Due to conflicting judgments on whether alimony can be granted when a marriage is declared void under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, the Supreme Court referred the matter to a ...
2025 INSC 197 Civil Appeal No.2536 of 2019 etc. Page 1 of 19
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2536 OF 2019
Sukhdev Singh … Appellant
versus
Sukhbir Kaur … Respondent
with
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5726 Of 2019
J U D G M E N T
ABHAY S. OKA, J.
ISSUE REFERRED
1. The reference to a Bench of the three Hon’ble Judges has been
made by the order dated 22
nd August 2024 of this Court, which reads
thus:
“Learned counsel appearing for the parties
state at the Bar that these matters need to be
considered by a Three Judge Bench
combination as there are conflicting views on
the applicability of Sections 24 and 25 of the
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, whether alimony
can be granted where marriage has been
declared void.
Following are the judgments in favour of
granting alimony :-
Sl.
No.
CITATION TITLED
1. (1993) 3 SCC
406
Chand Dhawan
Vs.Jawaharlal
Dhawan
Civil Appeal No.2536 of 2019 etc. Page 2 of 19
2. (2005) 2 SCC 33 Rameshchandra
Rampratapji Daga
Vs. Rameshwari
Rameshchandra
Daga
Following are the judgments against granting
alimony :-
Sl.
No.
CITATION TITLED
1. (1988) 1 SCC 530 Yamunabai
Anantrao Adhav
Vs. Anantrao
Shivram Adhav &
Another
2. AIR 1999 AP 19 Abbayolla Reddy
Vs. Padmamma
3. (2003) 1 HLR 100 Navdeep Kaur Vs.
Dilraj Singh
4. (2004) AIR Bom.
283(FB)
Bhausaheb @
Sandhu S/o
Raguji Magar Vs.
Leelabai W/o
Bhausaheb Magar
5. (2005) 3 SCC 636 Savitaben
Somabhai
Bhatiya Vs. State
of Gujarat &
Others
Accordingly, let the papers be placed before
Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India for passing
appropriate orders.”
RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF LAW
2. Before we refer to the submissions made across the Bar, it will be
necessary to briefly refer to the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act,
1955 (for short, ‘the 1955 Act’). Section 5 deals with the conditions for
a Hindu marriage, which reads thus:
Civil Appeal No.2536 of 2019 etc. Page 3 of 19
“5. Conditions for a Hindu marriage. —A
marriage may be solemnized between any
two Hindus, if the following conditions are
fulfilled, namely:—
(i) neither party has a spouse living at the
time of the marriage;
(ii) at the time of the marriage, neither party—
(a) is incapable of giving a valid consent
to it in consequence of unsoundness of
mind; or
(b) though capable of giving a valid
consent, has been suffering from mental
disorder of such a kind or to such an
extent as to be unfit for marriage and
the procreation of children; or
(c) has been subject to recurrent attacks
of insanity;
(iii) the bridegroom has completed the age of
twenty-one years and the bride, the age of
eighteen years at the time of the marriage;
(iv) the parties are not within the degrees of
prohibited relationship unless the custom
or usage governing each of them permits of
a marriage between the two;
(v) the parties are not sapindas of each
other, unless the custom or usage governing
each of them permits of a marriage between
the two;”
(emphasis added)
3. The 1955 Act deals with void marriages and voidable marriages.
Section 11, which deals with void marriages, reads thus:
“11. Void marriages. — Any marriage
solemnised after the commencement of this Act
shall be null and void and may, on a petition
presented by either party thereto against the
other party, be so declared by a decree of nullity
Civil Appeal No.2536 of 2019 etc. Page 4 of 19
if it contravenes any one of the conditions
specified in clauses (i), (iv) and (v) of section 5.”
4. The 1955 Act contemplates the filing of the following categories of
petitions for grant of different reliefs:
a. A petition seeking relief of restitution of conjugal rights in
accordance with Section 9;
b. A petition seeking relief of judicial separation in accordance
with Section 10;
c. A petition seeking a declaration that a marriage is void in
accordance with Section 11;
d. A petition for annulment of a marriage on the ground that it is
voidable in accordance with Section 12;
e. A petition seeking a divorce in accordance with Section 13; and
f. A petition seeking divorce by mutual consent in accordance
with Section 13B.
