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CASE NO.:

Appeal (crl.) 801 of 1999

PETITIONER:

STATE OF PUNJAB

Vs.

RESPONDENT:

HARNEK SINGH

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 15/02/2002

BENCH:

R.P. Sethi & Bisheshwar Prasad Singh

JUDGMENT:

(With Crl.A.Nos.802-808/1999,

Crl.A.No.809-810/1999

Crl.A.No.374/2001)

J U D G M E N T

SETHI,J.

In all these appeals, the FIRs and subsequent

proceedings pending against the respondents under the

provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988

(hereinafter referred to as "the 1988 Act") were quashed by

the High Court in exercise of the powers vesting in it under

Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The accused-

respondents had been apprehended while accepting the bribe

by laying the trap under the 1988 Act. The High Court found

that as the investigations had not been conducted by the

authorised officers under the 1988 Act, the same were

vitiated and deserved to be quashed.

The questions of law to be adjudicated upon in these

appeals are:

(1) Whether the notifications issued by the State

Government in exercise of the powers conferred

upon it under Section 5A(1) of the Prevention of

Corruption Act, 1947 (since repealed) empowering

and authorising Inspector of Police to investigate

the cases registered under the said Act are not

saved under the saving provisions of the re-

enacted Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

(2) Whether the aforesaid notifications not being

inconsistent with the provisions of the re-enacted

Act continue to be in force and be deemed to have

been issued under the Prevention of Corruption

Act, 1988 till aforesaid notifications are

superseded or specifically withdrawn."

Most of the facts in these appeals are not disputed.

It is agreed that during the subsistence of the Prevention

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of Corruption Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as "the

1947 Act"), the Government of Punjab issued a notification

on 9.7.1968 authorising Inspectors of Police, for the time

being serving in the State Vigilance Department or who may

be posted in future to serve with the said agency to

investigate the offences under the 1947 Act within the State

of Punjab so long as they remain posted in the said agency.

In supersession of the notifications dated 9th July, 1968,

the Government of Punjab issued another notification on

12.8.1968 under Section 5A(1) of the 1947 Act authorising

such inspectors of police to investigate the offences under

the Act even beyond the State of Punjab and the restrictions

of investigation within the State of Punjab were removed.

The 1947 Act was repealed on 9.9.1988 by re-enacting the

1988 Act being Act No.49 of 1988. FIRs against the

respondents were, concededly, registered after the coming

into force the 1988 Act and the investigation conducted by

the Inspectors of Police who had been authorised to

investigate the offences by notifications issued under the

repealed Act of 1947. The accused-respondents filed

petitions under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. (hereinafter

referred to as "the Code") for quashing the FIRs registered

and the proceedings pending against them on the ground that

the inspectors who had investigated the cases were not the

authorised officers in terms of Section 17 of 1988 Act.

In reply to the notices issued by the High Court, the

State filed counter affidavit submitting therein that the

investigating officers were authorised to investigate the

case as provided by first proviso to Sub-section (1) of

Section 5A of the 1947 Act. It was contended that in view

of the provisions of Section 30(2) of the 1988 Act read with

Sections 6 and 24 of the General Clauses Act, the

notifications issued by the State of Punjab under the 1947

Act were still in force which empowered the Inspectors of

the Police of the Vigilance Department to investigate the

cases under the 1947 Act.

The learned Judge, who disposed of the petitions for

quashing the FIRs and the subsequent proceedings vide the

judgment impugned in these appeals, first dealt with the

problem of prevalent corruption in society and described it

as cancer eating the bone marrow of the society. He,

however, found that the repeal of an Act amounted to its

revocation, annulment and abrogation, the effect of which

was that the repealed Act or Ordinance did not exist on the

statute book. The only exception being the saving

provisions in the repeal statute. Referring to Section 30

of the 1988 Act the learned Judge held:

"It is manifestly clear that the legislature had

the intention to bodily lift the provisions of

Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, and

incorporate the same in the Amending Act of 1988

and (no other provision) of the General Clauses

Act. If the legislature had intended to apply any

other provision or whole of the General Clauses

Act, 1897, it would have so said clearly instead

of saying that section 6 only would apply or would

have said nothing in that regard and in that

eventuality, whole of the Act of 1897 would have

its application. It is trite law that even when a

saving clause reserving the rights and liabilities

under the repealed law is absent in a new

enactment, the same will neither be material nor

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decisive on the question of different intention

because in such cases section 6 of the General

Clauses Act will be attracted and rights and

liabilities acquired, accrued under the repealed

law will remain saved unless there is something to

infer that legislature intended to destroy the

rights and liabilities already accrued. It,

therefore, appears clear that the legislature

intended to apply section 6 only and not the whole

of the Act."

