No Acts & Articles mentioned in this case
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 5
PETITIONER:
SULEMAN ISSA
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
THE STATE OF BOMBAY.
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
11/03/1954
BENCH:
HASAN, GHULAM
BENCH:
HASAN, GHULAM
MAHAJAN, MEHAR CHAND (CJ)
MUKHERJEA, B.K.
DAS, SUDHI RANJAN
BOSE, VIVIAN
CITATION:
1954 AIR 312 1954 SCR 976
ACT:
Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), s. 517-Person pro-
secuted under s. 61-E of the Bombay District Police Act
(Bombay Act IV of 1890)-Confiscation of gold worth about 3
lakhs Propriety of.
HEADNOTE:
Under s. 517 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the court is
empowered on the conclusion of an enquiry or trial to make
an
977
order for the disposal of any property or document produced
before it or in its custody or regarding which an offence
appears to have been committed or which had been used for
the commission of any offence. The power of the court
extends to the confiscation of the property in the custody
of the court but it is not in every case in which the court
must necessarily pass an order of confiscation irrespective
of the circumstances of the case.
Held, that the confiscation of gold worth about 3 lakhs of
rupees was singularly inappropriate in a case like the
present where the prosecution story that the gold in
question was smuggled into India from Africa was not
accepted by the court and the accused was convicted for an
offence under a. 61-E of the Bombay District Police Act,
1890, which provides a maximum sentence of three months and
a fine of Rs. 100 and which does not contain any substantial
provision such as the Sea Customs Act imposing the penalty
of confiscation.
JUDGMENT:
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 67 of
1951.
Appeal by special leave from the Judgment and Order, dated
26th June, 1950, of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay
(Dixit and Chainani JJ.) in Criminal Appeal No. 784 of 1949.
N. C. Chatterjee (H. J. Umrigar and S. P. Varma, with
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 5
him) for the appellant.
M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India (Porus A. Mehta,
with him) for the respondent.
1954. March 11. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
GULAM HASAN J.-This appeal is brought by special leave from
the judgment and order of the High Court of Judicature at
Bombay (Dixit and Chainani JJ.), dated June 26, 1950,
whereby the High Court allowed the appeal of the State of
Bombay, setting aside the order of acquittal of the
appellant passed by the Sessions Judge of Kaira, dated May
7, 1949, and restoring the order of conviction and sentence
of the appellant passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate,
Nadiad Prant, dated December 31, 1948.
The appellant, Suleman Issa, who is an inhabitant of Natal
in South Africa left Durban in August, 1947, by car for
India to pay a visit to his native place Sarsa in District
Kaira where his sister was living with her husband Alimahmad
Issak. He was accompanied by,
978
Daud Hassam another brother-in-law and both travelled to
Mombasa by car. From Mombasa they took a boat on August 30,
and reached Colombo on September 1 1. They flew from Colombo
to Madras on September 14, but shipped the car by a steamer.
They stayed in Madras until the steamer arrived on September
20. The car was delivered to the appellant on October 1,
after he had paid Rs. 2,700 as custom duty and a cash
deposit of Rs. 10,000 by way of security as the appellant
intended to take the car back to Durban on his return. The
party motored to Nardana on October 7, passing through
Bangalore, Poona, Nasik and Dhulia. From there they
travelled by train and reached Sarsa on October 8. The car
was booked in an open truck from Nardana to Anand where it
was taken delivery of and then driven to Sarsa.
One Ratansing Kalusing Raol, Senior Police Inspector of
Nadiad town, having noticed the car bearing no Indian number
passing in the town instructed policemen to keep a watch.
The appellants ordered to appear before the Sub-Inspector on
October 12. On being questioned he stated that his family
was the original inhabitant of Jamnagar State but for the
last 60 years they were doing the business of contractors
for purchasing and selling land in Durban. His brother Daud
Issa was, however, serving in Bombay. He gave details of
the journey performed by him and his companion and produced
passports, as also the receipts for paying custom duty and
the deposit. On October 15, Head Constable Ajit Singh,
informed Raol that some unknown person had come to the shop
of Umarbhai jeweller with a large quantity of gold.
Accordingly the police visited the shop of the jeweller and
his brother (also a jeweller) and came to know that gold had
been given to him by the appellant to be melted. This gold
along with some other gold kept at another place was seized
by the police. The police also took possession of the car.
