Page 1 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10613 OF 2014

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.36237 of 2012)

STATE OF M.P. & ORS. …APPELLANTS

VERSUS

PARVEZ KHAN …RESPONDENT

J U D G M E N T

ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. This appeal has been preferred against the Judgment

and Order dated 20

th

March, 2012 of the High Court of Madhya

Pradesh at Jabalpur in Writ Appeal No.262 of 2010.

3.The question raised for our consideration is whether the

refusal by the competent authority to give compassionate

appointment in police service on the ground of criminal

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antecedents of a candidate who is acquitted for want of evidence

or who is discharged from the criminal case on account of

compounding can be justified.

4.Sultan Khan was serving with the Madhya Pradesh Police.

He died in harness on 21

st

June, 2005. His son, the respondent

Parvez Khan, applied for compassionate appointment. The

competent authority sent his record for police verification. It was

found that he was involved in two criminal cases. In one case,

he was prosecuted for offences under Sections 323, 324, 325,

294 and 506-B/34 of the Indian Penal Code and in the other

under Sections 452, 394 and 395 of the Indian Penal Code. The

Superintendent of Police held that he was not eligible for

appointment in Government service and closed his case.

5.The respondent challenged the said order by way of Writ

Petition No.15052 of 2008 on the ground that in the first case he

was acquitted on 31

st

January, 2007 and in the second he was

discharged on account of compounding of offence.

6.Learned Single Judge did not find any merit in his

contention in the writ petition and dismissed the petition. On

appeal, the Division Bench took a different view. It was held that

the object of verification was to verify suitability of a candidate

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for employment. Since the respondent was acquitted in both the

criminal cases he could not be considered unsuitable. No

reason had been given as to why after acquittal in the criminal

case, the respondent was considered to be unsuitable.

Accordingly, the Division Bench directed consideration of case of

the respondent afresh in the light of observations in the order

within three months. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant-State has

preferred this appeal.

7.We have heard learned counsel for the parties.

8.Learned counsel for the State submitted that since on

police verification, it was found that the respondent was involved

in criminal cases involving moral turpitude, he could not be given

appointment. Mere acquittal for want of evidence or discharge

on account of compromise could not be taken to be conclusive

for suitability of a candidate. The result of criminal proceedings

was not conclusive of suitability of a candidate for recruitment to

police service.

9.It is submitted that in a criminal case, a person cannot be

punished in absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt but the

standard of proof required for consideration of suitability or

otherwise of a candidate was not the same. Discharge on

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account of compounding of the offence by the victim depended

upon the attitude of the parties. The victim may be prepared to

settle the matter for any consideration other than innocence of

the accused, but it did not wash off the criminal antecedents of

an accused. Entering into police service required a candidate to

be of character, integrity and clean antecedents. If a person is

acquitted or discharged, it cannot always be inferred that he was

falsely involved and he had no criminal antecedents. All that

may be inferred is that he has not been proved to be guilty.

Reliance has been placed on the decision of this Court in

Commissioner of Police vs. Mehar Singh

1

.

10.Learned counsel for the respondent supported the

impugned order and submitted that some other similarly placed

candidates had been given compassionate appointment. Two

such instances have been pointed out by the respondent in the

counter affidavit. He has also submitted that the State of

Madhya Pradesh has issued Guidelines dated 5

th

June, 2003 for

character verification of candidates for recruitment to

Government service and such guidelines do no justify rejection

of candidature of the respondent. One of the instances given is

of Dilip Kumar Samadhiya son of Shri Jagdish Prasad

1

2013 (7) SCC 685

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Samadhiya against whom three criminal cases were registered

prior to the recruitment in Government service but he was

acquitted either on account of compromise or on account of

benefit of doubt. Still, he was given appointment. Similarly,

Jitender Sharma was recruited to Police service though he was

tried for a criminal case, but acquitted on account of

compounding or on the basis of benefit of doubt. As per

Guidelines dated 5

th

June, 2003, an independent view can be

taken only where candidate has concealed the information about

pendency of trial and not where there is no such concealment,

as in the present case.

