W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 1 of 94

ORISSA HIGH COURT : CUTTACK

I.A. No.160 of 2026

in

W.A. No.99 of 2026

In the matter of an Application to condone the delay

in filing Appeal under Article 4 of

the Odisha High Court Order, 1948

read with

Clause 10 of the Letters Patent constituting

the High Court of Judicature at Patna

and

Rule 6 of Chapter-III and Rule 2 of Chapter-VIII

of the Rules of the High Court of Odisha, 1948

***

1. State of Odisha

Represented through its

Principal Secretary to Government

(at present

Commissioner-cum-Secretary

Panchayati Raj and Drinking Water Department

Secretariat Building, Bhubaneswar

District: Khordha.

2. Engineer-in-Chief

Panchayati Raj and Drinking Water Department

Lokseva Bhawan, Bhubaneswar

District: Khordha – 751 001.

3. Chief Engineer (RWSS)

Panchayati Raj and Drinking Water Department

Lokseva Bhawan, Bhubaneswar

District: Khordha – 751 001.

4. Additional Chief Engineer

(Panchayati Raj and Drinking Water)

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 2 of 94

RWSS Circle, Cuttack, Mahanadi Vihar,

P.O.: Nayabazar, District: Cuttack – 753 004.

5. Superintending Engineer

(Panchayati Raj and Drinking Water)

RWSS Division, Cuttack

At: Mahanadi Vihar, P.O.: Nayabazar

District: Cuttack – 753 004. … Appellants

(Opposite party Nos.1 to 5

in the Writ Petition).

-VERSUS-

Ratnakar Swain

Aged about 60 years

Son of Late Brundaban Swain

Village/P.O.: Lekhanpur, P.S.: Salepur

District: Cuttack … Respondent

(Petitioner in

the Writ Petition).

Counsel appeared for the parties:

For the Appellants : Mr. Debashis Tripathy,

Additional Government Advocate

For the Respondent : M/s. Jajati Keshari Khuntia,

Himansu Sekhar Deo,

Braja Kishore Mohanty,

Sai Suman, Advocates

P R E S E N T:

HONOURABLE CHIEF JUSTICE

MR. HARISH TANDON

AND

HONOURABLE

MR. JUSTICE MURAHARI SRI RAMAN

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 3 of 94

Date of Hearing : 22.06.2026 :: Date of Judgment : 30.06.2026

JUDGMENT

MURAHARI SRI RAMAN, J.—

THE QUESTION FOR CONSIDERATION IN THE INTERLOCUTORY

APPLICATION FILED PRAYING THEREIN TO CONDONE THE DELAY IN

FILING THE INTRA-COURT APPEAL:

Whether this intra-Court of appeal is liable to be

entertained by condoning the delay of 303 days

(excluding the prescribed period of thirty days) in filing

the writ appeal by the functionaries of the Government

of Odisha, being aggrieved by Order dated 13.02.2025

passed in W.P.(C) No.34529 of 2022, whereby and

whereunder allowing the writ petition invoking

provisions of Article 226 of the Constitution of India a

learned Single Judge of this Court directed the

appellants herein (the opposite parties in the writ

proceeding), to accord regularisation in the service and

pay retiral dues within period stipulated?

THE FACTS:

2. The factual matrix as discussed by the learned Single

Judge while disposing of the writ petition reveals that

the respondent was engaged as “Fitter Mechanic” on

Nominal Muster Roll basis with effect from 16.12.1980

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 4 of 94

in Salipur Division under the administrative control of

the Superintending Engineer, (Panchayati Raj and

Drinking Water), RWSS Division, Cuttack and the name

of the petitioner appears at serial No.54 of the gradation

list of the staff maintained by the then Executive

Engineer, Cuttack P.H. Division No.III, Cuttack.

2.1. Though the name of one Debendranath Puhan Fitter

Mechanic appeared in the said gradation list at serial

No.57 and his date of appointment, in the very division

of the petitioner was 05.03.1981, his service was

regularized treating the same as pensionable. Such fact

could come to the notice of the petitioner from an

information supplied under the Right to Information Act,

2005.

2.2. The petitioner got retired from service on 28.02.2022 on

attaining age of superannuation and was relieved.

2.3. On consideration of the length of service the respondent

had rendered since 16.12.1980 till he retired on

28.02.2022 (more than four decades), and taking note of

principles and view percolated through Jagoo Vrs. Union

of India 2024 INSC 1034; Shripal & another Vrs. Nagar

Nigam, Ghaziabad, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 221; Secretary,

State of Karnataka Vrs. Uma Devi, (2006) 4 SCC 1 and

many others on the subject, the learned Single Judge

held as follows:

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 5 of 94

“There cannot be a more glaring case than the case at

hand when after serving for more than four decades, on

flimsy grounds notwithstanding the regularization of

junior to him, petitioner is still in the portals of the Court to

get his legitimate dues and the matter has suffered

number of adjournments for non-filing of the counter.”

2.4. Taking note of decision rendered by this Court in

Chandra Nandi Vrs. State of Odisha, 2014 (I) OLR 734

and in the case of Narusu Pradhan Vrs. State of Odisha,

O.A No.1189(C) of 2006 disposed of on 11.06.2009

1 by

the learned Odisha Administrative Tribunal, Cuttack

Bench, Cuttack, the learned Single Bench directed as

follows:

“13. Accordingly, impugned order at Annexure-5 is

quashed. It is directed that the services of the

petitioner shall be regularized with effect from the

date the services of his junior, Mr. Puhan (adverted

to herein above) has been regularized and he shall

be paid retiral dues in accordance with law within a

period of three months hence, failing which, the

same shall entail interest at the rate of 10% per

annum from the date of entitlement till payment.

And, the recovery of such interest shall be effected

from the concerned official who is responsible.”

1

The principle decided by the Tribunal has not only been confirmed by a Division

Bench of this Court in State of Odisha Vrs. Narusu Pradhan, W.P.(C) No.5377 of

2010, dismissed on 19th December, 2011. The SLP before the Supreme Court of

India preferred by the State has been dismissed vide order dated 7th January,

2013 in Civil Appeal No.22498 of 2012. : See discussion of Division Bench of

this Court in State of Odisha Vrs. Saroj Kanta Chaini, WA No.199 of 2023, vide

Order dated 7

th

November, 2023.

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 6 of 94

2.5. Aggrieved thereby, the State of Odisha has approached

this Court in this writ appeal; but with a delay of 303

days (excluding thirty days of normal period allowed to

file appeal).

HEARING OF THE INTERLOCUTORY APPLICATION FILED IN THE WRIT

APPEAL BY THE APPELLANTS FOR CONDONATION OF DELAY :

3. This matter was taken up for hearing on the point of

limitation on 22.06.2026. Having heard Sri Debashis

Tripathy, learned Additional Government Advocate for

the appellants and Sri Jajati Keshari Khuntia, learned

Advocate for the respondent, matter stood posted today

for orders.

Cause shown by the appellants explaining the delay:

4. The explanation offered by the State of Odisha in filing

the writ appeal with such inordinate delay is stated in

the petition as follows:

“2. That, the appellants have stated the necessary and

relevant facts of the case and the grounds on the

basis of which appeal is sought in the accompanying

Writ Appeal, and the same may be treated as part

and parcel of this application.

3. That, it is humbly submitted that the detailed factual

report in the matter was sought from the subordinate

offices. The officers of the Department examined the

impugned order dated 13.02.2025 by taking into

account various factors including nature of issues

involved, Rules, Regulations, Guidelines, Circulars

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 7 of 94

and Case Laws regulating the subject matter,

recurring effects and financial implications on the

State Exchequer. Accordingly, decision for filing of

Writ Appeal was taken. The draft Writ Appeal with

detailed grounds and justifications for challenging

the said impugned order was prepared and sent for

vetting to the Advocate General vide PR&DW

Department Letter No.30860, dated. 06.11.2025.

After vetting, the writ appeal was finalized and

accordingly is being filed on 12.01.2026 by AGA on

26.12.2025. As such, the delay of 303 days is bona

fide, and is neither deliberate nor intentional.”

Objection of the respondent:

5. Objections inter alia are raised by the respondent

against the explanation of the appellants showing cause

for the inordinate delay occurred in filing the writ

appeal:

i. After initiation of contempt proceedings for non-

compliance of the Order dated 13.02.2025 passed

in the writ petition by the learned Single Judge, the

writ appeal has been filed along with an application

for condonation of delay.

ii. The explanation offered by the appellants is vague,

evasive and the explanation does not cover entire

period of delay inclusive of normal specified period

allowed for filing appeal.

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 8 of 94

iii. The writ appeal, being hopelessly time-barred, the

merit of the case cannot be touched or examined.

Each day‟s delay being not explained by the

appellants the interlocutory application praying

therein to condone the delay in filing the writ

appeal is liable to be dismissed.

5.1. The respondent would rely on Pathupati Subba Reddy

Vrs. Special Deputy Collector, (2024) 4 SCR 241; Union of

India Vrs. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoi, (2024) 4 SCR 76;

Shivamma Vrs. Karnataka Housing Board, (2025) 9 SCR

1774; Israr Ahmed Khan Vrs. Amarnath Prasad, 2026

INSC 209, et. al. to buttress the stand that length of

delay is a relevant factor for consideration of application

for condonation of delay; inasmuch as there ought to be

end to a litigation. Per contra it is fervent request of the

appellants that inordinate days of delay in filing appeal

by the State of Odisha can be condoned on the

principles propounded in Collector, Land Acquisition,

Anantnag Vrs. Mst. Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107; G.

Ramegowda, Major Vrs. Special Land Acquisition Officer,

(1988) 2 SCC 142; State of Haryana Vrs. Chandra Mani,

(1996) 3 SCC 132; Sheo Raj Singh Vrs. Union of India,

(2023) 10 SCC 531; and Bhubaneswar Development

Authority Vrs. Madhumita Das, (2023) 6 SCR 590.

CONSIDERATION OF RIVAL CONTENTIONS AND SUBMISSIONS :

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 9 of 94

6. Sri Debashis Tripathy, learned Additional Government

Advocate for the appellants placed the fact leading to

delay in preferring the appeal by stating that after

receipt of inputs from different offices and upon scrutiny

of record and examination of law, it was decided to

approach the writ appeal. The claim of the respondent

was examined at various levels and the file was

submitted before the learned Advocate General for

taking steps to file the writ appeal. After thorough

examination and necessary vetting, the appeal could be

filed on 12.01.2026.

6.1. Sri Debashis Tripathy, learned Additional Government

Advocate contended that the writ appeal is required to

be considered on merits inasmuch as the order of the

learned Single Judge is vulnerable and placed heavy

reliance on the following observation made in paragraph

37 of Sheo Raj Singh (Deceased) through L.Rs. & others

Vrs. Union of India and another, (2023) 13 SCR 743

2:

2

The judgment in Sheo Raj Singh, (2023) 13 SCR 743 has a marked distinction

on facts, which is culled out by a three-Judge Bench of the Hon‟ble Supreme

Court in the case of Delhi Development Authority Vrs. Tejpal, (2024) 5 SCR 1211,

wherein it has been made categorical that:

“38. Similarly, in Sheo Raj Singh (supra), the marked distinction was the scope

of interference by this Court while exercising judicial review of an order of

condoning delay passed by a High Court. This Court distinguished

between the two situations, namely:

(i) its constraints while sitting in appeal over a discretionary order;

and

(ii) itself considering an application for condonation of delay.

Such a distinction is discernable from the following passage in Sheo Raj

Singh (supra):

„30. Be that as it may, it is important to bear in mind that we are not

hearing an application for condonation of delay but sitting in

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 10 of 94

“Having bestowed serious consideration to the rival

contentions, we feel that the High Court‟s decision to

condone the delay on account of the first respondent‟s

inability to the present appeal within time, for the reason

assigned therein, does not suffer from any error

warranting interference. As the aforementioned

judgments have shown, such an exercise of discretion

does, at times, call for a liberal and justice-oriented

approach by the Courts, where certain leeway could be

provided to the State. The hidden forces that are at work

in preventing an appeal by the State being presented

within the prescribed period of limitation so as not to

allow a higher court to pronounce upon the legality and

validity of an order of a lower court and thereby secure

unholy gains, can hardly be ignored. Impediments in the

working of the grand scheme of governmental functions

have to be removed by taking a pragmatic view on

balancing of the competing interests.”

6.2. He submitted that since the learned Single Judge

ignored basic factual backdrop that the respondent was

engaged on NMR basis initially and was brought to work

charged establishment in the year 2009 along with other

appeal over a discretionary order of the High Court granting the

prayer for condonation of delay. In the case of the former, whether

to condone or not would be the only question whereas in the latter,

whether there has been proper exercise of discretion in favour of

grant of the prayer for condonation would be the question…‟

39. It seems to us that acceding to the appellants‟ request on the aforesaid

account would also have undesirable consequences. If delay were to be

condoned merely on the basis of a broad general assertion of bureaucratic

indifference, without requiring demonstration of bona fide or an act of

mala fide on the part of specific individuals, it would create an artificial

distinction between the private parties and the Government entities vis-à-

vis the law of limitation. This would not be in conformity with the spirit of

equality before law as guaranteed under our Constitution. Allowing such

latitude would further distort incentives for the Government and

encourage more laxity by the bureaucracy in its general functioning,

thereby undermining quality governance.”

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 11 of 94

NMRs under RWSS due to benevolent policy of the

Government and got retired on attaining the age of

superannuation under work charged establishment in

the year 2022 even as his seniors were awaiting for their

absorption under regular establishment.

6.3. Sri Debashis Tripathy urged that the Odisha Civil

Services (Pension) Rules, 1992 as amended by virtue of

the Odisha Civil Services (Pension) Amendment Rules,

2005 vide Notification No.44451 dated 17.09.2005 does

not extend the benefit of pension to the employee in the

work charged establishment.

6.4. He, therefore, persisted to condone the delay of 303 days

occasioned by official process and requested for

admitting the writ appeal for hearing on merit.