The entire quantity of gold seized was 27731 tolas the value
of which is roughly estimated at Rs. 3 lakhs. Proceedings
under action 20 of the Indian Telegraph Act were instituted
979
against the appellant and others on the assumption that the
wireless set in the car was a transmitter but they were
dropped when it was found otherwise. The car was thoroughly
examined but nothing incriminating was found. The appellant
was also detained under the Public Securities Act but was
released. Ultimately on January 2, 1948, he along with
others was prosecuted on the complaint of Raol for an
offence under section 61 E of the Bombay District Police Act
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 5
(IV of 1890) read with section 109 of the Indian Penal Code.
Section 61E says:-
" Whoever has in his possession or conveys in any manner, or
offers for sale or pawn, anything which there is reason to
believe is stolen property or property fraudulently
obtained, shall, if he fails to account for such possession
or act to the satisfaction of the Magistrate, be punished
with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three
months or with fine which may extend to one hundred rupees."
He was convicted by the Magistrate and sentenced to a fine
of Rs. 100 and the gold was directed to be confiscated under
section 517 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The other
accused who were charged with abetment were acquitted,. The
Magistrate took the view that there wag no direct evidence
to show that the accused had committed theft or had obtained
property fraudulently but there were in his opinion
circumstances which led to the reasonable belief that the
gold in question was either stolen or was fraudulently
obtained. The Sessions Judge held that although the
possession of the gold was highly suspicious, nevertheless
it did not constitute sufficient ground for a reasonable
belief that the property was either stolen or was
fraudulently obtained. He accordingly set aside the
conviction and sentence and ordered the gold to be restored
to the appellant. The High Court in appeal by the State did
not accept the prosecution story that the gold was brought
into India by the appellant in his motor-car, but held
agreeing with the Magistrate that from the circumstances
there was reason to believe that he was in possession of
gold which was either stolen property or property
980
fraudulently obtained. The High Court did not accept the
explanation of the appellant that his father had brought the
gold to Sarsa from time to time when he visited his native
place. As regards the order of confiscation under section
517, the High Court held that it was not necessary that the
property confiscated must be the property in relation to
which an offence appears to have been committed but it was
enough if ,the property is produced before the court. In
this view the acquittal was set aside and the order of the
Magistrate was restored.
Mr. Chatterjee on behalf of the appellant stated at the
outset that he was not prepared to concede that the
appellant's conviction was right but he proceeded on the
assumption that even if it was so, section 517 had no
application to the case and the court had no jurisdiction to
pass the order of confiscation of the gold. He also urged
that 'in any, view of the matter the order of confiscation
was not a proper order in the circumstances of this case.
Section 517(1) reads thus:-
When an inquiry or a trial in any criminal court is
concluded, the court may make such order as it thinks fit
for the disposal (by destruction, confiscation, or delivery
to any person claiming to be entitled to possession thereof
or otherwise) of any property or document produced before it
or in its custody or regarding which any offence appears to.
have been committed, or which has been used for the
commission of any offence."
The section on a plain reading shows that upon the
conclusion of an inquiry or trial the court is empowered to
make an order for disposal of any property or document
produced before it
or in-its custody,
or regarding which any offence appears to have been
committed,
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 5
or which has been used for the commission of an offence.
The section also shows that the power of the court extends
to destruction, confiscation or delivery to any
981
person claiming to be entitled to possession of such
property.
Mr. Chatterjee contended that the gold after it was seized
by the Police was sent to the Treasury and was never
produced before the court. We do not think that the
evidence on this point is clear and definite. This point
does not appear to have been raised before the courts below.
The High Court justified the order on the ground that the
property was produced before the court and held that it was
not necessary to find before passing the order that " any
offence appears to have been committed " in respect of it.
It is clear to us that the property was not one regarding
which any offence appears to have been committed, or which
has been used for the commission of any offence. Now the
power of the court no doubt extends to confiscation of
property in the custody of the court but it is not every
case in which the court must necessarily pass an order of
confiscation irrespective of the circumstances of the case.
It is possible to conceive of cases where the subject matter
of the offence may be property which under the law relating
to that offence is liable to be confiscated as a punishment
on conviction. Assuming therefore that the court had
jurisdiction to pass an order regarding the disposal of the
gold, it seems to us that the order of confiscation was not
an appropriate order in the circumstances of this case.