11.After due consideration, we are of the view that the

impugned order cannot be sustained. Refusal by the competent

authority to recruit the respondent on the ground of criminal

antecedents is not liable to be interfered with. The applicable

Guidelines dated 5

th

June, 2003 inter alia provide :

“On the basis of merits and demerits by the Hon’ble

Court the acquitted candidate will be eligible for the

Government Service.”

The above guidelines show that acquittal is not conclusive.

Even after acquittal, basis of order of the Court has to be gone

into by the competent authority. Even after order based on

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compromise or lack of evidence may render a candidate

ineligible. In the present case, the relevant part of the order of

the Superintendent of Police is as follows:

“Action was taken in regard to the proceedings of

compassionate appointment, character verification

was got done, wherein vide Letter

No.V.S./21/VHR/2007/17(F)283/07 dated 17.9.2007

of the Police Headquarters it was informed that a

case under Section 294, 323, 506, 324, 34 of IPC

had been registered against the applicant in Police

Station Kotwali as Crime No.185/06 and the

applicant was acquitted on the basis of a

compromise by the Court on 23.2.2007. In the

same manner in Crime No.494/06 under Section

394, 364, 451 of IPC a case was registered and vide

judgment dated 31.1.2007 of the Court he was

acquitted.

Two separate crimes had been registered against

the applicant, wherein in one case Section 394,

451, 365 of IPC are there and which come in the

category of moral turpitude. In the judgment of the

Court benefit of doubt has been given, therefore, as

per the new guidelines of 2003 issued by the

Government of Madhya Pradesh in respect of

character verification the applicant Parvez Khan

alias Sonu alias Raja has been found to be ineligible

for Government service.”

12.In Mehar Singh (supra) , the question considered by this Court

was as follows :

“18. The question before this Court is whether the

candidature of the respondents who had made a

clean breast of their involvement in a criminal case

by mentioning this fact in their

application/attestation form while applying for a

post of Constable in Delhi Police, who were

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provisionally selected subject to verification of

their antecedents and who were subsequently

acquitted/discharged in the criminal case, could be

cancelled by the Screening Committee of the Delhi

Police on the ground that they are not found

suitable for appointment to the post of Constable.”

After considering the rival contentions, the Court held :

“23. A careful perusal of the policy leads us to

conclude that the Screening Committee would be

entitled to keep persons involved in grave cases of

moral turpitude out of the police force even if they are

acquitted or discharged if it feels that the acquittal or

discharge is on technical grounds or not honourable.

The Screening Committee will be within its rights to

cancel the candidature of a candidate if it finds that the

acquittal is based on some serious flaw in the conduct

of the prosecution case or is the result of material

witnesses turning hostile. It is only experienced officers

of the Screening Committee who will be able to judge

whether the acquitted or discharged candidate is likely

to revert to similar activities in future with more

strength and vigour, if appointed, to the post in a police

force. The Screening Committee will have to consider

the nature and extent of such person’s involvement in

the crime and his propensity of becoming a cause for

worsening the law and order situation rather than

maintaining it. In our opinion, this policy framed by the

Delhi Police does not merit any interference from this

Court as its object appears to be to ensure that only

persons with impeccable character enter the police

force.

24. We find no substance in the contention that by

cancelling the respondents’ candidature, the Screening

Committee has overreached the judgments of the

criminal court. We are aware that the question of co-

relation between a criminal case and a departmental

enquiry does not directly arise here, but, support can

be drawn from the principles laid down by this Court in

connection with it because the issue involved is

somewhat identical, namely, whether to allow a person

with doubtful integrity to work in the department. While

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the standard of proof in a criminal case is the proof

beyond all reasonable doubt, the proof in a

departmental proceeding is preponderance of

probabilities. Quite often criminal cases end in acquittal

because witnesses turn hostile. Such acquittals are not

acquittals on merit. An acquittal based on benefit of

doubt would not stand on a par with a clean acquittal

on merit after a full-fledged trial, where there is no

indication of the witnesses being won over. In R.P.

