1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO(s). 169-170 of 2022

(Arising out of SLP(C) Nos. 11596-11597 of 2020)

STATE OF UP

THROUGH SECRETARY (EXCISE) & ORS. ….APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

M/S MCDOWELL AND COMPANY LIMITED ….RESPONDENT(S)

JUDGMENT

Dinesh Maheshwari, J.

Contents

Preliminary and brief outline ................................................................... 2

Relevant factual aspects and background: The fire incident and

demand of excise duty on the liquor destroyed .................................... 6

Before the fire ....................................................................................... 6

The fire incident and relevant reports ................................................... 8

Demand of excise duty on the liquor lost in fire .................................. 11

Writ petition in the High Court and interim order therein .................. 17

Impugned orders dated 10.04.2017 and 06.11.2019: High Court

allowed the writ petition and passed consequential orders .............. 18

Rival submissions .................................................................................. 21

Questions for determination ................................................................. 33

Relevant statutory provisions ............................................................... 34

Whether the demand in question is authorised by law? .................... 41

2

Whether respondent company remains liable to pay excise duty on

the liquor lost in fire ............................................................................... 49

Control of Department over the distillery and godown: effect of ......... 50

Negligence .......................................................................................... 52

Act of God ........................................................................................... 56

Inevitable accident .............................................................................. 61

Res ipsa loquitur ................................................................................. 63

The respondent company remains liable ........................................... 65

Insurance coverage only of the value of liquor: effect of .................. 70

Summation .............................................................................................. 74

Conclusion .............................................................................................. 75

Preliminary and brief outline

Leave granted.

2. By way of these appeals, the State of Uttar Pradesh and its officers

related with the Excise Department as also the District Magistrate,

Shahjahanpur have essentially questioned the order dated 10.04.2017 in

Misc. Bench No. 4493 of 2006, whereby the High Court of Judicature at

Allahabad, Lucknow Bench, Lucknow

1

quashed the demand raised against

the writ petitioner company (respondent herein) towards loss of excise

revenue because of destruction of liquor in fire. The appellants have also

questioned the order dated 06.11.2019 in C.M. Application No. 90936 of

2019, whereby the High Court directed the appellant No. 2 (Excise

Commissioner, Uttar Pradesh

2

) to expeditiously take a final decision on the

1

Hereinafter also referred to as ‘the High Court’.

2

Hereinafter also referred to as ‘the Excise Commissioner’.

3

application for refund of the amount that was deposited by the writ

petitioner pursuant to the interim order passed in the said writ petition.

3. Before dilating on the issues raised in this case, we may draw a

brief outline of the matter to indicate the contours of forthcoming

discussion.

3.1. The genesis of the present litigation had been in a fire incident that

took place in a godown of the distillery of the respondent company on

10.04.2003. As many as 35,642 cases of Indian Made Foreign Liquor

3

of

different brands got destroyed in this fire. After receiving the initial reports

that the fire possibly took place due to short circuit of electricity, the

department proposed to recover the amount of excise duty lost, due to such

destruction of liquor, from the respondent company. The respondent

maintained that there was no negligence on its part and, therefore, no case

for recovery of the alleged loss of excise duty was made out under Rule

7(11) of the Uttar Pradesh Bottling of Foreign Liquor Rules, 1969

4

and Rule

709 of the Uttar Pradesh Excise Manual

5

.

3.2. However, the Excise Commissioner, by his order dated 11.07.2006,

rejected the submissions of the respondent and raised a demand to the

tune of Rs. 6,39,32,449.44 towards loss of excise revenue on account of

destruction of liquor. Accordingly, the District Magistrate, Shahjahanpur

asked the respondent to deposit the amount within one week.

3

‘IMFL’ for short

4

Hereinafter also referred to as ‘the Rules of 1969’.

5

Hereinafter also referred to as ‘the Excise Manual’.

4

3.3. Assailing the demand and recovery steps aforesaid, the

respondent-company preferred a writ petition

6

wherein, the High Court, by

way of an interim order dated 25.07.2006, stayed the recovery

proceedings, subject to the respondent company (writ petitioner)

depositing an amount of Rs. 3 crores. A petition seeking special leave to

appeal against this interim order was rejected by this Court on 14.08.2006.

Thereafter, on 21.08.2006, the respondent company deposited the said

amount of Rs. 3 crores with the District Magistrate, Shahjahanpur.

3.4. The writ petition so filed by the respondent company was allowed

by the High Court in its impugned order dated 10.04.2017, essentially with

findings that Rule 7(11)(a) of the Rules of 1969 was not applicable in the

matter because there was no wastage in handling operations of bottling

and storage of IMFL; that Rule 709 of the Excise Manual was attracted for

which negligence was required to be shown; that the order passed by the

Excise Commissioner was based on conjectures and without any cogent

evidence about negligence on the part of the writ petitioner; and that the

‘incident was nothing but an act of God. The High Court, accordingly, set

aside the impugned orders of demand and recovery towards the alleged

loss of excise revenue. Thereafter, for the department having failed to

refund the amount deposited pursuant to the interim order in the writ

petition, the respondent company moved an application before the High

Court whereupon, by the order dated 06.11.2019, the High Court directed

6

Misc. Bench No. 4493 of 2006

5

the Excise Commissioner to take a decision on the application for refund

within four weeks.

3.5. As noticed, the aforesaid orders dated 10.04.2017 and 06.11.2019

passed by the High Court are questioned in these appeals. The appellants

maintain that the High Court was not justified in its findings that the incident

in question was an act of God and not that of negligence on the part of the

respondent. The appellants rely upon Rule 7(11)(a) of the Rules of 1969

and Rules 708 and 709 of the Excise Manual to contend that the

respondent company is absolutely liable to pay the excise duty payable on

the stock of IMFL destroyed in fire. An ancillary aspect relating to the effect

of insurance coverage, only of the value of liquor, and receiving of

insurance claim by the respondent company have also been raised. Per

contra, it submitted that the claim of excise duty in the present case cannot

be enforced, for being not authorised by law; and that the respondent is not

liable to pay excise duty on the IMFL destroyed in fire, particularly when

there was no negligence on its part.

4. The foregoing outline would indicate that the focal point in this case

is, as to whether the appellants are entitled to levy, and correspondingly,

the respondent is liable to pay, the excise duty on the liquor destroyed in

fire? As regards this focal point, three principal questions would require

determination, as noticed infra.

6

Relevant factual aspects and background: The fire incident and

demand of excise duty on the liquor destroyed

5. Having regard to the questions involved, we may briefly take note

of the relevant factual and background aspects, particularly those relating

to the functioning of the respondent company and setup of the distillery and

godown in question as also the fire incident and the demand of excise duty,

leading to the present litigation.

Before the fire

6. The respondent company had been engaged in the business of

distillation, bottling and vending of different brands of IMFL. For the

purpose of these activities, the respondent was granted license in Form

PD-2 to establish and run a distillery for distillation and manufacture of

potable alcohol at Distillery Unit Rosa, Shahjahanpur; and was also

granted license for wholesale vend of IMFL in Form FL-3 and FL-3A under

the Rules of 1969. The respondent company had been functioning at the

licensed premises since the year 1994.

7. We need not elaborate on various features of the processes of

distillation, bottling and storage but, a few facts placed on record by the

parties, relating to the electrical installations and firefighting measures in

the premises in question could be usefully noticed.

7.1. On 19.09.2002, the Assistant Electricity Inspector, Government of

Uttar Pradesh, Shahjahanpur Zone, Shahjahanpur, after having conducted

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a periodical inspection of the said premises of the respondent company,

made the following observations pertaining to the electrical installations: -

“(a) Except the endorsement made herein the relevant rules of

Indian Electricity Rules, 1956 was being complied with.

(b) The details mentioned in the subsequent page are not

according to Indian Electricity Rules, 1956

Hence, in the interest of Safety, you are requested that

you should rectify the deficiency by engaging any of the authorized

electrician and sent a report within one month after compliance in

accordance with the Indian Electricity Rules,1956.

xxx xxx xxx

Rule 35: It is found that CAUTION place is not placed at certain

prominent places. The same should be placed/installed.

Rule 61(2): At one point of Turbine’s Distribution Board Panel, earth

wiring has been done with a thin wire. Hence the same should be

removed and strip earthing should be done.”

(underlining supplied)

In response to the aforesaid, the respondent company stated, in its

letter dated 23.09.2002, that the work pointed out in the report had been

completed.

7.2. Apart from the above, it appears that certain

modification/upgradation work was undertaken at the production plant in

the distillery and in that regard, the Excise Inspector, Production Section,

Rosa Distillery, Shahjahanpur, in his letter dated 26.12.2002, advised the

respondent that electrical and gas wielding jobs be performed carefully with

full safety, while ensuring standard methods of fire safety and the required

firefighting devices. The said Excise Inspector cautioned the respondent

that “You will be responsible for any loss of revenue/other loss if that occurs

due to your carelessness.”

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7.3. On 01.03.2003, the office of Fire Brigade Officer, Shahjahanpur

issued a No Objection Certificate of Fire Fighting Department for the period

between 06.02.2003 to 30.09.2003 after carrying out inspection of the

premises in question. In this inspection, the Fire Brigade Officer took note

of the fact that different types of fire extinguishers and other firefighting

instruments were at the right place and were in working condition, which

were refilled by the Chief Engineer of the respondent company. However,

a direction was given with regard to the refilling and testing of the

instruments; and Foam Installation was also suggested for better

firefighting arrangements in the following terms: -

“You are directed that, in future Fire Fighting Instruments (Fire

Extinguisher) should be tested in Fire Station Shahjahanpur before

refilling. It is also suggested that, for better management of fire

fighting arrangements, Foam Installation should be done in

Distillation Plant. With this suggestion, NO objection Certificate of

Fire Fighting Department is granted for a period between

06.02.2003 to 30.09.2003, because the said firm has deposited the

Testing Fee to the Fire Brigade Department on 06.02.2003.”

The fire incident and relevant reports

8. The aforesaid had been the position of record in relation to the

electrical installations and firefighting measures in the premises in

question. However, on 10.04.2003, a fire incident did take place in a

godown of the respondent company, which resulted in 35,642 cases of

manufactured IMFL getting destroyed.

8.1. It has been the case of the respondent company that the godown

in question was locked for lunch at 12:00 noon on 10.04.2003 under joint

lock and key of the Excise Inspector in-charge of the distillery and the

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company’s representative and at that time, nothing objectionable was

noticed and the stocks were in safe condition. However, at about 12:55

p.m., smoke was noticed emitting from the godown. Thereupon, the Excise

Inspector in-charge of the distillery was immediately informed and the joint

locks were opened; and it was noticed that the stocks of IMFL were on fire.

The information about this fire was given to the Police Department and also

to the Fire Department and other Excise Authorities. As per the averments

and the material on record, it appears that the firefighters could bring the

fire under control only by 5:00 a.m. on 11.04.2003.

9. It is borne out that upon receiving information about the incident in

question, the Deputy Excise Commissioner, Bareilly, reached the distillery

at about 06:30 p.m. on 10.04.2003 and carried out spot inspection with

other officers of the department and the Manager Personnel of the

respondent company. In his initial report drawn on spot inspection, the said

Deputy Excise Commissioner took note of the efforts being made for

controlling and dousing the fire as also damage to a substantial quantity of

liquor; and also indicated that upon enquiring about the possible reasons

of this fire, he was informed that the same took place, probably, due to

short circuit in the electricity supply. According to the appellants, even the

Station House Officer concerned opined in his investigation report dated

11.04.2003 that the reason for fire was short circuit of electricity.

10. On 13.04.2003, the Fire Brigade Officer of Uttar Pradesh Fire

Service also drew up the report about the incident and the efforts made for

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controlling the fire. He, however, indicated that the reason of fire was

unknown. The relevant part of this report, counter signed by the Deputy

Superintendent of Police, as placed on record by the respondent, reads as

under: -

“ON receiving information about Fire, Fire Service Unit rushed to

the Place of Incident. On arriving, it was seen that the front part of

Godown of Indian Made Foreign Liquor was burning in fire badly,

which is situated in Rosa Kothi, M/s Mcdowell Company Ltd. Thana-

R.___ , District- Shahjahanpur, and fire was in a horrible, which was

being doused by the Staff of M/s Mcdowell & Company Ltd. with the

help of available instrument but the fire was out of control for them.

After seeing the horrible condition of fire, immediately started the

work to control fire by laying two lines in one motor fire engine,

immediately thereafter second motor fire engine was brought from

Kasba- Tilhar. In dousing the Fire other unit Oswal Chemical

Fertilizer and O.C.F. also helped, and after enough hard work,

process of dousing was started and after putting the life at risk and

after several hours, fire was doused/controlled. On

investigation/inspection of fire, it was found that, due to fire, Liquor

kept in Go-down was destroyed. Hence, in this fire after adding

building and Liquor, in total, according to station officer,

approximately a damage worth Rs. 2 crore has been assessed and

Rs. 1 crore value of property was saved. Reason of fire was

unknown.

Therefore, after finishing the entire work, the fire Service unit

returned to the Fire Station after giving instructions that in case

again the Fire shows up again, the Fire Station should be informed

immediately. We came back to the Fire Station.”

(underlining supplied)

11. Another report dated 02.08.2003 was submitted by the Assistant

Excise Commissioner, Rosa Distillery, Shahjahanpur to the Excise

Commissioner, detailing out the statements of stock of liquor saved as also

the stock destroyed in fire and his comments on the cause of fire. The

relevant part of this report could be usefully extracted as under: -

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“(f) Cause of Fire : A detailed enquiry and Investigation was done

by me in the distillery after the fire incident. All the Officers

mentioned in para (d) have also made inquiries and investigated the

matter in detail. All the Investigating Officers have also reached to

the conclusion that undisputedly the cause of fire was unknown.

