Page 1 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 9029 OF 2012

(Arising out of SLP (Civil) Nos. 35279 of 2009)

State of U.P. & Ors. …

Appellants

Versus

Ashok Kumar Nigam … Respondent

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9030 OF 2012

[Arising out of SLP(C) No. 24562 of 2010]

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9031 OF 2012

[Arising out of SLP(C) No. 24563 of 2010]

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9032 OF 2012

[Arising out of SLP(C) No. 24564 of 2010]

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9033 OF 2012

[Arising out of SLP(C) No. 35561 of 2010]

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9034 OF 2012

[Arising out of SLP(C) No. 35562 of 2010]

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9035 OF 2012

[Arising out of SLP(C) No. 35569 of 2010]

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9036 OF 2012

[Arising out of SLP(C) No. 35568 of 2010]

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9037 OF 2012

[Arising out of SLP(C) No. 35567 of 2010]

1

Page 2 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9038 OF 2012

[Arising out of SLP(C) No. 35566 of 2010]

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9039 OF 2012

[Arising out of SLP(C) No. 35565 of 2010]

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9040 OF 2012

[Arising out of SLP(C) No. 9156 of 2011]

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9041 OF 2012

[Arising out of SLP(C) No. 13788 of 2011]

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9042 OF 2012

[Arising out of SLP(C) No. 20917 of 2011]

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9043 OF 2012

[Arising out of SLP(C) No. 20918 of 2011]

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9044 OF 2012

[Arising out of SLP(C) No. 11261 of 2010]

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9045 OF 2012

[Arising out of SLP(C) No. 12993 of 2010]

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9046 OF 2012

[Arising out of SLP(C) No. 18407 of 2011]

J U D G M E N T

Swatanter Kumar J .

1.Leave granted in all the Special Leave Petitions.

2.These appeals are directed against the judgment of the

High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench. Though

2

Page 3 dated differently, the questions of law involved in all these

appeals are identical based upon somewhat similar facts.

SLP(C) No. 35569 of 2010 was filed against the order dated 24

th

September, 2008, SLP(C) No. 35568 of 2010 was filed against

the order dated 29

th

September, 2008, SLP(C) No. 35565 of

2010 was filed against the order dated 14

th

September, 2009,

SLP(C) No. 35566 of 2010 against the order dated 18

th

September, 2010, SLP(C) No. 35279 of 2009, SLP(C) No. 24562

of 2010, SLP(C) No. 24564 of 2010 and SLP(C) No. 35567 of

2010 against the order dated 14

th

October, 2009, SLP(C) No.

12993 of 2010, SLP(C) No. 24563 of 2010 and SLP(C) No. 35561

of 2010 against the order dated 16

th

November, 2009, SLP(C)

No. 11261 of 2010 against the order dated 21

st

January, 2010,

SLP(C) No. 35562 of 2010 against the order dated 9

th

April,

2010, SLP(C) No. 9156 of 2011 against the order dated 19

th

January, 2011, SLP(C) No. 20918 of 2011 and SLP(C) No. 13788

of 2011 against the order dated 28

th

April, 2011, SLP(C) No.

20917 of 2011 against the order dated 29

th

April, 2011 and

SLP(C) No. 18407 of 2011 against the order dated 26

th

April,

2011.

3

Page 4 3.We have taken the case of Ashok Kumar Nigam (supra) i.e.

Civil Appeal @ SLP(C) No. 35279 of 2009 as the lead case.

Before we proceed to notice the facts giving rise to the present

appeal in that case, it is necessary for us to notice that SLP

(Civil) No. 9156 of 2011 has been directed against an interim

order passed by the Division Bench of that High Court in

Miscellaneous Bench No. 523 of 2003 titled “Pramod Sharma v.

State of Uttar Pradesh”. The interim order dated 19.1.2011 had

directed that no regular appointment shall be made on the post

Government Advocate in place of the appellant. Vide its

judgment dated 10

th

February, 2011, the Division Bench of the

High Court finally disposed of the interim application by staying

the operation of the orders dated 24

th

December, 2010 and 28

th

December, 2010 passed by the respondents. It further directed

that the appellant be allowed to continue as the District

Government Counsel (Criminal) subject to any decision being

taken afresh in accordance with the directive issued by the

judgment of that Court passed in Writ Petition No.10038(MB) of

2009. In other words, the interim order had merged into the

order of the High Court dated 10

th

February, 2011 against which

as of now, no petition has been filed. Thus, the special leave

4

Page 5 petition No. 9156 of 2011 has been rendered infructuous and is

accordingly dismissed as such.