Elaborating arguments further Sri Debashis Tripathy,

learned Additional Governmen t Advocate canvassed

before the Court that proviso to sub-rule (4) of Rule 3 of

the Odisha Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1992

postulates that the scheme envisioned by way of

amendment in 2005 would not apply to the persons who

are appointed under job contract and work charged

establishments prior to 01.01.2005 and brought over to

the regular establishment on or after 01.01.2005. It is

therefore urged that even if maintaining parity the

respondent would be notionally brought to regular

establishment just before the date of retirement in view

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 12 of 94

of Chandra Nandi (supra), no benefit of pension can be

extended as the Rules have suffered amendment in the

year 2005. Granting pension to the respondent by

accepting the decision of the learned Single Judge would

be contradictory to the provisions of the Rules. The

learned Additional Government Advocate thus submits

to utilize the discretion by condoning the delay, be it

inordinate. The delay is to be weighed looking at the

merit of the matter to meet the ends of justice. If the

scales of balance are not utilized in favour of the State in

the present context, it would tantamount to negating the

provisions of the Odisha Civil Services (Pension) Rules.

6.5. It is emphasised that the delay in filing the writ appeal

be condoned and the matter is required to be considered

on merits in its own perspective.

7. Sri Jajati Keshari Khuntia, learned Advocate for the

respondent vociferously argued that while exercising

power to condone the delay, the merit of the writ appeal

cannot be taken into consideration; it is only the merit

so far as the delay is concerned deserves to be

considered. The appellants have not provided any

plausible explanation. The State of Odisha in its

interlocutory application failed to demonstrate

“sufficient” and “reasonable” cause. In State of Madhya

Pradesh Vrs. Bherulal, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 849, quoting

from Chief Post Master General Vrs. Living Media India

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 13 of 94

Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC 563 in extenso, it was held that two

years delay in filing writ petition against Order of the

learned Odisha Administrative Tribunal is not liable to

be condoned. On the same analogy, in the present case,

as no sufficient and reasonable cause has been shown

by the appellants-functionaries of the State of Odisha in

the petition for condonation of delay, there is no scope

left than to adhere to what has been directed by the

learned Single Judge while disposing of the writ petition.

7.1. It is submitted that the learned Single Judge in the right

earnest appreciated the plight of the respondent, who

was deprived of regularisation in service by bringing him

to the regular establishment from work charged

establishment so as to enable him to get the benefit of

grant of pension despite the fact that similarly situated

persons have already been extended such benefit. The

learned Single Judge having taken note of the fact that

despite opportunity the appellants did not wish to

furnish counter affidavit and it is only after contempt

proceeding being drawn up against the appellants, they

woke up from the slumber. Even otherwise, since the

junior employee was accorded the benefit, the

respondent having joined the organisation much prior to

named junior employee, is entitled to be given similar

benefit.

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 14 of 94

7.2. Alleging non-compliance of Order dated 13.02.2025 in

W.P.(C) No.34529 of 2022, a contempt application being

CONTC No.2750 of 2025 was filed on 23.06.2025.

However, the Writ Appeal being No.99 of 2026 was filed

on 12.01.2026, i.e., after the learned Single Judge

passed orders in the contempt petition on 08.08.2025.

7.3. The practice of belated filing of appeal has been

deprecated by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court of India in the

case of Israr Ahmad Khan Vrs. Amarnath Prasad, 2026

SCC OnLine SC 322 with the following observations:

“Belated/Delayed Appeals to Delay/Defeat

Implementation:

27. Delayed filing of appeals should be the exception,

but in recent times, the exception has practically

evolved to become the rule. Orders passed by the

Courts are not complied with for a long time, and

when Contempt Petitions are filed, belated appeals,

with tremendous delay, are preferred.

28. The (alleged) continuing contumacious conduct of the

defaulting party is sought to be justified on the mere

production of a Diary/Filing/Stamp Reporting

Number showing that an appeal has been preferred,

so as to obtain multiple adjournments in contempt

matters.

29. We, in no uncertain terms, deprecate these practices.

It is felt that by such modus operandi, disobedient

litigants act brazenly which has the further effect of

bringing down the authority and majesty of the

Courts and the rule of law, interfering in the

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 15 of 94

administration of justice. The same may well, in

certain situations, border on criminal contempt.

30. The High Courts should deal with such

unscrupulous litigants, moreso when they happen to

be „State‟, within the meaning of Article 12 of the

Constitution, or like bodies, with an iron hand.

Unless the High Courts, so also this Court deal with

these aspects firmly, we run the clear risk of erosion

of the unflinching faith that the ordinary litigants of

this country repose in the Judiciary at all levels. It is

the solemn duty of all of us manning the Courts

across the hierarchy to ensure that the public faith

never wavers.”

7.4. Sri Jajati Keshari Khuntia, learned Advocate laying

emphasis on the fact of inordinate delay, that too

without any plausible explanation in the interlocutory

application, submitted that a contempt petition was filed

alleging non-compliance of the Order of the learned

Single Judge in the writ petition. The appellants have

not only failed to comply with the direction of the

learned Single Judge, but also overstepped the period

stipulated in the Order dated 13.02.2025 passed in said

writ petition. As the authorities did not budge an inch

even as the respondent got retired on attaining

superannuation way back in the year 2022, finding no

alternative contempt application was filed.

7.5. He, therefore, strenuously argued that the plea of delay

on account of official process has no foundation as such

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 16 of 94

averment made without providing any material

particulars need not be considered. Such averment

being bald, terse and unintelligible is liable to be

discarded at the threshold.

7.6. The move of the appellants is calculated only to frustrate

the effect of direction contained in the Order dated

13.02.2025 passed in W.P.(C) No.34529 of 2022. It is

apparent from the contents of the writ appeal and the

averments made in the interlocutory application that the

appeal has been preferred only to avoid rigours of

contempt under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The

facts which were not brought to the notice of the learned

Single Judge nor were argued cannot be subject matter

to be agitated in the present appeal.

7.7. Under such premises, Sri Jajati Keshari Khuntia,

learned Advocate for the respondent has prayed to

dismiss the petition for condonation of delay and

consequently, urged not to entertain the writ appeal

being barred by limitation.

PROVISIONS REGARDING WRIT APPEAL AND THE PROVISIONS FOR

LIMITATION:

8. The writ appeal before this Court has been filed invoking

provisions of Clause 10 of the Letters Patent

Constituting the High Court of Judicature at Patna,

which stands thus:

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 17 of 94

“Civil Jurisdiction of the High Court

9. And We do further ordain that the High Court of

Judicature at Patna shall have power to remove and

to try and determine, as a Court of extraordinary

original Jurisdiction, any suit being or falling within

the jurisdiction of any Court subject to its

superintendence, when the said High Court may

think proper to do so, either on the agreement of the

parties to that effect, or for purposes of justice, the

reasons for so doing being recorded on the

proceedings of the said High Court.

10. And We do further ordain that an appeal shall lie to

the said High Court of Judicature at Patna from the

judgment (not being a judgment passed in the

exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a

decree or order made in the exercise of appellate

jurisdiction by a Court subject to the

superintendence of the said High Court, and not

being an order made in the exercise of revisional

jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order

passed or made in the exercise of the power of

superintendence under the provisions of Section 107

of the Government of India Act, or in the exercise of

criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the said High

Court or one Judge of any Division Court, pursuant

to Section 108 of Government of India Act and that

notwithstanding anything hereinbefore provided an

appeal shall lie to the said High Court from a

judgment of one Judge of said High Court or one

Judge of any Division Court, pursuant to Section 108

of the Government of India Act, made (on or after the

first day of February one thousand nine hundred

and twenty nine) in the exercise of appellate

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 18 of 94

jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in

the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court

subject to the superintendence of the said High

Court where the Judge who passed the judgment

declares that the case is a fit one for appeal; but that

the right of appeal from other judgments of Judges of

the said High Court or of such Division Court shall

be to us, Our Heirs or Successors in Our or Their

Privy Council, as hereinafter provided.”

8.1. Article 4 of the Orissa High Court Order, 1948 stands as

follows:

“The High Court of Orissa shall have, in respect of the

territories for the time being included in the Province of

Orissa, all such original, appellate and other jurisdiction

as under the law in force immediately before the

prescribed day is exercisable in respect of the said

territories or any part thereof by the High Court in Patna.”

8.2. Rule 6 of Chapter-III and Rule 2 of Chapter-VIII of the

Rules of the High Court of O rissa, 1948, are given

hereunder:

“Chapter-III

6. Appeals to the High Court under Article 4 of the

Orissa High Court Order, 1948 read with Clause 10

of the Letters Patent Constituting the High Court of

Judicature at Patna from the Judgment of a Bench

confirming the judgment of a lower Court under

Section 98 of the Code of Civil Procedure shall be

heard by a Bench consisting of at least three Judges

including both or either of the Judges of the Bench

from whose Judgment the appeal is preferred and, if

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 19 of 94

from the judgment of one Judge or a Bench of two

Judges, it shall be heard by a Bench consisting of at

least two Judges other than the Judge from whose

judgment the appeal is preferred.

Chapter-VIII

2. (1) Subject to Article 12 of the Orissa High Court

Order, 1948 every appeal to the High Court

under Article 4 thereof read with Clause 10 of

the Letters Patent Constituting the High Court

of Judicature at Patna from the judgment (not

being a judgment passed in the exercise of

appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or

order made in the exercise of appellate

jurisdiction by a Court subject to the

Superintendence of the High Court and not

being an order made in the exercise of

revisional jurisdiction, and not being a

sentence or order passed or made in the

exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of

the High Court or one Judge of any Division

Court pursuant to Article 225 of the

Constitution, shall be presented to the

Registrar within thirty days from the date

of the judgment appealed from unless a

Bench in its discretion, on good cause

shown, shall grant further time . The

Registrar shall endorse on the memorandum

the date of presentation and after satisfying

himself that the appeal is in order and is within

time shall cause it to be laid before a Bench for

orders at an early date. It shall be

accompanied by a certified copy of the

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 20 of 94

judgment appealed from together with a neatly

typed second copy thereof.

(2) Subject to Article 12 of the Orissa High Court

Order, 1948 every application for a Certificate

under Article 4 thereof read with Clause 10 of

the Letters Patent Constituting the High Court

of Judicature at Patna in the case of a

judgment of a Single Judge of the Court

deciding a second appeal shall be made orally

to the Judge in question immediately after the

judgment is delivered. No subsequent

application will be entertained unless upon a

duly stamped special application supported by

affidavit filed within thirty days and not more

from the date of the judgment the Judge is

satisfied that circumstances existed rendering

an immediate application impossible.

(3) If the Judge certifies that the case is a fit one

for appeal a duly stamped memorandum of

appeal may be presented to the Registrar

within a period not exceeding sixty days from

the date of the judgment unless the Judge in

his discretion on good cause shown shall grant

further time for its presentation.

(4) The memorandum of appeal need not be

accompanied by a copy of the judgment of

decree appealed from. ”

9. On conjoint reading of above provisions it is manifest

that notwithstanding unambiguous specific provisions

envisaging extension of time being postulated, the

appellants-functionaries of the State of Odisha ignored

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 21 of 94

to adhere to the recourse available therein showing

“good cause” with respect to delay caused in filing the

writ appeal.

9.1. Bearing in mind oft-quoted dicta that “a statute cannot

be used for a purpose alien to which it has been made,

and where a power is given to do a certain thing in a

certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at

all and that other methods of performance are necessarily

forbidden” [vide Taylor Vrs. Taylor, [L.R.] 1 Ch. 426, as

referred to in Sarda Mines Private Limited Vrs. State of

Odisha, 2026 SCC OnLine Ori 2303 ] scrutiny of I.A.

No.160 of 2026 reveals that the interlocutory application

for condonation of delay in filing writ appeal has been

filed with title “An Application under Section 5 of the

Limitation Act”. The nomenclature of cause title of said

petition strictly speaking is defective and as such the

petition is not maintainable for the reason that special

provision is available under the Rules of the High Court

of Orissa, 1948.

9.2. Be that as it may, without going into the technicalities,

this Court proceeds to consider the said interlocutory

application for condonation of delay taking into account

the reason ascribed therein for ascertaining whether the

appellants have shown “good cause”/”sufficient cause”

for filing the writ appeal with an inordinate delay of 303

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 22 of 94

days (excluding 30 days specified period for filing the

appeal) and on the basis of material available on record.

ANALYSIS:

10. Above provisions would go to indicate that the writ

appeal under Article 4 of the Odisha High Court Order,

1948 read with Clause 10 of the Letters Patent

constituting the High Court of Judicature at Patna is

required to be presented before this Court within thirty

days from the date of the judgment appealed from as

provided for in Rule 2 of Chapter-VIII of the Rules of the

High Court of Orissa, 1948. In the event the appeal is

not preferred within the said stipulated period, it is the

Bench which is empowered to use its discretion to “grant

further time”, subject to, of course, appreciation of “good

cause”.

11. Nevertheless, with the contents contained in the petition,

bearing I.A. No.160 of 2026, praying therein to condone

“the delay of 303 days in filing of the writ appeal”, this

Court now examines whether with the available material

on record as provided by the State of Odisha in said

petition “discretion” can be exercised to condone the

delay in preferring intra-Court appeal for “good cause”

shown by the appellants. Finding good cause shown,

this Court by exercising discretion may condone the

delay in filing the writ appeal by granting “further time”.

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 23 of 94

11.1. On a conspectus catena of decisions rendered by

different Courts it emerges that “discretion” means use

of private and independent thought. When anything is

left to be done according to one‟s discretion the law

intends it to be done with sound discretion and

according to law. Discretion is discerning between right

and wrong and one who has power to act at discretion is

bound by rule of reason. Discretion must not be

arbitrary. The very term itself stands unsupported by

circumstances imports the exercise of judgment, wisdom

and skill as contra-distinguished from unthinking folly,

heady violence or rash injustice. When applied to a

Court of Justice or Tribunal or quasi judicial body, it

means sound discretion guided by law. It must be

governed by rule, not by humour; it must not be

arbitrary, vague and fanciful but legal and regular.

