverse, wholly

unsustainable, or manifestly illegal. Having examined the

record, we are unable to hold so.

13. The informant, Sunil Kumar (PW-1), stated that the

accused was the General Manager at Sundernagar and he used to

pass the bill. The informant had submitted the bill to Jyoti

Company. He approached the Jyoti Company's officials, and they

told him that they had no payment to make. He knew Constable

Rajender and told him about the non-payment, who assured him

that he would get the money released. The accused was not

known to him, and had not demanded any money . The

informant was permitted to be cross-examined. He denied that

the accused had demanded money for passing the bill and that he

(the informant) had reported the matter to the police. He denied

that the police had constituted a trap party. He also denied that

he had visited the Sawagat Hotel and handed over the money to

the accused. He denied that he had recorded the conversation

between him and the accused and that he had handed over the

memory card to the police. He denied the previous statement

recorded by the police. Thus, it is apparent that he has not

supported the prosecution version.

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14. Ram Nath (PW-13) was a shadow witness. He stated

that he was taking tea in Hotel Swagat at Beri. The accused came

and placed an order for tea. A person came and started talking to

the accused. He could not hear the conversation. The person was

offering money to the accused, but the accused was not accepting

the money. 5-6 persons came inside the hotel, and the person

handed over the money to them . Those persons disclosed that

they were police officials. No demonstration was given in his

presence. He was permitted to be cross-examined. He denied that

he was associated as a shadow witness and was asked to spring

the trap by giving the signal to the police. He denied that the

police had given the demonstrati on. He denied that the

informant had paid the money to the accused and that he had

signalled the police. He denied that the police caught hold of the

accused. He denied the previous statement recorded by the

police.

15. Therefore, it is apparent that both these witnesses

have not supported the prosecution case. Thus, the learned Trial

Court had rightly held that the prosecution had failed to establish

the demand and acceptance by the accused. It was laid down by

the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State through the Central Bureau of

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Investigation Vs. Dr Anup Kumar Srivastava, 2017(15) SCC 560, that

demand and acceptance are essential to prove offences under

Section 7 and 13 (1)(d) of the PC Act. It was observed: -

“7. The essential ingredients of Section 7 are:

(i) that the person accepting the gratification should be a

public servant;

(ii) that he should accept the gratification for himself and

the gratification should be as a motive or reward for doing

or forbearing to do any official act or for showing or

forbearing to show, in the exercise of his official function,

favour or disfavour to any person.

8. Insofar as Section 13 (1) (d) of the Act is concerned, its

essential ingredients are:

(i) that he should have been a public servant;

(ii) that he should have used corrupt or illegal means or

otherwise abused his position as such a public servant; and

(iii) that he should have obtained a valuable thing or

pecuniary advantage for himself or for any other person.

9. In the case of C.K. Damodaran Nair v. Government of India 1997

(9) SCC 477, this Court had an occasion to consider the word

"obtained" used in Section 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of

Corruption Act, 1947 (now Section 13(1)(d) of the Act, 1988), and

it was held:

"12. The position will, however, be different so far as an

offence under Section 5(1) (d) read with Section 5(2) of the

Act is concerned. For such an offence, the prosecution has

to prove that the accused "obtained" the valuable thing or

pecuniary advantage by corrupt or illegal means or by

otherwise abusing his position as a public servant and that

too without the aid of the statutory presumption under

Section 4(1) of the Act as it is available only in respect of

offences under Section 5(1)(a) and (b) -- and not under

Section 5(1)(c), (d) or (e) of the Act. "Obtain" means to

secure or gain (something) as the result of request or

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effort (Shorter Oxford Dictionary). In case of obtainment,

the initiative vests in the person who receives, and in that

context, a demand or request from him will be a primary

requisite for an offence under Section 5(1) (d) of the Act,

unlike an offence under Section 161 IPC, which, as noticed

above, can be established by proof of either "acceptance"

or "obtainment."

10. The legal position is no more res integra that the

primary requisite of an offence under Section 13(1)(d) of

the Act is proof of a demand or request of a valuable thing

or pecuniary advantage from the public servant. In other

words, in the absence of proof of demand or request from the

public servant for a valuable thing or pecuniary advantage,

the offence under Section 13(1) (d) cannot be held to be

established.” (Emphasis supplied).

