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CASE NO.:

Special Leave Petition (crl.) 1295 of 1997

Special Leave Petition (crl.) 1603 of 1997

PETITIONER:

STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ORS.

Vs.

RESPONDENT:

SHRI RAM SINGH

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 01/02/2000

BENCH:

K.T. Thomas & R.P. Sethi.

JUDGMENT:

SETHI,J.

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Heard. Leave granted.

Relying upon the judgment of this Court in State of

Haryana & Ors. vs. Bhajan Lal & Ors. [1992 (1) Suppl.

SCC 335] and exercising powers under Section 482 of the

Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court of Madhya Pradesh

vide the judgment impugned in these appeals quashed the

investigations and consequent proceedings against the

respondents initiated, conducted and concluded by the police

under Sections 13(1)(e) and Section 13(2) of the Prevention

of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as the

Act). The Court found that for the offence punishable

under Section 13(1)(e) of the Act the investigation had not

been conducted by an authorised officer in terms of Section

17 of the Act. It was observed: It is of utmost

importance that investigation into criminal offence must

always be free from any objectionable features or

infirmities which may legitimately lead to the grievance of

the accused that the work of investigation is carried on

unfairly and with any ulterior motive. The prosecution of

the accused on the basis of investigation by a person who

had no legal authority to investigate cannot be allowed:

In order to appreciate the legal controversy, it is

proper to refer to some of the facts regarding which there

does not appear to be any dispute at this stage in these

appeals.

Regarding Ram Singh respondent, a secret information is

stated to have been received on 4.7.1992 alleging that when

he was a Sub Inspector, Excise and District Excise Officer,

he had acquired properties disproportionate to his known

sources of income. On verification it was found that he had

earned movable and immovable properties allegedly much more

disproportionate to his known sources of income during the

check period commencing from 1.1.1982 to 4.8.1992.

Resultantly Crime No.103/92 under Sections 13(1)(e) and

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13(2) of the Act was registered against him. On 4.8.1992 a

raid was conducted by Shri B.N. Bhatia, Dy.Superintendent

of Police, SPE, Lokayukt Office, Gwalior after obtaining a

search warrant from the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gwalior

