, 621

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STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

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·.. RAM SAGAR. YADAV AND ORS •. ·

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. (Y.V. Cl!ANDRACHVo .. C.I. AND AMARENDRA NATI! SEN, J.]. c

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lndion Penal Code.,-s.s. 300, 302 and 3H-Mr1rder and C1'1pablt ltomicldt 1

not om,,unling It> murder-Dbti~tlon between. · ' ·· , '

'.-.•

Indian E"'ldem:t Att-Evidence-Apprecfatlon of-Dyjnt deefarot/011-lf

true, whtthtr co1·roboration neces.rary:_DtaJh Caused and/or a1trOci1le1. Perpttra· D

t,dwhllt in police custOdy-Burdtn of proof-Need for ft~xamina1ton by ltgls•

laturt. ' · ' .· '

_, ...

Criminal Law-Petty detail$ and minor contr0dicli'1n1 in . evldence-Wht·

tlrtr can tilt the scale cf justice.

; .

Respondent 1 was the Station HOuse Officer and Rtspoadents 2 to 4 were

attached as constable.i to the Police Station. The prosecution aliegd that a com• -

pJaiot Wai filed againSt tt.e deceased for cattle trespas1 .. The Respondent pursuant to

the said complaint sought to extort illega1 gratification from the deceased for bush·

i.Dg up the case. Re-;pondent 2 succeeded in obtaining Rs. 100 and made a fu-rthcr

demand or Rs 200. The deceased refused to obJige him and made a complaint to

the Superintendent of Police, who forwarded h to Respondent 1 for jnquiry and .

report. This iuc:cnsed Respondent l .. The. deceased v.as arrest~ and brought to

the Police Station by Respondents 3 and 4 at about 10.00 · A.M; Same day at

about 6.00 P.M. tbe de,eased sucumbed to injuries which were caused to him by,

Respcndents white he was in their custody. · ·

j The SessiOnscCollrt tried the roui-RespOndents, convicled c:i~h or them

under 'se<:tion' 304. Part 2 of tbC: Penal Code wbi:e Respondeiit l wis" also coilvic ..

· tcd under section 220 of,tbe Penal Gode and all were seDtenccd to ditrefcnt termS '

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· The Respondents aprealed to the High. Court and a Sin&lc Judgc set

aside their order or conviciions and sentences. , · ~ . , , , :

Allowing the Appeal of the State, , '·

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622

SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1985] 2 SC.R.

HELD: I. It is impossible to sustain the judgment of the High Court

as it has totally overlooked crucial evidence Jed by the prosecution and taken an

unrealistic vLw of unequivocal fact~. It bas not even adverted to the reasons

give-!1 by the trial court for holdin~ the Respondents guilty of the offences of

which they were convicted. [625B-C]

2. It is quite clear that upon the evidence led by the pro::.ecution only one

conclusion is possible, which is, that the Responden s inflicte :I injuries upon

Brijlal while

he was in their custody, thereby causing

his death. [635F)

3.

It is

well-settled ·that, as a matter of law, a dying declaration can be

acted upon without corroboration. There is

not even a rule of prudence whkh

has harden d into a

rule.of law tjiat a dying declaration c:annot be acted upon

unless it is corroborated. The primary effort or the Court has to be to find out

whether the dyjng decJaration

is true. If it is, no

question of co;roboration arises.

Ii is only J the circumstances surrounding the dying declaration are not clear

or coov.ncing that the Court may, for its assurance, look for corroboration to the

dying declaration. [6280-E)

The instant case, is a typical i11ustratioa of that <Jass of cases in which

the Court shoi.Ild not hesitate to act on the basis of an uncorroborated dying

declaration The circumstances leave no doubt that the dying declaration made

by the deceased to the Judicial Magistrate to the effect tha[ he \Vas beaten by

Darogah and the constables

at the

Pqlice Station is true in 1.:very r~spect and it is

safe to accept tr.e same. [628F; G; 629A-B]

Khusha/ Rao v. The State of Bombay, [1958] SCR 552, Harba11s Singh v.

State of Punjab, (1962) Supp. ISCR 104 and Gopafsingh v. State of M.P, [1972)

3

sec 268, followed.