SLP(C) No. 35279 of 2009

4.Mr. Ashok Kumar Nigam, respondent herein was appointed

as District Government Counsel on 17

th

September, 2004 vide a

notification issued by the State Government. The term of the

said respondent was renewed on 3

rd

March, 2006 for a period of

one year and as such his term came to an end on 5

th

March,

2007. The respondent submitted his application for renewal of

his term on 19

th

January, 2007. The District Judge, Lucknow on

26

th

February, 2007 gave his report and the District Magistrate

also submitted his report on 5

th

March, 2007 recommending the

renewal of the term of the respondent. However, the State

Government, appellant herein, vide order dated 3

rd

April, 2008

refused his renewal which resulted in cancellation of

engagement of the said respondent. The order dated 3

rd

April,

2008 can usefully be reproduced at this stage:-

“From

Acharya Suresh Babu

Deputy Secretary

Government of Uttar Pradesh

To

5

Page 6 The District Magistrate

Lucknow

Nyay-Anubhag-3-Appointment Lkw, dated

3.4.2008

Sub: Renewal of Tenure of engagement of

District Government Counsels at the District

Level

Sir,

With reference to your Letter No.

855/JA(2)/Advocate-Renewal/07 dated

5.3.2007, I have been directed to say that

after due consideration, the Hon’ble

Governor had kindly ordered not to renew

the tenure of engagement of Sh. Ashok

Kumar Nigam, as District Government

Counsel (Criminal), Lucknow.

Accordingly, in the aforesaid background, the

engagement order of Sh. Ashok Kumar

Nigam, as District Government Counsel is

hereby terminated.

Please take necessary action at your end and

forward your proposal from the panel of

Advocates for being engaged as District

Government Counsel against the

consequential vacancy.”

5.Aggrieved from the above order, the respondent filed writ

petition before the High Court of Allahabad, Lucknow Bench. In

the writ petition, the stand taken by the respondent was that in

terms of the rule, the petitioner has a right to continue and in

any case for consideration of renewal of his term, the impugned

6

Page 7 order does not state any reasons and, in fact, does not take into

consideration the recommendations made by the District and

Sessions Judge and the District Magistrate, who had

recommended renewal of the term of the respondent. The

High Court after hearing the counsel appearing for the parties,

vide its judgment dated 14

th

October, 2009, allowed the writ

petition, setting aside the order dated 3

rd

April, 2008 and even

granting further relief to the appellant. The operative part of

the High Court judgment reads as under:-

“For the reasons stated above, the order

impugned dated 03.04.2008 is hereby set

aside.

We are informed that no person has yet been

appointed or engaged in place of the

petitioner, in view of the interim order passed

by this Court, we, therefore, further provide

that the petitioner shall be allowed to

continue to discharge the functions and duties

of the District Government Counsel, till the

consideration of the renewal of his term in

accordance with law.

We may further clarify that the renewal of the

petitioner’s term shall be considered in

accordance with the relevant provisions of

L.R. manual (unamended para 7.08 as the

amendments made in L.R. Manual are subject

matter of challenge in W.P. No. 7851 (M/B) of

2008 wherein the implementation of the

amended provisions stand stayed) if he has

not crossed the age of 60 years but if he has

already attained the age of 60 years, but has

7

Page 8 not yet reached the age of 62 years then his

case will be considered for extension of his

term upto the age of 62 years and for that

consideration, if any further formalities are to

be completed or some certificates are

needed, he shall be given an opportunity to

furnish the same, so that his case may be

considered in accordance with the relevant

rules. Writ petition is allowed. Cost easy.”