and a seizure memo was prepared with respect to recovery of

movable articles from the possession of his son, namely,

Pratap Singh, Advocate. On 7.8.1992 another raid was

conducted by Shri C.P.S. Chaturvedi, Dy.Supdt. of Police,

Lokayukt Office, Gwalior at the Government Quarter allotted

to the said respondent at Vikas Nagar, Betul, under a search

warrant dated 3.8.1992. Some documents, one transistor, one

pistol and diaries were recovered in the raid. The

respondent Shri Ram Singh moved Criminal Misc.No.143 of 1993

before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Gwalior praying

for anticipatory bail which was allowed. Vide letter dated

14.12.1993, the Additional Excise Commissioner, Madhya

Pradesh, Gwalior directed the respondent to submit the

statement on the prescribed form Nos.1, 2 and 3 to the

Lokayukt Gwalior. The statements were submitted to Shri

P.S. Sisodia, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Lokayukt

Office, Moti Mahal, Gwalior on 16.5.1994. It was mentioned

in the statement that the total income of the respondent

from all sources was Rs.4,19,000/- and expenditure was

Rs.2,58,700/- which show the savings of Rs.1,60,300/-. He

declared that his assets were not disproportionate to the

known sources of his income. After further information was

submitted by the respondent, a further enquiry was made on

5.6.1995 with respect to his bank account. In May, 1996 the

respondent filed the Petition No.2481/96 under Section 482

of the Criminal Procedure Code praying for quashing the

proceedings relating to Crime No.143/93 and charge-sheet

thereof filed against him. He contended that the entire

search and seizure made by Special Police Establishment was

illegal, malafide and without any basis. It was further

contended that the search was conducted without jurisdiction

and was in contravention of the provisions of Section 17 of

the Act. He alleged that the investigation was malicious

inasmuch as the accounts of his family members had illegally

been freezed. The State in its reply filed in the High

Court alleged that after investigation it had transpired

that during the check period, the respondent had a total

income of Rs.3,13,470.68 from all known sources and his

expenditure being Rs.16,25,723.49. Thus the

disproportionate amount came to Rs.13,12,252.81 which was

stated to be 350 times more than the known sources of his

income. After investigation sanction was obtained and

charge-sheet was filed. The initial investigation was

conducted by Shri B.N. Bhatia, Dy.Superintendent of Police,

Special Police Establishment, Gwalior and thereafter by Shri

D.S. Rana, Inspector SPE, Gwalior who was stated to have

been duly authorised by the Superintendent of Police, SPE,

Gwalior vide order No.SPE/2766/94 dated 12.12.1994. The

order of the Supteintendent of Police was claimed to be

strictly under Section 17 of the Act. Respondent Jagdish

Prasad was appointed as a Sub-Inspector and was also holding

the post of A.D.E.O. On 16.11.1984 Preliminary Enquiry

No.120/84 was registered against him. On 7.5.1985 one Shri

Tara Chand, resident of Dahimandi, Gwalior filed a complaint

against the said respondent whereupon another Preliminary

Enquiry No.5/85 was registered which was taken for

investigation. On the basis of Preliminary Enquiry No.5/85

Crime No.132/92 under Sections 13(1)(e) and 13(2) of the Act

was registered against him on 7.10.1992. After

investigation it transpired that during check period

commencing from 1.2.1964 to 31.1.1984 the respondent had

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earned a sum of Rs.1,12,380.54 from his known sources of

income and incurred an expenses of Rs.2,14,608.84. In this

way he was found to be possessing disproportionate property

worth Rs.1,02,228.30. After obtaining the sanction for

prosecution by the competent authority a charge-sheet was

submitted in the Court on 5.8.1986. The respondent moved

the High Court under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure

Code praying for quashing the investigation and consequent

proceedings against him in the light of the judgment in

Bhajan Lals case (supra) which was allowed vide the order

impugned. Respondent Kedarilal Vaishya had joined the

service in the Government on 15.7.1978 as Sub-Engineer and

was promoted to the post of Assistant Engineer on 8.3.1990.

An information was received in the office of the

Superintendent of Police, SPE Regional Lokayukta Karyalaya,

Gwalior that the aforesaid respondent had immovable

properties much more disproportionate to known sources of

his income. After verification Crime No.17/94 was

registered under Sections 13(1)(e) and 13(1)(d) read with

Section 13(2) of the Act. A search warrant was received by

Inspector Ram Lakhan Singh Bhadhouria from the Court of the

Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gwalior. The Superintendent of

Police SPE Regional Lokayukta Karyalaya, Gwalior issued

order No.454 dated 8.2.1994 authorising the investigation of

the case by Shri Ram Lakhan Singh Bhadhouria. On

investigation it was found that during the check period from

7.7.1978 to 2.9.1994 the respondent had earned a total

amount of Rs.3,86,966.75 and incurred an expenditure of

Rs.7,95,243.98. In this way he was found to be possessing

Rs.4,08,277.23 more than his earnings which was found to be

disproportionate to his known sources of income, punishable

under Section 13(1)(e) and 13(2) of the Act. The sanction

for prosecution was obtained on 26th October, 1996

whereafter a charge-sheet was filed against the respondent

in the Court of Sub-Judge Shivpuri which was registered as

Special Session Case No.4/1996. Not satisfied with the

investigation the respondent filed a petition under Section

482 of the Criminal Procedure Code praying for quashing of

the investigation and consequent proceedings in Crime

No.17/94 which was allowed vide the order impugned in these

appeals. Corruption in a civilised society is a disease

like cancer, which if not detected in time is sure to

maliganise the polity of country leading to disastrous

consequences. It is termed as plague which is not only

contagious but if not controlled spreads like a fire in a

jungle. Its virus is compared with HIV leading to AIDS,

being incurable. It has also been termed as Royal thievery.

The socio-political system exposed to such a dreaded

communicable disease is likely to crumble under its own

weight. Corruption is opposed to democracy and social

order, being not only anti people, but aimed and targeted

against them. It affects the economy and destroys the

cultural heritage. Unless nipped in the bud at the

earliest, it is likely to cause turbulence shaking of the

socio-economic-political system in an otherwise healthy,

wealthy, effective and vibrating society. The menace of

corruption was found to have enormously increased by first

and second world war conditions. The corruption, at the

initial stages, was considered confined to the bureaucracy

who had the opportunities to deal with a variety of State

largesse in the form of contracts, licences and grants.

