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Sukhdev Singh Vs. Sukhbir Kaur

  Supreme Court Of India Civil Appeal /2536/2019
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Due to conflicting judgments on whether alimony can be granted when a marriage is declared void under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, the Supreme Court referred the matter to a ...

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Document Text Version

2025 INSC 197 Civil Appeal No.2536 of 2019 etc. Page 1 of 19

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2536 OF 2019

Sukhdev Singh … Appellant

versus

Sukhbir Kaur … Respondent

with

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5726 Of 2019

J U D G M E N T

ABHAY S. OKA, J.

ISSUE REFERRED

1. The reference to a Bench of the three Hon’ble Judges has been

made by the order dated 22

nd August 2024 of this Court, which reads

thus:

“Learned counsel appearing for the parties

state at the Bar that these matters need to be

considered by a Three Judge Bench

combination as there are conflicting views on

the applicability of Sections 24 and 25 of the

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, whether alimony

can be granted where marriage has been

declared void.

Following are the judgments in favour of

granting alimony :-

Sl.

No.

CITATION TITLED

1. (1993) 3 SCC

406

Chand Dhawan

Vs.Jawaharlal

Dhawan

Civil Appeal No.2536 of 2019 etc. Page 2 of 19

2. (2005) 2 SCC 33 Rameshchandra

Rampratapji Daga

Vs. Rameshwari

Rameshchandra

Daga

Following are the judgments against granting

alimony :-

Sl.

No.

CITATION TITLED

1. (1988) 1 SCC 530 Yamunabai

Anantrao Adhav

Vs. Anantrao

Shivram Adhav &

Another

2. AIR 1999 AP 19 Abbayolla Reddy

Vs. Padmamma

3. (2003) 1 HLR 100 Navdeep Kaur Vs.

Dilraj Singh

4. (2004) AIR Bom.

283(FB)

Bhausaheb @

Sandhu S/o

Raguji Magar Vs.

Leelabai W/o

Bhausaheb Magar

5. (2005) 3 SCC 636 Savitaben

Somabhai

Bhatiya Vs. State

of Gujarat &

Others

Accordingly, let the papers be placed before

Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India for passing

appropriate orders.”

RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF LAW

2. Before we refer to the submissions made across the Bar, it will be

necessary to briefly refer to the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act,

1955 (for short, ‘the 1955 Act’). Section 5 deals with the conditions for

a Hindu marriage, which reads thus:

Civil Appeal No.2536 of 2019 etc. Page 3 of 19

“5. Conditions for a Hindu marriage. —A

marriage may be solemnized between any

two Hindus, if the following conditions are

fulfilled, namely:—

(i) neither party has a spouse living at the

time of the marriage;

(ii) at the time of the marriage, neither party—

(a) is incapable of giving a valid consent

to it in consequence of unsoundness of

mind; or

(b) though capable of giving a valid

consent, has been suffering from mental

disorder of such a kind or to such an

extent as to be unfit for marriage and

the procreation of children; or

(c) has been subject to recurrent attacks

of insanity;

(iii) the bridegroom has completed the age of

twenty-one years and the bride, the age of

eighteen years at the time of the marriage;

(iv) the parties are not within the degrees of

prohibited relationship unless the custom

or usage governing each of them permits of

a marriage between the two;

(v) the parties are not sapindas of each

other, unless the custom or usage governing

each of them permits of a marriage between

the two;”

(emphasis added)

3. The 1955 Act deals with void marriages and voidable marriages.

Section 11, which deals with void marriages, reads thus:

“11. Void marriages. — Any marriage

solemnised after the commencement of this Act

shall be null and void and may, on a petition

presented by either party thereto against the

other party, be so declared by a decree of nullity

Civil Appeal No.2536 of 2019 etc. Page 4 of 19

if it contravenes any one of the conditions

specified in clauses (i), (iv) and (v) of section 5.”