Discretion must be exercised honestly and in the spirit

of the statute. It is the power given by a statute to make

choice among competing considerations. It implies power

to choose between alternative courses of action. It is not

unconfined and vagrant. It is canalized within banks

that keep it from overflowing.

11.2. In S.P. Road Link Vrs. State of Tripura, (2006) 144 STC

380 (Gau) reference has been made to Kumaon Mandal

Vikas Nigam Ltd. Vrs. Girja Shankar Pant, (2001) 1 SCC

182 to observe that “discretion” means when it is said

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 24 of 94

that something is to be done within the discretion of the

authorities, that something is to be done according to

the rules of reason and justice, not according to private

opinion, according to law, and not humour. It is to be,

not arbitrary, vague, and fanciful, but legal and regular.

And it must be exercised within the limit, to which an

honest man competent to the discharge of his office

ought to confine himself.

11.3. The following observations made in Lanka

Venkateswarlu Vrs. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2011) 3

SCR 217 are pertinent to be referred to:

“21. In the case of Sardar Amarjit Singh Katra (dead) by

LRs Vrs. Pramod Gupta (dead) by LRs., (2002)

Suppl.5 SCR 350 = (2003) 3 SCC 272, this Court

again emphasized that provisions contained in the

Order 22 CPC were devised to ensure continuation

and culmination in an effective adjudication and not

to retard further progress of the proceedings. The

provisions contained in the Order 22 are not to be

construed as a rigid matter of principle, but must

ever be viewed as a flexible tool of convenience in

the administration of justice. It was further observed

that laws of procedure are meant to regulate

effectively, assist and aid the object of doing a

substantial and real justice and not to foreclose even

adjudication on merits of substantial rights of citizen

under personal, property and other laws. In the case

of Mithailal Dalsangar Singh Vrs. Annabai Devram

Kini, (2003) 10 SCC 691, this Court again reiterated

that inasmuch as abatement results in denial of

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 25 of 94

hearing on the merits of the case, the provision of an

abatement has to be construed strictly. On the other

hand, the prayer of setting aside abatement and the

dismissal consequent upon abatement had to be

considered liberally. It was further observed as

follows:

„The Courts have to adopt a justice oriented

approach dictated by the uppermost consideration

that ordinarily a litigant ought not to be denied an

opportunity of having a lis determined on merits

unless he has, by gross negligence, deliberate

inaction or something akin to misconduct, disentitled

himself from seeking the·indulgence of the court.‟

22. The concepts of liberal approach and

reasonableness in exercise of the discretion by the

Courts in condoning delay, have been again stated

by this Court in the case of Balwant Singh (dead)

Vrs. Jagdish Singh, (2010) 8 SCR 597 = (2010) 8

SCC 685 as follows:

„25. We may state that even if the term „sufficient

cause‟ has to receive liberal construction, it

must squarely fall within the concept of

reasonable time and proper conduct of the

party concerned. The purpose of introducing

liberal construction normally is to introduce the

concept of „reasonableness‟ as it is understood

in its general connotation.

26. The law of limitation is a substantive law and

has definite consequences on the right and

obligation of party to arise. These principles

should be adhered to and applied

appropriately depending on the facts and

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 26 of 94

circumstances of a given case. Once a valuable

right has accrued in favour of one party as a

result of the failure of the other party to explain

the delay by showing sufficient cause and its

own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take

away that right on the mere asking of the

applicant, particularly when the delay is

directly a result of negligence, default or

inaction of that party. Justice must be done to

both parties equally. Then alone the ends of

justice can be achieved. If a party has been

thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights

and remedies, it will be equally unfair to

deprive the other party of a valuable right that

has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting

vigilantly.‟

***

24. Having recorded the aforesaid conclusions, the High

Court proceeded to condone the delay. In our

opinion, such a course was not open to the High

Court, given the pathetic explanation offered by the

respondents in the application seeking condonation

of delay.

25. This is especially so in view of the remarks made by

the High Court about the delay being caused by the

inefficiency and ineptitude of the Government

pleaders. The displeasure of the Court is patently

apparent from the impugned order ·itself. In the

opening paragraph of the impugned order the High

Court has, rather sarcastically, dubbed the

Government pleaders as without merit and ability.

Such an insinuation is clearly discernable from the

observation that „This is a classic case, how the

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 27 of 94

learned Government pleaders appointed on the basis

of merit and ability are discharging their function

protecting the interest of their clients.‟ Having said

so, the High Court, graphically narrated the clear

dereliction of duty by the concerned Government

pleaders in not pursuing the appeal before the High

Court diligently. The High Court has set out the

different stages at which the Government pleaders

had exhibited almost culpable negligence in

performance of their duties. The High Court found

the justification given by the Government pleaders to

be unacceptable. Twice in the impugned order, it

was recorded that in the normal course, the

applications would have been thrown out without

having a second thought in the matter. Having

recorded such conclusions, inexplicably, the

High Court proceeds to condone the

unconscionable delay.

26. We are at a loss to fathom any logic or

rationale, which could have impelled the High

Court to condone the delay after holding the

same to be unjustifiable. The concepts such as

„liberal approach‟, „justice oriented approach‟,

„substantial justice‟ cannot be employed to

jettison the substantial law of limitation.

Especially, in cases where the Court concludes that

there is no justification for the delay. In our opinion,

the approach adopted by the High Court tends to

show the absence of judicial balance and restraint,

which a Judge is required to maintain whilst

adjudicating any lis between the parties. We are

rather pained to notice that in this case, not being

satisfied with the use of mere intemperate language,

the High Court resorted to blatant sarcasms. The use

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 28 of 94

of unduly strong intemperate or extravagant

language in a judgment has been repeatedly

disapproved by this Court in a number of cases.

Whilst considering applications for

condonation of delay under Section 5 of the

Limitation Act, the Courts do not enjoy

unlimited and unbridled discretionary powers.

All discretionary powers, especially judicial

powers, have to be exercised within reasonable

bounds, known to the law. The discretion has to

be exercised in a systematic manner informed by

reason. Whims or fancies; prejudices or predilections

cannot and should not form the basis of exercising

discretionary powers.”

11.4. The discretionary exercise of power amounts to

something that is not compulsory, but it is left to the

discretion of the person or authority involved, such as a

discretionary grant. It is opposite to “mandatory”.

Therefore, “discretionary” is a term which involves an

alternative power, i.e., a power to do or refrain from

doing a certain thing. In other words, it would be power

of free decision or choice within certain legal bounds.

12. In this regard, therefore, the interpretation of the

expression “sufficient cause” as found in the provisions

of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 has bearing on

the question that is involved in the instant case.

12.1. The expression “satisfies the Court” employed in Section

5 of the Limitation Act has significance. “Satisfaction”

before completion of the proceedings under the Act is a

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 29 of 94

condition precedent for the exercise of jurisdiction. It is

the satisfaction of the Court in the course of the

proceedings regarding the delay in approaching the

Court with sufficient reason, which constitutes the basis

and foundation of the proceedings for consideration of

condonation of delay. There must be something which

shows from the record itself that in the course of the

proceedings the Court was satisfied that there was

sufficiency of reason for not approaching the Court

within stipulated period and, therefore, it is a case in

which the appeal deserves to be admitted for hearing on

merit. To be satisfied with a state of things means to be

honestly satisfied in one‟s own mind. Satisfaction is

essentially a condition of the mind. It means that there

is a substantial ground for the conclusion on the

material available the phrase „satisfied‟ means, makes

up its mind; actual persuasion; a mind not troubled by

doubt or a mind which has reached a clear conclusion.

12.2. In Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal Vrs. Rewa Coalfields

Ltd., (1962) 2 SCR 762 it has been succinctly stated:

“Section 5 of the Limitation Act provides for extension of

period in certain cases. It lays down, inter alia, that any

appeal may be admitted after the period of limitation

prescribed therefor when the appellant satisfies the Court

that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal

within such period. This section raises two questions for

consideration. First is, what is sufficient cause; and

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 30 of 94

the second, what is the meaning of the clause

„within such period‟?”

***

In construing Section 5·it is relevant to bear in mind two

important considerations. The first consideration is that

the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for

making an appeal gives rise to a right in favour of the

decree-holder to treat the decree as binding between the

parties. In other words, when the period of limitation

prescribed has expired the decree-holder has obtained a

benefit under the law of limitation to treat the decree as

beyond challenge, and this legal right which has accrued

to the decree-holder by lapse of time should not be light,

heartedly disturbed. The other consideration which

cannot be-ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing

delay is shown discretion is given to the Court to condone

delay and admit the appeal. This discretion has been

deliberately conferred on the Court in order that judicial

power and discretion in that behalf should be exercised to

advance substantial justice. As has been observed by the

Madras High Court in Krishna Vrs. Chattappan, 1890 ILR

13 Mad 269:

„Section 5 gives the Court a discretion which in respect of

jurisdiction is to be exercised in the way in·which judicial

power and discretion ought to be exercised upon

principles which are well understood; the words

„sufficient cause‟ receiving a liberal construction so as to

advance substantial justice when no negligence nor

inaction nor want of bona fide is imputable to the

appellant.‟

Now, what do the words „within such period‟ denote? It is

possible that the expression „within such period‟ may

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 31 of 94

sometimes mean during such period. But the question is:

Does the context in. which the expression occurs in

Section 5 justify the said interpretation? If the Limitation

Act or any other appropriate statute prescribes different

periods of limitation either for appeals or applications to

which Section 5 applies that normally means that liberty

is given to the party intending to make the appeal or to file

an application to act within the period prescribed in that

behalf. It would not be reasonable to require a party to

take the necessary action on the very first day after the

cause of action accrues. In view of the period of limitation

prescribed the party would be entitled to take its time and

to file the appeal on any day during the said period and

so prima facie it appears unreasonable that when the

delay has been made by the party in filing the appeal it

should be called upon to explain its conduct during the

whole of the period of limitation prescribed. In our opinion,

it would be immaterial and even irrelevant to invoke

general considerations of diligence of parties in construing

the words of Section 5. The context seems to suggest that

„within such period‟ means within the period which ends

with the last day of limitation prescribed. In other words,

in all cases falling under Section 5 what the party has to

show is why he did not file an appeal on the last day of

limitation prescribed. That may inevitably mean that the

party will have to show sufficient cause not only for not

filing the appeal on the last day but to explain the delay

made thereafter day by day. In other words, in showing

sufficient cause for condoning the delay the party may be

called upon to explain for the whole of the delay covered

by the period between the last day prescribed for filing

the appeal and the day on which the appeal is filed. To

hold that the expression „within such period‟ means

during such period would, in our opinion, be repugnant in

the context. We would accordingly hold that the learned

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 32 of 94

Judicial Commissioner was in error taking the view that

the failure of the appellant to account for its non-diligence

during the whole of the period of limitation prescribed for

the appeal necessarily disqualified it from praying for the

condonation of delay, even though the delay in question

was only for one day; and that too was caused by the

party‟s illness.

***

It is, however, necessary to emphasise that even after

sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to

the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right.

The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for

the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the

court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not proved

nothing further has to be done; the application for

condoning delay has to be dismissed on that ground

alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the court

has to enquire whether in its discretion it should

condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally

introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is

at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides

may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry

while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient

cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such

facts as the court may regard as relevant. It cannot justify

an enquiry as to why the party was sitting idle during all

the time available to it. In this connection we may point

out that considerations of bona fides or due diligence are

always material and relevant when the court is dealing

with applications made under Section 14 of the Limitation

Act. In dealing with such applications the Court is called

upon to consider the effect of the combined provisions of

Sections 5 and 14. Therefore, in our opinion,

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 33 of 94

considerations which have been expressly made material

and relevant by the provisions of Section 14 cannot to the

same extent and in the same manner be invoked in

dealing with applications which fall to be decided only

under Section 5 without reference to Section 14. ***”

12.3. It needs to be discussed the connotation of “good cause”

vis-à-vis “sufficient cause”. In Arjun Singh Vrs. Mohindra

Kumar, (1964) 5 SCR 946, these two terms have been

considered as follows:

“Before proceeding to deal with the arguments addressed

to us by Mr. Setalvad— learned counsel for the appellant,

it would be convenient to mention a point, not seriously

pressed before us, but which at earlier stages was

thought to have considerable significance for the decision

of this question viz., the difference between the words

„good cause‟ for non-appearance in Order IX, Rule 7 and

„sufficient cause‟ for the same purpose in Order IX, Rule

13 as pointing to different criteria of „goodness‟ or

„sufficiency‟ for succeeding in the two proceedings, and as

therefore furnishing a ground for the inapplicability of the

rule of res judicata. As this ground was not seriously

mentioned before us, we need not examine it in any

detail, but we might observe that we do not see any

material difference between the facts to be

established for satisfying the two tests of „good

cause‟ and „sufficient cause‟. We are unable to

conceive of a „good cause‟ which is not „sufficient‟

as affording an explanation for non -appearance,

nor conversely of a „sufficient cause‟ which is not a

good one and we would add that either of these is

not different from „good and sufficient cause‟ which

is used in this context in other statutes. If, on the

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 34 of 94

other hand, there is any difference between the two it can

only be that the requirement of a „good cause‟ is complied

with on a lesser degree of proof than that of „sufficient

cause‟ and if so, this cannot help the appellant, since

assuming the applicability of the principle of res judicata

to the decisions in the two proceedings, if the court finds

in the first proceeding, the lighter burden not discharged,

it must a fortiori bar the consideration of the same matter

in the later, where the standard of proof of that matter is,

if anything, higher.”

12.4. The meaning of „sufficient‟ is „adequate‟ or „enough‟,

inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose

intended. Therefore, word „sufficient‟ embraces no more

than that which provides a platitude which when the act

done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the

facts and circumstances existing in a case and duly

examined from the view point of a reasonable standard

of a cautious man. „Sufficient cause‟ means that the

party had not acted in a negligent manner or there was a

want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and

circumstances of a case or the party cannot be alleged to

have been „not acting diligently‟ or „remaining inactive‟.