Regarding the continuity of the notifications after the 1988

Act, the learned Judge observed:

"These notifications were issued under sub section

(1) of Section 5-A of the Prevention of Corruption

Act, 1947, and Inspector of Police serving in the

Special Inquiry Agency in the Vigilance Department

of the Punjab Government or who were to be posted

in future to serve in the said agency were

authorised to arrest and investigate the case for

the commission of the offence under the Act of

1947. The notifications enure in respect of any

investigation legal proceedings or remedy that may

be instituted, continued or any such penalty,

forfeiture or punishment that may be imposed under

the Act of 1947, as if the repealing Act or

Regulation had not been passed. These

notifications referred to above, were not

expressly saved by saving provision contained in

Section 30(2) of the Act of 1988. These

notifications, therefore, would not enure or

survive to govern any investigation done or legal

proceedings instituted in respect of cases

registered under the repealing Act, 1988, after it

came into force w.e.f. 9th September, 1988."

After holding that the investigation had not been conducted

by the officers as authorised under Section 17(1) of the

1988 Act, the proceedings against the respondents were

quashed vide the judgment impugned.

Mr.Inderbir Singh Alag, Advocate appearing for the

appellant, contended that the impugned judgment is not

sustainable in view of the mandate of Section 30 of the 1988

Act and Section 6 read with Section 24 of the General

Clauses Act. It is argued that as notifications issued

under Section 5A of the 1947 Act had survived the repeal of

the State Act, there was no necessity of issuing any new

notification. There being no inconsistency between Section

5A of the 1947 Act and Section 17 of the 1988 Act, the

earlier notifications are deemed to be in existence and

Inspector of Police authorised to investigate the offences

under the 1988 Act.

Appearing for some of the respondents Mr.Ranjit Kumar,

Senior Advocate contended that in view of the change in the

nature and scope of Prevention of Corruption Act as to its

ambit and applicability, the penal statute requires to be

strictly construed. As the repealing and saving Section 30

of the 1988 Act refers only to Section 6 of the General

Clauses Act, the other provisions of the General Clauses Act

cannot be relied upon for the purposes of ascertaining the

life of the notifications issued under the 1947 Act. It is

submitted that what is saved by the repealed Act, are only

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the proceedings already having arisen under the repealed Act

and nothing more than that. According to him Section 24 of

the General Clauses Act cannot be pressed into service for

the purpose of deciding the effect of the repeal in the

context of notifications issued under 1947 Act.

Mr.Manoj Swarup, learned counsel appearing for some of

the respondents contended that the provisions made in two

enactments being inconsistent, as is evident from the scheme

of the Acts, sub-section (2) of Section 30 would not save

the notifications issued under the 1947 Act. He contended

that the Legislature intended not to apply any other

provision of the General Clauses Act, as is evident from the

mentioning of the application of Section 6 of the said Act

only in sub-section (2) of Section 30 of the 1988 Act.

Learned counsel appearing for the other respondents

made similar submissions to support the impugned judgment in

these appeals.

Realising that provisions made in the Indian Penal Code

were not adequate to meet the exigencies of the time, an

imperative need was felt to make a law to eradicate the evil

of bribery and corruption for which the 1947 Act was

enacted. The said Act was amended twice by Criminal Law

Amendment Act of 1952 and later in 1964. Ultimately the

said Act was repealed by the 1988 Act being Act No.49 of

1988. The new Act has made the anti corruption law more

effective by widening its coverage and by strengthening its

provisions.