4. The 1955 Act contemplates the filing of the following categories of

petitions for grant of different reliefs:

a. A petition seeking relief of restitution of conjugal rights in

accordance with Section 9;

b. A petition seeking relief of judicial separation in accordance

with Section 10;

c. A petition seeking a declaration that a marriage is void in

accordance with Section 11;

d. A petition for annulment of a marriage on the ground that it is

voidable in accordance with Section 12;

e. A petition seeking a divorce in accordance with Section 13; and

f. A petition seeking divorce by mutual consent in accordance

with Section 13B.

5. We are called upon to interpret Sections 24 and 25 of the 1955

Act, which read thus:

“24. Maintenance pendente lite and

expenses of proceedings.—Where in any

proceedings under this Act it appears to the

court that either the wife or the husband, as

the case may be, has no independent income

sufficient for her or his support and the

necessary expenses of the proceeding, it may,

on the application of the wife or the husband,

order the respondent to pay to the petitioner

the expenses of the proceeding, and monthly

during the proceeding such sum as, having

regard to the petitioner's own income and the

income of the respondent, it may seem to the

court to be reasonable:

Civil Appeal No.2536 of 2019 etc. Page 5 of 19

Provided that the application for the payment

of the expenses of the proceeding and such

monthly sum during the proceeding shall, as

far as possible, be disposed of within sixty

days from the date of service of notice on the

wife or the husband, as the case may be.”

25. Permanent alimony and

maintenance.—(1) Any court exercising

jurisdiction under this Act may, at the time

of passing any decree or at any time

subsequent thereto, on application made

to it for the purpose by either the wife or

the husband, as the case may be, order that

the respondent shall pay to the applicant

for her or his maintenance and suppor t

such gross sum or such monthly or

periodical sum for a term not exceeding the

life of the applicant as, having regard to the

respondent's own income and othe r

property, if any, the income and other

property of the applicant, the conduct of

the parties and other circumstances of the

case, it may seem to the court to be just,

and any such payment may be secured, if

necessary, by a charge on the immovable

property of the respondent.

(2) If the court is satisfied that there is, a

change in the circumstances of either party at

any time after it has made an order under

sub-section (1), it may at the instance of either

party, vary, modify or rescind any such order

in such manner as the court may deem just.

(3) If the court is satisfied that the party in

whose favour an order has been made under

this section has remarried or, if such party is

the wife, that she has not remained chaste, or,

if such party is the husband, that he has had

sexual intercourse with any woman outside

wedlock, it may at the instance of the other

party vary, modify or rescind any such order

in such manner as the court may deem just.”

(emphasis added)

Civil Appeal No.2536 of 2019 etc. Page 6 of 19

6. The following questions arise for our consideration:

(i)Whether a spouse of a marriage declared as void by a

competent Court under Section 11 of the 1955 Act is entitled

to claim permanent alimony and maintenance under Section

25 of the 1955 Act?

(ii)Whether in a petition filed seeking a declaration under

Section 11 of the 1955 Act, a spouse is entitled to seek

maintenance pendente lite under Section 24 of the 1955 Act?

SUBMISSIONS

7. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant-husband relied

upon five decisions mentioned in the order dated 22

nd August 2024. We

have already reproduced the said order in this judgment. The learned

counsel has taken us through the relevant paragraphs of the five

decisions. He urged the Court to reconsider the two decisions

mentioned in the order dated 22nd August 2024, which support the

proposition that a spouse of a declared void marriage is entitled to seek

maintenance under Section 25 of the 1955 Act.

8. The learned counsel pointed out that there can be void marriages

between father and daughter, brother and sister and grandfather and

granddaughter. He questioned whether, in the case of such marriages,

after the same are declared void, the Court can exercise the power under

Section 25 of the 1955 Act to grant maintenance. He submitted that

there would be cases where parties to void marriages are conscious of

the fact that their marriage would be bigamous. There would be cases

where the wife may be responsible for concealing her first marriage

which is in subsistence, and induce the husband to marry. There may

be cases where both parties may be unaware that they are solemnising

a void marriage. He submitted that it is absurd to include a decree

Civil Appeal No.2536 of 2019 etc. Page 7 of 19

declaring a marriage as void in the expression “any decree” used in

Section 25 of the 1955 Act. He submitted that to that extent, the view

taken by this Court in the case of Chand Dhawan v. Jawaharlal

Dhawan

1 and Rameshchandra Rampratapji Daga v. Rameshwari

Rameshchandra Daga

2 is incorrect.