4. The distinction

b~tween murder and culpable born cide not amounting

to murder is often lost.sisht of, resulting in undue lib~rality in favour of undeserv­

ing culprits like tbe respondent-police officers. Except in cases covered by five

exceptions mentioned in section 300 of the P~nal_ Code, culpable homicide is

·murder if the act by which the death is cau~ed is done with the.intention of caus­

ing death, or if-the act falls within any of the three clauses of section 300,

namely, 2ndly, 3rdly and 4thly. [630 F·G]

The instant case, appears to fall under the clause

1

2ndly' of section 300,

since the act by which the death of was caused, was done with the intention of

causing such bodily injury as the Respondents kn.:w to be likely to cause bis

death.

It is

regrCttable that the Se -sions Court convicted the Respc;>ndents under

section 304 instead of convicting them under sect:on 302 of the Pen11l Code. This

Court, would

not however pursue the matter further since the

State did not filed

an appeal against the judgment of the Sessions Court. [6JOH; 63JA]

5. The record of the case is disproportionately bulky to the narrow point

b

. b .

involved in the case. It is not an uousuJl experience that tbe wood is

W

tC IS d ' nf d 'h . bl d

. d, r the trees when a Ju gets co ronte wit a Jum e -up mass of data,

m1sse io

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U.P. STATE v. R.S. YADAV 623

relevant and irrelevant. It is necessary in such cases to find out the' central point

of tl~e ca,e and to concentrate upon evidence which bears upon that point. Petty

de ails which befog the real issue and c2n tradictions in the evidence which are

inevitable when a story is narraied under the stress of a ¥rave crime, ought not

to be p.rmitted to tilt the scales of justice. The more a Judge gets bogged down

in superfluous detai\s', the greater is the likelihood of his-straying away from evi

dcnce

wh ch can clinch the issue. [625C-E]

In the instant

case, the-High ~curt rnisstd or mistook the salient features

of the case and embarked upon a hair· splitting exercise while app1 eciat ng the

evidence.

6. Remand orders are oft~n passed mechanical'!y without a proper appli·

cation of mind. In this case, the Magistrate was led into passing an order of

remand on the basis of the usual statement that the offence of which the accused

was charged was still und r investigation. What is imprirt·Jnt is that dec~ased had

not committed ar~y offence at all for which ht could be remanded and, far from

being an accused, he was

in the position ol a complainant.

Respondent' 1 was

the architect of his remand and the motive for obtaining the remand order

was

to keep him in custady so as

tO prevent him from disclosing to his people

who beat him and where. (627D-F]

7.

It is

neces~ary that the Government amends the law appropriately so

that policemen who commit atrocities on persC1ns u..ho are in their custody rire

not allowe1 to e~cape by reason of paticity or absence of evidence. P)Jice ·omc~rs

alone_ and none else. can give evidence as regards the circumstances in which a

person in their custody comes to rec1 ive injuries while in their custody. Bound

6Y-ties of a kin1 of brotherhood, t'ley often pr('fer to remain s.Jent in such situa­

tions and when. they choose to speak they put their own gLiss up.'ln facts

and per·1ert the truth. The result is th3t person_s, on whom atrocities are

perpetrated by t1~e police in the s·anctum sanctorum or the Police StaC:on, are left

without any evidence to prove who the offenders are. The Jaw as to the burden

of proof in such cases may be re·examined by the l~gislature so that hand-maids

of law and order do not u~e their authority and opportunities· for oppressing the

in.nocent citizens, who look ~o them for protection. [631C·EJ

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 69

of 1975.

From the Judgment and Order dated 13th May, 1974 of the

Allahabad

High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 269 of 1973,

M.R.

Sharma, Dalveer Bhandari, H.M. Singh and Miss Raclma

Joshi, for the Appellant ·

R.K. Garg, VJ. Francis and N.M. Popli for the Respondents.

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624 .. SUPREME COURT REPORTS

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The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

(1985] 2 S.C.R.

CHANCRACHUD, C.J. This is an appeal by the State of U.P.,

against the judgment of a learned single Judge of the Allahabad High

. Court, setting aside the order of conviction and sentence, pas5ed by

the learned Sessions Judge, Fatehpur against the four respondents.

Respondents I and 2, Ram Sagar Yadav and Shobha Nath alias Ptljari

were convicted by the learned Sessions Judge under section 304. Part

2, of the Penaf Code and were sentenced to rigorous imprisonment

for seven years. Respondent 1

was

also convicted under section · 220

of the Penal Code for keeping a person in confinement corruptly and

was sent~nced to rigorous imprisonme.nt for 'five years Re•pondents

. 3 and 4 were convicted under section 304, Part 2 of. the Penal Code

and were sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for three years.