6.Aggrieved from the above judgment of the High Court, the

State of Uttar Pradesh (appellant herein) has filed the present

appeal before this Court. The challenge to the impugned order

is, inter alia, but primarily on the following grounds:-

A) In terms of the relevant rule, the State Government has

discretion to terminate the term of the District

Government Counsel (Criminal), and in any case, the term

of the respondent had come to an end by efflux of time,

and therefore, the High Court has exceeded its jurisdiction

in setting aside the order dated 3

rd

April, 2008.

B)At best, if allowing the writ petition, the High Court could

set aside the impugned order, but could not direct that

they be retained or continued till the age of 60 or 62 years

as the case may be. The respondent would only have a

right of consideration and nothing more, therefore, the

8

Page 9 judgment of the High Court suffers from apparent errors.

The High Court gave no reasons much less valid reasons

for setting aside the order dated 3

rd

April, 2008.

7.Opposed to the above contentions, it is contended on

behalf of the respondents that the order dated 3

rd

April, 2008

was a non-speaking order and suffered from the vice of non-

application of mind and was arbitrary and has correctly been

set aside by the High Court. Reliance in this regard is placed

upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Kumari Shrilekha

Vidyarthi and Others v. State of U.P. & Ors. [(1991) 1 SCC 212].

Further, that the impugned order dated 3

rd

April, 2008 is

contrary to the rules in force. The order of the High Court under

appeal does not call for any interference.

8.Before we examine the merit or otherwise of the

contentions, it will be appropriate for this court to notice the

relevant rule. Chapter 7 of the Legal Remembrancer’s Manual

deals with District Government Counsel. In terms of Para 7.01,

the District Government Counsel are legal practitioners

appointed by the State Government to conduct in any court,

other than the High Court, such civil, criminal or revenue cases

9

Page 10 on behalf of the State Government as assigned to them either

generally or specially. Para 7.02 deals with the power of the

government to appoint government counsels in the districts.

As per this provision, the government was to ordinarily appoint

District Government Counsel (Criminal), District Government

Counsel (Civil) and District Government Counsel (Revenue) for

each district, for which they have to make an application.

9.Under these rules, the appointments are to be made and

renewal to be considered upon the recommendation of the

District Officer and the District Judge. The rules even state the

factors which are to weigh in the mind of the recommending

authority while recommending or declining to recommend

renewal of term of the government pleaders. Paras 7.6 to 7.8

read as under:-

“7.06. Appointment and renewal – (1) The legal

practitioner finally selected by the Government

may be appointed District Government Counsel

for one year from the date of his taking over

charge.

(2) At the end of the aforesaid period, the District

Officer after consulting the District Judge shall

submit a report on his work and conduct to the

legal Rememberancer together with the

statement of work done in Form no. 9. Should

his work or conduct be found to be unsatisfactory

the matter shall be reported to the Government

10

Page 11 for orders. If the report in respect of his work

and conduct is satisfactory, he may be furnished

with a deed of engagement in Form no. 1 for a

term no exceeding three years. On his first

engagement a copy of Form no. 2 shall be

supplied to him and he shall complete and return

it to the Legal Remembrancer for record.

(3) The appointment of any legal practitioner as

a District Government Counsel is only

professional engagement terminable at will on

either side and is not appointment to a post

under the Government. Accordingly the

Government reserves the power to terminate the

appointment of any District Government Counsel

at any time without assisting any cause.

7.08. Renewal of term – (1) At least three months

before the expiry of the term of a District

Government Counsel, the District Officer shall

after consulting the District Judge and

considering his past record of work, conduct and

age, report to the Legal Remembrancre, together

with the statement of work done by him in Form

no. 9 whether in his opinion the term of

appointment of such counsel should be renewed

or not. A copy of the opinion of the District

Judge should also be sent along with the

recommendations of the District Officer.

(2) Where recommendation for the extension of

the term of a District Government Counsel is

made for a specified period only, the reasons

thereof shall also be stated by the District

Officer.

(3) While forwarding his recommendation for

renewal of the term of a District Government

Counsel –

(i) The District Judge shall give an

estimate of the quality of the Counsel’s

work from the judicial stand point,

11

Page 12 keeping in view the different aspects of a

lawyer’s capacity as it is manifested

before him in conducting State cases,

and specially his professional conduct;

(ii) The District Officer shall give his

report about the suitability of the District

Government Counsel from the

administrative point of view, his public

reputation in general, his character,

integrity and professional conduct.