Kapur v. Union of India

[

AIR 1964 SC 787] this Court

has taken a view that departmental proceedings can

proceed even though a person is acquitted when the

acquittal is other than honourable.

25. The expression “ honourable acquittal” was

considered by this Court in S. Samuthiram [2013 (1)

SCC 598]. In that case this Court was concerned with a

situation where disciplinary proceedings were initiated

against a police officer. Criminal case was pending

against him under Section 509 IPC and under Section 4

of the Eve-Teasing Act. He was acquitted in that case

because of the non-examination of key witnesses.

There was a serious flaw in the conduct of the criminal

case. Two material witnesses turned hostile. Referring

to the judgment of this Court in RBI v. Bhopal Singh

Panchal [1994 (1) SCC 541] where in somewhat similar

fact situation, this Court upheld a bank’s action of

refusing to reinstate an employee in service on the

ground that in the criminal case he was acquitted by

giving him benefit of doubt and, therefore, it was not

an honourable acquittal, this Court held that the High

Court was not justified in setting aside the punishment

imposed in the departmental proceedings. This Court

observed that the expressions “honourable acquittal”,

“acquitted of blame” and “fully exonerated” are

unknown to the Criminal Procedure Code or the Penal

Code. They are coined by judicial pronouncements. It is

difficult to define what is meant by the expression

“honourably acquitted”. This Court expressed that

when the accused is acquitted after full consideration

of the prosecution case and the prosecution miserably

fails to prove the charges levelled against the accused,

it can possibly be said that the accused was honourably

acquitted.

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26. In light of the above, we are of the opinion that

since the purpose of the departmental proceedings is to

keep persons, who are guilty of serious misconduct or

dereliction of duty or who are guilty of grave cases of

moral turpitude, out of the department, if found

necessary, because they pollute the department, surely

the above principles will apply with more vigour at the

point of entry of a person in the police department i.e.

at the time of recruitment. If it is found by the

Screening Committee that the person against whom a

serious case involving moral turpitude is registered is

discharged on technical grounds or is acquitted of the

same charge but the acquittal is not honourable, the

Screening Committee would be entitled to cancel his

candidature. Stricter norms need to be applied while

appointing persons in a disciplinary force because

public interest is involved in it.

27. Against the above background, we shall now

examine what is the nature of acquittal of the

respondents. As per the complaint lodged by Ramji Lal,

respondent Mehar Singh and others armed with iron

chains, lathis, danda, stones, etc. stopped a bus,

rebuked the conductor of the bus as to how he dared to

take the fare from one of their associates. Those who

intervened were beaten up. They received injuries. The

miscreants broke the side windowpanes of the bus by

throwing stones. The complainant was also injured.

This incident is undoubtedly an incident affecting public

order. The assault on the conductor was preplanned

and premeditated. The FIR was registered under

Sections 143, 341, 323 and 427 IPC. The order dated

30-1-2009 passed by the Additional Chief Judicial

Magistrate, Khetri shows that so far as offences under

Sections 323, 341 and 427 IPC are concerned, the

accused entered into a compromise with the

complainant. Hence, the learned Magistrate acquitted

respondent Mehar Singh and others of the said

offences. The order further indicates that so far as

offence of rioting i.e. offence under Section 147 IPC is

concerned, three main witnesses turned hostile. The

learned Magistrate, therefore, acquitted all the accused

of the said offence. This acquittal can never be

described as an acquittal on merits after a full-fledged

trial. Respondent Mehar Singh cannot secure entry in

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Page 10 Civil Appeal No. of 2014 @ SLP (C) No.36237 of 2012

the police force by portraying this acquittal as an

honourable acquittal. Pertinently, there is no discussion

on merits of the case in this order. Respondent Mehar

Singh has not been exonerated after evaluation of the

evidence.