Respondent I,· Ram Sagar Yadav, was the Station House

Officer of the Hussainganj Police Station, District Faiehpur, while the

remaining three respondents were. attached to 'that police station as

constables. On the morning of August 29, 1969 respondents 3 and 4

went to village. Haibatpur, arrested the deceased Brijlal and brought

him to the rolice station

at about

.10.00 A.M. Brijlal died

the same day

at about

6.00 P.M. due to the injuries which were

caused to him between the time that he

was brough(to the police

station and the forenoon

of August 29.

·

·.•

The case: of the prosecution is' that the re1pondents wanted . tO

extort illegat;gratification from Brijlal in connection. with a complaint ·

which was filed against him by one Faheeman Faqirin for cattle tres­

pass. ·Respondent 2, Sbobha Nath, had succeeded in obtaining a· sum

of Rs.100 from Brijlal with an assurance that no steps will be taken

against him in that complafot. Respondent 2 demanded a further sum

of Rs .. 200 from Brijlal for hushing up the case. which the latter

refused to pay. Instead, ·a11 August 7,'· 1969 he sent a complaint

(Exhibit Ka-2) to the Superientendent

of

Police, Fatehpur, complain·

ing that a bribe was being demanded from him by respondent 2, a

. policeman of the Hussainganj Police Station. That complaint was for·

warded by the Superintendent of Police to respondent I for inquiry and

report.

Being

incensed by the 'audacity' of Brijlal in complaining .

against a policeman under his charge, respondent I sent respondents

· 3 and 4 to bring Brijlal to the police station iii· order that he could be

taught a proper lesson. That

is the genesis of Brijlars arrest.

Apart from

Faheeman Faqirin's complaint that Brijlars bullock had damaged her

crop, thare was no complaint or charge against him. ' .

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u P. STATE v. R.S. YADA\' .(Chandrachud, C.J.) 625

We have heard this appeal.at reasonable length and both Shri

M :R. Sharma, who appears on.behalf of the appellant, l\lld Shti R.K,.

Garg who appears on behalf of the· respondents, have taken us

through the relevant evidence

and the judgments of the

High' Court

and the Sessions Court. Upon a:consideration. of that evidence, we

find it impossible to sustain the judgment of the High Court; It has

totally overlooked crucial evidence Jed by the prosecution in; support

of-its case and, with respect, taking an unrealistic vie1~"of unequivocal

facts, it has not even adverted to the reasons given by-the trial court

in support

of its conclusion

that-the respondents are.guitly of the

offences

of which-it convicted them.

The record

of the case is diproportionately bulky to the narrow

point which is involved in the case. It is not an ., unsual:. experience

that the wood is missed for the trees when a Judge is confronted with

a jumbled-up mass

of data, relevant and irrelevant. It is necessary in

such cases

to find out the central point of the case .and to concentrate

upon evidence which bears upon that point.

Petty details which befog

the real issue and minor contradictions in the evidence which_ are

inevitable when a story

is narrated under the stress of a grave crime,

ought

~ot to be .permitted to tilt the scales of justice. The more a

Judge gets bogged down in superfluous details, the greater is the like­

lihood of his straying away from evidence which can clinch the issue.

In the instant case, the High. Court missed or mistook the salient

features

of the case.and, in the result, embacked upon a hair-splitting exercise _while apprecia\ing the evidence ..

Werlo not propose to discuss. more than is. strictly necessary

since· it is 11uite clear that upon the evidence led by the. prosecution

only

one

ceuclusion is possible, which .is,_that the respondents iutlic­

ted injuries· upon Brijla while he was in their custody,. thereby

causing his death.

Brijlal was hale and hearty-on the,anorning of-August 29, 19~9.

He was ploughing his field when respondents 3 and 4 reached.Haibat­

pur in order to arrest him. They took him on foot to the Hussaniganj

· Police Station which is about 3 km away from. Haibatpur. They

reached

the police station at

I0.00 A.M. Two hours later,· Brijlal was

taken,in a police van to the Court of the learned Additional District

Magistrate for. obtaining remand, Shri· RcC, Nigam, thei-Piesiding

_i.. Officer, of .. the Court, had finished the winding.,. list. of the

-r<;mand .. applica\iQns, at the eml oL which, the .. M~harir,-of, the

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626

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1985] 2 s.c.R,

Court informed him that a remand order1 had remained to be

passed against

an accused who was brought from the Hussainganj

Police Station and

that the accused could not be produced in Court

since

be was lying in the verandah in a badly injured condition.