(4) If the Government agrees with the

recommendations of the District Officer for the

renewal of the term of the Government Counsel,

it may pass orders for re-appointing him for a

period not exceeding three years.

(5) If the Government decides not to re-appoint a

Government Counsel, the Legal Remembrancer

may call upon the District officer to forward fresh

recommendations in the manner laid down in

para 7.03.

(6) The procedure prescribed in this para shall be

followed on the expiry of every successive period

of renewed appointment of a District

Government Counsel.”

10.From the above rules, it is clear that the government

counsel has to be appointed and/or his term renewed upon

recommendation of the District Judge and the District Officer

and in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the

above rules. It is only when the recommendations based upon

stated criteria are unfavourable to the applicant in question

that the government could decline renewal of the term. In the

12

Page 13 present case, we are not concerned with the appointment as

such. All the cases in hand are cases of renewal of term.

11.The High Court in its judgment has noticed that the order

dated 3

rd

April, 2008 clearly shows that the request for renewal

has been rejected without considering the recommendation of

the District Judge and District Magistrate. The High Court has

even noticed in its judgment that in view of this fact it had

called for the records and the records produced did not show

proper consideration by the State Government before refusing

to grant renewal of the term of the respondent. The High Court

also noticed that the Government had taken enblock decision

that the renewal in the cases of such Government counsel

whose term have come to an end will not be granted. It was in

pursuance to this decision that the government refused to grant

renewal to the respondent as well.

12.The High Court had examined the records and after being

satisfied that the record produced did not exhibit proper

application of mind or due consideration as per prescribed

procedure and the action being arbitrary, had set aside the

order dated 3

rd

April, 2008. There is nothing on record placed

before this court by the appellant that could demonstrate that

13

Page 14 such view of the High Court suffered from any infirmity. The

prescribed procedures under para 7.08 of the Manual requires

the government to invite to invite opinion of the District Judge

and District Officer, three months prior to the expiry of the term

of the District Government Counsel. By amendment, proviso

was added to para 7.03 to provide that District Magistrate shall

always be free to nominate such person who may be found

eligible but who had not submitted particulars for being

appointed as such. As per the prescribed procedure, the office

of Legal Remembrance was expected to consider the past

record of work and conduct of the concerned District

Government Counsel and then to send a report together with

the statement of work done by such applicant. The High Court

had clearly stated the principle that where there is conflict

between the recommendation of the District Judge and the

District Magistrate, primacy shall be given to the report of the

District Judge. Thus, in our opinion, the onus is shifted to the

State to show that it had acted in accordance with the

prescribed procedure and its action does not suffer from the

vice of discrimination and arbitrariness.

14

Page 15 13.Total non-application of mind and the order being

supported by no reason whatsoever would render the order

passed as ‘arbitrary’. Arbitrariness shall vitiate the

administrative order. The rules provide a procedure and even

require the State Government to consider the case for renewal

of the government counsel whose term is coming to an end.

The scheme of para 7.06 of the Manual is that appointment of a

government pleader is to be made for a period of one year and

at the end of the period, the District Officer in consultation with

the District Judge is required to submit a report on the work and

conduct to the legal remembrancer together with the work

done in Form 9. It is only when his work or conduct is found to

be unsatisfactory that it is so reported to the government for

appropriate orders. If the report is satisfactory, the rule

requires that he may be furnished with a deed of engagement

in form I, for a term not exceeding three years, on his first

engagement. In terms of para 7.06 (3), the Government

reserves the power to terminate the appointment of any District

Government Counsel at any time without assigning any cause.

Firstly, one has to examine the entire scheme of para 7.06 (3).