During my Investigation and calculation work also, no fact or

evidence came to my knowledge, which indicates that there was

any negligence either on the part of Distiller or on the part of Excise

Staff deputed in the Distillery. It also does not appear that the said

incident was deliberately done by any of them. In fact, the Distiller

and the Excise Staff have worked jointly with great efficiency and

hard work during and after the fire Incident. Thereby ---- stock was

saved from the damaged stock.

This fact was confirmed by, Joint Excise Commiss ioner

Investigation dated 30.04.2003, Deputy Excise Commissioner,

Bareilly Incharge, Bareilly , investigation dated 10.04.03, Fire

Brigade Officer, Investigation report dated 13.04.03 and Station

House Officer’s Final Report dated 11.04.03, also with copies

annexed. In the report of Station House Officer reason of incident is

possibly due to short circuit in Electricity. I had also seen the burned

cable in debris, but in my opinion Nothing can be confirmed. It can

be such an incident, in which reason is Unknown.

On the Distiller level, in the month of December, Instrument

according to Fire safety standard, were installed and safety orders

were ordered in respect of Letter No. 39/ dated 26.12.02 by the

distillery Fire Brigade Officer, Shahjahanpur; Letter No. Memo/F.S./

date 1.03.03, and received the certificate regarding the Instrument

in good condition. The Distillery also produced certificate by U.P.

Electricity Department, regarding Electricity cabel Establishment.

In accordance, with letter sent by me dated 14.04.03 and

21.04.03 in view of the aforementioned points before the Fire

Incident, during the Fire Incident and after that, the calculation of

the damaged stock and possible reason of Fire incident was

discussed.”

(underlining supplied)

Demand of excise duty on the liquor lost in fire

12. In view of the fact that a substantial quantity of the stored liquor got

destroyed in the fire and that had the consequence, inter alia, of loss of

excise revenue, the Excise Department proposed to recover this loss from

the respondent company.

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12.1. In the first place, on 24.09.2003, a show-cause notice No.

463/CAA/Rosa Distillery/Shahjahanpur was issued by Assistant Excise

Commissioner, Rosa distillery to the respondent company seeking

explanation regarding the recovery of excise duty in view of Rule 7(11) of

the Rules of 1969, as the respondent allegedly failed in its responsibility to

keep the stock of liquor safe and secure. In its response letter dated

01.10.2003, the respondent company stated that there was no negligence

on its part in regard to the said fire incident; that Rule 7(11) of Rules of

1969 was of no application; and that Rule 709 of the Excise Manual would

apply only in case of negligence, which was not proved.

12.2. The Excise Commissioner, however, proposed to recover excise

duty from the respondent company and sent a letter dated 27.11.2003 to

the Principal Secretary to the Government seeking directions. The said

Principal Secretary, in his response letter dated 17.02.2004, stated that the

provision regarding imposition of excise duty on the stock of IMFL

destroyed in fire was laid down in Rule 709 of the Excise Manual and on

the basis thereof, the Excise Commissioner was competent enough to

proceed. The Principal Secretary, inter alia, stated as under: -

“Please refer to your letter No. G-43/9-alcohol/Rosa- Fire incident

dated 27

th

November, 2003 regarding directions to be given to the

District Magistrate Shahjahanpur with regard to imposition of excise

duty on the stock of IMFL destroyed in fire incident dated

10.04.2003 at M/s McDowell & Co. Ltd., Rosa, Shahjahanpur.

1. In this Connection I have been advised to ask you that the

provision regarding imposition of excise duty involved in the

stock of IMFL destroyed in the above fire incident at McDowell

& Co Ltd., Rosa Shahjahanpur on 10.04.2003 is laid down in

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rule 709 of Excise Manual, on the basis of which you are

competent enough to proceed in the matter.

2. Your proposal regarding levy of excise duty on the stock of

IMFL destroyed in the above fire incident is in Order. Please

take necessary steps at the earliest and inform the same to

the Government within 15 days.”

12.3. Proceeding on the letter so received from the Principal Secretary,

the Excise Commissioner, on 23.02.2004, asked the District Magistrate to

quantify the excise duty leviable under Rule 7(11) of the Rules of 1969.

Having noticed such steps on the part of the authorities, the respondent

company remonstrated in its letter dated 08.06.2004 addressed to the

Excise Commissioner and requested that the competent authority must first

determine as to whether excise duty could at all be levied on IMFL

destroyed due to fire before the point of issue of liquor for sale was

reached. It was also submitted that the directions may be given only to

proceed in terms of Rule 709 of the Excise Manual and not Rule 7(11) of

the Rules of 1969. The Excise Commissioner, in his letter dated

12.05.2005, sought a point-wise reply from the respondent company and

this letter was replied on 16.05.2005, wherein the respondent company

maintained that fire incident was due to the reasons beyond human control

and there was no negligence on the part of the company.

12.4. Yet further, the respondent company stated in its letter dated

05.06.2005 that they had a certificate issued by Fire Department, valid up

to 03.09.2003; that appropriate fire protection equipments were installed;

that electricity safety certificate was also given on 19.09.2002; that MCBs

were installed; that there was no material to show that it was an accident

14

due to negligence on part of the company; and that there was no

compulsion to get insurance with respect to excise duty. The aforesaid

reply was forwarded by the Excise Commissioner to the Principal

Secretary, Excise with his letter dated 29.06.2005. Thereafter, the State

Government, in its letter dated 27.12.2005, observed that excise duty on

the rates prevailing should be imposed on the respondent company in the

interest of revenue.

13. The aforesaid exchange of communications culminated in the

impugned order dated 11.07.2006 by the Excise Commissioner, seeking to

recover a sum of Rs. 6,39,32,449.44 from the respondent company

towards the loss of excise revenue. The Excise Commissioner, inter alia,

relied upon the inspection reports and held that the respondent was

responsible for the safety of the alcohol but failed to ensure such safety;

had been careless in not providing fire-proof electric equipments of good

quality; and had taken insurance of liquor but not of excise duty. This order

dated 11.07.2006, being the bone of contention in the present matter, could

be reproduced in extenso as under:

“OFFICE OF EXCISE COMMISSIONER, UTTAR PRADESH,

ALLAHABAD

No. 7244/9-Alcohol/131/Rosa/Fire Incident Allahabad

Dated – 11.07.2006

ORDER

M/s McDowell & Company Ltd., Rosa, District Shahjhanpur is a

PD-2 Licensed distillery. The abovementioned distillery has been

granted FL-3 and FL 3A license under the Uttar Pradesh Bottling of

Foreign Liquor Rules, 1969 and has been doing the bottling of

Indian Made Foreign Liquor of their brand and brand of Harbartsons

15

Ltd. respectively. On 10.04.2003, due to fire incident in the FL-3 and

FL3A godown of the distillery, 35,642 (Thirty five thousand six

hundred forty two) cases of Indian Made Foreign Liquor of different

brands got destroyed. During investigation, it is revealed that the

McDowell and company ltd. had taken the insurance of the Indian

Made Foreign Liquor kept in the sealed godown. The distillery has

also received the claim for that. A Show cause Notice no.

463/CAA/Rosa Distillery/Shahjahanpur dated 24.09.2003 was

given to the M/s. McDowell and Company ltd. in relation to the

burning of the alcohol kept in the sealed godown. It has been stated

by the M/s Mcdowell and Company Ltd. in its explanation dated

01.10.2003 to the abovementioned Show Cause Notice that the fire

incident is an act of god and they have no control over this. On

10.04.2003, during the spot inspection conducted by Deputy Excise

Commissioner Bareilly, Manager Personnel Shri Anurag Dhawan

who was present has stated that possibly fire took place due to short

circuit in the electricity supply. The Station officer Shri Ram Chandra

Mishan, District Shahjahanpur has stated in his investigation report

dated 11.04.2003 that the reason for fire is the short circuit of

electricity. The inspection of the M/s McDowell and Company Ltd.

was conducted by Joint Excise Commissioner (Task Force) and

Deputy Excise Commissioner (Law). It has been found in the

inspection that the godown is very old and its repair has also not

been done. It is also necessary to mention that M/s Mcdowell and

Company Ltd. in the distillery from the time of British period and the

distillery & sealed godown has been running in the old building. The

roof of the godown was made of asbestos sheet. The short circuit

can take place due to old electric wiring in the godown.

In this relation District Officer, Shahjahanpur vide his letter no.

689/OSD/Camp/2004 dated 01.04.2004 has requested for

guidance/instruction on the incident. The Excise Commissioner,

Uttar Pradesh, vide his letter no. G-43/9-alcohol/Rosa fire incident

dated 17.11.2003 has referred this incident to the government in

which the government vide letter no. 3763 E-2/13-03 dated

17.02.2004 has directed that the excise duty may be charged on

the class of alcohol prevalent at that time on the class of alcohol

destroyed and it was also directed that Excise Commissioner is

capable to act in this incident.

In perspective to the direction made by Government, the case is

that the M/s Mcdowell and Company Ltd., Rosa Shahjhanpur had

taken license of FL-3 and FL 3A under UP Bottling of Foreign Liquor

Rules, 1969. According to Rule 7 (11) (a) of the abovementioned

rules, the licensee is liable to pay excise duty on the wastage of

more than 1%. It was responsibility of the license holder to take

remedy /precautions for the safety of the alcohol kept in the godown

but proper safety of the alcohol kept in the godown was not taken

up. The licensee had taken the insurance of the price of alcohol,

bottle, label, etc. but insurance of the excise duty imposed on the

alcohol was not done. In this way, the licensee has secured his

16

value of alcohol. The licensee has not suffered any loss in this

incident and whatever loss has taken place has been recovered

from the insurance. Therefore, perhaps the licensee was careless

regarding the electric equipments. The licensee was aware about

the terms and conditions while taking license that he is to pay the

excise duty on the wastage of stocked alcohol greater than 1 % of

the quantity. Inspite of having knowledge, the licensee has not

arranged the fire proof electric equipments of good quality due to

which questioned incident has taken place. The carelessness taken

by the distiller in the safety of the stock of alcohol cannot be

considered as Act of God. The license is granted to him under the

UP Bottling of Foreign Liquor Rules, 1969. There is provision of

charging excise duty on the wastage more than 1 % under Rule

7(11) (a) of those Rules. The Licensee cannot deny the conditions

of the license. It has been clearly stated by the Constitution Bench

of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in judgment Har Shankar and Anr.

Vs. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner and Anr. (1997) 1

SCC 737 that the licensee has taken the license after carefully

reading the questioned rules of 1969 and now he cannot wriggle out

from the conditions of the license. The licensee has received the

license after reading the Uttar Pradesh Bottling of Foreign Liquor

Rules 1969 with open eyes, therefore he cannot wriggle out to follow

the Rules.

It has been mentioned in Khode Distilleries Ltd. and Ors. vs.

State of Karnataka and Ors. (1975) SCC 576 at point (h) “The State

can adopt any mode of selling the licences for trade or business

with a view to maximize its revenue so long as the method adopted

is not discriminatory”.

It is clear from the Rule 7(11)(a) of UP Bottling of Foreign Liquor

Rules, 1969 are made to secure the revenue. The State has special

privilege on manufacturing of liquor, custody, transport, import -

export. The State in public interest to increase the revenue strictly

monitor the business of alcohol so that neither it can be misused

and nor it can cause loss of revenue to be received from it. In

respect to the abovementioned according to Rule 7(11)(a) of UP

Bottling of Foreign Liquor Rules, 1969, the excise duty of Rs.

6,39,32,449.44/- (Rupees Six Crore Thirty Nine Lakh Thirty Two

Thousand Four Hundred Forty Nine and Forty Four Paise Only) is

leviable on M/s Mcdowell and Company Ltd., Rosa, district

Shahjahanpur as per prevalent rate at the time of incident for year

2003-2004 on different brands of alcohol.

Gejendra Pal

Excise Commissioner

Uttar Pradesh.”

(underlining supplied)

17

13.1 Pursuant to the order so passed by the Excise Commissioner,

District Magistrate, Shahjahanpur commenced recovery proceedings and

directed the respondent company to deposit the aforesaid sum of Rs.

6,39,32,449.44 within one week.

Writ petition in the High Court and interim order therein

14. Aggrieved by the demand so raised by the Excise Commissioner

and the recovery proceedings so adopted by the District Magistrate, the

respondent company filed the writ petition, being Misc. Bench No. 4493 of

2006, before the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench,

Lucknow, with the following prayers: -

“i. Issue, a writ order, or direction in the nature of Certiorari calling

for the records and quashing the impugned order dated 11

th

July,

2006 passed by the Excise Commissioner, U.P. and letter dated

17

th

July, 2006 of the District Magistrate Shahajahanpur, U.P. de-

manding Rupees 6,39,32,449.44.

ii. Issue, a writ order, or direction in the nature of mandamus com-

manding the respondents not to recover any amount from the peti-

tioner towards the alleged demand with regards to the quantity of

Indian Made Foreign Liquor destroyed due to fire accident at

Shahjhanpur on 10

th

April, 2003.

iii. Issue a writ/order or directions in the nature of mandamus de-

claring Rule 7 (11) of the UP Bottling of Indian Made Foreign Liquor

Rules, 1969 as null and void and ultra vires of the UP Excise Act.

iv. Issue a writ/order or directions in the nature of Certiorari calling

for the records and quashing the Impugned Order of the State Gov-

ernment which was conveyed through letter dated 17.02.2004 of

the Principal Secretary (Excise), Government of UP to Excise

Commissioner.”