Chapter IV deals with the investigation into cases

under the Act and Section 17 provides:

"17. Persons authorised to investigate. --

Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of

Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), no police

officer below the rank, --

(a) in the case of the Delhi Special Police

Establishment, of an Inspector of Police;

(b) in the metropolitan areas of Bombay,

Calcutta, Madras and Ahmedabad and in any

other metropolitan area notified as such

under sub-section (1) of section 8 of the

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974),

of an Assistant Commissioner of Police;

(c) elsewhere, of a Deputy Superintendent of

Police or a police officer of equivalent

rank,

shall investigate any offence punishable under

this Act without the order of a Metropolitan

Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class, as

the case may be, or make any arrest therefor

without a warrant:

Provided that if a police officer not below the

rank of an Inspector of Police is authorised by

the State Government in this behalf by general or

special order, he may also investigate any such

offence without the order of a Metropolitan

Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class, as

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the case may be, or make arrest therefor without a

warrant:

Provided further than an offence referred to in

clause (e) of sub-section (1) of section 13 shall

not be investigated without the order of a police

officer not below the rank of a Superintendent of

Police."

Section 30 of the Act provides:

"30 Repeal and saving.--(1) The Prevention of

Corruption Act, 1947 (2 of 1947) and the Criminal

Law Amendment Act, 1952 (46 of 1952) are hereby

repealed.

(2) Notwithstanding such repeal, but without

prejudice to the application of section 6 of the

General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897), anything

done or any action taken or purported to have been

done or taken under or in pursuance of the Acts so

repealed shall, in so far as it is not

inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, be

deemed to have been done or taken under or in

pursuance of the corresponding provision of this

Act."

It is relevant, at this stage, to take note of the

provisions of Section 5A of the 1947 Act which provided:

"5A. Investigation into cases under this Act - (1)

Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of

Criminal Procedure, 1898 (5 of 1898), no police

officer below the rank, --

(a) in the case of the Delhi Special Police

Establishment, of an Inspector of Police;

(b) in the presidency-towns of Calcutta and

Madras, of an Assistant Commissioner of

Police;

(c) in the presidency-town of Bombay, of a

Superintendent of Police; and

(d) elsewhere, of a Deputy Superintendent of

Police,

shall investigate any officer punishable under

Section 161, Section 165 or Section 165A of the

Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) or under Section 5

of this Act without the order of a Presidency

Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class, as

the case may be, or make any arrest therefor

without a warrant:

Provided that if a police officer not below the

rank of an Inspector of Police is authorised by

the State Government in this behalf by general or

special order, he may also investigate any such

offence without the order of a Presidency

Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class, as

the case may be, or make arrest therefor without a

warrant:

Provided further that an offence referred to in

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clause (e) of sub-section (1) of section 5 shall

not be investigated without the order of a police

officer not below the rank of a Superintendent of

Police.

(2) If, from information received or otherwise, a

police officer has reason to suspect the

commission of an offence which he is empowered to

investigate under sub-section (1) and considers

that for the purpose of investigation or inquiry

into such offence, it is necessary to inspect any

bankers' books, then, notwithstanding anything

contained in any law for the time being in force,

he may inspect any bankers' books in so far as

they relate to the accounts of the person

suspected to have committed that offence or of any

other person suspected to be holding money on

behalf of such person, and take or cause to be

taken certified copies of the relevant entries

therefrom, and the bank concerned shall be bound

to assist the police officer in the exercise of

his powers under this sub-section:

Provided that no power under this sub-section in

relation to the accounts of any person shall be

exercised by a police officer below the rank of a

Superintendent of Police, unless he is specially

authorised in this behalf by a police officer of

or above the rank of a Superintendent of Police.

Explanation.-- In this sub-section, the

expressions "bank" and "bankers' books" shall have

the meaning assigned to them in the Bankers' Books

Evidence Act, 1891 (18 of 1891)."

For deciding the controversy it is also necessary to

take note of the provisions of Sections 6 and 24 of the

General Clauses Act which provide as under:

"6. Effect of repeal. -- Where this Act, or any

Central Act or Regulation made after the

commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment

hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then,

unless a different intention appears, the repeal

shall not--

(a) revive anything not in force or existing at

the time at which the repeal takes effect; or

(b) affect the previous operation of any

enactment so repealed or anything duly done

or suffered thereunder; or

(c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or

liability acquired, accrued or incurred under

any enactment so repealed; or

(d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment

incurred in respect of any offence committed

against any enactment so repealed; or

(e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or

remedy in respect of any such right,

privilege, obligation, penalty, forfeiture or

punishment as aforesaid,

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and any such investigation, legal proceeding or

remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced,

and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may

be imposed as if the repealing Act or Regulation

had not been passed."