Shri

Nigam (P.W. 5) says in his evidence that since the accused could not

be brought to the Court-room, be himself went to the verandah

where the accused was lying and be asked him his name. The accu­

sed was unable to respond at first since bis condition was "very

serious" but, on repeated inquiries, the accused told Shri Nigam

that bis name was Brijlal. On being questioned as to how be came

to receive the injuries, Brijlal replied

that 'the Darogab of

Hussain­

ganj and the. constables had beaten him very badly'. Shri Nigam

made a note

of the statement made by Brijlal on the remand

appli­

cation (Exhibit Ka-1). That application bears Shri Nignm's signature

and the thumb impression

of Brijlal.

Shri Nigam's evidence

is of a crucial character since it

establi­

shes, beyond any doubt, that Brijlal had extensive injuries on his

person and that,

at the earliest opportunity, he involved the

police­

men of the Hussainganj Police Station as the authors of those injuries,

It is as transparent, as any fact can be, that the injuries which were

found on the person

of Brijlal were caused to him at the Hussainganj Police Station. The few and simple steps in the logical process leading

to that conclusion are that Brijlal had no injuries on his person when

he was arrested

at Haibatpur in the morning or when he was brought

to the police station

at about

10.00 A.M., and that, when he was sent

for remand he had a large number

of injuries on his person which

had induced a state

of shock. We are unable to see what other

expla­

nation can reasonably be given of this chain of facts except that the

injuries were caused to Brijlal by the policemen attached to the

Hussainganj Police Station. Who, from amongst them,

is or are

responsible for causing the injuries has undoubtedly

to be considerd.

But, there

is no escape from the conclusion that Brijlal was assaulted

while be was in custody

of the respondents at the Hussainganj Police

Station.

'

The evidence of Laxmi Narain,

P.W. No. 17, who was one of

the constables attached to the Hussainganj Police Station bas an im­

portant bearing on the guilt of the respondents, an aspect which has

escaped the attention

of the High Court. Laxmi Narain says that when

he went to the police station

at· about 10.45 a.m. on August 29, 1969,

respondent !, the Station House Officer, and the other three respon-

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U.P. STATE v. R.S. YADAV (Chandrachud, c J.) 627

dents were present at the police station ; that Brijlal was lying in the

. .,,_ lock-up of the police station shrieking in pain ; and that, when Brijlal

was handed over to his custody for being taken to the Magistrate,

there were a number

of injuries on his arms and legs. According to

Laxmi Narain, and that

is undisputed, respondent I also accompanied

him and Brijlal to the Magistrate's court.

It seems to us surprising

A

that respondent I was nowhere on the scene in the Magistrate's court, B

especially in the light

of the fact that Brijlal's was an unsual case in

~ which, the prisoner for whom remand was to be obtained was in a

precarious condition due to the injuries suffered

by him. It was res­

pondent I

who, being the

S.H.O., had the custody and care of Brijlal.

Instead

of making himself available to the Magistrate for explaining

how Brijlal came to be injured, he resorted to the expedient of depu-

ting Laxmi Narain to face the Magistrate. Laxmi Narain has also C

stated in his evidence that Brijlal told the Magistrate that the Daro-

gah and the constables

of the Hussainganj Police Station had assaul-

--..1 #' ted him.

It is notorious that remand orders are often passed mechanically

without a proper application of mind. Perhaps, the Magistrates are

not to blame because, heaps

of such applications are required to be

·disposed of by them before the regular work of the day begins. Shri

Nigam has to be complimented for the sense of duty and humanity

which he showed in leaving his seat and going to the verandah to see

an humble villager like Brijlal.

It is obvious that he was led into

passing an order

of remand on the basis of the usual statement that

the offence of which the accused

was charged was still under

investigation. What

is important is that Brijlal had not committed

any offence

at a!l for which he could be remanded and, far from

being an accused, he

was in the position of a complainant.

Respon­

dent I was the architect of his remand and the motive for obtaining

the remand order

was to keep Brijlal in custody so as to prevent

him from disclosing to his people

who beat him and where.