14.1. In the said writ petition, an interim order was passed by the High

Court on 25.07.2006 staying the recovery proceedings subject to the

18

respondent company depositing an amount of Rs. 3 crores with the Excise

Commissioner. The respondent company attempted to challenge this

interim order dated 25.07.2006 by way of SLP(C) No. 12902 of 2006 but,

this Court declined to interfere with the interim order and the special leave

petition was dismissed on 14.08.2006. Thereafter, the respondent

company deposited the said sum of Rs. 3 crores with the District

Magistrate, Shahjahanpur on 21.08.2006. The appellants filed their counter

affidavit in the writ petition on 08.09.2006 and the writ petition was finally

heard and decided by the High Court by its impugned judgment dated

10.04.2017.

Impugned orders dated 10.04.2017 and 06.11.2019: High Court

allowed the writ petition and passed consequential orders

15. The High Court, in its impugned order dated 10.04.2017, after

taking note of the aforesaid background aspects as also the Rules of 1969

and the Excise Manual, in the first place noted the fact that though the

validity of Rule 7(11) of Rules of 1969 was questioned in the writ petition

but while arguing the matter, learned counsel for the company confined his

challenge to the impugned orders of recovery of excise duty essentially on

the grounds that the company could have been held guilty only if there was

any negligence on its part in causing loss of excise revenue but, in the

present case, there was no negligence on the part of the company; and

that it was an act of God and, therefore, no liability could be imposed on

the company. The High Court observed that Rule 7(11)(a) of the Rules of

19

1969, dealing with wastage, in the operation of bottling and storage of IMFL

was of no application because in the present case, there was no wastage

in handling operations of bottling and storage but there was loss of spirit

due to fire. The High Court pointed out that Rule 709 of the Excise Manual

would apply and in that regard, if the company was shown to have caused

loss to excise duty on account of any negligence, it would be liable to make

good the loss. The High Court, inter alia, observed as under: -

“26. Rule 7(11)(a) of Rules, 1969 talks of wastage which occurred

in the operation of bottling & storage of IMFL, but here is not a case

where there is any wastage in handling operations of bottling & stor-

age of IMFL but there is total loss of spirit due to fire and this in turn

has caused loss to excise duty.

27. In our view, it is Rule, 709 of U.P. Excise Manual which applies

and if petitioner can be shown to have caused loss to excise duty

on account of any negligence, it is liable to make good the said loss.

The condition precedent, therefore, is the factum of “negligence” on

the part of petitioner. We have no manner of doubt that in the pre-

sent case Rule 7(11)(a) of Rules, 1969 has no application and it is

Rule 709 of U.P. Excise Manual which is attracted.”

16. The High Court, thereafter, proceeded to analyse the impugned

order dated 11.07.2006 and observed that the inferences drawn therein

were lacking in material foundation and were only of conjectures and

surmises. The High Court found that there was no apparent negligence on

the part of the company and also recorded its conclusion that the incident

was nothing but an act of God. The High Court further observed that

negligence being the condition precedent for the fiscal liability in question,

no such liability could be fixed unless negligence was found on the basis

of some material; and held that in absence of any material to show that the

20

loss was caused on account of any negligence on the part of the company,

the demand in question was wholly illegal and unsustainable. The High

Court proceeded to set aside the demand in question with the following

observations and findings: -

“29. In order to hold petitioner guilty of negligence, ECUP vide im-

pugned order dated 11.7.2006 while admitting that police officials

as well as joint inspection report, possible reason has been given

as “short circuit” from electrical supply, but having said so, it has

further said that (i) godown is very old and has not been properly

repaired; (ii) Distillery is of British period, Distillery and Warehouse

both are running in old buildings; (iii) roof of godown is made of

abestos sheets and there is possibility of short circuit due to old

electrical wire in the godown; (iv) Insurance of excise duty was not

obtained, though spirit was insured; (v) licensee was probably neg-

ligent in maintenance of electrical equipments; (vi) licensee did not

insure electrical equipments; (vii) fire proof of electrical equipments

were not of good quality, and this resulted in the incident. Therefore,

it is not an act of God. When we asked from learned counsel for

respondents as to wherefrom respondents got information that fire

equipments were not of good quality and have caused incident or

that Distillery was negligent in maintenance of electrical equiments,

he could not point out any material on record, wherefrom the afore-

said inference drawn by ECUP could have been substantiated or to

be justified. In fact, the aforesaid inference is nothing but conjec-

tures and surmises on part of ECUP without having any material

foundation.

30. On the contrary, various authorities from time to time, who have

visited site, have clearly reported that there was no apparent negli-

gence on the part of petitioner. The incident was nothing but an act

of God. When a fiscal liability is founded on certain condition prec-

edent, i.e. “negligent” on the part of the person whom we have to

hold responsible, then no responsibility can be fixed unless such

negligence is shown to be founded on the basis of some material.

Factum that building was old or the wirings were old have pointed

out to be dangerous or prone to fire either by Electricity Department

or Fire Department or even by Excise Authorities, who were In

charge of bonded Distillery, storage and godown.

31. Further, electrical equipments installed at the Distillery were not

of good quality is also conjectures and surmises as no material

was shown to fortify the same. In absence of any material to show

that loss was caused on account of any negligence on the part of

petitioner, we find that demand made in this writ petition is wholly

illegal and cannot sustain.

32. The writ petition is accordingly allowed. Impugned orders dated

21

11.7.2006 and 17.7.2006 are hereby set aside. No costs.”

(underlining supplied)

17. After the decision aforesaid, the respondent company sought

directions for refund/adjustment of the sum of Rs. 3 crores deposited in

compliance of the interim order. The said application, being C.M.

No. 90936 of 2019, was considered and allowed by the High Court by its

order dated 06.11.2019 requiring the Excise Commissioner to decide the

application moved by the company while keeping in view of the fact that

the money was deposited pursuant to the interim order and subsequently,

the writ petition was allowed.

Rival submissions

18. While assailing the orders passed by the High Court, learned

counsel for the appellants has advanced essentially two-fold contentions:

one, that it had been clearly a case of negligence on the part of the

respondent company where the fire incident cannot be termed as an act of

God; and second, that as per the applicable provisions of U.P. Excise Act,

1910

7

, the Excise Manual and the Rules of 1969, the demand of excise

duty on the liquor lost in fire has rightly been raised. The learned counsel

has also addressed the Court on another facet of the case, as regards the

effect of insurance claim received by the respondent company towards the

cost of IMFL destroyed in fire.

7

Hereinafter also referred to as ‘the Act of 1910’.

22

19. Learned counsel has submitted that an act of God is an inevitable,

unpredictable and unreasonably severe event caused by natural forces

without any human interference, such as earthquake, lightning, flood etc.;

it is a natural hazard outside the human control for which, no person could

be held responsible. It is submitted that for the fire in distillery to be an act

of God, there must have been some such incident like earthquake or

lightning but no such natural forces were in operation at the time of the

incident; and this incident cannot be attributed to any such force of nature

but only to some human fault. Learned counsel would submit that when

operation of natural forces is ruled out and the incident had, in fact, taken

place, it would obviously be referred to the elements of negligence on the

part of the respondent company. The learned counsel has elaborated on

the submissions that negligence is a specific tort and essentially refers to

a failure to exercise that care which circumstances demand. To support the

contentions that the present one has not been an act of God, learned

counsel has referred to and relied upon the decisions in Divisional

Controller, KSRTC v. Mahadeva Shetty and Ors.: (2003) 7 SCC 197,

Vohra Sadikbhai Rajakbhai & Ors. v. State of Gujarat and Ors: (2016)

12 SCC 1 and Patel Roadways Limited v. Birla Yamaha Limited: (2000)

4 SCC 91.

19.1. Learned counsel for the appellants would submit that the incident

of fire in the present case, on account of short-circuit in the godown storing

large quantity of highly inflammable IMFL, was clearly an incident which

23

was avoidable, if proper and necessary care was taken by the respondent

company. It is submitted that distilleries are even otherwise susceptible to

fire due to large amount of alcoholic vapour being in the air and the

respondent company was required to take all care and precautions to avoid

any such incident. With reference to the inspection reports, learned counsel

has contended that even before the incident in question, the defects and

deficiencies in electrical installations and wiring had been indicated and

when the incident of fire took place due to short-circuit, the company cannot

avoid its liability by merely suggesting that they had followed all preventive

measures or had taken a certificate from the Fire Department.

20. As regards the entitlement of appellants to demand and recover

the excise duty on IMFL lost in fire and corresponding liability of the

respondent company to make such payment, learned counsel for the

appellants has made elaborate reference to the relevant statutory

provisions and has submitted that the demand in question has been

squarely in conformity with law and deserves to be upheld.

21. With reference to entries 8 and 51 of List II of the Seventh Schedule

to the Constitution of India, learned counsel would submit that the entire

field of legislation on the subject relating to intoxicating liquors as also the

matters concerning duties of excise and countervailing duties is in the

domain of the State legislature; and for the present purpose, the matter is

governed by the provisions contained in the Act of 1910, the Excise Manual

and the Rules of 1969. With reference to Sections 17, 18, 19, 28, 29 and

24

30 of the Act of 1910 the learned counsel has submitted that no intoxicant

can be manufactured and no liquor can be bottled for sale except under

the authority and subject to the terms and conditions of a licence granted

in that behalf (Section 17); and, as per Section 18, the Excise

Commissioner may grant a licence for establishment of distillery and

warehouse in which spirit may be manufactured under a licence granted

under Section 17. Further, as per Section 19, no intoxicant can be removed

from any distillery, brewery, warehouse or the place of storage, unless duty

has been paid or a bond has been executed for payment thereof. It is thus

submitted that the condition precedent for removal of any intoxicant is

actual payment of the duty payable or execution of bond for such payment.

Learned counsel has referred to the bond executed in favour of the

Governor of Uttar Pradesh by the respondent for bottling of IMFL and has

submitted that the licencee has been under obligation to observe all the

provisions of the Act of 1910 and the rules made thereunder.

21.1 The learned counsel would submit that the distillery having been

established under PD-2 licence, the respondent was under obligation to

follow the terms and conditions of the licence and correspondingly, has

always been under obligation to deposit the duty demanded under the

provisions of the Act of 1910, particularly when all the operations, including

that of transfer of the liquor from PD-2 licensed area to the bottling hall and

to the godown and then, dispatch are covered by the terms of licence and

the bond executed by the distiller. Yet further, learned counsel would

25

submit that in terms of Rule 7(11) (a) of the Rules of 1969, the respondent

company was responsible for payment of duty on wastage in excess of 1

per cent and cannot avoid this obligation. With reference to Rule 813 of the

Excise Manual, the learned counsel has submitted that in terms thereof,

free wastage allowance for different kinds of spirits stored in a distillery is

provided but with the specific exclusion of bottled spirit; and it is clear that

once the spirit is bottled and stored, the licencee remains liable to make

payment of excise duty in case of wastage of bottled spirit in terms of Rule

7(11)(a) of the Rules of 1969 read with Rule 709 of Excise Manual. With

reference to the decision of this Court in the case of Har Shankar and

Others v. Deputy Excise & Taxation Commissioner and Others: (1975)

1 SCC 737, the learned counsel would submit that when the licencee has

taken the licence after carefully reading the Rules of 1969, it cannot wriggle

out of the conditions of licence.

22. On the question as to when IMFL became exigible to excise duty,

learned counsel has contended that in the scheme of the Act of 1910 and

Rules thereunder, excise duty is leviable right from the point of entry of

spirit into the distillery for manufacturing of alcohol and on every point

including the points of blending, manufacturing and bottling; and thereafter

on the bottled spirit. It is thus contended that the respondent company is

incorrect in its assertion that the goods having been destroyed in the

godown, excise duty did not become leviable. It is submitted that the

26

moment spirit has been stored in the bottle, excise duty is leviable on the

bottle, even if the same is not taken out of the warehouse.

22.1. With reference to Sections 28 and 29 of the Act of 1910, learned

counsel would submit that these provisions, respectively empowering the

State to impose excise duty and providing for the manner in which the duty

is to be levied, clearly show that the excise duty, which in real terms is price

of exclusive privilege of the State, may be imposed on the liquor

manufactured in the distillery and it is wrong to contend that excise duty

cannot be levied on bottled spirits or is liable to be quantified and collected

only at the point of issuance of liquor from godown. Learned counsel has

particularly referred to the decision of this Court in the case of State of U.P.

and Others v. M/s Modi Distillery Etc.: (1995) 5 SCC 753, as regards

various features of the demand of excise duty at different stages and

different events. The learned counsel has also referred to the decision in

the case of State of U.P. and Ors. v. M/s Mohan Meakin Brewery Ltd.

and Anr.: (2011) 13 SCC 588.

23. As regards another facet of the stand of respondent that there

being regular deployment of the staff of Excise Department at the distillery;

the entire operation being under the control and supervision of the Excise

Department; the bonded warehouse being always under the joint lock of

Excise Department and the respondent; and liquor being issued only upon

the Excise Inspector opening the department’s lock, learned counsel would

submit that such deployment of Excise Officers is necessary to ensure the

27

implementation of the rules and to safeguard the revenue interests of the

State but for the matter, the safety and security of the distillery and

prevention of any mishap by proper maintenance of the building and

installations cannot be shifted on the Excise Department; and such safety

and security had been the sole responsibility of the licencee. Thus,

according to the learned counsel, for the fire incident in question, which

could only be attributed to want of proper maintenance and upkeep of

installations and/or equipment, the respondent company alone remains

liable and responsible.