5. We are called upon to interpret Sections 24 and 25 of the 1955
Act, which read thus:
“24. Maintenance pendente lite and
expenses of proceedings.—Where in any
proceedings under this Act it appears to the
court that either the wife or the husband, as
the case may be, has no independent income
sufficient for her or his support and the
necessary expenses of the proceeding, it may,
on the application of the wife or the husband,
order the respondent to pay to the petitioner
the expenses of the proceeding, and monthly
during the proceeding such sum as, having
regard to the petitioner's own income and the
income of the respondent, it may seem to the
court to be reasonable:
Civil Appeal No.2536 of 2019 etc. Page 5 of 19
Provided that the application for the payment
of the expenses of the proceeding and such
monthly sum during the proceeding shall, as
far as possible, be disposed of within sixty
days from the date of service of notice on the
wife or the husband, as the case may be.”
25. Permanent alimony and
maintenance.—(1) Any court exercising
jurisdiction under this Act may, at the time
of passing any decree or at any time
subsequent thereto, on application made
to it for the purpose by either the wife or
the husband, as the case may be, order that
the respondent shall pay to the applicant
for her or his maintenance and suppor t
such gross sum or such monthly or
periodical sum for a term not exceeding the
life of the applicant as, having regard to the
respondent's own income and othe r
property, if any, the income and other
property of the applicant, the conduct of
the parties and other circumstances of the
case, it may seem to the court to be just,
and any such payment may be secured, if
necessary, by a charge on the immovable
property of the respondent.
(2) If the court is satisfied that there is, a
change in the circumstances of either party at
any time after it has made an order under
sub-section (1), it may at the instance of either
party, vary, modify or rescind any such order
in such manner as the court may deem just.
(3) If the court is satisfied that the party in
whose favour an order has been made under
this section has remarried or, if such party is
the wife, that she has not remained chaste, or,
if such party is the husband, that he has had
sexual intercourse with any woman outside
wedlock, it may at the instance of the other
party vary, modify or rescind any such order
in such manner as the court may deem just.”
(emphasis added)
Civil Appeal No.2536 of 2019 etc. Page 6 of 19
6. The following questions arise for our consideration:
(i)Whether a spouse of a marriage declared as void by a
competent Court under Section 11 of the 1955 Act is entitled
to claim permanent alimony and maintenance under Section
25 of the 1955 Act?
(ii)Whether in a petition filed seeking a declaration under
Section 11 of the 1955 Act, a spouse is entitled to seek
maintenance pendente lite under Section 24 of the 1955 Act?
SUBMISSIONS
7. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant-husband relied
upon five decisions mentioned in the order dated 22
nd August 2024. We
have already reproduced the said order in this judgment. The learned
counsel has taken us through the relevant paragraphs of the five
decisions. He urged the Court to reconsider the two decisions
mentioned in the order dated 22nd August 2024, which support the
proposition that a spouse of a declared void marriage is entitled to seek
maintenance under Section 25 of the 1955 Act.
8. The learned counsel pointed out that there can be void marriages
between father and daughter, brother and sister and grandfather and
granddaughter. He questioned whether, in the case of such marriages,
after the same are declared void, the Court can exercise the power under
Section 25 of the 1955 Act to grant maintenance. He submitted that
there would be cases where parties to void marriages are conscious of
the fact that their marriage would be bigamous. There would be cases
where the wife may be responsible for concealing her first marriage
which is in subsistence, and induce the husband to marry. There may
be cases where both parties may be unaware that they are solemnising
a void marriage. He submitted that it is absurd to include a decree
Civil Appeal No.2536 of 2019 etc. Page 7 of 19
declaring a marriage as void in the expression “any decree” used in
Section 25 of the 1955 Act. He submitted that to that extent, the view
taken by this Court in the case of Chand Dhawan v. Jawaharlal
Dhawan
1 and Rameshchandra Rampratapji Daga v. Rameshwari
Rameshchandra Daga
2 is incorrect.