However, the facts and circumstances of each case must

afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to

exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the

Court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised

judiciously. While deciding whether there is sufficient

cause or not, the Court must bear in mind the object of

doing substantial justice to all the parties concerned and

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 35 of 94

that the technicalities of the law should not prevent the

Court from doing substantial justice and doing away the

illegality perpetuated on the basis of the judgment

impugned before it. “Sufficient cause” is thus the cause

for which the defendant could not be blamed for his

absence. Therefore, the applicant must approach the

Court with a reasonable defence. Sufficient cause is a

question of fact and the Court has to exercise its

discretion in the varied and special circumstances in

the case at hand. There cannot be a straitjacket

formula of universal application. [Ref.: Ramlal, Motilal

and Chhotelal Vrs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., AIR 1962 SC

361 = (1962) 2 SCR 762; Lonard Grampanchayat Vrs.

Ramgiri Gosavi, AIR 1968 SC 222; Surinder Singh Sibia

Vrs. Vijay Kumar Sood, (1992) 1 SCC 70; Orinental Aroma

Chemical Industries Ltd. Vrs. Gujarat Industrial

Development Corporation, (2010) 5 SCC 459; Parimal Vrs.

Veena, (2011) 3 SCC 545; Sudarshan Sareen Vrs.

National Small Industries Corporation Ltd., 2013 SCC

OnLine Del 4412; State of Bihar Vrs. Kameshwar Prasad

Singh, (2000) 9 SCC 94; Madanlal Vrs. Shyamlal, (2002) 1

SCC 535; Davinder Pal Sehgal Vrs. Partap Steel Rolling

Mills (P) Ltd., (2002) 3 SCC 156; Ram Nath Sao Vrs.

Gobardhan Sao, (2002) 3 SCC 195, Kaushalya Devi Vrs.

Prem Chand, (2005) 10 SCC 127, Srei International

Finance Ltd. Vrs. Fairgrowth Financial Services Ltd.,

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 36 of 94

(2005) 13 SCC 95; Reena Sadh Vrs. Aniana Enterprises,

(2008) 12 SCC 589].

12.5. “Sufficient cause” has to be construed as an elastic

expression for which no hard-and-fast guidelines can

be prescribed. The Courts have a wide discretion in

deciding the sufficient cause keeping in view the

peculiar facts and circumstances of each case. The

“sufficient cause” for non-appearance refers to the date

on which the absence was made a ground for proceeding

ex parte and cannot be stretched to rely upon other

circumstances anterior in time. If “sufficient cause” is

made out for non-appearance of the defendant on the

date fixed for hearing when ex parte proceedings were

initiated against him, he cannot be penalised for his

previous negligence which had been overlooked and

thereby condoned earlier. In a case where the defendant

approaches the Court immediately and within the

statutory time specified, the discretion is normally

exercised in his favour, provided the absence was not

mala fide or intentional. For the absence of a party in

the case the other side can be compensated by adequate

costs and the lis decided on merits. [Ref.: G.P. Srivastava

Vrs. R.K. Raizada, (2000) 3 SCC 54; A. Murugesan Vrs.

Jamuna Rani, (2019) 20 SCC 803]. The Court, in its

discretion, has to consider the „sufficient cause‟ in the

facts and circumstances of every individual case.

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 37 of 94

Although in interpreting the words „sufficient cause‟, the

Court has wide discretion but the same has to be

exercised in the particular facts of the case. See, Hira

Sweets & Confectionary Pvt. Ltd. Vrs. Hira Confectioners,

2021 SCC OnLine Del 1823.

12.6. In Balwant Singh Vrs. Jagdish Singh, (2010) 8 SCR 597

the ingredients of “sufficient cause” for the purpose of

condonation of delay has been discussed as follows:

“7. *** However, in terms of Section 5, the discretion is

vested in the Court to admit an appeal or an

application, after the expiry of the prescribed period

of limitation, if the appellant shows „sufficient cause‟

for not preferring the application within the

prescribed time. The expression „sufficient cause‟

commonly appears in the provisions of Order 22

Rule 9(2), CPC and Section 5 of the Limitation Act,

thus categorically demonstrating that they are to be

decided on similar grounds. The decision of such an

application has to be guided by similar precepts.

***

8. In the case of P.K. Ramachandran Vrs. State of

Kerala, (1997) 7 SCC 556 where there was delay of

565 days in filing the first appeal by the State, and

the High Court had observed, „taking into

consideration the averments contained in the

affidavit filed in support of the petition to condone

the delay, we are inclined to allow the petition".

While setting aside this order, this Court found that

the explanation rendered for condonation of delay

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 38 of 94

was neither reasonable nor satisfactory and held as

under:

„3. It would be noticed from a perusal of the

impugned order that the court has not recorded

any satisfaction that the explanation for delay

was either reasonable or satisfactory, which is

an essential prerequisite to condonation of

delay.

4. That apart, we find that in the application filed

by the respondent seeking condonation of

delay, the thrust in explaining the delay after

12.05.1995 is:

„*** at that time the Advocate General‟s office

was fed up with so many arbitration matters

(sic) equally important to this case were

pending for consideration as per the directions

of the Advocate General on 02.09.1995.‟

5. This can hardly be said to be a reasonable,

satisfactory or even a proper explanation for

seeking condonation of delay. In the reply filed

to the application seeking condonation of delay

by the appellant in the High Court, it is

asserted that after the judgment and decree

was pronounced by the learned Sub-Judge,

Kollam on 30.10.1993, the scope for filing of

the appeal was examined by the District

Government Pleader, Special Law Officer, Law

Secretary and the Advocate General and in

accordance with their opinion, it was decided

that there was no scope for filing the appeal

but later on, despite the opinion referred to

above, the appeal was filed as late as on

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 39 of 94

18.1.1996 without disclosing why it was being

filed. The High Court does not appear to have

examined the reply filed by the appellant as

reference to the same is conspicuous by its

absence from the order. We are not satisfied

that in the facts and circumstances of this

case, any explanation, much less a reasonable

or satisfactory one had been offered by the

respondent-State for condonation of the

inordinate delay of 565 days.

6. Law of limitation may harshly affect a

particular party but it has to be applied

with all its rigour when the statute so

prescribed and the courts have no power

to extend the period of limitation on

equitable grounds. The discretion exercised

by the High Court was, thus, neither proper nor

judicious. The order condoning the delay

cannot be sustained. This appeal, therefore,

succeeds and the impugned order is set aside.

Consequently, the application for condonation

of delay filed in the High Court would stand

rejected and the miscellaneous first appeal

shall stand dismissed as barred by time. No

costs.‟

***

10. Another Bench of this Court in a recent judgment of

Katari Suryanarayana Vrs. Koppisetti Subba Rao,

AIR 2009 SC 2907 again had an occasion to

construe the ambit, scope and application of the

expression „sufficient cause‟. The application for

setting aside the abatement and bringing the legal

heirs of the deceased on record was filed in that

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 40 of 94

case after a considerable delay. The explanation

rendered regarding the delay of 2381 days in filing

the application for condonation of delay and 2601

days in bringing the legal representatives on record

was not found to be satisfactory. Declining the

application for condonation of delay, the Court, while

discussing the case of Perumon Bhagvathy

Devaswom Vrs. Bhargavi Amma, (2008) 8 SCC 321

in its para 9 held as under:

„11. The words „sufficient cause for not making the

application within the period of limitation‟

should be understood and applied in a

reasonable, pragmatic, practical and liberal

manner, depending upon the facts and

circumstances of the case, and the type of

case. The words „sufficient cause‟ in Section 5

of Limitation Act should receive a liberal

construction so as to advance substantial

justice, when the delay is not on account of any

dilatory tactics, want of bona fides, deliberate

inaction or negligence on the part of the

appellant.‟

***

15. We feel that it would be useful to make a reference

to the judgment of this Court in Perumon Bhagvathy

Devaswom Vrs. Bhargavi Amma, (2008) 8 SCC 321.

In this case, the Court, after discussing a number of

judgments of this Court as well as that of the High

Courts, enunciated the principles which need to be

kept in mind while dealing with applications filed

under the provisions of Order 22, CPC along with an

application under Section 5, Limitation Act for

condonation of delay in filing the application for

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 41 of 94

bringing the legal representatives on record. In

paragraph 13 of the judgment, the Court held as

under:

„(i) The words „sufficient cause for not making the

application within the period of limitation‟

should be understood and applied in a

reasonable, pragmatic, practical and liberal

manner, depending upon the facts and

circumstances of the case, and the type of

case. The words „sufficient cause‟ in Section 5

of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal

construction so as to advance substantial

justice, when the delay is not on account of any

dilatory tactics, want of bona tides, deliberate

inaction or negligence on the part of the

appellant.

(ii) In considering the reasons for condonation of

delay, the courts are more liberal with

reference to applications for setting aside

abatement, than other cases. While the court

will have to keep in view that a valuable right

accrues to the legal representatives of the

deceased respondent when the appeal abates,

it will not punish an appellant with foreclosure

of the appeal, for unintended lapses. The

courts tend to set aside abatement and decided

the matter on merits. The courts tend to set

aside abatement and decide the matter on

merits, rather than terminate the appeal on the

ground of abatement.

(iii) The decisive factor in condonation of delay, is

not the length of delay, but sufficiency of a

satisfactory explanation.

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 42 of 94

(iv) The extent or degree of leniency to be shown by

a court depends on the nature of application

and facts and circumstances of the case. For

example, courts view delays in making

applications in a pending appeal more leniently

than delays in the institution of an appeal. The

courts view applications relating to lawyer's

lapses more leniently than applications relating

to litigant's lapses. The classic example is the

difference in approach of courts to applications

for condonation of delay in filing an appeal and

applications for condonation of delay in re-filing

the appeal after rectification of defects.

(i) Want of „diligence‟ or „inaction‟ can be

attributed to an appellant only when something

required to be done by him, is not done. When

nothing is required to be done, courts do not

expect the appellant to be diligent. Where an

appeal is admitted by the High Court and is

not expected to be listed for final hearing for a

few years, an appellant is not expected to visit

the court or his lawyer every few weeks to

ascertain the position nor keep checking

whether the contesting respondent is alive. He

merely awaits the call or information from his

counsel about the listing of the appeal. ***

16. Above are the principles which should control the

exercise of judicial discretion vested in the Court

under these provisions. The explained delay should

be clearly understood in contradistinction to

inordinate unexplained delay. Delay is just one of

the ingredients which has to be considered by the

Court. In addition to this, the Court must also take

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 43 of 94

into account the conduct of the parties, bona fide

reasons for condonation of delay and whether such

delay could easily be avoided by the applicant

acting with normal care and caution. The statutory

provisions mandate that applications for

condonation of delay and applications belatedly filed

beyond the prescribed period of limitation for

bringing the legal representatives on record, should

be rejected unless sufficient cause is shown for

condonation of delay. The larger benches as well

as equibenches of this Court have consistently

followed these principles and have either

allowed or declined to condone the delay in

filing such applications. Thus, it is the

requirement of law that these applications cannot be

allowed as a matter of right and even in a routine

manner. An applicant must essentially satisfy the

above stated ingredients; then alone the Court

would be inclined to condone the delay in the filing

of such applications.”

12.7. In Pundlik Jalam Patil Vrs. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon

Medium Project, (2008) 17 SCC 448, it is observed that:

“The laws of limitation are founded on public policy.

Statutes of limitation are sometimes described as

“statutes of peace”. An unlimited and perpetual threat of

limitation creates insecurity and uncertainty; some kind of

limitation is essential for public order. The principle is

based on the maxim “interest reipublicae ut sit finis

litium”, that is, the interest of the State requires that there

should be end to litigation but at the same time laws of

limitation are a means to ensure private justice

suppressing fraud and perjury, quickening diligence and

preventing oppression. The object for fixing time-limit for

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 44 of 94

litigation is based on public policy fixing a lifespan for

legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They are

meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory

tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in

his Jurisprudence states that the laws come to the

assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy.”

12.8. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court of India investigated if “to

condone, or not to condone” four days‟ delay, besides

examining as to “whether or not to apply the same

standard in applying the „sufficient cause‟ test to all the

litigants regardless of their personality” in Collector,

Land Acquisition, Anantnag Vrs. Mst. Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC

107 = (1987) 2 SCR 387 and laid down the following

dicta:

“The Legislature has conferred the power to condone

delay by enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of

1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial

justice to parties by disposing of matters on „merits‟. The

expression „sufficient cause‟ employed by the Legislature

is adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law

in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of

justice— that being the life-purpose for the existence of

the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this

Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in

matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not

appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in

the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on

principle as it is realized that:

1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by

lodging an appeal late.

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 45 of 94

2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a

meritorious matter being thrown out at the very

threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As

against this when delay is condoned the highest

that can happen is that a cause would be decided

on merits after hearing the parties.

3. „Every day‟s delay must be explained‟ does not

mean that a pedantic approach should be made.

Why not every hour‟s delay, every second‟s delay?

The doctrine must be applied in a rational common

sense pragmatic manner.

4. When substantial justice and technical

considerations are pitted against each other, cause

of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the

other side cannot claim to have vested right in

injustice being done because of a non-deliberate

delay.

5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned

deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or

on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to

benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a

serious risk.

6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on

account of its power to legalize injustice on technical

grounds but because it is capable of removing

injustice and is expected to do so.

Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective,

there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the

institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the „State‟

which was seeking condonation and not a private party

was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before

law demands that all litigants, including the State as a

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 46 of 94

litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is

administered in an even handed manner. There is no

warrant for according a step-motherly treatment when the

„State‟ is the applicant praying for condonation of delay.

In fact experience shows that on account of an impersonal

machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or

hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal)

and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with

the note-making, file pushing, and passing-on-the-buck

ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand

though more difficult to approve. In any event, the State

which represents the collective cause of the community,

does not deserve a litigant-non-grata status. The Courts

therefore have to be informed with the spirit and

philosophy of the provision in the course of the

interpretation of the expression „sufficient cause‟. So also

the same approach has to be evidenced in its application

to matters at hand with the end in view to do even

handed justice on merits in preference to the approach

which scuttles a decision on merits.”