Even after the war the opportunities for corruption

continued as large amounts of Government surplus stores were

required to be disposed of by the public servants. As

consequence of the wars the shortage of various goods

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necessitated the imposition of controls and extensive

schemes of post-war reconstruction involving the

disbursement of huge sums of money which lay in the control

of the public servants giving them wide discretion with the

result of luring them to the glittering shine of the wealth

and property. In order to consolidate and amend the laws

relating to prevention of corruption and matters connected

thereto, the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 was enacted

which was amended from time to time. In the year 1988 a new

Act on the subject being Act No.49 of 1988 was enacted with

the object of dealing with the circumstances, contingencies

and shortcomings which were noticed in the working and

implementation of 1947 Act. The law relating to prevention

of corruption was essentially made to deal with the public

servants, as understood in the common parlance but

specifically defined in the Act. The Act was intended to

make effective provision for the prevention of bribe and

corruption rampant amongst the public servants. It is a

social legislation defined to curb illegal activities of the

public servants and is designed to be liberally construed so

as to advance its object. Dealing with the object

underlying the Act this Court in R.S. Nayak vs. A.R.

Antulay [1984 (2) SCC 183] held: The 1947 Act was enacted,

as its long ltitle shows, to make more effective provision

for the prevention of bribery and corruption. Indisputably,

therefore, the provisions of the Act must receive such

construction at the hands of the Court as would advance the

object and purpose underlying the Act and at any rate not

defeat it. If the words of the Statute are clear and

unambiguous, it is the plainest duty of the court to give

effect to the natural meaning of the words used in the

provision. The question of construction arises only in the

event of an ambiguity or the plain meaning of the words used

in the statute would be self-defeating. The court is

entitled to ascertain the intention of the Legislature to

remove the ambiguity by construing the provision of the

Statute as a whole keeping in view what was the mischief

when the Statute was enacted and to remove which the

Legislature enacted the Statute. The rule of construction

is so universally accepted that it need not be supported by

precedents. Adopting this rule of construction, whenever a

question of construction arises upon ambiguity or where two

views are possible of a provision, it would be the duty of

the Court to adopt that construction which would advance the

object underlying the Act, namely, to make effective

provision for the prevention of bribery and corruption and

at any rate not defeat it.

Procedural delays and technicalities of law should not

be permitted to defeat the object sought to be achieved by

the Act. The overall public interest and the social object

is required to be kept in mind while interpreting various

provisions of the Act and decided cases under it.

For the purposes of deciding these appeals reference to

Sections 13 and 17 of the Act is necessary. Section 13

deals with the criminal misconduct of the public servants

and prescribes the punishment for the commission of offence

of criminal misconduct. A public servant is said to commit

the offence of criminal misconduct:

(a) if he habitually accepts or obtains or agrees to

accept or attempts to obtain from any person for himself or

for any other person any gratification other than legal

remuneration as a motive or reward such as is mentioned in

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section 7; or

(b) if he habitually accepts or obtains or agrees to

accept or attempts to obtain for himself or for any other

person, any valuable thing without consideration or for a

consideration which he knows to be inadequate from any

person whom he knows to have been, or to be, or to be likely

to be concerned in any proceeding or business transacted or

about to be transacted by him, or having any connection with

the official functions of himself or of any public servant

to whom he is subordinate, or from any person whom he knows

to be interested in or related to the person so concerned;

or

(c) if he dishonestly or fraudulently misappropriates or

otherwise converts for his own use any property entrusted to@@

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him or under his control as a public servant or allows any@@

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other person so to do; or

(d) if he,--

(i) by corrupt or illegal means, obtains for himself or

for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary

advantage; or

(ii) by abusing his position as a public servant,

obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable

thing or pecuniary advantage; or

(iii) while holding office as a public servant, obtains

for any person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage

without any public interest; or

(e) if he or any person on his behalf, is in possession

or has, at any time during the period of his office, been in@@

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possession for which the public servant cannot@@

JJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJ

satisfactorily account, of pecuniary resources or property

disproportionate to his known sources of income.

ExplanationFor the purposes of this section, known

sources of income means income received from any lawful

source and such receipt has been intimated in accordance

with the provisions of any law, rules or orders for the time

being applicable to a public servant

(2) Any public servant who commits criminal misconduct

shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall

be not less than one year but which may extend to seven

years and shall also be liable to fine.

