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GAHC030002752025

THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT

(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)

Case No. : MACApp./8/2025

1. State of Mizoram Through the Secretary,

Transport Department Mizoram, Aizawl.

2. The Director to the Government of Mizoram,

Transport Department Mizoram, Aizawl.

……...Appellants

-Versus-

Smt. Zohmingthangi,

W/o K. Lalengmawia (L)

R/o Chanmari West,

Aizawl, Mizoram

……...Respondent

:

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:: BEFORE ::

HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE MRIDUL KUMAR KALITA

For the Appellant :Ms. Caroline K. Lungawipuii,

Government Advocate.

For the Respondent :Mr. L. H. Lianhrima, Sr.

Advocate.

Ms. Ruth Lalruatfeli

Date of Hearing : 05.02.2026

Date of Judgment :12.02.2026

JUDGEMENT& ORDER(CAV)

1) Heard Ms. Caroline K. Lungawipuii, learned Government Advocate, appearing

for the appellants. Also heard Mr. L. H. Lianhrima, learned Senior Advocate,

assisted by Ms. Ruth Lalruatfeli, learned counsel for the respondent.

2) This appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 has been

preferred by the State appellants, impugning the judgment and award dated

14.02.2025, passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Aizawl, in MACT

Case No. 38/2022, whereby, the appellants were directed to pay acompensation

amount of Rs. 23,30,000/- along with the interest at the rate of 7% per annum

from the date of filing of the claim petition till its realization.

3) The facts relevant for consideration of the instant appeal, in brief, are that

the present respondent, as claimant, had filed an application under Section 166

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of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988, before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal,

Aizawl, claiming compensation for death of her husband Late. K.Lalengmawia,

who died in a vehicular accident, on 18.11.2011, at about 6:30 PM, involving a

Mizoram State Transport Bus Bearing Registration No. MZ-01-D-2250 driven by

one Shri K. Lallawmsanga.

4) The present appellant contested the claim by filing a written statement,

wherein, amongst the general defense, which are usually taken by the opposite

parties in claims cases, a plea was also raised that the claim is barred by the law

of limitation.

5) Upon pleadings of the parties, the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Aizawl

framed following issued in the aforesaid claim case-

i. Whether the present claim application is maintainable in its

present form and style?

ii. Whether there was fault on the part of the driver or owner of

the accident vehicle?

iii. Whether the claimant is entitled to get compensation, if so,

who is liable to pay and to what extent?

6) The claimant examined 5 (five) witnesses, including herself, to prove her

case, whereas, the present appellants as opposite partieshad examined 2 (two)

witnesses, namely, the driver of the ill-fated vehicle, Shri. K. Lallawmsanga as

opposite party witness No. 1, and the conductor of the ill-fated vehicle namely,

Shri. Lalhmangaiha, as opposite party witness No. 2. However, after conclusion

of the enquiry, the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Aizawl, by the judgment and

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award, which has been impugned in this appeal, directed the present appellant

to pay a compensation of Rs. 23,30,000/- (Rupees Twenty-Three Lakh Thirty

Thousand) along with an interest @ 7 % per annum from the date of filing of

the claim petition till its realization.

7) Ms. Caroline K. Lungawipuii, learned counsel for the appellants, hassubmitted

that the accident in which the husband of the respondent died, occurred on

18.11.2011, whereas, the respondent/claimant filed an application under

Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, after a lapse of more than ten

years from the date of the said accident, i.e., on 11.10.2022, before the Motor

Accident Claims Tribunal, Aizawl. She further submitted that the Motor Accident

Claims Tribunal had miserably failed to apply its judicial mind by entertaining

such a stale claim.

8) She submits that though Section 166(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988,

which earlier provided for the limitation period for filing a claim petition, has

been deleted from the statute book, however, the inordinate delay in filing a

claim petition in motor accident cases still remains a relevant factor. According

to her, this aspect has been completely ignored by the Motor Accident Claims

Tribunal.

9) She has further submitted that the explanation furnished by the

respondent/claimant for approaching the Tribunal belatedly, after a lapse of

more than ten years, does not absolve the claimant/respondent of the obligation

to show due diligence on her part. She further submits that the Tribunal failed

to properly consider and discuss the issue of delay raised by the appellants in

the impugned judgment.