9. He submitted that a marriage declared void under Section 11 is
void ab initio, which does not exist. Therefore, a wife whose marriage is
declared void cannot claim to be a spouse within the meaning of Section
25 of the 1955 Act. He relied upon a decision of the Full Bench of the
Bombay High Court in the case of Bhausaheb @ Sandhu s/o Raghuji
Magar v. Leelabai w/o Bhausaheb Magar
3. He relied upon the
observations made therein that an illegitimate wife cannot be equated
to a divorced wife. He would, therefore, submit that Section 25 of the
1955 Act cannot apply to a spouse whose marriage is declared void.
10. The learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent-wife has
made detailed submissions. She supported the decisions in the cases
of Chand Dhawan
1 and Rameshchandra Rampratapji Daga
2 and
submitted that the view taken therein is correct. She relied upon Article
15(3) of the Constitution of India and submitted that Section 25 is a
special provision enacted for women. The learned senior counsel also
tried to argue on facts of the case. However, we are not concerned with
the facts of the case.
OUR VIEW ON THE QUESTION (i)
11. If Section 5 is read in conjunction with Section 11, the following
categories of marriages are void:
1
(1993) 3 SCC 406
2
(2005) 2 SCC 33
3
AIR 2004 Bom 283
Civil Appeal No.2536 of 2019 etc. Page 8 of 19
a. If one or both the parties to the marriage have a spouse living
at the time of marriage;
b. The parties to the marriage are within the degrees of
prohibited relationship unless the custom or usage
governing each of them permits of a marriage between the
two and
c. The parties are sapindas of each other, unless the custom
or usage governing each of them permits of a marriage
between the two.
12. A marriage is void when either of the parties to the marriage has
a spouse living, and the marriage with the spouse is subsisting. If any
of the spouses of the marriage had an earlier marriage dissolved by a
decree of divorce before their marriage, clause (a) above will not apply.
As far as clause (b) regarding prohibited relationships is concerned, the
degrees of prohibited relationships have been specified in clause (g) of
Section 3. Regarding the third category of sapinda relationship, clause
(f) of Section 3 defines what is a sapinda relationship.
13. Section 11 provides for the grant of a declaration of a marriage as
null and void. The marriages covered by the categories (a), (b) or (c)
mentioned above become void at the inception. Therefore, such
marriages are void ab initio. Such marriage does not exist at all in the
eyes of the law.
14. Now, we come to Section 25 of the 1955 Act. We have already
reproduced Section 25. It confers a power on the matrimonial court to
grant permanent alimony “at the time of passing any decree or at any
time subsequent thereto”. The issue is about the meaning of the decree
contemplated by Section 25. A cause of action arises for the spouses to
Civil Appeal No.2536 of 2019 etc. Page 9 of 19
apply for permanent alimony and maintenance when any decree is
passed by any court exercising its jurisdiction under the 1955 Act.
15. Section 23 has the title “decree in proceedings”. Section 23 of the
1955 Act reads thus:
“23. Decree in proceedings. — (1) In any
proceeding under this Act, whether
defended or not, if the court is satisfied that
(a) any of the grounds for granting relief exists
and the petitioner except in cases where the
relief is sought by him on the ground specified
in sub-clause (a), sub-clause (b) or sub-clause
(c) of clause (ii) of section 5 is not in any way
taking advantage of his or her own wrong or
disability for the purpose of such relief, and
(b) where the ground of the petition is the
ground specified in clause (i) of sub-section (1)
of section 13, the petitioner has not in any
manner been accessory to or connived at or
condoned the act or acts complained of, or
where the ground of the petition is cruelty the
petitioner has not in any manner condoned the
cruelty, and
(bb) when a divorce is sought on the
ground of mutual consent, such
consent has not been obtained by force,
fraud or undue influence, and
(c) the petition (not being a petition presented
under section 11) is not presented or
prosecuted in collusion with the respondent,
and
(d) there has not been any unnecessary or
improper delay in instituting the
proceeding, and
(e) there is no other legal ground why relief
should not be granted, then, and in such a
case, but not otherwise, the court shall decree
such relief accordingly.