Section 17 deals with investigation into cases under the

Act and provides:

17. Persons authorised to investigateNotwithstanding

anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

(2 of 1974), no police officer below the rank,--

(a) in the case of the Delhi Special Police

Establishment, of an Inspector of Police;

(b) in the metropolitan area of Bombay, Calcutta, Madras

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and Ahmedabad and in any other metropolitan area notified as

such under sub-section (1) of Section 8 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), of an Assistant

Commissioner of Police;

(c) elsewhere, of a Deputy Superintendent of Police or a

police officer of equivalent rank.

shall investigate any offence punishable under this Act

without the order of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a

Magistrate of the first class, as the case may be, or make

any arrest therefore without a warrant;

Provided that if a police officer not below the rank of

an Inspector of Police is authorised by the State Government

in this behalf by general or special order, he may also

investigate any such offence without the order of a

Metropolitan Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class,

as the case may be, or make arrest therefore without a

warrant;

Provided further that an offence referred to in clause

(e) of sub- section (1) of section 13 shall not be

investigated without the order of a police officer not below

the rank of a Superintendent of Police.

This Section provides that no police officer below the

rank of an Inspector in the case of Delhi Special Police

Establishment, an Assistant Commissioner of Police in the

metropolitan areas of Bombay, Calcutta, Madras and Ahmedabad

and any other metropolitan area notified as such and

Dy.Superintendent of Police or a police officer of the

equivalent rank shall investigate an offence punishable

under the Act without prior order of the metropolitan

Magistrate or a Magistrate of the First Class, as the case

may be, or make any arrest thereof without warrant.

According to the first proviso if a police officer not below

the rank of an Inspector of Police is authorised by the

Government in this behalf by general or special order, he

can also investigate in such offences without the order of

Metropolitan Magistrate or the Magistrate of First Class, as

the case may be, or make arrest thereof without a warrant.

Regarding compliance of this part of the section there is no

controversy in the present appeals. However, the second

proviso provides that where an offence referred to in clause

(e) of sub-section (1) of section 13 is sought to be

investigated, such an investigation shall not be conducted

without the order of a Police Officer not below the rank of

a Superintendent of Police. The interpretation of this

proviso is involved in the present controversy. The

investigation conducted and the consequent proceedings are

stated to have been quashed on similar grounds in Bhajan

Lals case(supra). The facts of that case were, one Dharam

Pal presented a complaint against Ch.Bhajan Lal, the former

Chief Minister of Haryana making certain serious allegations

against him which prima facie showed commission of offence

punishable under the Act. The complaint was presented in

the Chief Ministers Secretariat on 12.1.1987 when said Shri

Bhajan Lal had ceased to be the Chief Minister. An

endorsement was made by the Officer on Special Duty in the

Chief Ministers Secretariat to the effect: C.M. has

seen. For appropriate action and was marked to the

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Director General of Police who in turn made endorsement on

the same day which read, Please look into this; take

necessary action and report and marked it to the

Superintendent of Police, Hissar. The complaint alongwith

the above endorsement of OSD and DGP was put up before the

SP on 21.11.1987 on which date the SP made his endorsement

reading Please register a case and investigate. The

Station House Officer of the Police Station registered a

case on the basis of the allegations in the complaint under

Sections 161 and 165 of the Indian Penal Code and Section

5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. After

forwarding the copy of the First Information Report to the

Magistrate and other officers concerned, the SHO took up the

investigation and proceeded to the spot accompanied by his

staff. At this stage Shri Bhajan Lal filed Writ Petition

No.9172/87 under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of

India seeking quashing of the First Information Report and

issuance of directions restraining the police from further

proceeding with the investigation. The High Court held that

allegations made in the complaint do not constitute a

cognizable offence for commencing a lawful investigation and

granted relief as prayed for by the petitioner therein.

Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment the State of Haryana

preferred an appeal in this Court which was disposed of as

under:- We set aside the judgment of the High Court

quashing the First Information Report as not being legally

and factually sustainable in law for the reasons

aforementioned; but, however, we quash the commencement as

well as the entire investigation, if any, so far done for

the reasons given by us in the instant judgment on the

ground that the third appellant (SHO) is not clothed with

valid legal authority to take up the investigation and

proceed with the same within the meaning of Section 5A(1) of

the Prevention of Corruption Act, as indicated in this

judgment. Further we set aside the order of the High Court

awarding costs with a direction that the said costs is

payable to the first respondent (Ch.Bhajan Lal) by the

second respondent (Dharam Pal).