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10)She submitted that the claimant sought to shift the entire burden for the

belated approach to the tribunal on the counsel allegedly engaged by her;

however, the said counsel was neither examined as a witness for the claimant

nor as a court witness. Consequently, the Tribunal, according to her, has erred in

accepting the explanation offered by the respondent/claimant for the inordinate

delay in filing the claim petition.

11) The learned counsel for the appellants has also submitted that the

Tribunal, while allowing the claim petition filed by the respondent/claimant,

erred in arriving at the conclusion that the accident occurred due to the

negligence of the driver of the offending vehicle. She submits that the driver of

the offending vehicle was not even impleaded as a party in the said MACT case

and, as such, the claim petition suffered from the vice of non-joinder of

necessary parties.

12) She has further submitted that the finding regarding negligence of the

driver of the offending vehicle was based entirely on the testimony of the

Investigating Officer, who had acted as the complainant, the enquiry officer, as

well as the Investigating Officer in the criminal case, which was registered after

the accident. She submits that, the allegation that the driver of the offending

vehicle was in a drunken condition while he was driving the said vehicle could

not be corroborated by any medical evidence or by the examination of any

doctor. She submits that no documentary proof for intoxication could be

produced by the claimant during the enquiry.

13)She has further submitted that the tribunal has also failed to consider the

evidence of opposite party witness No. 1, i.e., the driver of the offending

vehicle, who denied the fact that he was intoxicated while driving the vehicle.

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She further submits that no requisition was made to the motor vehicle inspector

for mechanical examination of the offending vehicle. She submits that

considering the circumstances in which the accident is claimed to have occurred,

non-examination of the offending vehicle by the Motor Vehicle Inspector is fatal

to the case of the claimant.

14) The learned counsel for the appellants further submits that the Motor

Accident Claims Tribunal had also erred in, not considering the fact that in the

connected criminal case, i.e., Criminal Trial No. 2622/2011, which was registered

after the said accident,the driver of the offending vehicle was discharged by the

Court of learned Judicial Magistrate 1

st

Class, Aizawl exonerating him from the

charges of rash and negligent driving. She submits that the Motor Accident

Claims Tribunal had erred in attributing negligence to the driver of the offending

vehicle for the aforesaid accident.

15) Learned counsel for the applicant has also submitted that the Motor

Accident Claims Tribunal has erred in relying on the certificate, which was

exhibited as Exhibit-C8, issued by the Young Mizo Association (YMA), Chanmari

West Branch, to assess the income of the deceased at Rs. 16,900/- for month.

She submits that the aforesaid certificate was issued almost after 11 years of

the date of the accident, and was not accompanied by any supporting pay slips,

account book or financial records of Young Mizo Association to show that such a

remuneration was ever paid or recorded. As such, she submits that the tribunal

erred in giving undue reliance to the certificate of income issued by the Young

Mizo Association.

16) The learned counsel for the appellants has also submitted that the Motor

Accident Claims Tribunal has also erred in applying the principles regarding

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computation of the quantum of award in a motor accident claims case as laid

down by the Apex Court in the case of “National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Pranay

Sethi &Ors.,”reported in (2017) 16 SCC 680,in as much as the aforesaid

judgment was delivered on 31.10.2017, whereas, the accident had occurred on

18.11.2011, i.e., about 6 years prior to the date of the judgment in the

aforesaid case. She submits that as the principles laid down by the Apex Court

in the case of “Pranay Sethi &Ors.” (supra) is governed by the doctrine of

prospective over ruling, the said principles cannot be retrospectively applied in

connection with a case where the accident occurred almost 6 years prior to the

delivery of the judgment in the case of “Pranay Sethi &Ors.” (supra).

17) She further submits that the trial court had also erred in regarding all the

sons and daughters of the deceased as his dependent, in as much as, on the

date of the accident 4 out of 5 children of the deceased had already attained

the age of majority and therefore, they may be presumed to be financially

independent.

18) She further submits that the tribunal had also erred in accepting the age of

the deceased as 47 years at the time of his death and mechanically applying the

multiplier of 13 without arriving at a clear finding as regards the age of the

deceased based on the evidence on record. She submits that the marriage

certificate of the deceased, which has been annexed as Annexure-1 to the claim

petition, clearly shows that the date of birth of the deceased was 22

nd

May,

1959.She has further submitted that during cross-examination, she has also

stated that in the charge sheet, arrest intimation, enquiry report and

postmortem examination report annexed along with the claim petition, the age

of deceased was reflected as 52 years.