9. He submitted that a marriage declared void under Section 11 is

void ab initio, which does not exist. Therefore, a wife whose marriage is

declared void cannot claim to be a spouse within the meaning of Section

25 of the 1955 Act. He relied upon a decision of the Full Bench of the

Bombay High Court in the case of Bhausaheb @ Sandhu s/o Raghuji

Magar v. Leelabai w/o Bhausaheb Magar

3. He relied upon the

observations made therein that an illegitimate wife cannot be equated

to a divorced wife. He would, therefore, submit that Section 25 of the

1955 Act cannot apply to a spouse whose marriage is declared void.

10. The learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent-wife has

made detailed submissions. She supported the decisions in the cases

of Chand Dhawan

1 and Rameshchandra Rampratapji Daga

2 and

submitted that the view taken therein is correct. She relied upon Article

15(3) of the Constitution of India and submitted that Section 25 is a

special provision enacted for women. The learned senior counsel also

tried to argue on facts of the case. However, we are not concerned with

the facts of the case.

OUR VIEW ON THE QUESTION (i)

11. If Section 5 is read in conjunction with Section 11, the following

categories of marriages are void:

1

(1993) 3 SCC 406

2

(2005) 2 SCC 33

3

AIR 2004 Bom 283

Civil Appeal No.2536 of 2019 etc. Page 8 of 19

a. If one or both the parties to the marriage have a spouse living

at the time of marriage;

b. The parties to the marriage are within the degrees of

prohibited relationship unless the custom or usage

governing each of them permits of a marriage between the

two and

c. The parties are sapindas of each other, unless the custom

or usage governing each of them permits of a marriage

between the two.

12. A marriage is void when either of the parties to the marriage has

a spouse living, and the marriage with the spouse is subsisting. If any

of the spouses of the marriage had an earlier marriage dissolved by a

decree of divorce before their marriage, clause (a) above will not apply.

As far as clause (b) regarding prohibited relationships is concerned, the

degrees of prohibited relationships have been specified in clause (g) of

Section 3. Regarding the third category of sapinda relationship, clause

(f) of Section 3 defines what is a sapinda relationship.

13. Section 11 provides for the grant of a declaration of a marriage as

null and void. The marriages covered by the categories (a), (b) or (c)

mentioned above become void at the inception. Therefore, such

marriages are void ab initio. Such marriage does not exist at all in the

eyes of the law.

14. Now, we come to Section 25 of the 1955 Act. We have already

reproduced Section 25. It confers a power on the matrimonial court to

grant permanent alimony “at the time of passing any decree or at any

time subsequent thereto”. The issue is about the meaning of the decree

contemplated by Section 25. A cause of action arises for the spouses to

Civil Appeal No.2536 of 2019 etc. Page 9 of 19

apply for permanent alimony and maintenance when any decree is

passed by any court exercising its jurisdiction under the 1955 Act.

15. Section 23 has the title “decree in proceedings”. Section 23 of the

1955 Act reads thus:

“23. Decree in proceedings. — (1) In any

proceeding under this Act, whether

defended or not, if the court is satisfied that

(a) any of the grounds for granting relief exists

and the petitioner except in cases where the

relief is sought by him on the ground specified

in sub-clause (a), sub-clause (b) or sub-clause

(c) of clause (ii) of section 5 is not in any way

taking advantage of his or her own wrong or

disability for the purpose of such relief, and

(b) where the ground of the petition is the

ground specified in clause (i) of sub-section (1)

of section 13, the petitioner has not in any

manner been accessory to or connived at or

condoned the act or acts complained of, or

where the ground of the petition is cruelty the

petitioner has not in any manner condoned the

cruelty, and

(bb) when a divorce is sought on the

ground of mutual consent, such

consent has not been obtained by force,

fraud or undue influence, and

(c) the petition (not being a petition presented

under section 11) is not presented or

prosecuted in collusion with the respondent,

and

(d) there has not been any unnecessary or

improper delay in instituting the

proceeding, and

(e) there is no other legal ground why relief

should not be granted, then, and in such a

case, but not otherwise, the court shall decree

such relief accordingly.