16. A similar view was taken in Aman Bhatia v. State (NCT

of Delhi), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1013, wherein it was observed:

52. It is well-settled that mere recovery of tainted money,

by itself, is insufficient to establish the charges against an

accused under the PC Act. To sustain a conviction under

Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of the Act, respectively, it must be

proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the public servant

voluntarily accepted the money, knowing it to be a bribe.

The courts have consistently reiterated that the demand

for a bribe is sine qua non for establishing an offence under

Section 7 of the PC Act.

53. A five-Judge Bench of this Court in Neeraj Dutta v. State

(Government of NCT of Delhi), (2023) 4 SCC 731 ,

categorically held that an offer by the bribe-giver and the

demand by the public servant have to be proved by the

prosecution as a fact in issue for conviction under Sections

7 and 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the PC Act. Mere acceptance of

illegal gratification without proof of offer by the bribe-

giver and demand by the public servant would not make an

offence under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the PC

Act. The relevant observations are reproduced herein

below:

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“88.4. (d) In order to prove the fact in issue, namely,

the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by

the public servant, the following aspects have to be

borne in mind:

(i) If there is an offer to pay by the bribe-giver

without there being any demand from the public

servant, and the latter simply accepts the offer

and receives the illegal gratification, it is a case of

acceptance as per Section 7 of the Act. In such a

case, there need not be a prior demand by the

public servant.

(ii) On the other hand, if the public servant

makes a demand and the bribe-giver accepts the

demand and tenders the demanded gratification,

which in turn is received by the public servant, it

is a case of obtainment. In the case of

obtainment, the prior demand for illegal

gratification emanates from the public servant.

This is an offence under Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and

(ii) of the Act.

(iii) In both cases of (i) and (ii) above, the offer by

the bribe-giver and the demand by the public

servant, respectively, have to be proved by the

prosecution as a fact in issue. In other words, mere

acceptance or receipt of an illegal gratification

without anything more would not make it an

offence under Section 7 or Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and

(ii), respectively, of the Act. Therefore, under Section

7 of the Act, in order to bring home the offence, there

must be an offer which emanates from the bribe-

giver and is accepted by the public servant, which

would make it an offence. Similarly, a prior

demand by the public servant when accepted by

the bribe-giver and in turn there is a payment

made which is received by the public servant,

would be an offence of obtainment under

Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.” (Emphasis

supplied)

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54. It was further explained by this Court in P.

Satyanarayana Murthy v. State of A.P., (2015) 10 SCC 152, as

follows:

“23. The proof of demand of illegal gratification, thus, is

the gravamen of the offence under Sections 7 and

13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act and in the absence thereof,

unmistakably the charge therefor would fail. Mere

acceptance of any amount allegedly by way of illegal

gratification or recovery thereof, dehors the proof of

demand, ipso facto, would thus not be sufficient to bring

home the charge under these two sections of the Act. As a

corollary, failure of the prosecution to prove the demand

for illegal gratification would be fatal and mere recovery of

the amount from the person accused of the offence under

Section 7 or 13 of the Act would not entail his conviction

thereunder.” (Emphasis supplied)

55. From the above exposition of law, it may be safely

concluded that mere possession and recovery of tainted

currency notes from a public servant, in the absence of

proof of demand, is not sufficient to establish an offence

under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of the PC Act, respectively.

Consequently, without evidence of demand for illegal

gratification, it cannot be said that the public servant used

corrupt or illegal means, or abused his position, to obtain

any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage in terms of

Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act.

56. The present case is not one of an “offer to pay by the

bribe-giver” where, in the absence of any demand from the

public servant, the mere acceptance of illegal gratification

would constitute an offence under Section 7 of the PC Act.

The expression “offer” indicates that there is a

conveyance of an intention to give, which must be

communicated and understood by the recipient, leading to

the meeting of minds. Consequently, the offer is accepted.

For such an acceptance to constitute an offence under

Section 7, there must be clear and cogent evidence

establishing that the public servant was aware of the offer

and accepted it voluntarily, knowing it to be illegal

gratification. In other words, even where there is no

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express demand, the bribe-giver and the bribe-taker must

be shown to have been ad idem as regards the factum of

the offer of a bribe.

17. In the present case, the informant and the shadow

witness have not deposed about the dema nd and the essential

ingredients of the charged offences were not proved.