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19) The learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the tribunal has

failed to take into consideration of all these aspects while coming to the findings

regarding the date of birth of the deceased and erroneously considered the age

of the deceased as 47 years for the purpose of using a higher multiplier for

computation of the quantum of the compensation. She therefore, submits that

the impugned judgment & award is liable to be set aside and also makes an

alternative submission that in the event the Court is not inclined to set aside the

impugned judgment and award, the quantum of the compensation awarded

may be reduced as per the applicable laws. In support of her submission, the

learned counsel for the appellant has cited following rulings: -

a) “The Branch Manager Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. Vs.

Smt.Saphnuni& Another”(Judgment dated 19/09/2018 in MAC App. No.

41/2017.)

b) “New India Assurance Company Ltd. Vs. KawllianThanga” reported in

(2007) GLJ 332.

20) On the other hand, Mr. L. H. Lianhrima, the learned Senior Counsel

appearing for the respondent has submitted that the delay in filing the claim

case, before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Aizawl, by the claimant, has

been properly explained. He submits that the claimant has adduced evidence to

show that she has engaged Mr. J. Lalremruata to pursue her claim case before

the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. However, the papers submitted by her to

the said counsel were misplaced by him. He further submits that the said fact

has been established by the certificate to that effect given by her earlier

engaged counsel, J. Lalremruata, which is exhibited as Exhibit-C9. Wherein he

had also mentioned that whenever the claimant enquired about the matter, he

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used to always assure the claimant of a fruitful result. Learned Senior Counsel

for the respondent/claimant has submitted that the claimant cannot be made

liable for the mistake committed by her engaged counsel. He has cited a ruling

of the Apex Court in the case of “Lala Mata Din Vs. A. Narayanam”,reported in

1969 (2) SCC 770.

21) The learned Senior Counsel for the respondent further submits that when

the alleged accident had occurred, there was no period of limitation in the MV

Act, 1988 for filing claim petitions under Section 166 of the said Act.He submits

that as such the law prevailing on the date of accident has to be applied in this

case. In support of his submissions learned counsel for the respondent has cited

the ruling of the Apex Court in the Case of “MatriKoley& Another Vs. New India

Assurance Co. and Others”reported in 2003 8 SCC 718.

22) The learned Senior Counsel for the respondent has also submitted that the

Motor Accident Claims Tribunal has rightly not given much importance to the

fact that the driver of the offending vehicle was discharged in the criminal case

arising out of the said accident, in as much as the order of discharge of the

driver of the offending vehicle was passed by the concerned Judicial Magistrate

not on merit of the case as no observation that the driver was not negligent

while driving the offending vehicle has been made by the learned Judicial

Magistrate Frist Class, Aizawl. He submits that otherwise also, the standard of

prove in a criminal trial is much higher than what is applicable in a Claims case

before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. Where the standard of prove is on

the basis of preponderance of probabilities rather than beyond reasonable

doubt. He, therefore, submits that the fact that the driver of the offending

vehicle was discharged by criminal court does not have much implication in the

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outcome of the claims case filed by the respondent and the tribunal has rightly

not given much importance to the said factor. In support of his submissions,

learned Senior Counsel for the respondent has cited a ruling of the Apex Court

in the case of “Anita Sharma & Others Vs. New India Assurance Company and

Another”reported in (2021) 1SCC 171.

23) The learned Senior Counsel for the respondent has submitted that the

Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Aizawl, while arriving at the finding that the

driver of the offending vehicle was negligent and rash in driving the offending

vehicle rightly took into consideration, the testimony of the claimant’s witness

namely, H. Lalchawimawia, SI of Police, who conducted the enquiry immediately

after the accident and found that the driver of the offending vehicle drove the

bus rashly and negligently. He also found that the driver of the bus had

consumed liquor at the time of driving.

24) He submits that the claims tribunal also took into consideration, the

testimony of the eye witness to the accident Smti. K. Sanghluni who was one of

the passengers of the offending vehicle and who has categorically stated that

the vehicle was driven in a rash and negligent manner, which resulted in the ill-

fated accident in which the husband of the claimant sustained injury and

ultimately died.He submits that the said testimony of the eye witness as well as

the Enquiry Officer could not be demolished by the present appellants during

their cross examination.