After obtaining the remand order, Brijlal

was sent to the

Fateh­

pur District Jail at 3.40 p.m. Shea Shanker Sharma, P. W.8, who

was the Assistant Jailor of the Fetehpur Jail, says that when he exami­

ned Brijlal

at about 3.45 p.m. while admitting him to the Jail, he ..I.. found that there was swelling on his bands, legs and knees. Brijlal

was unable to get up and on being questioned, he told Sharma that

the policemen belonging to the Police Smtiou arrested him

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628

SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1985] 2 S.C.R.

from his field, took him to the Police Station and committed

"marpit" on him, as a result of which the was unable to stand. Fin­

ding that Brijlal's condition was serious, he called the Jail Doctor.

Dr. S. C. Misra PW. 21, went to the District Jail at about 5.20

p.m. He fonnd that there were 19 injuries on the various parts of

Brijlal 's person. On being questioned, Brijlal told him in a faltering

voice

that he had been beaten by the policemen. Dr. Misra says that

Brijlal's condition

was precarious but that, he had neither any fever

nor any symptoms of

Pneumonie. The evidence of Dr Misra proves

that Brijlal died on account of the injuries received

by him and that,

the suggestion made

by the defence that he died on account of some

kind

of a fever or on account of the pneumonic condition of his

lungs,

is utteiy baseless. The congestion in his lungs was the result

of the beating administered to him.

It is well-settled that, as a matter of law, a dying declaration

"' ..,.

can be acted upon without corroboration. (See Khushal Rao v. The

State of Bombay(l);Harbans Singhv. State of Punj1b,(2) and Gopa/singh

v. State of M.P.)(

3

) There is not even a rule of prudence which has

hardened into a rule

of law that a dying declaration cannot be acted

upon nnless it

is corroborated. The primary effort of the Court has

to

be to find out whether the dying declaration is true. If it is, no

question of corroboration arises.

It is only if the circumstances

sur­

rounding the dying declaration are not clear or convincing that the

Court may, for its assurance, look for corroboration to the dying

declaration. The case before

us is a typical illus! ation of that class

of

cases in which, the Court should not hesitate to act on the basis

of an uncorroborated dying declaration. Brijlal had no reason for

involving the policemen falsely for having assaulted him. There

was

no possiblity of anyone tutoring him, for the simple reason that he

was in the exclusive custody of the policemen of Husssainganj

Police

Station. It is the respondents who were in a position to exert influ-

ence over him. No one

else bad access to him, which not only exclu-

des the possibility of his being tutored, but which also excludes

the possibility that he

was assaulted by any one else. Indeed, the

circumstances of the case leave no doubt that the dying declaration

(1) [19581

SCR 552.

(2) [1962] Supp. I SCR 104.

en 119121 J sec 268.

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U.P. STATE v. R.S. YADAV (Chandrachud, c J.) 629

made by Brijlal to Shri Nigam is true in every respect. We consider

it safe to accept the statement made by Prijlal to Shri Nigam that

be

was beaten by the 'Darogab and the constables' of the Hussain­

gauj

Police Station.

The only question which remains for consideration is as to the

identity

of the persons belonging to the Hussainganj

Police Station

who participated in the assault on Brijlal. Respondent I is directiy

and specifically implicated in the dying declaration.

He was the "Darogah" of that Police Station. Laxmi Narain says in his evidence

that

at I

0.45 a.m. when Brijlal was brought to the police station by

respondents 3 and 4 respondent I was present. It is difficult to believe

that the police constables would beat an accused so mercilessly in

the police station without the connivance, consent or coollaboration

of the

Station House Officer. The Police Station of Hussainganj is

not so large that the Station House Officer would not know what is

happening there during his presence. The possibility of any other

officer being a "Darogah" is removed by the evidence of S.I. Bajrang

Babadur Singh, P. W. 19, who says that, at the relevant time, there

was no other Second Officer at the Hussainganj Police Station except

him.

Any doubt lurking about the involvement

of respondent 1 in

the incident

is removed by bis own conduct. Though be was

unques­

tionably present at the police station at the material time, be prepared

a false record in order to show that be bad gone for the purpose

of

an identification parade to another place. We agree with the learned Sessions Judge that the record was thus prepared by respondent 1

falsely in order to support the defence

of alibi. That, indeed, was bis

defence

at the trial. He also prepared false record to show that Brij­

lal

was involved in a dacoity cas.e and was brought to the police

station for that reason. There

was no such charge against Brijlal and

yet, respondent

1, as the

S.H.O., authorised or allowed respondents 3

and 4 to go Haibatpur for arresting Brijlal. The true reason for

arresting him was that the respondent were incensed

at the complaint

made

by Brijlal against respondent 2 for extorting a bribe.