It cannot be read in isolation. The right of consideration for

15

Page 16 renewal for the specified period is a legitimate right vested in

an applicant and he can be deprived of such right and be

declined renewal where his work is unsatisfactory and is so

reported by the specified authorities. It is difficult to

comprehend that clause (3) of para 7.06 can be enforced in the

manner as suggested. If it is construed, as suggested, that the

government has an absolute right to terminate the appointment

at any time without specifying any reason, it will be violative of

Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India and such rule

shall be arbitrary, thus not sustainable in law. In the case of

Delhi Transport Corporation v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress [1991

Supp. (1) SCC 600] while dealing with Regulation 9, which was

worded similarly, this Court held as under:-

“202. Thus on a conspectus of the catena of

cases decided by this Court the only

conclusion that follows is that Regulation

9(b) which confers powers on the authority

to terminate the services of a permanent

and confirmed employee by issuing a notice

terminating the services or by making

payment in lieu of notice without assigning

any reasons in the order and without giving

any opportunity of hearing to the employee

before passing the impugned order is wholly

arbitrary, uncanalised and unrestricted

violating principles of natural justice as well

as Article 14 of the Constitution. It has also

been held consistently by this Court that the

16

Page 17 government carries on various trades and

business activity through the instrumentality

of the State such as Government Company

or Public Corporations. Such Government

Company or Public Corporation being State

instrumentalities are State within the

meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and

as such they are subject to the observance

of fundamental rights embodied in Part III as

well as to conform to the directive principles

in Part IV of the Constitution. In other words

the Service Regulations or Rules framed by

them are to be tested by the touchstone of

Article 14 of Constitution. Furthermore, the

procedure prescribed by their Rules or

Regulations must be reasonable, fair and

just and not arbitrary, fanciful and unjust.

Regulation 9(b), therefore, confers

unbridled, uncanalised and arbitrary power

on the authority to terminate the services of

a permanent employee without recording

any reasons and without conforming to the

principles of natural justice. There is no

guideline in the Regulations or in the Act, as

to when or in which cases and circumstances

this power of termination by giving notice or

pay in lieu of notice can be exercised. It is

now well settled that the ‘audi alteram

partem’ rule which in essence, enforces the

equality clause in Article 14 of the

Constitution is applicable not only to quasi-

judicial orders but to administrative orders

affecting prejudicially the party-in-question

unless the application of the rule has been

expressly excluded by the Act or Regulation

or Rule which is not the case here. Rules of

natural justice do not supplant but

supplement the Rules and Regulations.

Moreover, the Rule of Law which permeates

our Constitution demands that it has to be

observed both substantially and

procedurally. Considering from all aspects

17

Page 18 Regulation 9(b) is illegal and void as it is

arbitrary, discriminatory and without any

guidelines for exercise of the power. Rule of

law posits that the power is to be exercised

in a manner which is just, fair and

reasonable and not in an unreasonable,

capricious or arbitrary manner leaving room

for discrimination. Regulation 9(b) does not

expressly exclude the application of the

‘audi alteram partem’ rule and as such the

order of termination of service of a

permanent employee cannot be passed by

simply issuing a month's notice under

Regulation 9(b) or pay in lieu thereof without

recording any reason in the order and

without giving any hearing to the employee

to controvert the allegation on the basis of

which the purported order is made.

203. It will be profitable to refer in this

connection the observations of this Court in

the case of Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel

where the constitutionality of provisions of

Article 311 particularly the second Proviso to

clause (2) of the said article came up for

consideration. This Court referred to the

findings in Roshan Lal Tandon v. Union of

India wherein it was held that though the

origin of a government service is contractual

yet when once appointed to his post or

office, the government servant acquires a

status and his rights and obligations are no

longer determined by the consent of both

the parties, but by statute or statutory rules

which may be framed and altered

unilaterally by the government. In other

words, the legal position of a government

servant is more one of status than of

contract. The hall-mark of status is the

attachment to a legal relationship of rights

and duties imposed by the public law and

not by mere agreement of the parties. It has

18

Page 19 been observed that Article 14 does not

govern or control Article 311. The

Constitution must be read as a whole. Article

311(2) embodies the principles of natural

justice including audi alteram partem rule.

Once the application of clause (2) is

expressly excluded by the Constitution itself,

there can be no question of making

applicable what has been so excluded of

seeking recourse to Article 14 of the

Constitution.”

14.Thus, in our opinion it was not permissible for the

government to take recourse to Para 7.06 (3) in the manner in

which it has done and in any case, the said rule can hardly be

sustained in law.