25) Learned Senior Counsel for the respondent has also submitted that the

Motor Accident Claims Tribunal has rightly relied on the income certificate of the

deceased issued by the YMA, as it was the YMA, who had engaged the husband

of the respondent to do the work of “head mistry” (mason)in the construction

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work of Chanmari west branch of Young Mizo Association. He submits that the

said income certificate was exhibited by the Vice President of YMA, Chanmari

Branch, Shri. LalmuanakimaChawhte and during his cross-examination the

present appellants had failed to demolished his testimony. No question was

posed as regards the income certificate i.e., Exhibit C8, which was issued by the

said witness as president of YMA branch. He, therefore, submits that the Motor

Accident Claims Tribunal has rightly relied upon the income certificate of the

deceased husband of the claimant issued by the president of YMA, Chanmari

West Branch.

26) The learned Senior Counsel for the respondent has also submitted that the

Motor Accident Claims Tribunal has rightly assessed the age of the deceased

husband of the claimant as 47 years at the time of his death, and as much as, it

relied upon the best document as regards the age of the deceased i.e., Exhibit-

C2, which is the birth certificate of the deceased issued by the competent

authority, i.e., Government of Mizoram, Department of Economic & Statistic. He

submits that the reliability of the said birth certificate could not be demolished

by the present appellant by cross-examining the witness, who had exhibited the

same.

27) The learned Senior Counsel for the respondent has further submitted that

the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal was correct in applying the principles laid

down by the Apex Court in the case of “National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Pranay

Sethi &Ors.” (supra) as there is no indication in the said judgment that it would

have prospective effect only. He submits that any judgment by a court of law

has the retrospective effect, if the contrary is not specifically stated. He has

cited the ruling of the Apex Court in the Case of “P. V. George &Ors. Vs. State of

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Kerala and Ors.”reported in (2007) 3SCC 557,in support of his submission.

28) The learned Senior Counsel for the respondent has further submitted that

it is well settled that in motor accident claims cases, the tribunal cannot be

adopt a hyper technical approach, but it has to discharge the role of Parens

patriae.In support of his submissions, he has cited a ruling in the Apex Court in

the case of “Mohar Sai & Another Vs. Gayatri Devi &Ors.” (2018) 16 SCC 210.

29) The learned Senior Counsel for the appellant has submitted that the

deceased husband of the appellant was the sole bread earner of the family and

due to his death in the vehicular accident, the respondent and her family had to

pass their days in a severe financial constrain. He submits that the MV Act, 1988

being a beneficial legislation should be interpreted and implemented in a

manner so as to give relief to the persons (claimant) who are made to suffer

because of untimely death of the sole bread earner of the family, in a vehicular

accident for no fault of them. He, therefore, prays for dismissing the instant

appeal.

30) I have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for both

the sides and have gone through the materials available on record. I have also

gone through the rulings cited by the learned counsel for both sides in support

of their respective submissions.

31) As regards the first contention raised by the learned counsel for the

appellants regarding delay in approaching the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal by

the claimant for filing the claim application under Section 166 of the MV Act,

1988 is concerned, it appears that the accident in question had occurred on

18.11.2011 i.e., the date before which the limitation of 6 months for filing the

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claim application was introduced under Section 166 (3) of the Motor Vehicle Act,

1988 in the year 2019, which was made effective from 25

th

February 2022. It

has been settled by the Apex Court in the catena of judgments [viz.,

“MaitriKoley& Another Vs. New India Assurance Company & Others” (supra)]that

the law prevailing on the date of accident has to be applied in claims cases. As

such, since there was no bar of limitation in filing an application under Section

166 of the MV Act, 1988 belatedly, the contention raised by the appellants does

not have much force. Moreover, the clarification given by the

respondent/claimant for approaching the tribunal belatedly can not be totally

brushed aside. Hence, the plea that the claimant approached the Court after 10

years of the accident in which her husband expired is not sufficient to discard

the case of the claimant.

32) As regards the contention of the appellants that the claim case filed by

the respondent is bad for non-joinder of the driver of the offending vehicle, as

he was the necessary party in the said claim case, it appears that the evidence

on record shows that the offending vehicle i.e., the mini bus bearing registration

No. MZ 01D 2250 was a government vehicle (Mizoram State Transport Bus).It

also appears that driver of the said bus was a government employee and the

accident occurred when the said driver was driving the vehicle in course of his

employment. It also appears that though the driver K. Lallawmsanga was not

impleaded as a party in the claim case, however, he appeared before the Motor

Accident Claims Tribunal, Aizawl and deposed as the witness for the opposite

party. Hence, he was able to place his version of the incident before the

tribunal.