24. In another limb of submissions, learned counsel has referred to the

fact that the respondent company had taken insurance coverage of the

value of liquor and hence, was compensated by the insurer. The learned

counsel has contended that when the respondent company got

reimbursement of value of liquor from the insurance company, the event

was akin to that of the sale of liquor; and on the principles of equity and fair

play, the State cannot be put to loss in the manner that even when the

distiller has received value of liquor, the corresponding excise duty would

not be made available to the State. The learned counsel has also

contended that omission on the part of the respondent company to take

insurance coverage of the value of excise duty, while taking insurance

coverage of the value of the liquor, itself amounts to negligence on the part

of the respondent and for this reason too, the respondent is liable to make

payment of the excise duty on the value of liquor recovered from the

28

insurance company. In support of these contentions, the learned counsel

has referred to an order passed by the Customs, Excise and Service Tax

Appellate Tribunal, Northern Bench, New Delhi

8

in the case of Dharampal

Satyapal v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Noida: (2004) 167 ELT

291, wherein remission of duty on account of damage of goods (pan

masala) in rain water was disallowed, when it was found that the assessee

had been compensated by the insurance company with an amount which

was much more than the duty involved.

25. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent has supported

the order passed by the High Court allowing the writ petition and has

contended that there had not been any negligence on the part of the

respondent company in relation to the incident of fire and no liability could

be fastened on it towards excise duty on the liquor destroyed in fire. This

apart, the learned counsel would contend, with reference to Article 265 of

the Constitution of India, that levy and collection of tax must be authorized

by law and in the scheme of the Act of 1910, the Excise Manual and the

Rules of 1969, the excise duty could have been collected only at the point

of issuance of IMFL from distillery and there was no question of demand of

excise duty on the stock of IMFL destroyed due to fire in the godown. The

learned counsel has also submitted that in regard to the stock of IMFL

destroyed in fire, there was no transfer of property to anyone else and

therefore, there was no sale so as to occasion recovery of excise duty.

8

‘CESTAT’ for short

29

26. While asserting that the respondent had taken all precautions of

safe maintenance/storage of the stock of IMFL in the godown of distillery,

learned counsel has submitted that the fire extinguishing equipments were

installed in the distillery premises and the Fire Department issued No

Objection Certificate dated 01.03.2003 on being fully satisfied with the

precautions taken by the distillery in respect of the safety against fire; that

the Assistant Electrical Inspector issued the certificate dated 19.09.2002

after inspection and on being satisfied that the electrical wiring equipments

etc. were in accordance with Indian Electricity Act, 1966; that the distillery

had obtained license to work on 06.10.1994 which was renewed annually

and was valid on the date of incident; that it was specifically stated in the

report of the Assistant Excise Commissioner dated 02.08.2003 that the

cause of fire could not be ascertained and there was nothing to show that

distillery was, in any manner, negligent or had caused the fire deliberately;

that even in the report submitted by the police department, it was stated

that the cause of fire could not be ascertained and there was absolutely no

mention of any negligence on the part of the respondent; that in the report

of the Fire Department too, it was pointed out that the cause of fire could

not be ascertained; that the District Magistrate, Shahjahanpur, in his letter

dated 21.10.2003 to the Principal Secretary(Excise) similarly stated that

the reason of fire was unknown and there was no proof with regard to the

negligence of distillery. With these facts and factors, learned counsel for

the respondent would submit that the fire incident due to which IMFL got

30

destroyed was not caused by any negligence of the respondent and

coupled with this remains the fact that complete control and supervision of

the distillery was exercised by the State Excise Department. Thus,

according to the learned counsel, there being no negligence on the part of

the respondent, no liability of excise duty on the liquor destroyed in fire

could be fastened on it.

27. While maintaining that there was no negligence on the part of the

respondent, the learned counsel has assailed the legality and validity of the

demand of duty against the respondent. In this regard, learned counsel has

referred to Article 265 of the Constitution of India, the provisions of the Act

of 1910 and the Rules thereunder as also the Excise Manual and has

submitted that Rule 708 of the Excise Manual absolves the State

Government from the responsibility for the destruction, loss or damage of

any spirit stored in distillery by fire or theft or by gauging or proof or by any

other cause, for the reason that the entire distillery (including godown) is

under the lock and key of Excise Department. Learned counsel has

referred to Rule 709 of the Excise Manual to submit that in the event of

loss, the distilleries are made liable to make good any loss of revenue to

the Government only in the event of such loss having been caused due to

their negligence. Learned counsel has emphatically argued that in terms of

Rule 709, if a distillery has not been negligent in safe custody of the stock

of spirit, it cannot be held liable to make payment towards loss of excise

31

duty, if any, due to accident or reasons beyond the control of human

agency.

27.1 Yet further, learned counsel has submitted that entire bottling

operations including the storage of bottled liquor are done under the strict

supervision of the Excise Inspector and the stocks are maintained in

separate rooms under joint lock and key of the department and the

company. With reference to the Rules of 1969, particularly Rule 7 thereof,

the learned counsel would submit that the stock so maintained under the

joint lock and key is issued for the purpose of export outside the state of

UP or for the purpose of wholesale vend within the state of UP; and it is

only at the point of issuance of liquor from the bottling rooms/godowns

when the excise duty is liable to be quantified and collected with reference

to the date, time and place of issuance. In this regard, learned counsel has

also referred to the provisions contained in Sections 28 and 29 of the Act

of 1910 and has re-emphasised that in exercise of powers thereunder, the

State Government has chosen the point of issue for sale as being the point

for quantification, calculation and collection of excise duty under its

notification dated 30.03.1962 which makes it clear that the rate of duty is

linked to the point of time to the date of issue for sale and not to the date

of manufacture. Learned counsel would submit that IMFL in question

having been destroyed on account of fire before its issuance from the

godown for sale, there arise no question of collecting any excise duty on

the said destroyed stock of IMFL. Learned counsel has further submitted

32

that under the Excise Act though the duty is levied at the point of

manufacture but the point of collection of the duty is only at the time of

issuance for sale and hence, to cover the eventuality in between post-

manufacturing and before sale, Rule 7(11) of the Rules 1969 allows 1% of

wastage and mandates to charge full rate if wastage occurs beyond 1%;

and in case of destruction or loss due to fire or theft etc., the distillery is

made liable for loss of revenue only if there is negligence on its part. Thus,

according to the learned counsel, in the present case, where the liquor had

not been issued from the godown for sale and had not been lost due to any

negligence on the part of distiller, the levy of excise duty deserves to be

disapproved, for being not the one authorized by law and being hit by the

requirements of Article 265 of the Constitution of India. Learned counsel

has referred to the decision in Somaiya Organic (India) Pvt. Ltd. and Anr.

v. State of U.P. and Anr.: (2001) 5 SCC 519 to submit that both the levy

and collection of tax must be authorised by law. According to the learned

counsel, the High Court has correctly held that Rule 709 of the Excise

Manual would be applicable and no duty could be imposed on the

respondent as there was no negligence on its part.

28. As regards the effect of insurance and reimbursement of the value

of IMFL by the insurance company, learned counsel has referred to the

definition of sale in the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 as also in the U.P. Trade

Tax Act, 1948, and has submitted that in the stock of IMFL destroyed due

to fire, neither there was any transfer of property nor there was a sale; and

33

the claim received from the insurer on account of loss of goods in a fire

cannot be termed as consideration. It is also submitted that not taking

insurance cover for the excise duty was an irrelevant and immaterial fact

because liability to pay excise duty would have arisen only when there was

negligence on the part of the respondent company and not otherwise. The

learned counsel has also submitted that in fact, the insurance company

itself would not have cleared the insurance claim if there was any

negligence on the part of the respondent and clearance of insurance claim

itself fortifies that there was no negligence on the part of the respondent. It

is also submitted that the respondent company had not earned any profit

in the matter and in fact, it pays the excise duty when the same is recovered

from the ultimate consumer but in the present case, when the respondent

did not pass on and did not recover excise duty from any consumer, the

question of levying the same on the respondent does not arise.

29. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at sufficient length

and have examined the material placed on record with reference to the law

applicable

Questions for determination

30. In view of rival submissions, the following three major questions

arise for determination in this case:

34

A. As to whether demand of excise duty on the liquor lost in fire is

authorised by law and has rightly been raised as per the applicable

provisions of the Act of 1910, the Excise Manual and the Rules of 1969?

B. As to whether the fire incident in question had been an event

beyond human control and no negligence could be imputed on the

respondent company?

C. What would be the effect of the fact that the respondent company

had taken insurance coverage only of the value of liquor (and not that of

excise duty thereupon) and then, had received the insurance claim towards

the value of liquor?

Relevant statutory provisions

31. Having regard to the questions involved, we may take note of the

constitutional and statutory provisions, which do carry their own relevance

in the present case.

32. The fundamental constitutional mandate that no tax shall be levied

or collected except by authority of law is contained in Article 265 of the

Constitution of India, which reads as under: -

“265. Taxes not to be imposed save by authority of law.- No tax

shall be levied or collected except by authority of law.”

32.1. The relevant Entries 8 and 51 in List II (State List) of the Seventh

Schedule to the Constitution of India could also be usefully reproduced as

under: -

“8. Intoxicating liquors, that is to say, the production, manufacture,

possession, transport, purchase and sale of intoxicating liquors.

35

51. Duties of excise on the following goods manufactured or

produced in the State and countervailing duties at the same or lower

rates on similar goods manufactured or produced elsewhere in

India: -

(a) alcoholic liquors for human consumption;

(b) opium, Indian hemp and other narcotic drugs and narcotics,

but not including medicinal and toilet preparations containing

alcohol or any substance included in sub-paragraph (b) of this

entry.”

33. The law relating to intoxicating liquors and intoxicating drugs in the

State of Uttar Pradesh is principally governed by the provisions contained

in the U.P. Excise Act, 1910. A few of the relevant definitions contained in

Section 3 as also the relevant provisions, which are of direct bearing in the

present case, as contained in Sections 17, 18, 19, 28 and 29 read as

under:-

3. Interpretation.- In this Act, unless there is something repugnant

in this subject or context -

(1) "excise revenue" means revenue derived or derivable from any

duty, fee, tax, fine (other than a fine imposed by a court of law), or

confiscation imposed or ordered under the provisions of this Act, or

of any other law for the time being in force relating to liquor or

intoxicating drugs;

*** *** ***

(3a) "excise duty" and "countervailing duty" means any such excise

duty or countervailing duty, as the case may be, as is mentioned in

entry 51 of List II in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution;

*** *** ***

(8) "spirit" means any liquor containing alcohol obtained by

distillation, whether it is denatured or not;

*** *** ***

(11) "liquor" means intoxicating liquor and includes spirits of wine,

spirit, wine, tari, pachwai, beer and all liquid consisting of or

containing alcohol, also any substance which the State Government

may by notification declare to be liquor for the purposes of this Act;

*** *** ***

(22-a) "excisable article" means -

(a) any alcoholic liquor for human consumption; or

(b) any intoxicating drug;

*** *** ***

36

17. Manufacture of intoxicants prohibited except under the

provisions of this Act. - (1) (a) No intoxicant shall be

manufactured;

(b) no hemp plant (cannabis sativa) shall be cultivated;

(c) no portion of the hemp plant (cannabis sativa) from which any

intoxicating drug can be manufactured shall be collected;

(d) no liquor shall be bottled for sale; and

(e) no person shall use, keep or have in his possession any

materials, still, utensil, implement or apparatus whatsoever for the

purpose of manufacturing any intoxicant other than tari.

Except under the authority and subject to the terms and

conditions of a licence granted in that behalf by the Collector.

(2) No distillery or brewery or manufactory shall be constructed

or worked except under the authority and subject to the terms and

conditions of a licence granted in that behalf by the Excise

Commissioner under Section 18.

18. Establishment or licensing of distilleries and warehouses.-

The Excise Commissioner may-

(a) establish a distillery in which spirit may be manufactured

under a licence granted under Section 17 on such conditions

as the State Government deems fit to impose;

(b) discontinue any distillery so established;

(c) licence, on such conditions as the State Government deems

fit to impose the construction and working of a distillery or

brewery or manufactory;

(d) establish or licence a warehouse wherein any intoxicant may

be deposited and kept without payment of duty; and

(e) discontinue any warehouse so established.

19. Removal of intoxicants from distillery, etc.- No intoxicant

shall be removed from any distillery, brewery, manufactory,

warehouse or other place of storage established under this Act

unless the duty (if any) payable under Chapter V has been paid or

a bond has been executed for the payment thereof.

*** *** ***

28. Duty on excisable articles – (1) An excise duty or a

countervailing duty, as the case may be at such rate or rates as the

State Government shall direct may be imposed, either generally or

for any specified local area, on any excisable article -

(a) imported in accordance with the provisions of Section

12(1); or

(b) exported in accordance with the provisions of Section 13;

or

(c) transported; or

(d) manufactured, cultivated or collected under any licence

granted under Section 17; or

37

(e) manufactured in any distillery established, or any distillery

or brewery licensed, under Section 18 :

Provided as follows-

(i) duty shall not be so imposed on any article which has been

imported into India and was liable on such importation to

duty under the Indian Tariff Act, 1894, or the Sea Customs

Act, 1887.

Explanation. - Duty may be imposed under this section at

different rates according to the places to which any excisable article

is to be removed for consumption, or according to the varying

strength and quality of such article.

(2) The State Government shall, in imposing an Excise duty or a

countervailing duty as aforesaid and in fixing its rate, be guided by

the directive principles specified in Article 47 of the Constitution of

India.