Civil Appeal No.2536 of 2019 etc. Page 10 of 19

(2) Before proceeding to grant any relief under

this Act, it shall be the duty of the court in the

first instance, in every case where it is possible

so to do consistently with the nature and

circumstances of the case, to make every

endeavour to bring abou t reconciliation

between the parties:

Provided that nothing contained in this sub-

section shall apply to any proceeding wherein

relief is sought on any of the grounds specified

in clause (ii), clause (iii), clause (iv), clause (v),

clause (vi) or clause (vii) of sub-section (1) of

section 13.

(3) For the purpose of aiding the court in

bringing about such reconciliation, the court

may, if the parties so desire or if the court

thinks it just and proper so to do, adjourn the

proceedings for a reasonable period not

exceeding fifteen days and refer the matter to

any person named by the parties in this behalf

or to any person nominated by the court if the

parties fail to name any person, with directions

to report to the court as to whether

reconciliation can be and has been, effected

and the court sha ll in disposing of the

proceeding have due regard to the report.

(4) In every case where a marriage is dissolved

by a decree of divorce, the court passing the

decree shall give a copy thereof free of cost to

each of the parties.”

(emphasis added)

Clause (a) of Section 23(1) applies to a case where a decree of annulment

is sought under Section 12. Only clause (d) of Section 23(1) is

applicable when a decree of nullity is sought. The decree of nullity

cannot be passed if there has been unnecessary and improper delay in

instituting the petition seeking a declaration of nullity.

Civil Appeal No.2536 of 2019 etc. Page 11 of 19

16. The following are the decrees which may be passed under the

1955 Act:

a. A decree under Section 9 of restitution of conjugal rights;

b. A decree under Section 10 of judicial separation;

c. A decree under Section 11 declaring a marriage as void;

d. A decree under Section 12 of annulment of a marriage on

the ground that it is voidable; and

e. A decree of divorce under Sections 13 and 13B.

17. An order of dismissal of a suit will be a decree, provided the

conditions in Section 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 are

satisfied. However, a decree in proceedings contemplated by Section 23

of the 1955 Act is a narrower concept. It can only be a decree granting

one of the reliefs under Sections 9 to 13 of the 1955 Act. The decree

referred to in Section 25 of the 1955 Act is the decree as contemplated

by Section 23, which has the title ‘decree in proceedings’. On plain

reading thereof, the decree contemplated by Section 23 is a decree

granting relief under the 1955 Act. Section 23 deals with only the

decrees granting reliefs under Sections 9 to 13 of the 1955 Act.

Considering the language employed in Section 23, the ‘decrees in

proceedings’ will not include the decisions dismissing the petitions

seeking reliefs under Sections 9 to 13. The decrees passed under

Sections 11 to 13 bring about a change of status of the parties to the

marriage. Even a decree of restitution of conjugal rights brings about a

change of status of the parties in case there is no restitution of conjugal

rights within one year of a decree. That is a ground for passing a decree

of divorce under Section 13(1A)(ii). Even a decree of judicial separation

under Section 10 brings about a change of status in the sense that a

Civil Appeal No.2536 of 2019 etc. Page 12 of 19

spouse who has got such a decree is no longer under an obligation to

cohabit with his or her spouse. If the separation from the date of the

decree continues for a period of one year, it becomes a ground for

passing a decree of divorce by invoking Section 13(1A)(i).

18. While enacting Section 25(1), the legislature has made no

distinction between a decree of divorce and a decree declaring marriage

as a nullity. Therefore, on a plain reading of Section 25(1), it will not be

possible to exclude a decree of nullity under Section 11 from the purview

of Section 25(1) of the 1955 Act.