33) Though, the said driver is the prime tort-feasor in this case, however, he

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was a government employee and the accident occurred during the course of his

employment. The state respondents are vicariously liable for any damage

caused to any third party due to negligence of the driver committed during the

course of his employment.

34) Whether the said driver is a necessary party or a proper party is a

question, which may be determined only in the light of the facts and

circumstances of this case. A necessary party is a person, who ought to be

joined as a party in the case and in whose absence and effective decree cannot

be passed by the Court. Whereas a proper party is a person whose present

would enable the court to completely and effectively and properly adjudicate

upon matters and issues, though he may not be a person against whom a

decree is to be made.In the instant case, the state respondents (appellants)

being the employer of the offending driver are vicariously liable for the

negligence committed by the driver during the course of his employment and it

is they (the appellants), who are required to pay compensation to the claimants/

respondents, as the vehicle involved was a government vehicle and the

offending driver was their employee.In the instant case, under the facts and

circumstances discussed above, this court is of the considered opinion that since

in the absence of the driver also and effective award may be passed against the

appellants (employer of the driver). More so, when they have not disowned the

fact that the driver of the offending vehicle was a government employee. As

such though the driver appears to be a proper party, he may not be regarded as

the necessary party for whose absence the entire claim proceeding may get

vitiated. More so, as the Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, empowers

the claims tribunal to specify while making the award, as to whether the same

shall be paid by the employer, the owner or the driver of the vehicle involving

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the accident or by all or any of them as the case may be.Since the driver of the

offending vehicle has been examined by the appellants as witness and he was

thoroughly cross-examined by the claimant side, and the driver was able to put

forth his version of the story, this case may not be regarded as a case

wherethere is denial of the principles of natural justice to the respondents who

were ultimately directed to pay the compensation to the claimant.This case is

also not a case where the tribunal was not aware about the version of the driver

about the alleged accident. Hence, under such circumstances, this court is of

the considered opinion that though the driver of the offending vehicle under the

aforesaid circumstances appears to be a proper party, he may not be regarded

as a necessary party so as to vitiate the claim case due to his not impleadment.

35) As regards the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that as

the driver was exonerated in the criminal case and as such the tribunal was

wrong in attributing the negligence on him due to which, the alleged accident

occurred, this court is of the considered opinion that in the discharge order of

the criminal court has not discussed the evidence collected by the investigating

officer in detail. More over, adopting an approach that when criminal case has

ended in acquittal of the offending driver, the civil suit (in the instant case the

claim case) must follow the suit, was rejected by the Apex Court in the case of

“N. K. V. Brothers. (P) Ltd. Vs. M. Karumai Annal”reported in (2009) 13 SCC 530. It

was observed in the said case that culpable rashness under Section 304 of the

Indian Penal Code is more drastic than negligence under the law of torts to

create civil liability. The Apex Court in the case of “BimalaDevei Vs. Himachal

RTC”reported in 2009 13 SCC 530has observed that in a claim petition filed

under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the tribunal has to

determined the amount of just compensation to be given to the claimant in the

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event an accident has been take by the reasons of negligence of driver of the

motor vehicle. In a motor accident claims case, the claimant has to established

his or her case on the touch-stone of preponderance of probabilities, the

standard of prove beyond reasonable doubt cannot be applied while considering

an application under Section 166 of the MV Act, 1988 seeking compensation on

account of death or injury in a road traffic accident.

36) In the instant case, the claimant’s witness No. 2 who is the Enquiry Officer

who conducted the enquiry immediately after the accident, found that the driver

of the offending vehicle had consumed liquor at the time of driving the

offending vehicle when the accident occurred.Even the driver of the offending

vehicle, who was examined as one of the opposite party witnesses has admitted

during the cross-examination that after the accident he was taken to civil

hospital by the police for examination as to whether he had consumed any

liquor or alcohol and the medical doctor was of the view that he had consumed

alcohol at the time of examination.

37) In view of the said testimony of the driver of the offending vehicle, there

remains no doubt that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Aizawl has rightly

arrived at the conclusion that the offending vehicle was driven in a rash and

negligent manner by the driver of the said vehicle. The mere fact that the driver

of the vehicle was discharged in the connected criminal trial arising out of the

same accident, as well as the fact that he was also exonerated in the

departmental proceedings conducted by the state respondents, in itself, may not

be sufficient to absolve the appellants who being the employer of the driver

because of whose fault the accident occurred from the liability of paying just

compensation to the claimant.