18. It was submitted that the recovery of the currency

notes would shift the burden to the accused to rebut the

presumption contained in Section 20 of the PC Act. This

submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by the Hon’ble

Supreme Court in Paritala Sudhakar v. State of Telangana, 2025

SCC OnLine SC 1072, that the presumption under Section 20 of the

PC Act will not be triggered without the evidence of the demand.

It was observed:

“21. As far as the submission of the State is that the

presumption under Section 20 of the Act, as it then was,

would operate against the Appellant is concerned, our

analysis supra would indicate that the factum of demand,

in the backdrop of an element of animus between the

Appellant and the complainant, is not proved. In such

circumstances, the presumption under Section 20 of the

Act would not militate against the Appellant, in terms of

the pronouncement in Om Parkash v. State of Haryana,

(2006) 2 SCC 250:

‘22. In view of the aforementioned discrepancies in the

prosecution case, we are of the opinion that the defence

story set up by the appellant cannot be said to be wholly

improbable. Furthermore, it is not the case where the

burden of proof was on the accused in terms of Section

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20 of the Act. Even otherwise, where demand has not been

proved, Section 20 will also have no application. (Union of

India v. Purnandu Biswas [(2005) 12 SCC 576: (2005) 8

Scale 246] and T. Subramanian v. State of T.N. [(2006) 1

SCC 401: (2006) 1 Scale 116])’ (emphasis supplied)”

19. In the present case, there is no satisfactory evidence

of the demand, and no advantage can be derived from the

provisions of Section 20 of the PC Act.

20. As per the prosecution, the informant had submitted

the bills to Jyoti Construction, who had engaged him as a Sub-

Contractor. The accused was to pass the bill of Jyoti Construction

regarding the Tower Nos. 20 and 22. Rakesh Roshan (PW-3)

produced the record related to Tower Nos. 20 and 22. He stated

that the payment of Tower No. 22, amounting to ₹2,57,336/-,

had already been made to the informant against the bill, and the

payment of Towe r No. 20, amounting to ₹1,91,840/-, was

pending, which could not be made because of the shortage of

funds. He was permitted to be cross-examined, and he denied

the previous statement recorded by the police. He stated in his

cross-examination by learned counsel for the defence that full

payment for the construction work of Tower No. 20 and 22 ha d

already been received by Jyoti Co. Ltd. before May 2010. He

admitted that there is no financial control of the Power Grid

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Corporation regarding the further disbursement of payment by

Jyoti Construction Company to the Sub-Contractor.

21. Learned trial Court had rightly pointed out that the

statement of this witness made the prosecution case highly

suspect. The payment was made to Jyoti Construction Company.

Therefore, the accused had no justification to demand the money

from the informant, and the informant also had no justification

to pay money to the accused.

22. It was laid down in Kanhaiyalal v. State of Rajasthan,

1998 SCC OnLine Raj 342: 1998 Cri LJ 3155, that when no work was

pending with the accused, no bribe could have been given to him.

It was observed at page 3159:

“13…It is proved by this negative evidence that no such

verification was made by the patwari. Hence, a form to

obtain a subsidy for Rukmani could not have been and was

not presented to the accused appellant. So no work was

pending, and the demand of Rs. 100/- could not have been

made by the accused appellant. When it is proved beyond

doubt from the record that no such application form was

submitted, it cannot be held that any work was pending with

the accused and any demand could be made by him in relation

to the sanction to be made with regard to the deepening of the

well. P.W. 1 Radhey Shyam has himself admitted that he did

not pay the money for the purpose. According to him, instead,

the amount was paid to the accused appellant for the work

which had already been done and for which there is no charge

against the accused appellant.” (Emphasis supplied)

21

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23. In Suryabhan v. State of Maharashtra, 1994 SCC OnLine

Bom 428: (1996) 1 Bom CR 46: 1995 Cri LJ 107 , mutation was

already entered by the accused, which was certified and approved

before the alleged demand of a bribe. It was held that the

essential ingredient that the money was demanded as a motive or

reward for doing an official act was missing. It was observed at

page 52:

“12...The copy of the extract of the mutation register (Exh.