In so far as respondent 2 is concerned, be is truly the cause of

the assault on Brijlal. It was be who bad extorted a bribe from Brijlal

and was attempting to get some money from him. Brijlal sent

a complaint on August 7,

1969 to the

[Superintendent of Police,

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Fatehpur, complaining against respondent 2. That complaint having H

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630 SUPREME COURT ·REPORTS [1985] 2 s.c.R.

been referred for inquiry and report to the Hussainganj Police Soltion,

respondents hatched a conspiracy to put Brijlal under arrest, bring

him to the police station and assault him.

In

so far as

responden\5 3 and 4 are conc~rned, it is they who

arrested Brijlal on a false charge of dacoity and brought him to

the

police station at

10 a.m., on August 29. Shortly thereafter, constable

Laxmi Narain found that Brijlal

was lying in the lock-up in a badly

injured

con~ition and was shrieking in agony.

In the light of these findings, it is unnecessary to refer to the

evidence

of

P.Ws. 6. 7 and 9 who are respectively the nephew, the

daughter and the

wife of Brijlal. We agree with the learned

Sessions

Judge that these·persons went to the police station immediately after

Brijlal

was taken there under arrest. It is not, however, possible to

say with a reasonable amount of certainty that they saw the respon­

dents assaulting Brijlal. They reached the police station quite some

time after Brijlal

was taken there and it would be too much of a

coincidence to suppose that they arrived at the police station precisely

at the time when Brijlal was being beaten. They might have heard

the shrieks

of Brijlal who was writhing in pain. But, standing outside

the police station,

as they were, it could not have been possible for

them to

see who was assaulting Brijlal. The limited relevance of their

evidence

is for showing, apart from the other circumstances stated

above,

that Brijlal was lying injured in the police station.

For these reasons,

we allow this appeal, set aside the judgment

· of the High Court and affirm that of the Sessions Court. It is to be

greretted that the learned Sessions Judge convicted the respondents

under section 304 instead of convicting them under section 302 of the

Penal Code. The distinction between murder and culpable homicide

not amounting to murder

is often lost sight of, resulting in undue

liberality in favour of undeserving culprits like the respondent-police

officers, Except in

cases covered by the five exceptions mentioned in

section

300 of the Penal Code, culpable homicide is murder if the act

by· which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing

death, or

if the act falls within any of the three clauses of section 300, namely, 2ndly, 3rdly and 4thly. In this case, the injuries suffered

by Brijlal would appear to fall under the clause '2ndly' of section

300, since the act by which his death was caused was done with the

intention

of causing such bodily injury as the respondents knew to be likely to cause his death. However, we will not pursue that matter

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f

•

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•

tJ.J>. STATE v. R.S. YADAV (Chandrachud, C.i.) 631

any further since the State did not file an appeal against the judgment

of the learned Sessions Judge asking that the respondents should be

convicted under section

302 of the

Penal Code and since the prosecu­

tion did not lead sufficient evidence through the Medical Officer in

order to bring

out the true nature of the injuries suffered by Brijlal.

Before

we close, we would like to impress upon the Government

the need

to amend the law appropriately so that policemen who com­

mit atrocities

on persons who are in their custody are not allowed to

escape

by reason of paucity or absence of evidence.

Police Officers

alone, and none else, can give evidence

as regards the circumstances

in which a person in

their custody comes to receive injuries while in

their custody. Bound by ties

of a kind of brotherhood, they often

prefer to remain silent in such situations

and when they choose to

speak, they put their own gloss upon facts and pervert the truth.

The result

is that persons, on whom atrocities are perpetrated by the

police in the

sanctum sanctorum of the police station, are left without

any evidence to prove who the offenders are. The law as to the

burden

of proof in such cases may be re-examined by the legislature

so

that hand-maids of law and order do not use their authority and

opportunities for oppressing the innocent citizens who look to them

for protection.

It is ironcial that, in the instant case, a person who

complained against a policeman for bribery, was done to death by

that policeman, his tw

> companions and his superior officer, the

Station House Officer. The vigilant Magistrate, Shri R.C. Nigam,

deserves a word

of praise for dutifully recording the dying declaration

of the victim, which has come to constitute the sheet anchor of the

case

of the prosecution.

A.

P.J . Appeal allowed.

A

B

c

D

E