19. In the case of Chand Dhawan

1, the issue arose regarding the

meaning of ‘decree’ referred to under Section 25 of the 1955 Act. In

paragraph 25 of the said decision, this Court observed thus:

“25. We have thus, in this light, no

hesitation in coming to the view that when

by court intervention under the Hindu

Marriage Act, affectation or disruption to

the marital status has come by, at that

juncture, while passing the decree, it

undoubtedly has the power to grant

permanent alimony or maintenance, if that

power is invoked at that time. It also retains

the power subsequently to be invoked on

application by a party entitled to relief. And

such order, in all events, remains within the

jurisdiction of that court, to be altered or

modified as future situations may warrant. In

contrast, without affectation or disruption

of the marital status, a Hindu wife

sustaining that status can live in separation

from her husband, and whether she is living

in that state or not, her claim to

maintenance stands preserved in

codification under Section 18(1) of the

Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act. The

court is not at liberty to grant relief of

maintenance simpliciter obtainable under

one Act in proceedings under the other. As

Civil Appeal No.2536 of 2019 etc. Page 13 of 19

is evident, both the statutes are codified as

such and are clear on their subjects and by

liberality of interpretation inter -

changeability cannot be permitted so as to

destroy the distinction on the subject of

maintenance.”

(emphasis added)

In the case of Rameshchandra Rampratapji Daga

2, the same view

was taken relying upon the decision in the case of Chand Dhawan

1. In

paragraphs 18 to 20, this Court held thus:

“18. In the present case, on the husband's

petition, a decree declaring the second

marriage as null and void has been granted.

The learned counsel has argued that where the

marriage is found to be null and void —

meaning non-existent in the eye of the law or

non est, the present respondent cannot lay a

claim as wife for grant of permanent alimony or

maintenance. We have critically examined

the provisions of Section 25 in the light of

conflicting decisions of the High Court cited

before us. In our considered opinion, as has

been held by this Court in Chand Dhawan

case [(1993) 3 SCC 406 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 915]

, the expression used in the opening part of

Section 25 enabling the “court exercising

jurisdiction under the Act” “at the time of

passing any decree or at any time

subsequent thereto” to grant alimony or

maintenance cannot be restricted only to,

as contended, decree of judicial separation

under Section 10 or divorce under Section

13. When the legislature has used such wide

expression as “at the time of passing of any

decree”, it encompasses within the

expression all kinds of decrees such as

restitution of conjugal rights under Section

9, judicial separation under Section 10,

declaring marriage as null and void under

Section 11, annulment of marriage as

voidable under Section 12 and divorce under

Section 13.

Civil Appeal No.2536 of 2019 etc. Page 14 of 19

19. Learned counsel for the husband has

argued that extending the benefit of Section 25

to even marriages which have been found null

and void under Section 11 would be against the

very object and purpose of the Act to ban and

discourage bigamous marriages.

20. It is a well-known and recognised legal

position that customary Hindu law like

Mohammedan law permitted bigamous

marriages which were prevalent in all Hindu

families and more so in royal Hindu families. It

is only after the Hindu law was codified by

enactments including the present Act that bar

against bigamous marriages was created by

Section 5(i) of the Act. Keeping in

consideration the present state of the

statutory Hindu law, a bigamous marriage

may be declared illegal being in

contravention of the provisions of the Act

but it cannot be said to be immoral so as to

deny even the right of alimony or

maintenance to a spouse financially weak

and economically dependent. It is with the

purpose of not rendering a financially

dependent spouse destitute that Section 25

enables the court to award maintenance at

the time of passing any type of decree

resulting in breach in a marriage

relationship.”

(emphasis added)

When a decree is sought under Sections 9 to 13 and is declined by the

court, the remedy under Section 18 of the Hindu Adoption and

Maintenance Act, 1956, remains available to the wife. Even the remedy

under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short,

‘the CrPC’) or Section 144 of the Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita,

2023 (for short, ‘the BNSS’) continues to be available. The view taken

in both cases on the interpretation of the words ‘any decree” used in

Section 25 is consistent with what we have held above.