“29. Manner in which duty may be levied.-Subject to such rules

as the Excise Commissioner may prescribe to regulate the time,

place and manner of payment, such duty may be levied in one or

more of the following ways as the State Government may by notifi-

cation direct :

(a) In the case of excisable articles imported under Section 12 (1)-

(i) by payment either in the province of import or in the prov-

ince or territory of export; or

(ii) by payment upon issue for sale from a warehouse estab-

lished or licensed under Section 18 (d);

(b) in the case of excisable articles exported under Section 13-by

payment either in the province of export or in the province or terri-

tory of import ;

(c) in the case of excisable articles transported-

(i) by payment in the district from which the excisable article is

to be transported or

(ii) by payment upon issue for sale from a warehouse estab-

lished or licensed under Section 18 (d) ;

(d) in the case of intoxicating drugs manufactured under any licence

granted under Section 17 (1) -

(i) by a rate charged upon the quantity manufactured under a

licence granted under the provisions of Section 17 (1) (a), or

issued from a warehouse established or licensed under Sec-

tion 18 (d) ;

(ii) where the intoxicating drug is manufactured from hemp

plant (cannabis sativa) cultivated or collected under a licence

granted under the provisions of Section 17 (1) (b) and (c), by

an acreage rate levied on the cultivation, or by a rate charged

upon the amount collected ;

(e) in the case of spirit or beer manufactured in any distillery estab-

lished or any distillery brewery or manufactory licensed under Sec-

tion 18-

(i) by a rate charged upon the quantity produced or issued

from the distillery brewery or manufactory, as the case may

38

be, or issued from a warehouse established or licensed under

Section 18 (d) ;

(ii) by a rate charged in accordance with such scale or equiv-

alents, calculated on the quantity of materials used or by the

degree of attenuation of the wash or wort, as the case may be,

as the State Government may prescribe :

Provided that, where payment is made upon issue of an ex-

cisable article for sale from a warehouse established or licensed

under Section 18(d), it shall be at the rate of duty which is in force

on the article on the date when it is issued from the warehouse.”

34. Rules 708, 709 and 813 of the Excise Manual, dealing with the

issues pertaining to loss of spirit in distilleries and wastage allowance, read

as under: -

“708. Government not liable for loss, of spirit in distilleries. -

Government shall not be liable for the destruction, loss or damage

of any spirit stored in distilleries by fire or theft, or by gauging, or

proof, or by any other cause whatsoever. In case of fire or other

accident officers in-charge of distilleries shall immediately attend, to

open the premises at any hour by day or nights.

709. Distillers responsible for loss etc. of spirit in distilleries. -

Distillers shall be responsible for the safe custody of stock of spirit

in their distilleries and shall be liable to make good any loss of

revenue caused to Government by their negligence.

*** *** ***

813. Wastage allowance. – The free wastage allowances for

different kinds of spirit (excluding bottled spirit) stored in a distillery

shall be as follows:

Per cent

(1) Plain and spiced spirit … … 0.7

(2) Rectified spirit and Sophisticated spirit … 0.4

(3) Denatured spirit … … 0.5

If the total wastage on any kind of spirit does not exceed 3 per cent

duty will be charged on the net wastage in excess of the free

allowances. But if the total wastage exceeds 1.5 per cent duty shall

be liable to be charged on the whole wastage without allowing for

the free allowances at the following rates :

39

(1) Plain and rectified sprits. - At the highest rate of duty leviable on

country spirit in the case of plain spirit and at the highest rate of

duty leviable on I.M.F.L., in the case of Rectified sprit.

(2) Sophisticated spirits including spiced Country spirit. - At the rate

of duty leviable on that spirit.

(3) Denatured spirit. - A penalty at the highest rate of purchase tax

leviable on such spirit :

Provided that if it is proved to the satisfaction of the Excise

Commissioner that the deficiency or wastage in excess of the

prescribed limit has been caused by an accident or other

unavoidable cause, the payment of duty on such deficiency or

wastage shall be not be required.

When the wastage does not exceed the prescribed limit, no action

need be taken by the officer-incharge, but when an excess is found

in any case at the time of monthly stock-taking, the officer incharge

must obtain a written explanation from the distillers and forward the

same together with a full report of the circumstances to the Assistant

Excise Commissioner/Deputy Excise Commissioner. The Assistant

Excise Commissioner/Deputy Excise Commissioner shall charge

the duty on excess wastage if he is satisfied that the wastage in

excess of the prescribed limit is not on account of an accident or

any unavoidable cause. In case the excess wastage is due to an

accident or unavoidable cause, the matter will be referred to the

Excise Commissioner for orders.”

35. One major activity concerning one of the intoxicating liquors,

namely, bottling and storage of foreign liquor, is regulated in the State of

Uttar Pradesh by the Rules of 1969 which, inter alia, provide for grant of

bottling licence in Form FL-3 to a distiller to bottle spirits; to a brewer to

bottle beer; and to a vintner to bottle wines. Various general conditions of

such a licence are contained in Rule 6 of these Rules and then, additional

special conditions in relation to bottling of IMFL in bond under FL-3 licence

are contained in Rule 7. Elaborate provisions have been made in Rule 7

concerning the actual operations of bottling and storage as also

supervision thereof. For the present purpose, only sub-clause (11) of Rule

40

7 needs to be noticed and the same is reproduced hereunder (while

omitting other sub-clauses, being not relevant): -

“7. Following additional special conditions will be applicable to bot-

tling of Indian Made Foreign Liquor in bond under F.L.-3 licence :

*** *** ***

(11) (a) An allowance up to one per cent. may be made on the total

quantity of spirit stored during a month for actual loss in bottling and

storage. The licensee shall be responsible for the payment of duty

on wastage in excess of one per cent.

(b) When the wastage does not exceed the prescribed limit, no ac-

tion need be taken by the Excise Inspector incharge but if an excess

is found at the time of monthly stock taking the Excise Inspector

shall submit a statement to the Collector by fifth day of the month in

Form F.L.B.-10 showing the quantity of actual wastage and the duty

to be paid by the licensee on the excess wastage. On receipt of the

statement, the Collector shall recover the duty from the licensee at

the full rate of duty leviable on Indian made foreign spirit.

*** *** ***”

36. Before proceeding further we may, at once, summarise that IMFL

destroyed in fire in this case undoubtedly answered to the description of

“spirit”, “liquor” and “excisable article” within the meaning of Clauses (8),

(11) and (22-a) of Section 3 of the Act of 1910, for being an intoxicating

liquor containing alcohol obtained by distillation; and the same was

manufactured under a licence granted in terms of Section 17 in the distillery

of the respondent and was kept in the warehouse established in terms of

Section 18 of the Act of 1910. Thus, this liquor (IMFL) could not have been

removed from the place of storage unless excise duty payable thereupon

had been paid or a bond was executed for the payment thereof. The duty

was payable in terms of Section 28 and its rate was to be that as applicable

on the date of its issue from the warehouse in terms of Section 29. An

allowance upto 1% was admissible on the total quantity of liquor stored

41

during a month for actual loss in bottling and storage and else, no wastage

allowance as such was admissible thereupon. Moreover, the Government

was not to be liable for any loss in the quantity of this stored liquor for

whatever reason; and on the other hand, the distillery, i.e., the respondent

was to be responsible for the safe custody thereof and also liable to make

good any loss of revenue including owing to any loss during storage

beyond permissible one per cent of the total quantity. Considering that

mandate, the respondent was solely liable for payment of excise duty on

wastage of stored total quantity with allowance only upto one per cent, as

specified. While keeping in view these salient features emerging from a

combined reading of the above quoted provisions of the Act of 1910, the

Excise Manual and the Rules of 1969, we may take up the questions calling

for determination in this case.

Whether the demand in question is authorised by law?

37. With reference to the provisions above-mentioned, the main plank

of submissions on behalf of the respondent company has been that the

point of quantification and calculation of excise duty being the point of issue

from the bonded warehouse and that point/stage having not reached in

relation to the liquor destroyed in fire, the question of demand of excise

duty would not arise. It has also been submitted that Rule 7(11) of the Rules

of 1969 has no application and only Rule 709 of the Excise Manual could

apply for which, negligence on the part of the distillery is required to be

proved. Before taking up the issue relating to the applicable rule, we may

42

deal with the fundamental question raised on behalf of the respondent, i.e.,

as to whether the demand is unauthorised for the reason that the

point/stage of quantification and calculation of duty had not reached and

liquor got destroyed while lying in warehouse.

38. As noticed, such an argument, that the demand of duty remains

unauthorised for the point of issue of liquor having not reached, was not

raised as such before the High Court nor the High Court had proceeded on

that basis. Be that as it may, the submission even otherwise remains

untenable and is required to be rejected.

39. It remains a fundamental constitutional mandate, and needs no

elaboration, that in terms of Article 265 of the Constitution, both levy and

collection of tax must be authorised by law, as held by this Court in the

case of Somaiya Organics (supra). It remains equally trite that by virtue

of Entry 51 of List II, the State has been authorised to impose duty of excise

on alcoholic liquors for human consumption manufactured or produced in

the State. The question raised on behalf of the respondent company, about

the authority of the appellant-State to levy excise duty on the liquor in

question that was destroyed in fire and had not reached the point of issue,

could be adequately answered with reference to the principles concerning

the event and the point where entitlement of the State to levy excise duty,

and corresponding liability of the respondent to make payment thereof,

comes into existence.

43

39.1. In the case of State of U.P. & Ors. v. Delhi Cloth Mills & Anr.:

(1991) 1 SCC 454, this Court dealt with the question as to whether excise

duty could have been levied on the wastage of liquor in transit and held

that the levy of differential duty, which was charged upon reporting of

excess wastage, did not cease to be an excise duty even if it was levied

upon declaration of excess wastage because, ‘the taxable event was

production or manufacture of liquor.’ This Court further made it clear that

the excise duty remained a single point duty which could be levied at one

of the points mentioned in Section 28 of the Act of 1910. The relevant

observations and declaration of law by this Court could be usefully

reproduced as under: -

“8. The original Section 28 of the Act now re-numbered as sub-

section (1) thereof, and sub-sections (2) and (3) inserted by Section

2 of the U.P. Act 7 of 1970 clearly covers Indian made foreign

liquors. There can be no dispute as to military rum being one of the

Indian made foreign liquors excisable under the Act. A duty of

excise under Section 28 is primarily levied upon a manufacturer or

producer in respect of the excisable commodity manufactured or

produced irrespective of its sale. Firstly, it is a duty upon excisable

goods, not upon sale or proceeds of sale of the goods. It is related

to production or manufacture of excisable goods. The taxable event

is the production or manufacture of the liquor. Secondly, as was

held in A.B. Abdulkadir v. State of Kerala: AIR 1962 SC 922, an

excise duty imposed on the manufacture and production of

excisable goods does not cease to be so merely because the duly

is levied at a stage subsequent to manufacture or production. That

was a case on Central Excise, but the principle is equally applicable

here. It does not cease to be excise duty because it is collected at

the stage of issue of the liquor out of the distillery or at the

subsequent stage of declaration of excess wastage. Legislative

competence under entry 51 of List II on levy of excise duty relates

only to goods manufactured or produced in the State as was held

in Bimal Chandra Banerjee v. State of M.P.: 1970 (2) SCC 467. In

the instant case there is no dispute that the military rum exported

was produced in the State of U.P. In State of Mysore v. D. Cawasji

&Co.: 1970 (3) SCC 710, which was on Mysore Excise Act, it was

held that the excise duty must be closely related to production or

44

manufacture of excisable goods and it did not matter if the levy was

made not at the moment of production or manufacture but at a later

stage and even if it was collected from retailer. The differential duty

in the instant case, therefore, did not cease to be an excise duty

even if it was levied on the exporter after declaration of excess

wastage. The taxable event was still the production or manufacture.

*** *** ***

17. …. If out of the quantity of military rum in a consignment, a part

of portion is claimed to have been wastage in transit and to that

extent did not result in export, the State would, in the absence of

reasonable explanation, have reason to presume that the same

have been disposed of otherwise than by export and impose on it

the differential excise duty. A statute has to be construed in light of

the mischief it was designed to remedy. There is no dispute that

excise duty is a single point duty and may be levied at one of the

points mentioned in Section 28.”

(underlining supplied)

39.2. In the case of M/s Mohan Meakin Brewery Ltd. (supra), the question

of exigibility of beer to excise duty arose in respect of excess wastage in

the brewery. With reference to the aforesaid decision in the case of Delhi

Cloth Mills as also several other decisions and upon interpretation of

Section 29(e)(i) of the Act of 1910, this Court reaffirmed that exigibility of

the liquor (beer in that case) to excise duty occurred at the stage of

manufacture or production in the following words:-

“33. Section 29(e)(i) of the U.P. Excise Act makes it clear that in the

case of beer manufactured in a brewery, excise duty may be levied,

by a rate charged upon the quantity produced or issued from the

brewery or issued from a warehouse. This means that in respect of

beer that undergoes the process of filtration, the exigibility to excise

duty will occur either at the end of the filtration process when it is

received in storage/bottling tanks or when it is issued from the

brewery. In regard to draught beer drawn directly from fermentation

vessels, without further processing or filtration, the exigibility to

excise duty will occur either at the end of the fermentation process

or when it is issued from the brewery.”

(underlining supplied)

45

40. The very same provision [i.e., Section 29(e)(i) of the Act of 1910],

which has been interpreted by this Court in the aforesaid decision of M/s

Mohan Meakin in relation to beer manufactured in a brewery, applies with

necessary variations to the case of spirit manufactured in a distillery

established under Section 18. Undoubtedly, the liquor in question was

manufactured by the respondent company in its distillery established under

Section 18. Thus, the liquor that had been produced, became exigible to

excise duty at the end of the distillation process when it was received in

storage/bottling tanks or when it was issued from the distillery. To put it

differently, the taxable event was production or manufacture of this liquor,

for it being a duty upon the goods and not upon sale or proceeds of sale of

the goods.