Civil Appeal No.2536 of 2019 etc. Page 10 of 19
(2) Before proceeding to grant any relief under
this Act, it shall be the duty of the court in the
first instance, in every case where it is possible
so to do consistently with the nature and
circumstances of the case, to make every
endeavour to bring abou t reconciliation
between the parties:
Provided that nothing contained in this sub-
section shall apply to any proceeding wherein
relief is sought on any of the grounds specified
in clause (ii), clause (iii), clause (iv), clause (v),
clause (vi) or clause (vii) of sub-section (1) of
section 13.
(3) For the purpose of aiding the court in
bringing about such reconciliation, the court
may, if the parties so desire or if the court
thinks it just and proper so to do, adjourn the
proceedings for a reasonable period not
exceeding fifteen days and refer the matter to
any person named by the parties in this behalf
or to any person nominated by the court if the
parties fail to name any person, with directions
to report to the court as to whether
reconciliation can be and has been, effected
and the court sha ll in disposing of the
proceeding have due regard to the report.
(4) In every case where a marriage is dissolved
by a decree of divorce, the court passing the
decree shall give a copy thereof free of cost to
each of the parties.”
(emphasis added)
Clause (a) of Section 23(1) applies to a case where a decree of annulment
is sought under Section 12. Only clause (d) of Section 23(1) is
applicable when a decree of nullity is sought. The decree of nullity
cannot be passed if there has been unnecessary and improper delay in
instituting the petition seeking a declaration of nullity.
Civil Appeal No.2536 of 2019 etc. Page 11 of 19
16. The following are the decrees which may be passed under the
1955 Act:
a. A decree under Section 9 of restitution of conjugal rights;
b. A decree under Section 10 of judicial separation;
c. A decree under Section 11 declaring a marriage as void;
d. A decree under Section 12 of annulment of a marriage on
the ground that it is voidable; and
e. A decree of divorce under Sections 13 and 13B.
17. An order of dismissal of a suit will be a decree, provided the
conditions in Section 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 are
satisfied. However, a decree in proceedings contemplated by Section 23
of the 1955 Act is a narrower concept. It can only be a decree granting
one of the reliefs under Sections 9 to 13 of the 1955 Act. The decree
referred to in Section 25 of the 1955 Act is the decree as contemplated
by Section 23, which has the title ‘decree in proceedings’. On plain
reading thereof, the decree contemplated by Section 23 is a decree
granting relief under the 1955 Act. Section 23 deals with only the
decrees granting reliefs under Sections 9 to 13 of the 1955 Act.
Considering the language employed in Section 23, the ‘decrees in
proceedings’ will not include the decisions dismissing the petitions
seeking reliefs under Sections 9 to 13. The decrees passed under
Sections 11 to 13 bring about a change of status of the parties to the
marriage. Even a decree of restitution of conjugal rights brings about a
change of status of the parties in case there is no restitution of conjugal
rights within one year of a decree. That is a ground for passing a decree
of divorce under Section 13(1A)(ii). Even a decree of judicial separation
under Section 10 brings about a change of status in the sense that a
Civil Appeal No.2536 of 2019 etc. Page 12 of 19
spouse who has got such a decree is no longer under an obligation to
cohabit with his or her spouse. If the separation from the date of the
decree continues for a period of one year, it becomes a ground for
passing a decree of divorce by invoking Section 13(1A)(i).
18. While enacting Section 25(1), the legislature has made no
distinction between a decree of divorce and a decree declaring marriage
as a nullity. Therefore, on a plain reading of Section 25(1), it will not be
possible to exclude a decree of nullity under Section 11 from the purview
of Section 25(1) of the 1955 Act.