24. Continuation of orders, etc., issued under

enactments repeated and re-enacted - Where any

Central Act or Regulation is, after the

commencement of this Act, repealed and re-enacted

with or without modification, then unless it is

otherwise expressly provided, any appointment,

notification, order, scheme, rule, form or bye-law

made or issued under the repealed Act or

Regulation, shall so far as it is not inconsistent

with the provisions re-enacted, continue in force,

and be deemed to have been made or issued under

the provisions so re-enacted, unless and until it

is superseded by any appointment, notification,

order, scheme, rule form or bye-law made or issued

under the provisions so re-enacted and when any

Central Act or Regulation, which, by a

notification under Section 5 or 5A of the

Scheduled District Act, 1874 (XIV of 1974), or any

like law, has been extended to any local area,

has, by a subsequent notification, been withdrawn

from the re-extended to such area or any part

thereof, the provisions of such Act or Regulation

shall be deemed to have been repealed and re-

enacted in such area or part within the meaning of

this section."

The General Clauses Act has been enacted to avoid

superfluity and repetition of language in various

enactments. The object of this Act is to shorten the

language of Central Acts, to provide as far as possible, for

uniformity of expression in Central Acts, by giving

definition of series of terms in common use, to state

explicitly certain convenient rules for the construction and

interpretation of Central Acts, and to guard against slips

and oversights by importing into every Act certain common

form clauses, which otherwise ought to be inserted expressly

in every Central Act. In other words the General Clauses

Act is a part of every Central Act and has to be read in

such Act unless specifically excluded. Even in cases where

the provisions of the Act do not apply, courts in the

country have applied its principles keeping in mind the

inconvenience that is likely to arise otherwise,

particularly when the provision made in the Act are based

upon the principles of equity, justice and good conscience.

The words "anything duly done or suffered thereunder"

used in sub-clause (b) of Section 6 are often used by the

Legislature in saving clause which is intended to provide

that unless a different intention appears, the repeal of an

Act would not affect anything duly done or suffered

thereunder. This Court in Hasan Nurani Malak v. Assistant

Charity Commissioner, Nagpur & Ors. [AIR 1967 SC 1742] has

held that the object of such a saving clause is to save what

has been previously done under the statute repealed. The

result of such a saving clause is that the pre-existing law

continues to govern the things done before a particular date

from which the repeal of such a pre-existing law takes

effect. In Universal Imports Agency v. Chief Controller of

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Imports and Exports [1961 (1) SCR 305 = AIR 1961 SC 41) this

Court while construing the words "things done" held that a

proper interpretation of the expression "things done" was

comprehensive enough to take in not only the things done but

also the effect of the legal consequence flowing therefrom.

Section 24 of the General Clauses Act deals with the

effect of repeal and re-enactment of an Act and the object

of the section is to preserve the continuity of the

notifications, orders, schemes, rules or bye-laws made or

issued under the repealed Act unless they are shown to be

inconsistent with the provisions of the re-enacted statute.

In Neel @ Niranjan Majumdar v. The State of West Bengal

[AIR 1972 SC 2066], the petitioner therein had challenged

the order of his detention under sub-section (1) read with

sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the West Bengal (Prevention

of Violent Activities) Act, 1970. Sub-section (1) read with

sub-section (3) of Section 3 authorised District Magistrate

to direct detention of any person in respect of whom he was

satisfied that such detention should be ordered with a view

to prevent him from acting prejudicially to the security of

the State or the maintenance of public order. Sub-section

(2) of Section 3 contained a special definition of the

expression "acting in any manner prejudicial to the security

of the State or the maintenance of public order" to mean the

acts enumerated in clauses (a) to (e) thereof. Clause (d)

provided:

"(d) committing, or instigating any person to

commit, any offence punishable with death or

imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term

extending to seven years or more or any offence

under the Arms Act, 1959 or the Explosive

Substances Act, 1908, where the commission of such

offence disturbs, or is likely to disturb, public

order."