67) shows that the mutation has been effected in the

mutation register on 2-1-1986 itself. The said mutation

was made on 2 -1-1986, and it is recorded that the

concerned persons were intimated on 2 -1-1986. It is

further apparent from the said document that the

mutation, which was effected in the names of Shankar

Ingole (P.W. 11), Dayaram Ingole (P.W. 7) and Bhaiya

Ingole (P.W. 9), was certified by the Revenue Inspector on

31-1-1986. Both Shankar Ingole (P.W. 11) as well as his

brothers Bhaiya Ingole (P.W. 9) and Dayaram (P.W. 7) are

shown to be present at the time of verification and

certification by the Revenue Inspector. It is recorded in the

said register that the persons named Bhaiya (P.W. 9),

Dayaram (P.W. 7) and Shankar (P.W. 11) were present and,

on verification of the will deed, they admitted that

Bhagirathibai has died. On that, the mutation which was

effected on 2-1-1986 by the accused was certified on 31-1-

1986. When the mutation was effected on 2-1-1986 by the

accused - appellant and it was duly certified by the

Revenue Inspector on 31 -1-1986 in the presence of

Shankar Ingole (P.W. 11), Dayaram (P.W. 7) and Bhaiya

Ingole (P.W. 9), it becomes unbelievable and, in any case,

highly doubtful that the accused demanded the sum of Rs.

200/- in the month of May, 1986. It will be further seen

from the statement of P.W. 7 Dayaram Ingole that the

agricultural field was partitioned amongst the brothers,

22

2026:HHC:42849

namely, Dayaram (P.W. 7), Bhaiya (P.W. 9) and Shankar

(P.W. 11) in the month of February 1986. It is thus clear

that after the mutation was effected on 2-1-1986 and duly

certified on 31-1-1986, the partition of agricultural land

took place between the three brothers and thus it can be

inferred that Shankar Ingole (P.W. 11), Bhaiya Ingole (P.W.

9) and Dayaram Ingole (P.W. 7) had knowledge that the

mutation was effected on 2-1-1986 and was duly certified

on 31-1-1986 by the Revenue Inspector. The statement of

these three brothers, namely, P.W. 7 Dayaram, P.W. 9

Bhaiya and P.W. 11 Shankar, to the contrary that they were

not present on 31-1-1986 before the Revenue Inspector

cannot be believed. This is further fortified from the fact

that on 5-5-1986 one of the brothers Bhaiya (P.W. 9) has

sold his share of agricultural land to Ishwar Raut by the

registered sale-deed (Exh. 98). If the mutation had not

been effected on 2-1-1986 and certified on 31-1-1986 and

was not in the knowledge of these three brothers as

alleged, Bhaiya could not have sold his share on 5-5-1986

much before the date of incident on 16-5-1986. From this

evidence, it can be inferred that the prosecution's case

that Rs. 200/- was demanded by the accused - appellant

from Madhukar Ingole (P.W. 1) as gratification , as a

motive or reward for effecting the entries in the mutation

register in favour of Shankar and his brothers does not

inspire confidence and cannot be believed. On the face of

the facts that the mutation was already effected by the accused

- appellant on 2-1-1986, which was certified by the Revenue

Inspector on 31-1-1986 and the post conduct of Shankar

Ingole and his brothers of partition of their respective shares

in the month of February, 1986 and the sale of share by one of

the brothers Bhaiya (P.W. 9), the prosecution story about the

demand of Rs. 200/- by the accused - appellant from

Madhukar Ingole (P.W. 1) as gratification as a motive or

reward for effecting entries in the mutation register in favour

of Shankar and his brothers becomes highly improbable and

can be said to be suffering from inherent improbabilities.

There is no reason to doubt the correctness and

genuineness of the entries recorded in the mutation

23

2026:HHC:42849

register on 2-1-1986 and 31-1-1986 respectively….”

(Emphasis supplied)

24. Similar is the judgment in Chandrasen v. State of

Maharashtra, 2011 SCC OnLine Bom 277, wherein it was observed:

“36. Therefore, on going through the entire evidence

brought on record and more particularly, the evidence of

P.W.1 Laxman, complainant, it is clear that the

complainant and his two sons were released on bail at the

police station and on the next day their bail was accepted

in Chapter Case in Tahsil Office at Beed. This fact is also

corroborated by P.W.2 Vasant, who has proved Exh. 19/1 to

19/7. These documents would show that in Chapter Case

No. 1/91, the complainant and his sons were released on

furnishing a P.R. bond of Rs. 500/- on 2.1.1991 and in

Chapter Case No. 3/91, they were released on furnishing a

P.R. bond of Rs. 2000/- on 4.1.1991 by accepting surety.