In the result, the appeal is disposed of accordingly but

at the same time giving liberty to the State Government to

direct an investigation afresh, if it so desires, through a

competent Police Officer empowered with valid legal

authority in strict compliance with S.5A(1) of the Act as

indicated supra. No order as to costs.

In the facts and circumstances of that case this Court

posed a question to itself in the following terms:

Now what remains for consideration is whether there is

any valid order of the S.P. permitting the third appellant

to investigate the offence falling under clause (e) of

sub-section (1) of Section 5. As we have already mentioned

in the earlier part of this judgment, the S.P. (the second

appellant) has given the one word direction on 21.11.1987

investigate. The question is whether the one word

direction investigate would amount to an order within

the meaning of second proviso of Section 5A(1).

The Court found on facts that as there was absolutely no

reason given by the SP in directing the SHO to investigate,

the order of the SP was directly in violation of the dictum

of law. The SHO was, therefore, found not clothed with the

requisite legal authority within the meaning of second

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proviso to Section 5A(1) of 1947 Act to investigate the

offences under clause (e) of Section 5(1) of the Act. This

Court held that (1) as the salutary legal requirement of

disclosing the reason for according the permission is not

complied with; (2) as the prosecution is not satisfactorily

explaining the circumstances which impelled the SP to pass

the order directing the SHO to investigate the case; (3) as

the said direction manifestly seems to have been granted

mechanically and in a very casual manner, regardless of the

principles of law enunciated by this Court and (4) as the

SHO had got neither any order from the Magistrate to

investigate the offences under Sections 161 and 165 IPC nor

any order from the SP for investigation of the offences

under Section 5(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act in

the manner known to law, the order of direction reading only

investigate suffered from legal infirmity. The Court

found that despite quashing the direction of the SP and the

investigation thereupon would not, in any manner, deter the

State of Haryana to pursue the matter and direct the

investigation afresh in pursuance of the FIR, if the State

so desire.

It may be noticed at this stage that a three Judge Bench

of this Court in H.N. Rishbud & Anr.vs. State of Delhi

[AIR 1955 SC 196] had held that a defect or illegality in

investigation, however, serious, has no direct bearing on

the competence or the procedure relating to cognizance or

trial. Referring to the provisions of Section 190, 193, 195

to 199 and 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (1898) in

the context of an offence under the Prevention of Corruption

Act, 1947, the Court held:

A defect or illegality in investigation, however

serious, has no direct bearing on the competence or the

procedure relating to cognizance or trial. No doubt a

police report which results from an investigation is

provided in Section 190, Cr.P.C. as the material on which

cognizance is taken. But it cannot be maintained that a

valid and legal police report is the foundation of the

jurisdiction of the Court to take cognizance. Section 190,

Cr.P.C. is one out of a group of sections under the heading

Conditions requisite for initiation of proceedings. The

language of this section is in marked contrast with that of

the other sections of the group under the same heading,

i.e., Sections 193 and 195 to 199.

These latter sections regulate the competence of the

Court and bar its jurisdiction in certain cases excepting in

compliance therewith. But Section 190 does not. While no

doubt, in one sense, clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section

190(1) are conditions requisite for taking of cognizance, it

is not possible to say that cognizance on an invalid police

report is prohibited and is therefore a nullity. Such an

invalid report may still fall either under Clause (a) or (b)

of Section 190(1), (whether it is the one or the other we

need not pause to consider) and in any case cognizance so

taken is only in the nature of error in a proceeding

antecedent to the trial. To such a situation Section 537,

Cr.P.C. which is in the following terms is attracted:

Subject to the provisions hereinbefore contained, no

finding, sentence or order passed by a Court of competent

jurisdiction shall be reversed or altered on appeal or

revision on account of any error, omission or irregularity

in the complaint, summons, warrant, charge, proclamation,

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order, judgment or other proceedings before or during trial

or in any enquiry or other proceedings under this Code,

unless such error, omission or irregularity, has in fact

occasioned a failure of justice.

If, therefore, cognizance is in fact taken, on a police

report vitiated by the breach of a mandatory provision

relating to investigation, there can be no doubt that the

result of the trial which follows it cannot be set aside

unless the illegality in the investigation can be shown to

have brought about a miscarriage of justice. That an

illegality committed in the course of investigation does not

affect the competence and the jurisdiction of the court for

trial is well settled as appears from the cases in Prabhu

v. Emperor, AIR 1944 PC 73 (C) and Lumbhardar Zutshi v.