28. So far as respondent Shani Kumar is concerned,

the FIR lodged against him stated that he along with

other accused abused and threatened the

complainant’s brother. They opened fire at him due to

which he sustained bullet injuries. The offences under

Sections 307, 504 and 506 IPC were registered against

respondent Shani Kumar and others. The order dated

14-5-2010 passed by the Sessions Judge,

Muzaffarnagar shows that the complainant and the

injured person did not support the prosecution case.

They were declared hostile. Hence, the learned

Sessions Judge gave the accused the benefit of doubt

and acquitted them. This again is not a clean acquittal.

The use of firearms in this manner is a serious matter.

For entry in the police force, acquittal order based on

benefit of doubt in a serious case of this nature is

bound to act as an impediment.

29. In this connection, we may usefully refer to Sushil

Kumar [1996(11) CC 605]. In that case, the

respondent therein had appeared for recruitment as a

Constable in Delhi Police Services. He was selected

provisionally, but, his selection was subject to

verification of character and antecedents by the local

police. On verification, it was found that his

antecedents were such that his appointment to the

post of Constable was not found desirable.

Accordingly, his name was rejected. He approached

the Tribunal. The Tribunal allowed the application on

the ground that since the respondent had been

discharged and/or acquitted of the offence punishable

under Section 304, Section 324 read with Section 34

and Section 324 IPC, he cannot be denied the right of

appointment to the post under the State. This Court

disapproved of the Tribunal’s view. It was observed

that verification of the character and antecedents is

one of the important criteria to test whether the

selected candidate is suitable for the post under the

State. This Court observed that though the candidate

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Page 11 Civil Appeal No. of 2014 @ SLP (C) No.36237 of 2012

was provisionally selected, the appointing authority

found it not desirable to appoint him on account of his

antecedent record and this view taken by the

appointing authority in the background of the case

cannot be said to be unwarranted. Whether the

respondent was discharged or acquitted of the

criminal offences, the same has nothing to do with the

question as to whether he should be appointed to the

post. What would be relevant is the conduct or

character of the candidate to be appointed to a

service and not the actual result thereof.

30. It was argued that Sushil Kumar must be

distinguished from the facts of the instant case

because the respondent therein had concealed the

fact that a criminal case was registered against him,

whereas, in the instant case there is no concealment.

It is not possible for us to accept this submission. The

aspect of concealment was not considered in Sushil

Kumar at all. This Court only concentrated on the

desirability to appoint a person, against whom a

criminal case is pending, to a disciplined force. Sushil

Kumar cannot be restricted to cases where there is

concealment of the fact by a candidate that a criminal

case was registered against him. When the point of

concealment or otherwise and its effect was not

argued before this Court, it cannot be said that in

Sushil Kumar this Court wanted to restrict its

observations to the cases where there is concealment

of facts.

xxxxxxxxx

33. So far as respondent Mehar Singh is concerned,

his case appears to have been compromised. It was

urged that acquittal recorded pursuant to a

compromise should not be treated as a

disqualification because that will frustrate the purpose

of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987. We see no

merit in this submission. Compromises or settlements

have to be encouraged to bring about peaceful and

amiable atmosphere in the society by according a

quietus to disputes. They have to be encouraged also

to reduce arrears of cases and save the litigants from

the agony of pending litigation. But these

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considerations cannot be brought in here. In order to

maintain integrity and high standard of police force,

the Screening Committee may decline to take

cognizance of a compromise, if it appears to it to be

dubious. The Screening Committee cannot be faulted

for that.

xxxxxxxxxx

35. The police force is a disciplined force. It shoulders

the great responsibility of maintaining law and order

and public order in the society. People repose great

faith and confidence in it. It must be worthy of that

confidence. A candidate wishing to join the police

force must be a person of utmost rectitude. He must

have impeccable character and integrity. A person

having criminal antecedents will not fit in this

category. Even if he is acquitted or discharged in the

criminal case, that acquittal or discharge order will

have to be examined to see whether he has been

completely exonerated in the case because even a

possibility of his taking to the life of crimes poses a

threat to the discipline of the police force. The

Standing Order, therefore, has entrusted the task of

taking decisions in these matters to the Screening

Committee. The decision of the Screening Committee

must be taken as final unless it is mala fide. In recent

times, the image of the police force is tarnished.