41. As per Section 19, no intoxicant (and that obviously includes the

liquor manufactured by the respondent) can be removed from the distillery

or the place of storage unless the duty leviable thereupon has been paid

or a bond has been executed for the payment thereof. Considering the

overall scheme of the Act and the Rules, it may not be out of place to

interpret the expression “removal” in Section 19 to include wastage in

excess of permissible limit of total quantity of spirit produced or

manufactured and stored. A comprehensive look at the scheme of Sections

17 to 19 and 28 and 29 of the Act of 1910 and the enunciations of this Court

leave nothing to doubt that in respect of the liquor that had undergone the

process of distillation, exigibility to excise duty had occurred at the end of

46

the distillation process or when it was issued from the distillery. The point

of quantification of this duty, even if linked in point of time to the date of

issue for sale in terms of proviso to Section 29, does not relate to the ‘event

of chargeability’ that had occurred as soon as the liquor was distilled and

received in the bottling tank or had been otherwise issued from distillery. In

other words, the liquor that was lying stored in the bonded warehouse had

already become subject to the excise duty, with postponement of actual

charging of the duty as per the rate applicable on the date and time of issue

for sale from the warehouse. It gets perforce reiterated that taxable event

was production or manufacture, and not sale, of the liquor. In this view of

the matter, the submission that the levy in question is not authorised by

law, and is hit by Article 265 of the Constitution of India, remains untenable

and is required to be rejected.

42. As regards the applicable rules for the demand in question, the High

Court has proceeded on the reasoning that the present one had not been

the case of wastage in handling and therefore, Rule 7(11) of the Rules of

1969 would not be applicable. The respondent company has also

submitted that Rule 7(11) of the Rules of 1969 is inapplicable and it is

pointed out that even the State Government had directed the Excise

Commissioner to proceed under Rule 709 of the Excise Manual and not

Rule 7(11) of the Rules of 1969, which deals only with wastage in normal

course of bottling operation and storage. It has further been contended that

only Rule 709 of the Excise Manual could be taken recourse of by the

47

Government, but in that case, the distillery could be made liable only if it

could be shown that the loss had been caused to the Government by any

negligence on part of the distillery.

43. In regard to the above submissions, though the demand in question

would be essentially referable to Rule 709 of the Excise Manual, but Rule

7(11) of the Rules of 1969 provides for an allowance up to 1% on the total

quantity of spirit stored during a month towards actual loss in bottling and

storage; and the licencee is responsible for payment of duty on the wastage

in excess of 1%. This Rule 7(11) makes it clear that even in relation to the

wastage in storage, the allowance is only up to 1% of total quantity of spirit

stored during a month. This provision may also be read with Rule 813 of

the Excise Manual, which provides for free wastage allowance for different

kinds of spirit in a distillery with the specified percentage, namely the plain

and spiced spirit (0.7%), rectified and sophisticated spirit (0.4%), and

denatured spirit (0.5%). The significant aspect of the matter is that though

wastage allowance is provided for different kinds of spirit but, the bottled

spirit is specifically excluded therein.

44. A comprehensive look at the relevant provisions of law makes it

clear that so far as IMFL is concerned, no provision is made in the Excise

Manual for any wastage allowance in relation to the bottled sprit, but, in

terms of Rule 7(11) of the Rules of 1969, an allowance up to 1% on the

total quantity of spirit stored during a month may be allowed for actual loss

in bottling and storage. Any allowance for any wastage or loss beyond the

48

same remains, obviously, impermissible. The logic is not far to seek. As

noticed, in respect of the liquor that had undergone the process of

distillation, exigibility to excise duty had occurred at the end of the

distillation process or when it was issued from the distillery. Thus, any loss

or wastage of the bottled spirit would be directly a loss of excise duty it had

already become exigible to. The rule making authority has taken abundant

care to ensure that there is no pilferage of the excise revenue available to

the Government on the bottled spirit by any act of wastage, while making

the licencee responsible for payment of duty on wastage in excess of 1%

on the total quantity of spirit stored during the month. Thus, neither the

submissions on behalf of the respondent company nor the observations of

the High Court about the total inapplicability of Rule 7(11) could be

accepted. In other words, Rule 7(11) of the Rules of 1969 is required to be

taken into account for the legal consequences that so far as the bottled

spirit is concerned, the licencee remains responsible for payment of duty

on any kind of wastage in excess of 1%. Coupled with this provision, Rule

709 of the Excise Manual makes it clear that the distillery remains

responsible for safe custody of the stock of spirit and remains liable to make

good any loss of revenue caused to the Government by their negligence.

45. Therefore, a plain answer to the legal issue raised on behalf of the

respondent company is that the demand in question cannot be said to be

unauthorised but, its validity would depend on answer to the question as to

whether negligence could be imputed on the respondent company in terms

49

of Rule 709 of the Excise Manual. We shall examine various features

related with this question in the next segment of discussion.

Whether respondent company remains liable to pay excise duty

on the liquor lost in fire

46. As noticed, the fire incident in question led the Excise

Commissioner to propose recovery of excise duty on the stock of IMFL

destroyed in fire from the respondent company and the respondent

company maintained that the incident was due to the reasons beyond

human control and there was no negligence on its part. However,

ultimately, the Excise Commissioner passed the order dated 11.07.2006

holding, inter alia, that the respondent company had not arranged the fire

proof electric equipments of good quality due to which the incident had

taken place; and the carelessness of the distillery for the safety of stock

cannot be attributed to an act of God. The High Court has, however, held

that the inference drawn by the Excise Commissioner was nothing but of

conjectures and surmises without any material foundation. The High Court

has also observed that when a fiscal liability was founded on a condition

precedent, i.e., negligence on the part of the person concerned, no

responsibility could be fixed unless such negligence was shown to be

founded on some material. According to the appellants, the incident in

question is attributable only to some negligence on the part of the

respondent company and it had not been an act of God for having occurred

on account of fault in the electrical installation and short circuit; and the

50

incident was avoidable if proper and necessary care was taken by the

respondent company. On the other hand, on behalf of the respondent,

though the principles relating to an “act of God” have not been invoked as

such before us but the contention has been that the fire was not caused by

the negligence of the respondent company in maintaining safe custody of

the stock of spirits; and the incident had been the one which occurred for

the reasons beyond the control of human agency. It has also been

contended that the entire distillery (including the godown) has been under

lock and key of the department; and the department had been exercising

complete control and supervision over the distillery and, therefore, no

negligence could be imputed on the respondent.

Control of Department over the distillery and godown: effect of

47. In view of rival submissions, we may begin with the issue relating

to supervision and control of State Excise Department over the distillery

and the godown. The submissions made in this regard on behalf of the

respondent company remain baseless and have only been noted to be

rejected. In the scheme of the Act of 1910, the Rules of 1969 and the Excise

Manual, it is evident that the Government is not liable for destruction, loss

or damage of any spirit stored in distillery by fire or theft or any other cause

(as per Rule 708 of the Excise Manual). On the other hand, distillery is

made responsible for safe custody of the stock of spirit and is also made

liable to make good any loss of revenue caused to the Government by their

negligence.

51

47.1. It has rightly been contended on behalf of the appellants that the

purpose of posting Excise Officers in the distillery is for securing the interest

of the State by collection of revenue and to put a check over any act of

theft, wastage, illegal sale as also to ensure proper implementation of rules.

Rule 736 of the Excise Manual makes it clear that the doors of buildings or

rooms which are used for storage of spirit are under double locks, where

one of the locks is of the Excise Department and other of the distillery. The

other provisions of the Rules of 1969 and the Excise Manual further make

it clear that as regards general arrangement and management of

distilleries, elaborate provisions have been made like as to how the pipes

would be laid, fixed and painted, as to how lock fastening would be

constructed etc. Even a minor alteration in the distillery arrangement

requires previous sanction of the Excise Commissioner (Rule 771) and

repairs etc. are to be reported (Rule 772). The rules in their conspectus

provide for strict supervision and control of the Excise Department over the

working of distillery at every stage but that supervision and control does not

correspondingly absolve the distillery of its duty and responsibility towards

safe custody of the stock of spirit and towards avoidance of wastage. Any

doubt in that regard is effectively quelled by a combined reading of Rules

708 and 709 of the Excise Manual as also Rule 7(11) of the Rules of 1969.

The contentions in this regard as urged on behalf of the respondent

company are, therefore, rejected.

52

Negligence

48. Now, for entering into the core of this matter, i.e., as to whether the

loss of revenue caused to the Government by destruction of liquor in fire

could be attributed to any negligence on the part of the respondent

company, we may take note of the legal principles related with the liability

arising out of, or due to, negligence as also the exceptions and defences

in relation to any claim based on negligence.

49. “Negligence” is one such class of “wrongs” that leads to liability. The

fundamental jurisprudential principle of “liability” is crisply defined in

Salmond on Jurisprudence

9

thus: -

“Liability or responsibility is the bond of necessity that exists

between the wrongdoer and the remedy of the wrong.”

“Liability” arises from breach of duty, which may be in the form of

an act or omission. We need not delve, for the present purpose, on the

classification of liability into civil or criminal and remedial or penal and

various other jurisprudential features of liability. In the present case, we are

primarily concerned with the question of liability arising out of negligence.

Having regard to the questions involved and the provisions applicable, it

would be appropriate to take into comprehension the meaning and

connotation of the term “negligence” with reference to the dictionaries,

lexicons and decided cases.

9

12

th

Edition, p. 349.

53

49.1. In Concise Oxford English Dictionary

10

, the term “negligence” is

defined and explained as under: -

“negligence ▪ n. failure to take proper care over something. ➤ Law

breach of a duty of care which results in damage.”

The adjective of this expression is “negligent” and its adverb form

is ‘negligently’. These expressions, for deeper understanding need to be

correlated with the verb ‘neglect’ that has been defined and explained in

the same dictionary as under: -

“neglect ▪ v. fail to give proper care or attention to. ➤ fail to do

something. ▪ n. the state or process of neglecting or being

neglected. ➤ failure to do something.”

49.2. In Webster’s Third New International Dictionary,

11

the terms

“neglect” and “negligence” are defined and explained as under: -

“ne●glect 1 a : to give little or no attention or respect to : consider

or deal with as if of little or no importance : DISREGARD, SLIGHT

<some of the most significant issues have been ~ed -Bruce Payne>

<~ed the real needs of the students> b : to fail to attend to

sufficiently or properly : not give proper attention or care to ….. 2 :

to carelessly omit doing (something that should be done) either

altogether or almost altogether : leave undone or unattended to

through carelessness or by intention : pass lightly over <~ing their

obvious duty> <~ed to mention that he was a convict –Bernard

Smith>.

“neg●li●gence 1 a : the quality or state of being negligent b : a

failure to exercise the care that a prudent person usu. exercises –

opposed to diligence;”

10

11

th

Edition, p. 958.

11

1976 Edition Vol. II p. 1513

54

49.3. In Black’s Law Dictionary

12

, “negligence” and several of its forms

and features have been explained. For the present purpose, we may

usefully extract the relevant parts as under: -

“negligence, n. (14c) 1. The failure to exercise the standard of care

that a reasonably prudent person would have exercised in a similar

situation; any conduct that falls below the legal standard established

to protect others against unreasonable risk of harm, except for

conduct that is intentionally, wantonly, or willfully disregardful of

others’ rights; the doing of what a reasonable and prudent person

would not do under the particular circumstances, or the failure to do

what such a person would do under the circumstances…..

active negligence. (1875) Negligence resulting from an affirmative

or positive act, such as driving through a barrier. Cf. passive

negligence.

advertent negligence. (1909) Negligence in which the actor is

aware of the unreasonable risk that he or she is creating;

RECKLESSNESS. – Also termed willful negligence; supine negligence.

casual negligence. (1812) A plaintiff’s failure to (1) pay reasonable

attention to his or her surroundings, so as to discover the danger

created by the defendant’s negligence, (2) exercise reasonable

competence, care, diligence, and skill to avoid the danger once it is

perceived, or (3) prepare as a reasonable person would to avoid

future dangers.

gross negligence. (16c) 1. A lack of even slight diligence or care.

● The difference between gross negligence and ordinary

negligence is one of degree and not of quality. Gross negligence is

traditionally said to be the omission of even such diligence as

habitually careless and inattentive people do actually exercise in

avoiding danger to their own person or property. – Also termed

willful and wanton misconduct. 2. A conscious, voluntary act or

omission in reckless disregard of a legal duty and of the

consequences to another party, who may typically recover

exemplary damages. – Also termed reckless negligence; wanton

negligence; willful negligence; willful and wanton negligence; willful

and wanton misconduct; hazardous negligence; magna

neglegentia.

inadvertent negligence. (18c) Negligence in which the actor is not

aware of the unreasonable risk that he or she is creating, but should

have foreseen and avoided it. – Also termed simple negligence.

12

10

th

Edition pp. 1196-1198

55

passive negligence. (18c) Negligence resulting from a person’s

failure or omission in acting, such as failing to remove hazardous

conditions from public property. Cf. active negligence.”

49.4. In P. Ramanatha Aiyar’s Advanced Law Lexicon

13

, various

connotations of the expression “negligence” are stated, inter alia, in the

following terms: -

“Negligence. Failure to use the care that a reasonable and prudent

person would have used under the same or similar circumstances.

Negligence in law signifies a coming short of the performance of

duty.

Failure to use the care that a reasonably prudent and careful person

would use under similar circumstances.

Negligence is “the absence of proper care, caution and diligence; of

such care, caution and diligence, as under the circumstances

reasonable and ordinary prudence would require to be exercised.”