In the grounds of detention it was mentioned that the

detenue indulged in activities including causing injuries

with a sword. Under Section 2(1)(c) of the Arms Act, the

word "arms" was defined to mean articles of any description

designed or adapted as weapons for offence or defence which

included firearms, sharp-edged and other deadly weapons.

Section 4 of the Arms Act empowered the Central Government,

if it was of opinion that having regard to the circumstances

prevailing in any area it was necessary or expedient in the

public interest that acquisition, possession or carrying of

arms, other than firearms, should also be regulated, it may

by notification direct that the Section shall apply to the

area specified in such a notification and thereupon no

person shall acquire, have in his possession or carry in

that area arms of such class or description as may be

specified in that notification, except under a licence

issued under the provisions of the Act or the rules made

thereunder. It was found that no notification, as

contemplated by Section 4 of 1959 Act had been issued. But

in 1923 such a notification was issued under Section 15 of

the earlier Indian Arms Act of 1878 which in terms was

similar to Section 4 of the 1959 Act. The question posed

before the court was whether Act No.XI of 1878 having been

repealed, the said notification issued under Section 15

thereof can still be said to be operative. Dealing with

such a situation this Court held:

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"Section 6(b) of the General Clauses Act, however,

provides that where any Central Act or regulation

made after the commencement of the Act repeals any

earlier enactment, then, unless a different

intention appears, such repeal shall not "affect

the previous operation of any enactment so

repealed or any thing duly done or suffered

thereunder". Section 24 next provides that where

any Central Act is repealed and re-enacted with or

without modification, then, unless it is otherwise

expressly provided, any notification issued under

such repealed Act shall, so far as it is

inconsistent with the provisions re-enacted,

continue in force and be deemed to have been made

under the provisions so re-enacted unless it is

superseded by any notification or order issued

under the provisions so re-enacted. The new Act

nowhere contains an intention to the contrary

signifying that the operation of the repealed Act

or of a notification issued thereunder was not to

continue. Further, the new Act re-enacts the

provisions of the earlier Act, and Section 4 in

particular, as already stated, has provisions

practically identical to those of Section 15 of

the earlier Act. The combined effect of Sections

6 and 24 of the General Clauses Act is that the

said notification of 1923 issued under Section 15

of the Act of 1878 not only continued to operate

but has to be deemed to have been enacted under

the new Act."

In Central Bureau of Investigation v. Subodh Kumar

Dutta & Anr. [1997 (10) SCC 567] the cognizance of the

offence had been taken by Special Court constituted under

the West Bengal Special Courts Act. After cognizance had

been taken, the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 came to

be repealed by the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 w.e.f.

9.9.1988. The accused filed a Criminal Revision Petition in

the High Court seeking quashing of the proceedings in the

case pending against him before the Special Court in which

the principal ground raised was the violation of fundamental

right of the accused to speedy trial. During the arguments

the accused was permitted to raise a plea that the Special

Court, trying the bribery case, had no jurisdiction to take

cognizance of the offence under the Prevention of Corruption

Act, 1947 as that court had not been constituted pursuant to

Section 3 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 which

had repealed the 1947 Act. Taking note of Section 26 of the

1988 Act, the Single Judge of the High Court opined that the

cognizance taken by the Special Court on 9.7.1988 under the

1947 Act was not saved and thus quashed the proceedings.

Interpreting sub-section (2) of Section 30 of the 1988 Act,

this Court held that a bare look at the provisions of sub-

section (2) of Section 30 shows that anything done or any

action taken or purported to have been taken under or in

pursuance of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 shall be

deemed to have been taken under or in pursuance of the

corresponding provision of the Prevention of Corruption Act,

1988. In view of this specific provision, the cognizance of

the offence taken by the Special Court stood saved.

In Nar Bahadur Bhandari & Anr. v. State of Sikkim &

Others [1998 (5) SCC 39] it was held that sub-section (2) of

Section 30 of the 1988 Act, on the one hand ensures that the

application of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act is not

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prejudiced, on the other it expressed a different intention

as contemplated by the said section. The last part of sub-

section introduced a legal fiction whereby anything done or

action taken under or in pursuance of 1947 Act shall be

deemed to have been done or taken under or in pursuance of

the corresponding provision of the 1988 Act. The fiction is

to the effect that the 1988 Act had come into force when

such thing was done or action was taken.