Instances of police personnel behaving in a wayward

manner by misusing power are in public domain and

are a matter of concern. The reputation of the police

force has taken a beating. In such a situation, we

would not like to dilute the importance and efficacy of

a mechanism like the Screening Committee created

by the Delhi Police to ensure that persons who are

likely to erode its credibility do not enter the police

force. At the same time, the Screening Committee

must be alive to the importance of the trust reposed

in it and must treat all candidates with an even

hand.”

13.From the above observations of this Court, it is clear that a

candidate to be recruited to the police service must be worthy of

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Page 13 Civil Appeal No. of 2014 @ SLP (C) No.36237 of 2012

confidence and must be a person of utmost rectitude and must

have impeccable character and integrity. A person having

criminal antecedents will not fit in this category. Even if he is

acquitted or discharged, it cannot be presumed that he was

completely exonerated. Persons who are likely to erode the

credibility of the police ought not to enter the police force. No

doubt the Screening Committee has not been constituted in the

case considered by this Court, as rightly pointed out by learned

counsel for the Respondent, in the present case, the

Superintendent of Police has gone into the matter. The

Superintendent of Police is the appointing authority. There is no

allegation of mala fides against the person taking the said

decision nor the decision is shown to be perverse or irrational.

There is no material to show that the appellant was falsely

implicated. Basis of impugned judgment is acquittal for want of

evidence or discharge based on compounding.

14.The plea of parity with two other persons who were recruited

can also not help the respondent. This aspect of the matter was

also gone into by this Court in Mehar Singh (supra) and it was

held :

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Page 14 Civil Appeal No. of 2014 @ SLP (C) No.36237 of 2012

“36. The Screening Committee’s proceedings have

been assailed as being arbitrary, unguided and

unfettered. But, in the present cases, we see no

evidence of this. However, certain instances have been

pointed out where allegedly persons involved in serious

offences have been recommended for appointment by

the Screening Committee. It is well settled that to such

cases the doctrine of equality enshrined in Article 14 of

the Constitution of India is not attracted. This doctrine

does not envisage negative equality (Fuljit Kaur (2010

(11) SCC 455). It is not meant to perpetuate illegality or

fraud because it embodies a positive concept. If the

Screening Committee which is constituted to carry out

the object of the comprehensive policy to ensure that

people with doubtful background do not enter the

police force, deviates from the policy, makes exception

and allows entry of undesirable persons, it is

undoubtedly guilty of committing an act of grave

disservice to the police force but we cannot allow that

illegality to be perpetuated by allowing the respondents

to rely on such cases. It is for the Commissioner of

Police, Delhi to examine whether the Screening

Committee has compromised the interest of the police

force in any case and to take remedial action if he finds

that it has done so. Public interest demands an in-depth

examination of this allegation at the highest level.

Perhaps, such deviations from the policy are

responsible for the spurt in police excesses. We expect

the Commissioner of Police, Delhi to look into the

matter and if there is substance in the allegations to

take necessary steps forthwith so that policy

incorporated in the Standing Order is strictly

implemented.”

15.Having given our thoughtful consideration, we are of the

view that the Division Bench of the High Court was not justified

in interfering with the order rejecting the claim of the respondent

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for recruitment to the police service by way of giving him

compassionate appointment.

16.Accordingly, we allow this appeal and set aside the

impugned order. There will be no order as to costs.

…………………………………………J.

(T.S. THAKUR)

.…………………………………………J.

(ADARSH KUMAR GOEL)

NEW DELHI

DECEMBER 1, 2014.

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