50. Salmond on Jurisprudence

14

refers to a terse exposition in Grill

v. General Iron Screw Colliery Co.: (1866) L.R. 1 C.P., that negligence

is “the absence of such care as it was the duty of the defendant to use”;

and further explains the subtle distinction of inadvertent and advertent

negligence in the following: -

“It is to be observed, in the second place, that carelessness or

negligence does not necessarily consists in thoughtfulness or

inadvertence. This is doubtless the commonest form of it, but it is

not the only form. If I do harm, not because I intended it, but

because I was thoughtless and did not advert to the dangerous

nature of my act, or foolishly believed that there was no danger, I

am certainly guilty of negligence. But there is another form of

negligence, in which there is no thoughtlessness or inadvertence

whatever. If I drive furiously down a crowded street, I may be fully

conscious of the serious risk to which I expose other persons. I may

not intend to injure any of them, but I knowingly and intentionally

13

5

th

Edition, Vol. 3, p. 3435

14

Ibid p. 380

56

expose them to the danger. Yet if a fatal accident happens, I am

liable, at the most, not for wilful, but for negligent homicide. When I

consciously expose another to the risk of wrongful harm, but without

any wish to harm him, and harm actually ensues, it is inflicted not

wilfully, since it was not desired, nor inadvertently, since it was

foreseen as possible or even probable, but nevertheless negligently

(c).

Negligence then is failure to use sufficient care, and this failure

may result from a variety of factors…..”

51. Without multiplying the case law on the topic, sufficient it would be

to refer to the connotation of the term “negligence” explained succinctly by

this Court in the case of State of Maharashtra and Ors. v. Kanchanmala

Vijaysing Shirke and Ors.: (1995) 5 SCC 659 as follows: -

“9.…‘Negligence’ is the omission to do something which a

reasonable man is expected to do or a prudent man is expected to

do...”

52. Therefore, it could be reasonably summarised for the present

purpose that failure to exercise that care which a reasonably prudent

person would usually exercise under similar circumstances would amount

to negligence; it is not necessary that negligence would always be

advertent one where the wrongdoer is aware of unreasonable risk being

created but it may be inadvertent or passive too, arising for want of

foresight or because of some omission. However, the question as to

whether the liability because of negligence could be fastened on the

respondent company or not cannot be determined without dealing with the

other aspects related with exceptions and defence to the allegation of

negligence.

Act of God

57

53. In its assertions before the Department as also before the High

Court, the respondent company attempted to rely upon the principles

related with “act of God” and it was sought to be suggested that if the fire

had taken place despite the company having taken all care, it was nothing

but an act of God of which, no human agency had any control. The High

Court has accepted this part of submissions. Though in the argument

before us, learned counsel for the respondent has not laid much stress on

this theory but looking to the relevant background, it would be apposite to

take note of a few features related with “act of God” and its connotations

on the jurisprudential principles of liability.

54. In P. Ramanatha Aiyar’s Advanced Law Lexicon

15

, variegated

connotations of the term “act of God” or Vis major are specified with

reference to the treatise and citations. A few relevant aspects for the

present purpose could be usefully extracted as under: -

“All natural agencies, as opposed to human activities, constitute

acts of God, and not merely those which attain an extraordinary

degree of violence or are of very unusual occurrence. The

distinction is one of kind and not one of degree. The violence or

rarity of the event is relevant only in considering whether it could or

could not have been prevented by reasonable care : if it could not,

then it is an act of God which will relieve from liability, howsoever

trivial or common its cause may have been. If this be correct, then

the unpredictable nature of the occurrence will go only to show that

the act of God in question was one which the defendant was under

no duty to foresee or provide against. It is only in such a case that

the act of God will provide a defence.” R.F.V. HEUSTON. Salmond

on the Law of Torts 330 (17th ed. 1977).

“A natural act such as a storm, floods or an earthquake which

cannot be foreseen and usually absolves a person from liability if

damage occurs as a result.

15

5

th

Edition, p. 83

58

Any event so out of the ordinary that it could not have been

prevented by any amount of human care and forethought, e.g.

lightning, freak tidal waves or floods etc., which relieves a

contractor, such as a freight carrier, of any liability for losses

suffered as a result of it.”

"…..The expression ‘act of God’ signifies the operation of natural

force free from human intervention, such as lightning. It may be

thought to include such unexpected occurrences of nature as

severe gale, snowstorms, hurricanes, cyclones and tidal-bures and

the like. But every unexpected wind and storm does not operate as

an excuse from liability, if there is a reasonable possibility of

anticipating their happening. An act of God provides no excuse,

unless it is so unexpected that no reasonable human foresight could

be presumed to anticipate the occurrence, having regard to the

conditions of time and place known to be prevailing at…..”

54.1. The case of Mahadeva Shetty (supra) related to the loss suffered

by the claimant due to the injuries sustained in a vehicular accident that

rendered him paraplegic. The bus in which he was a passenger plunged

into a pit after rolling down from a great height. The stand of the

appellant Corporation in opposition to his claim petition was that the

accident was not due to rash and negligent driving but was an act of God.

In that context, this Court explained the essential features concerning an

act of God in contradistinction to an act or omission of human beings in the

following words: -

“9. The expression “act of God” signifies the operation of natural

forces free from human intervention, such as lightening, storm etc.

It may include such unexpected occurrences of nature as severe

gale, snowstorms, hurricanes, cyclones, tidal waves and the like.

But every unexpected wind and storm does not operate as an

excuse from liability, if there is a reasonable possibility of

anticipating their happening. An act of God provides no excuse

unless it is so unexpected that no reasonable human foresight could

be presumed to anticipate the occurrence, having regard to the

conditions of time and place known to be prevailing. For instance,

where by experience of a number of years, preventive action can

be taken, Lord Westbury defined the act of God (damnum fatale in

Scotch Laws) as an occurrence which no human foresight can

59

provide against and of which human prudence is not bound to

recognize the possibility. This appears to be the nearest approach

to the true meaning of act of God. Lord Blancaburgh spoke of it as

"an irresistible and unsearchable providence nullifying our human

effort".

54.2. In the case of Vohra Sadikbhai Rajabhai (supra), the water

released from a dam constructed by the respondents flooded the land of

the appellants and destroyed the plantation therein. As per the

respondents, the water had to be released from the dam as it reached

alarming level because of heavy rains and non-release would have

breached the dam; and that the action was taken in public interest and it

was occasioned because of the rains, which was an act of God. The

appellants, on the other hand, contended that it was sheer negligence on

the part of the respondents in not maintaining low level of the water keeping

in mind the ensuing monsoon season and, therefore, the damage which

the appellants suffered had direct nexus or causal connection with the

aforesaid act of negligence and it could not be attributed to the rains; and

hence, the respondents could not term it as an act of God and excuse

themselves from tortious liability. The Trial Court and the High Court

accepted the case of respondents that they were forced to release the

water due to the heavy rains; and that the land of the appellants was

situated adjacent to the river bank and, therefore, due to heavy rain, the

river could have overflown resulting in entering of the water into the fields

of the appellants in any case.

60

54.2.1. In appeal, this Court, while examining the question as to whether it

were a case of gross negligence, observed that the respondents did not

properly controvert the allegations of the appellants that water was not

maintained at an appropriate level to take care of ensuing monsoons. They

had also not supported their plea to the effect that had the water been not

released, it would have breached the dam and that act would have caused

more public harm. This Court held that since the dam was constructed and

maintained by the respondents and the appellants suffered losses as a

result of release of water from the said dam, onus was on the respondents

to prove that they had taken proper care in maintaining appropriate level of

water in the dam. This Court further held that the respondents were the

owners of the dam in question; and they were expected to keep the dam in

such a condition which avoided any loss or damage of any nature to the

neighbours or passersby. This Court observed that merely by saying that

the level of water in the dam increased because of monsoon rains and that

the water was released in public interest could not be treated as

discharging the burden on the part of the respondents in warding off the

allegation of negligence. While rejecting the defence of an “act of God”,

this Court explained thus: -

“22. …. An act of God is that which is a direct, violent, sudden and

irresistible act of nature as could not, by any amount of ability, have

been foreseen, or if foreseen, could not by any amount of human

care and skill have been resisted. Generally, those acts which are

occasioned by the elementary forces of nature, unconnected with

the agency of man or other cause will come under the category of

acts of God. Examples are: storm, tempest, lightning, extraordinary

fall of rain, extraordinary high tide, extraordinary severe frost, or a

61

tidal bore which sweeps a ship in mid-water. What is important here

is that it is not necessary that it should be unique or that it should

happen for the first time. It is enough that it is extraordinary and

such as could not reasonably be anticipated……”

54.3. The case of Patel Roadways (supra) essentially related to a

common carrier’s liability when goods entrusted to it were destroyed in a

fire that took place in the godown of the appellant. As regards the question

of negligence vis-a-vis a common carrier’s liability, this Court referred to a

passage from Sarkar on Evidence (15th Edn., 1999) at p. 1724 and

observed that as a rule, negligence is not to be presumed; it is rather to be

presumed that ordinary care has been used but that this rule does not apply

in the case of common carriers, who, on grounds of public policy, are

presumed to have been negligent if goods entrusted to their care have

been lost or damaged or delayed in delivery.

55. The present one had not been a case where anything related with

the forces of nature like storm, floods, lightning or earthquake had been in

operation or caused the fire. When nothing of any external natural force

had been in operation in violent or sudden manner, the event of the fire in

question could be referable to anything but to an act of God in legal

parlance. The observations of High Court in this regard do not appear

sound and are required to be disapproved.

Inevitable accident

56. The submissions before this Court on behalf of the respondent

company had been that the company had taken all precautions which was

expected of it and yet if the fire incident took place, it was something

62

beyond human control for which respondent company cannot be held

liable. This line of submission, at best, could be taken into another

exception to the rules governing liability, where inevitable accident is

generally recognised as a ground of exception. Again, we may refer to the

principles stated by Salmond

16

thus: -

“Accident, like mistake, is either culpable or inevitable. It is culpable

when due to negligence, but inevitable when the avoidance of it

would have required a degree of care exceeding the standard

demanded by the law. Culpable accident is no defence, save in

those exceptional cases in which wrongful intent is the exclusive

and necessary ground of liability. Inevitable accident is commonly

a good defence, both in the civil and in the criminal law.

To this rule, however, there are, at least, in the civil law, important

exceptions. These are cases in which the law insists that a man

shall act at his peril, and shall take his chance of accidents

happening. If he desires to keep wild beasts (f), or to construct a

reservoir of water (g), or to accumulate upon his land any substance

which will do damage to his neighbours if it escapes (h), he will do

all these things suo periculo (though none of them are per se

wrongful), and will answer for all ensuing damage, notwithstanding

consummate care…..”

57. To accept the case of respondent company about it being an

“inevitable accident”, it is to be seen if preventing of the fire in question

would have required a degree of care from the respondent company

beyond or exceeding the standard demanded by law. The question would

thus be as to what had been the normal and reasonable requirement for

safe custody of the liquor in question and if the respondent company,

despite having attended on all such normal and reasonable requirements,

could not have prevented the fire in question. While looking for an

16

Ibid p. 399

63

appropriate answer to this question, we shall have to take an overall view

of the material available on record as also all the surrounding factors and

circumstances. In this regard, before proceeding further, we could

profitably refer to a significant guiding principle embodied in the maxim res

ipsa loquitur whereby negligence may be presumed from the mere fact of

accident; of course, the presumption depends upon the nature of the

accident and the surrounding factors.

Res ipsa loquitur

58. In order to understand the operation of the maxim res ipsa loquitur,

we may usefully refer to a couple of the decisions of this Court. Of course,

these decisions related with vehicular accidents but the principles therein

remain fundamental in operation of res ipsa loquitur.

58.1. Shyam Sunder and Ors. v. The State of Rajasthan: (1974) 1

SCC 690 had been a case where the victim was travelling in a truck whose

engine got fire and while jumping from the vehicle, he struck against a

stone on the side of the road and died on the spot. The High Court in that

case held that merely for the truck catching the fire would not be evidence

of negligence on part of the driver; and that res ipsa loquitur had no

application. However, this Court, inter alia, pointed out and held as under:-

“9.… The maxim res ipsa loquitur is resorted to when an accident

is shown to have occurred and the cause of the accident is primarily

within the knowledge of the defendant. The mere fact that the cause

of the accident is unknown does not prevent the plaintiff from recov-

ering the damages, if the proper inference to be drawn from the cir-

cumstances which are known is that it was caused by the negli-

gence of the defendant. The fact of the accident may, sometimes,

64

constitute evidence of negligence and then the maxim res ipsa

loquitur applies.”

58.1.1. This Court then quoted the following passage from the case of

Scott v. London & St. Katherine Docks: (1865) 3 H&C 596, 601: -

“... where the thing is shown to be under the management of the

defendant or his servants, and the accident is such as in the ordi-

nary course of things does not happen if those who have the man-

agement use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the ab-

sence of explanation by the defendants, that the accident arose

from want of care.”

58.1.2. This Court further explained the operation of this maxim for

importing strict liability into negligence cases and observed: -

“The mere happening of the accident may be more consistent with

the negligence on the part of the defendant than with other causes.

The maxim is based on commonsense and its purpose is to do

justice when the facts bearing on causation and on the care

exercised by defendant are at the outset unknown to the plaintiff

and are or ought to be within the knowledge of the defendant

(see Barkway v. S. Wales Transo [(1950) 1 All ER 392, 399]).”

58.2. In Pushpabai Purshottam Udeshi and Ors. v. M/s. Ranjit

Ginning & Pressing Co. (P) Ltd. and Anr. (1977) 2 SCC 745, this Court

again explained the application of the principle of res ipsa loquitur and

explained various features thereof in the following words: -

“6. The normal rule is that it is for the plaintiff to prove negligence

but as in some cases considerable hardship is caused to the plaintiff

as the true cause of the accident is not known to him but is solely

within the knowledge of the defendant who caused it, the plaintiff

can prove the accident but cannot prove how it happened to

establish negligence on the part of the defendant. This hardship is

sought to be avoided by applying the principle of res ipsa loquitur.