19. In the case of Chand Dhawan
1, the issue arose regarding the
meaning of ‘decree’ referred to under Section 25 of the 1955 Act. In
paragraph 25 of the said decision, this Court observed thus:
“25. We have thus, in this light, no
hesitation in coming to the view that when
by court intervention under the Hindu
Marriage Act, affectation or disruption to
the marital status has come by, at that
juncture, while passing the decree, it
undoubtedly has the power to grant
permanent alimony or maintenance, if that
power is invoked at that time. It also retains
the power subsequently to be invoked on
application by a party entitled to relief. And
such order, in all events, remains within the
jurisdiction of that court, to be altered or
modified as future situations may warrant. In
contrast, without affectation or disruption
of the marital status, a Hindu wife
sustaining that status can live in separation
from her husband, and whether she is living
in that state or not, her claim to
maintenance stands preserved in
codification under Section 18(1) of the
Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act. The
court is not at liberty to grant relief of
maintenance simpliciter obtainable under
one Act in proceedings under the other. As
Civil Appeal No.2536 of 2019 etc. Page 13 of 19
is evident, both the statutes are codified as
such and are clear on their subjects and by
liberality of interpretation inter -
changeability cannot be permitted so as to
destroy the distinction on the subject of
maintenance.”
(emphasis added)
In the case of Rameshchandra Rampratapji Daga
2, the same view
was taken relying upon the decision in the case of Chand Dhawan
1. In
paragraphs 18 to 20, this Court held thus:
“18. In the present case, on the husband's
petition, a decree declaring the second
marriage as null and void has been granted.
The learned counsel has argued that where the
marriage is found to be null and void —
meaning non-existent in the eye of the law or
non est, the present respondent cannot lay a
claim as wife for grant of permanent alimony or
maintenance. We have critically examined
the provisions of Section 25 in the light of
conflicting decisions of the High Court cited
before us. In our considered opinion, as has
been held by this Court in Chand Dhawan
case [(1993) 3 SCC 406 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 915]
, the expression used in the opening part of
Section 25 enabling the “court exercising
jurisdiction under the Act” “at the time of
passing any decree or at any time
subsequent thereto” to grant alimony or
maintenance cannot be restricted only to,
as contended, decree of judicial separation
under Section 10 or divorce under Section
13. When the legislature has used such wide
expression as “at the time of passing of any
decree”, it encompasses within the
expression all kinds of decrees such as
restitution of conjugal rights under Section
9, judicial separation under Section 10,
declaring marriage as null and void under
Section 11, annulment of marriage as
voidable under Section 12 and divorce under
Section 13.
Civil Appeal No.2536 of 2019 etc. Page 14 of 19
19. Learned counsel for the husband has
argued that extending the benefit of Section 25
to even marriages which have been found null
and void under Section 11 would be against the
very object and purpose of the Act to ban and
discourage bigamous marriages.
20. It is a well-known and recognised legal
position that customary Hindu law like
Mohammedan law permitted bigamous
marriages which were prevalent in all Hindu
families and more so in royal Hindu families. It
is only after the Hindu law was codified by
enactments including the present Act that bar
against bigamous marriages was created by
Section 5(i) of the Act. Keeping in
consideration the present state of the
statutory Hindu law, a bigamous marriage
may be declared illegal being in
contravention of the provisions of the Act
but it cannot be said to be immoral so as to
deny even the right of alimony or
maintenance to a spouse financially weak
and economically dependent. It is with the
purpose of not rendering a financially
dependent spouse destitute that Section 25
enables the court to award maintenance at
the time of passing any type of decree
resulting in breach in a marriage
relationship.”
(emphasis added)
When a decree is sought under Sections 9 to 13 and is declined by the
court, the remedy under Section 18 of the Hindu Adoption and
Maintenance Act, 1956, remains available to the wife. Even the remedy
under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short,
‘the CrPC’) or Section 144 of the Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita,
2023 (for short, ‘the BNSS’) continues to be available. The view taken
in both cases on the interpretation of the words ‘any decree” used in
Section 25 is consistent with what we have held above.