Civil Appeal No.2536 of 2019 etc. Page 15 of 19

20. But in the case of Rameshchandra Rampratapji Daga , this

Court observed that as a bigamous marriage cannot be said to be

immoral, the right to claim maintenance under Section 25 is not taken

away. The real question involved was whether a decree of nullity was a

decree within the meaning of section 25. If a decree of nullity is covered

by Section 25, the issue of whether a bigamous marriage is immoral is

irrelevant. The entitlement under Section 25 does not depend on

whether the bigamous marriage is moral or immoral.

21. Now, we come to the decision relied upon by the appellant -

husband. In the first decision in the case of Yamunabai Anantrao

Adhav v. Anantrao Shivram Adhav & Anr.

4, this Court was dealing

with an application under Section 125 of the CrPC. This Court held

that when a marriage is nullity by Section 25 of the 1955 Act, the spouse

of such marriage is not entitled to get the benefit of Section 125 of the

CrPC. Section 125 of the CrPC operates altogether in a different field.

It is a quick and efficacious remedy made available to a wife or a child

to seek maintenance. The proceedings under Section 125 of the CrPC

are of a summary nature. While deciding the applications under Section

125 of the CrPC, a summary procedure is required to be followed, and

a detailed adjudication of the rights of the parties cannot be made. The

same is the legal position as regards the corresponding remedy under

Section 144 of the BNSS. Hence, the decision in the case of

Yamunabai

6 will have no application to Section 25.

22. The remedy under Section 25 of the 1955 Act is completely

different from the remedy under Section 125 of the CrPC. It confers

rights on the spouses of the marriage declared as void under Section 11

of the 1955 Act to claim maintenance from the other spouse. The

remedy is available to both husband and wife. The principles which

4

(1988) 1 SCC 530

Civil Appeal No.2536 of 2019 etc. Page 16 of 19

apply to Section 125 of the CrPC cannot be applied to Section 25 of the

1955 Act. The relief under Section 125 of the CrPC can be granted to

wife or child and not to husband.

23. Now, we come to the decision in the case of Abbayolla Reddy v.

Padmamma

5. The Andhra Pradesh High Court’s view is based on the

right of a spouse to claim maintenance under Section 18 of the Hindu

Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956. This is a specific provision for

the grant of maintenance to the wife. The right under Section 25 of the

1955 Act is different. The right is created in favour of both spouses

once there is a decree passed under Sections 9 to 13 of the 1955 Act.

The third decision is in the case of Navdeep Kaur v. Dilraj Singh

6. In

paragraph 10 of the said decision, the Himachal Pradesh High Court

gave a very narrow meaning to the ‘decree in proceedings’ under the

1955 Act by holding that the expression “husband and wife” used in

Section 23 must mean legally wedded husband and wife. This view is

entirely contrary to the view taken in the case of Chand Dhawan

1.

24. The Bombay High Court, in the case of Leelabai

3, dealt with the

reference made to the Full Bench of the three Hon’ble Judges. The issue

referred to Full Bench was the same one we are dealing with. The Full

Bench of the Bombay High Court relied upon the decision in the case of

Yamunabai

6. In paragraph 18 of the judgment, the Full Bench has

coined the term “illegitimate wife”. Calling the wife of a marriage

declared as void as an illegitimate wife is very inappropriate. It affects

the dignity of the concerned woman. Unfortunately, the Bombay High

Court went to the extent of using the words “illegitimate wife” .