12.9. Discussing the scope and discretion of the Court in

condoning the substantial delay caused in filing appeal

by the State in G. Ramegowda Major Vrs. Special Land

Acquisition Officer, (1988) 2 SCC 142 the Hon‟ble

Supreme Court of India observed as follows:

“15. In litigations to which Government is a party there is

yet another aspect which, perhaps, cannot be

ignored. If appeals brought by Government are

lost for such defaults, no person is individually

affected; but what, in the ultimate analysis,

suffers is public interest. The decisions of

Government are collective and institutional

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 47 of 94

decisions and do not share the characteristics

of decisions of private individuals.

16. The law of limitation is, no doubt, the same for

a private citizen as for Governmental-

authorities. Government, like any other litigant

must take responsibility for the acts or

omissions of its officers. But a somewhat

different complexion is imparted to the matter

where Government makes out a case where

public interest was shown to have suffered

owing to acts of fraud or bad faith on the part

of its officers or agents and where the officers

were clearly at cross-purposes with it.

17. Therefore, in assessing what, in a particular case,

constitutes „sufficient cause‟ for purposes of Section

5 it might, perhaps, be somewhat unrealistic to

exclude from the considerations that go into the

judicial verdict, these factors which are peculiar to

and characteristic of the functioning of the

Government. Governmental decisions are

proverbially slow encumbered, as they are, by a

considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the

process of their making. A certain amount of latitude

is, therefore, not impermissible. It is rightly said that

those who bear responsibility of Government must

have „a little play at the joints‟. Due recognition of

these limitations on Governmental functioning— of

course, within a reasonable limits—is necessary if

the judicial approach is not rendered unrealistic. It

would, perhaps, be unfair and unrealistic to put

Government and private parties on the same footing

in all respects in such matters. Implicit in the very

nature of Governmental functioning is procedural

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 48 of 94

delay incidental to the decision making process. In

the opinion of the High Court, the conduct of the law-

officers of the Government placed the Government in

a predicament and that it was one of these cases

where the mala fides of the officers should not be

imputed to Government. It relied upon and trusted

its law-officers. Lindley, M.R., in the In re: National

Bank of Wales Ltd., LR 1899 2 Ch. 629 @ 673

observed, though in a different context:

„Business cannot be carried on, upon principles of

distrust. Men in responsible positions must be

trusted by those above them, as well as by those

below them, until there is reason to distrust them.‟

In the opinion of the High Court, it took quite

sometime for the Government to realise that the law-

officers failed that trust.

18. While a private person can take instant decision a

„bureaucratic or democratic organ‟ it is said by a

learned Judge „hesitates and debates, consults and

considers, speaks through paper, moves horizontally

and vertically till at last it gravitates towards a

conclusion, unmindful of time and impersonally.‟ ***”

12.10. In absence of showing deliberate delay as a dilatory

tactic, the manner of use of discretion in favour of

condonation of delay in filing appeal by the State

machinery with due regard to „sufficient cause‟ has been

enumerated in N. Balakrishnan Vrs. M. Krishnamurty,

(1998) 7 SCC 123 in the following terms:

“8. The Appellant‟s conduct does not on the whole

warrant to castigate him as an irresponsible litigant.

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 49 of 94

What he did in defending the suit was not very

much far from what a litigant would broadly do. Of

course, it may be said that he should have been

more vigilant by visiting his advocate at short

intervals to check up the progress of the litigation.

But during these days when everybody is fully

occupied with his own avocation of life an omission

to adopt such extra vigilance need not be used as a

ground to depict him as a litigant not aware of his

responsibilities, and to visit him with drastic

consequences.

9. It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter

of discretion of the court Section 5 of the Limitation

Act does not say that such discretion can be

exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit.

Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of

the explanation is the only criterion.

Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be

uncondonable due to want of acceptable

explanation whereas in certain other cases

delay of very long range can be condoned as

the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the

Court accepts the explanation as sufficient it is the

result of positive exercise of discretion and normally

the superior court should not disturb such finding,

much less in reversional jurisdiction, unless the

exercise of discretion was on whole untenable

grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different

matter when the first Court refuses to condone the

delay. In such cases, the superior Court would be

free to consider the cause shown for the delay

afresh and it is open to such superior Court to come

to its own finding even untrammeled by the

conclusion of the lower Court.

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 50 of 94

10. The reason for such a different stance is thus:

The primary function of a Court is to adjudicate the

dispute between the parties and to advance

substantial justice. Time limit fixed for

approaching the Court in different situations is

not because on the expiry of such time a bad

cause would transform into a good cause .

11. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the

right of parties. They are meant to see that

parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but

seek their remedy promptly. The object of

providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage

caused by reason of legal injury. Law of limitation

fixes a life-span for such legal remedy for the

redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is

precious and the wasted time would never revisit.

During efflux of time newer causes would sprout up

necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by

approaching the courts. So a life span must be fixed

for each remedy. Unending period for launching the

remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and

consequential anarchy. The law of limitation is

thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined

in the maxim interest reipublicae up sit finis

litium (it is for the general welfare that a

period be putt to litigation). Rules of limitation

are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties.

They are meant to see that parties do not resort to

dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The

idea is that every legal remedy must be kept

alive for a legislatively fixed period of time.

12. A Court knows that refusal to condone delay would

result foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 51 of 94

cause. There is no presumption that delay in

approaching the Court is always deliberate. This

Court has held that the words „sufficient cause‟

under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive

a liberal construction so as to advance substantial

justice vide Shakuntala Devi Jain Vrs. Kuntal

Kumari, AIR 1969 SC 575 = (1969) 1 SCR 1006 and

State of West Bengal Vrs. The Administrator,

Howrah Municipality, AIR 1972 SC 749 = (1972) 1

SCC 366.

13. It must be remembered that in every case of delay

there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant

concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down

his plea and to shut the door against him. If the

explanation does not smack of mala fides or it

is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy

the Court must show utmost consideration to

the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground

to think that the delay was occasioned by the

party deliberately to gain time then the Court

should lean against acceptance of the

explanation. While condoning delay the Court

should not forget the opposite party altogether. It

must be borne in mind that he is a looser and he too

would have incurred quiet a large litigation

expenses. It would be a salutary guideline that

when Courts condone the delay due to laches

on the part of the applicant the Court shall

compensate the opposite party for his loss.”

12.11. It is significant to notice the decision of the Hon‟ble

Supreme Court of India rendered in the case of Sheo Raj

Singh (deceased) through Legal Representatives Vrs.

Union of India, (2023) 10 SCC 531 wherein while

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 52 of 94

explaining the term “sufficient cause”, the nature of

approach of the Court and the methodology in deciding

the application for condonation of delay have been

discussed with reference to earlier precedents. The said

Court in the mentioned reported case held as follows:

“30. Considering the aforementioned decisions, there

cannot be any quarrel that this Court has stepped in

to ensure that substantive rights of private parties

and the State are not defeated at the threshold

simply due to technical considerations of delay.

However, these decisions notwithstanding, we

reiterate that condonation of delay being a

discretionary power available to Courts,

exercise of discretion must necessarily depend

upon the sufficiency of the cause shown and

the degree of acceptability of the explanation,

the length of delay being immaterial.

31. Sometimes, due to want of sufficient cause being

shown or an acceptable explanation being proffered,

delay of the shortest range may not be condoned

whereas, in certain other cases, delay of long

periods can be condoned if the explanation is

satisfactory and acceptable. Of course, the Courts

must distinguish between an „explanation‟ and

an „excuse‟. An „explanation‟ is designed to give

someone all of the facts and lay out the cause for

something. It helps clarify the circumstances of a

particular event and allows the person to point out

that something that has happened is not his fault, if

it is really not his fault. Care must however be

taken to distinguish an „explanation‟ from an

„excuse‟. Although people tend to see „explanation‟

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 53 of 94

and „excuse‟ as the same thing and struggle to find

out the difference between the two, there is a

distinction which, though fine, is real.

32. An „excuse‟ is often offered by a person to deny

responsibility and consequences when under attack.

It is sort of a defensive action. Calling something as

just an „excuse‟ would imply that the explanation

proffered is believed not to be true. Thus said,

there is no formula that caters to all situations

and, therefore, each case for condonation of

delay based on existence or absence of

sufficient cause has to be decided on its own

facts. At this stage, we cannot but lament that it is

only excuses, and not explanations, that are more

often accepted for condonation of long delays to

safeguard public interest from those hidden forces

whose sole agenda is to ensure that a meritorious

claim does not reach the higher Courts for

adjudication.

***

34. The order under challenge in this appeal is dated

21

st December 2011. It was rendered at a point of

time when the decisions in Mst. Katiji (supra),

Ramegowda (supra), Chandra Mani (supra),

Tehsildar (LA) Vrs. K.V. Ayisumma, (1996) 10 SCC

634 and State of Nagaland Vrs. Lipok AO, (2005) 3

SCC 752 were holding the field. It is not that the

said decisions do not hold the field now, having

been overruled by any subsequent decision.

Although there have been some decisions in the

recent past [State of M.P. Vrs. Bherulal, (2020) 10

SCC 654 is one such decision apart from University

of Delhi Vrs. Union of India, (2020) 13 SCC 745]

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 54 of 94

which have not accepted governmental lethargy,

tardiness and indolence in presenting appeals

within time as sufficient cause for condonation of

delay, yet, the exercise of discretion by the High

Court has to be tested on the anvil of the liberal and

justice oriented approach expounded in the

aforesaid decisions which have been referred to

above.

***

40. We can also profitably refer to State of Manipur Vrs.

Koting Lamkang, (2019) 10 SCC 408 … where the

same Bench of three Hon‟ble Judges of this Court

which decided University of Delhi Vrs. Union of

India, (2020) 13 SCC 745 was of the view that the

impersonal nature of the State‟s functioning should

be given due regard, while ensuring that individual

defaults are not nit-picked at the cost of collective

interest. The relevant paragraphs read as follows:

„7. But while concluding as above, it was

necessary for the Court to also be

conscious of the bureaucratic delay and

the slow pace in reaching a Government

decision and the routine way of deciding

whether the State should prefer an appeal

against a judgment adverse to it. Even

while observing that the law of limitation would

harshly affect the party, the Court felt that the

delay in the appeal filed by the State, should

not be condoned.

8. Regard should be had in similar such

circumstances to the impersonal nature of the

Government‟s functioning where individual

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 55 of 94

officers may fail to act responsibly. This in

turn, would result in injustice to the

institutional interest of the State. If the appeal

filed by the State are lost for individual default,

those who are at fault, will not usually be

individually affected.‟

41. Having bestowed serious consideration to the rival

contentions, we feel that the High Court‟s decision to

condone the delay on account of the first

respondent‟s inability to present the appeal within

time, for the reasons assigned therein, does not

suffer from any error warranting interference. As

the aforementioned judgments have shown,

such an exercise of discretion does, at times,

call for a liberal and justice-oriented approach

by the Courts, where certain leeway could be

provided to the State. The hidden forces that

are at work in preventing an appeal by the

State being presented within the prescribed

period of limitation so as not to allow a higher

court to pronounce upon the legality and

validity of an order of a lower court and

thereby secure unholy gains, can hardly be

ignored. Impediments in the working of the grand

scheme of governmental functions have to be

removed by taking a pragmatic view on balancing of

the competing interests.”

12.12. In Pathupati Subba Reddy (died) by Lrs. Vrs. The

Special Deputy Collector (LA), (2024) 4 SCR 241 = 2024

INSC 286, having taken review of relevant earlier

decisions, the principles for consideration of

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 56 of 94

condonation of delay have been expounded in the

following terms:

“6. The moot question before us is whether in the facts

and circumstances of the case, the High Court was

justified in refusing to condone the delay in filing the

proposed appeal and to dismiss it as barred by

limitation.

***

9. Section 3 of the Limitation Act in no uncertain terms

lays down that no suit, appeal or application

instituted, preferred or made after the period

prescribed shall be entertained rather dismissed

even though limitation has not been set up as a

defence subject to the exceptions contained in

Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) of the Limitation Act.

***

12. In view of the above provision, the appeal which is

preferred after the expiry of the limitation is liable to

be dismissed. The use of the word „shall‟ in the

aforesaid provision connotes that the dismissal is

mandatory subject to the exceptions. Section 3 of the

Act is peremptory and had to be given effect to even

though no objection regarding limitation is taken by

the other side or referred to in the pleadings. In

other words, it casts an obligation upon the

Court to dismiss an appeal which is presented

beyond limitation. This is the general law of

limitation. The exceptions are carved out under

Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) of the Limitation

Act but we are concerned only with the

exception contained in Section 5 which

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 57 of 94

empowers the Courts to admit an appeal even

if it is preferred after the prescribed period

provided the proposed appellant gives

„sufficient cause‟ for not preferring the appeal

within the period prescribed. In other words, the

Courts are conferred with discretionary powers to

admit an appeal even after the expiry of the

prescribed period provided the proposed appellant is

able to establish „sufficient cause‟ for not filing it

within time. The said power to condone the

delay or to admit the appeal preferred after

the expiry of time is discretionary in nature

and may not be exercised even if sufficient

cause is shown based upon host of other

factors such as negligence, failure to exercise

due diligence etc.

13. It is very elementary and well understood that

Courts should not adopt an injustice-oriented

approach in dealing with the applications for

condonation of the delay in filing appeals and rather

follow a pragmatic line to advance substantial

justice.

***

17. It must always be borne in mind that while

construing „sufficient cause‟ in deciding

application under Section 5 of the Act, that on

the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed

for filing an appeal, substantive right in favour

of a decree-holder accrues and this right ought

not to be lightly disturbed. The decree-holder

treats the decree to be binding with the lapse of time

and may proceed on such assumption creating new

rights.