Civil Appeal No.2536 of 2019 etc. Page 15 of 19
20. But in the case of Rameshchandra Rampratapji Daga , this
Court observed that as a bigamous marriage cannot be said to be
immoral, the right to claim maintenance under Section 25 is not taken
away. The real question involved was whether a decree of nullity was a
decree within the meaning of section 25. If a decree of nullity is covered
by Section 25, the issue of whether a bigamous marriage is immoral is
irrelevant. The entitlement under Section 25 does not depend on
whether the bigamous marriage is moral or immoral.
21. Now, we come to the decision relied upon by the appellant -
husband. In the first decision in the case of Yamunabai Anantrao
Adhav v. Anantrao Shivram Adhav & Anr.
4, this Court was dealing
with an application under Section 125 of the CrPC. This Court held
that when a marriage is nullity by Section 25 of the 1955 Act, the spouse
of such marriage is not entitled to get the benefit of Section 125 of the
CrPC. Section 125 of the CrPC operates altogether in a different field.
It is a quick and efficacious remedy made available to a wife or a child
to seek maintenance. The proceedings under Section 125 of the CrPC
are of a summary nature. While deciding the applications under Section
125 of the CrPC, a summary procedure is required to be followed, and
a detailed adjudication of the rights of the parties cannot be made. The
same is the legal position as regards the corresponding remedy under
Section 144 of the BNSS. Hence, the decision in the case of
Yamunabai
6 will have no application to Section 25.
22. The remedy under Section 25 of the 1955 Act is completely
different from the remedy under Section 125 of the CrPC. It confers
rights on the spouses of the marriage declared as void under Section 11
of the 1955 Act to claim maintenance from the other spouse. The
remedy is available to both husband and wife. The principles which
4
(1988) 1 SCC 530
Civil Appeal No.2536 of 2019 etc. Page 16 of 19
apply to Section 125 of the CrPC cannot be applied to Section 25 of the
1955 Act. The relief under Section 125 of the CrPC can be granted to
wife or child and not to husband.
23. Now, we come to the decision in the case of Abbayolla Reddy v.
Padmamma
5. The Andhra Pradesh High Court’s view is based on the
right of a spouse to claim maintenance under Section 18 of the Hindu
Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956. This is a specific provision for
the grant of maintenance to the wife. The right under Section 25 of the
1955 Act is different. The right is created in favour of both spouses
once there is a decree passed under Sections 9 to 13 of the 1955 Act.
The third decision is in the case of Navdeep Kaur v. Dilraj Singh
6. In
paragraph 10 of the said decision, the Himachal Pradesh High Court
gave a very narrow meaning to the ‘decree in proceedings’ under the
1955 Act by holding that the expression “husband and wife” used in
Section 23 must mean legally wedded husband and wife. This view is
entirely contrary to the view taken in the case of Chand Dhawan
1.
24. The Bombay High Court, in the case of Leelabai
3, dealt with the
reference made to the Full Bench of the three Hon’ble Judges. The issue
referred to Full Bench was the same one we are dealing with. The Full
Bench of the Bombay High Court relied upon the decision in the case of
Yamunabai
6. In paragraph 18 of the judgment, the Full Bench has
coined the term “illegitimate wife”. Calling the wife of a marriage
declared as void as an illegitimate wife is very inappropriate. It affects
the dignity of the concerned woman. Unfortunately, the Bombay High
Court went to the extent of using the words “illegitimate wife” .
Shockingly, in paragraph 24, the High Court described such a wife as a
“faithful mistress”. It is pertinent to note that the High Court has not
5
AIR 1999 AP 19
6
(2003) 1 HLR 100 : 2002 SCC OnLine P&H 498
Civil Appeal No.2536 of 2019 etc. Page 17 of 19
used similar adjectives in the case of husbands of void marriages. Under
Section 21 of the Constitution of India, every person has a fundamental
right to lead a dignified life. Calling a woman an “illegitimate wife” or
“faithful mistress” will amount to a violation of the fundamental rights
of that woman under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Describing
a woman by using these words is against the ethos and ideals of our
Constitution. No one can use such adjectives while referring to a woman
who is a party to a void marriage. Unfortunately, we find that such
objectionable language is used in a judgment of the Full Bench of a High
Court. The use of such words is misogynistic. The law laid by the Full
Bench of the Bombay High Court is obviously not correct.