The King, AIR 1950 PC 26(D).

It further held:

In our opinion, therefore, when such a breach is

brought to the notice of the Court at an early stage of the

trial, the court will have to consider the nature and extent

of the violation and pass appropriate orders for such

investigation as may be called for, wholly or partly, and by

such officer as it considers appropriate with reference to

the requirements of Section 5-A of the Act. It is in the

light of the above considerations that the validity or

otherwise of the objection as to the violation of Section

5(4) of the Act has to be decided and the course to be

adopted in these proceedings, determined.

In Bhajan Lals case this Court had found on facts that

the SP had passed the order mechanically and in a very

casual manner regardless of the settled principles of law.

The provisions of Section 17 of the Act had not been

complied with. As earlier noticed the SP while authorising

the SHO to investigate had made only endorsement to the

effect please register the case and investigate. The SP

was shown to be not aware either of allegations or the

nature of the offences and the pressure of work-load

requiring investigation by an Inspector. There is no denial

of the fact that in cases against the respondents in these

appeals, even in the absence of the authority of the SP the

Investigating Officer was in law authorised to investigate

the offence falling under Section 13 of the Act with the

exception of one as is described under sub-section (1)(e) of

the Act. After registration of the FIR the Superintendent

of Police in the instant appeals is shown to be aware and

conscious of the allegations made against the respondents,

the FIR registered against them and pending investigations.

The order passed by the SP in case of Ram Singh on

12.12.1994 with respect to a Crime registered in 1992 was to

the effect: In exercise of powers conferred by the

provisions on me, under Section 17 of the Prevention of

Corruption Act, 1988, I P.K. RUNWAL, Superintendent of

Police, Special Police Establishment, Division-I Lokayukt

Karyalaya, Gwalior Division Gwalior (M.P.), authorised Shri

D.S. RANA INSP-(SPE) LAK-GWL (M.P.) to investigate Crime

No.103/92 U/s 13(1)(E), 23(2) of the Prevention of

Corruption Act, 1988 against Shri RAM SINGH D.O. EXCISE

BATUL (M.P.).

Similar orders have been passed in the other two cases

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as well. The reasons for entrustment of investigation to

the Inspector can be discerned from the order itself. The

appellant-State is, therefore, justified in submitting that

the facts of Bhajan Lals case were distinguishable as in

the instant case the Superintendent of Police appears to

have applied his mind and passed the order authorising the

investigation by an Inspector under the peculiar

circumstances of the case. The reason for entrustment of

investigation were obvious. The High Court should not have

liberally construed the provisions of the Act in favour of

the accused resulting in closure of the trial of the serious

charges made against the respondents in relation to

commission of offences punishable under an Act legislated to

curb the illegal and corrupt practices of the public

officers. It is brought to our notice that under similar

circumstances the High Court had quashed the investigation

and consequent proceedings in a case registered against Shri

Ram Babu Gupta against which Criminal Appeal No.1754 of 1986

was filed in this Court which was allowed on 27th September,

1986 by setting aside the order of the High Court with a

direction to the trial court to proceed with the case in

accordance with law and in the light of the observations

made therein.

We are not satisfied with the finding of the High Court

that merely because the order of the Superintendent of

Police was in typed proforma, that showed the

non-application of the mind or could be held to have been

passed in a mechanical and casual manner. As noticed

earlier the order clearly indicates the name of the accused,

the number of FIR, nature of the offence and power of

Superintendent of Police permitting him to authorise a

junior officer to investigate. The time between the

registration of the FIR and authorisation in terms of second

proviso to Section 17 shows further the application of mind

and the circumstances which weighed with the Superintendent

of Police to direct authorisation to order the

investigation.

Under these circumstances the appeals are allowed and

the judgments of the High Court impugned in these appeals

regarding the interpretation of Section 17 and holding the

investigation to have not been investigated by an authorised

officer being not sustainable in law are hereby set aside

with the direction to the Trial Court to proceed with the

trial in accordance with the provisions of law. The

respondents would be at liberty to defend their cases on all

such contentions on facts and law as are available to them

which have not been adjudicated upon against them by the

High Court and this Court.