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 58 of 94

***

26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of

the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this

Court, it is evident that:

(i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy

that there should be an end to litigation by

forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the

right itself;

(ii) A right or the remedy that has not been

exercised or availed of for a long time must

come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed

period of time;

(iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be

construed differently, such as Section 3 has to

be construed in a strict sense whereas Section

5 has to be construed liberally;

(iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though

liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or

cause of substantial justice may be kept in

mind but the same cannot be used to defeat

the substantial law of limitation contained in

Section 3 of the Limitation Act;

(v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to

condone the delay if sufficient cause had been

explained, but that exercise of power is

discretionary in nature and may not be

exercised even if sufficient cause is established

for various factors such as, where there is

inordinate delay, negligence and want of due

diligence;

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 59 of 94

(vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar

matter, it does not mean that others are also

entitled to the same benefit if the Court is not

satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in

filing the appeal;

(vii) Merits of the case are not required to be

considered in condoning the delay; and

(viii) Delay condonation application has to be

decided on the parameters laid down for

condoning the delay and condoning the delay

for the reason that the conditions have been

imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the

statutory provision.”

12.13. It may be of benefit to have reference to Esha

Bhattacharjee Vrs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur

Nafar Academy, (2013) 9 SCR 782, wherein the following

principles are culled out:

“15. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that

can broadly be culled out are:

(i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice- E

oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing

with an application for condonation of delay,

for the courts are not supposed to legalise

injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.

(ii) The terms „sufficient cause‟ should be

understood in their proper spirit, philosophy

and purpose regard being had to the fact that

these terms are basically elastic and are to be

applied in proper perspective to the obtaining

fact-situation.

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 60 of 94

(iii) Substantial justice being paramount and

pivotal the technical considerations should not

be given undue and uncalled for emphasis.

(iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate

causation of delay but, gross negligence on the

part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note

of.

(v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking

condonation of delay is a significant and

relevant fact.

(vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict

proof should not affect public justice and cause

public mischief because the courts are required

to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate

there is no real failure of justice.

(vii) The concept of liberal approach has to

encapsule the conception of reasonableness

and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered

free play.

(viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay

and a delay of short duration or few days, for

to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted

whereas to the latter it may not be attracted.

That apart, the first one warrants strict

approach whereas the second calls for a liberal

delineation.

(ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party

relating to its inaction or negligence are

relevant factors to be taken into consideration.

It is so as the fundamental principle is that the

courts are required to weigh the scale of

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 61 of 94

balance of justice in respect of both parties and

the said principle cannot be given a total go by

in the name of liberal approach.

(x) If the explanation offered is concocted or

the grounds urged in the application are

fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not

to expose the other side unnecessarily to

face such a litigation.

(xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away

with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation

by taking recourse to the technicalities of law

of limitation.

(xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully

scrutinized and the approach should be based

on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is

founded on objective reasoning and not on

individual perception.

(xiii) The State or a public body or an entity

representing a collective cause should be given

some acceptable latitude.

16. To the aforesaid principles we may add some more

guidelines taking note of the present day scenario.

They are:

(a) An application for condonation of delay should

be drafted with careful concern and not in a

half hazard manner harbouring the notion that

the courts are required to condone delay on the

bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a

lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation

system.

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 62 of 94

(b) An application for condonation of delay should

not be dealt with in a routine manner on the

base of individual philosophy which is

basically subjective.

(c) Though no precise formula can be laid down

regard being had to the concept of judicial

discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving

consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory

system should be made as that is the ultimate

institutional motto.

(d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a

non-serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical

propensity can be exhibited in a non-challant

manner requires to be curbed, of course, within

legal parameters. ”

12.14. In Amalendu Kumar Bera Vrs. State of West Bengal,

(2013) 4 SCC 52 the consideration of “sufficient cause”

qua official business has been perceived in the following

manner:

“There is no dispute that the expression “sufficient cause”

should be considered with pragmatism in justice oriented

approach rather than the technical detection of “sufficient

cause” for explaining every day‟s delay. However, it is

equally well settled that the courts albeit liberally

considered the prayer for condonation of delay but in

some cases the court may refuse to condone the delay

inasmuch as the Government is not accepted to keep

watch whether the contesting respondent further put the

matter in motion. The delay in official business requires

its pedantic approach from public justice perspective. In a

recent decision in Union of India Vrs. Nripen Sarma,

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 63 of 94

(2013) 4 SCC 57 = AIR 2011 SC 1237 the matter came up

against the order passed by the High Court condoning the

delay in filing the appeal by the appellant-Union of India.

The High Court refused to condone the delay on the

ground that the appellant-Union of India took their own

sweet time to reach the conclusion whether the judgment

should be appealed or not. The High Court also expressed

its anguish and distress with the way the State conducts

the cases regularly in filing the appeal after the same

became operational and barred by limitation.”

12.15. Having thus discussed the gamut of “sufficient

cause” vis-à-vis “good cause” with reference to the

parameters of consideration of germane grounds for

condonation of delay in preferring appeal, this Court

feels expedient to observe that in State of M.P. Vrs.

Pradeep Kumar, (2000) 7 SCC 372, the Hon‟ble Supreme

Court held that if an appeal is time barred, the Court

should either return the memorandum of appeal to the

appellant to submit it along with an application under

Section 5 of the Limitation Act or should provide a

chance to file application for condonation of delay. The

Court cannot, under such circumstances, dispose of the

appeal on merit. In S.V. Matha Prasad Vrs. Lalchand

Meghraj, (2007) 14 SCC 722, it has been clearly held that

while dealing with an application under Section 5 of the

Limitation Act, the Court cannot dispose of an appeal on

merit and such a course has been disapproved by the

Hon‟ble Supreme Court of India. However, in O.P.

Kathpalia Vrs. Lakhmir Singh, AIR 1984 SC 1744, it is

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 64 of 94

held that if the refusal to condone the delay results in

grave miscarriage of justice, it would be a ground to

condone the delay.

12.16. The Supreme Court of India in State of Madhya

Pradesh Vrs. Bherulal, (2020) 10 SCC 654, made it clear

that,

“5. A preposterous proposition is sought to be

propounded that if there is some merit in the

case, the period of delay is to be given a go-by.

If a case is good on merits, it will succeed in

any case. It is really a bar of limitation which

can even shut out good cases. This does not, of

course, take away the jurisdiction of the Court

in an appropriate case to condone the delay.

6. We are also of the view that the aforesaid approach

is being adopted in what we have categorised earlier

as “certificate cases”. The object appears to be to

obtain a certificate of dismissal from the Supreme

Court to put a quietus to the issue and thus, say that

nothing could be done because the highest Court has

dismissed the appeal. It is to complete this

formality and save the skin of officers who

may be at default that such a process is

followed. We have on earlier occasions also

strongly deprecated such a practice and process.

There seems to be no improvement. The purpose of

coming to this Court is not to obtain such

certificates and if the Government suffers

losses, it is time when the officer concerned

responsible for the same bears the

consequences. The irony is that in none of the

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 65 of 94

cases any action is taken against the officers,

who sit on the files and do nothing. It is

presumed that this Court will condone the delay and

even in making submissions, straightaway the

counsel appear to address on merits without

referring even to the aspect of limitation as

happened in this case till we pointed out to the

counsel that he must first address us on the

question of limitation.

7. We are thus, constrained to send a signal and we

propose to do in all matters today, where there are

such inordinate delays that the Government or State

authorities coming before us must pay for wastage

of judicial time which has its own value. Such costs

can be recovered from the officers responsible.”

12.17. Taking note of State of Madhya Pradesh Vrs.

Bherulal, (2020) 10 SCC 654, in the cases of State of

Odisha Vrs. Sunanda Mahakuda, (2021) 11 SCC 560;

State of Gujarat Vrs. Tushar Jagdish Chandra Vyas,

2021 SCC OnLine SC 3517 ; State of U.P. Vrs. Sabha

Narain, (2022) 9 SCC 266; Union of India Vrs. Central

Tibetan Schools Admin, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 119; Union

of India Vrs. Vishnu Aroma Pouching Pvt. Ltd., (2022) 9

SCC 263; Commissioner of Public Instruction Vrs.

Shamshuddin, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 3518 identical view

has been expressed by the Supreme Court of India.

12.18. The stand taken in the interlocutory application for

condonation of delay by the State of Odisha does not

disclose any sufficient/good cause. This apart, the

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 66 of 94

appellants have not explained with material particulars

the delay in filing the writ appeal from the original

prescribed period. Noteworthy here to have regard to the

following conclusions enumerated by the Hon‟ble

Supreme Court of India in the case of Shivamma Vrs.

Karnataka Housing Board, (2025) 9 SCR 1774:

“261.Thus, for the reasons aforesaid, the impugned order

of the High Court deserves to be set aside. Before we

proceed to close this judgment, we deem it

appropriate to make it abundantly clear that

administrative lethargy and laxity can never stand

as a sufficient ground for condonation of delay, and

we want to convey an emphatic message to all the

High Courts that delays shall not be condoned on

frivolous and superficial grounds, until a proper case

of sufficient cause is made out, wherein the State-

machinery is able to establish that it acted with

bona fides and remained vigilant all throughout.

Procedure is a handmaid to justice, as is famously

said. But courts, and more particularly the

constitutional courts, ought not to obviate the

procedure for a litigating State agency, who also

equally suffer the bars of limitation from pursuing

litigations due to its own lackadaisical attitude.

262. The High Courts ought not give a legitimizing effect

to such callous attitude of State authorities or its

instrumentalities, and should remain extra cautious,

if the party seeking condonation of delay is a State-

authority. They should not become surrogates for

State laxity and lethargy. The constitutional courts

ought to be cognizant of the apathy and pangs of a

private litigant. Litigants cannot be placed in

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 67 of 94

situations of perpetual litigations, wherein the fruits

of their decrees or favourable orders are frustrated

at later stages. We are at pains to reiterate this

everlasting trend, and put all the High Courts to

notice, not to reopen matters with inordinate delay,

until sufficient cause exists, as by doing so the

courts only add insult to the injury, more particularly

in appeals under Section 100 of the Code of Civil

Procedure, wherein its jurisdiction is already limited

to questions of law.

263. Limitation periods are prescribed to maintain a

sweeping scope for the lis to attain for finality. More

than the importance of judicial time, what worries us

is the plight of a litigant with limited means, who is

to contest against an enormous State, and its

elaborate and never-exhausting paraphernalia. Such

litigations deserve to be disposed of at the very

threshold, because, say if a party litigating against

the State, for whatever reason, is unable to contest

the condonation of delay in appeal, unlike the

present case, it reopens the lis for another round of

litigation, and leaves such litigant listless yet again.

As courts of conscience, it is our obligation that we

assure that a litigant is not sent from pillar to post to

seek justice.

264. No litigant should be permitted to be so

lethargic and apathetic, much less be

permitted by the courts to misuse the process

of law.”

13. Thus being the delineated legal perspective for

consideration of petition for condonation of delay, the

decisions of the Courts as referred to supra, it is to be

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 68 of 94

seen whether the petition under consideration filed by

the State suggests sufficient cause for condonation of

delay in filing writ appeal by conscientious application of

discretion.

CONCLUSION & DECISION:

14. Cursory glance at the substance and circumstances

demonstrated in the petition with regard to the gap

between 13.02.2025 (date of pronouncement of order in

writ petition in presence of the appellants being

represented by the Additional Standing Counsel ) to

12.01.2026 (date of filing of the writ appeal) it is

discernible that vague explanation without material

particulars save and except examination of “various

factors” has been proffered. No whisper is made with

respect to contempt proceedings faced by the appellants

before the learned Single Judge. This Court feels it

expedient to take cognizance of the fact that such a vital

non-disclosure would tantamount to suppression of

material fact in the petition for consideration of

condonation of delay.

14.1. It is pertinent to quote the following from the Order

dated 13.02.2025 passed in the writ petition:

“Since the counter was not filed, by order dated

16.08.2023, as a last chance, two weeks time was

allowed to file counter. Even in the face of such order as

the counter was not filed “last and final opportunity” of

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 69 of 94

two weeks was granted as per order dated 12.09.2023.

Such time to file counter was further extended by four

weeks by order dated 01.03.2024. While passing such

order, this Court observed thus:

„Let the counter be filed within four weeks, failing which,

the matter shall be taken into adjudication on its own

merit without further opportunity to file counter affidavit.‟

Taking a liberal view, further time was allowed by order

dated 29.07.2024 and the matter was adjourned at the

instance of learned counsel for the State on 31.08.2024.

The matter was adjourned to 31.08.2024 at the instance

of the learned counsel for the petitioner and the matter

was posted to 23.09.2024. While adjourning the matter

on 04.11.2024 further prayer was made to file counter

and the matter was adjourned to 21.01.2025 to file

counter. In spite of repeated opportunities as detailed

above, the State has chosen not to file any counter

affidavit. Hence, this Court proceeds to hear the matter on

merits.”

14.2. Record does not reveal any alacrity is shown by any of

the authorities-functionaries of the State of Odisha

though such observation was made by the learned Single

Judge in the order disposing of the writ petition. Even

after Order dated 08.08.2025 was passed in the

contempt petition being CONTC No.2750 of 2025 by the

learned Single Judge, the writ appeal could be filed only

on 12.01.2026. This shows scant regard for paying

attention to the orders of this Court and negligent

attitude of the functionaries.

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 70 of 94

14.3. At this juncture, this Court is reminded of a judgment of

this Court showing dissatisfaction taking note of non-

filing of response by the State in the case of Jagadish

Dey Vrs. State of Odisha, 2000 (I) OLR 609. The

observation and direction of the Division Bench of this

Court are as follows:

“2. It appears that in OJC No. 12623 of 1997 on

11.09.1997 a Division Bench of this Court presided

over by the then Chief Justice directed the Inspector

of Schools, Balasore (opposite party No. 3) to

consider the case of the petitioners within two

months as to whether they are entitled for payment

of salary, and in case he comes to conclusion that

they are so entitled, the same shall be paid to them

within two months from the date decision is taken

by him. As no steps at all were taken by the

aforesaid opposite party No.3, the petitioners and no

option than to file the present contempt application

on 07.01.1999 after waiting for one year and two

months.