Therefore, P.W.1 himself has stated that they were

released on bail six days prior to the date of the trap.

Therefore, one of the essential ingredients of section 7 of

the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, that the amount of

Rs. 300/- was received by the accused/appellant from

Laxman Arey P.W.1 as gratification as a motive or reward

for releasing him on bail, has not been proved by the

prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt.”

25. In S.D. Amalraj vs. State Cr.A. no. 490 of 2002, decided

on 25.1.2008 (Madras High Court), the order was passed and

placed on file for issuing a licence. It was held that the demand

for a bribe for issuing the licence was not probable. It was

observed:

“10. When the accused has already passed an order to issue

a licence and sent the file to A.4 clerk even on 24.8.1998,

nothing remains to be done by the accused thereafter. It is

the duty of A.4 Clerk to wait for three days or one week;

24

2026:HHC:42849

whether the applicant (P. W.2) comes and gets the licence

or otherwise, A.4 Clerk should have sent the licence to the

applicant by post. P. W.1 Collector himself has admitted as

follows: -... (vernacular matter omitted).

11. Therefore, the payment of a bribe after completion of

the official favour is a serious lacuna in the prosecution

case, as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of U. P.

Vs. Jagdish Singh Malhotra, 2003 SCC(Cri) 1008. In the

present case, on the facts, there is no official favour

persisted at all when already the appellant has ordered for

the issue of a licence.

12. In Ram Smugh Mourya Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh,

2002 2 CurCriR 169, the Madhya Pradesh High Court has

held as follows:-

"17. In the present case, the purpose for which the

money was demanded as illegal gratification by the

appellant was already served much prior to the

alleged demand of Rs. 100/- to the appellant for

releasing the complainant and his son Mohan.

Complainant Rajaram was also given notice for

appearance before the Court for filing the charge

sheet. In the circumstances, it would be difficult to

believe that the appellant was demanding money for

the work which had already been done. If the money

was not paid by the complainant, after his release on

surety, Deokaran (PW.5) was never called and asked

for the payment of money because, as per the

prosecution case, on his assurance, the complainant

Rajaram and his son were released on bail. This fact

is also tilting the balance of innocence in favour of

the appellant. "

13. In S. Suryanarayana Rao Vs. State of Karnataka, 2000

CrLJ 2377, the Karnataka High Court has held as follows:-

6……Unless there is corroboration by oth er

materials, it is difficult to hold that the prosecution

has established beyond a reasonable doubt that

there was demand and acceptance. Moreover,

another hole in the jacket of the prosecution is that

25

2026:HHC:42849

the file was left on 22.7.1986 itself with P. W2 to

conduct the survey. In view of these facts and

circumstances of the case, naturally, the doubt

arises as to the genuineness of the prosecution's

story. Hence, the benefit of the doubt is extended to

the appellant"

14 In M. K. Shanmugasundaram Vs. The Inspector of Police, V

and AC, Salem, 2007 1 LW(Cri) 199, this court held that.

"Like every other criminal case, a case of bribery is

subject to the rule that the accused is presumed

innocent and that the burden to discharge the said

innocence is paramountly on the prosecution.

However strong the suspicion against the accused, if

every reasonable possibility of innocence has not

been excluded, he is entitled to an acquittal. If,

therefore, the evidence regarding the demand and

acceptance of a bribe leaves room for doubt and does

not displace the presence of innocence wholly, the

charge cannot be said to have been established".

26. Similar is the judgment in Basavaraj I. v. State of

Karnataka, 2025 SCC OnLine Kar 1084, wherein it was observed:

“13. According to the case of PW 1, on 23-3-2000, he

visited the appellant's office to request her to issue a final

assessment order. According to his case, at that time,

initially, the appellant reiterated her demand of Rs. 3000.

But she scaled it down to Rs. 2000. Admittedly, on 15-3-

2000, the said Society was served with a notice informing

the said Society that an exemption had been granted from

payment of commercial tax to the said Society. Therefore,

the said Society was not liable to pay any tax for the year

1996-1997. The issue of the final assessment order was

only a procedural formality. Therefore, the prosecution's

case about the demand for a bribe made on 23-3-2000 by

the appellant appears to be highly doubtful.”