Section 517 contains a general provision for disposal of the
property in the circumstances mentioned in the latter part
of the section. Section 61E by itself does not empower the
court to impose the penalty of confiscation and the sentence
of imprisonment and fine authorized by the section is a
nominal sentence for the obvious reason that the section
proceeds upon the mere belief that the property in
possession of the person is stolen property or property
fraudulently obtained possession of which is not
satisfactorily accounted for. It is an offence under the
local Police Act and not under an Act which contains any
substantive provision such as the Sea Customs Act imposing
the penalty of confiscation. Confiscation is not the only
mode of disposal under section 517 and is singularly
127
982
inappropriate in a case where the accused is prosecuted for
an offence punishable with a maximum sentence of 3 months
and a fine of Es. 100. It was certainly open to the court
to order the property to be delivered to the person claiming
to be entitled to its possession. Here the gold was found
from the possession of the appellant, and the court was not
called upon to consider any rival claims about its
possession. Admittedly ,there was no evidence to prove that
it was stolen, or that it was fraudulently obtained and all
that was found was that there was reason to believe that it
was stolen or fraudulently obtained and that the appellant
failed to account for its possession to the satisfaction of
the court. The High Court thought that the gold was
smuggled from Africa into India but assuming this to be so,
its confiscation under section 517 upon the existence of a
mere belief required to sustain a conviction under section
61 E was palpably harsh and unreasonable. We hold,
therefore, that the order of confiscation of gold cannot be
supported.
We accordingly set aside the order of confiscation and
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 5
direct that the, gold seized from the appellant's possession
shall be restored to him.
Appeal allowed.
Agent for the respondent: B. H. Dhebar.
The 1954 Supreme Court ruling in Suleman Issa v. The State of Bombay remains a pivotal judgment on the application of Section 517 Criminal Procedure Code, establishing crucial precedents on the court's discretionary power regarding the Confiscation of Property. This case, now authoritatively documented and accessible on CaseOn, explores the principles of proportionality and justice in legal penalties, questioning whether a severe measure like confiscation is justified for a minor offense.
The petitioner, Mr. Suleman Issa, a resident of Natal, South Africa, travelled to India by car in 1947. During his stay, the police seized a significant quantity of gold, valued at approximately 3 lakhs—a substantial sum at the time—from his possession. The prosecution's initial theory that the gold was smuggled into India from Africa was not accepted by the courts.
Instead, Mr. Issa was prosecuted under Section 61-E of the Bombay District Police Act, 1890. This provision dealt with the possession of property that is reasonably believed to be stolen or fraudulently obtained, where the possessor fails to provide a satisfactory account. The penalty for this offense was minimal: a maximum of three months imprisonment or a fine of up to Rs. 100.
This led the petitioner to appeal to the Supreme Court of India, specifically challenging the legality and appropriateness of the confiscation order.
The central legal question before the Supreme Court was: Is an order for the confiscation of property valued at approximately 3 lakhs rupees a just and appropriate order under Section 517 CrPC, when the conviction is for a minor offense under a local police act that carries a maximum penalty of a Rs. 100 fine?
The case revolved around the interpretation of two key legal provisions:
The Supreme Court conducted a meticulous analysis of the discretionary power vested in courts by Section 517 CrPC. The bench, led by Justice Ghulam Hasan, clarified that while the court possesses the power to confiscate property, it is not a mandatory action in every case. The exercise of this power must be guided by the specific circumstances and the principles of justice.
The Court highlighted the glaring disproportionality in the High Court's order. It found the act of confiscating gold worth 3 lakhs as a consequence of an offense punishable by a mere Rs. 100 fine to be “singularly inappropriate” and “palpably harsh and unreasonable.”
Furthermore, the Court noted that the offense under Section 61-E was based on a 'mere belief' and the accused's failure to account for his possession, not on a definitive finding that the property was stolen or smuggled. Since the specific Act under which the appellant was convicted did not provide for confiscation, relying solely on the general powers of Section 517 CrPC to impose such a drastic penalty was an improper exercise of judicial discretion. The Court distinguished this from cases under acts like the Sea Customs Act, which contain substantial provisions for confiscation as a primary penalty.
Legal professionals often face complex rulings where understanding the court's reasoning on discretionary powers is key. For a quick and efficient grasp of such nuanced judgments, the CaseOn.in 2-minute audio briefs provide invaluable assistance in breaking down the core analysis and its implications.
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal. It set aside the order for the confiscation of the gold, holding that it was not a just or appropriate order in the context of the case. While not overturning the conviction itself, the Court directed that the seized gold be restored to the appellant, Mr. Suleman Issa. The judgment firmly established that the power of confiscation under Section 517 CrPC must be exercised judiciously and in proportion to the gravity of the offense committed.
In Suleman Issa v. State of Bombay, the Supreme Court ruled that the confiscation of property worth 3 lakh rupees under Section 517 CrPC was unjustified for a conviction under Section 61-E of the Bombay District Police Act, which only carried a maximum fine of Rs. 100. The Court held that the power to confiscate is discretionary and must not be exercised in a manner that is harsh, unreasonable, or disproportionate to the offense.
Disclaimer: This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For any legal issues, it is recommended to consult with a qualified legal professional.
Legal Notes
Add a Note....