25. Then comes the decision in the case of Savitaben Somabhai
Bhatiya v. State of Gujarat & Ors
7. We must note here that in this
decision, this Court was dealing with the proceedings under Section 125
of the CrPC which is of a summary nature. This Court dealt with the
eligibility of a spouse to claim maintenance under Section 125 of the
CrPC. Therefore, none of these decisions support the stand taken by
the appellant-husband.
26. An apprehension is the expression by the learned counsel for the
appellant that if it is held that Section 25 of the 1955 Act also applies
to void marriages, it will lead to a ridiculous result. He gave an example
of a wife whose first marriage is subsisting, inducing another man to
marry her. He also gave an example of a daughter getting married to
her father. We must note that Sub-Section 1 of Section 25 uses the word
“may". A grant of a decree under Section 25 of the 1955 Act is
discretionary. If the conduct of the spouse who applies for maintenance
is such that the said spouse is not entitled to discretionary relief, the
Court can always turn down the prayer for the grant of permanent
7
(2005) 3 SCC 636
Civil Appeal No.2536 of 2019 etc. Page 18 of 19
alimony under Section 25 of the 1955 Act. Equitable considerations do
apply when the Court considers the prayer for maintenance under
Section 25. The reason is that Section 25 lays down that while
considering the prayer for granting relief under Section 25, the conduct
of the parties must be considered.
OUR VIEW ON THE QUESTION (ii)
27. Section 24 confers a power on a matrimonial Court to grant
interim maintenance in pending proceedings seeking a decree
contemplated under the 1955 Act. The power is to be exercised pending
the proceedings for a grant of a decree under Sections 9 to 13 of the
1955 Act. The conditions for applicability of Section 24 are:
(i) There must be a proceeding under the 1955 Act pending and
(ii) the court must come to a conclusion that either the wife or the
husband, as the case may be, has no independent income
sufficient for her or his support and the necessary expenses of the
proceeding.
26. Even if, prima facie, the matrimonial court finds the marriage
between the parties is void or voidable, the court is not precluded from
granting maintenance pendente lite provided the conditions mentioned
above are satisfied. The grant of relief under Section 24 is discretionary
as the Section uses the word ‘may’. While deciding the prayer for interim
relief under Section 24, the Court will always consider the conduct of
the party seeking the relief. It provides for issuing a direction to pay a
reasonable amount.
28. Accordingly, we answer the questions as follows:
a. A spouse whose marriage has been declared void under
Section 11 of the 1955 Act is entitled to seek permanent
Civil Appeal No.2536 of 2019 etc. Page 19 of 19
alimony or maintenance from the other spouse by invoking
Section 25 of the 1955 Act. Whether such a relief of
permanent alimony can be granted or not always depends
on the facts of each case and the conduct of the parties. The
grant of relief under Section 25 is always discretionary; and
b. Even if a court comes to a prima facie conclusion that the
marriage between the parties is void or voidable, pending the
final disposal of the proceeding under the 1955 Act, the
court is not precluded from granting maintenance pendente
lite provided the conditions mentioned in Section 24 are
satisfied. While deciding the prayer for interim relief under
Section 24, the Court will always take into consideration the
conduct of the party seeking the relief, as the grant of relief
under Section 24 is always discretionary.
We direct the Registry to place these appeals before the appropriate
Bench for the decision on merits.
..………......………………….J.
(Abhay S Oka)
.……….....…………………... J.
(Ahsanuddin Amanullah)
.………….…………………...J.
(Augustine George Masih)
New Delhi;
February 12, 2025.
Legal Notes
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