26

2026:HHC:42849

27. This position was reiterated in State of Lokayuktha

Police v. C.B. Nagaraj, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1175, wherein it was

observed:

“25. It is pertinent to note that till 05.02.2007, when the

Respondent had conducted the physical/spot inspection,

there was not even a whisper of there being any demand

for a bribe. Moreover, when the Complainant went back to

the Respondent's office at 5: 30 PM with the money, the

prosecution case itself, as per the deposition of its

witnesses, makes it clear that the Respondent had

informed the Complainant that he had already forwarded

the concerned file. Thus, if the same is accepted, there was

no occasion for the Complainant to go ahead with paying

the amount, which he claims to be in the nature of a bribe

demanded by the Respondent, after the work for which the

bribe was purportedly sought had already been done. The

observation of the High Court to this extent is correct that

just because money changed hands, in cases like the

present, it cannot be ipso facto presumed that the same

was pursuant to a demand, for the law requires that for

conviction under the Act, an entire chain, beginning from

demand, acceptance, and recovery, has to be completed. In

the case at hand, when the initial demand itself is

suspicious, even if the two other components- payment

and recovery can be held to have been proved, the chain

would not be complete. A penal law has to be strictly

construed [Md. Rahim Ali v. State of Assam, 2024 SCC

OnLine SC 1695 @ Paragraph 45 and Jay Kishan v. State of

U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 296 @ Paragraph 24]. While we

will revert to the presumption under Section 20 of the Act

hereinafter, there is no cavil that while a reverse onus

under a specific statute can be placed on an accused, even

then, there cannot be a presumption which casts an

uncalled-for onus on the accused. Chandrasha (supra)

would not apply as demand has not been proven. In

Paritala Sudhakar v. State of Telangana, 2025 SCC OnLine SC

1072, it was stated thus:

27

2026:HHC:42849

‘21. As far as the submission of the State is that the

presumption under Section 20 of the Act, as it then was,

would operate against the Appellant is concerned, our

analysis supra would indicate that the factum of demand,

in the backdrop of an element of animus between the

Appellant and the complainant, is not proved. In such

circumstances, the presumption under Section 20 of the Act

would not militate against the Appellant, in terms of the

pronouncement in Om Parkash v. State of Haryana,

(2006) 2 SCC 250:

‘22. In view of the aforementioned discrepancies in the

prosecution case, we are of the opinion that the defence

story set up by the appellant cannot be said to be wholly

improbable. Furthermore, it is not the case where the

burden of proof was on the accused in terms of Section

20 of the Act. Even otherwise, where demand has not

been proved, Section 20 will also have no application.

(Union of India v. Purnandu Biswas [(2005) 12 SCC 576

: (2005) 8 Scale 246] and T. Subramanian v. State of

T.N. [(2006) 1 SCC 401 : (2006) 1 Scale 116])’ (emphasis

supplied) (emphasis in bold is original, underlining

is ours)

28. A heavy reliance was placed upon the conversation

stated to have taken place between the informant and the

accused. The informant has not said anything about this

conversation. The learned Trial Court had rightly pointed out

that the voices and the conversation were not identified, and the

conversation cannot be connected to the accused.

29. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had taken a

reasonable view while acquitting the accused , and no

28

2026:HHC:42849

interference is required with a reasonable view of the learned

Trial Court even if another view is possible.

30. In view of the above, the present appeal fails, and it is

dismissed, so also the pending applications, if any.

31. In view of the pr ovisions of Section 437-A of the

Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik

Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the respondent is directed to furnish

personal bonds in the sum of ₹50,000/- with one surety in the

like amount to the satisfaction of the learned trial Court, which

shall be effective for six months with a stipulation that in the

event of a Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment

or on grant of the leave, the respondent on receipt of notice

thereof shall appear before the Hon'ble Supreme Court

32. The present appeal stands disposed of, so also the

pending miscellaneous application(s), if any

33. A copy of the judgment, along with the record of the

learned trial Court, be sent back forthwith.

(Rakesh Kainthla)

Judge

01

st

October, 2026

(Ravinder)