15.The order dated 3

rd

April, 2008 is even liable to be quashed

on another ground, that it is a non-speaking order also suffering

from the vice of non-application of mind. As already discussed,

the government has taken an enblock decision, without

recording any reason, not to renew the term of any of the

government counsel. That itself shows that there is no

application of mind. In the case of Kumari Shrilekha (supra),

this Court expressed the opinion that it would be alien to the

Constitutional Scheme to accept the argument of exclusion of

Article 14 in contractual matters. The arbitrary act of the

19

Page 20 State cannot be excluded from the ambit of judicial review

merely on the ground that it is a contractual matter. The

expression ‘At any time without assigning any cause’, can be

divided into two portions, one “at any time”, which merely

means the termination may be made even during the

subsistence of the term of appointment and second, “without

assigning any cause” which means without communicating any

cause to the appointee whose appointment is terminated.

However, “without assigning any cause” is not to be equated

with “without existence of any cause”.

16.Further, this Court in the case of Assistant Commissioner,

Commercial Tax Department, Works Contract and Leasing v.

Shukla and Brothers [(2010) 4 SCC 785], impressed upon the

need for recording of appropriate reasons in orders and held as

under:-

“11. The Supreme Court in S.N. Mukherjee v.

Union of India while referring to the practice

adopted and insistence placed by the courts in

United States, emphasised the importance of

recording of reasons for decisions by the

administrative authorities and tribunals. It said

“administrative process will best be vindicated

by clarity in its exercise”. To enable the courts

to exercise the power of review in consonance

with settled principles, the authorities are

advised of the considerations underlining the

20

Page 21 action under review. This Court with approval

stated: (SCC p. 602, para 11)

‘11. … ‘the orderly functioning of the

process of review requires that the

grounds upon which the administrative

agency acted be clearly disclosed and

adequately sustained’.’

12. In exercise of the power of judicial review,

the concept of reasoned orders/actions has

been enforced equally by the foreign courts as

by the courts in India. The administrative

authority and tribunals are obliged to give

reasons, absence whereof could render the

order liable to judicial chastisement. Thus, it

will not be far from an absolute principle of law

that the courts should record reasons for their

conclusions to enable the appellate or higher

courts to exercise their jurisdiction

appropriately and in accordance with law. It is

the reasoning alone, that can enable a higher

or an appellate court to appreciate the

controversy in issue in its correct perspective

and to hold whether the reasoning recorded by

the court whose order is impugned, is

sustainable in law and whether it has adopted

the correct legal approach. To subserve the

purpose of justice delivery system, therefore,

it is essential that the courts should record

reasons for their conclusions, whether

disposing of the case at admission stage or

after regular hearing.”

17.The order dated 3

rd

April, 2008, which we have reproduced

above, clearly shows non-application of mind and non-recording

of reasons, which leads only to one conclusion, that the said

order was an arbitrary exercise of power by the State. We

21

Page 22 cannot find any fault with the reasoning of the High Court in

that behalf. But we do find some merit in the contention raised

on behalf of the appellant State that the High Court should not

have directed appointments while regulating the age, as has

been done by the High Court in operative part of its judgment.

There is right of consideration, but none can claim right to

appointment. Para 7.06 states that renewal beyond 60 years

shall depend upon continuous good work, sound integrity and

physical fitness of the counsel. These are the considerations

which have been weighed by the competent authority in the

State Government to examine whether renewal/extension

beyond 60 years should be granted or not. That does not ipso

facto means that there is a right to appointment upto the age of

60 years irrespective of work, conduct and integrity of the

counsel. The rule provides due safeguards as it calls for the

report of the District Judge and the District Officer granting

renewal.

18.Thus, for the above-recorded reasons, while declining to

interfere in the judgment of the High Court, we direct that the

government shall consider cases of the respondents in these

petitions for renewal in accordance with the procedure

22

Page 23 prescribed and criteria laid down under Paras 7.06 to 7.08 of

the LR Manual. The consideration shall be completed as

expeditiously as possible and, in any case, not later than three

months from today.

19.Subject to the above observations, all the appeals are

dismissed without any order as to costs.

.………...….…………......................J.

(Swatanter Kumar)

…..…………..................................J.

(Sudhansu Jyoti Mukhopadhaya)

New Delhi,

December 13, 2012

23