3. On 15.02.1999 a Bench of this Court issued notice to

the opposite parties calling upon them to show-cause

in the matter. The Inspector of Schools, who is

opposite party No.3 filed cause on 03.08.1999

stating therein that immediately after receipt of the

order of this Court he moved the Director, Secondary

Education by office letter No. 2262 dated

02.03.1998 for allotment of funds to the tune of

Rs.3,05,720/- immediately for payment of arears

salary to the petitioners. As there was no response

from the Director, the Inspector of Schools by letter

No. 6046 dated 03.05.1999 requested him for

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 71 of 94

allotment of funds amounting to Rs.4,08,058/-

(inclusive of 1% audit cost) for payment of salary to

the petitioners. The Inspector of Schools indicated

his inability to make payment, as the funds were not

allotted from the Directorate.

4. Learned counsel for the State stated that he has

received instruction from the Deputy Director,

Secondary Education, Orissa who is present in Court

that now funds have been allotted for making

payment to the petitioners. When we put question to

the learned counsel as to why payment has not been

made, he stated that the State has no funds for

making payment. Neither any statement has been

made by learned counsel for the State nor any

affidavit has been filed on behalf of the State that

payment has already been made to the writ

petitioners. On the other hand, learned counsel for

the petitioners stated that no payment has been

made till today.

Since the day, one of us (the Chief Justice) joined

this Court on 18.11.1999, we find that the cases

where orders of this Court have not been complied

with are placed before Bench and adjourned at the

instance of State. We fail to understand why the

State counsel is not in a position to obtain

instruction from the concerned officer whether

he has complied with the order and if not what

is the reason for its non-compliance.

When time is fixed in the matter for

compliance by the Court, it should be

punctually complied with within the time

schedule and it should not be taken by the

State or its instrumentalities and their officers

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 72 of 94

that such orders fixing time schedule have

been passed by way of empty formality. As a

result of non-compliance of orders, citizens are made

to run from pillar to post in moving the concerned

authority and finally filing contempt applications

resulting thereby in increase of unnecessary

contempt applications before this Court and

unnecessary wastage of Court‟s time.

We have been noticing that in more than 90 per cent

of the cases orders of this Court are not complied

with and the writ petitioners are compelled to move

applications for contempt which is most unfortunate.

Reasons for non-compliance are also not furnished

before us. We do not understand the real reason for

non-compliance of Court‟s orders. But we presume

the same may be because of scarcity of funds or

inaction of the concerned officers which may in some

cases constitute justifiable reason but on most of the

occasions it may be for extraneous reasons not

permissible under law.

***

6. In the circumstances, we do not find any other

remedy except to direct the Chief Secretary to give

certain directions in this case. It may not be out of

place to mention that this is not a solitary case, but

this contempt application is an example of the type

indicated above.

For the foregoing reasons, we give the following

directions to the Chief Secretary, Government of

Orissa:

(a) He shall see that copy of this order is

communicated to each and every officer of the

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 73 of 94

State Government and its instrumentalities and

Departmental Heads shall maintain a register

in which he will take signature of the officer in

token of having received the order, so that if

there is any infraction of the order, he may not

take the plea that he did not know about the

order.

(b) The letter sent by the State Counsel, who is an

officer of the Court requiring the concerned

officers to send instructions and para-wise

comments along with competent person to file

counter affidavit should be treated to be a

direction of this Court. In case the said letter is

not complied with within the time schedule,

that may be a ground for taking action against

the concerned officer for punishing him for

violation of the order of this Court under Article

215 of the Constitution of India.

(c) All pending contempt applications relating to

any matter and the cases in respect of which

even if no contempt application has been filed

and time fixed for compliance of this Court‟s

order has already expired, the same shall be

complied within a period of two months from

today.

(d) In all cases where letters have been sent by

the State Counsel to different authorities and

have not been attended to, counter affidavit

must be filed in those cases within a period of

two months from today.

***”

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 74 of 94

14.4. It appears even after long years have been passed since

the said judgment was delivered, the directions of this

Court have not gone down well with the administration/

Government. After around twenty six years have been

elapsed from the date of said judgment, still indifferent

attitude is shown by the functionaries. The present case

is classic case of lethargy and indolence in the

functioning of the authorities.

14.5. This Court is apprised of the fact that a “Standard

Operating Procedure (SOP) for Ensuring Timely Filing of

Affidavits in Courts and Tribunals” has been issued by

the Government of Odisha in Law Department vide

Notification No.8292─IV/2 LR -210/26/L., dated

10.06.2026

3 in consequence of Order dated 24th March,

2026 passed in CONTC No 1011 of 2026 arising out of

WP(C) No 18177 of 2025 taking into account the casual

approach adopted by the State Authorities in filing

affidavits/instructions resulting in unwarranted delays

in disposal of Court Cases. It is also noticed that though

the State Litigation Policy was formulated in the State

during 2011 to reduce the State litigations basing on the

National Litigation Policy as per recommendation of the

13th Finance Commission, in its place a new State

3

Published in the Extraordinary Issue of the Odisha Gazette No.2406, dated

10.06.2026.

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 75 of 94

Litigation Policy

4 has been formulated to minimize the

litigations against/by the State and streamlining

consideration of the grievances to prevent avoidable

litigations keeping in view the Order dated 3rd October,

2023 passed by this Court in WPC (PIL) No.28053 of

2023 and the Guidelines of the National Litigation

Policy.

14.6. The fact pleaded does not transpire as to why the

appellants have not placed the materials relied on in the

instant writ appeal before the learned Single Judge. It is

not a fact nor could be asserted that the documents to

support pleadings were not available with the appellants

at the time of hearing of writ petition before the learned

Single Judge. There is no disclosure in the pleading to

suggest that the junior employee has been extended the

benefit as claimed for by the respondent and it is the

case of the appellants that the junior colleague of the

respondent was not similarly placed so that his service

could be regularized and granted pension.

14.7. From the contents of the writ appeal, it seems there is

no dispute set out by the appellants with respect to the

following observation on facts made by the learned

Single Judge:

4

The State Litigation Policy, 2024 is published in the Extraordinary Issue of the

Odisha Gazette No.2162, dated 18.11.2024.

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 76 of 94

“There cannot be a more glaring case than the case at

hand when after serving for more than four decades, on

flimsy grounds notwithstanding the regularization of

junior to him, petitioner is still in the portals of the Court to

get his legitimate”

14.8. Though such factual aspects are glaring on the face of

the writ appeal, this Court being conscious of ratio of

decisions of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court of India is

required to consider if at all the appellants have made

out a case showing “sufficient cause”/“good cause” with

respect to the delay of 333 days (including thirty days of

normal period) caused in filing appeal so that indulgence

can be shown to consider the merit of the matter by

condoning the delay in filing the intra-Court appeal.

14.9. This Court on careful examination of contents of the

interlocutory application praying therein for condoning

the delay found that no material particulars have been

pleaded leading to such inordinate delay. By way of

clever drafting of the writ appeal and the interlocutory

application the appellants have consciously avoided to

place on record the fact (though were aware of pendency

of contempt). It is sheer negligence and conscious

avoidance on the part of the appellants to disclose that

after the learned Single Judge passed Order dated

08.08.2025 in CONTC No. 2750 of 2025 in presence of

the learned Additional Government Advocate who was

directed to be served with copy of such contempt petition

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 77 of 94

the appeal was filed. Thereafter also there was sphinx

silence for about five months till 12.01.2026, when the

writ appeal was filed. By way of objection in shape of

affidavit the respondent clearly brought to fore pendency

of such contempt proceeding. It is eminently clear that

in order to thwart payment to the respondent and avoid

the rigours of contempt the writ appeal has been filed.

14.10. Another pertinent fact which came to light from

scrutiny of material available on record that despite the

learned Single Judge directed in the Order dated

13.02.2025 that the service of the respondent shall have

to be regularized with effect from the date the service of

his junior, Sri Debendranath Puhan, was regularized

and the respondent would be paid retiral dues in

accordance with law within stipulated period, failing

which, the same would entail interest at the rate of 10%

per annum from the date of entitlement till payment

and, the recovery of such interest shall be effected from

the concerned official who is responsible, nothing is

pleaded neither in the writ appeal nor in the

interlocutory application to show that action/step

against erring official(s) has been taken by the

Government.

14.11. While enunciating that pragmatism in justice

oriented approach is to be shown by the Court having

regard to the impersonal bureaucratic set up involved in

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 78 of 94

red-tapism within reasonable limits of time, the Hon‟ble

Supreme Court propounded to hold officer concerned

personally responsible in the case of State of Haryana

Vrs. Chandra Mani, (1996) 3 SCC 132 and the

proposition of legal position stands thus:

“It is notorious and common knowledge that delay in more

than 60 per cent of the cases filed in this Court— be it by

private party or the State— are barred by limitation and

this Court generally adopts liberal approach in

condonation of delay finding somewhat sufficient cause to

decide the appeal on merits. It is equally common

knowledge that litigants including the State are accorded

the same treatment and the law is administered in an

even-handed manner. When the State is an applicant,

praying for condonation of delay, it is common

knowledge that on account of impersonal

machinery and the inherited bureaucratic

methodology imbued with the note-making, file-

pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on

the part of the State is less difficult to understand

though more difficult to approve, but the State

represents collective cause of the community. It is

axiomatic that decisions are taken by officers/agencies

proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of

pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on

table for considerable time causing delay— intentional or

otherwise— is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural

red tape in the process of their making decision is a

common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is

not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State

are lost for such default no person is individually

affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers,

is public interest. The expression „sufficient cause‟

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 79 of 94

should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in

justice-oriented approach rather than the technical

detection of sufficient cause for explaining every

day‟s delay. The factors which are peculiar to and

characteristic of the functioning of the Governmental

conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of

pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process. The Court

should decide the matters on merits unless the case is

hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to

determine the cause laid by the State vis-a-vis private

litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient

cause. The Government at appropriate level should

constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any

legal principles are involved for decision by the Courts or

whether cases require adjustment and should authorise

the officers take a decision or give appropriate permission

for settlement. In the event of decision to file appeal

needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer

responsible to file the appeal and he should be made

personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the

State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual.

The individual would always be quick in taking the

decision whether he would pursue the remedy by

way of an appeal or application since he is a person

legally injured while State is an impersonal

machinery working through its officers or servants.

Considered from this perspective, it must be held that the

delay of 109 days in this case has been explained and

that it is a fit case for condonation of the delay.”

14.12. In the considered view of this Court mere use of the

expressions like “no wilful negligence”, “no deliberate

laches”, “no deliberate” or “unintentional” in the petition

without putting forth material fact would not assist the

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 80 of 94

cause of the appellants for condoning the delay in

preferring writ appeal.

14.13. In the case of Maniben Devraj Shah Vrs. Municipal

Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157, the

observation of the Supreme Court of India may deserve

to be quoted:

“What colour the expression „sufficient cause‟ would get in

the factual matrix of a given case would largely depend

on bona fide nature of the explanation. If the Court finds

that there has been no negligence on the part of the

applicant and the cause shown for the delay does not

lack bona fides, then it may condone the delay. If, on the

other hand, the explanation given by the applicant is

found to be concocted or he is thoroughly negligent in

prosecuting his cause, then it would be a legitimate

exercise of discretion not to condone the delay.”

14.14. Besides having taken note of the principles

enunciated by the Court(s) as referred to in foregoing

paragraphs, it is noteworthy to have regard to the

following decisions also.

The position of law as discussed with regard to

condonation of delay in Office of the Chief Post Master

General Vrs. Living Media India Ltd., (2012) 1 SCR 1045 =

2012 INSC 105 may throw light on the issue at hand. In

the said case the Hon‟ble Supreme Court of India was

considering inordinate delay of around 427 days caused

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 81 of 94

by functionaries of the Government in filing SLPs and

the said Hon‟ble Court held as follows:

“12. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were

well aware or conversant with the issues involved

including the prescribed period of limitation for

taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave

petition in this Court. They cannot claim that

they have a separate period of limitation when

the Department was possessed with competent

persons familiar with court proceedings. In the

absence of plausible and acceptable

explanation, we are posing a question why the

delay is to be condoned mechanically merely

because the Government or a wing of the

Government is a party before us. Though we

are conscious of the fact that in a matter of

condonation of delay when there was no gross

negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of

bona fide, a liberal concession has to b e

adopted to advance substantial justice, we are

of the view that in the facts and

circumstances, the Department cannot take

advantage of various earlier decisions. The

claim on account of impersonal machinery and

inherited bureaucratic methodology of maki ng

several notes cannot be accepted in view of the

modern technologies being used and available. The

law of limitation undoubtedly binds ever ybody

including the Government.

13. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the

Government bodies, their agencies and

instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable

and acceptable explanation for the delay and there

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 82 of 94

was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the

usual explanation that the file was kept pending for

several months/years due to considerable degree of

procedural red-tape in the process. The Government

departments are under a special obligation to ensure

that they perform their duties with diligence and

commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception

and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for

government departments. The law shelters everyone

under the same light and should not be swirled for

the benefit of a few. Considering the fact that

there was no proper explanation offered by the

Department for the delay except mentioning of

various dates, according to us, the Department

has miserably failed to give any acceptable

and cogent reasons sufficient to condone such

a huge delay. Accordingly, the appeals are liable to

be dismissed on the ground of delay.”