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38) Similarly, the failure on the part of the claimants to adduce any evidence

as regards the examination of the offending vehicle by the Motor Vehicular

Inspector (MVI) does not weakens the case of claimant. In as much as if the

contention of the appellant is that the accident occurred due to some

mechanical failure of the vehicle, which was beyond the control of the driver, it

was for the appellants to prove their stand in the claims proceedings before the

Claims Tribunal. However, in the written statement filed by them, no such plea

of mechanical failure of the vehicle involved in the accident was taken, neither

any evidence was adduced by them to show the same, hence, the fact that the

claimant has failed to exhibit any MVI report would not affect the case of the

claimant in any manner.

39) As regards the ascertaining of income of the deceased at the time of his

death is concerned,the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Aizawl relied on the

Exhibit -C8, issued by the President of Young Mizo Association as well as the

testimony of Shri. LalmuankimaChawte, who issued the said certificate as the

President of YMA, Chanmari West Branch. During cross-examination of the PW2,

his testimony could not be demolished by the appellant. Merely, because of the

fact that the Exhibit- C8 was issued after 11 years of the date of accident, same

may not,in itself, diminish the probative value of the Exhibit- C8 as well as the

testimony of the aforesaid witness. It is obvious that the necessity of the

income certificate arose for the claimant only when the claim case was filed. As

such the mere fact of delay in granting of the said certificate in itself would not

diminish its reliability. More so, when the evidence of the CW-4 Shri.

LalmuankimaChawte, clearly show that it was the Young Mizo Association,

Chanmari, West Branch, who had engaged the deceased husband of the

respondent/ claimant as mason for their construction work.

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40) The evidentiary value of a document after the said document is admitted

in evidence is to be ascertained after proper scrutiny of their documents in the

instant case.In the instant case, though, the Exhibit-C8 was issued after 11

years of the death of the deceased husband of the claimant, however, the fact

remains the said exhibit has been issued by the president of the Young Mizo

Association, Chanmari, West Branch, who had engaged him for construction

work could not be demolished and as such, the mere fact that it was issued

after such a long period of the death of the husband of the claimant, in itself,

may not be a reason for discarding the reliability of the said document.

41) As regards the contention of the learned Government counsel that the

Motor Accident Claims Tribunal had erred in applying the principles laid down by

the Apex Court in the case of “National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Pranay Sethi

&Ors.”(supra) to this case, it appears that the judgment of the co-ordinate

bench of this Court relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant, i.e., the

case of “Raj Manager Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Smt. Saphnuni&

Another”(supra) was in respect of a judgment and award of the Motor Accident

Claims Tribunal, Aizawl, which was delivered on 12.10.2017, i.e., much before

the date when the judgment in the case of “National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs.

Pranay Sethi &Ors.” was delivered by the Apex Court on 31.10.2017. As such

the co-ordinate bench was correct that the concerned Motor Accident Claims

Tribunal could not have applied the principles laid down in the “Pranay Sethi

&Ors.” as when the judgment and award impugned in the aforesaid appeal was

passed by the tribunal, the judgment in the case of “Pranay Sethi &Ors.” was not

in existence. However, in the instant case the impugned judgment has been

passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Aizawl on 14.02.2025, therefore,

the law as clarified by the Apex Court in the case of “National Insurance Co. Ltd.

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Vs. Pranay Sethi &Ors.” is applicable in the instant case and the Motors Accident

Claims Tribunal has rightly applied the principles of laid down by the Apex Court

in the case of “Pranay Sethi &Ors.” (supra) in the instant case.

42) Regarding the question of dependency of the children of the deceased

husband of the claimant’s respondent is concerned, it appears that the claimant

in her evidence on affidavit, in para-No. 5, has categorically stated that all the

children of her husband were dependent on his income and this testimony has

not been contradicted by the appellant during her cross-examination and as

such there was no reason for the claims tribunal to disbelieved the testimony of

the claimant.

43) This Court is of considered opinion that the Motor Accident Claims

Tribunal, Aizawl, under the facts and circumstances of the present case, has

awarded just compensation to the claimant.

44) In view of he above discussions made and reason stated in the foregoing

paragraphs, this Court is not inclined to interfere in the impugned judgment and

award passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Aizawl in MACT Case No.

38/2022.

45) Accordingly, this appeal stands dismissed.

JUDGE

Comparing Assistant