The general purport of the words res ipsa loquitur is that the

accident “speaks for itself” or tells its own story. There are cases in

which the accident speaks for itself so that it is sufficient for the

plaintiff to prove the accident and nothing more. It will then be for

the defendant to establish that the accident happened due to some

65

other cause than his own negligence. Salmond on the Law of

Torts (15th Ed.) at p. 306 states: “The maxim res ipsa

loquitur applies whenever it is so improbable that such an accident

would have happened without the negligence of the defendant that

a reasonable jury could find without further evidence that it was so

caused”. In Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Ed., Vol. 28, at p. 77,

the position is stated thus: “An exception to the general rule that the

burden of proof of the alleged negligence is in the first instance on

the plaintiff occurs wherever the facts already established are such

that the proper and natural inference arising from them is that the

injury complained of was caused by the defendant's negligence, or

where the event charged as negligence ‘tells it own story’ of

negligence on the part of the defendant, the story so told being clear

and unambiguous”. Where the maxim is applied the burden is on

the defendant to show either that in fact he was not negligent or that

the accident might more probably have happened in a manner

which did not connote negligence on his part…..”

The respondent company remains liable

59. For what has been discussed hereinabove, this much is apparent

that in this case, the warehouse in question indeed got engulfed in fire and

that led to destruction of the liquor stored therein. Here, the respondent

company could be held liable to pay the excise duty on the liquor destroyed

in fire only if it could be held negligent in not ensuring safe custody of the

stored liquor. As regards this aspect, the fact that Department had control

and supervision over the distillery and godown would not absolve the

respondent of its liability. Further, the fire incident in question cannot be

termed as an “act of God”.

60. The matter then boils down to the question if the fire incident could

be said to be an inevitable accident. For that matter, we need to examine

as what had been the normal and reasonable requirement for safe custody

66

of the liquor in question and as to what could be deduced from the

surrounding factors.

60.1. One of the basic factors to be noticed is that the goods in question

were not ordinary goods but had been containing alcohol which, by its very

nature, is highly inflammable. Therefore, a particular nature of care which

might be sufficient as regards ordinary goods may not be adequate or

sufficient for the goods in question.

60.2. On 19.09.2002, the Assistant Electricity Inspector who conducted

periodical inspection of the premises in question made two observations.

One of them was a minor aspect that ‘Caution’ plate was not placed at

certain prominent place but the other observation was a significant one that

at one point of distribution panel, earth wiring was found with thin wire; and

it was suggested that same should be removed and strip earthing should

be done.

17

On 01.03.2003, while issuing No Objection Certificate, the Fire

Brigade Officer, inter alia, observed that firefighting equipments were at

right place and were in working condition but in future, they should be

tested in fire station Shahjahanpur before refilling; and it was also

suggested that Foam Installation should be provided for better

management of firefighting arrangements.

18

60.2.1. From the material placed on record, it is not forthcoming if strip

earthing had indeed been carried out, though the respondent company

generally stated in its letter dated 23.09.2002 that what was pointed out by

17

vide paragraph 7.1 supra

18

vide paragraph 7.3 supra.

67

the Assistant Electricity Inspector had been carried out. As to when strip

earthing was done and in what manner is not forthcoming. Further, it is also

not forthcoming if Foam Installations were provided, as suggested by the

Fire Brigade Officer. In view of extra care required of the highly inflammable

material, significance of none of these aspects could be gainsaid.

60.3. Though it is true that as per the suggestions made in the reports

relating to the fire incident in question, exact cause of fire could not be

ascertained but there had been indications that the officers, including the

Excise Officer and Station House Officer had seen burnt wires; and it was

reported that the fire ‘possibly’ took place because of short circuit. Taking

note of these facts as also the other facts that godown was an old one and

the roof of the godown was made of asbestos sheets, the Excise

Commissioner, in his order dated 11.07.2006, inferred that short circuit

could have taken place in old electric wiring in the godown and in that

context, observed that the licencee had not arranged the fire proof electric

equipments of good quality, which led to the incident in question.

61. A few words as regards ‘short circuit’ would also be apposite at this

juncture.

61.1. Short circuit is explained in the Dictionary of Technical Terms

19

by

F.S. Crispin as follows :-

“Short circuit (elec.): A path of low resistance placed across an

electrical circuit causing an abnormal flow of current.”

19

11

th

Edition, p. 369.

68

61.2. In McGrow-Hill Encyclopedia of Science and Technology

20

, the

relevant features of short circuit are stated as under: -

“An abnormal condition (including an arc) of relatively low

impedance, whether made accidentally or intentionally, between

two points of different potential in an electric network or system. SEE

CIRCUIT (ELECTRICITY); ELECTRICAL IMPEDANCE.

Common usage of the term implies an undesirable condition arising

from failure of electrical insulation, from natural causes (lightning,

wind, and so forth), or from human causes (accidents, intrusion, and

so forth). From an analytical viewpoint, however, short circuit

represent a severe condition that the circuit designer must consider

in designing an electric system that must withstand all possible

operating conditions. The short circuit thus is important in dictating

circuit design parameters (wire size and so on) as well as protective

systems that are intended to isolate the shorted element. SEE

ELECTRIC PROTECTIVE DEVICES ; ELECTRICAL INSULATION; LIGHTNING

AND SURGE PROTECTION .”

61.3. In the present case, even when the exact cause of fire could not be

ascertained, the indications in the reports like that of Assistant Excise

Commissioner dated 02.08.2003

21

that burnt cables were seen in the

debris and possibility had been of short circuit, the only inference could be

about some fault or shortcoming in electric installations (equipments and/or

wiring) which led to the abnormal flow of current and thereby, to the fire

incident in question.

62. As noticed, the fire incident in question had not taken place due to

operation of any forces of nature. It has also not been the case that the fire

was a result of any mischief by any person. Noticeably, the fire that started

around 12:55 p.m. on 10.04.2003 could be brought under control by the

20

6

th

Edition, volume 16, p 387.

21

vide paragraph 11 supra.

69

firefighters only by 5:00 a.m. on 11.04.2003. When all the relevant factors

are cumulatively taken into account, we find it difficult to accept that the fire

and the resultant loss had been beyond the control of human agency so as

to be termed as inevitable accident. Obviously, the fire had not generated

on its own and, with appropriately laid fire proof electrical installations as

also firefighting measures, the incident was an avoidable one or at least

the loss could have been minimised.

63. As noticed, the fault of “negligence” need not always be of active

negligence or of gross negligence, but it may also be of an inadvertent

negligence or of a passive negligence. It does not require much of

discussion to say that the goods in question, being highly inflammable,

required extra and excessive care for their safe custody; and any laxity or

slackness in that regard was impermissible. To put it differently, what was

required for ensuring safe custody of the goods in question was that of

heightened safeguard measures with foresight. When the respondent had

not been able to protect the goods in question from fire within the

warehouse and when all other factors, as noticed above, are taken into

account, the negligence as contemplated in Rule 709 of the Excise Manual

is directly attributable to the respondent company. In other words, even if

the present case is taken to be that of inadvertence or of unintentional

omission on the part of the respondent company, it would fall within the

definition of “negligence” for the purpose of Rule 709 of the Excise Manual.

70

63.1 In the given set of facts and circumstances, we are unable to

endorse the approach and views of the High Court, where it had basically

proceeded on the premise as if the incident in question was referable to an

‘act of God’. As noticed, the incident in question had not been because of

any forces of nature and cannot be said to be an ‘act of God’. The criticism

of Excise Commissioner’s order dated 11.07.2006 by the High Court, while

taking the observations and findings therein being of surmises and

conjectures, is also required to be disapproved. What the Excise

Commissioner had observed in the order dated 11.07.2006 had been of his

inferences, which were deduced out of the facts and circumstances of the

case and in true application of the principles of res ipsa loquitur.

64. Hence, we have no hesitation in disapproving the order of the High

Court and in endorsing the views of the Excise Commissioner in the order

dated 11.07.2006.

Insurance coverage only of the value of liquor: effect of

65. Before concluding on the matter, it would also be appropriate to

deal with yet another feature of this case relating to the insurance coverage

taken by the respondent company only of value of liquor and not that of

excise duty payable thereupon.

66. Admittedly, the respondent company had taken insurance coverage

of the value of liquor and indeed received such value of liquor from the

insurer. However, respondent company did not take insurance coverage of

the excise duty payable over such value of liquor. The appellants contend

71

that when the distiller has received value of liquor, on the principles of

equity and fair play, the corresponding excise duty ought to be made

available to them. It has also been contended that omission on the part of

the respondent company to take insurance coverage of value of excise

duty, while taking coverage of the value of liquor, itself amounts to

negligence. On the other hand, the respondent would submit that the claim

received from the insurer cannot be termed as consideration because there

was no transfer of property in goods and there was no sale. It has also

been submitted that there was no such requirement in law that the

respondent company was to take insurance coverage of the excise duty

too. Yet further, it has also been submitted that clearance of insurance

claim by the insurer itself shows that there was no negligence on the part

of the respondent. The Excise Commissioner in its order dated 11.07.2006

has observed that the distiller had taken insurance of the value of goods

and for this reason too, it remained rather lax in taking all care against fire.

67. Having examined the matter in its totality, we are clearly of the view

that the liability of the respondent company in this matter is rather fortified

from the facts that it had taken insurance coverage of the value of liquor

and indeed received such claim from the insurer. Further, failure to insure

the risk of excise duty liability cannot extricate the respondent from that

liability.

68. As noticed, in the scheme of law applicable, when duty of excise is

upon the goods and the taxable event is the production or manufacture of

72

the liquor, the liability to pay excise duty had arisen as soon as the liquor

was manufactured. Thereafter, when the liquor got destroyed in fire but its

value was recovered from the insurer, in our view, these events shall

answer to the broad expression “issue of an excisable article for sale from

a warehouse” for the purpose of proviso to Section 29(e) of the Act of 1910.

Putting it differently, receiving of insurance claim over the value of goods

by the respondent related back to the date of fire and the respondent

became liable to pay excise duty at the rate which was in force on the date

of fire, which would be deemed to be the date of “issue” from the

warehouse.

68.1. In the given set of facts and circumstances, we are not dilating on

the decision of CESTAT in the case of Dharampal Satyapal (supra)

wherein remission of duty on account of damage of pan masala in rain

water was disallowed, when it was found that the assessee had been

compensated by the insurance company with an amount which was much

more than the duty involved but, the submissions in the present case that

the goods had not been sold and duty has not been recovered from

consumers, do not take the case of respondent company any further. It was

for the respondent company to take necessary measures and care to

ensure that payable excise duty would reach the appellants once the goods

had been manufactured.

69. Another facet of this part of matter remains, and we agree with the

appellants, that not taking of insurance coverage of the excise duty while

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taking such coverage on the value of liquor itself amounts to negligence on

the part of the respondent company. As noticed, “negligence” has different

connotations and any particular act or omission, which may not be

negligence in a particular set of facts may still amount to negligence in

another set of facts. In the facts of the present case, where excise duty

became payable on manufacture of liquor, it was obviously expected of the

respondent company, as a reasonable and prudent distiller, to take all

necessary steps to safeguard not only the liquor and value thereof but also

the corresponding interest of the Government, i.e., the excise revenue. The

Excise Commissioner had been rather justified in drawing inference that

the respondent company, after having secured the value of goods for its

purpose, might not have been conscious and alert in taking all the

necessary care to guard against any loss to the Government due to any

mishap like fire.

70. The submission, that insurer would not have made payment of

insurance claim if there was any negligence on the part of the respondent

company, has its own shortcomings. The terms of fire insurance policy

have not been placed on record and it cannot be deduced as to what were

the terms and conditions of that policy under which insurer had acted in

accepting the claim of the respondent company. Secondly, what was not

treated as negligence by the insurer for the purpose of insurance claim

would not ipso facto become a proposition binding on the appellants as

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regards loss of revenue because of loss of liquor in fire. Such a contention

of the respondent could only be rejected.

Summation

71. In summation of what has been discussed hereinabove, we hold, -

(i). The demand raised by the appellants against the respondent

company, of excise duty on the liquor lost in fire, is authorised by law and

has rightly been raised as per the applicable provisions of the Act of 1910,

the Excise Manual and the Rules of 1969.

(ii). The fire incident in question cannot be said to be that of an event

beyond human control and the High Court has been in error in holding that

no negligence could be imputed on the respondent company.

(iii). The fact that the respondent company had taken insurance

coverage only of the value of liquor (and not that of excise duty thereupon)

and then, had received the insurance claim towards the value of liquor also

operates against the respondent company and fortifies the conclusion

about negligence of the respondent company.

71.1. Upshot of the discussion foregoing is that this appeal deserves to

succeed and the writ petition filed by the respondent company deserves to

be dismissed. As a necessary corollary, the miscellaneous application filed

by the respondent company, for consideration of its refund application, is

rendered redundant and deserves to be dismissed as such.

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Conclusion

72. Accordingly, and in view of the above, this appeal is allowed; the

impugned orders dated 10.04.2017 in Misc. Bench No. 4493 of 2006 and

dated 06.11.2019 in C.M. Application No. 90936 of 2019 are set aside; and

the writ petition as also the miscellaneous application filed by the

respondent company are dismissed but with no order as to costs.

..………………………….J.

(A.M. KHANWILKAR) 1

……..…………………….J.

(DINESH MAHESHWARI)

……..…………………….J.

(KRISHNA MURARI) 1

New Delhi;

January 05, 2022