In Kolhapur Canesugar Works Ltd. & Anr v. Union of

India & Ors. [2000 (2) SCC 356] this Court held that at

common law the normal act of repealing the statute or

deleting the provision is to obliterate it from the statute

book as completely as if it had never been passed, and the

statute must be considered as a law that never existed. To

this rule an exception is engrafted by the provisions of

Section 6(1). If a provision of a statute is

unconditionally omitted without a saving clause in favour of

pending proceedings, all actions must stop where the

omission finds them, and if final relief has not been

granted before the omission goes into, it cannot be granted

afterwards. Savings of the nature contained in Section 6 in

Special Act may modify the position.

There is no dispute that when an Act is repealed but

re-enacted, it is almost inevitable that there will be some

time lag between the re-enacted statute coming into force

and regulations being framed under the re-enacted statute.

In Chief Inspector of Mines & Anr., etc. vs. Karam Chand

Thapar, etc. [AIR 1961 SC 838] this Court observed that:

"However, efficient the rule-making authority may

be it is impossible to avoid some hiatus between

the coming into force of the re-enacted statute

and the simultaneous repeal of the old Act and the

making of regulations. Often, the time lag would

be considerable. It is conceivable that any

legislature, in providing that regulations made

under its statute will have effect as if enacted

in the Act, could have intended by those words to

say that if ever the Act is repealed and re-

enacted, (as is more than likely to happen sooner

or later), the regulations will have no existence

for the purpose of the re-enacted statute, and

thus the re-enacted statute, for some time at

least, will be in many respects, a dead letter.

The answer must be in the negative. Whatever the

purpose be which induced the draftsmen to adopt

this legislative form as regards the rules and

regulations that they will have effect "as if

enacted in the Act", it will be strange indeed if

the result of the language used, be that by

becoming part of the Act, they would stand

repealed, when the Act is repealed. One can be

certain that that could not have been the

intention of the legislature. It is satisfactory

that the words used do not produce that result."

We do not find any force in the submission of the

learned counsel appearing for the respondents that as

reference made in Sub-section (2) of Section 30 of 1988 Act

is only to Section 6 of General Clauses Act, the other

provisions of the said Act are not applicable for the

purposes of deciding the controversy with respect to the

notifications issued under the 1947 Act. We are further of

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the opinion that the High Court committed a mistake of law

by holding that as notifications have not expressly been

saved by Section 30 of the Act, those would not enure or

survive to govern any investigation done or legal proceeding

instituted in respect of the cases registered under the 1988

Act. There is no dispute that 1988 Act is both repealing

and re-enacting the law relating to prevention of corruption

to which the provisions of Section 24 of the General Clauses

Act are specifically applicable. It appears that as Section

6 of the General Clauses Act applies to repealed enactments,

the Legislature in its wisdom thought it proper to make the

same specifically applicable in 1988 Act also which is a

repealed and re-enacted statute. Reference to Section 6 of

General Clauses Act in sub-section (1) of Section 30 has

been made to avoid any confusion or misunderstanding

regarding the effect of repeal with regard to actions taken

under the repealed Act. If the Legislature had intended not

to apply the provisions of Section 24 of the General Clauses

Act to the 1988 Act, it would have specifically so provided

under the enacted law. In the light of the fact that

Section 24 of the General Clauses Act is specifically

applicable to repealing and re-enacting statute, its

exclusion has to be specific and cannot be inferred by

twisting the language of the enactments. Accepting the

contention of the learned counsel for the respondents would

render the provisions of 1988 Act redundant inasmuch as

appointments, notifications, orders, schemes, rules, by-

laws, made or issued under the repealed Act would be deemed

to be non-existent making impossible the working of the re-

enacted law impossible. The provisions of the 1988 Act are

required to be understood and interpreted in the light of

the provisions of the General Clauses Act including Sections

6 and 24 thereof.