This Court in Radharaman Store Vrs. Odisha Sales Tax

Tribunal and Another, 1997 SCC OnLine Ori 98 = 85

(1998) CLT 657 = (1998) 108 STC 284 (Ori) has been

pleased to make following observation for non-furnishing

plausible explanation by the Government:

“9. The question remains whether any plausible or

acceptable reason was indicated by the Revenue

while seeking condonation, and whether the

Tribunal considered the matter in its proper

perspective. The reasons indicated in the petition

filed by the Revenue extracted in its entirety reads

as follows:

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 83 of 94

„That the delay in filing of the appeal is non -

deliberate. The delay was due to the process of

decision-making in Government office.‟

The Tribunal‟s order in its entirety reads as follows:

„Heard the learned Addl. S.R. for the State and the

learned advocate for the assessee. The 1st appeal

orders were received in the office of the

Commissioner of Sales Tax on December 14, 1993

and due date of filing of the appeals was February

12, 1994, but the appeals have been filed on April 4,

1994 causing a delay of 50 days. In the petition for

condonation of delay it has been explained that the

delay in filing of the appeal was due to process of

decision-making for filing of the second appeals. On

a perusal of the administrative file it appears that

the file was endorsed to the Addl. S.R. for his

opinion on December 31, 1993 and decision was

made on March 30, 1994 for filing of the second

appeal. Thereafter the appeals were filed on April 4,

1994. So, the delay of 50 days in filing the second

appeal in decision-making which was considered

sufficient cause for not filing the second appeal in

time. Hence, the petition is allowed and the delay is

condoned. Register the appeals.‟

10. The factual backdrop and few relevant facts need to

be noted. It is an accepted position that the file was

endorsed to the Addl. S.R. for opinion on December

31, 1993, and he passed an order on March 30,

1994 for filing of the second appeal. No cause has

been indicated as to why the Addl. S.R. took such a

long time, and what transpired during that period.

In fact no explanation whatsoever has been

offered. Tribunal‟s reasoning is that there was

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 84 of 94

delay in decision-making process and that was

considered to be sufficient cause. The

conclusion does not stand to reason. On the

contrary, it shows non-application of mind to

the germane issue. Even though a liberal

approach has to be adopted, that does not

mean that any plea without any plausible or

acceptable basis, and not even hearing

semblance of rationality has to be accepted,

and delay has to be condoned. That shall be

against the very spirit of law. Prescription of

timelimit for filing appeals would become

meaningless in such event. Merely because State is

involved, that does not mean that any lethargic or

supine inaction has to be condoned or ignored, and

even if no reason is indicated that would be

inconsequential. The subject-matter was not very

complex and rather the grounds of appeal filed

appear to be of very routine nature. As has been

observed by this Court in Hindustan

Aeronautics Limited, Koraput Division Vrs.

State of Orissa, (1976) 38 STC 538, delay

caused by the concerned officer in giving his

opinion, without any explanation whatsoever

does not constitute sufficient ground for

condonation of delay. In the aforesaid

premises, the inevitable conclusion is that the

Tribunal has not applied its judicial mind to

the question whether delay was to be

condoned.

Certain interesting and relevant features are noticed

on perusal of the administrative file produced. Up to

end of page 2, the proposed grounds of appeal have

been written in hand. Interestingly from page 3, they

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 85 of 94

are typed. Except that portion, next are hand

written. This aspect assumes greater importance

because in the margin of page 2, the following

endorsement has been made on March 25, 1994

“signature is wanting”. Whose signature was

wanting and who detected it on March 25, 1994

remains a mystery. If the file was with the Addl.

S.R. till March 30, 1994, how another officer

handled it to notice absence of signature.

That has not been explained. If records have been

manipulated, it is a very serious matter and needs

an enquiry by the Commissioner of Sales Tax,

Orissa.”

14.15. Apparently from the explanation as found

mentioned in the interlocutory application, the

appellants have not given details of events with sufficient

reasons for the delay. Furthermore, there is no

explanation whatsoever is placed on record to show as to

why there was delay during the prescribed period of

limitation in terms of the provisions for filing writ appeal

under the Rules of the High Court of Orissa, 1948.

14.16. Regard may also be had to State of Madhya

Pradesh Vrs. Ramkumar Choudhary, 2024 SCC OnLine

SC 3612, wherein the following observations have been

made by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court of India:

“5. The legal position is that where a case has been

presented in the Court beyond limitation, the

petitioner has to explain the Court as to what was

the “sufficient cause” which means an

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 86 of 94

adequate and enough reason which prevented

him to approach the Court within limitation. In

Majji Sannemma Vrs. Reddy Sridevi 2021 SCC

OnLine SC 1260, it was held by this Court that even

though limitation may harshly affect the rights of a

party, it has to be applied with all its rigour when

prescribed by statute. A reference was also made to

the decision of this Court in Ajay Dabra Vrs. Pyare

Ram, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 92 wherein, it was held

as follows:

„13. This Court in the case of Basawaraj Vrs.

Special Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 14 SCC

81 while rejecting an application for

condonation of delay for lack of sufficient cause

has concluded in Paragraph 15 as follows:

„15. The law on the issue can be summarised

to the effect that where a case has been

presented in the court beyond limitation,

the applicant has to explain the court as

to what was the “sufficient cause” which

means an adequate and enough reason

which prevented him to approach the

court within limitation. In case a party is

found to be negligent, or for want of bona

fide on his part in the facts and

circumstances of the case, or found to

have not acted diligently or remained

inactive, there cannot be a justified

ground to condone the delay. No court

could be justified in condoning such an

inordinate delay by imposing any

condition whatsoever. The application is

to be decided only within the parameters

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 87 of 94

laid down by this Court in regard to the

condonation of delay. In case there was

no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to

approach the court on time condoning the

delay without any justification, putting

any condition whatsoever, amounts to

passing an order in violation of the

statutory provisions and it tantamounts to

showing utter disregard to the

legislature.‟

14. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion

that the High Court did not commit any mistake

in dismissing the delay condonation

application of the present appellant.‟

Thus, it is crystal clear that the discretion to condone

the delay has to be exercised judiciously based on

facts and circumstances of each case and that, the

expression „sufficient cause‟ cannot be liberally

interpreted, if negligence, inaction or lack of bona

fides is attributed to the party.

5.1. In Union of India Vrs. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy

(D) through his legal heir, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 489

= 2024 INSC 262 , wherein, one of us (J.B.

Pardiwala, J) was a member, after referring to

various decisions on the issue, it was in unequivocal

terms observed by this Court that delay should not

be excused as a matter of generosity and rendering

substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the

opposite party. The relevant passage of the same is

profitably extracted below:

„24. In the aforesaid circumstances, we made it

very clear that we are not going to look into the

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 88 of 94

merits of the matter as long as we are not

convinced that sufficient cause has been made

out for condonation of such a long and

inordinate delay.

25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a private

party or a State or Union of India when it

comes to condoning the gross delay of more

than 12 years. If the litigant chooses to

approach the court long after the lapse of the

time prescribed under the relevant provisions of

the law, then he cannot turn around and say

that no prejudice would be caused to either

side by the delay being condoned. This

litigation between the parties started sometime

in 1981. We are in 2024. Almost 43 years have

elapsed. However, till date the respondent has

not been able to reap the fruits of his decree. It

would be a mockery of justice if we condone

the delay of 12 years and 158 days and once

again ask the respondent to undergo the

rigmarole of the legal proceedings.

26. The length of the delay is a relevant matter

which the court must take into consideration

while considering whether the delay should be

condoned or not. From the tenor of the

approach of the appellants, it appears that

they want to fix their own period of limitation

for instituting the proceedings for which law

has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is

held that a party has lost his right to have the

matter considered on merits because of his

own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed

to be non-deliberate delay and in such

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 89 of 94

circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard

to plead that the substantial justice deserves to

be preferred as against the technical

considerations. While considering the plea for

condonation of delay, the court must not start

with the merits of the main matter. The court

owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of

the explanation offered by the party seeking

condonation. It is only if the sufficient

cause assigned by the litigant and the

opposition of the other side is equally

balanced that the Court may bring into

aid the merits of the matter for the

purpose of condoning the delay.

27. We are of the view that the question of

limitation is not merely a technical

consideration. The rules of limitation are

based on the principles of sound public

policy and principles of equity. We should

not keep the „Sword of Damocles‟ hanging over

the head of the respondent for indefinite period

of time to be determined at the whims and

fancies of the appellants.

***

34. In view of the aforesaid, we have reached to

the conclusion that the High Court committed

no error much less any error of law in passing

the impugned order. Even otherwise, the High

Court was exercising its supervisory

jurisdiction under Article 227 of the

Constitution of India.

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 90 of 94

35. In a plethora of decisions of this Court, it has

been said that delay should not be excused as

a matter of generosity. Rendering substantial

justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite

party. The appellants have failed to prove

that they were reasonably diligent in

prosecuting the matter and this vital test

for condoning the delay is not satisfied in

this case.

36. For all the foregoing reasons, this appeal fails

and is hereby dismissed. There shall be no

order as to costs.‟

Applying the above legal proposition to the facts of

the present case, we are of the opinion that the High

Court correctly refused to condone the delay and

dismissed the appeal by observing that such

inordinate delay was not explained

satisfactorily, no sufficient cause was shown

for the same, and no plausible reason was put

forth by the State. Therefore, we are inclined to

reject this petition at the threshold.

6. At the same time, we cannot simply brush aside the

delay occurred in preferring the second appeal, due

to callous and lackadaisical attitude on the part of

the officials functioning in the State machinery.

Though the Government adopts systematic

approach in handling the legal issues and

preferring the petitions/applications/appeals

well within the time, due to the fault on the

part of the officials in merely communicating

the information on time, huge revenue loss will

be caused to the Government exchequer. The

present case is one such case, wherein, enormous

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 91 of 94

delay of 1788 days occasioned in preferring the

second appeal due to the lapses on the part of the

officials functioning under the State, though valuable

Government lands were involved. Therefore, we

direct the State to streamline the machinery touching

the legal issues, offering legal opinion, filing of cases

before the Tribunal/Courts, etc., fix the responsibility

on the officer(s) concerned, and penalize the

officer(s), who is/are responsible for delay,

deviation, lapses, etc., if any, to the value of the loss

caused to the Government. Such direction will have

to be followed by all the States scrupulously.

7. There is one another aspect of the matter which we

must not ignore or overlook. Over a period of time,

we have noticed that whenever there is a plea for

condonation of delay be it at the instance of a

private litigant or State the delay is sought to be

explained right from the time, the limitation starts

and if there is a delay of say 2 years or 3 years or 4

years till the end of the same. For example if the

period of limitation is 90 days then the party

seeking condonation has to explain why it was

unable to institute the proceedings within that

period of limitation. What events occurred

after the 91st day till the last is of no

consequence. The court is required to consider

what came in the way of the party that it was

unable to file it between the 1

st day and the

90

th day. It is true that a party is entitled to wait

until the last day of limitation for filing an appeal.

But when it allows the limitation to expire and

pleads sufficient cause for not filing the appeal

earlier, the sufficient cause must establish that

because of some event or circumstance arising

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 92 of 94

before the limitation expired it was not possible to

file the appeal within time. No event or

circumstance arising after the expiry of

limitation can constitute such sufficient cause.

There may be events or circumstances

subsequent to the expiry of limitation which

may further delay the filing of the appeal. But

that the limitation has been allowed to expire

without the appeal being filed must be traced to a

cause arising within the period of limitation. (See:

Ajit Singh Thakur Singh Vrs. State of Gujarat, (1981)

1 SCC 495 = AIR 1981 SC 733).”

14.17. In Vedabai @ Vaijayanatabai Baburao Patil Vrs.

Shantaram Baburao Patil, AIR 2001 SC 2582, the Hon‟ble

Court observed that,

“A distinction must be made between a case where the

delay is inordinate and a case where the delay is of a few

days. Whereas in the former case the consideration of

prejudice to the other side will be a relevant factor so the

case calls for a more cautious approach but in the latter

case no such consideration may arise and such a case

deserves a liberal approach. No hard and fast rule can

be laid down in this regard. The C ourt has to

exercise the discretion on the facts of each case

keeping in mind that in construing the expression

„sufficient cause‟ the principle of advancing

substantial justice is of prime importance.”

14.18. It needs to be emphasised age -old maxim

“Vigilantibus Et Non Dormientibus Jura Subveniunt ”,

meaning thereby equity avails to the vigilant, not the

person who sleeps over his right. The Courts will not

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 93 of 94

help the person who sleeps over their rights but help

those who are aware of their rights. A person is said to

be liable for laches when he comes to the Court to affirm

rights after a reasonable delay in that respect.

14.19. This Court, therefore, comes to the irresistible

conclusion that stating simply that due to movement of

files delay occasioned would not suffice. It cannot thus

be construed that such explanation (rather excuse) is

“sufficient cause”/“good cause” so as to warrant

consideration of cause for the delay in filing writ appeal.

This Court does not find the averments of the appellants

in the application for condonation of delay as genuine.

15. From the above discussions it is immutable that unless

“sufficient cause”/“good cause” is shown, there is little

scope for the Court to exercise the discretion in

condoning the inordinate delay in filing writ appeal by

the Government.

15.1. Under the above premises, the petition for condonation

of delay does not demonstrate sufficient/good cause; as

such, this Court does not deem it a fit case deserving

condonation of inordinate delay in filing writ appeal.

Having noticed want of bona fide on the part of

appellants and the inaction or negligence as is perceived

on the facts and the circumstances of the present case,

it would deprive the appellants of the protection within

W.A. No.99 of 2026 & I.A. No.160 of 2026 Page 94 of 94

ken of the connotation of the term “sufficient

cause”/“good cause”. Thus, the petition praying to

condone the delay of 303 (plus 30 days specified

prescribed period) in filing the writ appeal cannot be

allowed. It is on threadbare discussion on the material

available on record this Court comes to hold that the

appellants were found to be negligent. The appellants

have not been diligently prosecuting cases.

16. In the wake of aforesaid discussions and reasons

ascribed on facts and in law, the interlocutory

application, being I.A. No.160 of 2026, is dismissed.

Consequently, the writ appeal bearing W.A. No.99 of

2026 stands dismissed with cost assessed at

Rs.1,00,000/- to be deposited with the Odisha State

Legal Services Authority within a week from date. In the

event of such deposit, the said amount shall be kept in

the account earmarked for Juvenile . Pending

interlocutory application(s), if any, shall also stand

disposed of accordingly.

I agree.

(HARISH TANDON) (MURAHARI SRI RAMAN)

CHIEF JUSTICE JUDGE

High Court of Orissa, Cuttack

The 30

th June, 2026//Aswini/Bichi