Shockingly, in paragraph 24, the High Court described such a wife as a

“faithful mistress”. It is pertinent to note that the High Court has not

5

AIR 1999 AP 19

6

(2003) 1 HLR 100 : 2002 SCC OnLine P&H 498

Civil Appeal No.2536 of 2019 etc. Page 17 of 19

used similar adjectives in the case of husbands of void marriages. Under

Section 21 of the Constitution of India, every person has a fundamental

right to lead a dignified life. Calling a woman an “illegitimate wife” or

“faithful mistress” will amount to a violation of the fundamental rights

of that woman under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Describing

a woman by using these words is against the ethos and ideals of our

Constitution. No one can use such adjectives while referring to a woman

who is a party to a void marriage. Unfortunately, we find that such

objectionable language is used in a judgment of the Full Bench of a High

Court. The use of such words is misogynistic. The law laid by the Full

Bench of the Bombay High Court is obviously not correct.

25. Then comes the decision in the case of Savitaben Somabhai

Bhatiya v. State of Gujarat & Ors

7. We must note here that in this

decision, this Court was dealing with the proceedings under Section 125

of the CrPC which is of a summary nature. This Court dealt with the

eligibility of a spouse to claim maintenance under Section 125 of the

CrPC. Therefore, none of these decisions support the stand taken by

the appellant-husband.

26. An apprehension is the expression by the learned counsel for the

appellant that if it is held that Section 25 of the 1955 Act also applies

to void marriages, it will lead to a ridiculous result. He gave an example

of a wife whose first marriage is subsisting, inducing another man to

marry her. He also gave an example of a daughter getting married to

her father. We must note that Sub-Section 1 of Section 25 uses the word

“may". A grant of a decree under Section 25 of the 1955 Act is

discretionary. If the conduct of the spouse who applies for maintenance

is such that the said spouse is not entitled to discretionary relief, the

Court can always turn down the prayer for the grant of permanent

7

(2005) 3 SCC 636

Civil Appeal No.2536 of 2019 etc. Page 18 of 19

alimony under Section 25 of the 1955 Act. Equitable considerations do

apply when the Court considers the prayer for maintenance under

Section 25. The reason is that Section 25 lays down that while

considering the prayer for granting relief under Section 25, the conduct

of the parties must be considered.

OUR VIEW ON THE QUESTION (ii)

27. Section 24 confers a power on a matrimonial Court to grant

interim maintenance in pending proceedings seeking a decree

contemplated under the 1955 Act. The power is to be exercised pending

the proceedings for a grant of a decree under Sections 9 to 13 of the

1955 Act. The conditions for applicability of Section 24 are:

(i) There must be a proceeding under the 1955 Act pending and

(ii) the court must come to a conclusion that either the wife or the

husband, as the case may be, has no independent income

sufficient for her or his support and the necessary expenses of the

proceeding.

26. Even if, prima facie, the matrimonial court finds the marriage

between the parties is void or voidable, the court is not precluded from

granting maintenance pendente lite provided the conditions mentioned

above are satisfied. The grant of relief under Section 24 is discretionary

as the Section uses the word ‘may’. While deciding the prayer for interim

relief under Section 24, the Court will always consider the conduct of

the party seeking the relief. It provides for issuing a direction to pay a

reasonable amount.

28. Accordingly, we answer the questions as follows:

a. A spouse whose marriage has been declared void under

Section 11 of the 1955 Act is entitled to seek permanent

Civil Appeal No.2536 of 2019 etc. Page 19 of 19

alimony or maintenance from the other spouse by invoking

Section 25 of the 1955 Act. Whether such a relief of

permanent alimony can be granted or not always depends

on the facts of each case and the conduct of the parties. The

grant of relief under Section 25 is always discretionary; and

b. Even if a court comes to a prima facie conclusion that the

marriage between the parties is void or voidable, pending the

final disposal of the proceeding under the 1955 Act, the

court is not precluded from granting maintenance pendente

lite provided the conditions mentioned in Section 24 are

satisfied. While deciding the prayer for interim relief under

Section 24, the Court will always take into consideration the

conduct of the party seeking the relief, as the grant of relief

under Section 24 is always discretionary.

We direct the Registry to place these appeals before the appropriate

Bench for the decision on merits.

..………......………………….J.

(Abhay S Oka)

.……….....…………………... J.

(Ahsanuddin Amanullah)

.………….…………………...J.

(Augustine George Masih)

New Delhi;

February 12, 2025.

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