There is no substance in the arguments of the learned

counsel appearing for the respondents that the provision

made in two enactments were inconsistent and sub-section (2)

of Section 30 would not save the notifications issued under

the 1947 Act. The consistency, referred to in sub-section

(2) of Section 30 is with respect to acts done in pursuance

of the Repealed Act and thus restricted it to such provision

of the Acts which come for interpretation of the court and

not the whole of the scheme of the enactment. It has been

conceded before us that there is no inconsistency between

Section 5A of the 1947 Act and Section 17 of the 1988 Act

and provisions of General Clauses Act would be applicable

and with the aid of sub-section (2) of Section 30 anything

done or any action taken or purported to have been done or

taken in pursuance of 1947 Act be deemed to have been done

or taken under or in pursuance of the corresponding

provision of 1988 Act. For that purpose, the 1988 Act, by

fiction, shall be deemed to have been in force at the time

when the aforesaid notifications were issued under the then

prevalent corresponding law. Otherwise also there does not

appear any inconsistency between the two enactments except

that the scope and field covered by 1988 Act has been

widened and enlarged. Both the enactments deal with the

same subject matter, i.e. corruption amongst the public

servants and make provision to deal with such a menace.

To justify the impugned judgment and to impress upon us

the inconsistency in the two provisions, the learned counsel

appearing for the respondents referred to some

communications included in the paperbook from pages 109 to

120. It is submitted that the aforesaid correspondence in

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the form of Annexure P-2 to P-5 showed that the Government

had applied its mind under the re-enacted law and took a

conscious decision that the Inspectors of Police were not

competent to investigate the offences punishable under the

new Act and that only officers above the rank of Dy.

Superintendent of Police should investigate the cases under

the Act. Reference to the aforesaid letters is based upon

misconception. In none of the letters the Government is

shown to have taken any decision as argued. The aforesaid

documents are the letters exchanged between different

officials of the Police Department of the State of Punjab

which are not referable to any specific decision of the

State Government. In the Memo of Appeal and the Rejoinder

Affidavit filed on behalf of the State it is specifically

submitted that the proceedings of the high level meeting

presided over by the Chief Secretary, referred to by the

respondents as decision of the Government, "is internal

communication between different wings of the Government and

cannot be made basis to conclude that State Government had

neither any intention to keep alive the notifications under

the Old Act of 1947 nor have any intention to empower the

Inspector of Police in the Vigilance Department to

investigate the afresh cases. It is also relevant that as

per the Old Act, since there were notifications which were

valid under the New Act by virtue of Section 6 and 24 of

General Clauses Act unless these were formally rescinded,

the same hold good and the notings on the file to any effect

cannot be made basis for striking down those notifications".

It is, therefore, evident that the notifications issued

by the Government of Punjab, in exercise of the powers

conferred under Section 5A of the 1947 Act, empowering and

authorising the Inspectors of Police posted in Special

Inquiry Agency of the Vigilance Department, Govt. of Punjab

to investigate the cases registered under the said Act were

saved under the saving provision of the re-enacted 1988 Act.

Such notifications are not inconsistent with the provisions

of re-enacted Act and are deemed to continue in force as

having been issued under the re-enacted 1988 Act till the

aforesaid notifications are specifically superseded or

withdrawn or modified under the 1988 Act. The investigation

conducted by the Inspectors of Police authorised in that

behalf under the 1947 Act are held to be proper, legal and

valid investigation under the re-enacted Act and do not

suffer from any vice of illegality or jurisdiction. The

High Court committed a mistake of law in holding the

aforesaid notifications as not saved under the re-enacted

1988 Act. The quashing of the proceedings on the basis of

the First Information Report registered against the

respondent-accused was illegal and contrary to the settled

position of law. The judgment of the High Court, impugned

in these appeals, is, therefore, liable to be set aside.

Under the circumstances, the appeals are allowed and

the impugned judgments are set aside. The Trial Courts are

directed to proceed with the matter in accordance with law

and after framing the charges decide cases on their merits.

In view of the fact that the proceedings have been

unnecessarily delayed and protracted by the respondents for

a sufficiently long period, the trial courts are impressed

upon to give priority to the aforesaid cases and conclude

the trials at the earliest.

............................J.

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(R.P. Sethi)

...........................J.

(Bisheshwar Prasad Singh)

February 15, 2002